

EVOLVING APPROACHES TO SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

**REPORT OF A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY THE
INSTITUTE OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
(IDSS)**



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OVERVIEW

The first in a series of conferences organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) with support from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation was held in Singapore, from 9–11 December 2002. The conference focused on “Evolving Approaches to Security in the Asia-Pacific” and brought together distinguished academics and young scholars from around the region.

The conference examined the concepts used by regional states as the basis of their defence policies and security practice in the Asia-Pacific. Participants concluded that several key concepts and arrangements play an especially important role in shaping regional security relations. These include collective defence, manifested most notably in the bilateral alliances between the U.S. and its regional allies: Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia, as well as the concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security. These latter approaches have had an important influence on the security practice of regional states, particularly since the end of the Cold War. They underpin regional institutions such as ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The conference was dominated by discussions about the impact of the war on terrorism on concepts and practice of regional security in the Asia-Pacific. All the participants agreed that the principal security structures in the region remain the five bilateral alliances, but there was some disagreement about how important these would be in the future. Some participants expressed doubts about the ability of collective defence arrangements to cope with the threats posed by non-state actors and terrorism. Others said they believed the alliances would remain central and would evolve to meet new challenges. Several papers suggested that counter-terrorism might provide a spur for creative thinking about how to transform alliance relations. Others were more sceptical, expressing doubts that a multilateral regime could be built around a contested term like terrorism.

Participants agreed that although the bilateral alliances remain at the core of the regional order today, most Asia-Pacific states rely on a range of mechanisms for insuring their security. These include self-help, formal and informal bilateral ties, and participation in multilateral institutions such as ASEAN and the ARF. Participants agreed that most Asia-Pacific states do not see bilateral and multilateral approaches to security as contradictory or competitive, but rather as complementary.

Several participants argued there was a need to formally restructure the current alliance system away from a focus on deterring specific threats towards the promotion of norms and order building. Several specific initiatives were suggested, including an Asia-Pacific Declaration setting out the principles of a “convergent security” strategy, and the transformation of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting into the primary security forum for the region.

Participants differed in their analysis of American policy in the region since September 11, 2001. Some believed the U.S. had shown a new interest in the East Asian littoral, in particular a new interest in strengthening bilateral ties with states in Southeast Asia. Other paper givers said they doubted there had been any major shift in U.S. strategic priorities. While Southeast Asia had been given greater importance in the war on terror, the U.S. remained focused on an international campaign against terrorist groups. Several participants said they saw more continuity than change in American security policy statements and doctrines released since 9/11.

All the papers recognized that the particular security concepts and practices adopted by regional states reflect a wide range of influences. These include individual historical and cultural experiences, domestic politics, bureaucratic rivalries, internal threats and unrest, as well as reactions to the actions and policies of other states. A number of participants stressed the importance of taking domestic politics into account when assessing regional security practice since 9/11. They argued that in Southeast Asian states with significant

Muslim populations, security and foreign policy approaches were being carefully calibrated. Leaders were aware of the need to cooperate with the United States against terrorism, but acutely conscious that if cooperation went too far, it could arouse nationalistic or Islamic fundamentalist sentiments. They could not risk being seen to be craven to Western influences, something that explained the fierce reaction in the region to Australian Prime Minister Howard's comments about a "right of pre-emption." Striking the right balance in defence policy in such a context was an extremely difficult challenge.

THREE CHALLENGES



Professor Amitav Acharya giving opening remarks at the conference

The conference was opened by **Amitav Acharya**, Head of Research at IDSS and Director of the IDSS-Sasakawa Project on "The Evolving Approaches to Security in the Asia-Pacific". He said there were three key challenges in Asia-Pacific security, which he hoped would be addressed by the conference participants. The most notable of these was the new attention given to international terrorism. This was an important challenge for both the region and for the international community, but it was not the only challenge. There were significant continuities as well as changes in the post-9/11 world. A second issue concerned the changing role of United States. He said American interest

in Asia and many of its bilateral relationships had been strengthened by a perception of common danger from terrorism and extremists. A third challenge was the one facing security cooperation. After a productive and creative period at the beginning of the 1990s, Acharya said enthusiasm for multilateralism had waned. Despite the new bilateral ties being forged since 9/11, he still believed multilateralism remained relevant. Finally, he outlined some key questions for the conference to consider: what kind of security environment is there in Asia today? What is the role for the U.S.? How can we develop multilateral approaches so as to move away from the kind of bilateral, exclusionary arrangements that can exacerbate the security dilemma?

SESSION ONE

SECURITY CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE

Presenting the first paper, entitled "Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution of Concepts and Practices", **Ralf Emmers** identified two principal sets of influences on regional security thinking: alliances on the one hand, and concepts like cooperative and comprehensive security on the other. Alliances have a narrow focus on military security and are designed to work by deterring specific enemies. By contrast, comprehensive and cooperative security take a broader approach to security. They are predicated on the need to seek security *with* others and not against them. In the Asia-Pacific, bilateral military alliances between regional states and the U.S. dominate the security architecture, although Emmers said the long-term relevance of alliances was uncertain. He said they could be undermined by a resurgence of American unilateralism, or the growing technological gap between the U.S. and its allies. He also said the relevance of alliances in a counter terrorism context remained to be proved.

Emmers said the ARF has focused to date on creating habits of dialogue and confidence building. It had helped establish multilateralism in the region, but was not yet a security

community in its own right. He said the ARF could better be considered as the first security regime in Asia-Pacific, its contribution limited to the promotion of norms and CBMs. According to Emmers, while the practice of security in the Asia-Pacific continues to be dominated by bilateral alliances, most states' policies are influenced by cooperative and comprehensive security. These concepts complement the alliances, rather than compete with them.



Professor William Tow

The next speaker, **William Tow** presented a paper on “Convergent Security Revisited: Reconciling Bilateral and Multilateral Security Approaches”. He defended the long-term relevance of the bilateral

alliances. One of their biggest advantages was that unlike some of the more ambitious proposals offered by various analysts and academics, they were already well established.

Tow argued in favour of what he called a “convergent security” strategy for the region, combining bilateral alliances and multilateral institutions. He described convergent security as a “judicious mix of realist and liberal strategies”. It recognizes the realist principle of the centrality of state interests, but it also contains a liberal component. Importantly for the present situation in the region, it recognizes that existing alliance mechanisms can be applied to objectives other than countering specific threats. Tow’s paper anticipated the creation of a Sino-American system based on cooperation with small and medium powers. He said convergent security was not a way towards community building, but was a form of security cooperation between powers. It was an example of expansive bilateralism.

Tow argued that the present alliances should be re-conceptualized, moving from a threat-based focus to one concerned with order maintenance. He said counter-terrorism could force the existing alliances to be used in new creative ways. He also stressed the need for trust building among major powers through diplomacy and interaction. As one example, he argued that the U.S. should come to grips with China’s “new security concept”. He urged the major powers to become involved in regional disputes only with the consent of small regional powers.

In conclusion, Tow proposed that regional states should come up with an Asia-Pacific policy declaration containing the principles for moving the alliances away from deterring threats to creating a new vision of regional order.

The third speaker on this panel, **Satu Limaye** spoke on “Recalibration or Transformation: The U.S. Asia-Pacific Security Policies After 9/11 and NSS”. He drew attention to important changes in the U.S. security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. These changes had been caused not only by the terrorist attacks of September 2001, but also by doctrinal and policy changes in the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) and the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS).

He identified seven key elements of the U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy. First, the Bush administration has sought to revitalize relationships with friends and allies in Asia. This was motivated by a perception that the Clinton administration had neglected key alliance ties and partnerships. While much of the attention has been on Northeast Asia, there was also a desire to improve relations along the entire “East Asia littoral”. In Dr. Limaye’s view, this approach had been welcomed by regional states. Second, the administration had signalled a new relationship with China. China was seen as a major regional rival but it was also believed that the PRC should be a less central player in U.S. regional policy. Third, the administration had expressed scepticism about South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” of engaging North Korea. Washington was distrustful of North Korean

promises. A fourth element of U.S. policy was its desire to transform its relations with India. Limaye noted that India was increasingly seen as a player in an East Asian context. Fifth, there was greater attention generally to Asia within the U.S. global strategy. There had been some redeployment of assets to Asia as well as the continued commitment to forward stationed troops in the region and the deployment of missile defences. Sixth, there was a general scepticism about the utility of regimes, treaties and multilateralism in the Bush administration. Finally, he said, there was less interest in non-traditional security issues than there had been during the Clinton administration.

The Bush administration's attitude towards multilateralism meant that multilateralism now had to be justified and that participants had to be held to their commitments. Bilateralism will be the basis of U.S. policy for the foreseeable future, and the NSS makes the bilateral alliances the basis for improving American ties with Asia.

DISCUSSION

The first part of the discussion focused on the relationship between the U.S., China and Japan. **Renato De Castro** argued that China is using liberalism and multilateral approaches to mitigate the highly unilateral approaches of the Bush administration. Asked to explain his concept of "convergent security" Tow outlined a "co-hegemonic" order between the United States and China, which would be a compromise between the San Francisco system and China's New Security Concept. He also said that there has to be an escape mechanism—a hedge—where either the U.S. or China can revert to the traditional realist application of their national capabilities when vital national interests are at stake.

Daljit Singh asked what the reaction of Japan would be to this co-management between the United States and China. He also wondered how much space the U.S. would be prepared to give to China in the Asia-Pacific? Tow replied that he did not envisage a U.S.-China coalition, but rather a *modus operandi*. As for Japan, it is not a large power or small power, but a

unique power. A bargain needs to be forged between the U.S. and Japan that is "minimally acceptable" to China. There were domestic, demographic and economic constraints on Japanese influence. It also had a credibility problem in the region. Accordingly, it was hard for it to create a strategic presence. He said the U.S. can influence Japan to be a compliant ally.

Addressing the question "how much space will the U.S. cede to China," **Satu Limaye** held that the space is not the U.S.'s to give. If Chinese behaviour gives confidence to its neighbours it will make its own space. He noted that China's increased interest in multilateralism over the last decade had helped it make progress. He did not see containment as a goal of U.S. policy. Washington wants a relationship that is cooperative. It wants to see a China that is engaged in the international community.

The discussion then moved to the relationship between bilateral alliances and multilateral cooperation. **Ron Huisken** said many states already recognized the value of transforming existing alliances. Australia and the U.S. set out to restructure their alliance relationship in 1995. He said the 1996 Sydney Statement recast ANZUS to operate in the long term in a region without a threat. Politically, he said, the event was over shadowed by the April 1996 U.S.-Japan agreement that led to Chinese perceptions that the U.S. was lining up its allies in a containment strategy.

Chin Kin Wah asked for clarification on the relevance of the bilateral alliance to fighting terrorism. What role for multilateral arrangements such as the ARF in counter-terrorism? He noted that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which has been promoted by China, has been undermined since 9/11 by the U.S. effort to develop military relations with its Central Asian member states.

Ralf Emmers agreed that bilateral alliances remained the cornerstone of region security. However, the war on terrorism requires some form of larger cooperation, and of building security with others. Addressing the question

about Central Asia, Tow said the U.S. needed to convince China it is not trying to contain it through Central Asia. This was a good opportunity for convergent security. The U.S. and China could come up with an agenda, including trust-building measures, and use this to embrace the Chinese New Security Concept.

Shin-Wha Lee said she was very sceptical about the role of East Asian multilateralism, based on her experiences working on the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), which developed ideas for deepening the ASEAN-Plus-Three Process. The track two EAVG produced a report that was delivered to the APT leaders meeting in Brunei in 2001. It was followed by the official response from the East Asian Study Group, a body composed of senior officials. In short, she said, the EAVG report had been a success, making a number of important recommendations, but because the EASG was at the level of track one, it had problems reaching consensus and had made little progress.

Nan Li asked how ASEAN could be described as a security community when there is considerable use of mutual deterrence in the region? Couldn't ASEAN's history of war avoidance just be a consequence of the U.S. presence, or the region's geography? Emmers replied that it was impossible to quantify the factors that lead to war avoidance. There are many factors involved: deterrence, geography, and the fact that the region is made up of weak states. Amitav Acharya added that Goh Chok Tong had recently said that it was "not intuitively obvious" that the ASEAN-5 could have avoided war in 1967. But in his view, the fact that other variables helped explain the absence of war in Southeast Asia did not render ASEAN's role irrelevant. To take one example, U.S. power, it was not clear that the U.S. would have intervened in Southeast Asia in the wake of the Nixon Doctrine.

Chulacheeb Chinwanno raised the subject of the strategic relationship between Russia, China and India. There had been possible talk of an emerging united front to counter U.S. unilateralism. What is the impact of these links

on regional security?

Pham Cao Phong replied by noting that China, Russia and India all see their bilateral ties with the U.S. as more important than relations between them. The much-vaunted "Strategic Partnership" signed in 1996 between Russia and China does not work, he said, because both countries value their relations with the U.S. more than their bilateral relationship. He expressed scepticism about the successes claimed for the SCO.

SESSION TWO

JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA



From left to right, Professors Yasuhiro Takeda and Shin-Wha Lee during their panel presentations

The second session addressed the security practices and concepts of states in Northeast Asia. In his opening paper, "Security Order and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Japan's Compound Approach", **Yasuhiro Takeda** said the current security order in the Asia-Pacific was organized under a mix of principles. Cooperative security was considered to be a good means of mitigating the security dilemma, while collective defence or collective security approaches were more attractive to those who saw conscious rivalries persisting in the region. He said this mix of policies presents a challenge. In his view, the concepts are juxtaposed in regional security practice without being integrated. The region lacks a way to organically link them.

Takeda argued that Japan uses a "compound"

KEYNOTE SPEECH 1

ADMIRAL DENNIS BLAIR, "SECURITY COMMUNITIES AFTER 9/11"



Admiral Dennis Blair delivering his keynote address

In his keynote speech, Retired Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, looked back over the last three years to determine how the security community concept had fared and looked to the future to examine the continuing relevance of this approach to the international relations of the Asia-Pacific. He explained that security communities are groups of nations that do not intend to go to war with one another. Instead, they are ready to cooperate for common objectives. He believed that the reaction to international terrorism was the most important example of the Asian nations coming together as a security community. He argued, therefore, that security communities are forming in Asia because regional nations are increasingly cooperating when dealing with common threats and pursuing common objectives.

Admiral Blair ventured some ideas about the future of security communities by first referring to some of the threats faced by the region. Militant aggressive Islam poses such a danger. An intensified U.S.-China rivalry is another development that could submerge security community approaches in Asia. Nuclear weapons is a final development that could plunge Asia back into balance of power approaches. Yet, he did not see these potential developments as likely. In contrast, he hoped for the rejuvenation of multilateral bodies, starting with the United Nations. On ASEAN and the ARF, he argued that it was "time for an expansion in effectiveness". ASEAN, he said, should start with transnational issues, including terrorism, drugs, piracy, illegal immigration and others. China also needs to take an active role in multilateral efforts. Finally, Admiral Blair said that the intellectual community has to play its part in contributing to fresh multilateral approaches in Asia.

concept of security that brings together the concepts of collective security, cooperative security and collective defence. The Japan-U.S. alliance operates as the core of this structure, but there is also an element of collective security evidenced by Japan's increasing participation in UN peacekeeping. Takeda argued that Japan's alliance with the United States has gone from being a bilateral alliance against a common threat to a security regime for building new norms, principles, rules and procedures.

He asked whether the U.S.-Japan security treaty could be seen as an international public good. To be a public good, he said, the alliance needed to be both reliable and promote confidence. In terms of reliability, the major question concerned the limits on Japan's ability to exercise its right of self-defence. In terms of promoting confidence, he said significant progress had been made in improving relations between Japan and the ROK. This had been symbolized by the 1998 joint declaration on "a Japan-South Korea partnership toward the twenty-first century". However, there had been less progress in relations with China, although he noted that since 9/11 China has muted some of its criticisms of Japan's security role.

According to Takeda, the debate about bilateralism or multilateralism in Japanese security policy was over. The widely held consensus today is that Japan should rely on the U.S. alliance and also embrace multilateralism. These approaches are seen to be complementary. He concluded by saying he believed the U.S.-Japan alliance has been transformed into a security regime, permitting even non-members to enjoy the benefits. He said no single notion of security cooperation could provide the organizing principle for the region. What is needed is not to try to create a comprehensive system combining all the various concepts nor to rely on any one of them, but rather to find integrative security policies that can help create real public goods for the region.

The next speaker in the second panel, **Shin-Wha Lee**, spoke on "Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Order in Korea: International Engagement on Inter-Korean

Relations". She said that South Korea wanted an approach that acknowledged not just traditional military threats, but also the importance of economic security. Current thinking focused on three different sets of concerns: traditional military threats, non-traditional security issues and humanitarian concerns. Lee said that in the Korean context, all three are related to each another. The current focus of traditional military concerns was of course the North Korean nuclear threat. Despite this challenge, there was growing domestic unhappiness about U.S. forces in Korea. This surge in anti-Americanism has prompted serious thinking about whether U.S. forces are needed in Korea. Even if they do not favour a complete withdrawal, Lee said the majority of Korean people now prefer a reduction in the number of American troops. She predicted that if Roh wins the December presidential election then the United States and Korea will have a very different alliance relationship in the future.

Lee stressed that while the threat from the North was real, security needs to be defined more broadly than simply traditional military concerns. She said humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism were also vital issues.

Referring to regional multilateral institutions, Lee said the ARF has unfortunately not played an active role in promoting Korean reconciliation. Rather, inter-Korean ties were more linked closely to the state of U.S.-DPRK relations. She suspected that North Korea would not pay real attention to the ARF but believed multilateral efforts by the ARF and the UN could be significant as a first step for regional confidence building.

The third panellist, **Nan Li's** paper, "The Evolving Chinese View on Security", began by discussing the evolution of Chinese thinking on security under Mao and Deng Xiaoping. Under Mao, the focus was on war and revolution both within China and around the world. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping had accepted the idea of the nation-state as the focus of security policy. His successor, Jiang Jemin, supported the use of military force as an instrument in policy,

for example in deterrence and war games. Yet, cooperative security has had an impact on Chinese thinking in the form of the “New Security Concept”. This emphasized the need for equality of relations, cooperation, dialogue, transparency and confidence-building. Other specific examples of how multilateral security concepts have influenced Chinese security thinking were the recent agreement on conduct in the South China Sea and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). He said the SCO was the “most remarkable example” of the new Chinese approach. It focused on intra-mural confidence building and enhancing transparency among members. The SCO combines traditional security elements, particularly fighting separatism and terrorism, as well as economic security goals such as trade promotion.

The new security concept was important as it served as a public instrument to enhance the legitimacy of China vis-à-vis the U.S. It contributed to the view of a “kindler gentler” China in the region. He said the concept is frequently used alongside allegations accusing the U.S. of persisting with a Cold War mentality.

The discussant for this panel, **Muthiah Alagappa**, suggested that the various terms such as bilateralism, collective defence, cooperative security and multilateralism need to be defined precisely in order to make them useful. He also wondered if more attention could be paid to another central security concept, that of self help. How do these various approaches interact? To test this, he said, we needed to look at concrete issues. With Japan, this can be done by looking at its approach to the Northern Territories question, or dealing with the China threat. How do these approaches work in practice? The same question could be asked regarding North Korea. How relevant is the U.S.-ROK alliance compared to KEDO and other multilateral options? On some issues one approach might be more salient than others. Perhaps there is even a hierarchy used by states.

Referring to the Korean paper, he asked what

would be the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance if issues on the Peninsula were resolved? Commenting on China, Alagappa said China still acts in a predominantly realist fashion, and emphasizes power, albeit through alignments not alliances. It is important to understand why China embraces multilateral institutions, and how this relates to its concerns about acquiring power. Is China taking a selective approach to multilateralism?

DISCUSSION

At the outset, the discussion focused on the state of alliances in the region. **William Tow** noted that America’s alliances in the region were taking on an increasingly broad range of issues. **Ron Huisken** said that since the end of the Cold War, alliances have been subject to powerful contradictory forces. On the one hand, alliances became less relevant with the disappearance of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the U.S. has become significantly more calculating about its alliances. It increasingly looks at its alliance partners to ask: “what services are you providing for me today and what can you provide tomorrow?” Referring to the current state of the U.S.-ROK alliance, **Shin-Wha Lee** said the problem with the relationship is not the alliance itself, but the fact that it is dominated by the U.S. She said in her view, the alliance should be reformulated to go beyond the Korean Peninsula

Turning to China’s approach to security, **Pham Cao Phong** said that China principally relied on self-help to enhance its military capacity against challengers. But **Amitav Acharya** suggested that multilateralism could be used as a tool to induce changes in Chinese behavior. For example, the U.S. Pacific Command had wanted China to take part in a military exercise. China had refused to come to the bilateral exercise, but said it would go to COBRA GOLD because it was multilateral. Multilateralism was seen as a tool that could be used to help China develop more transparent relations with the U.S.

Muthiah Alagappa pointed out that now almost every state in the region accepts the U.S. as the preponderant world power. In

his view, American preponderance is here to stay for the next 10–15 years. There was even “grudging acceptance” of this fact by the Chinese. This preponderance has consequences for the alliances. They are being transformed because there is no longer a specific threat, but this process also creates its own tensions. Sometimes, the U.S.’s relations with non-allies do not seem much different to its relations with states that are allies. He noted that there is also the potential problem that when both parties to an alliance want it to move beyond simply deterring threats, the direction the U.S. wants to go in might not be the same as the other party.



Barry Desker, Director of IDSS, and Admiral Dennis Blair

SESSION THREE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND AUSTRALIA

The conference’s third session focused on security concepts and practice in the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. **Renato de Castro** (“Revitalized Philippine-United States Security Relations: The Triumph of Bilateralism Over Multilateralism in Philippines Foreign Policy?”) discussed the Philippines-U.S. security alliance and how this was resurrected in the light of the war on terrorism. He noted that in the middle of the 1990s Manila had started to use multilateral mechanisms as a result of its breakdown in relations with the U.S. after the end of the Cold War. The Philippines saw multilateralism as a way to improve regional comfort levels, pursue confidence-building measures (CBMs), and to constrain powers such as China and Australia. However, its expectations had not been totally

met. For example, China had not been willing to talk about Mischief Reef in a multilateral context. There was also a growing sense in Manila that the ARF was becoming a talk shop. As a result, by 1998, the Philippines had sought to revitalize its bilateral alliance.

The events of 9/11 presented a further opportunity for strengthening U.S.-Philippines ties. He summarized current U.S. assistance in the country, saying it was aimed at developing the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) counter-terrorism capability. It also helped the AFP deal with external and internal threats, and had the additional benefit of being an insurance policy against China. De Castro’s assessment was that the Philippines’ strategy was a combination of expedient defensive realism with multilateralism. Its current enthusiasm for bilateralism is not exclusive, and does not mean it has lost interest in multilateral mechanisms.



From left to right, Professors Renato de Castro and Chulacheb Chinwanno

The second speaker in this panel, **Chulacheeb Chinwanno**, (“Thailand and Regional Security: A Search for Security Cooperation”) said that World War II had taught Thailand that it needed allies. As a result, in the 1950s it had joined SEATO. However, its experience with multilateral collective defence was not a happy one. Thailand was unimpressed by SEATO’s lack of concern in keeping Laos

free from communism. Multilateral collective defence was seen as unreliable, and as a result Thailand signed the Rusk-Thanat communiqué establishing bilateral security ties with the United States.

With the creation of ASEAN in 1967, Thailand found a new way of approach to ensure it did not become isolated if it came under pressure from any large state. It pursued a combination of bilateral and multilateral security policies. Today, Thailand continues to support this mix. It places great importance on ASEAN. Thailand also strongly supported the creation of the ARF and hosted the first ministers meeting in Bangkok in 1994. The Thai-U.S. military exercise COBRA GOLD has also become multilateral in recent years and has expanded to incorporate non-traditional security aspects.

In terms of the impact of 9/11 on Thai security policy, Chulacheeb said Thailand tried to distinguish between local and international terrorism. The government was concerned with the sensitivities of the Muslims in the south, but it also wanted to support the U.S. Thailand also supported an ASEAN declaration on terrorism and is a party to an ASEAN counter-terrorism agreement. To date, its preference has been to stress multilateral initiatives in combating extremism.

Ron Huisken (“Security Cooperation in East Asia: Accelerating the Evolutionary Process”) discussed the need to strike a balance between alternative instruments for achieving security. East Asia, he said, was a region of turbulence with a limited history of security cooperation. He said the security challenges faced in Asia are distinctive thus solutions have to be equally distinctive. In his view what was needed was a “cocktail” approach to security. He argued that multilateralism is the critical “5–10% ingredient in the cocktail that makes or breaks the drink”.

Huisken said the major regional approaches to security could be summarized as self-help, bilateral alliances with the U.S. and “a dash of multilateralism”. Like most regional states, Australia uses a mix of these instruments to

promote its security. Various governments in Canberra had played with foreign policy priorities at the margins, but Huisken said there has been little significant change in security strategy. In his view, however, Australia was closer to the “optimal security cocktail” in the first half of the 1990s than it is today.

Huisken believed that the region was on the cusp of a major decision about whether to strengthen alliances and set off down the road to create a multilateral collective defence structure. A small step had been taken in this direction with the establishment of a trilateral dialogue between senior defence officials from the U.S., Japan and Australia. An alternative path was to opt for more concentrated multilateral security processes. In his view, it was important to try this.

One way to forge a more potent multilateral process was to build on APEC. APEC is a Head of State meeting which needs a Head of State agenda. APEC’s leaders should declare that they are taking responsibility for the big issues in the region. This would not necessarily mean the end of the ARF. The leaders could anoint the forum to address specific issues, but he admitted it would require some relaxation of ASEAN’s current control over the ARF agenda and pace.



From left to right, Dr. Ng Chee Yuen, Ms. Seoun Seong, Dr. Ron Huisken and Dr. Satu Limaye

The discussant for this panel, **Alan Chong** of the National University of Singapore, commented that in considering the future of alliances, there should be more emphasis on internal threats and domestic politics. The key issue in dealing with terror is securing domestic law and order, rather than getting neighbouring states to make various commitments. In the Philippines and elsewhere around the region, he said, local states have not solved their own problems. But regionalism in East Asia remains important. Huisken was wrong to suggest East Asian regionalism is not progressing. In his view, it is a “multi-speed process” and it cannot be expected to move forward without any obstacles.

DISCUSSION

Rizal Sukma expressed doubts that the model of Philippines-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation could be extended throughout Southeast Asia. He said U.S.-Philippines operations might work effectively against Abu Sayyaf, but he said he was not sure how they would work against a group like JI (Jemaah Islamiah). He said Singapore had broken up terrorist plots against embassies in the country, not because of the U.S. presence, but because of its own domestic intelligence capability and the sharing of intelligence between Singapore and Malaysia.

Mely Anthony expressed surprise that there was little discussion of ASEAN in the Philippines context. She said if you want to trace the Philippines’ approaches to security, it is vital to include questions of identity and domestic politics. Domestic issues in the Philippines are very troubling and there is a need for the Philippines to be identified with ASEAN to solve those domestic problems, for example, to combat Muslim secessionism. She said the Philippines had to have cooperative arrangements with its neighbours, because security and economic ties with ASEAN helped its development.

Amitav Acharya likened the U.S.-Philippines security arrangement to something from Jurassic Park that had been brought back to life. But he asked what exactly “the dinosaurs”

would do after the common issue of terrorism had been solved? In particular, he wondered to what extent did the U.S. and the Philippines see the relationship as having a use regarding China?

Commenting on Thailand’s security practice, Acharya said that Thailand’s historical approach to multilateralism could be likened to a “toolbox attitude”. Multilateralism is a tool to be taken out and used when it is required. However, he wondered if there has been a longer-term commitment to multilateral institutions since democratization took place in the 1990s and Thai security policy was less dominated by the military.




Dr. Chin Kin Wah during the discussions

Chin Kin Wah asked about the importance of the China factor in Thailand’s preferred security architecture. Chulaceeb replied that in his view, Thailand was “dancing” with both China and the U.S., but would prefer to move closer to ASEAN.

Barry Desker noted the extent to which Prime Minister Howard’s comments about pre-emption had provoked comment and wondered how this fits with Australia’s tradition of forward deployment. In his view, terrorism provides a return to history. He recalled that when there was a communist terrorist threat against Singapore it had engaged in pre-emptive actions. Similarly, Malaysia had based some of its forces in southern Thailand. During *Konfrontasi* Malaysia and the British engaged in strikes into Indonesia. He said you could argue Vietnam did

KEYNOTE SPEECH 2

DR. MUTHIAH ALAGAPPA, "DOES A SECURITY ORDER EXIST IN ASIA?"



Dr. Muthiah Alagappa delivering his keynote address

In his keynote speech, Dr. Muthiah Alagappa, Director of the East-West Center's Washington Office, noted that while more than a decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, Asia still faces serious security challenges. These include the conflicts in the Korean peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait, and over Kashmir; the danger of nuclear and missile proliferation; internal conflicts and their link to international terrorism; and the concern with the rising power of China and with American dominance. Indeed, some experts see Asia as a dangerous place and project an unstable future. Dr. Alagappa, in his presentation, disagreed with this assessment and projection. Although it does face serious challenges, he argued that Asia is a relatively stable, predictable, and prosperous region, especially when compared to the early post-independence era. Despite periodic crises, there has not been a major war since 1979. With very few exceptions, states do not fear for their survival, most disputes are managed or adjusted in a peaceful manner, and, despite setbacks, international trade, investment and production have flourished. Asia has enjoyed relative peace, security, and prosperity over the last two decades. According to Dr. Alagappa, this situation is unlikely to alter dramatically.

Drawing on the multi-year East-West Center Asian Security Order project, Dr. Alagappa contended that security order exists in Asia; although it is best described as an "instrumental" order with some "normative-contractual" features. There is no single pathway to order in Asia. While the U.S. role remains important, order in Asia also rests on a widely shared normative framework. There exist a set of rules and norms which ease the security dilemma, ensure state survival and sustain normal political and diplomatic interaction which produce a degree of coordination and cooperation among Asian states over private and common security goals. These rules can be broken only at a high cost. While the effectiveness of these rules vary from issue to issue, and region to region, and while certain rules are contested, they have contributed to an overall climate of predictability and stability. Territorial disputes are being managed peacefully and economic interdependence has flourished. There are signs of a basic understanding among the parties even in cases of acute conflict. Dr. Alagappa concluded that Asia's security order is likely to persist for some time and change will be gradual and incremental.

the same with its intervention into Cambodia, and with Thai actions against the Vietnamese in Cambodia. With the re-emergence of terrorist attacks these practices have returned.

SESSION FOUR

INDONESIA, MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

The first speaker, **Rizal Sukma**, presented a paper on “Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security”. He said that from the beginning, Indonesia has been opposed to collective defence ties. Historically, it was suspicious of major extra-regional powers, which Jakarta believed had wanted to retain Dutch colonial rule. Domestic politics had also always conspired against collective defence arrangements. A common fear in Indonesia was that any external defence pact could undermine its national identity. This explained the importance to Indonesia of ASEAN with its mantra of “regional solutions for regional problems”.

After the end of the Cold War, there was a greater recognition by Indonesia of the rights of extra regional powers to be involved in the region’s affairs. It supported peacekeeping operations (PKOs) as a modified collective security approach within the U.N. framework, and has participated in more than 60 PKO missions. Since the East Timor crisis, however, he said the Indonesian military has come to the belief that U.N. missions can be used by big powers to advance their own issues. Indonesian leaders have made it clear that they will not participate in peace enforcement missions, only in peacekeeping.

The Megawati government is very nationalistic and collective defence is still unacceptable to Jakarta. Despite this, there has been little official comment about the presence of American troops in the Philippines. However, whenever there is any talk in the U.S. media about possibly dispatching troops to Indonesia, there has been a strong reaction from the government. There was a similar response condemning Australian Prime Minister Howard’s comments about pre-

emption. Despite that, he noted that there have not been complaints expressed within Indonesia about Australian police helping their Indonesian counterparts with the Bali investigation. Sukma concluded that questions of sovereignty and Indonesia’s “allergy” to external interference will continue to be obstacles to closer regional security cooperation.

The paper by **J.N. Mak** on “Malaysia and Security Cooperation: Coming out of the Closet” pointed out that although Malaysia does not have a formal military relationship with the United States, its bilateral ties are actually surprisingly close. Malaysia moved to “actively, if quietly” engage the U.S. after it began to withdraw from Vietnam in the 1970s. It did so again after the Cold War ended when Kuala Lumpur grew worried about possible Chinese or Japanese dominance in Southeast Asia. There have been more than 75 U.S. ship visits to Malaysia in the last two and half years, more than 1000 overflights annually, as well as U.S. army and Navy SEAL training in Malaysia.

What explains Malaysia’s often hostile rhetoric towards the West, despite the fact it works so closely with states like the United States and Australia? One reason is that extremist groups are seeking to topple the regime and could use close ties with the West to generate support for their cause. Mak said September 11th had been a double-edged sword for Malaysia. It helped legitimate Prime Minister Mahathir’s tough stance against radical Islamic opposition groups. But cooperation with the West against terrorism also irks nationalist and Islamic opinion within the country. Mak said John Howard’s statement about Australia’s “right” to pre-empt in the region undermines Malaysia’s ability to crackdown on its own Muslim fundamentalists, because Kuala Lumpur cannot risk being seen to pander to Canberra.

Chin Kin Wah’s paper, “Singapore’s Perspective in the Regional Security Architecture”, addressed Singapore’s security policies. Chin said there was a great deal of pragmatism in Singaporean policy and it makes use of both realism and neoliberal approaches. Singapore supports a balance of power logic,

viewing the American treaties with Japan and South Korea and the U.S.'s forward deployment strategy as vital in ensuring regional security. It also engages in bilateral defence diplomacy with armed forces from ASEAN and around the world. While ASEAN is the immediate circle of Singapore's defence, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has training facilities in 12 countries and takes part in more than 80 exercises annually. The Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) is seen in Singapore as an important component in the regional security architecture. Singapore's bilateral relationship with Malaysia was also anchored in the FPDA.

Chin noted that Singapore's bilateral relationship with the United States was its "most substantive and extensive," although it remained a "strategic friend" rather than a formal ally. Singapore openly supports a U.S. presence in the region and offers access to its military facilities. The U.S. has a small logistics presence in the country and its navy has access to the Changi naval base. The U.S. relationship provides an opportunity for Singapore to network into exercises with other regional states, for example the COBRA GOLD exercise in Thailand.

In terms of multilateralism, Singapore sees the ASEAN Regional Forum as a means to influence the balance of power. It does not see the ARF as something that could replace the U.S.'s regional alliances in the immediate future, but believes the ARF can help build trust and confidence in the region and moderate relations between the major powers. In the post 9/11 setting, Chin said he thought the opportunities for multilateral cooperation may have increased. In conclusion, Singapore's approach to regional security is multilayered: it supports alliances, extended defence arrangements, and larger forums. Bilateralism and multilateralism are not seen as inconsistent.

The discussant for this panel, **K.S. Nathan** argued that Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia could cooperate against terrorism while differing about the best methods. All three reveal the multi-layered nature of Asia-Pacific security. Each country has its priorities but there is also flexibility in each national approach. Tensions

between the various security concepts do exist, but in his view these produces creativity and reduce complacency. He said in his experience security is always an ambiguous concept, but military planners are prepared to work with what is possible (whether it be unilateralism within a multilateralist framework, or multilateralism within a unilateralist framework). He said Singapore and Malaysia share very pragmatic views in this respect. No one approach is mutually exclusive to any other.

DISCUSSION

Rizal Sukma said that Jakarta has not officially expressed objections about closer U.S.-Philippines relations and the U.S. troop presence, but there has been some popular discontent. **Chin Kin Wah** asked about the possibility of reconciling the FPDA with bilateral ties with the United States. The link between the two is Australia. Australia has foot in ANZUS and a foot in the FPDA. If Australia had to choose between the two, however, there was no question of where it would go: to ANZUS Chin said while John Howard's recent statement about pre-emption in Southeast Asia had not been helpful in working out complexities in its regional relations, the impact of the comments should not be exaggerated. For example, Malaysia had not expressed any interest in withdrawing from the FPDA or removing senior Australian officers from command positions within regional air defence arrangements. **J.N. Mak** pointed out that while defence relations under the FPDA have been insulated from political disputes, Howard's "regional policeman" concept represented a real change in pace and tone in Australian policy.

Amitav Acharya said if Malaysia has quiet but significant bilateral military relations with the U.S., does this mean that Kuala Lumpur does not take the ARF seriously? What motivates the Malaysia-U.S. relationship? Is it regime security? Could it also be a case where Malaysia is competing with Singapore in developing relations with the U.S.? Mak replied that regime security could be strengthened by bilateral collective defence ties if they mean that fewer resources need to be spent on defence.

Malaysia's engagement with the U.S. allows it to spend money on nation-building projects it would otherwise spend on defence. Was there a rivalry with Singapore in courting the U.S.? Perhaps, he said, but a more likely explanation for the closeness of ties was simply that the U.S. was seen as most benign of the extra-regional powers.

Muthiah Alagappa said that Indonesian defence policy was not totally lacking a balance of power approach. He said that under Suharto there was certainly a conscious pro-Western tilt. The Indonesian-Australian defence agreement also showed a willingness to enter into bilateral defence arrangements. Sukma agreed that the balance of power approach was not totally absent, but he said there was no domestic support for this kind of approach. He noted how quickly the Indonesia-Australia agreement collapsed.

Turning to Malaysia, Alagappa said that arguments for cooperative security approaches were more frequently made by foreign ministry people than from defence ministry staff. He noted that Singapore's attachment to multilateralism was low in the early years of ASEAN, but over time it had developed. Chin replied that a multilateral defence framework could sustain and even nurture bilateral relationships that are embedded within it. Singapore wishes to see "a decisive America, but also one that is prepared to go decisively with company". Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has publicly expressed concern that a war against Iraq that is protracted and results in excessive loss of Muslim lives would upset the Islamic nations worldwide. Such an eventuality would only heighten the sense of shared vulnerability that already exists in Southeast Asia after the Bali bombings and recent attacks in the Philippines.



Participants at the conference having a break

IDSS would like to thank Dr. David Capie for his contribution to this report as the rapporteur for the conference.

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Sunday, 8 December 2002

- 1400 – 1700h Registration of Panellists
- 1800h Welcome Drinks
[Venue : Brasserie Tatler, Level 4]
- 1830h Welcome Dinner

Day One

Monday, 9 December 2002

- 0800h General Registration
- 0900h **Conference Opening** by Prof. Amitav Acharya (Deputy Director, IDSS)
- 0930h **Session 1 – Evolving Security Concepts & Approaches; the United States**
Chair:
Mr. K. Kesavapany (Director, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies)
Presenters:
Dr. Ralf Emmers (Post-Doctoral Fellow, IDSS)
Paper: “Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Evolution of Concepts and Practices”
Prof. William Tow (Professor, University of Queensland, Australia)
Paper: “Convergent Security Revisited: Reconciling Bilateral and Multilateral Security Approaches”
Dr. Satu Limaye (Director of Research, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, USA)
Paper: “Recalibration or Transformation: The United States’ Asia-Pacific Security Policy After 9/11 and NSS”
- 1030 – 1045h Refreshment break

- 1045h Discussant:
by Prof. Amitav Acharya (Deputy Director, IDSS)

- 1100 – 1200h Q & A

- 1230h Lunch
Distinguished Speaker:
Adm. Dennis Blair (Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense Analyses, USA)
Keynote address:
“Security Communities After 9/11”

1400h **Session 2 – Japan, Korea, and China**

Chair:
Amb. Mushahid Ali (Senior Fellow, IDSS)

Presenters:

Prof. Yasuhiro Takeda (Professor of International Relations, National Defense Academy, Japan)

Paper: “Security Cooperation and Order in the Asia Pacific: Japan’s Compound Approach”

Prof. Shin Wha Lee (Research Professor of International Relations, Korea University)

Paper: “Evolving Approaches to Security Cooperation in East Asia: The Case of the Republic of Korea”

Dr. Li Nan (Fellow, IDSS)

Paper: “The Evolving Chinese View on Security”

- 1500 – 1515h Refreshment break

- 1515h Discussant:
Dr. Muthiah Alagappa (Director, East-West Center Washington, USA)

- 1530 – 1630h Q & A

- 1900h Dinner at Garden Hotel, Poolside

Day Two**Tuesday, 10 December 2002**

0930h	<p>Session 3 – Philippines, Thailand and Australia</p> <p>Chair:</p> <p>Assoc. Prof. Simon Tay (Chairman, Singapore Institute of International Affairs)</p> <p>Presenters:</p> <p>Dr. Renato De Castro (Associate Professor, De La Salle University, Philippines)</p> <p>Paper: “Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: The Triumph of Bilateralism Over Multilateralism in Philippine Foreign Policy?”</p> <p>Dr. Chulacheeb Chinwanno (Associate Professor, Thammasat University, Thailand)</p> <p>Paper: “Security Order in Southeast Asia: A Perspective from Thailand”</p> <p>Dr. Ron Huiskens (Senior Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia)</p> <p>Paper: “Security Cooperation in East Asia: Accelerating the Evolutionary Process” (an Australian view)</p>
1030 – 1045h	Refreshment break
1045h	<p>Discussant:</p> <p>Dr. Alan Chong (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, NUS)</p>
1100 – 1200h	Q & A
1230h	<p>Lunch</p> <p>Distinguished Speaker:</p> <p>Dr. Muthiah Alagappa (Director, East-West Center Washington, USA)</p> <p>Keynote Address:</p> <p>“Does a Security Order Exist in Asia?”</p>
1400h	<p>Session 4 – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore</p> <p>Chair:</p> <p>Assoc. Prof. Lee Lai To (Head, Dept. of Political Science, NUS)</p> <p>Presenters:</p> <p>Dr. Rizal Sukma (Director of Studies, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Indonesia)</p> <p>Paper: “Indonesia and Regional Security: The Quest for Cooperative Security”</p> <p>Mr. J. N. Mak (Director of Research, Maritime Institute of Malaysia)</p> <p>Paper: “Malaysia and Security Cooperation: Coming Out of the Closet”</p> <p>Dr. Chin Kin Wah (Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore)</p> <p>Paper: “Singapore’s Perspective in the Regional Security Architecture”</p>
1500 – 1515h	Refreshment break
1515h	<p>Discussant:</p> <p>Dr. K.S. Nathan (Senior Fellow, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore)</p>
1530 – 1630h	Q & A
1600 – 1700h	Closing Remarks by Professor Amitav Acharya (Deputy Director, IDSS)
Note	Q & A: question-and-answer period

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

PRESENTERS

1. Dr. Muthiah Alagappa
Director
East West Center Washington
1819L Street, NW
Second Floor
Washington DC 20036
Tel: 202-293-3995 ext 20
Fax: 202-293 1402
E-mail: AlagappM@EastWestCenter.org
2. Admiral Dennis C. Blair
Senior Fellow
Institute for Defense Analyses
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22311-1882
United States of America
Tel: 703-845-2156 Fax: 703-845-2569
E-mail: dblair@ida.org
3. Dr. Chin Kin Wah
Senior Fellow
Institute of Southeast Asia Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614
Tel: 6870 0955 Fax: 6778 1735
E-mail: chinkw@iseas.edu.sg
4. Dr. Chulacheeb Chinwanno
Associate Professor
Faculty of Political Science
Thammasat University
Prachan Road, Bangkok 10200
Fax: 662-281 6748
E-mail: cchinwanno@yahoo.com
5. Dr. Renato De Castro
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
De La Salle University
2401 Taft Avenue, 1004
Manila, Philippines
Fax: 632-526 5917
Email: clarcd@mail.dlsu.edu.ph
6. Dr. Ralf Emmers
Post-Doctoral Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 4340 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: isremmers@ntu.edu.sg
7. Dr. Ron Huisken
Senior Fellow
Strategic Defence Studies Centre
The Australian National University
Building 6, Fellows Road
Canberra Act 0200, Australia
Tel: 612-6125 9938 Fax: 612-6248 0816
E-mail: ron.huisken@anu.edu.au
8. Professor Shin-Wha Lee
Research Professor of International
Relations
Iimin International Relations Institute
Korea University
5-1, Anam-dong, Sungbuk-ku
Seoul, Korea 136-5165
Tel: 822-3290 1649 Fax: 822-927 5165
E-mail: swlee@korea.ac.kr
9. Dr. Nan Li
Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 5983 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: isnli@ntu.edu.sg
10. Dr. Satu Limaye
Director of Research
Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies
2255 Kuhio Avenue, 18th Floor
Honolulu, Hawaii 96815
Tel: 808-971 4054 Fax: 808-971 8989
E-mail: limayes@apcss.org
11. Mr. J.N. Mak
Director of Research
Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA)
Unit B-06-08-B06-11
6th Floor, Blk B, Megan Phileo Avenue
12, Jalan Yap Kwan Seng
50450, Kuala Lumpur
Tel: 02-03 2161 2960 Fax: 02-03-2161 4035
E-mail: makjn@pd.jaring.my

12. Dr. Rizal Sukma
Director of Studies
Centre of Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS)
Jalan Tanah Abang III/23-27
Jakarta 10160, Indonesia
Tel: 6221-386 5532 Fax: 6221-384 7517
E-mail: Rsukma@csis.or.id
13. Professor Yasuhiro Takeda
Professor of International Relations
National Defense Academy
Hashirimizu 1-10-20
Yokosuka-shi, Kanagawa-ken
239-8686 Japan
Tel: 81-468-41-3810 Fax: 81-468-44-5921
E-mail : takeda@nda.ac.jp
14. Professor William Tow
Professor
School of Political Science & International
Studies
University of Queensland
Brisbane Australia 4072
Tel: 617-3365 3042 Fax: 617-3365 1388
E-mail: w.tow@mailbox.uq.edu.au

DISCUSSANTS/CHAIRPERSONS

15. Dr. Alan Chong
Assistant Professor
Dept. of Political Science
NUS, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent
Singapore 119200
Tel: 6874 6068 Fax: 67796815
E-mail: polccs@nus.edu.sg
16. Dr. K.S. Nathan
Senior Fellow
Institute of Southeast Asia Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614
Tel: 6870 4521 Fax: 67781735
E-mail: ksnathan@iseas.edu.sg

17. Mr. K. Kesavapany
Director
Institute of Southeast Asia Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614
Tel: 6870 0955 Fax: 67781735
E-mail: Kesavapany@iseas.edu.sg
18. Assoc Prof. Lee Lai To
Head
Dept of Political Science
National University of Singapore
AS1, 4th Level, 11 Arts Link
Singapore 117570
Tel: 6874 3970 Fax: 6779 6815
E-mail: polleelt@nus.edu.sg
19. Assoc Prof. Simon Tay
Chairman
Singapore Institute of International Affairs
6 Nassim Road
Singapore 258373
Tel: 6734 9600 Fax: 6733 6217
E-mail: siia@pacific.net.sg
20. Mr. Mushahid Ali
Senior Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 6128 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: ismali@ntu.edu.sg

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

21. Mr. Barry Desker
Director
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 6907 Fax: 6793 2991
E-mail: isbdesker@ntu.edu.sg

22. Professor Amitav Acharya
Deputy Director
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 6213 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: isaacharya@ntu.edu.sg
23. Dr. Tan See Seng
Assistant Professor
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 4277 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: issstan@ntu.edu.sg
24. Mr. Masato Seko
Associate Program Officer
The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
The Nippon Foundation Bldg
1-2-2 Akasaka, Minato-ku
Tokyo 107-8523, Japan
Tel: 813-6229 5444 Fax: 813-6229 5473
E-mail: seko@spf.or.jp
25. Mr. Souen Seong
The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
The Nippon Foundation Bldg
1-2-2 Akasaka, Minato-ku
Tokyo 107-8523, Japan
Tel: 813-6229 5444 Fax: 813-6229 5473
26. Mr. Arun Mahizhnan
Deputy Director
Institute of Policy Studies
1 Hon Sui Sen Drive
Hon Sui Sen Memorial Library Bldg
Singapore 117588
Tel: 6779 2633 Fax: 6777 0700
E-mail: Arun_Mahizhnan@ips.org.sg
27. Dr. Ng Chee Yuen
Blk 2 #04-280
Chai Chee Road
Singapore
Tel: 6448 7948 Fax: 6472 3028
E-mail: Cheeyuen2001@yahoo.com
28. Mr. Chris Leck
Defence Policy Officer
Ministry of Defence
Gombak Drive, Off Upper Bukit Timah
Road
MINDEF Building
Singapore 669638
Tel: 6768 4721 Fax: 6768 2325
E-mail: Leck_su_wee@mindef.gov.sg
29. Mr. Seah Kiin Peng
Country Officer/ Directorate Two
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tanglin
Singapore 248163
Tel : 6379 8211 Fax : 6479 5377
E-mail: Seah_kiin_peng@mfa.gov.sg
30. Mr. Scott Loh Chee Heong
Country Officer/Directorate Four
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tanglin
Singapore 248163
Tel : 6379 8412 Fax: 6379 8448
E-mail: Loh_chee_heong@mfa.gov.sg
31. Ms Chua Lee Hoong
Features Editor
The Straits Times
1000 Toa Payoh North
Singapore 318994
Tel : 6319 5521 Fax: 6732 0131
E-mail: leehoong@sph.com.sg
32. Mr. Pham Cao Phong
Visiting Sasakawa Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 5884 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: iscpgham@ntu.edu.sg
33. Assoc Prof. Ang Cheng Guan
Head of Studies
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 5978 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: iscgang@ntu.edu.sg

34. Mr. Mark Hong
Visiting Senior Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 6053 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: istshong@ntu.edu.sg
35. Dr. Mely C. Anthony
Assistant Professor
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 5886 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: ismcanthony@ntu.edu.sg
36. Dr. Evelyn Goh
Assistant Professor
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 4909 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: isclgoh@ntu.edu.sg
37. Mr. Joey Long
Associate Research Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 6978 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: issrlong@ntu.edu.sg
38. Dr. Helen Nesadurai
Assistant Professor
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 5889 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail: isesnesadurai@ntu.edu.sg
39. Mr. Ong Hock Chye
Adjunct Senior Fellow
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
South Spine 4, Level B4
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
Tel: 6790 4752 Fax: 6794 0617
E-mail : ishcong@ntu.edu.sg
40. Dr. David Capie
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Institute of International Relations
The University of British Columbia
Lie Centre – 6476 N.W. Marine Drive
Vancouver B.C. Canada V6T 1Z2
Tel: 604-822 3607 Fax: 604-822 6966
E-mail: dhcapie@interchange.ubc.ca

The Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) was established in July 1996 as an autonomous research institute within the Nanyang Technological University. Its objectives are to:

- conduct research on security, strategic and international issues;
- provide general and graduate education in strategic studies, defence management and defence technology; and
- promote joint and exchange programs with similar regional institutions; organize seminars/conferences on topics salient to the strategic and policy communities of the Asia-Pacific.