


The Issues Shaping Asian Security



SDA Roundtable

28 April 2006, Brussels
Rapporteur: John Chapman

SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA

Bibliothèque Solvay, Parc Léopold,
137 rue Belliard, B-1040, Brussels, Belgium
Telephone: +32 (0)2 737 91 48 Fax: +32 (0)2 736 32 16
E-mail: info@securitydefenceagenda.org Website: www.securitydefenceagenda.org

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PROGRAMME OF THE DAY

SDA Monthly Roundtable, Bibliothèque Solvay, April 28, 2006, 12:00-16:00

THE ISSUES SHAPING ASIAN SECURITY

WHAT'S AT STAKE?

Session I
12:00-13:30

Developments in Asia's security environment are changing with China and India taking the lead. This has implications for diplomatic relations across the globe, yet a handful of topics are the shared concern of the major players on the international security scene: WMD proliferation, antiterrorism cooperation, the development of emerging technologies and energy security. Is a coherent concept of Asian regional security becoming clearer? What consequences has the 'war on terror' had within the region and what are the underlying issues to be addressed? How are apprehensions over energy supplies affecting relations with key oil and gas producing regions and could the growing focus on energy security undermine the future of multilateralism across Asia?

- **H.E. Saeed Khalid**, Ambassador, Mission of Pakistan to the EU
- **H.E. Jaebum Kim**, Ambassador-at-Large, Seoul
- **Ashok Sajjanhar**, Deputy Chief of Mission, Mission of India to the EU
- **H.E. Humayun Tandar**, Ambassador, Mission of Afghanistan to the EU
- **Ruan Zongze**, Deputy Chief of the China Institute for International Studies, Beijing

SDA Members' Lunch:
13:30-14:30

GETTING DOWN TO DETAIL: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR POWERS OUTSIDE THE REGION?

Session II
14:30-16:00

With many security issues now on the table, the EU, US and Russia find themselves looking towards Asia. Nuclear policies, disaster management, arms sales, dual-use technologies and terrorist attacks in the region form a circle of geopolitical interest. How can each player more effectively communicate nuclear proliferation policies in the region? Should Europe share or contest the US view that China's growing economic might must not be developed into military power? What are Russia's main priorities in the region? Do the major global players yet fully understand the complexities of the region's security challenges?

Opening Address: **Glyn Davies**, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US State Department

- **Henriette Geiger**, Political Desk Officer for China, European Commission DG External Relations
- **Hervé Ladsous**, Director for Asia and Oceania, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **Victor Seleznev**, Deputy Director, Department of ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Regional Affairs, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- **Antonio Tanca**, Co-ordinator of the Asia Team, Council of the European Union

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - SLICING UP THE ASIAN CAKE

By focusing on Asian security, the SDA reflected the region's growing importance. Speakers from Pakistan, South Korea, India, Afghanistan and China described an area that was teeming with major issues – nuclear proliferation, poverty, human rights, democracy, terrorism, health concerns, energy consumption, etc. It was similar to other parts of the globe, except that in Asia's case, the issues were all major and coming to the boil at the same time.

This made for an invigorating and enlightening discussion, but in only three hours, it was asking a lot to resolve any of the issues on the table. All issues could impact security but the actual effect was impossible to define. At one stage, SDA Director **Giles Merritt** asked if the topic (Asian Security) was too large and whether it would be better to slice it up into manageable chunks. That was undoubtedly true but it was necessary to first see the big picture before deciding on the number and size of the respective portions.

As it was, China received the most attention. On the issue of democracy, the China Institute for International Studies' **Ruan Zongze** argued that China was not opposed to the philosophy but that in a diversified world, different formats of political systems could exist. The Commission's **Henriette Geiger** gave an EU perspective, saying that China would remain inward-looking and that growing social imbalances if not properly addressed could have serious security implications. The Council of the EU's **Antonio Tanca** stated that the EU would not be taken seriously if it didn't get its act together.

The Chinese focus was understandable but Zongze wanted it put on record that China could not be held responsible for all of Asia's security considerations. He argued that terrorism was less a threat than poverty and in that sense, China's economic expansion was essential. Zongze was also concerned that his country was surrounded by nuclear powers and the potential devastating impact on China's environment.

India's EU Deputy Chief of Mission **Ashok Sajjanhar** wanted a stronger and more relevant UN as well as a successful Doha Round. Pakistan's Ambassador to the EU, H.E. **Saeed Khalid** offered his country's assistance in the nuclear dispute with Iran and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' **Victor Seleznev** wanted a cooperative security system for the whole region with equal rights for all participants.

Adding a US perspective, the US State Department's **Glyn Davies** agreed that the region's focus was more on increasing economic prosperity than on fighting terrorism, and he welcomed the EU's increased interest in Asia. But what would that interest lead to? Tanca said a strategic vision was needed, and Geiger wanted "a more coherent CFSP". The intention was for the EU to increasingly speak with one voice on Asia. Issues such as Kashmir, the Taiwan Straits dispute and the EU's arms embargo on China were all raised but with a divergent set of views.

Ambassador Khalid had a warning. While welcoming the EU's offer to lend its experience to the region, he wanted hard issues to be resolved. To that end, the Ambassador had been disappointed to see that South Asia had not featured in the EU presentations. Zongze also wanted "substance" from the EU. There were many pieces to this particular cake and it was down to the EU to decide on its approach – it just had to be a meaningful one.

DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

SESSION 1 HIGHLIGHTS

- Ambassador Saeed Khalid foresaw a modern *Silk Route* that was not only used for trade, but also for gas pipelines and energy links. He further mentioned the possibility of pipelines from China, over the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas, all the way down to the Arabian Sea at the newly-built Pakistani port of Gwadar.
- Ambassador Jaebum Kim mentioned that all parties in the Six-Party Talks had their own objectives and that their interests and policies had never been identical. This absence of joint objectives was said to be a major obstacle to success in the talks.
- Ashok Sajjanhar stated that India considered nuclear weapons as a “threat to humanity”, and although India would keep a minimum nuclear deterrent, it would avoid first use and not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. He also saw the promotion of democracy as the best way of ensuring democracy.
- Ambassador Humayun Tandar described Asia as the region with the most natural resources as well as the greatest number of military conflicts.
- Despite describing a positive picture of Asian security, Ruan Zongze warned of challenges facing Asia: North Korea was refusing to return to negotiations unless the US complied with its demands. Zongze believed that a quick return to the table (if achievable) would be the best way forward. China was concerned by the situation in North Korea, as it understood that security depended on having a stable environment. Ruan Zongze reiterated China’s concern that it was encircled by nuclear powers, adding that China wanted de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and no new nuclear powers to be created. Additional problems included avian flu, energy security, drug trafficking and tsunamis.

SESSION 2 HIGHLIGHTS

- Glyn Davies saw many problems, but focused on four of them: 1) *North Korea*: a threat to the stability of the Korean peninsula and to much of North Asia; a danger of nuclear proliferation and a challenge for the UN 2) *Terrorism*: a growing challenge across the region even though East Asia had rejected extreme forms of Islam and saw the need for cooperation 3) *Taiwan*: where US policy remained unchanged 4) *Burma*: a “pernicious” problem given the ruling government’s treatment of its people, a seeming desire to alienate its neighbours and its overall isolationist policies. US policy was to demand the release of political prisoners and continue dialogue with opposition parties.
- Hervé Ladsous argued that it did not make sense to say that a strategic relationship (EU-China) was desired, while keeping China in the same category as Burma and Zimbabwe, and that the arms embargo on China should be lifted, as it was not so much about weapons or military technology, but about recognising China as major global player in the 21st century. Glyn Davies disagreed, stating that the arms embargo was indeed highly symbolic and for that reason it should remain in place.
- Victor Seleznev explained that Russia would address security issues in the region in two ways: a) by strengthening bilateral arrangements with Asian countries, and b) by enhancing Russia’s participation in promising regional organisations. Russia’s main fears included trans-national threats (such as international terrorism), unsettled border disputes and inter-ethnic problems due to intolerance. Seleznev argued that the next step for the Asia-Pacific region was to develop a multilateral comprehensive security system – with

equal rights for all participants.

- Antonio Tanca emphasised the existence of a divergence of values (values gap) between the West and Asia, especially China, and that this would determine the extent of any future cooperation. If the EU was to be serious about East Asia, it had to set goals that would assist in improving stability. These could include: a) the preservation of peace and security, and b) the promotion of a rules-based international system (regional integration, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights).
- Henriette Geiger listed several key issues that impacted Asian security: *Energy security*: a “hot” issue where global awareness was forming, with China and India at the forefront. China and India had to be accommodated rather than contained, and everyone “had to play by the rules”. *Tensions in East Asia*: not yet at threatening levels but the North Korea situation, cross-straits relations and Sino-Japan relations had to be watched carefully. The emotional content of these disputes could lead to an “accidental escalation” that could have global implications. *Emerging regional structures*: Developments such as the East Asia Summit were seen as positive, but the future direction of such structures was not totally clear. However, it was certain that these new regional structures would have security implications and an impact on the balance of power in the region.
- William Heng-Sheng Chuang insisted that Taiwan was a democracy and warned that any cross-straits incident could have a global impact; he also wanted the issue of the arms embargo to be seen in the context of Taiwan’s wish to keep prosperity and stability in the area.

SESSION I: WHAT'S AT STAKE?

Opening the latest roundtable discussions, SDA Director **Giles Merritt** stated that “Asian security” had been treated as something of a backwater in the global security debate. However, given the region’s dramatic changes, it was now a major element in everyone’s thinking.




Map 1 - Asia

With a scope that covered Iran, nuclear proliferation, the India-Pakistan relationship, Afghanistan, the future of China, NATO’s role in Asia and the US’s place in a new form of multilateralism, there was nothing left to do but listen to the assembled experts.

PAKISTAN

H.E. Saeed Khalid, Ambassador, Mission of Pakistan to the EU



H.E. Saeed Khalid,
Ambassador, Mission of Pakistan to the EU

Given the agenda’s “huge spectrum”, Ambassador **Saeed Khalid**, felt it necessary to situate his

country’s position in the various regional organisations. Pride of place went to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)¹. Ambassador Khalid stressed its importance, especially with the arrival of China and Japan as observers and with the EU planning to request that status.

With one foot in South Asia and the other in Central Asia, Ambassador Khalid explained that Pakistan was also a founding member of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)². This was dissolved in 1985 and replaced by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which now had 10 members, including the founding members and Afghanistan.



Map 2 – South Asia

Describing the achievements of SAARC and ECO as modest in comparison to those of organisations such as the EU, the Ambassador explained they were associations with rather limited objectives – generating trade, improving communications, etc. Stressing the importance in Pakistan of cooperation between the Asian countries on energy, Ambassador Khalid foresaw a modern *Silk Route* that was not only used for trade, but also for gas pipelines and energy links. He further mentioned the possibility of pipelines from China, over the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, all the way down to the Arabian Sea at the newly-built Pakistani port of Gwadar³.

¹ SAARC is an association of eight countries of South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and most recently admitted, Afghanistan. These countries comprise an area of 5,127,500 km² and a fifth of the world’s population. (Wikipedia).

² The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was a multi-governmental organization which was originally established in 1962 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to allow socio-economic development of its member states.

³ The cost of the Gwadar project is estimated at US\$1.16 billion, of which China has contributed about \$198 million for the first phase - almost four times the amount provided by Pakistan - which includes construction of three multi-purpose ship berths. China has invested another \$200 million toward building a highway connecting the Gwadar port with Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, also a port on the Arabian Sea. (*Asia Times*, 4/3/05).


“The Pakistan-India dialogue has helped but it has not solved the hard issues.”

H.E. Saeed Khalid

The Ambassador added that Pakistan had signed on as an observer of the Energy Charter and desired its neighbours to do likewise so as to improve the overall framework for energy links. Furthermore, the latest round of expert-level Pakistan-India confidence-building discussions had recently taken place on nuclear issues, including the Indo-US deal. He closed with a mention that Pakistan's future prosperity was linked to the existence of a stable Afghanistan.

SOUTH KOREA

H.E. Jaebum Kim, Ambassador-at-Large, Seoul



H.E. Jaebum Kim, Ambassador-at-Large, Seoul

Speaking in a personal capacity, Ambassador-at-Large **Jaebum Kim** focussed on a “hot global topic” - energy security. In regard to the situation in Korea, Ambassador Jaebum Kim drew on his intimate knowledge of the Korean Peninsular Development Organisation (KEDO⁴), which was responsible for building light-water reactors (LWRs) in North Korea. This unfinished project was terminated in January 2006.

The Six-Party Talks⁵ were the starting point for Ambassador Kim. These had broken down,

⁴ KEDO was founded in March 1995 by the US, South Korea and Japan to implement the 1994 Agreed Framework that froze North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant development centred at Yongbyon.

⁵ Six-Party Talks is the name given to meetings of China, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan and the US, held to resolve the crisis over the North Korean Nuclear weapons programme.

according to the Ambassador, due to “a difference in interpretation of the agreement reached in the talks”. The objectives of the talks included:

1. Denuclearisation the Korean peninsular
2. Normalisation of relations between North and South Korea, the US and Japan
3. Development of economic incentives for North Korea (including the removal of sanctions)
4. Achieving permanent peace on the Korean peninsular

After describing the breakdown of the talks in some detail, Ambassador Jaebum Kim gave his opinion on the roles of the various parties (excluding the US): North Korea was using the talks as a forum for bilateral talks with the US, China and South Korea were acting as facilitators, while Russia and Japan were cast as observers. He added that all five had their own objectives and that their interests and policies had never been identical.

“In the Six-Party Talks, all parties have their own objectives.”

H.E. Jaebum Kim

This absence of joint objectives was said to be a major obstacle to success in the Six-Party Talks. Ambassador Jaebum Kim referred to suggestions for the creation of a permanent organisation – the Northeast Asia Regional Forum (NERF⁶) – to address common issues, such as energy security.



Map 3 – South Korea

⁶ Choi, Kawaguchi and Bremmer have recommended the creation of the NERF, to include five permanent members - Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and the US. It would consist of "multilateral diplomatic meetings at regular intervals, in which key energy, security and economic questions could be considered."


Providing a US perspective, Ambassador Jaebum Kim said China was seen to be holding the keys to a solution, due to its increasing influence on North Korea. He reasoned that the issue was receiving less attention in the US, due to President Bush addressing other priorities during his second term. In addition, the Ambassador could see little hope for a settlement, given North Korea's habit of simply replacing its demands by new ones, once initial demands were met.

Note: Due to time pressures, Ambassador Jaebum Kim did not complete his remarks. In a paper submitted to the SDA, the Ambassador made the following recommendations / comments:

1. North Korea seemed to be intent on waiting for a change of administration in the US
2. North Korea should be offered completion of the LWRs and the supply of electricity generated from them and distributed through KEDO's power grid.
3. KEDO should become a permanent structure, with the assistance of the EU (and France and the UK in particular, due to their membership of the P5)
4. It would be unlikely that the US (Bush Administration) would support this proposal

INDIA

Ashok Sajjanhar, Deputy Chief of Mission, Mission of India to the EU



Ashok Sajjanhar, Deputy Chief of Mission, Mission of India to the EU

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) **Ashok Sajjanhar** opened his remarks by arguing that security should not be seen simply as the absence of armed conflict, but rather as a broader concept that encompassed both military and human security. The latter was linked to the eradication of poverty, seen as “the most formidable challenge facing India”. The Ambassador described an India whose economy was growing at an average of 6.5% per year over

the past decade, and which hoped to see double-digit rates of growth in the coming years.

Turning to energy, DCM Sajjanhar added that 70% of India's supplies were imported. To meet energy needs, India was active in the areas of renewable energy, carbon sequestration and capture, and nuclear power. He described the current Indo-US nuclear deal as the most affordable and environmentally-friendly way of meeting India's growing energy requirements.

DCM Sajjanhar also called for an international response to the global security challenges (e.g. terrorism, WMD, drug trafficking, HIV-AIDS, avian flu and environmental protection). He also saw the promotion of democracy as the best way of ensuring security. India was working with its neighbours and other countries in keeping its uncompromising position firmly based on “zero tolerance for terrorist actions”. On the issue of nuclear weapons, he stated that India considered them as a “threat to humanity”. Although India would keep a minimum nuclear deterrent, it would avoid first use and would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country.

“We need a stronger and more relevant UN that reflects today's world”

Ashok Sajjanhar

Stressing the need to cooperate with its neighbours and other countries, Ambassador Sajjanhar called for a stronger and more relevant UN, one that reflected today's geopolitical realities. He also noted India's presence in many associations, including SAARC, ARF, Indian-ASEAN Summit, BIMSTEC, East Asia Summit, etc. and described India's vision – to bring South Asian countries together in pursuit of peace and prosperity, so that the region could emerge as a powerhouse of economic growth and enterprise.

AFGHANISTAN

H.E. Humayn Tandar, Ambassador,
Mission of Afghanistan to the EU



H.E. Humayn Tandar, Ambassador,
Mission of Afghanistan to the EU



Map 4 - Afghanistan

After describing Asia as the region with the most natural resources and the greatest number of military conflicts, Ambassador **Humayn Tandar**, argued that “new mechanisms” were necessary to combat terrorism and threats to energy security. The Ambassador explained that steps had already been taken to ensure secure energy supplies, with negotiations being held between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Pakistan. Recently, the Asian Development Bank had also been brought into the process.

“Terrorism is a common enemy so we need a high level of cooperation”

H.E. Humayn Tandar

Ambassador Tandar looked for increased cooperation between Afghanistan and both China and India, the latter being seen as a major energy consumer and customer for Afghanistan’s gas supplies. He also wanted to move towards technology transfer as another example of increased collaboration. The strategic objective was seen to be greater confidence and stability, thereby reducing tension and poverty in the region. The Ambassador also put his country’s weight behind regional organisations such as SAARC, ECO and ASEAN.

China

Ruan Zongze, Deputy Chief of the China
Institute for International Studies, Beijing



Ruan Zongze, Deputy Chief of the China Institute for
International Studies, Beijing

After giving an overall assessment of the Asian security situation, **Ruan Zongze** outlined the challenges facing the region and offered his opinion as to what could be done.

Initially, Zongze opined that the region was stable, although potential disputes still existed. Part of this stability could be put down to a booming economy and growing cooperation in the face of the devastation caused by the recent Tsunami and Pakistan earthquake. In addition, a sense of collaboration was being assisted by China’s participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),

the Six-Party Talks and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)⁷.

Despite this positive picture, Zongze warned of challenges facing Asia:

- *Nuclear problems on the Korean peninsula:* This was a priority topic for the Six-Party Talks, but North Korea was refusing to return to negotiations unless the US complied with its demands. Zongze believed that a quick return to the table (if achievable) would be the best way forward. China was concerned by the situation in North Korea, as it understood that security depended on having a stable environment.
- *Historical issues:* Zongze argued that Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine⁸ were undermining trust in the region.
- *New security threats:* These included avian flu, energy security, drug trafficking and tsunamis.

“China is not responsible for the whole of Asian security.”

Ruan Zongze

As for the best approach to be taken, Zongze saw multilateralism and “new security thinking” as the keys to bringing mutual trust, equality and cooperation to the region. He added that China was committed to facilitating “peaceful development” in regard to regional security, emphasising that China had opened up its borders in order to lift 250 million people out of poverty. Zongze also commented that China's strategy was to establish free trade areas (FTAs) with ASEAN⁹, Australia and others.

⁷ The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a regional security organization founded in Shanghai by the governments of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Mongolia is currently an observer member.

⁸ The Yasukuni Shrine (literally “peaceful nation shrine”) is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, dedicated to the spirits of soldiers who died fighting on behalf of the Japanese emperor. However, according to some observers, China, North and South Korea and Taiwan see the shrine as a symbol of Japanese militarism and right-wing nationalism.

⁹ The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 in Bangkok by the five original Member Countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Burma (Myanmar) in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. The ASEAN region has a population of about 500 million.


SESSION I : Q&A

NATO'S ROLE IN THE REGION

Defense News's **Brooks Tigner** asked for Pakistan's opinion on NATO being in the region. **Ambassador Khalid** said it was complicated as the region was dealing with the after-shocks of a tectonic shift (due to the presence of both the USSR and the US in Afghanistan). The Alliance had asked for help from many countries including Pakistan (to assist in creating supply routes into Afghanistan). In the longer term, Ambassador Khalid wanted Afghanistan to develop its own security forces to take over NATO's responsibilities. **Ambassador Tandar** put the emphasis on the need to defeat terrorism and fascism so that Afghanistan was no longer threatened by these matters.

Following up, Jane's Defence Weekly's **Nicholas Fiorenza** wanted to know more about NATO's request to use Pakistan for supply routes into Afghanistan. Ambassador Khalid said negotiations were continuing as the Alliance was putting a strong emphasis on the need for these routes.

NATO IN AFGHANISTAN – A TIMETABLE?



Willem van der Geest, Director, European Institute for Asian Studies (IEAS)

The IEAS's **Willem van der Geest** was interested in any existing timetable or roadmap for NATO's presence in Afghanistan. Ambassador Tandar argued that the political objective was to bring all forces under democratic control. Although Afghanistan was making good progress in terms of having sufficient police and armed forces (60,000 and 25,000 respectively), there was a need for more equipment. This was a problem given the current budgetary constraints.

WHAT INFLUENCE COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON IRAN?

Tigner also wanted to know if, and how, both Pakistan and India could influence matters in Iran. For Pakistan, Ambassador Khalid said there had been regular contacts with Iran (some at the highest level). Iran had been (strongly) informed that it should fulfil its obligations and Pakistan had suggested to the US and the EU that a peaceful solution must be found to avoid instability in the region.

DCM **Ashok Sajjanhar** stressed the traditional and historical links between Iran and India. He also noted that Iran was a major supplier of India's energy. However, India was against nuclear proliferation and the presence of more nuclear powers in the neighbourhood. As Iran was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India had informed Iran that it should meet its international obligations and commitments. Sajjanhar added that India favoured a resolution through dialogue rather than by armed conflict. Later in the debate, **Ruan Zongze** added that China was working with Iran on this issue.

PAKISTAN, INDIA AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Japanese Media Representative **Nagayo Taniguchi** was keen to know if Pakistan and India were considering a "zero-option" deal whereby medium-range nuclear weapons would be eliminated, and, if not, why not. As a follow-up question, he asked for a definition of nuclear disarmament, in the Asian context, from the representatives of both countries.


Ambassador Khalid said talks were ongoing on many levels and that he hoped for progress. The Ambassador wanted to avoid (the possibility of) accidents and agreed that disarmament talks could well be an issue that might be addressed in the future.

On behalf of India, DCM Sajjanhar said that discussions were ongoing in order to build confidence and lessen the chance of accidents. He explained that India stood for "global nuclear disarmament on a verifiable basis".

TAIWAN AND CROSS-STRAITS RELATIONS

The Japanese Mission to the EU's **Osamu Hayakawa** commented that Zongze had not mentioned several security challenges in the region. The first of these was the issue of Taiwanese cross-strait relations, which were a source of potential tension and conflict.

Responding, Zongze said he regarded Taiwan as a strictly internal Chinese matter. However, he argued that China had facilitated closer economic ties with Taiwan in order to foster peace. He insisted there was no intention to change the status quo and that if the rest of the world cared about peace and stability it should be looking at restricting the “Taiwan Independence” force. Zongze emphasised that this force wanted to unilaterally change the current situation, as advocated by Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian.



Map 5 – China and Taiwan

CHINA – A CALL FOR MORE TRANSPARENCY

Hayakawa also argued that there was a lack of transparency in China’s defence budget, and that Japan’s concerns in this area were shared by both the US and the EU.

On this specific issue, Zongze said that China had produced several defence white papers, including ones on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. On the broader issue of transparency, he stated that China was committed to peaceful development and was intent on improving relations with its neighbours. Border disputes had been settled with Russia and progress was being made on similar disputes with India. Zongze added that these examples showed China was serious about improving its dialogue with the rest of the world.

THE PAKISTAN EARTHQUAKE

Fiorenza asked what had prompted Pakistan to ask for aid from NATO following the recent earthquake. Stating that the resulting needs had been way beyond Pakistan’s capacity to react, Ambassador Khalid explained it had launched an international appeal. Shortly before that, NATO had developed new plans in regard to disaster response. The Alliance had therefore helped in air-lifting goods and supplies (from the UN and other countries) into the affected region.

BURMA (MYANMAR) AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Hayakawa commented that human rights were an important factor in guaranteeing stability, and that Japan wanted to see China playing a greater role in Burma as that country was still a source of tension in South-East Asia.

Zongze was convinced that engagement was the best way for China to have any influence in Burma. Isolation was not recommended. On a more general point, Zongze stated that China had recently enshrined human rights within its own constitution.

JAPAN – CHINA RELATIONS

Hayakawa also supported Japan Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, adding that Japan was willing to conduct dialogues with China at the ministerial level. He added that Japan’s role had been positive as it was keen to promote security and build confidence through participation in the ARF and the East Asia Summit.

DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Given comments from the panel that the promotion of democracy was an important factor in improving security, **Peter Lennon** asked if China agreed and what that country was doing in order to further the spread of democracy.

Zongze saw a diversified world, one that could accommodate different formats of democracy and various ideologies. He argued that China was tolerant towards different civilisations and that the main thrust for China’s system was to work for the interests of its own people as well as for those of the region. Zongze added that China was not opposed to democracy, that the recent economic prosperity had generated many types of freedom and the “tremendous transformation” had brought more good things than bad, even among political systems.


ANY HOPEFUL SIGNS IN KOREA?

The EIAS’s van der Geest had heard Ambassador Kim discuss the possibility of a Northeast Asia Regional Forum (NERF) and asked if there were signs of success in the Six-Party Talks so that such a forum could emerge. Ambassador Kim confirmed that he was personally not in favour of the creation of the NERF and referred the panel to his paper presented to the SDA.

Zongze reiterated China’s concern that it was encircled by nuclear powers, adding that China wanted de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and no new nuclear powers to be created.

WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BE DOING?

Given that Asia had the greatest number of declared and undeclared nuclear powers, as well as many of the world's riches and problems, *European Voice's* **Ilana Bet-El** asked the panellists what they thought the international community should be doing to help the situation.



Ilana Bet-El, Op-Ed Editor, European Voice

Ambassador Tandar wanted the international community to do its utmost to meet the objectives of the Millennium Goals. DCM Sajjanhar thought responses could be both regional and global, and outlined India's own efforts in the region. Among the initiatives covered, Sajjanhar mentioned:

- Non-reciprocal arrangements on goods and services with Nepal and Bhutan
- Successful bilateral free trade links with Sri-Lanka
- The South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), which was helping bring prosperity and peace to all countries of the region
- Bilateral trade agreements with China, estimated at \$18 billion (annually) which placed China in second place in terms of India's bilateral trading partners

Sajjanhar added that India's main thrust was to promote the free flow of goods, services, ideas and people. This would increase prosperity and enhance security in the region. As for international efforts, he looked forward to a successful conclusion to the Doha Round of Talks.

SESSION 2: WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR POWERS OUTSIDE THE REGION?

Moderating an afternoon session that focused on the role of non-Asian powers, the SDA's **Giles Merritt** mused that it might be better (in future) to address the topic of Asian security in more manageable chunks, i.e. India-Pakistan, Islamic fundamentalism (from Iran to Indonesia), the Japan-China-Russia triangle, etc. But before discussing future events, he wanted to know how non-Asian players saw the current situation and how they planned to get involved.

THE US POSITION IN EAST ASIA

Glyn Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US State Department



Glyn Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US State Department

Glyn Davies opened the second session. He described a region (East Asia) that was peaceful, prosperous and less concerned about terrorism than it was about increasing such prosperity. Democracy was expanding – Indonesia being a good example – with “free and fair elections”. Countries were working multilaterally, and a pan-Asian impulse could be seen.

Davies supported EU involvement in the region and welcomed examples of multilateral cooperation, such as the signing of the Aceh Agreement (talks chaired by then Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari) and the efforts to support its compliance. However, there was no coherent approach to the region, as an “alphabet soup” of multilateral institutional organisations existed, with some measure of overlap.

The main areas of concern

Davies saw many problems but he focused on four of them:

- a) *North Korea*: a threat to the stability of the Korean peninsula and to much of North Asia; a danger of nuclear proliferation and a challenge for the UN
- b) *Terrorism*: a growing challenge across the region even though East Asia had rejected extreme forms of Islam and the need for cooperation had been accepted
- c) *Taiwan*: where the US policy remained unchanged¹⁰
- d) *Burma*: a “pernicious” problem given the ruling government’s treatment of its people, the seeming desire to alienate its neighbours and its overall isolationist policies. US policy was to demand the release of political prisoners and continue dialogue with opposition parties.

“Many more” challenges existed, and the US wanted to work with its partners and treaty allies. Davies gave a special mention to the US-Japan relationship, which was now a full-fledged partnership (examples included Japan’s deployment of troops in Iraq and the recent reconstruction work in Afghanistan). He also described the US-Australia relationship (especially in the areas of defence and intelligence) as being in the best shape that it had ever been, adding that good relations also existed with South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore.

Multilateral agreements

Davies emphasised the US role in multilateral organisations such as ASEAN, ASEAN RF and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC¹¹). He particularly mentioned the role of APEC in promoting economic growth and in combating other types of threats such as Avian flu.

US-China relations

Acknowledging that China was vital to the region for a host of reasons, Davies used the recent visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Washington to show the breadth and depth of US-China relations. Describing the visit as a “success”, Davies outlined the scope of the talks:

¹⁰ In keeping with its one-China policy, while the US does not support Taiwan independence, it does support Taiwan’s membership in appropriate international organizations, such as the WTO, APEC forum, and the Asian Development Bank, where statehood is not a requirement for membership. (US State Department’s website www.state.gov)

¹¹ APEC is a group of Pacific Rim countries who meet to improve economic and political ties.

- Long-term structural reform: from an export-led economy to a consumer-driven one, with the correction of trade imbalances; expansion of market access; review of artificial exchange rates; and strengthened IPR protection
- Iran: China agreed that it should meet its nuclear obligations, with denuclearisation being the goal
- North Korea: the two countries reaffirmed their strategic goal of denuclearising North Korea and agreed that Chinese action to bring North Korea back to the Six Party talks to give up its weapons programmes
- Avian Flu: bilateral cooperation would be expanded
- President Hu accepted President Bush's offer of a visit to China by the NASA Administrator this fall to open a dialogue on potential cooperation on lunar exploration
- The two countries agreed to expand military-to-military exchanges and begin a strategic nuclear dialogue between STRATCOM and the Chinese strategic missile command.

“China has taken a big step to becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international system.”

Glyn Davies

In conclusion, Davies said China had taken a big step to becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international system.

FRANCE'S VIEW

Hervé Ladsous, Director for Asia and Oceania, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Hervé Ladsous, Director for Asia and Oceania, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Hervé Ladsous, said the morning's talks had confirmed Asia faced both global and regional

threats. In addition, there were complicated relationships between neighbours and domestic situations that could escalate. Ladsous reminded the audience that the current problems in North Korea showed that there were still lingering reminders of the Cold War.

“In regard to the North Korean situation, unlike in 1994, Europe needs to be part of the political process.”

Hervé Ladsous

Turning to what could be done, vis-à-vis current problems, Ladsous looked at four potential avenues:

1. *Security architecture*: A comprehensive security architecture had to developed, as a “glaring gap” existed. Although this was currently being addressed by the ARF and a “proliferation of other bodies”, no comprehensive architecture had emerged. Ladsous insisted that while the Asian countries themselves had to resolve the issues, the international community could help.
2. *France's role*: Ladsous emphasised France's permanent membership of the UN Security Council – it had experience in resolving disputes and had developed its relationship with Germany (after two world wars) so that it was now one of the driving forces of the European project. This experience could be helpful in Asia, perhaps in the contexts of the China-Japan and India-Pakistan relationships.
3. *Supporting multilateral agreements*: Europe had a wealth of experience which might be applicable. Ladsous' message was that Europe was available – for help in both concepts and deeds.
4. *Institutional building*: Ladsous said Europe could support institutional building, as in the support of ASEAN (“the core of the process”). He added that France expected to sign a treaty with ASEAN following meetings in Bali in April. This would make France the first European member of the organisation.

Ladsous also addressed problems on the North Korean peninsula, where he warned that there should be no repeat of the 1994 situation. At that time, according to Ladsous, the EU had been asked to sign a cheque and contribute funds. Now Europe had to be part of the political process.

In conclusion, Ladsous said he saw Japan, India and China as France's (and the EU's) strategic partners. With particular regard to China, which was

expected to contribute to the development of world order, Ladsous argued that the arms embargo should be lifted as it was not so much about weapons or military technology, but about recognising China as a major global player in the 21st century. The dialogue had to be strengthened.

A VIEW FROM RUSSIA

Victor Seleznev, Deputy Director, Department of ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Regional Affairs, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Victor Seleznev, Deputy Director, Department of ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Regional Affairs, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Having heard his fellow panellists, **Victor Seleznev** felt that everyone was agreed that events in the Asia-Pacific region would have a deep global impact. Russia wanted to uphold peace and security in the region in order to avoid adverse impacts on the economic-social development of Russian Siberian forest areas.



Map 6 – Siberia

Seleznev explained that Russia would address security issues in the region in two ways:

- By strengthening bilateral arrangements with Asian countries
- By enhancing Russia's participation in promising regional organisations.

In terms of the current security situation in the Asia-Pacific, Seleznev agreed with other speakers that it remained stable. Any crises that had arisen had been controlled, though not necessarily resolved, by the states themselves. As seen by Russia, the main fears were: trans-national threats (such as international terrorism), unsettled border disputes and inter-ethnic problems due to intolerance. Seleznev agreed that the threat of international terrorism was spreading throughout the Asia-Pacific.

“Energy is a worldwide problem, Russia will not undermine its relationship with Europe.”

Victor Seleznev

Other negative developments included: the proliferation of WMDs, illegal arms trade, piracy, illegal immigration, corruption, cyber crime, national catastrophes and pandemics. Seleznev stated that Russia welcomed multilateral cooperation against terrorism, as this was the only way forward. Efforts had to include the fight against the financing of terrorism. Seleznev also highlighted the need to cultivate tolerance.

Concluding a wide-ranging and comprehensive speech, Seleznev also listed several areas where Russia was active. These included:

- The fight against drug trafficking and the illegal trade of arms
- Participation in international partnerships, including the Russia-US Pacific partnership
- Partnerships with, for example, ASEAN, ARF and APEC
- Cooperation with India and China
- Encouraging the fight against poverty which could lead to frustration and the spread of terrorism

Overall, Seleznev argued that the next step for the Asia-Pacific region was to develop a multilateral comprehensive security system – with equal rights for all participants. It was part of Russia's foreign policy to encourage stronger links between Asia-Pacific states in order to produce lasting stability in the region.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EU'S OPINION

Antonio Tanca, Co-ordinator of the Asia Team, Council of the European Union



Antonio Tanca, Co-ordinator of the Asia Team, Council of the European Union

Antonio Tanca focussed on cooperation between the EU and Asia to fight global challenges such as energy security, health hazards (avian flu, etc.), terrorism and non-proliferation. Tanca emphasised the existence of a divergence of values (values gap) between the West and Asia, especially China, and that this would determine the extent of any future cooperation. He argued that how China saw its future and whether it would see itself as a rival to the West depended on the way in which it was treated (by the West).

Tanca warned however that an over-emphasis on this values gap would blunt the EU's efforts. He explained that the EU was developing a strategic vision in the areas of democracy, stability, non-proliferation and counter-terrorism for the region. The application of the EU's broad approach to security in the region would help it to achieve stability.

Tanca also stated that the rise of Asian powers such as China, India and Indonesia made it vital for the international community to develop harmonious relationships. He argued that, until recently, the EU had not made a serious effort in East Asia. The EU's CFSP was a relatively recent phenomena and the EU had had other immediate priorities. If the EU was to be serious, it had to set goals that would assist in improving stability. These could include:

- The preservation of peace and security
- The promotion of a rules-based international system (regional integration, democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights)

- The promotion of policies to meet global challenges (e.g. energy, environment, health)

Progress could not be made without the support of all the nations in the neighbourhood. Tanca again focussed on China and its policy choices, saying that if China achieved its goals it would be a major contributor to world stability. Touching on the US, Tanca said that the EU and US should build shared assessments of the challenges they faced in order to maximise cooperation. In terms of what the EU could actually do, Tanca felt this was uncertain. However, he argued that if the EU did not get its act together, there was a risk that it would not be taken seriously. The economic presence of the EU Member States in the region could be used as a tool for cooperation, as could its experience in post-war reconciliation, and political and economic integration.

On China, Tanca said the EU wanted it to emerge as a successful and responsible member of the international community. Cooperation would be increased in all fields mentioned previously, together with the monitoring of China's internal developments in case China needed help dealing with potential downsides of its economic growth.

On North Korea, Tanca said the EU fully supported the Six-Party Talks and wanted to be involved when the timing was right. Finally, on the issue of the Taiwan Straits, Tanca reiterated the EU's One-China policy. However, initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue and confidence-building measures across the straits were welcome.

“If the EU does not get its act together (in the region) it will not be taken seriously.”

Antonio Tanca

Tanca added that the EU could bring its experience to bear on existing and rising tensions (i.e. the rise of competitive nationalism). The EU's current focus was on East Asia but this could be expanded, and close cooperation was needed with China, Japan and the US.

THE COMMISSION'S POSITION

Henriette Geiger, Political Desk Officer for China, European Commission DG External Relations



Henriette Geiger, Political Desk Officer for China, European Commission DG External Relations

Henriette Geiger also focused on East Asia, where the EU's interest had grown tremendously in recent years. It now went far beyond economic interests, although East Asia accounted for 26% of all external EU trade¹², as there was a new focus on the political aspects of cooperation. It was now obvious that Asia was critical to the EU's growth prospects and a more coherent CFSP was necessary.

“The EU is increasingly trying to speak with one authentic voice on East Asia and China.”

Henriette Geiger

Moving on to key issues that impacted Asian security, Geiger listed:

- *Energy security*: a “hot” issue where global awareness was forming. China and India would be major consumers of energy and the Commission was in the process of engaging with all countries across the region. The next EU-China Summit would probably have an energy focus. China and India had to be accommodated rather than contained, and everyone “had to play by the rules”.
- *The tensions in East Asia*: not yet at threatening levels but the North Korea situation, cross-straits relations and Sino-Japan relations had to be watched carefully. The emotional content of these disputes could lead to an “accidental escalation” that could have global implications. Furthermore, rising competitive nationalism in China and

Japan could be sharpened by the increasing energy demands.

- *Emerging regional structures*: Developments such as the East Asia Summit were seen as positive, but the future direction of such structures was not totally clear. However, it was certain that these new regional structures would have security implications and an impact on the balance of power in the region.
- *China*: China was seen as a positive driving force for regional integration. It was a positive development that China now recognised it needed to share the benefits of its rise with its neighbours. Whatever happened, there would be a major impact on the region. Geiger argued that despite China's intense diplomatic efforts, its focus remained inward-looking and that this would be reflected in its foreign policy. Furthermore, growing social imbalances and environmental concerns could pose threats that could have a regional or even global impact if not handled correctly. Another thorny problem was China's military build-up, where the difficulty lay in transparency and how it was being interpreted internationally. In addition, the US and China might become strategic competitors and which could have security and stability implications for the international community.

Geiger said the EU was trying to speak with one authentic voice on Asia, and was looking for common ground with its international partners. This was especially true in the cases of East Asia and China. The EU wanted an “open China” that acted responsibly at home and abroad. China's success had to be “rules-based” and the EU wanted China to move forward (in climate change, non-proliferation, energy, etc.). There was no alternative to the EU forging a strategic partnership with China.

¹² Geiger stated that China was now in 2nd place in the list of the EU's trading partners, behind the US. Japan, ASEAN, South Korea and Taiwan were all in the Top Ten.

SESSION II: Q&A

THE EU'S ARMS EMBARGO ON CHINA

The Japanese EU Mission's **Osamu Hayakawa** disagreed with **Hervé Ladsous's** comments concerning the EU's arms embargo on China. Hayakawa said that the embargo was totally related to arms sales (as were the ones in Zimbabwe and Burma). Furthermore, the Taiwan anti-secession law had been politically insensitive and there had been no demonstration to the international community that arms sales to China would not rise if the embargo was lifted.

Ladsous said China was in the same category as Zimbabwe and Burma, that was the problem! It did not make sense to say that a strategic relationship (EU-China) was desired, while keeping China in such a category. He said arms and military technology sales to China would not increase in quality or quantity, as they would be coupled to a code of conduct (a legally-binding common position of the EU). Ladsous insisted the embargo had political symbolic value. China had made progress from 1989 to 2006, further progress was needed on human rights and bilateral frameworks were in place to achieve this. France had criticised the Taiwan anti-secession law, but it saw the lifting of the embargo as being in the best interests of the world community.

Glyn Davies argued that China had changed since 1989, but he noted that protestors from that era were still in jail. The arms embargo was indeed highly symbolic and for that reason it should remain in place. **Ruan Zongze** said the embargo was a legacy of the Cold War mentality. The EU wanted a strategic partnership but in terms of substance, China was disappointed. The EU had a code of conduct in place so why was an embargo necessary? Furthermore, the Taiwan anti-secession law was a red herring, as China's intention was to keep the status quo across the straits. **Henriette Geiger** commented that the EU had 25 members and that no consensus on the arms embargo had yet been reached.

CHINA'S ROLE IN ASIA

Zongze felt it necessary to insist that China could not be held totally responsible for security issues in Asia. It was willing to accept its responsibilities but China's role should not be exaggerated. The US, EU and many other actors all had a part to play. China would be concentrating on internal matters in the foreseeable future. It would be creating 9 million jobs per year – so there was a lot to do! Remarkable progress was being made, expansion was not the name of the game and China did not intend to humiliate its neighbours.

Ilana Bet-El wanted to know if the US had considered that Chinese behaviour was a result of its economic expansion rather than a sign of its political aspirations. Was the US over-reacting by trying to contain it while continuing to trade? Davies argued that he had meant the opposite, the US was not trying to contain China but rather to engage with it. The US had questions about China's military expenditure but its main thrust was engagement.

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS (THE RISE OF COMPETITIVE NATIONALISM)

Hayakawa had heard speakers say that Sino-Japanese relations were a major source of concern for the EU, but it did not appear to be saying anything or advocating actions in this area. He asked if the speakers were airing personal views or official ones (of the Commission, the Council or those of a French perspective). **Antonio Tanca** added that "competitive nationalism" could make the situation worse – and its rise was not limited to China and Japan. That did not mean that the EU would take action. However, the presence of a strong regional multilateral system could keep disputes in check.

THE CROSS-STRAITS (TAIWAN) ISSUE

William Heng-sheng Chuang, First Secretary in the Taipei Representative Office in the EU, insisted that Taiwan was a free democracy and pluralistic society. The future of Taiwan could only be decided by the Taiwanese through the democratic process in the future – in line with the fundamental universal values and the theory of democracy. Warning that any incident could have global impact, Heng-sheng Chuang said no unilateral actions would be taken by the Taiwanese government. He wanted the issue of the arms embargo to be seen in the context of Taiwan's wish to keep prosperity, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, Asia, the world, and the future of human rights and democracy in China. The speaker did not want China's rise to cause any problems for anyone.

Zongze disagreed, stating that the rest of the world did not fear anything. The EU and US would welcome a stable and prosperous China. It was going through a tremendous transformation and it deserved a period of calm. China had suffered over many years and it deserved better treatment. It had sufficient self-respect and intended to show the world that it would be a responsible player, starting from its actions within the Asia-Pacific region.

THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Brooks Tigner wanted to know what the US's position was on the use of military action in Iran. Davies said no decisions had been taken, but added that no one in Washington was talking about military solutions. It was seen as a diplomatic issue.

RUSSIAN OBJECTIVES?

Bet-El wanted to know if Russia's major interest in Asia was the fact that it would be a major market for energy? Approaching the question from a different perspective, Seleznev said that containing Asia would be difficult. He noted that China and India had gone unscathed through two world wars and also through the recent rise in oil prices. Russia would not undermine its relationship with Europe, and as energy was a worldwide problem, Russia would be developing relationships with all countries and not just with Asia.

THE EU – ACTION WANTED, NOT WORDS

Ambassador Khalid brought the day to a close. He agreed that Asia could use the EU's (and individual Member States') experience in order to overcome rivalries. The Ambassador noted that the India-Pakistan dialogue had been in place for two years and, while it had helped, it had not solved the hard issues. Kashmir was at the centre of the dialogue, while talks on nuclear confidence-building measures and the ratio (India-Pakistan) of conventional forces were also important.

However, the Ambassador argued that it was fine for the EU to say that Asia should learn from its experiences, but actions were needed from the international community. He concluded by agreeing that China was not responsible for the whole of Asia. The Ambassador had also seen that the focus was very much on East Asia, with the various EU presentations virtually ignoring South Asia. Perhaps there was room for improvement.


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The Biblioth que Solvay.



Input from Osamu Hayakawa of the Japanese Mission to the EU.



Ashok Sajjanhar.



Ruan Zongze.



Gert Caami and Ashok Sajjanhar during lunch.



The first panel wrapping up.



Victor Seleznev and Glyn Davies sharing a laugh.



A Speaker's Table at lunchtime.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 28 APRIL 2006

Hanif Ahmadzai

Second Secretary, Mission of Afghanistan to the EU

Muzaffer Akyildirim

Counsellor on defence, Mission of Turkey to the EU

Saud Saad Al-Thobaiti

Counsellor, Mission of Saudi Arabia to the EU

Massimo Amadei

Policy & Plans Division, European Union Military Staff

Hans-Ulrich Beelitz

Former Adviser European Commission

Alexander Beetz

Assistant to Karl von Wogau, European Parliament

Ilana Bet-El

Op-Ed Editor, European Voice

Alberto Bin

Head, Regional Affairs & Mediterranean Dialogue/Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Section, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Jan-Willem Blankert

China Team Relationship, European Commission: Directorate General for External Relations

Geert Cami

Managing Director, Security & Defence Agenda

John Chapman

Rapporteur, Security & Defence Agenda

Finn Chemnitz

UNC, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

William Heng-sheng Chuang

First Secretary, Taipei Representative Office in Belgium

Carolina Constantino

Attaché, Mission of the Philippines to the EU

Marzio Cuoco

National Armaments Director Representative, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU

Perrine Daniel

Assistant to the European Programmes Director, Thales

Michael W. David

Vice President, International Business Development, Cubic Corporation

Glyn T. Davies

Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States, State Department

Gao Deyi

Counsellor, Mission of China to the EU

Margaret Diop

Public Affairs Officer for Asia, Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Alex Dowling

Coordinator, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Jean Pierre Euzen

Deputy Head of Unit, New Working Environments, European Commission: Directorate General for Information Society and Media

Alexander Evans

Strategic Policy Advisor, DSI, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK

Julien Feugier

European Affairs Manager, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)

Nicholas Fiorenza

NATO and EU Affairs Correspondent, Jane's Defence Weekly

Paul Flaherty

Defence Counsellor, Delegation of the United Kingdom to NATO

Conor J. Foley

Director, Foley Sterneberg Communications

Vladimir Forshenev

First Secretary, Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU

Henriette Geiger

Political Desk Officer for China, European Commission: Directorate General for External Relations

Bill Giles

Director General Europe, BAE Systems

Neena Gill

Member, European Parliament

Dov Goshen

Assistant to Head of Israeli Mission of Defence, Embassy of Israel to Belgium

Hikmet Hajiyev

Third Secretary, Mission of Azerbaijan to NATO

Osamu Hayakawa

Counsellor, Mission of Japan to the EU

Rainer Hellmann

Journalist, Fuchsbriefer

Jessica Henderson

Project Manager, Security & Defence Agenda

Arnauld Hibon

Vice-President, Director EU Affairs, Eurocopter

Chris Holtby

Policy Unit - Asia & Pacific PSC Coordination, Council of the European Union

Yu Hong

Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China

Chunying Hua

First Secretary, Mission of China to the EU

Arnaud Jacomet

Head of Secretariat General, Western European Union (WEU)

Jeannine Johnson Maia

Press Officer and Webmaster, Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Marx Kahende

Ambassador, Embassy of Kenya to Belgium

Linda Karvinen

Senior Manager, Security & Defence Agenda

Ersin Kaya

Deputy Military Representative to the EU, Mission of Turkey to the EU

Saeed Khalid

Ambassador, Mission of Pakistan to the EU

Jaebum Kim

Ambassador-at-Large, Yonsei University

Dong Gi Kim

First Secretary, Mission of Korea to the EU

Victor Kochukov

First Counsellor, Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO

Oleg Kotov

First Secretary, Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO

Karel Kovanda

Deputy Director General, CFSP, Multilateral Relations & North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA & EFTA, European Commission: Directorate General for External Relations

Puneet Kundal

First Secretary, Mission of India to the EU

Hervé Ladsous

Director for Asia and Oceania, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Loïc Langot

Special Projects Officer, Armament Directorate, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Peter Lennon

Wampie Libon

First Secretary, Development, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the EU

Tjien-Khoen Liem

Policy Officer Preparatory action for security research, European Commission: Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry

Andrey Litvinov

Second Secretary, Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU

Gwen Lyle

Standards Attaché, Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Javanshir Mammadov

Counsellor, Mission of Azerbaijan to NATO

Raphaël Mathieu

Researcher, Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense

Marichu Mauro

First secretary, Mission of the Philippines to the EU

Neil Melvin

Senior Researcher and Project Leader, Armed Conflict and Conflict Prevention Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Giles Merritt

Director, Security & Defence Agenda

Sung-Hwan Moon

First Secretary, Political Affairs, Mission of Korea to the EU

Charles Morgan

Political Affairs Advisor, Mission of Korea to the EU

Nabeel Munir

First Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan to Belgium

David Oppenheimer

Assistant to Ana Gomes, European Parliament

Antonio Ortiz

Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Alexandros Papaioannou

Policy Advisor, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Christian Pilgaard Zinglarsen

Secretary of the Embassy, External Relations, Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU

Vasile Pirnea

Deputy Director, Defence Intelligence General Directorate, Ministry of Defence, Romania

Nicolas Pomey

Consultant, Avisal/JHL Conseil

Peter Rasmussen

National Technical Expert/Industrial Advisor, NATO C3 Agency, Delegation of Denmark to NATO

Kyriakos Revelas

Principal Administrator, Security and Stability, Counter Terrorism, Non Proliferation and Disarmament Unit, European Commission: Directorate General for External Relations

Diego Ruiz Palmer

Head Planning Section, Operations Division & International Staff, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Michael Ruoff

Independent EU Policy Advisor

Ashok Sajjanhar

Deputy Chief of Mission, Mission of India to the EU

Brian Sayers

Crisis Management Policy Section Operations Division, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Victor Seleznev

Deputy Director, Department of ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Regional Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia

Amarsaikhan Serdari

Defence Attaché, Embassy of Mongolia to Belgium

Alain Spoiden

Deputy Director & Director of Scientific Research, Royal Defence College

Laszlo Stock

COASI Representative, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Hungary to the EU

Peter Stonier

Director of Programs, Public Affairs, Mission of the United States of America to the EU

Michael Swann

Principal Administrator, Asia and Oceania, Council of the European Union: Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs

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Antonio Tanca

Co-ordinator of the Asia Team, Council of the European Union: Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs

Humayun Tandar

Ambassador, Mission of Afghanistan to the EU

Nagayo Taniguchi

Journalist, Shincho

Thabo Thage

Counsellor, Mission of South Africa to the EU

Brooks Tigner

EU / NATO Correspondent, Defense News

Tom Underwood

First Secretary, Delegation of the United States of America to NATO

Emil Valdelin

Project Assistant, Security & Defence Agenda

Willem Van Der Geest

Director, European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS)

Marielle Ver Elst

Head Science Policy & Space Affairs - Minister Plenipotentiary, Service Public Fédéral Affaires Etrangères, Commerce Extérieur et Coopération

Christophe Viprey

Counsellor for Asia, Permanent Representation of France to the EU

Xiong Wei

First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China

Rachel Winks

Director, EU and NATO Relations, Boeing International

Richard Wright

Director, North America, East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, EEA, EFTA, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco, European Commission: Directorate General for External Relations

Xiaorong Yang

Counsellor, Mission of China to the EU

Ruey Yang

Senior Adviser, Taipei Representative Office in Belgium

Mojtaha Zahedi

Third Secretary, Embassy of Iran to Belgium

Tang Zhiwen

Second Secretary, Mission of China to the EU

Ruan Zongze

Vice President, China Institute of International Studies

DISCUSSION PAPER: DEFENCE & SECURITY EXPERTS COMMENT ON ASIAN SECURITY

The SDA put six questions to a group of experts in Asia, the EU and US to clarify the issues shaping Asian security. Security in Asia impacts diplomatic relations across the globe, yet a handful of topics are the shared concern of the major players on the international security scene: WMD proliferation, antiterrorism cooperation, energy security and crisis management only scrape the surface of issues that face the region.

A selection of their responses follows:*

IS A COHERENT CONCEPT OF ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY BECOMING CLEARER?



Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd), Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

The short answer is no. But, first, a brief attempt at understanding Asia and Asian security:

There is no clear concept as to what defines Asia. It is neither a single entity nor has it a common concept of security encompassing the entire region. For the purpose of security, Asia may be divided into five groups. One perspective, especially when observed from say Delhi, would be more inclusive and include; Northeast, Southeast or the region of ASEAN, South, West or the Middle East and Central - encompassing the five states of Central Asia, possibly a sixth including Azerbaijan. In some European views, Asia and Asian security includes and extends to the north up to Malaysia. Many European analysts see Central Asia as something of an extension of Europe as it is covered under OSCE arrangements. From Washington the dominant view is that it encompasses only China, Japan, the Koreas and Taiwan. The rest of the region is often divided into NESAs (Northeast and South Asia), or South Asia, with Central Asia considered a part of Eurasia or the FSU (Former Soviet Union). Few analysts in Europe will include West Asia as within Asia, thus excluding the region which is possibly the source of the most vital security concern of our times: international terrorism.

Each set or grouping of countries in Asia has different security priorities. For Northeast Asia, the key issues are North Korean nuclearisation and growing Chinese power and assertiveness. For Southeast Asia, it is how to deal with creeping Chinese influence and internal instabilities (particularly in Indonesia and Thailand), Myanmar's authoritarian rule and the rise of political Islam. In South Asia, it is clearly international terrorism and the prospects of the rise of militant Islam and left extremist ideologies in Nepal and India. In West Asia, the most pressing security problems are likely to be the fall-out of the War in Iraq, militant Islam and its factional rivalries, the Palestine issue and Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Finally, for Central Asia, the issues are state formation and democratic transition.

If an attempt is made to identify the most important security issues in Asia (however defined) it will be the rise of China and managing energy security for emerging economies.

*Most comments submitted are personal and do not necessarily represent the opinions of organisations represented.

Dr. Jing Huang, Senior Fellow (Expert on Chinese Policy and Asian security issues), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC



No. Basically, there are two concepts of Asian regional security. The traditional one, held mainly by the USA and its allies, holds that maintenance of strategic balance, based on the US presence and its alliances, is the key for peace and security in the region. It focuses on the “traditional” security issues such as the North Korean nuclear program, the tension across the Taiwan Strait, Sino-Japanese frictions, China’s military build-up, nuclear rivalry in South Asia, and (needless to say) terrorist activities in Central and Southeast Asia. The “new security concept,” advocated mainly by China and largely accepted by the ASEAN countries after the 1998 Asian economic crisis, suggests that globalisation on the one hand and economic integration on the other have put all the Asian countries in the same boat. In other words, “security” has become a “collective issue” that needs to be addressed through multilateral consultation, cooperation and coordination among the Asian countries. Any unilateral actions would undermine peace and security in the entire region. It’s obvious that neither concept provides us with a cover-it-all explanation of the security situation in Asia.



Osamu HAYAKAWA, Counsellor (External Affairs, Political), Mission of Japan to the EU

First, unlike NATO in Europe, there is no multilateral security framework in Asia based on military alliance. Under such circumstances, the US has played a key role on maintaining regional security by extending a series of bilateral security arrangements.

In his speech on December 7, 2005¹³, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso noted we have not yet achieved sufficient regional military confidence building or transparency of information regarding national defence and military readiness in Asia as a whole. In this regard, ARF has been playing an important role as the sole intergovernmental forum of dialogue on regional security issues. It has promoted confidence building and dialogue among its members including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and is expected to play a part in conflict prevention as well.

Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General



No. Asia does not have the extensive network of multilateral security organisations that we have in Europe. It is still at the mid-point between a security system based on traditional great power rivalries and power balances and 20th century multilateral approaches. It is still not clear if it will lapse back into the first or progress towards the second and no Asian country seems to be taking the lead in this connection. The balance of power and therefore ultimate security in the present circumstances is secured by the United States, not the Asian countries themselves.



Dr. George Tsai, Chair and Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei

No, I don't think there is such an existing coherent concept of security, although policymakers and scholars alike understand the need for more regional security dialogues, if not arrangements. Everybody is talking about and concerned with security, but the essence and priority of security is still controversial to some extent. In addition to the war against terrorism, there are also other immediate, or mid-to-long term security

¹³ www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech

concerns which people think need to be dealt with sooner or later, including the six party talks, poverty, money laundering, drug and human trafficking, fraud, the rise of sea levels, pollution, ecology, bird flu, disease control, energy competition, socioeconomic reforms in certain given countries and water resources.

WHAT CONSEQUENCES HAS THE 'WAR ON TERROR' HAD WITHIN ASIA?

William Pope, former Acting US Counterterrorism Coordinator

The first thing to remember is that there is "Asia" and then there is Southeast Asia. The Australians got it, all along, as did the New Zealanders, to some extent. The Australians stood up right away after 9/11 and were ready to provide important assistance to Indonesia after the Bali bombing of October 2002. Japan had had its own terrorism issues and was keen to establish a counter-terrorism (CT) dialogue with the US. How effective they were is another matter, but they got it. Similarly, China feared terrorism in its western region and also wanted a formal CT dialogue with us. North Korea is a formally designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and was responsible for airline bombings and other atrocities. Right now, though, I think the concern regarding the DPRK is primarily a proliferation one.



A second factor is that, with the destruction of al-Qaeda's infrastructure in Afghanistan, the global terrorist movement has become more decentralised. There is a lot of pressure on leaders who are at large (many, such as Hambali and KSM, have been killed or captured), and some are looking for ungoverned or lightly governed spaces in which to hide, rest and re-fit. Many are nowhere near Asia, of course (North Africa, Afghan-Pakistan border region, etc), but the concern is that some would gravitate towards ungoverned regions, such as the Cambodian border. (Note: This is not a knock on Cambodia. My recollection is that the government there was doing its best, within its resources, to prevent terrorists' establishing themselves.) The point is that Asia, like other regions of the world, does have lightly governed areas about which the international community needs to be concerned.

The main issue, of course, is Southeast Asia and so-called Islamic terrorism. (I say "so-called" because it is the terrorists who claim that they are massacring people in the name of Islam. They are self-defining. The U.S. and others respect Islam as one of the great religions and have no intention or desire to go to war with Muslims.)

You ask what consequences has the "war on terror" had there. That is a good question and not easy to answer. Terrorist movements in SE Asia have been killing people and making war on their own governments for a long time, well before 9/11. Look at the ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) in the Philippines, for example. Jamaah Islamiya bombed churches in Indonesia in 2000. I do believe that JI has, as its master plan, the establishment of a Caliphate consisting of the southern provinces of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the southern provinces of the Philippines. Those countries will do all in their power to avoid being broken up or subsumed, but it is a tough fight.

There was a lot of denial in SE Asia before the Bali bombing of 2002. I think that terrible event made it easier to work with us and the Australians but, at the same time, global developments made it politically complicated on a domestic basis to be seen cooperating too closely on CT with non-Muslims.



Dr. George Tsai, Chair and Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei

It reminds us that nobody is free from terrorists' indiscriminate attacks and we should have made every joint effort to prevent such kind of suicidal attack. It is not a single country's business alone and every country should share some of the burden. Cooperation and information sharing are crucial. In addition to military actions alone, more dialogue, education, work shops and task forces are necessary to beef up our efforts to diminish the danger of terrorist attacks. However, on the other hand, people also gradually realising that the heavy handed unilateral approach employed by the US is not an effective way to eliminate the terrorist problem at all. It is going to be a long time and energy consuming effort to deal with the terrorist movement. There is no easy way to resolve the problem in the foreseeable future. Fair, quiet diplomacy, education, social/economic reforms and more consultation and multilateralism might help reduce the hatred and extreme elements in a given country.

Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd), Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

I would identify three.

First, it highlighted the dangers that politically militant Islam poses to the rest of Asia. While its origin may be traced to the late 1970's, the dangers it posed to the region and the world would not have been apparent without 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror.

Second, it has brought from the brink a failed state, Afghanistan, and has provided it an opportunity to integrate with the world. That it may still slide in to chaos and disorder is another issue.

Third, it has led to the most vicious possibility for the future with the failures in Iraq, of a major sectarian and ethnic struggle in West Asia that may engulf the region and perhaps the world.



Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General

It has helped to improve relations between the US and China and also has reinforced the links between Australia and the United States, and between the United States and Pakistan most obviously. However, it has been dealt with mainly on a bilateral basis rather than in a new multilateral framework akin to the way that the EU and NATO have pulled together over terrorism since 9/11. For many Asian countries, terrorism is still largely a domestic problem, such as Abu Sayaf in the Philippines or the Islamist groups in Indonesia rather than a trans-national issue requiring an Asian regional approach.

Kyriakos Revelas, Principal Administrator, Security and Stability, Counter Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Unit, European Commission Directorate General for External Relations

Negative consequences, I am afraid: it has reinforced the anti-US (and anti-Western?) sentiment and emotional solidarity among Muslims. It also allowed authoritarian regimes (e.g. Uzbekistan) to be under less pressure; the instability potential has increased.





Dr. Jing Huang, Senior Fellow (Expert on Chinese Policy and Asian security issues), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

Ironically, the most far-reaching consequence of the “war on terror” is the decline of US influence and clout in Asia. With the statement that “you are either with us or the terrorists” and practices of unilateralism, not only has the Bush Administration created a difficult situation for most of the Asian countries – given their internal and external environments, most Asian countries are reluctant to choose sides despite their condemnation of terrorist activities – in its “war on terror,” but also belittled or even overlooked other important US interests (e.g., in economic exchanges, environment, human rights, cultures, and etc.) in Asia. Meanwhile, China’s rise and rapid economic integration in the region have given rise to regionalisation in Asia, a process in which the US has yet to find a way to participate effectively despite its enormous stake and prominent presence in the region. Given the fact that China’s rise and the entire Asian prosperity have been achieved essentially through integrations in the existing international system, a system that is based on market economy and led by democracies, the extent to which the momentum of regionalisation in Asia would reinforce (or undermine) this international system would have serious implications to world peace and prosperity.

HOW ARE APPREHENSIONS OVER ENERGY SUPPLIES AFFECTING RELATIONS WITH KEY OIL AND GAS PRODUCING REGIONS AND COULD THE GROWING FOCUS ON ENERGY SECURITY UNDERMINE THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERALISM ACROSS ASIA?

Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General

Energy security is a good opportunity for the Asian countries to step up their cooperation in order to head off an “every man for himself” approach in which countries try to negotiate monopolistic agreements with key suppliers such as Iran, Russia, and Sudan. The development of new pipelines from Iran or from Russia into Asia is a good opportunity for the countries of the region to cooperate and share investment costs. If no cooperative approach is taken, energy could once more become a major security problem as it was for Japan in the 1930s. This is because of the high degree of dependency of nearly all Asian countries on imported oil and natural gas (90% in Japan) and because of the dynamism of Asian economies which means that import needs will rise dramatically over the next few years (China’s energy imports are predicted to double between today and 2025). A cooperative approach in terms of securing a diversity of supplies, in sharing energy resources and in looking at alternatives such as nuclear power would therefore seem to make sense, but who will take the lead in this connection?



Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd), Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Given the likely very wide gap between the demand and possible supply of energy to the rapidly growing economies in Asia, the possibility of addressing this through genuine multilateral mechanisms and cooperative regional arrangements seem remote. Competition is more likely to be intense and violent.

Kyriakos Revelas, Principal Administrator, Security and Stability, Counter Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Unit, European Commission Directorate General for External Relations



Prima facie, competition about energy supplies could disturb relations; but energy security could add substance to multilateral cooperation schemes in Asia by linking essential interests of most countries (economic growth and integration). The European experience is not necessarily to be replicated elsewhere, but it is useful to bear in mind that a common set of values and complementary interests are at the foundation of European integration (Council of Europe, EU, also OSCE and NATO).



Michael W. David, Vice President, International Business Development, Cubic Corporation

This is the key to the future of the world economy and not only in Asia. Energy security is critical to economic development and social stability. The EU, US, China, Japan & Russia have to work towards more effective and supportive energy policies. Without economic cooperation, integrated energy policies and positive engagement, friction and hostility will develop. This would only lead to very negative and counter-productive results for all concerned.

In more specific terms, energy needs and interests have caused increased territorial friction. One example is the dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku Islands and related oil and natural gas resources.

Dr. Jing Huang, Senior Fellow (Expert on Chinese Policy and Asian security issues), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC



Rising energy demand has become (or is becoming) a driving factor in foreign policymaking in countries like China, Japan and India. While this has led to rapid development of bilateral relations between these Asian countries and energy producing regions (for example, economic exchanges between China and Saudi Arabia have more than tripled in the past five years), it also provides some “rogue” states (e.g., Iran, Venezuela, and Sudan) with more economical and political leverage in resisting international pressure for change. Given that virtually all the major powers in Asia depend on foreign oil and gas, they actually have more common interests than differences in their efforts to secure energy supply. As long as these countries try to meet their energy demands with market mechanisms rather than political or even military means, their growing focus on energy security should help promote multilateralism across Asia. The recently signed Sino-Indian and Sino-Pakistan energy treaties/agreements, albeit symbolic rather than substantial, reflect such a tendency. After all, given the global energy market, consultations and cooperation among the consumers make more sense than vicious competition. On the other hand, there is evidence that China and (to a less extent) India are trying to solve their energy problems by acquiring overseas assets with strategies inconsistent with the market mechanism; and such efforts will eventually undermine not only multilateralism across Asia, but also the stability and health of the entire global energy market. Moreover, the Sino-Japanese tension over the East China Sea oil/gas fields also exerts negative implications to regional security and peace.



Dr. George Tsai, Chair and Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei

As is known, Japan, China and Russia are all playing games and competing to enhance their respective interests in acquiring energies. Even the US is trying to further expand its influence, if not control, of the Malacca Strait and stays there under the guise of antiterrorism protection. We also see that China is trying to use the Mekong River and considering the construction of a canal in Thailand so as to guarantee the safety of its energy route. The US is also trying to woo India into its brace to counterbalance the peaceful rise of China. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia also have their different considerations. For the time being, antiterrorism is still the foremost important concern for some of the countries in this region and cooperation is likely to be kept intact, particularly if under strong US pressure. But as the competition for energy becomes more serious, which is almost certain in the near future, trust and cooperation will evaporate fast. Of course, people can easily argue that should energy competition become a real issue, it does not have to hinder their cooperation in other fields, such as antiterrorism efforts. However, the hard earned basis of mutual trust will certainly be replaced by other more urgent demands. It depends on how all the players are playing the game.

HOW CAN THE EU & US MORE EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION POLICIES IN THE REGION?

Ana Gomes, Vice-Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament



There is no need to reinvent the wheel: any communication strategy by the EU and the US on non-proliferation in Asia has to be based on the legal edifice of the NPT.

The credibility of the EU and the US in this domain hinges, among other factors, on their ability to deal with those states that are completely outside the non-proliferation framework, like Israel, India and Pakistan. It is clear that to avoid further erosion of the NPT (and the crises with North Korea and Iran have only aggravated that erosion) and to be able to mobilize the international community against dangerous proliferators, the transatlantic community has to be seen as a firm supporter of the implementation and the universalization of the NPT.

The recent nuclear deal between the US and India, supported by France and the UK, is a clear example of how to undermine the only solid framework - the NPT - within which proliferation in Asia, and indeed around the planet, can be addressed in a credible and efficient way. And it could not come in a more inappropriate moment, when the world is faced with a drive by Iran to develop a military nuclear program, which perverts the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology granted by the NPT. This is a moment when all efforts should focus on how to deter Iran.

The combination of NPT rules, wise US domestic legislation and the informal rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has effectively limited the ability of countries outside the NPT, namely India, to both produce nuclear weapons in large amounts *and* satisfy their growing energy needs with nuclear power. India is a textbook case: it has begun suffering from a serious gap between its energy needs and available resources, but had been unable to close it through the nuclear route - it wasn't able to legally import enough nuclear fuel for its civilian and military programmes.

In that sense, the US deal literally saves India by opening the door to the sale of nuclear fuel. And places New Delhi in a rather surreal position: should this deal get the go-ahead from the US Congress, India will have all the advantages of being a legal nuclear power, without being bound (as is the case with the US, Russia, China, the UK and France) by

NPT rules, which include commitments to gradually reduce nuclear arsenals and submit the **entirety** of their nuclear programs - civilian *and* military - to scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Besides, all legal nuclear powers have at least signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and have committed themselves to put an end to producing plutonium and enriched uranium. India has committed to none.

And this is precisely the main concern the US-India deal raises: it constitutes a tremendous disincentive to join (or take seriously) the rules-based approach to nuclear cooperation, which is the main safeguard against cascading proliferation in Asia. And in the world.

Choosing a bilateral approach to nuclear issues over the more traditional reliance on the multilateral legal framework begs the question of how the transatlantic community will, from now on, be able to convince other "great, freedom-loving democracies" that "don't engage in proliferation" (Japan and Brazil, for example) that they in turn should take the NPT seriously and not go down the path of military nuclear programs. Also, how will the transatlantic community react if China - following their *own* strategic imperatives - puts forward a proposal for similar treatment for Pakistan in the NSG?

Any strategy against nuclear proliferation has to steer clear from ad-hoc alliances based on old-fashioned balance of power approaches, dividing the world into 'friends' that are allowed to go nuclear and stay outside the framework of the NPT, and 'non-friends' that are lectured about the importance of rules and urged to respect the letter and the spirit of international law.

Europe and the US are both guilty of these blatant double-standards. President Chirac's offer of nuclear 'cooperation' to India, as soon as the US had announced the deal, reveals the high economic and strategic stakes involved, if the rules of the game are loosened for India. Russia, of course, who was sharply criticised in 2001 for violating NSG rules and selling 58 tons of nuclear fuel to be used in the Indian nuclear power plant in Tarapur (India was then called a "nuclear pariah state"), was also quick to join in. As Jon Wolfsthal, from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) observes, "*if the US decided to put business above non-proliferation priorities, they shouldn't be surprised if other countries do the same.*" The same could be said about the UK and France. All this doesn't bode well for security in Asia. And indeed for global security.

Developments in Iraq and in the fight against terrorism attest to how wisely the Bush Administration deals with complex strategic issues. The India-US deal confirms this sceptical assessment.

Condoleezza Rice may believe that "*civil nuclear co-operation with India will not lead to an arms race in South Asia*". She should rather heed the warnings from Jon Wolfsthal and Mary B. Nikitin, in their CSIS paper 'The US-India atomic balm': "*India will be able to greatly expand its nuclear arsenal*" and "*the future growth in India's nuclear arsenal may increase pressure on both China and Pakistan to further increase their own nuclear weapon programs.*"

There is, indeed, no need to reinvent the wheel in this area. As there is no shortage of ideas on how to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Europe and the US should take a closer look at them. IAEA proposals on the multilateralisation of uranium enrichment and the universalisation of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreements are just two of the most useful examples. The best way for the transatlantic community to communicate nuclear proliferation policies in Asia is to join forces, retake the initiative in strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regime, and abandon incoherent, short-sighted and dangerous power politics.



Dr. Jing Huang, Senior Fellow (Expert on Chinese Policy and Asian security issues), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

First and foremost, the two sides have to make joint efforts to promote mutual understanding and appreciation of each other's strategic interests on this issue, and how these interests converge and/or diverge in a given context. It is also necessary to make formal arrangements and/or institutions that can constrain unilateral actions but guarantee effective and meaningful communications, especially when divergence appears to outweigh convergence of their respective interests.

Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General

Obviously by working together as they are currently doing vis-à-vis Iran. We cannot afford in this respect to separate our strategic interests from our commercial policies.



Osamu HAYAKAWA, Counsellor (External Affairs, Political), Mission of Japan to the EU

This question seems to be based on the assumption that the US and EU do not communicate sufficiently with each other on nuclear non-proliferation. In my view, they are quite actively communicating with each other at various levels.

Let me also add that the EU and US, together with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), have been working closely with each other on KEDO.

Kyriakos Revelas, Principal Administrator, Security and Stability, Counter Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Unit, European Commission Directorate General for External Relations

Effective communication presupposes coherent policies and common positions when more than one actor is involved; on the Iran nuclear issue, there is a convergence of EU and US policies, but questions remain as to their consistency with respect to the three nuclear states outside NPT.



Dr. George Tsai, Chair and Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei

Sharing information, sticking to non-proliferation policy, sanctioning against any violator, safe-guarding technology, monitoring technology transfer, and taking pre-emptive strikes if necessary, etc. on the one hand. On the other hand, we should also consider the possibility of providing incentives for late-comers so as to encourage them not to develop nuclear capabilities.

Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd), Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

By crafting, in cooperation with others, a new international non-proliferation order. A system that will retain much of the old, but also introduce new arrangements to ensure five vital elements. 1) No new nuclear weapon states other than the eight. 2) No further nuclear tests. 3) A genuine and time bound commitment to eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, howsoever in the distant future. 4) A genuine and effective arrangement for non-discriminate development of nuclear energy around the world. 5) Greater international control over fissile material to ensure these do not find their way into the hands of terrorists.



DO THE US AND EU YET FULLY UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE REGION'S SECURITY CHALLENGES?



Dr. Jing Huang, Senior Fellow (Expert on Chinese Policy and Asian security issues), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC

The question is not necessarily whether they fully understand the security challenges in Asia, but whether the US and EU can understand and appreciate the other side's view of and therefore approach to these challenges. Essentially, complexities originate not so much from a lack of understanding as from different or even conflicting views and approaches, beneath which lie inconsistent or even contradictory interests. Again, effective, meaningful and multilateral communication, consultation and coordination are necessary for addressing these difficult problems.

Dr. George Tsai, Chair and Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei

I would incline to think so. Their concerns are similar and both know where the problems, or flash points, are. The problem is to set a priority and how to deal with it. Both understand where the problems are, but they have different interests that make it difficult to cooperate with a full heart. Furthermore, there is not a coherent policy between the EU and US and most policies are reactive and short-sighted. Sometimes, good intentions or some seemingly correct near-sighted compromises bring about not only bad consequences, but also create more problems for the future. To make things worse, US arrogance, hegemonic attitudes, dictation and its unilateral insistence sometimes make things more complex than they should be and thus more difficult to resolve. Dialogue at different levels, no matter if they are official, academic or second/third track should always be encouraged.



Kyriakos Revelas, Principal Administrator, Security and Stability, Counter Terrorism, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Unit, European Commission Directorate General for External Relations

The position and capabilities of the EU and US are not comparable: the US has extended security presence in Asia; the EU has extensive economic ties, but is an emerging security actor (observer in ARF, recently ESDP operation in Aceh).

Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General



The US clearly understands the complexities as it has been an Asian Pacific power since the end of World War II and has a large number of bilateral security commitments in the region, notably Japan, South Korea and Australia. It is also now actively engages in India whose future role will be crucial. The EU is also a major player but is largely dealing with the countries on a bilateral basis and largely linked to trade. Developing a strategic overview for the region as a whole will be necessary if the EU is to be an actor alongside the United States. Although much of the focus is naturally on China, Japan is also a very major world player whose economy is now recovering rapidly from the stasis of the 1990s. The EU-Japanese relationship will therefore be an essential corollary of the EU-China relationship.



Osamu HAYAKAWA, Counsellor (External Affairs, Political), Mission of Japan to the EU

The US and EU troika have held regular dialogue on East Asian security at a senior official level and launched the Strategic Dialogue on East Asian security in May last year based on the existing framework. This clearly shows their eagerness to deepen their mutual understanding on East Asian security challenges.

Both the EU and US have been actively involved in ARF activities. They have worked with each other, together with Japan, in order to promote practical cooperation and meet security challenges in the region.

Michael W. David, Vice President, International Business Development, Cubic Corporation



There are persons and entities that understand the complexities. The problem has been to get US administrations and policymakers to pay attention to the experts and personnel with first hand experience. The recent rash of criticism by retired US military officers of the US Secretary of Defence on Iraq is an example of this type of problem.

CAN THE ARMS EMBARGO IN THE SHORT TERM DELAY CHINA'S MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND IN THE LONGER TERM COULD A RESOLUTION OF THIS TRIANGULAR US-EU-CHINA ISSUE COULD LAY THE BASIS OF A WIDER SECURITY FRAMEWORK?



Osamu HAYAKAWA, Counsellor (External Affairs, Political), Mission of Japan to the EU

I do not see any indication that the US is in favor of a trilateral dialogue with China and the EU on the arms embargo issue. The US and Japan have opposed the EU's lifting of the embargo on China, and I do not see any immediate prospect of trilateral consultation between the EU, US, and China on this issue.

Dr. George Tsai, Chair and Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei



Yes and no in a dialectical way of thinking. It can go either way. As far as this author is concerned, it seems that even if the EU lifts the arms embargo against China, Beijing has no intention of buying lots of arms from Europe. Other than the political implications, what China needs is European technology, instead of its hardware. With or without EU support, China is determined to advance its military modernisation scheme. For European political and economic interests alone, this author sometimes wonders why the EU lets America play the vital role and lets itself be excluded from the power game. The author also understands that the EU is not as united as it appears in this case. Some countries are more inclined to lift the embargo for various reasons, while some are not because of US pressure.



Michael W. David, Vice President, International Business Development, Cubic Corporation

The arms embargo is as much emotional as it is political. It would be better to try to find a pragmatic way for the US, EU and China to have more open dialogue and cooperation in the area of defence and security. China has not traditionally been an expansionist nation. Its energy and economic needs cannot be met by military action. However, China, like any nation, wants to be able to secure its land and sea lanes of communication. This is best done by political and economic cooperation and engagement. There is very little to be gained by taking a confrontational approach with China. After all, there was an official announcement from the Chinese government that China's holding of US Treasury bills finally surpassed that of Japan. The US certainly cannot afford to bite the hand that is feeding it.

Jamie Shea, Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the NATO Secretary General



The key challenge is to integrate a rising China into a global multilateral system which is cooperative, inter-dependent and rules-based. A multi-polar world does not mean a world of competing power centres but a world in which several major players work together to uphold a set of principles which are in their common interest. As a member of the UN Security Council, China's military forces should be used to uphold international stability and support the UN peacekeeping missions in the same way of those of the entire UN community. A key future objective of the US-EU relationship is to help China to find a framework in which it can be embedded as a significant and responsible pillar of the international system. As with everywhere else, arms sales have to take broader strategic interests into account but the overriding principle must be stability.



Major General Dipankar Banerjee (Retd), Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Dehli

It can be argued that the EU and US arms embargo on China has not been entirely successful. China has acquired whatever arms and technology it needed from Russia, from rogue western companies and through espionage. Its dynamic industry and R&D capabilities are managing the rest. Yet, it has not been entirely successful. If the embargo is properly enforced and prolonged, it can possibly delay China's emergence as a military power. In turn, this might provide additional time to craft cooperative security measures and multilateral security initiatives in Asia to deal with the sudden rise in Chinese power.

It needs to be much more broadly based than restricted merely to a EU-US-China dialogue.

Dr. Jing Huang, Senior Fellow (Expert on Chinese Policy and Asian security issues), The Brookings Institution, Washington DC



Not really. This badly leaking arms embargo has become politically symbolic rather than technically substantial. A long term security framework should be based on a set of water-tide codes, supervised and reinforced by a joint US-EU institution which coordinates US-EU actions on this issue.

William Heng-Sheng Chuang, First Secretary, Taipei Representative Office to the EU

In terms of cultural aspects, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland have a close cultural link. However, politically they are two separate countries. Taiwan is an independent country formally called the Republic of China. People in Taiwan strongly intend to lead their democratic and prosperous lives and hope to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, namely status quo. As you know, the world is fully interdependent in every respect including security nowadays; if any possible military conflicts unexpectedly happen in the Taiwan Strait, the interests of many countries and the lives of people will be endangered and sacrificed. Therefore, I believe no country wants to see any disaster in the Taiwan Strait.

To support peace, stability and security in the Taiwan Straits, Asia, the world, and the future of human rights and democracy in China, I would like strongly and sincerely to urge the EU not to lift its arms embargo on China.

ABOUT THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA

The Security & Defence Agenda, formerly the New Defence Agenda (NDA) has become established as the only regular Brussels-based forum where political figures and journalists gather to discuss the future of European and transatlantic defence and security policies.

The aim of the SDA is not to replicate more academic research-based projects but to give greater prominence to the complex questions of how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and how transatlantic challenges such as terrorism and WMD can be met.

Bringing clarity and new ideas to the rapidly-changing defence and security policy scene has been the SDA's aim from its beginning. SDA's activities range from monthly roundtables and international conferences to reports and discussion papers, all of which attract high-level speakers and authors and institutional, governmental and industry support.

One of our prime objectives is to raise the profile of defence and security issues among the Brussels-based international press. To encourage more in-depth coverage of these topics, the SDA holds regular, informal dinners for journalists with high profile decision makers.

Recent speakers and participants include

Gijs de Vries, Counter-terrorism Coordinator, Council of the EU; **Richard Falkenrath**, Research Fellow, Brookings Institution and former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the US President; **Franco Frattini**, Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, European Commission; **Bill Giles**, Director General, Europe, BAe Systems; **Vecdi Gönül**, National Defence Minister, Turkey; **Scott A. Harris**, President, Lockheed Martin International; **Patrick Hennessey**, Director, DG Enterprise, European Commission; **Hilmar Linnenkamp**, Deputy Chief Executive, European Defence Agency; **Alessandro Minuto Rizzo**, Deputy Secretary General, NATO; **Sergei Ordzhonikidze**, Director General of the United Nations Office in Geneva; **Zonghuai Qiao**, Vice Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China; **George Robertson**, Former Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; **Gary Titley**, MEP, Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy, European Parliament; **Michel Troubetzkoy**, Senior Vice President, Director for Relations with European Institutions, EADS; **Günter Verheugen**, Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, European Commission; **Antonio Vitorino**, former Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, European Commission; **Karl von Wogau**, Chairman, Subcommittee on Defence and Security, European Parliament, **Geoffrey van Orden**, Vice-Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament



La Bibliothèque Solvay



"[NATO] An Alliance in which Europe and North America are consulting every day on the key security issues before them. Acting together, in the field, to defend our shared security... Because in a dangerous world, business as usual is not an option"

NATO Secretary General **Jaap de Hoop Scheffer**, Annual Conference 17 May 2004

"Homeland Security - a concerted, comprehensive and nationwide effort to prevent future terrorist attacks, to protect the most vulnerable targets against future terrorist attacks and to be ready to respond against possible attacks and minimize loss of life and damage if such attacks occur" **Richard Falkenrath**, former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, 17 November 2003 Annual Conference



"The agency should generate ideas and speak the truth to defence ministers."

Nick Witney, Chief Executive, European Defence Agency 28 April 2004 Press Dinner



"There is an opportunity for Europe to take advantage of the US's investment by issuing collaborative programmes – paid for to a certain extent by the US taxpayer. The European Defence Agency could foster transatlantic cooperation rather than follow more traditional approaches"

Scott Harris, President Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin, 28 April 2004 Press Dinner

ACTIVITIES

MONTHLY ROUNDTABLES

SDA's series of Monthly Roundtables are attended by some 70+ defence and security experts who participate actively in the debates. Their discussions are summarised in concise reports that are circulated to a wide range of stakeholders across the globe. Roundtable topics include:

- Is the transatlantic defence marketplace becoming a reality?
- Defence aspects of EU and NATO enlargements
- What policies will create effective peacekeeping?
- Strategic priorities for protecting Europe's infrastructure against terrorism
- Will the EU get tough on opening-up national defence procurement?
- The powers and responsibilities of the European Defence Agency
- Europe's drive to implement an anti-terrorist strategy
- On the eve of Istanbul – Can NATO become a motor for reform?
- Does Europe need a Black Sea security policy?
- Is maritime security Europe's Achilles' heel?
- Space and security in Europe

REPORTS on Monthly Roundtables discussions are available on the SDA website. The SDA also published a **Discussion Paper** 'Fresh Perspectives on Europe's Security' in 2004 and its Bioterrorism Reporting Group has published three in depth analyses on bio threats and our responses.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

The SDA organises a number of major conferences with partners, in Brussels and elsewhere. Conferences gather 200+ senior defence and security policymakers, industrialists and media to discuss current policies and decision-making.

- **Protecting Europe: Policies for enhancing security in the EU**, May 2006
- **Towards an EU Strategy for Collective Security**, Feb 2005
- **Defending Global Security: The New Politics of Transatlantic Defence Cooperation**, May 2004
- **Towards Worldwide Security: Building the Transatlantic Agenda**, Nov 2003
- **Reinventing Global Security**, June 2003
- **The Relaunching of Transatlantic Relations and Anti-Terrorism Cooperation**, May 2003
- **How credible are Europe's Anti-Terrorism Defences?**, Oct 2002

PRESS DINNERS

Correspondents of top European newspapers take full advantage of these rare opportunities to explore in informal circumstances the thinking of senior MEPs, industry executives, ambassadors and EU and NATO officials. Recent press dinners featured **Nick Witney**, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA) 'Powers and Responsibilities of the new European Defence Agency (April 2004); **Erkki Liikanen**, EU Commissioner for Enterprise, 'Europe's Defence and Security Research' (November 2003); **General James L. Jones**, Supreme Allied Commander SACEUR, NATO 'NATO's Transformation Process and Cooperation with the EU in the future' (October 2003); **Margot Wallström**, EU Commissioner for Environment 'Civil Protection and Bioterrorism' (May 2003); and **Robert Cooper**, Director General for External & Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the EU (Oct 2002)



General James L. Jones, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO with Thomas Enders, Executive Vice President, EADS April 2004 Press Dinner

BIOTERRORISM REPORTING GROUP


Following the interest generated in past SDA events, the SDA decided to create a venue

for more focused discussions on the area of bioterrorism. The Bioterrorism Reporting Group meets every three months and will allow the discussions not only to be tailored to the evolving developments in the biological field but most of all, the resulting reports will act as a catalyst for the political world.

- 21 June 2004 'Countering Bioterrorism: Prevention and Protection'
- 18 October 2004 'Countering Bioterrorism: Science, Technology and Oversight'
- 25 January 2005 'Next Generation Threat Reduction: Bioterrorism's Challenges and Solutions'
- 25 April 2005 'Countering Bioterrorism: How can Europe and the United States work together?'



THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA WOULD LIKE TO THANK ITS PARTNERS AND MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE SDA A SUCCESS



Geneva Centre for Security Policy



Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy
University of Birmingham

Interested in joining the SDA? Please contact LINDA KARVINEN:
Tel: +32 (0)2 737 9148
Fax: +32 (0)2 736 3216
Email : linda.karvinen@securitydefenceagenda.org

A *Security & Defence Agenda* Roundtable Report

Cover image: www.geo.mtu.edu

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Maps:

Map 1: http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/countries_map/asia_ref802643_99_small.jpg

Map 2: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html

Map 3: [http://www.gurteen.com/gurteen/gurteen.nsf/id/L000298/\\$File/ks-map.gif](http://www.gurteen.com/gurteen/gurteen.nsf/id/L000298/$File/ks-map.gif)

Map 4: <http://www.greentranslations.com/images/maps/map-afghanistan.jpg>

Map 5: <http://apna.tv/news/data/upimages/taiwan-china-map.jpg>

Map 6: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siberia>

SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA (SDA)

Bibliothèque Solvay, Park Léopold, 137 rue Belliard, B-1040, Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2 737 91 48 Fax: +32 (0)2 736 32 16 E-mail: info@securitydefenceagenda.org
www.securitydefenceagenda.org