

Europe's long-term vision of the defence environment in 2025: sharp or fuzzy?

Summary from Expert Seminar
organised with the European Defence Agency (EDA)
13 June 2006
Brussels

PROGRAMME

EUROPE'S LONG-TERM VISION OF THE DEFENCE ENVIRONMENT IN 2025: SHARP OR FUZZY?

INTRODUCTION

11:00

by Nick Witney, Chief Executive of EDA

WHAT THREATS AND CHALLENGES WILL EUROPE BE FACING IN 2025?

Session I

11:30-13:30

What will the world look like 20 years from now, and how can Europe plan to meet the challenges to its own and global security? What will be the sources of instability, the nature of military challenges and the EU member states' ability and preparedness to address them? What technology developments do we foresee over the coming 20 years, and how will these affect Europe's defence capabilities? How can Europe "prepare for the future"? A long-term vision can help to define possible capability and capacity needs for supporting ESDP, but can we factor possible shock developments like 9/11 into our assessment, and which features of the global environment can, like demography, be predicted?

Lunch

13:30-14:30

GETTING OUR CAPABILITIES RIGHT

Session II

14:30-16:00

What will European operations, ranging from military outreach to civilian crisis management, look like in the future? Which capabilities should be given greater priority so that shrinking defence budgets are counter-balanced by greater investments in other ESDP instruments? What industrial developments can be foreseen with R&T advances and how can industry better provide the tools needed for crisis management? As the nature of warfare and conflict changes, what steps should Europe's military planners be taking to ensure that future EU military units are effective and sustainable and have the right capabilities?

Closing Session and Discussion

16:00-17:00

Hilmar Linnenkamp, Deputy Chief Executive of EDA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 13, 2006, European Defence Agency Chief Executive Nick Witney and Security & Defence Agenda Director Giles Merritt co-chaired an expert level seminar focussing on the nature and the drivers shaping the future military environment. The meeting came at a time as the EDA is undertaking detailed analysis, using a range of conceptual approaches, aimed at developing an initial long-term vision for European capability and capacity needs. In October 2006, the EDA Steering Board is to assess the emerging conclusions raised by the wide ranging analysis.

Experts examined questions arising from consideration of European internal and global security in the coming decades. Major factors influencing future capability needs identified include continued EU geographical proximity to sources of instability, new military and technological challenges, greater EU Member State cooperation, global economic, demographic and political change, civil-military co-operation and a further shift towards crisis prevention and management.

Following the opening session, seminar participants considered the implications of current and possible future changes for a range of sectors including military, industry, technology and civilian organisations. The challenge of developing the necessary capabilities was addressed as well. A list of participants to the seminar is attached.



Nick Witney, Chief Executive of EDA and Giles Merritt, Director of SDA.

Participants at the expert seminar held in Brussels 13 June 2006.



Introduction

by Nick Witney, Chief Executive of EDA

Opening the seminar, Nick Witney noted the suitable timing of the event, as fundamental conclusions regarding European defence environments and needs had been drawn from three major sources: the EU Institute of Security Studies in Paris, the EU Military Committee and a panel of science and technology experts.

Witney stressed that the seminar was not aimed at examining specific future conflicts or matters such as the size of an EU army. The goal is to understand the challenges to be faced by the EU defence community in the future. For Witney, such a forward-looking exercise is premised on the assumption that globalisation will continue.

The process of reflection initiated by the EDA has seen the Institute of Security Studies in Paris give a digest of future perspectives in different countries, organisations and corporations. A second strand, performed by the EU Military Committee, looked more closely at the environment and demands of future ESDP military operations. A final element saw EDA R&T Directorate and ten science and technology experts examine the threats and opportunities facing Europe.

A range of factors impact the future defence environment. These include an older age structure in Europe partly due to decreased fertility rates. By 2025, merely six percent of world population is predicted to be European. There will be fewer Europeans of working age to take care for more pensioners. The armed forces will face a shrinking recruitment pool. Europeans may not be individually poorer, but Europe will have a declining share of total world wealth.

The burden of providing for pensions will also inevitably increase pressure on public budgets. This may further squeeze tight military budgets, especially with respect to external operations. Europe, given the Iraq experience, will also be more cautious to engage in actions outside its borders. Closer attention to legality and UN 'sanction' will make for more cautious decision-making by

governments as well as greater consideration of environmental concerns.


Witney compared Europe's geographical position to that of the United States. Europe is characterised by its proximity to potential losers from globalisation such as Africa, Russia and the Middle East. These potentially conflictual regions encircle Europe. Additionally, Africa, even taking account of AIDS, is set to experience a population growth of some 40 percent. This will add to humanitarian crises and migratory pressures. Europe also faces greater competition for energy, especially fossil fuels.

Witney noted the fast pace of change to an 'information age of war'. There is an increasing emphasis on 'intelligence' as opposed to 'kinetic energy'. Science and technology are playing a dominant role.

Pure defence, as seen in traditional terms, is increasingly less important than civilian affairs. Defence thus needs to find ways to increase efficiency in handling and benefiting from technology. Achieving greater efficiency and technology take-up will be based upon the realisation that innovation comes from networks and collaboration.

For Witney, the changes outlined above signify a more constant interplay between politics and military action. This will result in less direct military conflict and, subsequently, greater examination of how force is employed to enforce international norms such as those laid down by the United Nations or African Union.

Within these new parameters, there will also be a greater financial challenge. This entails using less money to achieve the same effect and investing more, and more efficiently, to sustain defence industries and smaller armed



Nick Witney, EDA

forces often engaged in joint and multinational operations.

In conclusion, Witney noted the pressing need to converge capability and need requirements so as to make more economies of scale.

Discussion

What Threats and Challenges Will Europe be Facing in 2025?

Opening the session, Giles Merritt enquired as to the process of EU decision-making with respect to defence. What roles will the Commission and Council play and what are the next steps to be taken?

Nick Witney said that the decision-making process is clearly inter-governmental, albeit with an increasing readiness to accept greater procedural efficiency especially in terms of pooling ideas and proposals. The EDA was set up precisely to provide this pool. Looking ahead, the next significant step in the construction of EU defence policy will take place with the creation of an EU Foreign Minister. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will drive closer integration of ESDP in the effort to pool responsibilities.

Due to budgetary forces, EU Member States, he noted, will move towards greater cooperation balancing national control and efficiency. Within this framework, public support for defence will need to be sustained. At the end of the day, the question is that of force planning in a situation where all EU countries are now 'small' countries in defence terms with the EU collectively spending EUR 180 billion. How can budgets that are increasingly under pressure be better spent whilst at the same time taking into account the increased importance of crisis management, demographic change and a manpower dilemma?

Stephan De Spiegeleire, expressed doubts as to the utility of concentrating upon traditional military concepts such as 'force planning'. Given the deep uncertainty of the environment in which defence decisions will have to be taken, traditionally received ideas




Stephan De Spiegeleire,
Clingendael Centre
for Strategic Studies

and constructs, often based on decision-makers' personal and historical experiences, may prove imperfect guidance. He was also curious to know why a scenario-based approach was not used.

Nick Witney said that scenarios were not used as we did not want to discuss ESDP development. He also noted that there is no link with 'force planning' in the EU institutions, although some movement towards such constructs has emerged. The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was short-term and geared to specific issues and problems. As to adopting scenario-based approaches at a European level, any such document must take full account of the EU decision-making process. The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was such a document and allowed for conclusions to be drawn up by ministers within a short period of time.

Rather than by foreign policy, Claude-France Arnould, stressed that EDSP may be pushed forward by concrete integration. This would be following specific equipment and economic interests that differentiate the US and EU. There are many



Claude-France
Arnould, Council of the
European Union

other factors, too, that make predictions as to institutional structures and needs related to defence issues very hypothetical. She stressed how difficult predicting future defence requirements is even in terms of just 10 or 15 years. With respect to the EU, enlargement could also radically change perceived security needs.

General Sir Rupert Smith, also expressed doubts, more specifically with respect to scenario-planning and equipment purchasing. Opponents do not cooperate with pre-established scenarios, he noted, drawing on some 30 years of experience. This can make equipment purchased according to pre-established scenarios unusable.

For General Smith, scenarios are of lesser value in resolving the conundrums faced by the EU. The Union needs to arrive at a generic way of operating so as to learn from the past, to identify and defeat threats far enough ahead. This requires maximising capabilities to gather and assess information and subsequently taking initiatives. The goal should be to force opponents to conform to the EU, not the other way round.



Nicole Gnesotto, EU
Institute for Security
Studies

Nicole Gnesotto noted that although she was in the beginning a little sceptical, working without scenarios proved to be a very good idea. She also stressed the need to move beyond traditional planning schemas to include other disciplines. For instance, economic studies indicate that globalisation has made 'global' war "impossible", whilst, at the same time, increasing the likelihood of local conflicts. Other elements that must be taken into account include the increased privatisation of armed forces. In many countries, and not only in Africa and Iraq, the use of private armed forces has become a clear trend.

As to future predictions, she noted the difficulty of forecasting over periods of 20 years. Enlarging the EU by adding Turkey, for instance, would dramatically change EU demographics and military equations. However, there is an assumption that the period of progress, peace, and prosperity enjoyed in Western Europe since the end of World War II will continue. Gnesotto posited

this may not be the case and EDSP may have to protect the external borders of Europe whilst guarding against terrorism. There is also the dilemma of continuing external intervention or building real containment forces within a framework characterised by the trend towards mega-cities and urban conflicts.

Malgorzata Alterman emphasised the attention that should be given to relations with contractors. In developing equipment, one needs to shop around and also examine both small and medium-sized enterprises. Much can be learnt from under-financed enemies that use cheap, small and effective weaponry according to the resources at their disposal.

Lars-Erik Lundin recalled how, in 1974 at a defence seminar, discussion on whether the EU would eventually become a defence actor was seen as too hypothetical. During the past ten years, there has, nonetheless, been great movement towards a broader framework. In terms of public support, citizens, as Eurobarometers indicate, strongly support common EU action. In the Lisbon agenda, for instance, the defence industry is an integral part of discussion on growth and technology. Integrated security too has entered into EU discussions. This has all happened since 1999.

Lieutenant General Jean-Paul Perruche stressed the need, when talking of defence and security interests, to move towards common ownership and integration between Member States. If there is a better picture of what the EU can create in the interest of all Member States then this will help define the ways forward on how to protect them over a period of ten or twenty years.



Lieutenant General
Jean-Paul Perruche, EU
Military Staff

Stephan De Spiegeleire lamented the state of defence planning in Europe. Inefficient defence planning, he argued, leads to extra costs. For smaller countries, this is even worse. NATO,

according to De Spiegeleire, does not have the whole agenda. The EU does, especially with regard to smaller countries. That is why the process of developing EU policy-making and structures is so important. Whilst national defence planning remains important, national military structures, for obvious reasons, have an inclination towards operational planning.

Major General Wolfgang Jilke stressed the importance of gaining the right capabilities and making right choices. This will involve Member States at some stage as they will be called on to provide resources to the EU, whether in terms of the defence market, industry, or budgets. With national budgets decreasing, this may mean that an EU military budget will face constraints or compete with national budgets. In addition, due to the fact that many Member States provide their capabilities to NATO as well, a coordination of the two organisations' long term visions could prevent creating another source of competition.



General Wolfgang Jilke,
Austrian Permanent
Representation to the
EU

Jamie Shea noted that there will probably not be two major defence structures but some type of merger or rationalisation. In the short term, though, policy makers will need to help the EU and NATO work together to avoid duplication wherever politically feasible. As military forces, both the EU and NATO will have to improve their usability and availability. NATO is changing with defence planning having moved on from Warsaw Pact scenarios to a concentration on smaller operations. In this respect, NATO defence planners could advise nations as to learning from the good practice of others.

NATO itself has a major weakness in the civil interface and with respect to civilian planning capabilities. Experience in Bosnia indicated that much time was wasted before linking up with civilian organisations, NGOs and others

to drive forward reconstruction. NATO could, therefore, learn from others.

Stephan De Spiegeleire noted that defence planning is not about telling people what to do. Defence planning does not need to be executed top-down. There is a great need for counselling, advisory services and benchmarking at the EU level. The Dutch government is currently producing a national security strategy that includes benchmarking. But this strategy would be much more effective if effectuated at a European level. Unfortunately, there is still too much secrecy and not enough information sharing surrounding military affairs.

Given European demographics, defence planning at the national and EU levels will have to look closely at manpower issues and consider matters such as outsourcing as well as the ability to train other force providers.

Planning needs to take into account the adversary, not just pure capabilities. Adversaries may not be states, or even organisations, but groups of individuals. Many capabilities for the future will require investment today. De Spiegeleire argued for bolder planning looking far beyond Iraq and Kosovo. The whole decision-making process with respect to the political-military interface will change radically. Information technology, too, will have a profound influence on planning.

Giles Merritt noted that there is no finality to decreasing budgets. As global communications develop, there is more concern about defence that could lead to a more pro-defence environment. Defence is an area where national governments can no longer operate so efficiently and need to cooperate with each other. There is a growing sense that national defence is no longer an isolated policy area. Nonetheless, within this new policy framework there is still the question of large and small countries. Larger countries in the EU still have defence industries, smaller countries do not.

Pierre Hougardy noted that if there is some sudden break with the past, then the EU will face totally different scenarios. This raises questions as to whether the EU is currently

doing enough in terms of civilian operations and, with regards to technology, so as to convince individual Member States to adapt faster.

Major General Sauro Baistrocchi referred to the complexity of the EU as an organisation. There are obviously vested interests in defence matters, including within the institutional framework. Failing to understand causalities properly makes us do lots of mistakes. A more scientific approach to the planning and resources needs to take into account the wide range of cultural, economic and political factors that affect movement towards integration.

In creating planning solutions, one needs then to avoid solutions to problem that do not exist or basing solutions on assumptions that are ideologically limiting. Even the terrorist attack of 9/11, while extremely shocking, had a logic that can and must be analysed. As a general point, though, even if all options are considered, we will be surprised as the enemy will not cooperate with such planning frameworks.

Getting Our Capabilities Right

Giles Merritt wondered what recent lessons have been learnt as regards capabilities from experience in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq.

For General Smith, the first thing to take from recent operations is that military inventories are not the sum of capabilities. Why then should we buy 500 military items, for instance, that will not be used operationally? Since the Cold War, it has become clear that capabilities can only be measured in relation to an opponent. As such, they are relative measures.



General Sir Rupert Smith

General Smith noted that recent opponents have been demonstrably under-equipped. Yet

opponents have been able to deny superiority by using their relatively simple equipment most effectively according to their aims. Smith called for greater understanding of the way the EU should operate with a common political will. Situations must be avoided where, as in Somalia, the US had overwhelming military capability but lacked the political will to use it. He was also of an opinion that industry needs to provide a wide range of possible options. We need information on how civilian innovations can be adapted [when, how, at what cost?].

General Rolando Mosca Moschini noted that the Military Committee has carried out important analytical work based on the concept of capability and the need to learn lessons from recent operations to guide future efforts. This emphasises that rapid response is a package constituted not only by means, but by political will, clear command structures, rapidly deployable units and effective political and military decision-making processes. This package cannot be broken. What is the point of having a rapidly deployable military unit that remains in its barracks? General Moschini also stressed the need to learn from recent history. To tackle the present crises, a multidisciplinary approach is needed. The military component is one of many elements which, perhaps initially more important, later gives way to others. This is a major lesson from recent history.



General Rolando Mosca Moschini, EU Military Committee

Only by providing effective operational knowledge can we decide where to apply multidisciplinary capabilities, taking maximum advantage of resources and opportunities available with respect to risks and threats.

Ulf Dahlsten stressed the need to be prepared for the unexpected even if some security problems can be foreseen such as failing states. This requires a focus on avoiding crises

before they happen. A general goal for Europe should be that of getting more for less defence spending. In the long term, this may require a joint command structure. Europe needs a vision for the future with joint structures even if this is a long term process.

For Dahlsten other goals can be achieved in the short term. One instance is improving communications between deployed services. Concentrating on short-term success can also build support for long-term goals. Software Defined Radio is an opportunity in short term.

Jamie Shea noted the vital importance of analysing the consequences before taking action. You should always have a plan B. In Kosovo, there was no Plan B. Kosovo was initiated as an air campaign. One lesson learnt was



Jamie Shea, NATO

that you should not announce policy if you cannot implement it. This can prove to be a public relations disaster. Shea wondered whether the military campaign or NATO sticking together was more important for victory in Kosovo. Only as Milosevic saw a united adversary did he seek a way out.

He noted a growth of military involvement in civilian actions. This is putting pressure on elite forces in terms of undertaking real military action. We should not fall into the trap of using elite forces for everything. He also underlined the need for greater transport capability. Recent operations have also indicated the importance of situational awareness. In Kosovo, riots were not predicted due to a lack of situational awareness. He noted that battle damage assessment is central but it can mislead your strategy if misinterpreted.

For Shea, operational culture is also important. Troops and tanks are there but may not be used in the most optimal manner. There is a need to put more soldiers in the field. In Kosovo, for instance, initially eight out of ten soldiers were located at headquarters.

There also needs to be more flexibility on funding. Using resources to help reconstruction can be as vital as purely military spending.

Nicole Gnesotto, noted that preparing capacities for the EU requires better definition of the types of mission to be undertaken by the EU. There also needs to be recognition of the EU as a political entity with a different approach to that of the US. EU Member States might want to accept different missions in a NATO rather than an EU framework.

Giles Merritt enquired as to what extent has planning come to revolve around military or civilian operations. Winning the peace seems to be the real prize especially as authorities have developed support in European public opinion about peacekeeping. Is the military effectively mirroring this?

For General Mosca Moschini, the real pacifists are the soldiers engaged in stabilisation processes. This requires a specific approach. A soldier engaged in crisis management needs to dissuade, persuade and understand much more than destroy or neutralise. Previous peacekeeping missions have indicated the need to develop the right culture without losing traditional military capacity. EU soldiers should tackle various missions taking advantage of their diversity, whilst, at the same, time seeking necessary harmonisation.

General Smith noted that the culture of an army is in part a reflection of the society from which it is drawn. However, an army's culture is also in part a reflection of the intended use of the force operated. There is only control over the latter through training. The British army is from the United Kingdom, but Scottish units are culturally very different from those from the South of England. The army has sought to maximise those cultural differences. Europe, too, needs to profit from its diversity.

For Nick Witney, it is vital for the emerging European defence market to be seen as a benefit for all, not just major companies from large countries. The defence industry is increasingly divergent with more and more

companies getting involved. Experts now come with ever wider fields of expertise such as communications, technology and services. Industry itself has become faster and more agile in adapting to future trends. Consolidation of the supply side, the arms industry, has also moved faster than the demand side.

Giles Merritt wondered how the EU will define defence requirements in a way that will not be divisive in terms of the arms industry. Given the fact that the largest four EU countries have the largest defence industries, it will be important to maintain a balance and to refine decisions made in the past.

Ulf Dahlsten noted that the old relationship between industry and national governments is beginning to loosen driven by the necessity of facing a changed environment. Industry and governments now realise the need for capacity sharing and consolidation. There is also growing awareness in industry of the need for a common European approach as there are only few nations who can invest enough in industry.

As to restructuring, Dahlsten called for the market to decide. Authorities would then decide what purchases are to be made. Industry is mature enough to know it has to compete. The nature of the defence industry is changing rapidly. Whilst traditional types of industrial policies for defence are maintained, new providers have grown up.


Ulf Hammarström, noted that very few funds in defence budgets currently go on preparing for the future. Nonetheless, the EU needs to question a range of parameters including those related to changing technological development costs. Will development costs for equipment continue to rise? Should the EU buy so much equipment that may soon be obsolete?



Ulf Hammarström,
EDA

For Hammarström industry restructuring should be driven by the market. The current situation, with strong links between industry and politics, has led to interference in demand questions that do not reflect real needs. We should also concentrate on how we could do things better together the issues need to be tackled both from the demand and the supply side.

For Rear Admiral Pierre Sabatié-Garat, a major concern is whether customers will be able to form common demands and positions. This is an important consideration for the defence industry which is struggling to provide interoperable systems. Meanwhile, industry is organising itself to provide services for long periods of time (15 to 25 years), and there is great uncertainty as to the EU and national defence budgets 20 years from now. Everyone is complaining about how splitting budgets wastes scarce R&T resources. However, the EDA has struggled hard to get its fairly low R&T budget. Industry is supporting very strongly Nick Witney's efforts to improve it.



Pierre Sabatié-Garat,
EADS

For Sabatié-Garat, dialogue between industry and customers is vital from the very beginning. Understanding future operational concepts is essential in defining the solutions that industry can develop or propose. Destroying enemy military capabilities is sometimes not necessary. There are many situations that can be solved by neutralising rather than destroying those capabilities. Less lethal and neutralizing weapons are increasingly important.

On a more positive note, Sabatié-Garat noted that costs are actually decreasing in some areas, for instance, with respect to satellites.

For Pierre Hougardy, responding to the challenges thrown up by the information age is key. Even today some ministries of defence have difficulties matching requirements with

civilian markets. Another major concern for industry and policy makers is the protection of soldiers deployed. Governments will need to invest in the key capabilities, on the basis of a priority list.

According to Kyriakos Revelas, the European defence industry is constrained by fragmentation and needs further restructuring and consolidation. Negotiating restructuring might lead to discord; it would be better to define the framework conditions ("rules of the game") at a European level within which the market forces can operate so as to engender restructuring in a more natural way.

For Malgorzata Alterman, the Iraq experience has clearly shown the necessity of having the right equipment for the right conflict. Historically, the Cold War conflict revolved around spending the most amount of money. Today, though, there is no lack of money, but a need for greater ability to change to differing environments also in terms of purchasing policies.



Rear Admiral Jean-Louis Kerignard, ACT

Rear Admiral Jean-Louis Kerignard noted that industry has tended to be involved in helping the military to prepare and conceptualise. Industry has provided the military with a future vision with respect to many developments.

CONCLUDING WORDS

Hilmar Linnenkamp noted that the Agency will make best use of the day's discussions in further formulating a long term vision. This is not the last opportunity to contribute to LTV development. LTV development is an iterative living process.



Hilmar Linnenkamp, EDA

The Agency will continue to draw upon input from experts in examining the future of a stronger Europe supported by shared goals and common abilities. One must not forget, Linnenkamp noted, that Europe's capabilities are the product of several elements including the will to use them.

An interesting, forward-looking development evidenced by discussions is, for Linnenkamp, the blurring of distinctions between inter-governmental and common decision-making processes with respect to a range of issues; for instance, research and technology, industrial matters, crisis management and humanitarian policy. This blurring also stems from the fact that technological developments are being driven by civilian rather than military demand.

Linnenkamp thus underlined the need to look closely at how this common Europe is engineered. Member States may still appear somewhat reluctant. Nonetheless, it is necessary for Europeans to do more together, albeit without giving up sovereignty. There is also a need for openness in this debate as to the future of Europe's defence environment.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Ian Abbott Chief of Policy and Plans	EU Military Staff
Malgorzata Alterman Head of Media and Communication	European Defence Agency (EDA)
Claude-France Arnould Director, Defence Aspects	Council of the European Union
Major General Sauro Baistrocchi Assistant to the Chairman	European Union Military Committee
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Paul Collins Head of Capability Development	European Defence Agency (EDA)
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Stephan De Spiegeleire Program Director, Defence Transformation	Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies
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Jamie Shea Director for Policy & Planning, Private Office of the Secretary General	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
Major General Kari Siiki Military Representative	Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU
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Nick Witney Chief Executive	European Defence Agency (EDA)

A Security & Defence Agenda Report

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