

# PROTECTING EUROPE

Policies for enhancing security in the EU



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# PROTECTING EUROPE

Policies for enhancing security in the EU

**An international conference organised by  
the Security & Defence Agenda in partnership with  
Finmeccanica and Thales with the support of Microsoft**

Tuesday, 30 May 2006  
Palais d'Egmont  
Brussels

The Atlantic Rendez-Vous satellite debate was organised in partnership with:  
*Friends of Europe, CSIS, EC Delegation to US, Gallup Europe*

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Giles Merritt

## INTRODUCTION

The SDA is proud to present this summary of debates at the May 30 high-level international conference « Protecting Europe: Policies for enhancing security in the EU » we organised with Thales and Finmeccanica with the support of Microsoft.

This years' conference addressed the state of Europe's security strategies in the wake of the Madrid and London bombings. Are we properly utilising Europe's political clout to diffuse potential threats? Do we have the right instruments? Has Europe begun to think like America in the area of homeland security?

European Commissioners Franco Frattini and Benita Ferrero-Waldner rallied for a more comprehensive approach to EU security, underlining the need for effectiveness between public, civilian and private security sectors.

Industry CEOs Denis Ranque of Thales and Giuseppe Orsi of AgustaWestland discussed the fragmented transatlantic marketplace, while highlighting industry's crucial role in analysing today's changing security environment.

The day's ruling by the European Court of Justice that the EU-US agreement on passenger data transfers was illegal laid interesting ground for the transatlantic satellite session with Washington DC. Both sides seemed to agree that while EU and US narratives may differ, shared values still remained at the core of the transatlantic relationship and security cooperation had to be strengthened.

The SDA would like to thank Thales and Finmeccanica for their excellent partnership in organising this event.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Giles Merritt'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial 'G' and a long, sweeping underline.

**Giles Merritt**

Director, Security & Defence Agenda

## ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

The Security & Defence Agenda's (SDA) annual security conference, Protecting Europe, attracted an audience of several hundred industry leaders, government officials, members of the European institutions and NGOs, academics and international press representatives. Held in Brussels at the Palais d'Egmont, on May 24, 2006, the SDA organised the event in partnership with Finmeccanica and Thales and with the support of Microsoft.

SDA Director Giles Merritt introduced the conference and the initial keynote addresses were delivered by Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Thales CEO Denis Ranque and AgustaWestland CEO Giuseppe Orsi.

Following lunch, a further keynote address was delivered by Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security Franco

Frattini. Three sessions were on the agenda and these were moderated, by Giles Merritt and by IISS Research Fellow for European Security Jean-Yves Haine. Immediately following Commissioner Frattini's address, the SDA's partner think tank, *Friends of Europe*, organised a transatlantic satellite session with Washington DC on the subject "Can the US and EU fashion common homeland security strategies?"



Transatlantic Satellite Session with Washington DC



# The conference programme

## **First Session:** What 'layers' of threat must Europe plan for?

In the wake of the Madrid and London bombings, the counter-terrorism strategy agreed by EU leaders in late 2005 heralds a more concerted approach to security in Europe. How could the strategy be tailored to take an "all hazards" approach to the many layers of threat, ranging from terrorist attack to natural catastrophe, disease pandemics and organized crime? What specific steps are needed to strengthen EU countries' security, and is the pooling of national resources a viable option in any of these?

Moderator:

**Jean-Yves Haine**, Research Fellow for European Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)

Keynote Address:

**Denis Ranque**, CEO, Thales

**Simon Manley**, Head of Counter-Terrorism Policy Department, Directorate for Defence and Strategic Threats, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom

**Magnus Norell**, Director of the Centre for the Study of Low Intensity Conflicts and Terrorism, Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

**Ambassador Georg Witschel**, Commissioner for Combating International Terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany

## Second Session: Are we providing the right instruments?

From rail transport to maritime and airport security, from energy to telecoms and financial services, the vulnerability of Europe's complex infrastructures is demanding a new approach to security. What measure of border security and civil protection is afforded by technologies developed by Europe's industries, and what new instruments are needed? Is a more structured dialogue needed, at national and eventually EU levels, between industry and public authorities?

Moderator:

**Giles Merritt**, Director, Security & Defence Agenda

Keynote Address: **Giuseppe Orsi**, CEO, AgustaWestland

**Sandra Bell**, Director, Homeland Security & Resilience, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI)

**Bogdan Klich**, MEP, Rapporteur of the European Parliament's Security Research Report, European Parliament

**Robert Mocny**, Deputy Director, US-VISIT, US Department of Homeland Security

**Herbert Von Bose**, Head of Unit, Preparatory Action for Security Research, European Commission Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry

Jamie Shea, Denis Ranque and Franco Frattini prepare for the transatlantic satellite debate.



## **Third Session:** Can the US and EU fashion common homeland security strategies?

Transatlantic Satellite Session with Washington DC in partnership with *Friends of Europe*, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the European Commission Delegation in Washington DC and Gallup Europe

The aftermath of 9/11 at first was an increase in transatlantic frictions over different approaches to anti-terrorist policy by the US and EU member states. How much coordination now exists in areas ranging from intelligence-gathering to surveillance of people, and from enhanced security measures to civil and infrastructural protection? Have America and Europe begun to think alike on homeland security?

Moderators: **David Heyman**, Director and Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) & **Jamie Shea**, Director for Policy and Planning, Office of the NATO Secretary General

**Franco Frattini**, EU Commissioner for Freedom, Justice and Security

**Remo Pertica**, Co-COO, Finmeccanica

**Denis Ranque**, CEO, Thales

**Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton**, US Coordinator for Counterterrorism

**Stewart Baker**, Assistant Secretary General for Policy, US Department of Homeland Security



## **FOURTH SESSION: Is Europe getting the politics of security right?**

The security challenge of protecting the EU's 450m citizens divides broadly into external policies to defuse potential threats and internal measures to neutralise them. Is there a case for developing a more global EU concept that would seek to combine external and internal approaches more closely? How satisfactory have been European policymakers' efforts to reconcile citizens' rights as individuals with the demands of collective security? And what long-term strategy should the EU be developing that could remove the shadow of Islamic unrest and avert the 'clash of civilizations'?

Moderator:

**Giles Merritt**, Director, Security & Defence Agenda

**Ana Gomes**, MEP, Vice-Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament

**Lars-Erik Lundin**, Deputy Political Director for CFSP and ESDP, European Commission DG External Relations

**Sergei Ordzhonikidze**, Under Secretary General and Director General, United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG)

**Ambassador Lamberto Zannier**, Director, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)

# Executive Summary

## Public-private partnerships, at the right price!

Speaking at the SDA's Annual Security Conference (Protecting Europe), top executives from leading European defence and security companies called for more public-private partnerships to be involved in the provision of security solutions. European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security **Franco Frattini** definitely saw a role for industry, but he also had a warning; Industry's solutions had to be affordable, adaptable and they must guarantee privacy for the individual.

Opening the Conference, European Commissioner for External Relations **Benita Ferrero-Waldner** insisted that action at the EU level was the only effective response to the security threats Europe faces. She highlighted three elements of the EU's approach: security in its immediate neighbourhood; a holistic concept of human security; and ensuring the internal and external dimensions of security are effectively coordinated.

Echoing her words, Thales CEO **Denis Ranque** argued that the EU's citizens expected full cooperation between the Union and its Member States. He described a fragmented security market, one that was totally different to the mature defence marketplace. Ranque had a wish-list that included the provision of more

detail on the EU's security concept, better implementation of the EU's Counter-terrorism policy and an improved public-private dialogue. Ranque did not underestimate the task, a "huge coordination effort" was required.

In agreement, AgustaWestland CEO **Giuseppe Orsi** said that any instruments proposed as solutions for security threats had to be integrated into a wider security system. He argued that better coordination was fine but only as a first step towards the creation of a European Homeland Security Agency, that would act as a counterpart to industry and maximise public-private partnerships.

Speaking at the *Friends of Europe's* Atlantic Rendez-Vous session – dovetailed within the conference - Finmeccanica Co-COO **Remo Pertica** saw the need for greater EU-US cooperation but was concerned about the lack of penetration to US markets afforded to European companies. On the subject of the much-needed security standards, Pertica reasoned that defence of local industries was often a barrier to progress.

Shortly before the transatlantic session, the European Court of Justice ruled that the EU-US

agreement requiring airlines to transfer passenger data to the US authorities was illegal. The Security & Defence Agenda's Director **Giles Merritt** asked what could be done about this unexpected "spanner in the works". EU Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner Franco Frattini was sanguine about the situation, saying that the ruling had been annulled on a legal technicality. US Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary **Stewart Baker** was in total agreement. He could not see the data flows stopping or planes being grounded. Commissioner Frattini added that he would be presenting concrete ideas to resolve the situation and he was looking for solutions before the summer.

During his keynote address, Commissioner Frattini called for more emphasis on information sharing and exchange of best practices across the EU. Focusing on the EUR 2.8 billion to be made available for security-related research (2007-2013), Frattini posited that public-private cooperation and technical innovation were vital but industry's products were currently too expensive. Solutions had to be tailor-made to suit the multi-faceted security marketplace – products developed for the police would probably not be usable by the transport sector for example – and "protection for privacy" had to be in-built within systems. Everyone was agreed, there had to be a balance between protecting citizens' rights and ensuring that their privacy was not violated. ■





Finmeccanica's Remo Pertica talks with Benita Ferrero-Waldner

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

**Benita Maria Ferrero-Waldner** European Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy

Opening the conference, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner referred to EU cooperation as the only sensible approach to enhance European security. While acknowledging that the future structure of Europe was unclear in some areas, the Commissioner said the EU must focus on its citizens' most pressing concerns if it is to convince them of its continued relevance. Issues such as WMD proliferation, widespread poverty, social exclusion, human rights, corruption, illegal immigration, climate change and, of course, terrorism, were all major security concerns for the EU and its 450 million citizens.

The Commissioner acknowledged that globalisation had some negative effects, but overall it was a force for good. For example, while illegal migration and human trafficking are real problems, legal migration is necessary to maintain Europe's global competitiveness.

Looking at the bigger picture, the Commissioner pointed out that the role of politicians was action and urged the conference to provide concrete proposals for future policy measures. Defining her specific role, the Commissioner said she would take the policy initiatives necessary to combat broader security problems and to turn challenges into opportunities. Action at

the EU level was the only effective approach to protecting the EU's interests, promoting its strategic goals and consolidating a rule-based international order for the future.

### **The Commissioner focussed on three aspects of the EU's security policy:**

- 1) The neighbourhood policy (ENP): seen as a security policy, as the EU encourages economic integration, more good governance and closer political relations. The end result should be greater stability and security on the EU's borders. The Commissioner focussed on migration and energy flows, with bilateral action plans being put in place covering these and other areas with each neighbouring country.

Another vital element was strengthening of the judiciary. Overall, by helping its neighbours the EU would, in turn, help itself.

- 2) "human security concept": this underpins the EU's security approach, as the strategy is based on the security of the individual citizen; people must have "freedom from want and freedom from fear". This concept is a holistic approach to security, aiming to tackle inequalities and all types of conflicts.

**"The European Neighbourhood Policy is, in essence, a security policy"**

**Benita Ferrero-Waldner**



Benita Maria Ferrero-Waldner



- 3) “an integrated approach”: the internal and external dimensions of security have to be effectively coordinated, threats do not respect borders and the EU’s economic stability depends on trans-border flows (of information, people, goods, money, etc.). Any solutions must respect human rights.

The Commissioner emphasised the need for an effective security sector (police, armed forces, justice institutions) in all countries as an essential pre-requisite for internal and external security. Any state’s citizens should expect to be protected and their rights safeguarded. The

Commission had just adopted a paper on a “coherent approach” to security sector reform that added to the ESDP concepts adopted by the European Council under the UK presidency. This would employ joint tools for planning and implementation, integrating reforms into country and regional strategies and checking compliance with international standards.

The Commissioner said European R&D and innovation should be harnessed towards security research, as this would bring multiple benefits in the areas of space, maritime and air transport, etc. Funds would have to be allocated accordingly. ■

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

**Denis Ranque** Thales CEO

Thales CEO Denis Ranque was in agreement with the Commissioner, putting his weight behind the call for greater cooperation across Europe. As a practical step, Ranque wanted greater emphasis to be placed on public-private partnership.

Opening his remarks, Ranque referred to global security as the major challenge for all developed states in the 21st century. He agreed with Commissioner Ferrero-

Waldner that there could be no distinction between internal and external threats. Attacks had to be prevented and, in parallel, basic causes of instability had to be addressed.

Ranque wanted a comprehensive and coordinated response from the EU and its Member States. The existence of a "common market", and the impossibility of predicting where the threats would originate from, meant that coordination was essential. Furthermore, Ranque argued that the EU's citizens expected such coordination.

Moving to the industrial revolutions of the late 20th century, Ranque said dramatic improvements in the flow of information, money and goods (speed, accuracy and simplicity) had led to some of the security risks that we were now experiencing. But he argued that industry

could help solve the problems by identifying, monitoring and analysing these flows.

Looking specifically at the civil security market, Ranque saw dramatic differences in comparison to the more mature defence marketplace. Within the civil security arena, responsibilities were shared across ministries and local authorities, private companies were involved and the overall demand was totally fragmented. Solutions, were coming from all areas of industry.

This led Ranque to define the needs identified by Thales:

A detailed definition of the EU's security concept (internal and external objectives, to be met by cooperation between the EU and its Member States)

**“There is not enough money and too much fragmentation, we need a huge coordination effort”**

**Denis Ranque**

- Better implementation of agreed EU policies
- More cooperation between actors via a comprehensive integrated systems approach
- Development of dual-use technology within the EU framework programme
- Better cooperation between public and private players
- Greater public-private dialogue to encourage convergence of these efforts

Denis Ranque



Ranque summed up the situation by saying there was insufficient money to resolve the problems existing in a fragmented marketplace. A huge coordination effort was required.

Thales' proposal was to bring together a number of companies (eight to-date) so that they could jointly offer a platform (known as ESP 21) for public-private dialogue in order to tackle the

many issues in the security arena. Ranque invited interested parties to join and to expand the scope of the exercise. ■

# Session 1

## What layers of threat should Europe plan for?

**Ambassador Georg Witschel**, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Commissioner for Combating International Terrorism, argued that the EU's strategy was spot on. Everything was in place and the priority now was to "implement, implement, implement". He added that it was not necessary to reinvent the wheel, and that solutions had to be built on existing methods.

Ambassador Witschel contended that a new security environment existed, as typified by the attacks on Madrid and London. Terrorism was now a worldwide threat, operated by network-style organisations that were hard to decapitate. Religious beliefs played a major part and Ambassador Witschel agreed with previous speakers that the internal and external aspects of security were now inseparable.

Faced with the problems inherent within this new security environment, Ambassador Witschel described an EU that was peaceful but vulnerable. However, he believed that the EU had developed the correct strategic framework, as outlined initially in the Solana Strategy document. His second pillar was the Hague Programme<sup>1</sup> that aimed to strengthen control at the EU's external borders, improve internal security and



Ambassador Georg Witschel

prevent terrorism. Added to those strands was the EU's Counter-terrorism strategy that covered tackling the causes of terrorism, improving the security of critical infrastructure, pursuing terrorists across borders and responding to terrorist acts by minimising the consequences. His final piece of the jigsaw was the various initiatives, mainly national, aimed at stopping people being attracted to terrorism.

**"The EU has everything in place, we need to implement, implement, implement."**  
Georg Witschel

The Ambassador's conclusion was that everything was in place. He wanted the focus to be "implementation, implementation, implementation." In conclusion, the Ambassador

saw the need for pragmatism – there was “no one size fits all”. The main responsibility for security lay with Member States, but existing methods of cooperation had to be reinforced. There were practical steps to be taken: creation of disease outbreak systems, improvement of synergies between alert networks in the areas of chemical, biological and nuclear security, exchange of best practices regarding protection of critical infrastructure, the installation of radio-nuclear control points (outer borders of Schengen), greater cooperation within the Joint Situation Centre and intensified cooperation on R&D to save EU taxpayers’ money.

**Simon Manley**, Head of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Counter-Terrorism Policy Department, agreed with the Ambassador that the threats were changing and he concurred with his description of the challenges to be faced. He also wanted implementation of the agreed programmes and Manley did not want the pursuit of new collective actions to be used to paper over the cracks present in some national efforts.

During his remarks, Manley looked at the questions on the agenda:

As to whether the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy could be tailored to take an “all hazards” approach (to meet terrorist attacks, natural catastrophes, disease pandemics, etc.), Manley argued that the December 2005 agreement already set out a clear strategy (with four strands – prevent, protect, pursue, respond). It was therefore well-tailored now to meet all hazards.

In regard to the specific steps needed to strengthen EU countries’ security, Manley was



again in agreement with Ambassador Witschel. It was not so much a question of new steps but rather the implementation of agreed priorities including establishing proper crisis co-ordination mechanisms and operating procedures, rehearsing agreed procedures, etc.). The EU’s Counter-Terrorism policy had to bring added-value to national efforts by strengthening border security, using peer evaluations, sharing best practices, etc.

On the final question of whether further pooling of national resources was viable, Manley wanted the focus to be on day-to-day operational cooperation. It had to be needs-driven and practical. Manley did not want existing co-operation to be forced in a collective strait-jacket.

In conclusion, Manley said we shouldn’t pursue collective solutions at the expense of or in preference to addressing the deficiencies in national efforts. It was necessary to deliver results across the board. This was also part of the wider debate about a “Europe of results”: we



Magnus Norell

needed both to be less defensive about what we had achieved (e.g. the CT Strategy and European Security Strategy, the expansion of ESDP missions) and more rigorous in judging whether collective or national action could best make a difference in the lives of European citizens.

**Magnus Norell**, the Director of the Centre for the Study of Low Intensity Conflicts and Terrorism at the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), was not in total agreement with the previous speakers. He saw great difficulties in implementing programmes across 25 Member States. Norell wanted more realism, and he favoured national programmes backed by bi- and tri-lateral agreements.

Norell argued that cooperation at the EU level had been talked about for the past decade, but all the action was coming from national programmes. Coordination was necessary but this was a lower priority than national

**“Some things will never be shared across 25 Member States.”**  
**Magnus Norell**

measures that had to be taken to protect EU citizens. Norell saw this as perfectly normal. Each country had a different agenda and the threats were not the same for each Member State.

As an example, Norell said that Member States were reluctant to give Europol greater powers to fight terrorism. This was understandable, as some intelligence information would never be shared across 25 Member States. Trilateral and bilateral agreements were a better and more pragmatic way forward. Looking to the future, he could not see the development of a genuine defence and security policy across 25 Member States. EU counter-terrorism instruments were not robust enough and the citizens were showing (via the Constitution) that they were not convinced the EU was acting in their best interests. Norell had heard a reference to the EU being a “wimp” in the way it was facing terrorists. He tended to agree, it was time to use “all the tools in the toolbox”.

### **The first session debate**

Opening the debate, moderator **Jean-Yves Haine**, Research Fellow for European Security, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), reasoned that all the speakers had agreed that prime responsibility lay with Member States.

However, he could see significant differences in the threats faced by Member States, e.g. between Spain (with its borders facing Africa) and Poland for example. Haine also reminded the conference of trans-national vulnerabilities, where the existence of one

weak spot could have alarming repercussions across the EU.

### **A platform for dialogue**

EADS' Director for EU and NATO Affairs **Michel Troubetzkoy** was concerned about the platform announced by Denis Ranque. He said that discussions were ongoing between EADS and Thales, but he wanted to know if this commercial initiative was backed by the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD). And was there a problem if some organisations stayed outside of the platform?

Thales' **Denis Ranque** said that *ESP21* was initiated by the private sector to improve public-private dialogue. The Commission had given its support and everyone was welcome to join.

### **Public-private initiatives**

Thales' Senior Vice President for Marketing **Edgar Buckley** wanted to know why there had been so little mention of the need for more public-private intervention. Such a dialogue was essential as so much of critical infrastructure was in private hands. Did the panellists agree?



Jean-Yves Haine

**Ambassador Witschel** noted that Russia would be setting-up a public-private partnership to combat terrorism. He would be watching the results. As for why there was not so much attention paid to EU public-private activities, the Ambassador stated that most initiatives were happening at a national level.

### **A lack of definition on what constitutes a terrorist attack**

The Egyptian Ambassador to Belgium **Mahmoud Karem** said he was missing a

## **Cooperation on the ground**

- **EU's Joint Situation Centre: issues intelligence assessments based on input from Member States, to the Council, Commission etc.**
- **Eupol: cooperation against trafficking, money laundering, terrorism**
- **EuroJust: state magistrates working together against trans-border crimes**
- **Information sharing: various network and alert systems, to combat biological threats, pandemics, etc.**

real definition of “common defence security”. He argued that definitions varied between the US, the EU and countries south of the Mediterranean. Threat perceptions also varied especially in volatile areas where there were unresolved political conflicts such as those between the Arab world and Israel. It was not sufficient to build a culture of security, as it was necessary to deliver equipment, training and develop more cooperation with intelligence agencies (on an equal basis) – it was a call for more assistance. **Magnus Norell** agreed, the lack of definition made it difficult for countries to cooperate. He wanted countries to be more practical, and define for themselves what constituted an act of terrorism.

#### **EU-coordination vs. national / bilateral programmes**

Defense News’ **Brooks Tigner** asked a hypothetical question concerning a catastrophic event, such as a bomb in the channel or an attack on power lines across the Alps. Did the panel think that the public would then be supportive of the mainly national and bilateral agreements that were being put in place rather than genuine EU-based programmes.

**Simon Manley** argued that the public would want to know how effective such programmes

were. In the examples given by Tigner, Manley said that intensive bi-lateral and tri-lateral actions were already in place. EU collective actions had their place but they should not stifle national and bi-lateral efforts.

#### **Top-down, bottom-up or something in-between?**

TNO’s Director for European Affairs **Ernst van Hoek** thought that national efforts backed by EU coordination were useful but reasoned that the addition of an additional layer would be useful. Did the panellists agree?

**Ambassador Witschel** said the picture was far from clear. It was not only Member States’ governments involved, as there were also local authorities (within the federal states in Germany) on the front line. Rapid alert mechanisms were in place, although responses might be hampered by lack of training. He was reasonably confident of the ability to cope with mid-level disasters. The Ambassador preferred a bottom-up approach rather than a huge European super-agency set-up to create with all types of disasters. For Witschel, the focus should be on information sharing and coordination. ■



## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

**Giuseppe Orsi** AgustaWestland CEO

Beginning the second session, AgustaWestland CEO Giuseppe Orsi gave a keynote address in which he described current efforts to improve coordination as the first steps towards the creation of a single integrated European Homeland Security Agency.

Orsi insisted that everyone take a broad view when addressing the security issue. It was not just a matter of seeing if the right instruments were being provided, but of also optimising the overall performance, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the various solutions.

Taking the helicopter, and other vertical lift platforms, as examples of security solutions, Orsi gave an overview of the flexibility and power that they brought to the security marketplace. Emphasising their use in the case of national (and international) disasters, he listed their performance in all types of emergencies - from forest fires and highway accidents to terrorist attacks, and in response to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and landslides.

Turning to civil-military collaboration, Orsi described the dramatic increase in the demand for helicopters for security-related duties:

- about 3,000 civil-registered helicopters in the world employed in law enforcement duties, 1,000 less than 10 years old
- a fleet of several thousand airframes

employed worldwide by military/paramilitary forces in security roles

- use by the US Department of Homeland Security in round-the-clock air defence over Washington and New York City
- use by the US Port Authority (a sophisticated command and control helicopter)
- support in the fight against drug trafficking, via the US Coast Guard's Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON)

Looking 25 years out, Orsi introduced the concept of tilt-rotor aircraft with the ability to blend rotary wing (the capability to hover) and fixed wing (speed and range) benefits. These developments, together with improvements in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), were described as a result of a long-term investment effort by aircraft and mission-equipment manufacturers in Europe and in the US. With security and civil protection issues now a high priority for European governments, Orsi saw the need for a coordinated response which included the availability of capable equipment and highly-trained professionals. He added that industry was ready to invest in new technologies for the protection of Europe and its citizens.

Adding a message for those responsible for public procurement (for homeland security), Orsi stressed the need to make purchasing decisions on best value rather than on lowest-

cost. There had to be room for growth in the chosen instruments, as missions would change over time. Other key factors were: flexibility, interoperability and logistics support.

Orsi emphasised the need for a comprehensive package of capabilities in the face of complex security threats. These capabilities had to be integrated within a wider national security system and, above that, within a strategy that

emphasised the coordination and interoperability of EU nations. But even that coordination had limits. Orsi saw this as the first step towards the creation of a single integrated European Homeland Security Agency. It would act as a counterpart to industry in order to maximise the output that strategic public-private partnerships could deliver in order to better protect European nations. ■



Giuseppe Orsi

# Session 2

## Are we providing the right instruments?

The first speaker in the second session was **Sandra Bell**, RUSI's Director for Homeland Security & Resilience. Bell reminded her audience of the need for solutions to combine innovation, agility and speed – hence her call for SMEs and academia to be fully involved. She also warned of the current fragmented condition of the security marketplace. That meant that there was insufficient investment and hence little likelihood that layered, strategic solutions would be developed. That was bad news for business and bad news for policy – it was time for action.

Her first message was that the types of solutions under discussion (mass-transit screening, border control) would take a significant amount of time to be fully developed. Requirements, threats and space vulnerabilities had to be fully understood. As for critical infrastructure, Bell emphasised that much of that was in private hands and that meant private investment. This investment would have to come from diverse markets (transport, energy, finance, etc.) which were actually inter-dependent.

Bell's answer was to unite the public and private demand-sides to create an attractive market for industry to invest in. Furthermore,

**“(...to fight terrorism) we need to combine innovation, agility and speed.”**

**Sandra Bell**



Sandra Bell

there had to be a dialogue with industry so that the risks on each side could be understood. She described developments in the UK where all the actors were being brought together (SMEs, academia, trade associations, large industry) on the supply-side, together with cross-governmental and critical private-sector infrastructures and responders on the demand-side. The result would be a shared national government (public-private) industrial strategy. But the strategy would have to produce solutions that combined innovation, agility and speed – a “large beast” was not required.



Bell did not want knee-jerk reactions to disasters. One major problem could be information-sharing between public and private players. Global security information (on the public side) and competitive information (on the private side) were both closely guarded – it was going to be a real challenge and a real barrier to progress.

MEP **Bogdan Klich**, the European Parliament's Security Research Report Rapporteur wanted new capabilities to meet new threats. That implied more investment in security R&D and greater cooperation between Member States.

Taking a broad look at the security environment, Klich outlined the differences between US and EU approaches, with Europe emphasising the role of international organisations, being less ready to use force and preferring “preventive engagement”. Many aspects of security were coming together (internal and external, civil and military, soft and hard) and that pointed towards fully-integrated solutions.

Turning to enlargement, Klich felt this had made the EU (and its borders) more vulnerable. The ENP covered countries with radically different approaches, from Belarus (not democratic) to the Ukraine (where democracy was emerging). Klich wanted the EU to play a more dominant role in promoting democracy in the neighbouring states.

The EU had a growing responsibility to ensure peace (through diplomacy and military means), but this increased the security threats within the European homeland. Advanced instruments were essential if the EU was to have an effective security policy but there was a massive gap in EU and US R&D expenditure. Klich painted a picture of great fragmentation and duplication in European research, with no coherent approach at the EU level.

Civil and military research programmes were also seen as being disconnected. That could only be overcome by developing a flexible, coherent and coordinated approach to security research – hence the European Security Research Programme (ESRP). The Preparatory Action had identified five crucial areas (improving situation awareness, optimising security network systems, protecting against terrorism, enhancing crisis management and integrating information and communications systems).

Klich added that security was continually changing and that in-depth analysis had to be ongoing. Civil and military synergy was needed as it could save money by avoiding duplication and fragmentation. The ESRP should support national programmes and the cooperation between Member States had to be further developed.

The US Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT Program Deputy Director **Robert Mocny**, gave an overview of the US-VISIT Program<sup>2</sup>, a cornerstone of the US border management and immigration strategy adopted post-9/11. The focus of the programme is the collection of biometric and biographic information on individual travellers. Establishing a means to check the identity of individuals is a crucial element of the programme, as 19 individuals carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks. While the programme received some early criticisms, overall, US-VISIT had been successful, and had not affected tourism. Mocny described the US-VISIT programme's goals as:

- enhancing the security of US citizens and visitors to the US
- facilitating legitimate travel and trade
- ensuring the integrity of the immigration system (the abuse of the system was said to be an "unspoken truth")
- protecting the privacy of visitors

On the last point, Mocny highlighted the ability of visitors to be able to check their personal information and to ask for it to be corrected if they felt it was necessary.



### **The Power of Biometrics**

Describing the pre-9/11 situation, where information was spread across disparate databases, Mocny said there was no real confidence that decision-makers had access to the right information. In fact, the abuse of the programme was said to be an "unspoken truth." The real power of the US-VISIT programme was its use of biometrics. Its database held nearly 60 million finger scans, which led to the virtual elimination of visa shopping and visa fraud. An added benefit was the protection of an individual's personal identity, as visas could not be sold


## **US-VISIT programme**

- **In operation at nearly 300 ports of entry**
- **Working at 211 visa issuing posts**
- **Nearly 60 million finger scans taken**
- **1,100 people stopped for visa problems**
- **"tourism not affected"**

when associated with an individual's biometrics. Given the success of the US-VISIT programme, Mocny encouraged the exportation of the programme's techniques and methods.

The US was currently advising the UK on a new visa programme, and he stressed the advantages of all systems being interoperable.

DG Enterprise and Industry's **Herbert Von Bose**, Head of Unit for Preparatory Action for Security Research, was confident that the EU was on the right track in its efforts to improve coordination within the security research area.



**Herbert Von Bose**

As security and defence were seen to be areas where the EU would be in danger of infringing on national sovereignty, the initial focus had been on civil research rather than security policy. Within this, citizens security was being prioritised. In addition, the Commission saw the need for a competitive security industry. Von Bose used aeronautical research as an example

## “We must avoid systems that don't talk to each other.”

**Bob Mocny**

of the way he would like to see the future for security research. Aeronautics research had started small but now accounted for one-third of public spending in the research domain.

A public (and private) market was required. Public priorities centred on border patrolling and counter-terrorism, while private sector priorities were crisis management and critical infrastructure protection. The intention was to promote common products but that was not easy when the market was fragmented even within Member States.

Despite the small amount of EU security research funding currently available, some €15 million per annum, Von Bose was confident that the Commission was on the right track. Significant progress had been made in the IT, telecommunications and aerospace research areas, with less coordinated activity in the pharma, chemical and biochemical sectors. A key enabler was the exchange of best practices and Von Bose had been encouraged by the progress made bringing together the border control staff to discuss common strategies. The key was to set manageable goals.

Von Bose concluded by praising the work of the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB)<sup>3</sup>, which helped put EU security research on the right track. Noting that defence research was not in the scope, Von Bose nevertheless indicated the importance of close coordination while setting up EU security research with the European Defence Agency (EDA) - different clients but similar technologies - so duplication could be avoided.

## The second session debate

### Safe or sorry?

Opening the Q&A session moderator **Giles Merritt** asked the panel if EU citizens should feel safer now than on September 12th, 2001. Was the EU getting its act together?

**Bogdan Klich** argued that there had been an improvement in the intellectual and practical capability to support national state programmes in the face of terrorist threats. The European Parliament's view was that Europe was now better prepared. **Sandra Bell** agreed. Looking at the risks in total (including threats, vulnerability and the consequences), she saw real progress. As the threats were continually changing, there was always room for improvement, but the EU's information about vulnerabilities and the ability to minimise the consequences had definitely improved. **Giuseppe Orsi** also saw

an improvement in awareness. However, as a representative of industry, he saw a lot of work to be done before a common vision was established. But he felt the EU was on the right track. **Robert Mocny** felt that wherever measures had been taken (either in the US or in the EU) then citizens were safer. But problems existed in areas where steps were still needed, such as information sharing and the development of common systems.

### Containers – a security weakness?

On the subject of containers, Merritt wanted to know if the EU was taking action to secure the 140 million containers that were regularly circulating in Europe. **Herbert Von Bose** said they were a major headache, but that there was a significant amount of international cooperation. Advance information was needed ahead of the arrival of a container in a country and Von Bose wanted to see more US-EU cooperation. ■

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

**Franco Frattini** European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security

Commissioner Frattini opened his remarks by painting a picture of a fragmented security environment in the post-Cold War world. In the face of threats linked to terrorism, religious intolerance and economic inequalities, the EU was determining how it could progress – together with the US – on the parallel objectives of:

- expanding democracy across the globe
- strengthening relationships in operational terms to develop an effective response
- striking a balance between security and the protection of civil liberties

The Commissioner wanted the US and Europe to guard their shared values by developing a new approach that ensured measures taken were legitimate, proportionate and respectful of human rights. It was no longer possible for a single state to combat terrorism, and experiences, information and resources had to be shared between nations. Commissioner Frattini argued that remarkable progress had been made in the fields of police and judicial cooperation: the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) had reduced extradition times from months to days, while there had been real progress in bringing about

legislation to freeze bank accounts when money laundering was suspected. Legislation to enhance information exchange and the future possibility of joint operation teams were also seen as important steps.

However a more comprehensive approach was needed and that was the reason for the EU's

Counter-Terrorism strategy, introduced towards the end of 2005, based on the principles of prevention, protection, pursuit and response.

1) *prevention*: proposals to stop recruitment and radicalisation of terrorists

2) *protection*: proposals to be produced with the aim of protecting critical

infrastructures (shared responsibilities between institutions and Member States)

3) *pursuit*: while primarily a national responsibility, the EU's role is provide suitable tools for nations to pursue and prosecute terrorists, e.g. the EAW

4) *response*: the priority is to enhance European crisis management capacity, where the interlinking of various Commission rapid alert systems could play a major part.

**“We can't just use military action, we need more communication with the public and more international awareness (of the causes of terrorism)”**

**Franco Frattini**





Franco Frattini

### **Public-private partnership**

On public and private sector cooperation, Commissioner Frattini focused on four issues: information sharing (especially exchange of best practices), pooling of resources, research and innovation. More money was needed to back scientific efforts and build security into goods and services. The Commission's research budget available in the period 2004-2006 under the Preparatory Action for Security and Research was EUR 45 million but this was far from

sufficient. The increased amounts envisaged, EUR 2.8 billion to be available for security and space research in the period 2007-2013, would be crucial in the fight against the various threats.

However, Commissioner Frattini also wanted industry to get its act together. Industry's solutions had to be affordable, adaptable and they must guarantee privacy for the individual:

- *prices*: many of the private-sector tools were not yet affordable for mass markets

- *more adaptable solutions*: business had to produce purpose-built products (not simply adapt solutions from the defence market) that met specific requirements
- *data protection*: solutions had to be built so that they guaranteed citizens' right to privacy as well as offering security – this balance was essential

The Commissioner also wanted a completely open market on both sides of the Atlantic, so that everyone could benefit from the best available technologies. The EU was committed to working with international partners and was already cooperating with more than 80 third countries, to the extent of spending almost EUR 400 million per annum (training police forces, institution building, implementing agreements and capacity building for the judiciary).

Emphasising the importance of EU-US relations, Commissioner Frattini said the increase in terrorism had highlighted the shared values belonging to the EU and the US. Coordination would continue to be robust, as shown in the speeding-up extradition procedures.

Moving to the breaking news, the Commissioner spoke about the European Court of Justice's decision to declare as illegal the EU-US agreement requiring airlines to transfer passenger data to the US authorities. He reasoned that while the EU would respect the judgement, it would

also be developing concrete ideas for replacing the legal basis of the initiative without abandoning the substance, i.e. the guaranteed security of transportation and continuity of data exchange between the US and the EU.

Commissioner Frattini also described progress on biometrics, and the excellent cooperation between the EU and FBI. Both sides were also addressing the terrorists' finances by, for example, looking at ways of freezing assets. However, human rights had to be respected and the US and the EU agreed on this principle. Information sharing continued to be vital, and the Commissioner wanted the US to speed-up visa-free travel to the US for all 25 of the EU's Member States (as short-term visas were still needed for 10 Member States).

In conclusion, Commissioner Frattini repeated that the EU had made tremendous progress in enhancing its security, but two factors were vital:

- *delivery of results*: the EU had to ensure that bodies such as Europol and EuroJust delivered results, so counter-terrorism legislation had to be implemented as well as enacted
- *improved coordination*: within the EU and with international partners, especially the US, as security of citizens inside and outside of the EU could not be separated. ■

# Session 3

## Can the US and EU fashion common homeland security strategies?

### The debate

The aftermath of 9/11 at first saw an increase in transatlantic frictions over different approaches to anti-terrorist policy by the U.S. and EU Member States. This transatlantic debate, which linked European and American audiences via satellite, asked how much coordination existed in areas ranging from intelligence-gathering to surveillance, and from enhanced security measures to civil and infrastructural protection? Were the US and Europe thinking alike on homeland security?

### The Washington position

Opening the debate from Washington, **David Heyman** asked his US-based panellists to give their views on what had been accomplished and what they saw as the critical aspects of security policy.

Describing the transatlantic alliance as strong and getting stronger, **Ambassador Crumpton** emphasised the need for a deeper understanding of a common threat. Institutions and alliances had to remain strong in the face of new threats. Adding that shared technology and intelligence collection were fundamental, the Ambassador argued that the key was

leadership through “trusted networks” (both formal and informal). These had to include academia, business leaders and government representatives with flexibility and speed of the essence. **Stewart Baker** agreed that it was vital to have a continuing dialogue and a strong anti-terrorist coalition across the Atlantic. Intelligence sharing was critical and had to be maintained at a high and effective level.

### A view from the EU

In Brussels, Jamie Shea introduced the panellists and first off, **Commissioner Franco Frattini** also emphasised the importance of international cooperation based on solid networks. Describing the current security environment, the Commissioner said there was no distinction between the internal and external dimensions of security. He wanted a common security strategy based on the spread of democracy across the globe. Information exchange had to be maintained and improved, and a correct balance had to be struck between maintaining citizens’ rights and guaranteeing their overall protection.

Finmeccanica’s **Remo Pertica** agreed that solutions had to be more multi-layered and multinational. He wanted a joint and integrated approach in the face of terrorist threats and he

introduced an industry perspective, saying that the US tended to be taking a more national-centric view. This made it difficult for European companies to penetrate the global security market and to foster Transatlantic industrial collaboration. He also stated that the US should consider internationalising its programmes where appropriate and waive the Buy-America type of restrictions that often hobble collaboration. Thales' **Denis Ranque** agreed that EU-US interoperability was essential. This had been achieved to a certain extent on the defence front, in Afghanistan and Iraq, but greater collaboration was needed on civil security. Here, the picture was much more fragmented.

### Washington's priorities

Brussels moderator **Jamie Shea** asked Washington what their main concerns were, given that there had been no terrorist attacks in the US since 9/11. And as a supplementary question, what did Washington see as the main priorities for the EU to be concentrating on?

Heyman said all risks were important, as the flow of people and goods had to continue. But as well as strengthening homeland security, it was important to deny safe havens to terrorists.

Ambassador Crumpton was concerned about the relatively small size of the terrorist cells as that made them much more difficult to detect. The problems were exacerbated as these cells were often self-contained, although some were linked to trans-national criminals.

Baker wanted passport checks to be tightened and more emphasis on the ability to identify suspect containers early in transit. Ambassador Crumpton also highlighted the need to bring the government and the people in line. All actions had to be legitimate and it was essential to develop a clear perception of the threat and the increasing importance of a global media.

### Brussels perceptions

Passing the questions back to Brussels, Heyman asked if EU and US threat perceptions were fundamentally different. And which actions should be taken to strengthen security?

Commissioner Frattini focused on the need to protect critical infrastructure. In that respect, the EU's decision to spend EUR 2.8 billion on security-related research (2007-2013) was important. He emphasised the requirement to address

the root causes of terrorism and the reasons why terrorists were recruited. There was a new phenomenon in Europe, suicide bombers who were both well-educated and born in Europe; they were not always linked to, but were inspired by, Al-Qaeda's message. This meant that threat analysis was important leading to a better understanding of how risks could be eradicated from inside society. The Commissioner wanted the role of media to be examined, as it could not be allowed to incite terrorism.

Ranque reasoned that more civil cooperation was needed in order to protect critical

infrastructure. Some aspects of infrastructure security were global, and that implied global cooperation – everyone needed to be working on a single set of specifications. Shea asked if that meant that while the technology existed, it was not always used in an optimal way.

Ranque insisted that common standards of interoperability had to be put in place, for container tracking for example. In the world of defence, collaboration was good (due primarily to NATO) but it was missing in the civil sector. Military communication standards existed in the network centric warfare sector for example, and similar initiatives were needed in the fight against terrorists.

Pertica felt that the protection of local industry might be a negative factor in the attempts to develop common standards. This led Shea to comment that a transatlantic agency for standardisation might be required.

### **A need for more communication**

Asking the first question from Brussels, the EU Military Staff's **Ian Abbott** saw no room for complacency. There was work to be done, especially in regard to the threats caused by indigenous passport holders (as in the London bombings). Abbott asked if we were losing the battle to explain the situation to the public. They needed a better understanding of the threats faced and of what exactly we were protecting.

Baker agreed that there was no room for complacency. Globalisation had introduced new opportunities for disruption, new forms of terrorism would arrive on a regular basis. Ambassador Crumpton returned to Abbott's point about what we were protecting. He offered the following: people, liberal institutions, democracy, infrastructure and the alliances, including those with strong Muslim links.

### **One narrative, or two?**

Thales's **Edgar Buckley** saw major differences in the way the US and Europe perceived the actual situation. The US said it was at war, while the EU talked about political, social and criminal upheavals. This was a major disconnect and an agreed narrative was essential on both sides of the Atlantic.

Ambassador Crumpton said the two narratives showed differences in emphasis

and these had to be discussed. All instruments had to be blended together - the keys being the perception of the threat and ultimately the legitimacy of the actions taken.

### **Examining the roots of terrorism**

A question from Washington related to Commissioner Frattini's comments about suicide bombers in Europe who had no connections with Al-Qaeda, but who had been inspired by them. The questioner wanted to know if similar considerations would come under scrutiny in the US. What exactly was the US fighting?

**“We have the right technologies but they are not all ways employed.”**

**Remo Pertica**



Remo Pertica, Denis Ranque, Jamie Shea and Franco Frattini debate with Washington



In Brussels, Commissioner Frattini saw cooperation as essential as terrorists were trying to encourage a clash between civilisations. It was important to determine the roots of terrorism and that meant keeping contact with all the different communities (diasporas) living on EU territory. It was not possible to use military force alone, as international awareness of the pre-conditions leading to terrorism were just as important. US-EU dialogue was another aspect of the equation, as well as public-private cooperation on security research.

Ambassador Crumpton argued that we were fighting those enemies who use terrorism as a tactic but also fighting those conditions around the world that the enemy was exploiting. That was where non-military means had to play a role.

### **The European Court of Justice's ruling**

The Security & Defence Agenda's Director, **Giles Merritt**, turned to the issue of the European Court of Justice's ruling that the EU-US agreement requiring airlines to transfer passenger data to the US authorities was illegal. Merritt wanted to know what could be done about the situation.

Commissioner Frattini was sanguine, saying that it had been annulled on a legal technicality and not on the content. The Commissioner said the agreement would be in force until the end of September. Continuity of data exchange was essential to prevent terrorist attacks, and he

could not see the flow of information stopping. The Commissioner would be presenting concrete ideas to the Ministers (of the EU-25) and he was confident they would agree about the level of importance.

Baker was in total agreement. He could not see the data flows stopping or planes being grounded. Ambassador Crumpton added that there was no alternative to cooperative data exchange.

### **Summing up**

Heyman concluded that a deep understanding of a common threat was the priority if progress was to be continued in the face of terrorism. There had to be better intelligence sharing and better analysis.

Without that, there would be different perceptions and conflicting narratives – and progress could actually be hindered. Dialogue across the Atlantic had to continue.

In Brussels, Shea called for discussions between policymakers and industrialists as well as a dialogue across the Atlantic. The enemy was now much different than that of the Cold War. There were many more unknowns. Technical solutions did exist but they needed to be implemented, and that required coordination. Overall there might be different narratives (between the EU and US) but there were shared values and that's why the partnership was in good health. ■



# Session 4

## Is Europe getting the politics of security right?

Opening the final session, **Giles Merritt** said it would look at the wider picture and the longer term aspects of the terrorist threat. What policies would be needed and would it be necessary to view minority communities in a different way, given the immigration rates necessary to topus the European workforce?

United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG)'s Director-General, **Sergei Ordzhonikidze**, outlined the threats and benefits of globalisation. A new approach (multifaceted and multilateral) was required, and he described the UN-EU cooperation in places such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo. Explaining that UNOG focused on regional cooperation, he stated that the UN saw room for closer cooperation with the EU and its Member States, especially in two areas:

■ *disarmament:*

Ordzhonikidze said this was a key factor in building confidence, improving relations among states and consequently enhancing security and promoting development. What we were witnessing today, however, was a

**“Over \$1 trillion (annually) is being spent on arms, imagine what could be achieved if just 1% was spent on improving people’s lives”**  
**Sergei Ordzhonikidze**



Sergei Ordzhonikidze

de facto revival of the arms race, albeit in a different and geographical context

- *international terrorism:* The UN's comprehensive Counter-Terrorism strategy

aimed to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism, deny terrorists the means to carry out an attack, deter states from supporting terrorism, develop state capacity to defeat terrorism, and defend human rights

Ordzhonikidze stressed the need to understand the underlying reasons for



terrorism. The West was totally “off-the-mark” in talking about Islamic terrorism as there was no direct link between terrorist campaigns and any particular religion. He insisted that developing countries could not be allowed to fend for themselves. All countries had to work together and aim to develop an increased tolerance between the people of the North and the South.

In this regard, Ordzhonikidze referred to the Secretary-General’s proposals (of July 2005) for an “alliance of civilisations” that aimed to bring together Christian and Muslim nations. A high-level group would be assessing new and emerging threats (based on political, social and religious forces), and recommending strategies and actions. Ordzhonikidze argued that the “vicious circle” of misperception feeding extremism, and extremism appearing to validate misperception had to be broken and that meant fully understanding future challenges. The UN was undergoing a difficult process of reform and it looked forward to working closely with the EU in the challenging times to come.

The OSCE’s Conflict Prevention Centre Director,

**Ambassador Lamberto Zannier**, returned to Giles Merritt’s earlier question, – “are we safer?” Ambassador Zannier argued that strategies, including that of the OSCE, have been updated to reflect the new risks, but that there remained the question of whether we should do more to address the root causes of new risks, given their complex nature.

With many of the threats being global (drug and people trafficking, organised crime, etc.), the Ambassador reasoned that national policies were not enough. A more comprehensive approach to security was needed, focussing not only on the terrorist threats, but also addressing issues such as the protection of human rights, the spread of democracy and the improvement of economic governance. However, Ambassador Zannier said that such an approach required the introduction of better operational procedures, closer cooperation along international actors and a constant dialogue that produced a clearer alignment of responsibilities.

Looking at the OSCE’s tools, the Ambassador described:

- *The anti-terrorism unit:* inter alia, to increase support for UN conventions
- *A border management concept:* provision of assistance on the ground
- *Security sector reform:* including police training, equipping border forces, etc.
- *Politico-military tools:* including initiatives to reduce stockpiling, etc.

These activities had to be embedded within much broader policies. As an example,

Ambassador Zannier described the educational system in Central Asia which needed attention, to avoid long-term problems. New security threats had to be addressed at the source, and dialogue was a key tool to avoid a “clash of civilisations”.

Closing on the relationship between the EU and the OSCE, the Ambassador said this had improved, but there needed to be a much clearer perception of how the EU could use the different tools to promote its own policies. With the EU developing the ESDP, it was now being seen more clearly as a political player in its own right. However, Ambassador Zannier said that an effort was needed to recognise the usefulness of more neutral or broader frameworks, such as the OSCE, for the achievement of objectives which required the active involvement of non-EU member states. For example, the OSCE had Muslim countries among its members and this could make it a

## “We need a strict adherence to legality and humanitarian law”

Ana Gomes

good framework for EU initiatives concerning the dialogue among civilisations.

After outlining the various programmes in place within the EU and the gap that often existed between

theory and practice, MEP **Ana Gomes**, the European Parliament’s Vice-Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, stated that Europe was getting its counter-terrorism policy right. The EU was more aware of the threats and implications. But that did not remove the need for further cooperation, especially with the US.

The EAW was bringing improvements in extradition times, the Joint Situation Centre was adding real value with its assessments of the terrorist threats and other ad-hoc coalitions, such as the G5 group (sharing databases on terrorism) were showing the advantages of working together. Gomes said more team-efforts were needed, as they could support EU coordinated programmes.

However, more work was urgently required on addressing the sources of the problems and the root causes of the conflicts. Among the diverse problems highlighted by Gomes, were:

- The counter-productive impacts of the national caveats in the fight against terrorism
- The lack of interoperability between EU troops abroad
- The negative impact of the invasion of Iraq on European security





- The support of some “dictators” as they were seen as the EU’s allies
- The support for “racism hiding behind freedom of expression” in the Danish press cartoon scandal
- The introduction of double standards due to such acts as “extraordinary rendition” and the Abu Ghraib incidents
- The need for strict adherence to international legality and humanitarian laws

Echoing the words of Javier Solana when he addressed the European Parliament, Gomes concluded that the EU could not afford to lose sight of what it was fighting.

**Lars-Erik Lundin**, Deputy Political Director for CFSP and ESDP in the European Commission’s DG External Relations, spoke about a changed and changing world, one in which there was room for Commission activity in the areas of security and defence. Arguing that the Council had highlighted

the problems caused by failed states and organised crime in its 2003 strategy document (Solana), Lundin said it was still a “living document”.

Highlighting two points, Lundin looked at the need for a) the protection of citizens’ rights via a more inclusive approach, and b) a more holistic approach to fighting terrorism.

Protecting citizens’ rights:

This was seen not just as a matter of avoiding incidents such as Abu Ghraib, but of also changing the “EU’s external posture” in a positive way.

- A more cooperative and balanced approach was required that looked not just at operational systems and platforms but also at the various flows of information, drugs and people trafficking, as these were all interlinked and impacting terrorism
- Cooperative policies with third countries had to be emphasised, as such policies could not be imposed; the introduction of a feeling of inclusiveness was paramount with third countries being treated as real partners
- These links had to stand the test of time, especially with “proud countries” such as Indonesia and Pakistan – a long-term strategy was more important than the search for quick results

Holistic approach to fighting terrorism:

- The experts on specific fields in each organisation need to be brought together to focus on the various flows (drugs, people, money)

- There are proven links between terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, poverty, etc. but more analysis was necessary
- The Stability Instrument (especially the trans-regional aspects) needs to be used more effectively, to develop real networks
- Use links with OSCE and ASEAN, for example, as a first step to developing an integrated approach to internal and external security; there is a huge role for industrial research, as the best technology is needed to fight, for example, money laundering

Lundin concluded that a cooperative and balanced approach was the name of the game in order to improve relationships between the EU and the third world.

**“The EU often or sometimes is working with too short time perspectives.”**

**Lars-Erik Lundin**

## The Fourth session debate

### Disarmament and an arms race?

The Western European Union's **Paulo Brito** did not agree that it was a real “arms race”, as the US was the only country forcing the others (such as North Korea and Iran) to prepare for possible confrontations. However, the EU could also be seen as being in a race as it was improving its military capabilities. That could be good for the UN as more support would be possible.

**Sergei Ordzhonikidze** disagreed with that opinion. As well as the US, regional leaders in

Africa, Asia and in Latin America were spending heavily on arms. As for the EU being in a better position to help the UN, Ordzhonikidze said that in the 18 peace-keeping missions, only 1000 troops had been deployed from developed countries. The majority of the assistance was from developing countries and that was totally wrong.

**Ana Gomes** added that disarmament efforts were not serious enough, with the P5 not fulfilling its commitments. The spread of small arms was increasing in Africa, and the European Parliament was pressing for a legally-binding code of conduct.

### National caveats – good or bad?

Brito said that national caveats were often there for historical reasons and that this should be understood.

Gomes accepted that but

added that troops should be prepared to take whatever actions were necessary. If missions were initiated for legitimate reasons, then they should be accomplished effectively and national caveats were often hindering progress.

## Summing up

Giles Merritt closed the conference and said it had looked at a changing picture of global security, one where EU enlargement had led to a situation where individual nation states could not provide protection for its citizens without comprehensive and effective coordination. The SDA would return to these matters in the coming 12 months. ■

## TRANSATLANTIC GALLUP POLL

### Views of Leaders from Europe and the USA on the Future of Transatlantic Security and Various Anti-terrorism Strategies

#### Summary

The future of common security and anti-terrorism measures are critical questions for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. Gallup Europe conducted an important poll of government officials, members of national legislative bodies, heads of major corporations, media entities and NGOs about their views on the future of transatlantic security and anti-terrorism laws. The survey was carried out between April 11 and May 15 2006 with a total of 116 completed interviews.

This survey was done in cooperation with *Friends of Europe*, the Security and Defence Agenda (SDA), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the European Commission Delegation to the United States, with the support the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD).

#### Respondents include:

**Petras Austrevicius**, Member of Lithuanian Parliament; **Alyson Bailes**, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); **Enrique Baron Crespo MEP**, Chairman of the Committee on International Trade, European Parliament; **Carlo de Benedetti**, Chairman, CIR Group; **Joachim Bitterlich**, Executive Vice President of Veolia and Former Foreign Policy Advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl; **Jim Casella**, CEO, Reed Business Information;

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## Main findings

### 1. Transatlantic anti-terrorist cooperation is mostly working effectively but there is room for improvement.

The majority (63%) of the European and US leaders who responded to our survey mostly agree that transatlantic anti-terrorist cooperation is working effectively and 3% of the respondents completely agree with it. However, one-third of the respondents (33%) mostly disagree with this statement but only 1% of the leaders completely disagree that the transatlantic anti-terrorist cooperation is working effectively.

Highlights from some responses

- There is neither a war against terrorism to be fought with military means nor is there a clash of civilizations. It is a long and painful struggle to be won with intelligence, political and judicial cooperation on a shared basis. (Senior Policymaker)
- There seems to be a 'disconnect' between the rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic ('Old Europe' comments from this side and a general rhetorical anti-Americanism, particularly from France and Germany, from Europe.) But among the security and intelligence agencies, there is greater co-operation. (Academic)
- The extent of its effectiveness has been proved by for example the elaboration of lists of terrorist and terrorist organizations, exchange of information/cooperation between intelligence services and police authorities and the fight against money laundering by organisms linked to terrorism. The drawback is that the U.S. often makes decisions directly concerning European countries in a unilateral manner. Such decisions do not bring about an effective cooperation as they are often taken without consulting European authorities. There is a need for better coordination and consultation as, unfortunately, some European countries have a long experience of fighting against terrorism and a multilateral approach would be of benefit to both Europe and the U.S. (Senior Policymaker)
- There does not seem to be a public agreement on the need for anti-terrorist cooperation across Atlantic. I would hope that the security agencies cooperate privately but this has not been visible to me during my monthly visits in Europe. (Business Leader)
- The initial response of the transatlantic partners towards anti-terrorist was more common and based on strong understanding rather than practical cooperation. This

especially true in the choosing of measures implemented. (Senior National Policymaker)

- Notwithstanding public battles between and among political leaders in Europe and the United States, I understand that there is a higher level of cooperation between intelligence and security forces than is commonly known. I find this gratifying as the risk of terrorism to Europe and the United States remains large, and stands a better chance of being defeated or reduced if governments work together. (Business Leader)
- There is little public information about the nuts and bolts of this anti-terrorism cooperation; US anti-terrorism operations are not well coordinated as it is very unlikely that they would coordinate with other countries unless cooperation was on US terms. (Think Tank Leader)

## **2. Split views on NATO's coherent response to global terrorism since 9/11**

48% of the European and American leaders in our survey mostly disagree that NATO's member governments have responded to global terrorism by implementing a coherent anti-terrorism strategy since 9/11 and an additional 7% of the respondents completely disagree on this statement. Less than half (43%) mostly agree that NATO's member governments implemented a coherent anti-terrorism strategy but only 2% completely agree with this.

- With all the reservations mentioned

above it is also important to stress that the efficiency of the international cooperation in the fight against terrorism is hindered by remaining mistrust among governments - e.g. their unwillingness to share intelligence information, etc. (Press)

- The rift between the US and Europe and within Europe in 2003 remains to be bridged. Coalitions of the willing are not the same as an alliance. NATO is currently a tactical toolbox but not a strategic forum or operational hub. (Think Tank Leader)
- There has been nothing coherent about the US response -- witness the incoherent cobbling together of the DHS. Extend that beyond US borders and one finds greater degrees of incoherence. (Think Tank Leader)
- I think that European governments have done a better job than they have in the past. However, they may sometimes impose too many restrictions upon themselves as they attempt to balance the twin competing demands of protecting civil liberties while seeking intelligence about terrorist groups operating inside and outside of their countries. (Business Leader)

## **3. According to the leaders some European governments have more faith in cooperation arrangements with the US authorities than with each other**

The majority of the US and European Union leaders in our survey agree that some European governments have more



faith in cooperation arrangements with the US authorities than with each other, 63% mostly agree and 19% completely agree with this statement. Some 19% of the leaders mostly disagree whereas no one completely disagrees with this statement.

- This can be smoothed over in day-to-day business but becomes clear whenever we discuss hard security issues, especially Russia. For small European neighbors of Russia the US remains the indispensable final guarantor of security. (Think Tank Leader)
- The problem of the EU is sometimes that clear positions are missing, which the USA normally has. (Think Tank Leader)
- After 9/11 and 3/11 in Madrid and 7/7 in London cooperation has increased in a substantial way inside the EU. (Senior Policymaker)
- In all probability, yes. The UK, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands are probably key examples. (Think Tank Leader)
- The fact that practically all European governments have cooperation agreements with the US authorities does not mean that they do not have as much faith in cooperation between themselves. It is only because it is acknowledged that the US has better 'intelligence' and possibly also because few European governments can afford to deny the US cooperation in this matter, even though certain measures implemented in a clandestine manner by the US might well have embarrassed their European partner governments, as was the case with the secret

flights carrying alleged terrorists, making use of European airports. (Senior Policymaker)

- Mostly to blame is the French government, always trying to push forward a different agenda that unfortunately does not stand for current European needs. (Press)
- Although it is true that over the question of Iraq there was a division between European governments, this does not in any way imply or indicate that there is a difference as to how the European governments view the struggle against terrorism. (Senior Policymaker)
- When European nations disagree with the United States, they tend to be more direct. This makes it harder to achieve an agreement, but once it is done, it stands a better chance of being implemented in accordance with the intent of both parties. In contrast, European countries, when dealing with one another, tend to at times be overwhelmed by their desire to have a public signing ceremony. This sadly sometimes produces an attitude that the agreement is ink on paper and not really something that must be adhered to. (Business Leader)
- It is not that simple. On the EU side, the key issue is to enhance Pan-European responsibilities at Commission level or other institutional levels. (Press)

#### **4. Split views also on US and Europe's post 9/11 efforts on anti-terrorism**

45% of the US and European leaders in our survey mostly disagree and 2% completely

disagree that post 9/11 efforts to construct new anti-terrorism in both the US and Europe have had the effect of souring transatlantic relations without a substantial contribution in security terms. 45% agree with this statement and 9% completely agree with it.

- More accurately, a divisive effect among western European countries abetted by feelings in many that in the name of heightened security Western Europe is expected to kowtow to US supremacy. Perception to that western Europeans given their experience of terrorism (red brigades, IRA, ETA, Islamist threats etc.) needed no lessons from the US about handling terrorism. (Think Tank Leader)
- I do not find that transatlantic relations have gone sour. There was a time when there was resistance to the idea of transmitting air passenger data to the US. On the other hand many European countries, not only NATO countries, have benefited from cooperation with the US on anti terrorism, both with sharing of expertise, as well as with material help in providing technical resources. (Senior Policymaker)
- Although most of the Western governments have put too much emphasis on the repressive measures in the fight against terrorism, there are many differences when it comes to their scope and their relation to international law, human rights and democratic standards, and international obligations. Differences between the US and Europe are wider than they were before 9/11. (Press)

- We cannot escape the need for stronger security measures. The price in terms of negative effects on legitimacy among the public has been strongest in the US where the measures also have been most noticeable for the public. They could be carried out more smoothly in the US, but increased security measures are necessary. (Think Tank Leader)
- The souring of relations is due to the Iraq war and the US claim that it is anti terrorism driven, not due to the effort to establish joint defences. (Academic)
- I think some positive things have been accomplished notwithstanding the heated rhetoric of our political leaders. (Business Leader)

## **5. There is a strong need for US and European NATO members to improve anti-terrorist measures**

### **Strong consensus on the need to improve the infrastructure protection**

89% of the US and European Leaders of our survey have a consensus on the need to improve anti-terrorism measures in infrastructure protection. Only 11% mostly disagree that infrastructure protection improvement is needed.

### **Consensus on the need to improve intelligence sharing**

58% of our respondents agree completely that the US and its European NATO allies need to improve their anti-terrorist measures in the intelligence sharing, 35% mostly agree that intelligence sharing needs to be improved. Only 7% mostly disagree on this issue.

### **Need to improve border, airport and seaport protection**

38% of the US and European leaders of our survey agree completely and 43% mostly agree that the US and its European NATO allies need to improve their anti-terrorist measures in the border, airport and seaport protection areas. On the other hand, close to one-fifth of the respondents (17%) mostly disagree and an additional 2% completely disagree that further improvement is needed in this respect.

### **Majority of respondents feel need to improve anti-terrorist measures in public health**

37% of the US and European leaders of our survey agree completely and 47% mostly agree that the US and its European NATO allies need to improve their anti-terrorist measures in public health. Only 1% completely disagrees but 15% mostly disagree on the need for improvement in public health with regard to anti-terrorism measures.

### **Crisis management should also be improved**

44% the respondents agree completely that crisis management should be improved and another 48% mostly agree on the need for improving transatlantic crisis management. Only 8% mostly disagree and no one completely disagrees on this issue among our leaders.

- On one condition - that it is not a one-way street where the US happily receives but (pleading confidentiality and protection of sources) grudgingly gives. (Think Tank Leader)
- You do not take into account strategic assessment and political response to terrorism. (Think Tank Leader)

- Still, there are other very important areas that were not mentioned (some are even more important than those mentioned) - social coherence and integration of minority groups in order to create a multicultural society, effective development aid and restructuring of the international trade & economic relations which are current very unfair, to mention just a few... (Press)
- It is not realistic to expect US and Europeans to have the same interests or practices in either the intelligence field or the handling of individual crises. Also, intelligence exchange is less critical than good intelligence analysis which seems to be sorely needed at present on both sides. (Think Tank Leader)
- The three most critical areas where we must unite are: 1. A joint understanding of the threat. 2. A joint global strategy. 3. Joint leadership. Unless we unite in these three fundamental areas we will probably lose the growing global guerrilla war against the stakeholders of globalization. (Think Tank Leader)

## **6. Majority of the US and EU Leaders agree that the anti-terrorism measures in USA risk infringing on civil liberties.**

41% of the US and European leaders in our survey agree completely and 32% mostly agree that the anti-terrorism measures adopted in the USA risk infringing on civil liberties. However, 22% mostly disagree and 5% completely disagree that anti terrorism measures risk infringing on civil liberties in the US.

- They are infringing on civil liberties. (NGO Representative)
- I believe that the United States remains a vibrant and free country. Concern about terrorism or acts of war inevitably creates pressures to have greater surveillance and impose certain restrictions than might otherwise exist. This is true in both the United States and in Europe. Thus far, governments in both continents seem to have achieved the proper balance and I hope that it remains this way. (Business Leader)
- There is nothing like 'absolute liberty'. Everything is relative. Checking one's passport or asking for a driving license could also be considered as infringing one's civil liberties. However, preventive measures that could be considered as 'restrictive', which are commensurate with the gravity of the 'threat' the security forces are intending to prevent are in such circumstances acceptable. (Senior Policymaker)
- Mostly agree, though that does not mean I would stand for a European way towards fighting back terrorism. I would rather stress the need for more cooperation in order to develop a new mix between the European way and the American way. (Press)
- This allegation is quite exaggerated. Compared with past conflicts (US Civil War, WW I & II, McCarthy period in early Cold War), the infringements have been minimal. Moreover, the US by and large is more respectful of civil liberties than many European countries. (France with its preventive detention.) (Academic)

- Specific measures like secret wiretapping do infringe on civil liberties; recent constitutional interpretations of the powers of the presidency also threaten the limits of those liberties. (Think Tank Leader)

## **7. Fewer leaders think that the anti-terrorism measures being adopted in Europe risk infringing on civil liberties than those in USA.**

Close to half (48%) of the US and EU leaders who responded to our questions mostly disagree and another 10% completely disagree that the anti-terrorism measures being adopted in Europe risk infringing on civil liberties. Only 12% of the leaders in our survey completely agree that the anti-terrorism measures being adopted in Europe risk infringing on civil liberties but another 30% mostly agree on this issue.

- Pleas for expediency or confidentiality can be never be accepted as arguments for marginalizing due process of law. (Think Tank Leader)
- Anti-terrorist measures taken in Europe have not created the furore raised by measures taken by the US...enough to mention the Guantanamo Bay prisoners issue, and the issue of 'secret flights' to detention centres in Europe. (Senior Policymaker)
- Some minority groups and immigrants already feel the effects. But that is dangerous for Europe itself – if the EU wants to be perceived as a global player that strives for the better respect

of human rights, civil liberties and democratic standards in the international arena, it cannot build its anti-terrorism response on the repressive measures that compromise those very values. (Press)

- Civil liberties in continental Europe are not strictly comparable to civil liberties in the US. (Business Leader)
- Steps are necessary in view of the terrorist threat. And security too is a vital civil liberty. (Academic)

## **8. Close to two-thirds of our respondents agree that concerns over the infringement of civil liberties are greater in Europe than in USA.**

62% of the US and European leaders who responded to our survey agree that concerns over the infringement of civil liberties as a result of anti-terrorist measures are greater in European countries than in the United States. However, close to one-third (31%) of the respondents in our survey mostly disagree and another 7% completely disagree with this statement.

- Problem: they are less transparent plus they are connected to European/national laws. (Senior Policymaker)
- Not clear. There is no single European perspective. Look at the UK use of CCTV. It is far greater than anything seen here in the US (so far). I can't say for sure, but I'm not sure that other EU countries are as comfortable with surveillance as

the Brits seem to be. (Academic)

- Depends on the educational level of a particular segment of the population. (Business Leader)

## **9. Majority of our respondents believe there will be a shift in the makeup of US and European defence industries and defence spending**

More than half (53%) of the transatlantic leaders mostly agree and an additional 24% completely agree that the growing emphasis on anti-terrorist measures and technologies will bring about a major shift in the makeup of US and European defence industries and defence spending. On the other hand, 22% mostly disagree and another 1% completely disagrees with the above statement.

- Terrorism is the 'poor man's' weapon. Guarding society against terrorist attacks will tax the brains and the pockets of the world's most advanced and richest countries. (Senior Policymaker)
- It is true for a limited sector but mostly untrue because military means are the least useful ones against terrorism (esp. as seen in Europe). Overall, the demands of 'normal' crisis management are more of a driver on the choices of all EU countries (except perhaps those with industries most tightly linked to US technology). (Think Tank Leader)
- The major shift in the defence strategy and consequent spending on both continents is the immediate result of the new risk we

are facing. The nature of this risk is unique and it is natural that it demands different systems, strategies and technological developments than those involved in conventional warfare. (Senior Policymaker)

- Both Europe and the United States will be compelled to deal with the next war, and not the ones which preceded it. This will require different types of equipment and training. It will also result in Europe and the United States having to increase their defence expenditures at a period of time when their governments are confronting the challenges of having to pay for retirement benefits of a growing older population. (Business Leader) ■





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**The Security & Defence Agenda (SDA) is the only specialist Brussels-based think-tank where EU institutions, NATO, national governments, industry, specialised and international media, think tanks, academia and NGOs gather to discuss the future of European and transatlantic security and defence policies in Europe and worldwide.**

Building on the combined expertise and authority of those involved in our meetings, the SDA gives greater prominence to the complex questions of how EU and NATO policies can complement one another, and how transatlantic challenges such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction can be met.

By offering a high-level and neutral platform for debate, the SDA sets out to clarify policy positions, stimulate discussion and ensure a wider understanding of defence and security issues by the press and public opinion.



THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA WOULD LIKE TO THANK ITS PARTNERS AND MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE SDA A SUCCESS



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