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## ABOUT THE HUMAN SECURITY CENTRE

The Human Security Centre, which is based at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, was established in 2002 by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian minister for foreign affairs and then head of the Liu Institute. The centre's director, Andrew Mack, joined in 2002 after a year at Harvard's Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research and three years as director of the Strategic Planning Unit in Kofi Annan's Executive Office at the United Nations.

The Human Security Centre's mission is to make human security-related research more accessible to policy and research communities, the media, educators, and the public. In pursuit of this mission, the centre draws on a network of collaborators in research institutions around the world, as well as pursuing its own independent research.

The first issue of the Human Security Centre's flagship publication, the *Human Security Report*, was published in October 2005 and received an extraordinary amount of attention from the media, policymakers, and from within the research community. (The *Report* can be accessed online at [www.humansecurityreport.info](http://www.humansecurityreport.info)).

The *Human Security Report* is complemented by the Human Security Gateway, an online database of human security resources, and two online bulletins, *Human Security Research* and *Human Security News*.

- Human Security Gateway ([www.humansecuritygateway.info](http://www.humansecuritygateway.info))

The gateway is a rapidly expanding searchable online database of human security-related resources, including reports, journal articles, news items, and fact sheets. The gateway was developed in collaboration with the Canadian Consortium on Human Security.

- *Human Security Research* ([www.humansecuritycentre.org](http://www.humansecuritycentre.org))

*Human Security Research* is an online monthly compilation of new human security-related research published by university research institutes, think-tanks, governments, IGOs, and NGOs.

- *Human Security News* ([www.humansecuritycentre.org](http://www.humansecuritycentre.org))

*Human Security News Daily* is an online daily round-up of the latest human security-related news stories from around the world.

*Human Security News Weekly* highlights ten of the most significant news stories of the week.

All of these e-resources are available free of charge.

The centre is funded by the governments of Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

## WHAT IS HUMAN SECURITY?

Human security is a relatively new concept, but one that is now widely used to describe the complex of interrelated threats associated with civil war, genocide and the displacement of populations. The distinction between human security and national security is an important one.

While national security focuses on the defence of the state from external attack, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from *any* form of political violence.

Human security and national security should be—and often are—mutually reinforcing. But secure states do not automatically mean secure peoples. Protecting citizens from foreign attack may be a necessary condition for the security of individuals, but it is not a sufficient one. Indeed, during the last 100 years far more people have been killed by their own governments than by foreign armies.

All proponents of human security agree that its primary goal is the protection of individuals. But consensus breaks down over what threats individuals should be protected from. Proponents of the ‘narrow’ concept of human security, which underpins the *Human Security Report*, focus on violent threats to individuals, while recognizing that these threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and various forms of socio-economic and political inequity,

Proponents of the ‘broad’ concept of human security articulated in the UN Development Programme’s 1994, *Human Development Report*, and the Commission on Human Security’s 2003 report, *Human Security Now*, argue that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease and natural disasters because these kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.

Although still subject to lively debate within the research community, the two approaches to human security are complementary rather than contradictory.

## OVERVIEW

In October 2005 the first *Human Security Report* was launched at the United Nations by the University of British Columbia's Human Security Centre. The *Report* tracked some of the extraordinary changes that had taken place in the global security landscape since the end of the 1980s.

Published subsequently by Oxford University Press, the *Report* described how armed conflicts, war death tolls, military coups, refugee numbers, international crises, and genocides had all declined in the wake of the Cold War. It argued that many of these changes could be attributed to an explosion of international activism, spearheaded by the UN, that sought to stop ongoing wars, help negotiate peace settlements, support post-conflict reconstruction, and prevent old wars from starting again.

The next *Human Security Report* will be published at the end of 2007. It will focus on two major themes—"The Hidden Costs of War" and "The Causes of Peace." Short descriptions of both are included at the end of this *Brief*.

The intent of the *Human Security Brief 2006* is twofold: to update the core trend data on political violence around the world that were published in the 2005 *Human Security Report*, and second, to analyze the key findings of the three datasets that track these changes.

Second, it describes and analyses the findings of three recently released datasets compiled by the Human Security Centre's partner, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at Uppsala University. The datasets in question track trends in (a) wars fought by non-state actors, where none of the warring parties is a government; (b) campaigns of organized violence against civilians; and (c) war terminations.

### Structure and Contents

The *Brief* is divided into three short chapters. This overview describes their main themes and findings.

**Chapter 1: Trends in Armed Conflict** reviews the latest findings of two datasets that measure global and regional trends in the number of armed conflicts and their associated battle deaths.

**Chapter 2: Deadly Assaults on Civilians** compares the findings of three datasets that seek to measure—albeit very differently—the number of civilians intentionally killed in campaigns of political violence.

**Chapter 3: How Wars End** analyses the findings of a new dataset that provides a comprehensive account of how wars end in the post-World War II era.

### Key Findings

- Notwithstanding the escalating violence in Iraq and the widening war in Darfur, the new data indicates that **from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2005, the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world shrank 15% from 66 to 56. By far the greatest decline was in sub-Saharan Africa.**<sup>1</sup>
- **Battle-death tolls declined worldwide by almost 40% between 2002 and 2005.**<sup>2</sup> Battle-death statistics are prone to considerable error, however, so these findings should be treated with appropriate caution.
- **The steep post-Cold War decline in genocides and other mass slaughters of civilians has continued.** In 2005 there was just one ongoing genocide—in Darfur. In 1989 there were 10.<sup>3</sup>
- **Growing numbers of wars are ending in negotiated settlements instead of being fought to the bitter end—a trend that reflects the increased commitment of the international community to peacemaking.** In the Cold War era more wars were decided on the battle than ended in negotiation.
- **The estimated number of displaced people around the world—refugees and internally displaced persons—fell from 34.2 to 32.1 million between 2003 and 2005, a net decline of 6%.**<sup>4</sup>
- **The number of military coups and attempted coups fell from 10 in 2004 to just 3 in 2005, continuing an uneven decline from the 1963 high point of 25.**<sup>5</sup>

But other trends are far from positive:

- **Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world to see a decline in armed conflicts. In four other regions of the world the number of armed conflicts increased between 2002 and 2005.**
- **International terrorist incidents increased threefold worldwide between 2002 and 2005, the number of fatalities increased fivefold.** Most of the increases were associated with the war in Iraq.
- **Campaigns of organized violence against civilians have increased by 56% since 1989.** Although most of these kill relatively few people, these figures support the popularly-held belief that civilians are increasingly being victimized in the post-Cold War era by the perpetrators of political violence.

- The fact that more wars now end in negotiated settlements rather than victories is encouraging news for peacemakers. But it turns out that **wars that end in negotiated settlements last three times longer than those that end in victories and are nearly twice as likely to restart within five years.**

### Trends in Armed Conflict

Most armed conflict datasets only track trends in armed conflicts in which a government is one of the warring parties. Wars fought between militias, rival guerrilla groups, clans, warlords, or organized communal groups, but without the involvement of a government, have been systematically ignored.

Concerned that this omission gave an incomplete picture of the level of political violence around the world, in 2002 the Human Security Centre commissioned UCDP to compile a dataset on these “non-state” conflicts and their attendant death tolls.

The initial findings of this dataset, which were published in the 2005 *Human Security Report*, revealed that non-state conflicts were actually slightly more numerous than “state-based” conflicts. In 2002, for example, there were 34 non-state conflicts being fought around the world, compared with 32 state-based conflicts.

Chapter 1 of this *Brief* examines trends from 2002 to 2005 in both the state-based and non-state datasets. It shows that while there was little change in the number of conflicts involving a government from 2002 to 2005, the number of non-state conflicts dropped from 34 in 2002 to 25 in 2005.

The non-state conflict dataset also shows that these conflicts are much less deadly than those in which a government is one of the warring parties. Between 2002 and 2005 non-state conflicts caused only a quarter as many battle fatalities as did state-based conflicts.

By far the most important change in this period was in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2002 and 2005 the number of state-based conflicts in the region declined from 13 to 5; the number of non-state conflicts from 24 to 14.

In addition to the decline in overall conflict numbers, the number of sub-Saharan African countries experiencing one or more conflicts on their soil shrank from 15 to 8.

This remarkable change has taken place despite the fact that “structural” factors that are associated with heightened risks of armed conflict—poverty, low growth, economic shocks, and lack of state capacity—have changed little or even worsened. The decline has, however, been associated with a major increase in international support for efforts to end wars and prevent them from restarting.

One consequence of these changes is that sub-Saharan Africa is no longer the world’s most conflict-affected region. In fact, the drop in the number of conflicts in this region

has been the single most important factor driving down the global armed conflict toll over the past four years.

Trends in the rest of the world were less encouraging. Central and South Asia is now the most conflict-affected region. And the Middle East and north Africa, East and Southeast Asia and Oceania, and the Americas also experienced increased numbers of conflicts. There was no change in Europe.

The estimated global decline in battle deaths from both state-based and non-state conflicts has been much greater than the decline in the number of conflicts.

In 2002 there were an estimated 22,736 battle deaths worldwide from both types of conflict. In 2005 there were only 14,085.

Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the greatest decline.<sup>6</sup> The estimated state-based death toll in the region for 2005 (1,851) was just 2% of the highest post-Cold War battle-death toll of nearly 100,000 in 1999.<sup>7</sup>

These battle-death estimates should be viewed with considerable caution. UCDP's data collection and coding methodology undercounts death tolls—quite seriously in high-intensity conflicts. It is nevertheless possible to use the battle-death data to track trends even when estimates of battle-death numbers are known to be too low. Only trend data can tell policy-makers whether things are getting better or worse.

Moreover, battle-death counts in low-intensity conflicts are much less prone to error because there are fewer deaths to count. Today the overwhelming majority of armed conflict falls into this category and here the battle-death data can provide a useful guide to the human costs of war.

### **Deadly Assaults on Civilians**

When the Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his annual Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict report to the Security Council neither he nor his staff has any real idea whether deadly threats to civilians around the world are increasing or decreasing. There is no authoritative source of data on the numbers of civilians intentionally killed by organized political violence each year.

Chapter 2 examines three datasets that measure, in very different ways, the worldwide extent of deadly violence against civilians.

Although not directly comparable and problematic in a number of ways, these three sources of data provide the most comprehensive picture we have of global trends in organized violence against defenceless civilians.



## **“One-Sided Violence”**

The UCDP’s “one-sided violence” dataset, which covers the period from 1989 to 2005 and which was commissioned by the Human Security Centre, is the major focus of Chapter 2.

The term “one-sided violence” reflects the fact that the victims cannot fight back. The dataset counts first, the number of deadly campaigns perpetrated by either governments or armed non-state groups against civilians each year, and second, the fatalities associated with them.

The data indicate that the number of campaigns of one-sided violence increased by 55% between 1989 and 2005. The number of state-based armed conflicts decreased by some 40% from 1992 to 2005.

Estimates of the number of victims of one-sided violence provide a very different perspective, however. Even if we exclude the huge death toll of the Rwanda genocide in 1994, the data show that there has been a clear, albeit very uneven, decline in reported deaths from one-sided violence since the mid-1990s.

There are, however, even more uncertainties involved in reporting and recording civilian death tolls than in estimating battle deaths.<sup>8</sup> The trend data are suggestive—they are certainly not definitive.

## **Genocides and Politicides**

Barbara Harff of the United States Naval Academy defines genocides and politicides as campaigns of “political mass murder” directed primarily against civilians that are intended to exterminate “in whole or in part” a communal or political group.

A dataset compiled by Professor Harff shows the number of genocides rising steadily from 1956, peaking in the mid- to late-1970s, and then declining sharply from 1989 onward. Between 1989 and 2005 the number of these campaigns of political mass murder dropped by 90%.

This trend closely follows the rise and decline of high-intensity civil conflicts over the same period—which is not surprising since most genocides/politicides take place in the context of civil wars.

The sharp decline in these campaigns of mass killing of civilians since 1989 stands in marked contrast to the media and public perception that the number of genocides is increasing.

## **Terrorism**

Terrorism statistics provide a third measure of organized violence against civilians.

The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) is the only institution that publishes regularly updated international and national terrorism data. MIPT has data on international terrorist incidents and fatalities going back to 1968; national terrorism data date back to 1998.

The international terrorism data have followed a trend remarkably similar to those of state-based civil wars and genocides and politicides—namely a steep but uneven increase throughout the Cold War years followed by a steep decline throughout the 1990s.

But while neither civil wars nor genocides increased in number in the new millennium, the incidence of international terrorist attacks shot up almost threefold. According to MIPT, most of the terrorist killing took place in Iraq.

The death toll from international terrorism is, however, relatively small compared with the toll from the mass killings of civilians in genocides and politicides and other forms of one-sided violence.

## **Assessing the Evidence**

UCDP's data on the increased incidence of violent campaigns against civilians, and MIPT's findings on the soaring increase in national and international terrorist incidents both lend credence to the widely held belief that deadly threats to civilians have been increasing.

But if the data are examined from a different perspective a somewhat less bleak picture emerges.

It was noted earlier that UCDP's one-sided violence dataset shows that civilian deaths from organized violence have been declining since the mid-1990s. But in terms of saving civilian lives, by far the most important trend over the past 60 years has been the 90% decline in genocides and politicides since the end of the Cold War, and the parallel decline in high-intensity armed conflicts. Large numbers of civilians were intentionally killed by governments or rebel groups in many of these latter conflicts during the Cold War years.

What this suggests is that, notwithstanding the recent increase in terrorist attacks, the number of civilian victims of intentional organized violence remains appreciably lower today than it was in the Cold War years.

## How Wars End

The findings of a new dataset on conflict terminations from UCDP are the focus of discussion in Chapter 3 of this *Brief*. The new data, which cover the period from 1946 to 2005, reveal that there has been a radical shift in the number of wars starting and ending since the end of the Cold War. And there has been an equally important shift in the way in which conflicts come to an end.

The number of new conflict outbreaks in the 1990s was double that of the 1980s and previous decades—a dramatic increase that helped fuel public perceptions that the post-Cold War decade was uniquely dangerous.

But an even greater number of wars ended than began during the decade—though this change passed largely unnoticed in the media and among the general public. The net effect was that by 2003 there were 40% fewer state-based conflicts being waged around the world than in 1992—the conflict high point of the post-World War II era.

The 1990s witnessed a second striking change. For the first time more wars (42) had been ended by negotiated settlement than by military victory (23). This started a trend that accelerated in the new millennium. Between 2000 and 2005, 17 conflicts ended in negotiated settlements, just four ended in victory.

The big increase in negotiated settlements could be seen as a vindication of the UN's rapidly expanded peacemaking activities during this period. But it turns out that wars that end in negotiated settlements have a downside. They last three times longer on average than conflicts that end in victory, and are nearly twice as likely to start up again within five years.

This is a sobering finding, but the patterns of the past are not necessarily a reliable guide to the future, and the record of the past six years suggests—no more than this—that negotiated settlements may be becoming less prone to breakdown.

The increased emphasis in the UN and elsewhere on promoting negotiated settlements has been criticized on the grounds that too often mediation does little more than provide a breathing space for warring parties to prepare for the next round of fighting. Critics who hold this view argue that it is preferable to “give war a chance” and pursue a stable military solution.<sup>9</sup>

But the advocates of “give war a chance” assume that belligerents can choose between victory and a negotiated settlement. Often there is no such choice.

Conflicts usually become drawn-out affairs precisely because neither side can impose a military defeat on the other. And when victory is not an option, negotiation is the only way to stop the fighting.

The choice, in other words, is not between victory and a negotiated settlement, but between negotiation and no settlement at all.

Other skeptics have argued that today's conflicts are more intractable than those of the recent past—those that were easy to resolve have already been negotiated and settled.

This is too pessimistic a view for two reasons. First, many conflicts that once appeared intractable have in fact been resolved in the past decade—these include the wars in East Timor (Timor Leste), Aceh (Indonesia), Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Second, 71% of the conflicts that are currently underway around the world have lasted less than 10 years. These can hardly be written off as “intractable.”

On average over the past six years more conflicts have stopped than started each year. There is no reason to expect this trend to continue, but nor is there any reason to expect it to be reversed.

## TRENDS IN ARMED CONFLICT

The 2005 *Human Security Report* mapped trends in the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world from 1946 to 2003, and their associated battle-death tolls. This chapter updates the armed conflict and battle-death trend data to include new statistics for 2004 and 2005.

A key finding is that fewer armed conflicts were being waged in 2005 than 2003. Indeed when the number of conflicts involving only non-state actors are added to the number of conflicts in which a government is one of the warring parties, it is clear that there were 11% fewer conflicts in 2005 than in 2003 (56 versus 63). There has also been a sharp decline in death tolls. However, as argued below, large uncertainties with respect to the reliability of battle-death tolls in individual countries—particularly Iraq—mean that this finding should be viewed with considerable caution.

In the discussion that follows we pay particular attention to the years 2002 to 2005. These are the years covered by a new dataset on non-state armed conflicts that is discussed in detail later in this chapter.

### State-Based Armed Conflict

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), defines “state-based” armed conflicts as those between states, or between a state and one or more non-state armed groups.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 1.1 tracks the trends in four different categories of state-based armed conflict since 1946. This is a “stacked graph,” meaning that the number of conflicts in each category is indicated by the depth of the band of colour. The top trend line tracks the total number of armed conflicts being fought each year.

The four categories of conflict shown in Figure 1.1 are:

- “Intrastate”—internal conflicts fought between a government and a non-state group.
- “Internationalized Intrastate”—conflicts in which either the government, non-state armed group, or both, received external military support from a foreign government.
- “Extra-state”—conflicts between a state and a non-state armed group outside that state’s territory. These are essentially the wars of liberation from colonial rule.
- “Interstate”—conflicts fought between two or more states.




Figure 1.1 shows that the decline in state-based armed conflicts reported in the 2005 *Human Security Report* has levelled off since 2003. The number of conflicts changed little in the 2002 to 2005 period (from 32 to 31).

Only 23 countries experienced state-based armed conflict in 2005, and just six countries accounted for more than half of the global conflict total. India was involved in five conflicts, Myanmar in three, while Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Turkey had two each. But while most conflicts are being fought in a comparatively small number of countries, these countries are home to more than 20% of the world's population.

Of the 31 state-based conflicts in 2005, nine were new or restarted conflicts and 22 were ongoing from 2004.<sup>11</sup> Ten conflicts that were active in 2004 were no longer active in 2005.<sup>12</sup>

The greatest change has been in sub-Saharan Africa where the number of state-based conflicts has dropped by more than 60% between 2002 and 2005. There has also been a large decline in the number of countries in the region experiencing state-based conflict over this period from 11 to 4. (Note that some countries have more than one conflict.)

The year 2005 was also the first year since 1996 in which sub-Saharan Africa did not experience a war—that is a conflict that results in more than 1,000 battle deaths in a calendar year.<sup>13</sup>

Central and South Asia emerged as the region most affected by state-based conflicts in 2005. The countries in this region suffered both the greatest number of conflicts and the greatest number of battle-deaths.<sup>14</sup> Despite this, the death toll from state-based armed conflict in Central and South Asia was at its lowest point since 1984.

Although the Middle East and north Africa is home to Iraq, the country that suffered the world's single most deadly conflict in 2005, the region ranked second in terms of the number of state-based conflicts and, according to UCDP, second in terms of deaths from state-based conflicts.<sup>15</sup>

With seven state-based armed conflicts being waged in 2005, East and Southeast Asia outranked three other regions and ranked second in terms of conflict numbers with the Middle East and north Africa. However, according to UCDP, the total battle-death toll for East and Southeast Asia was below 1,000, making it the second-least deadly region.

There was only one state-based armed conflict in Europe in 2005—that in Chechnya—but by late 2006 the Chechin rebellion appeared to be coming to an end.

**Figure 1.2 Number of state-based armed conflicts, 2002-2005**

Region	2002	2003	2004	2005
Africa, Sub-Saharan	13	7	8	5
Americas	2	1	3	2
Asia, Central and South	7	10	10	9
Asia, East and SE and Oceania	5	5	4	7
Europe	1	1	1	1
Middle East and North Africa	4	6	6	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>

*Data source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset*

The number of state-based armed conflicts has remained relatively constant over the last four years, though the global figure masks sharp differences in the regional trends.

### **Battle-Death Trends in State-Based Armed Conflict**

UCDP's data indicates that there were fewer battle-deaths in 2005 than in any year since 1946.<sup>16</sup> Just two regions—Central and South Asia and the Middle East and north Africa—accounted for over 60% of the global toll in 2005. And one conflict, that in Iraq, accounted for almost 20% of battle-deaths worldwide.

In addition to experiencing a major drop in the number of conflicts being waged on its soil, sub-Saharan Africa has also witnessed a significant drop in battle deaths. In 2005 UCDP estimates that there were just 1,900 deaths from state-based conflict throughout the region—a decline of some 98% from the post-Cold War high in 1999 of nearly 100,000 when particularly deadly conflicts were being waged in the Great Lakes region and between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

In 2005 the five countries that experienced the most deaths from state-based conflict were Iraq, Nepal, India, Afghanistan, and Colombia.

**Figure 1.3 Number of reported, codable deaths from state-based armed conflict, 2002-2005\***

Region	2002	2003	2004	2005
Africa, Sub-Saharan	4741	3427	2914	1851
Americas	1200	518	1478	1106
Asia, Central and South	5292	3094	3924	4186
Asia, East and SE and Oceania	851	1630	1236	978
Europe	753	480	1151	668
Middle East and North Africa	2885	11183	6231	3250
<b>Total</b>	<b>15722</b>	<b>20332</b>	<b>16934</b>	<b>12039</b>

\*Fatality figures are 'best estimates'  
Data source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset

Given the challenges in counting and coding battle-deaths, particularly in Iraq, these figures should be treated with caution, however the number of reported, codable deaths from state-based armed conflict has declined slightly between 2002 and 2005.


Interstate conflicts have been the major drivers of war deaths during the Cold War years—1950–1989. But as Figure 1.4 clearly shows, in the post-Cold War period their share of the total death toll has shrunk from decade to decade.

It is no accident that interstate wars are so much deadlier than other types of war. Fighting a war with another country requires power projection capabilities and heavy weapons—in other words the capacity to create large numbers of casualties. The major interstate wars since 1950—the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Iran/Iraq war, the two US-led invasions of Iraq, and the Ethiopia/Eritrea war—were all fought with large armies and heavy weapons. And, unlike the mostly low-intensity wars of the past decade and a half, they involved major military engagements. The decline in interstate armed conflict since the Cold War ended has been a major factor driving down the global battle-death toll.

Intrastate conflicts have been the most prevalent form of armed conflict in the period 1950–2005 but, as Figure 1.4 shows, they account for a relatively small share of total battle deaths in this period. Again this is not surprising. Absent external military support, and often fought with small arms and light weapons and relatively few troops, these conflicts—particularly in recent years—have had relatively low fatality rates.

Since the end of the Cold War, internationalized intrastate conflicts have killed more people than any other type of conflict. The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq are both in this category, since the US is not fighting the incumbent governments (if the latter were the case these would be interstate conflicts) but assisting them. Foreign military assistance increases the killing capacity of the warring parties in internationalized intrastate wars.





Extra-state conflicts are essentially the wars of colonial liberation. They were fought for just three decades following the end of World War II. However, at times in the late 1940s and 1950s, they accounted for 20 to almost 50% of all state-based conflicts. Furthermore, from 1954 to 1961 extra-state conflicts were, on average, the deadliest form of armed conflict. France's colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria were the most deadly in the period 1950–2005.

### Non-state Armed Conflict

Non-state conflicts are those fought between militias, rival guerrilla groups, clans, warlords, or organized communal groups, without the involvement of a government.<sup>17</sup> Although non-state conflicts are about as prevalent as state-based conflicts, they are not recorded in the annual war counts that are published in the *Journal of Peace Research* nor in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's *SIPRI Yearbook*, both of which rely on UCDP data.

Concerned that this omission created a very incomplete picture of armed conflict around the world, the Human Security Centre commissioned UCDP to collect data on non-state conflicts for the *Human Security Report 2005*. This chapter presents new non-state conflict data for 2004 and 2005 that complement the material published in 2005.

Non-state conflicts are significantly less deadly than state-based conflicts. In 2005 the average death toll for each non-state conflict was just 82; for state-based conflicts it was 388.

Non-state conflicts also tend to be relatively short in duration. Just over a quarter of the 25 non-state armed conflicts in 2005 were also active in 2004. Of these, only one—that between the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the United Self-Defence Forces (AUC) in Colombia—has been active each year since 2002. Given their low deaths tolls and short duration, it is not surprising that many non-state conflicts are so little known outside the countries in which they occur.<sup>18</sup>

Non-state armed conflicts tend to occur in countries with weak governments that have little capacity for maintaining internal security. In 2005, as has been the case in each of the four years that data have been collected, over half of the world's non-state armed conflicts occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. The region has nevertheless seen a 42% decrease in these conflicts over the past four years.

Figure 1.5 shows the regional distribution of non-state conflicts. Both the concentration of these conflicts in Africa, and their sharp decline since 2003 are clearly evident in the table, which also reveals that Europe is the only region in this period to have experienced no non-state conflicts.

**Figure 1.5 Number of non-state armed conflicts, 2002-2005**

Region	2002	2003	2004	2005
Africa, Sub-Saharan	34	23	17	14
Americas	2	2	4	3
Asia, Central and South	3	5	3	4
Asia, East and SE and Oceania	2	0	1	1
Europe	0	0	0	0
Middle East and North Africa	3	3	3	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>

*Data source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset*

There was a 26% decline in the number of non-state conflicts between 2002 and 2005. Most of the decline was in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Non-state conflicts tend to be concentrated, not only in the sub-Saharan African region, but also within particular African countries. In 2005 five African countries accounted for 15 of the 25 non-state conflicts: Somalia experienced six conflicts; Nigeria three; while Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast, and Sudan had two each.

### **Battle-Death Trends in Non-state Conflicts**

Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the majority of deaths from non-state armed conflict in 2005—and indeed in all four years since data collection began. But there has been a dramatic 80% decline in the death toll in the region since 2002. Central and South Asia experienced an even greater decline in death toll—dropping some 88%. (Note that the

Sudan/Darfur data are included in the Middle East and north Africa region, not sub-Saharan Africa).

**Figure 1.6 Number of reported, codable deaths from non-state armed conflict, 2002-2005\***

Region	2002	2003	2004	2005
Africa, Sub-Saharan	4465	3155	2942	909
Americas	595	129	345	427
Asia, Central and South	1687	298	289	206
Asia, East and SE and Oceania	91	0	52	29
Europe	0	0	0	0
Middle East and North Africa	176	490	240	475
<b>Total</b>	<b>7014</b>	<b>4072</b>	<b>3868</b>	<b>2046</b>

*\*Fatality figures are 'best estimates'*  
*Data source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset*

There was a 71% decline in the number of reported and codable deaths from non-state conflict between 2002 and 2005, however given the challenges in counting and coding battle-deaths particularly in Iraq, these figures should be treated with caution.

### Trends versus Absolute Numbers

Counting armed conflicts is much more straightforward than estimating battle-death tolls. To determine whether or not there has been a conflict, researchers need only to know whether there have been 25 or more battle deaths in a calendar year. Determining the exact number of battle deaths is both far more difficult and far more contested—as the recent controversies about the death tolls in Iraq attest.<sup>19</sup>

We can be very confident about trends in the numbers of armed conflicts worldwide but we can have much less faith in battle-death estimates. UCDP's stringent coding rules, together with the many challenges involved in reporting casualties, mean that many of the battle-death numbers published here are too low. But since the undercounting bias is relatively consistent, the data can still determine whether fatality rates are increasing or decreasing. This sort of information, which is critically important for policy-makers, can only be obtained from trend data.

## DEADLY ASSAULTS ON CIVILIANS

It is widely believed—in the media, in NGOs, governments, and international agencies—that civilians are being targeted, and killed, in ever-greater numbers by the perpetrators of political violence. There is, however, very little hard evidence to support such a claim.

This chapter reviews the latest findings of a dataset commissioned from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) by the Human Security Centre. The data measure the worldwide incidence of organized violence against civilians from 1989 to 2005. The findings of this dataset are then compared with those of two others that also measure—albeit very differently—the global toll of civilians intentionally killed each year in campaigns of political violence.

The Political Instability Task Force’s dataset on genocides and politicides details programs of mass violence directed primarily at civilians from 1956 to 2005.

The dataset compiled by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s Terrorism Knowledge Base tracks the number of international terrorist incidents from 1968 to the present day, and the fatalities associated with these incidents. It also has data on the number of domestic terrorist incidents and fatalities since 1998.

All three datasets focus on the intentional killing of civilians—not on cases of “collateral damage,” where noncombatants are caught in the crossfire of military engagements, or become the unintended victims of artillery attacks or aerial bombing.

None of the datasets count deaths from interpersonal violence, nor “indirect deaths” from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition. In poor-country wars the latter kill far more civilians than do bombs and bullets. The extent and drivers of indirect deaths will be examined in detail in the next *Human Security Report*.

### Trends in “One-Sided Violence”

UCDP describes intentional attacks against civilians as “one-sided violence”—the term reflecting the fact that the victims cannot fight back.<sup>20</sup>

The new UCDP dataset counts civilian deaths in violent campaigns (UCDP uses the term “cases”) perpetrated by either governments or armed non-state groups each year. The latter category includes rebels, militias, warlords, clans, and other organized communal groups. In a few cases violence by organized criminal gangs is included. To count as a case of one-sided violence, at least 25 civilians must be killed in the course of a calendar year by the same government or non-state armed group. The fatalities per campaign are also counted.


What do the new data tell us? First, that while the number of armed conflicts being waged around the world declined by more than 40% from 1992 to the present, the number of violent campaigns that intentionally target civilians increased by more than half.

Second, that most of these campaigns, and most of the fatalities that result from them, have been concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa.

Third, that organized violence against civilians is strongly associated with armed conflicts. The data show that three-quarters of the perpetrators of violent campaigns against civilians were also involved in ongoing state-based armed conflicts. Civil wars and assaults on civilians are strongly interrelated.<sup>21</sup>

Fourth, that in most of the period 1989 to 2005—and with the obvious exception of the Rwandan genocide—the number of civilians killed in campaigns of organized violence has been relatively small compared with the total number of people killed in armed combat.

The trend line in Figure 2.1 shows the number of violent campaigns against civilians rising unevenly from 18 to 28 between 1989 and 2005—a 55% overall increase. This finding fits with the widely held belief that civilians have been increasingly targeted by both rebels and governments in the somewhat chaotic post-Cold War years.




It is not clear, however, why there should have been an increase in campaigns of low-level violence against civilians, especially since the armed conflicts with which such campaigns are so often associated have declined in number.

There have been a number of recent attempts to explain why governments and rebels intentionally target civilians.<sup>22</sup> But none of these studies has sought to account for the post-Cold War increase in campaigns of organized violence—perhaps because few researchers have realized that such a trend exists.

### Regional Differences

Sub-Saharan Africa endured 143 campaigns of deadly violence against civilians between 1989 and 2005, more than any other region in the world. Fifty-three different actors (governments or non-state armed groups) perpetrated violent campaigns against civilians in 19 different countries.

There were far fewer violent campaigns against civilians in other regions in the period under review. Central and South Asia had 89 campaigns; the Middle East and north Africa 74; the Americas 44; East and Southeast Asia 38; and Europe 24, between 1989 and 2005.



In addition to the high number of campaigns of one-sided violence in sub-Saharan Africa, Figure 2.2 clearly shows the sharp increase in violent campaigns against civilians in the Middle East and north Africa that began in the new millennium. A large part of this increase has been associated with the upsurge of violence against civilians in Iraq and in Darfur.<sup>23</sup>

In East and Southeast Asia there was a marked increase in campaigns directed against civilians starting in 2001, but there has been no consistent trend in Europe (which includes Russia), nor in the Americas.

The difficulty UCDP researchers confront in establishing reliable estimates of death tolls from one-sided violence is evident in the large variations between their “best” and “high” estimates of death tolls for some countries. In Darfur, for example, where obtaining reliable data is fraught with difficulty, UCDP’s high estimate is eight times larger than its low estimate.

So the civilian fatality data in the table below should be regarded with considerable caution—and seen as a very rough guide to differences in the extent of killing between regions rather than a true reflection of different regional civilian death tolls.

**Figure 2.3 Number of reported, codable deaths from one-sided violence by region, 1989-2005\***

Region	Reported codable deaths
Africa, Sub-Saharan**	535890
Americas	8187
Asia, Central and South	13903
Asia, East and SE and Oceania	3678
Europe	14811
Middle East and North Africa	12920
<b>Total</b>	<b>589389</b>

\*Fatality figures are 'best estimates'  
Data source: UCDP/Human Security Centre Dataset

Even without the huge death toll from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (included in the above figure), Sub-Saharan Africa has still suffered more deaths from one-sided violence than any other region.

\*\*Uppsala's 'best' estimate for the death toll from the Rwandan genocide is 500 000, considerably lower than the more commonly cited figure of 800 000 which is also Uppsala's 'high' estimate.

Knowing the civilian death tolls from one-sided violence for each region over a 16-year period tells us little about trends within each region. In some cases there are no clear trends, but in sub-Saharan Africa there has been a steep, but very uneven, decline in civilian deaths since the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

It is hard to overstate just how extreme and unusual an event the Rwandan genocide was. In just a few months more than five times as many civilians were slaughtered in this one country as in all other countries in the world from 1989 to 2005. In fact, the

estimated death toll was almost as large as the global toll from all state-based conflicts in 1950, the deadliest year for battle deaths in the entire post-World War II era.

In the other regions, Europe had two sharp peaks in civilian death tolls—in the early and mid-1990s, with a much smaller peak in 1999. All were associated with conflicts in the Balkans. The Americas experienced a relatively stable low level of one-sided deaths until 2001 and the September 11 attack on New York’s World Trade Center. Central and South Asia suffered relatively few one-sided deaths, with the exception of a sharp peak in 1998 that was largely associated with the violence in Afghanistan.

The one-sided violence death toll in the Middle East and north Africa was also relatively low and stable until 2001. Between 2001 and 2004 the estimated number of civilians intentionally killed increased twentyfold.

Even if we exclude the slaughter in Rwanda, UCDP’s data suggests that there has been a clear, albeit very uneven, global decline in the number of deaths resulting from one-sided violence since 1994. From 1995 to 1999 UCDP recorded a (best estimate) average of 8,000 civilian deaths per year; from 2000 to 2005 the average had dropped to 4,800. But given uncertainties about the death toll in Iraq and given the huge variation between the best and high estimates in Darfur, the data really isn’t robust enough to make any claims about trends with confidence.


### **The Worst Perpetrators?**

Who perpetrates the most violence against civilians—governments or non-state armed groups? The answer depends on what is being measured.

In the 17 years under review (1989–2005), non-state armed groups instigated more violent campaigns against civilians than did governments—and they did so with increasing frequency over the period. Far fewer governments have been involved in organized violence against civilians than non-state groups, but state-perpetrated violence killed more civilians in four out of the 17 years.

As Figure 2.4 shows, the incidence of campaigns against civilians by non-state armed groups increased over the period, while the incidence of government campaigns changed little.






The data almost certainly underestimate the responsibility of governments for killing civilians, however. In some cases—the janjaweed militias in Darfur are an obvious contemporary example—non-state groups may be little more than government surrogates.

### Genocides and Politicides

Barbara Harff of the United States Naval Academy, who compiled the genocide/politicide database used by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), defines genocides and politicides as campaigns of “political mass murder” that are directed primarily against civilians and are intended to exterminate “in whole or in part” a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.<sup>24</sup> (Politicides are similar to genocides except that their victims are targeted because of their political convictions rather than their ethnicity and religion, as is the case with genocide.)

While both PITF and UCDP’s one-sided violence datasets record cases of organized violence against civilians, the PITF dataset is concerned primarily with campaigns of mass violence.



As Figure 2.5, which updates the 1956–2001 data presented in the 2005 *Human Security Report*, shows, cases of genocide and politicide declined by 90% between 1989 and 2005. Over the same period UCDP’s one-sided violence dataset tracked a 55% increase in campaigns of violence against civilians—from 18 to 28.

Given that both datasets are tracking organized violence against civilians, how can such contradictory trends be explained?

In fact there is no necessary contradiction. Professor Harff’s dataset only tracks a relatively small number of campaigns of mass violence against civilians and almost all of these take place in the context of major intrastate armed conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War the number of major intrastate conflicts has declined by some 80%, with this decline has come a commensurate reduction in genocides/politicides.

UCDP, on the other hand, tracks the far more numerous minor campaigns of violence against civilians, in addition to genocides and politicides with their much higher death counts. The Harff dataset does not include any of the minor campaigns.

So it is perfectly possible for mass campaigns against civilians to decrease, while low-level campaigns increase. As noted earlier, however, there has as yet been no compelling explanation as to why the number of low-level campaigns should have risen when other forms of political violence were falling.


### **Terrorism**

Terrorism statistics provide a third measure of deadly threats to the innocent, but here too obtaining access to reliable and timely data is challenging.

The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), which codes and collates terrorism incident data provided by the RAND Corporation, is now the only institution that publishes updated international terrorism statistics on a timely annual basis. MIPT has international terrorism data going back to 1968, and domestic terrorism data from 1998.<sup>25</sup>

MIPT counts many of the same events as UCDP's one-sided violence dataset and PITF's genocide/politicide dataset. But unlike UCDP and PITF—it does not count the killing of civilians by governments.

As Figure 2.6 indicates, MIPT's trend data reveal a fourfold increase in international terrorist incidents from 1968 to 1991, followed by an almost fourfold decline by the end of the 1990s.




Until the beginning of the new millennium, the international terrorism data followed a trend line remarkably similar to those of state-based armed conflicts and genocides/politicides—i.e., a steady increase through the Cold War years followed by a sharp decrease in the 1990s. But over the past five years there has been a dramatic change.

Starting in 2001 the downward trend in international terrorist incidents was reversed and by 2004 there was almost four times as many incidents as in 2001. The global incidence of domestic terrorism also increased dramatically over the same period. (MIPT only has data on domestic terrorism from 1998.)

But when the international terrorist incident data are disaggregated on a regional basis it becomes clear that just two regions are driving almost all of the post-2000 increase.

Figure 2.7 shows the huge reported increase in international terrorism incidents in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Most of the increased terrorist activity has taken place in the former region where, since 2003, it has been driven primarily by the violence in Iraq.



When terrorist incidents in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and South Asia are removed from the global trend data, it becomes apparent that the decline in international terrorist incidents in the rest of the world that started 1991 has continued to the present day.

This decline—from just under 300 incidents in 1991 to 58 in 2005—has passed almost completely unnoticed by the media and expert community alike.

It is also worth noting that compared with armed conflict, terrorism has, on average, killed relatively few people over the past 40 years.

MIPT's data indicate that the global death toll from international terrorist attacks has averaged just 385 people a year since 1968, while civilian deaths from domestic terrorism have averaged 2,546 a year since 1998. By contrast, the average annual death toll from state-based armed conflict from 1998 to 2005 was almost 60,000 according to the Lacina and Gleditsch dataset.<sup>26</sup>

It is important to note, however, that the ratio between terrorist deaths and battle deaths is changing. Over the past eight years the global death toll from terrorism has been rising, while that of warfare has been falling.

### **Can We Trust the Data?**

Each dataset reviewed in this chapter relies, directly or indirectly, on media and other reports for their estimates of deaths from one-sided violence. But collecting data can be very challenging.

First, in war zones many deaths go unreported or unrecorded, often because reporters are physically denied access to the killing zones, or are intimidated from publishing what they know. Some are even killed.

Second, the greater the overall level of violence the less likely individual deaths are to be counted. In Iraq, for example, the level of killing is now so intense that the media tend only to report attacks that cause multiple deaths. Keeping an accurate record of the number of people killed in low-intensity conflicts is far less difficult.

Third, in the many conflicts where insurgents and militia fighters do not wear uniforms, the task of distinguishing civilian from combatant bodies is often impossible. This has been a particularly acute problem in Iraq.

Each dataset also has its own unique sources of potential bias. UCDP's stringent coding rules increase the risk of undercounting because the perpetrators of one-sided violence must be identified before their victims can be recorded. In conflicts like that in Iraq, where there are a large number of militias and insurgent groups, few of whom admit responsibility for any attacks, the task of identifying the perpetrators is often impossible.<sup>27</sup>

MIPT's dataset, like most other terrorism datasets, does not include civilians deliberately killed by their governments. Its data recording practice also appears to undercount civilian deaths perpetrated by rebel groups in rural insurgencies, which according to its definition should be included. For example, although attacks on civilians perpetrated by the janjaweed militia in Darfur would appear to fit with MIPT's definition of terrorism, the dataset only records 72 terrorism deaths in all of Sudan from 2002 to the present day.<sup>28</sup> This is despite the fact that the janjaweed are widely believed to have killed thousands of civilians since the latest fighting began. UCDP records a "best estimate" of 7,173 deaths from one-sided violence in Darfur from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2005.<sup>29</sup>

The PITF genocide/politicide dataset differs from both UCDP and MIPT in that it clearly includes some nonviolent civilian deaths from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition in its genocide death counts.<sup>30</sup> For example, the genocide toll in Darfur from 2003 to 2005 is estimated at 250,000. Since no studies have claimed that

violent deaths amount to even half that number over the period in question, it must be assumed that a considerable proportion of the estimated 250,000 deaths are from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition.

So we have three datasets, each of which measures deaths from one-sided violence, but whose estimates for the civilian death toll in Darfur over comparable periods range from 727,198 to 250,000.

Because each dataset estimates civilian death tolls differently, the absolute number of deaths and trends they describe are also very different. None offers a complete picture, but each provides different insights into one of the most pressing human security problems of our age.

### **The Need for Better Statistics**

This chapter has stressed our concerns about the reliability of data on civilian deaths. This remains a critical issue for all researchers working in this field. It is also a critical issue for policy-makers.

It is both extraordinary and troubling that when the Secretary-General of the United Nations reports to the Security Council on “The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” he has no access to reliable data that can inform the council whether deadly threats to civilians—the central focus of his report—are increasing or decreasing.<sup>31</sup>

The need for better data collection is obvious. Not one of the three datasets reviewed here can yet provide the sort of answers that the UN needs to determine whether or not its policies for the protection of civilians are having any impact.

There are no simple solutions to many of the data problems discussed in this chapter, but our knowledge could be immeasurably improved by a modest increase in resources to the few institutions that work in this field.

## HOW WARS END

Drawing on the findings of a new conflict terminations dataset from 1946–2005 compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and funded by the Human Security Centre, the analysis that follows offers a comprehensive description of how wars end in the modern era.

The analysis reveals the dramatic impact that the ending of the Cold War had on the way wars terminate, and that far more wars are now ending in negotiated settlements than in military victories. It shows that the number of negotiated settlements doubled in the 1990s, but that their failure rate increased dramatically as well. It also shows that while most conflicts have been fought over control of territory, most peace settlements have been negotiated in conflicts fought over who should control the government.

The final section of the chapter examines some of the policy implications of these changes and considers the claim that today's conflicts are more intractable than those of the past and are thus less likely to be resolved.

### War Termination Trends


The war trends revealed in the 2005 *Human Security Report* stood in stark contrast to the popular view of the 1990s as a period of escalating political violence around the world. The conventional wisdom was partly correct. There was a startling upturn in the number of new conflicts at the beginning of the decade, with much of the violence being associated with the breakup of the former Soviet Union and other instabilities associated with the end of the Cold War.

But the 1990s also witnessed an even greater number of wars ending. The net effect of these changes was that by 2003 there were 40% fewer conflicts than in the peak year of 1992. The number of high-intensity conflicts—i.e., those with 1,000 or more battle-related deaths a year—declined by 80% over the same period.<sup>32</sup>

During the Cold War years more wars started than ended each decade—which drove the number of conflicts steadily upwards for some 40 years. But over the past decade and a half the global conflict tally has been driven down again because more wars ended than started.

Figure 3.1 shows the changes per decade in the average number of conflict onsets and terminations each year since the end of World War II. The huge increase in the number of conflicts both starting and ending during the 1990s, compared to previous decades, is very evident.

What the bar graph data for the 1990s do not reveal—because they simply show the averages for the decade—is that more wars started than ended at the beginning of the decade, but more ended than started during the rest of the decade.



Between 2000 and 2005 the average number of conflicts both starting and ending each year declined sharply from the extraordinarily high rates of the 1990s.<sup>33</sup> More conflicts are now ending than beginning, continuing the trend started in the 1990s.

In fact, in the first six years of the new millennium there has been an average net decline of 1.5 conflicts each year. If this rate were to continue for another ten years, the number of conflicts currently being fought around the world would be halved. As noted previously, however, there are many reasons why such a trend may not continue.

Changes in war onset and termination rates have rather obvious policy implications. A major increase in the onset of new conflicts suggests that conflict prevention policies are having little or no effect. A major increase in negotiated settlements, on the other hand, suggests that efforts by the international community to mediate the end of wars may be succeeding.<sup>34</sup>


### Victories and Negotiated Settlements

Since the end of World War II, the manner in which wars end has changed radically. Between 1816 and 1945 there were extraordinarily few negotiated settlements and the overwhelming majority of wars were fought until one side or the other achieved a military victory.<sup>35</sup> But over the past 60 years mediated settlements have become far more common; the pursuit of victory much less so. By the 1990s, in a further radical shift, more wars were ending in negotiated settlements than in victories.



UCDP’s new conflict terminations dataset, which tracks these changes, covers the period from 1946 to 2005. It differs from other terminations datasets in two important ways—it is updated annually, and it includes low-intensity conflicts in addition to the high-intensity conflicts, which are the subject of most other termination datasets.<sup>36</sup>

The dataset records conflict “episodes”<sup>37</sup>—periods of violent conflict that can be ended by military victory, or by negotiated settlement—a category that includes peace agreements or ceasefires.<sup>38</sup> A third category, labelled “Other” in Figure 3.2, includes conflicts that end when death tolls fall below the 25 battle-death-per-calendar-year threshold.<sup>39</sup>



UCDP’s data show that between 1946 and 2005, 372 armed conflict episodes ended. Approximately one third of these terminations were military victories and just over a quarter were negotiated settlements (peace agreements and ceasefires). Most of the rest either ground to a halt or simmered along at a very low level.

But the pattern of terminations underwent major shifts during the period under review. The biggest changes came in the post-Cold War political turmoil of the 1990s. First, the decade’s tally of 120 terminations (an average of 12 a year) was more than double the average of the previous four decades. Second, an unprecedented 35% of all conflicts ended in some form of negotiated settlement.

During the Cold War decades victories had outnumbered negotiated settlements by more than two to one. But in the 1990s the reverse was true—42 conflicts ended in negotiated settlements; just 23 in victories. Between 2000 and 2005 there was a further change. There were now four times as many negotiated settlements (17) as there were victories (4).

This increase in negotiated settlements since the end of the Cold War has been associated with a major upsurge in international activism directed towards stopping armed conflicts.

As the 2005 *Human Security Report* pointed out, the UN's peacemaking efforts increased enormously between 1990 and 1999, with similar increases in activity by regional organizations, individual governments, and NGOs.<sup>40</sup> UN and regional organization peacekeeping missions (now usually referred to as "peace operations") also increased dramatically throughout the decade.

Determining whether the increase in efforts to stop wars caused the decline in armed conflicts or were simply associated with them is not easy, but a growing body of quantitative and case study evidence from the research community demonstrates that such initiatives can indeed improve the odds of attaining and sustaining peace agreements.<sup>41</sup> The next *Human Security Report* will offer a detailed critical analysis of the effectiveness of policies that seek to end wars and prevent them from restarting.

### **Different Stakes, Different Settlement Provisions**

Whether or not negotiated settlements succeed depends to a considerable degree on the stakes over which the conflict has been fought and the provisions of the settlement agreement. A new UCDP study shows that some types of conflict appear more difficult to resolve than others.<sup>42</sup>

UCDP divides armed conflicts into two broad categories: those fought over control of territory—very often secessionist struggles—and those fought over who should control a government.

A majority of conflicts during the post-Cold War era were fought over control of territory. However, most peace agreements during that time (70%) were associated with conflicts fought over who should control a government.

Successful negotiation depends in part on the political provisions of agreements. The provisions associated with the successful settlement of territorial conflicts turn out to be quite different from the provisions of settlements that successfully end conflicts fought over control of the state.

When negotiating agreements to end territorial conflicts after 1989, governments were often willing to agree to provisions for greater autonomy, regional government, cultural

freedoms, and regional development. But while provisions for referenda on the future status of the disputed territory were not uncommon in these agreements, there has not been a single case in the post-Cold War period of a government permitting a separatist movement to secede.

Peace agreements that follow wars over control of a government have very different settlement terms. The UCDP study found that there was a provision for elections in 48% of the settlements under review, and in a substantial minority of cases there were also provisions for creating an interim government, for integrating rebels into the government and/or civil service, and for establishing the right to create political parties.<sup>43</sup> While some researchers have stressed the importance of power-sharing pacts for the successful implementation of peace agreements, UCDP found that only 15% of agreements ending conflicts over government control had a provision for power-sharing.

The military provisions of peace settlements that seek to end intrastate conflicts were fairly consistent regardless of whether the fighting was about territory or the control of government. There were provisions for ceasefires in 60% of settlements; disarmament in 44%; integration of rebel forces into the national army in 38%; amnesties in 28%; and peacekeeping missions in 23%.

Further research in this area could help determine which sorts of political and military settlement provisions have been most effective in helping implement settlements of different types of conflict. Such findings would be of considerable utility to the policy community and could help reduce the high failure rate that has characterized peace settlements since the end of the Cold War.

### **The Downside of Negotiated Settlements**

The big increase in negotiated settlements over the past decade and a half suggests that the international community's greatly increased efforts to bring wars to an end in this period have had a positive effect. But the data also suggest that negotiated settlements have two significant downsides compared to the victories they appear to be replacing.

First, wars that end in negotiated settlements last almost three times longer on average than those that end in military victory.

Second, negotiated settlements are three times more prone to failure than are victories.

The fact that victories are more stable than negotiated settlements is not surprising. When wars end with the military defeat of one of the parties, the loser has no capacity to start fighting again, while the victor has no interest in doing so. But in negotiated settlements, where neither side has been defeated, the warring parties often retain substantial military capabilities well after peace agreements have been signed. Committing to peace in environments characterized by hostility and lack of trust is

extraordinarily difficult. Seeking a more advantageous outcome by returning to war remains an option—and one that is often pursued.

The fact that negotiated settlements are associated with longer wars and a greater risk of reoccurrence than are victories might suggest that seeking decisive outcomes on the battlefield would be preferable to pursuing negotiated peace agreements. But as the short essay, “Give War a Chance?” argues, this option is neither practical nor desirable.

In the 1990s negotiated settlements became much more unstable.<sup>44</sup> During the decade, 43% of all conflicts that ended in negotiated settlements started again within five years, compared with just 9% of conflicts that ended in victories.<sup>45</sup> (Five years without a restart is the standard measure of success for a negotiated settlement.) The average failure rate for peace settlements in the Cold War years had been just 13%.

Many of the negotiated settlements signed in the decade following the end of the Cold War appear to have been inappropriately designed, ineptly implemented, and poorly supported—hence their high failure rate. But the sheer number of new settlements more than offset the effect of their increased failure rate.

In the 1990s, 24 of the 42 negotiated settlements succeeded—i.e., fighting did not restart within five years. This meant that—despite the large number of failures—the 24 successful settlements during this decade were more than twice the average of each decade in the Cold War years.

The category of conflict terminations that has the highest probability of failure are, unsurprisingly, those that end in neither a victory nor a peace agreement, but where the fighting simply dies down completely or falls below the 25 battle-death-a-year threshold. This form of termination does not have the advantages of either victories or negotiated settlements.

It is too early to make any definitive statements about the stability of the settlements signed since 2000—five years have to elapse without a recurrence of fighting before a settlement can be labelled a success. But early indications suggest that negotiated settlements may be becoming more stable.

In the six years from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2005 only two out of 17 negotiated settlements failed. The negotiated settlements for this period include ten peace agreements—by the end of 2005 not one of these had failed.

### **Give War a Chance?**

In July 1999 *Foreign Affairs* published a provocative article by Edward Luttwak entitled, “Give War a Chance.” It made the case that more lives would be saved in the long term if the international community stopped trying to mediate settlements of violent conflicts, but instead allowed them to “burn themselves out.”<sup>46</sup>

Well-meaning efforts by the UN and NGOs to negotiate premature ceasefires and peace settlements, Luttwak argued, simply prolong the violence. They provide respites that allow the belligerents to reconstitute their forces, re-arm, and fight on, thus delaying the decisive victory that is the one sure way to end the slaughter.

The findings of UCDP's new conflict terminations dataset would appear to provide strong support for Luttwak's thesis. Armed conflicts episodes that end in negotiated settlements last almost three times longer on average than those that end in victories. And they are nearly twice as likely to relapse into violence within five years.<sup>47</sup>

So if wars that end in victories are far shorter and less likely to restart than those that end in negotiated settlements, should not the international community heed Professor Luttwak's advice and "give war a chance"?

The short answer is no.

While superficially plausible, Luttwak's thesis is based on a number of false assumptions. The first is that if no outside efforts are made to mediate conflicts, they will swiftly burn themselves out. But, as Chester Crocker has pointed out, there are many examples of conflicts that have not been subject to external mediation that have nevertheless persisted for decades.<sup>48</sup>

Luttwak concedes that this is true, but argues that this is because in civil wars it is often the case that neither side can defeat the other—a concession that fatally undermines his main argument.<sup>49</sup> Desirable or not, victory is simply not an option in many civil wars.

When victory is impossible, negotiations may be the only way to end the killing.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, warring parties often turn to negotiations aided by external mediators precisely because they are unable to prevail on the battlefield. It is no accident that belligerents in long-lasting wars are 70% more likely to pursue negotiations than those in the shortest conflicts.<sup>51</sup>

Wars that cannot be stopped by victory, especially those where the parties are trapped in a "mutually hurting stalemate," can be—and often are—stopped by negotiated peace settlements.<sup>52</sup>

Second, consider Luttwak's claim that external interventions in civil wars—typically UN efforts to mediate ceasefires and bring about peace settlements—simply prolong wars by giving the belligerents time to regroup, rearm, and thus continue fighting. His message is clear—mediation is dangerous.

In fact, external mediation plays a crucial role in stopping wars because it is so difficult for the warring parties on their own to commit to a negotiated settlement—particularly in those wars that neither side perceives it can win at acceptable cost. Such situations are

typically characterized by a huge level of mutual distrust and fears that enemies will exploit negotiated ceasefires for all the reasons that Professor Luttwak suggests.

External intervention matters because third parties can provide security guarantees that the warring parties on their own obviously cannot. As Barbara Walter has pointed out in a major study of civil war settlements, external mediation dramatically increases the chances of bringing conflicts successfully to an end. In her study of 23 civil wars, she found that in the 12 cases where third party security guarantees were offered, 11 of the signed agreements were implemented. In the 11 settlements where there were no third party security assurances, nine failed to be implemented.<sup>53</sup>

Third, Luttwak suggests that in stalemated wars, victory may still be possible if external actors intervene to help tip the military balance. “If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war.”<sup>54</sup>

There is little chance that the Security Council would agree to the UN playing such an obvious war-fighting role—sensitivity about sovereignty being but one of the many reasons that this is unlikely ever to happen. But the logic of Luttwak’s argument is clear enough—and it applies to any external actor, not simply the UN.

External military and economic assistance can indeed help a warring party win victory more swiftly on occasion—US aid to the Greek government helped it defeat a major communist insurgency in the 1940s, for example.<sup>55</sup> But such cases appear to be the exception, not the rule. As Patrick M. Regan and Ayesgul Alydin point out in a recent study of the impact of external interventions on 153 armed conflicts, “the weight of the evidence suggests that outside military and economic interventions increase the duration and hostility levels and make the termination of civil conflicts less likely.”<sup>56</sup>

It is true that the findings of the new UCDP dataset on conflict terminations appear to support Professor Luttwak’s provocative suggestion that pursuing victory on the battlefield is preferable to seeking peace settlements. But, as this short review of the evidence suggests, the prescriptions of “Give War a Chance” would in practice most likely lead to longer, not shorter, armed conflicts—and to greater death tolls.

### **Are Today’s Conflicts More Intractable?**

While the finding that the number of armed conflicts has declined since the end of the Cold War is slowly becoming more accepted, there remains considerable skepticism that the positive trend of the past dozen years can continue.

Some researchers believe that all the “low hanging fruit” have now been gathered and the conflicts that remain will be far tougher to bring to an end. Fen Hampson, Pamela Aall, and Chester Crocker, for example, have argued that, “The 21st century has been left with fewer but more intractable conflicts. Many are stalemated as antagonists

display an undiminished appetite for continuing with their struggle in the hopes of eventual military victory."<sup>57</sup>

If today's remaining conflicts are indeed more intractable, the implication is clear and sobering—we can expect fewer conflicts to end, and the decline in political violence the world has experienced since the end of the Cold War may have come to an end.

It is certainly true that a number of very long-lasting conflicts—those in Israel/ Palestine, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Burma, for example—still appear to be far from resolution. But in the last decade other major conflicts that once seemed hopelessly intractable have ended. These include the wars in East Timor, Aceh (Indonesia), Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, most recently, Nepal. Still other conflicts, such as that in Algeria, have seen a great reduction in the level of violence—or—like Burundi, northern Uganda, and possibly even Chechnya—appear to be moving towards some sort of termination.

Moreover, UCDP's new terminations dataset provides little statistical evidence to support claims that wars are becoming intractable. Of the 31 conflicts being waged in 2005, only 29% had been underway for 10 or more years and really merited the label "intractable." A further 29% had been ongoing for less than a year, while 42% had lasted one to 10 years.

The fact that 71% of today's ongoing conflicts have lasted less than 10 years suggests that "intractability" is not a major barrier to further progress.

There is, of course, no reason to expect the number of conflicts to continue to trend downwards—the future holds too many unknowables for any prediction to be made with confidence. But there is nothing in the data that provides grounds for pessimism either.

## **THE NEXT HUMAN SECURITY REPORT**

In addition to updating the major conflict datasets, the next *Human Security Report* will focus on two thematic issues: “The Hidden Costs of War” and “The Causes of Peace.”

### **The Hidden Costs of War**

While the number of armed conflicts and mass slaughters of civilians around the world has declined quite remarkably over the past 15 years, warfare still exacts a terrible—and largely unrecognized—toll.

In many of the world’s conflict zones, 10 or more people succumb to war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition for every combat death. In extreme cases the ratio can be even higher. The International Rescue Committee, for example, estimates that for every violent death in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there are currently some 50 “indirect” or “excess” deaths.<sup>58</sup>

Indirect deaths are rarely the subject of much political attention and are often only evident in changes in mortality statistics for diseases that are already major killers in poor countries. Such shifts can only be determined by epidemiological surveys—which are too rarely undertaken. As a consequence, indirect deaths remain mostly unseen, uncounted, and unnoticed.

The reality is that despite some improvements in data collection and a huge expansion of humanitarian activity since the end of the Cold War, we still know extraordinarily little about the true extent of the human costs of war. We know that the indirect death toll is driven by a number of factors—the intensity and scope of the conflict, the numbers of people displaced, the health of the population, and access to basic health services. We also know that humanitarian assistance can achieve dramatic and timely reductions in indirect deaths at a remarkably low cost.

The provision of humanitarian services—food, sanitation, shelter, and health services—can reduce mortality rates from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition to pre-war levels or better within four to six months.

The critical intervening variable that impacts indirect death rates is the extent and effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. Drawing on the wealth of extant research, plus new data, the *Report* will analyze the multitude of (mostly political) factors that determine the effectiveness of humanitarian action today.

The aim is to produce the most comprehensive overview, thus far published, of the hidden human costs of war. We will review what is known about the extent of indirect deaths worldwide and the major diseases that cause them; we will analyze the drivers



of those diseases and examine some of the key dilemmas and constraints that confront humanitarian and local actors as they seek to help reduce conflict-induced suffering.

### **The Causes of Peace**

The “Causes of Peace” section will offer a more in-depth analysis of the arguments made briefly in Part V of the 2005 *Human Security Report*. It will provide an accessible account of what is known about the drivers of peace in today’s most numerous and deadly conflicts—civil wars in poor countries.

This section will critically review key findings about the causes of peace from the conflict research literature, commissioning new research where necessary. It will compare explanations that stress structural factors (“root causes”) and events data with those that focus on policies that seek to reduce the risk and incidence of war. The latter include what the UN calls “peacemaking” and “peacebuilding,” but also include policies that seek to stop existing wars and deter new ones by coercive means.

It will also include detailed analyses of the many innovative security initiatives that have become standard security practice since the early 1990s—from the proliferation of “Friends” groups to the entrenchment of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs in peace operations.

Explanations for declining political violence that stress the importance of security policies stand in sharp contrast to the academic research that sees the drivers of peace as the inverse of the causes of war. In the latter case researchers use multiple regression analysis to determine whether, and to what extent, “structural” factors—such as income per capita, “youth bulges,” trade openness, “horizontal inequality,” and dependence on primary commodities—affect the risk and incidence of armed conflict.

The assumption that flows naturally from this work is that the drivers of peace are the antithesis of the drivers of war. There is in fact considerable evidence to support this assumption. For example, as incomes (and thus state capacity) rise and as economies diversify, state capacity increases, political instability decreases, group inequalities are attenuated, and the risk of civil war declines. Where the reverse is true, the risk of war increases. These sorts of structural changes helped drive the decline in armed conflicts in East and Southeast Asia that began in the 1970s as local economies boomed and democratization spread across the region. This decline has continued to the present day.

However, as the 2005 *Human Security Report* argued, the dramatic worldwide downturn in political violence that has occurred since the early 1990s cannot be explained by changes in structural factors like income per capita or rates of economic growth. Structural change simply has not been significant or widespread enough to explain the steepness of the decline in armed conflicts.

The case of sub-Saharan Africa is instructive here. Between 2003 and 2005 the number of low-income countries under stress had increased from 11 to 14.<sup>59</sup> Over the same period

the number of armed conflicts (including intercommunal conflicts) had declined by an extraordinary 37%—from 30 to 19. Here the most compelling explanation for the decline appears to lie with the greatly expanded conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding policies pursued by the international community during this period.

Drawing on a range of recent empirical research, we will also analyze the effectiveness of a range of coercive policies that have been employed by the international community in pursuit of security goals. These include sanctions, economic conditionality instruments, and military interventions. An initial review of the literature suggests that, with some exceptions, the success rate of coercive approaches is very low.

The section will contain an accessible guide to the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to explaining the causes of peace—from macroquantitative econometric analysis to case studies.

Unpacking the reasons why wars come to an end—or in some countries never start—is a complex and often contested task. In addressing it, the next *Report* is responding to the increasing insistence by donor governments, agencies, and major NGOs that humanitarian, peacebuilding, and conflict prevention policies be evidence-based.

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<sup>1</sup> The conflicts in question in this estimate include previously uncounted wars being waged between non-state groups where a government is not one of the warring parties. These are not counted in other conflict datasets.

<sup>2</sup> See UCDP/Human Security Centre dataset.

<sup>3</sup> Barbara Harff, “Assessing the Risks of Genocide and Politicide,” in *Peace and Conflict, 2005*, ed. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005). See <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/PC05print.pdf> (accessed 18 December 2006).

<sup>4</sup> The number of refugees (displaced persons who have crossed an international boundary) declined 12.5%—from 9.6 million in 2003 to 8.4 million in 2005. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) declined by 3.7% from 24.6 million to 23.7 million. See the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees website (<http://www.unhcr.ch/>, accessed 15 December 2006) and the website of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (<http://www.internal-displacement.org>, accessed 15 December 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Data provided by the Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> Note that Sudan is counted as part of the Middle East and north Africa region and therefore does not figure in the sub-Saharan African total.

<sup>7</sup> Deaths from the genocide in Rwanda, which did not involve fighting but rather the slaughter of unarmed civilians, are not counted in most conflict battle-death datasets. They are, however, counted in UCDP’s recently created “one-sided violence” dataset that is reviewed in Chapter 2. While there have been a number of reports suggesting that the war death toll in Darfur is well in excess of 100,000, most of these deaths are attributable to war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition, and are not directly caused by violence.

<sup>8</sup> First, governments and non-state armed groups rarely claim responsibility for killing civilians and UCDP’s coding rules preclude it from recording deaths committed by unknown perpetrators. In Iraq thousands of civilian deaths have likely gone unrecorded by UCDP for this reason. Second, when members of non-state armed groups do not wear uniforms it is often impossible to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Insurgent deaths may be counted as civilian deaths as a consequence.

<sup>9</sup> Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, 78, no.4 (July/August 1999): 36-34.

<sup>10</sup> UCDP, Uppsala University; Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2-3 (June,2005): 145-166.

<sup>11</sup> A list of all 31 conflicts, including the names of the warring parties, is available on the *Human Security Brief 2006* website at <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info>. New conflicts involve two parties that have not previously fought each other and which result in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year. Restarted conflicts are those where, after a period of at least one year of inactivity (i.e., fewer than 25 battle deaths), renewed fighting between two parties that have previously fought each other again results in at least 25 battle deaths in a calendar year. Ongoing conflicts are those where fighting between two parties, which were in conflict in the preceding year, results in at least 25 battle deaths in a calendar year.

<sup>12</sup> Ten state-based armed conflicts that were active in 2004 were not active in 2005: Georgia vs. the breakaway republic South Ossetia; Uzbekistan vs. the Jihad Islamic Group; India vs. the National Democratic Front of Bodoland; India vs. separatists in Tripura; Haiti vs. rebels; Ivory Coast vs. Forces Nouvelles; Angola vs. Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda; Nigeria vs. Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa in northern Nigeria; Nigeria vs. Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force; and Sudan vs. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army.

<sup>13</sup> The five wars recorded by UCDP in 2005 were as follows: Colombia: government vs. FARC-EP and ELN; Afghanistan: government and allied countries vs. Taliban; India (Kashmir): government vs. Kashmir insurgents; Nepal: government vs. Maoists; Iraq: government and allied countries vs. insurgents.

<sup>14</sup> The UCDP/Human Security Centre dataset records "best," "low," and "high" estimates for each category of political violence each year. The "best estimate" is the figure that UCDP regards as being most credible, based on the most authoritative available information. Although only "best estimates" are published in the *Brief*, "low" and "high" estimates are available on the *Human Security Brief* website at <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info>.

<sup>15</sup> The figures for the Middle East and north Africa considerably underestimate the death toll in this region. As noted elsewhere, UCDP's stringent coding rules, together with the nature of the Iraq conflict with its unusually large number of active militia and insurgent groups, who rarely wear uniforms and who almost never take responsibility for the deaths that they cause, makes coding many of the violent deaths in that country simply impossible. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding efforts to assess the death toll in Iraq see *Human Security Research*, "In Focus: Conflict Related-Mortality," November 2006, <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org>. The Middle East and north Africa also includes Sudan and thus the conflict in Darfur. Most of the violent deaths in Darfur are the result of intentional attacks on unarmed civilians, not armed combat. UCDP codes these deaths as deaths from one-sided violence as opposed to battle deaths. One-sided violence is discussed at length elsewhere in this *Brief*.

<sup>16</sup> The conflict in Iraq poses particular problems in terms of the coding and counting of battle deaths. It should also be noted that battle-death counts do not include the very large numbers of people who die from war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition. In poor countries these deaths can greatly exceed battle deaths. Currently "indirect death" tolls are only measured in a handful of countries.

<sup>17</sup> See the UCDP codebook at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our\\_data1.htm](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm) (accessed 14 December 2006).

<sup>18</sup> Examples of little-known non-state conflicts in 2005 include: Izzi tribe vs. Ukele tribe (Nigeria); Garre subclan, of Irir-Hawiye clan vs. Murule clan (Somalia); LTTE vs. LTTE-Karuna faction (Sri Lanka); Mara Salvatrucha vs. Mara 18 (Guatemala).

<sup>19</sup> Estimates of the numbers killed since the US-led invasion in 2003 vary wildly and are the subject of increasingly bitter contestation. UCDP and the much-cited NGO Iraq Body Count have war-death estimates in the tens of thousands, but a 2006 population survey, whose findings were published in the UK journal, *The Lancet*, in October 2006, claimed that over 600,000 people had been killed. The accuracy of the *Lancet* estimate remains the subject of intense—and unresolved—controversy among Iraq experts, epidemiologists, and statisticians. But although the different counting methodologies create radically different death counts, the trends revealed in all the estimates are identical—each reveals a steady and significant increase in the rate of killing. Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, "Mortality After the 2003

Invasion of Iraq: a Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey," *The Lancet* (11 October 2006), <http://www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2006).

<sup>20</sup> See the UCDP codebook at [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our\\_data1.htm](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/our_data1.htm) (accessed 14 December 2006).

<sup>21</sup> The overwhelming majority of campaigns against civilians in this period (1989 – 2005) take place in the context of intrastate conflicts.

<sup>22</sup> See Jean-Paul Azam and Anke Hoeffler, "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 4 (2002): 461-485; and Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>23</sup> Sudan is included in UCDP's Middle East and north African region.

<sup>24</sup> Barbara Harff, "Assessing the Risks of Genocide and Politicide," in *Peace and Conflict, 2005*, ed. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr (University of Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2005), 57. See <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/P05print.pdf> (accessed 14 December 2006).

<sup>25</sup> MIPT, Terrorism Knowledge Base, <http://www.tkb.org/ChartModule.jsp> (accessed 14 December 2006). All subsequent references to MIPT terrorism data are drawn from the Terrorism Knowledge Base.

<sup>26</sup> UCDP, Uppsala University; Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo; Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, no. 2–3 (2005): 145–166.

<sup>27</sup> The case of Iraq also clearly shows how different definitions and coding rules can lead to very different fatality estimates. For the years 2002 to 2005, UCDP's researchers recorded just 768 one-sided violence deaths in Iraq that had been perpetrated by non-state armed groups. Without being able to identify the perpetrators, UCDP cannot code the deaths. There were 11,409 reported deaths in this period that went uncoded because the perpetrators were unknown. There is no doubt that a sizeable number of these latter fatalities were civilians. MIPT does not have the same stringent coding rules as UCDP, so we would expect that its dataset would record more intentionally perpetrated civilian deaths. This is in fact the case. For the years 2002 to 2005, MIPT recorded 9,259 civilian deaths from domestic and international terror attacks in Iraq.

<sup>28</sup> See <http://www.tkb.org/Glossary.jsp> for MIPT's definition of terrorism.

<sup>29</sup> UCDP records a "high estimate" of nearly 56,000 deaths for Darfur in this period—a figure that could not be confirmed.

<sup>30</sup> Knowingly forcing people into situations where they would die from disease and malnutrition would be quite consistent with Professor Harff's definition of genocide/politicide.

<sup>31</sup> See Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (New York: Security Council, United Nations, November 28, 2005), <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2005/740> (accessed 14 December 2006).

<sup>32</sup> UCDP calls these high-intensity conflicts "wars."

<sup>33</sup> Given the sharp reduction in the overall number of conflicts being fought in the new millennium compared with the 1990s, it is not surprising that there should be a commensurate decline in the numbers of conflicts starting and ending each year as well. As a percentage of all conflicts, the number of conflicts starting and ending each year did not change very much from the 1990s to the 2000–2005 period.

<sup>34</sup> It is possible that conflict prevention policies may be effective even when conflict numbers rise—i.e., it is possible that there would have been even more conflicts had there been no prevention policies. It is also possible, though unlikely, that conflicts that ended in negotiated settlements would have ended absent external help. Barbara Walter's *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), offers a compelling analysis of why external mediation is so often a necessary condition for peace agreements to be successfully negotiated.

<sup>35</sup> Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace Agreements* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 87.

<sup>36</sup> Low-intensity conflicts are those with 25 or more, but less than 1,000 battle-related deaths a year.

<sup>37</sup> Conflict episodes are not necessarily the same as conflicts. If a single conflict episode comes to an end and does not restart, it constitutes a conflict. But if a conflict episode stops then starts again, with the same actors

and over the same basic issue, the entire period becomes a single conflict with two separate conflict episodes.

<sup>38</sup> For detailed descriptions of UCDP's definitions, see UCDP, *Armed Conflict Terminations Codebook*, [http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP\\_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20Termination%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20Termination%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf) (accessed 14 December 2006).

<sup>39</sup> Some 20 of the 372 terminations could not be coded in any of the major categories.

<sup>40</sup> See Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report 2005* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). The ending of quite a number of conflicts in this period had little or nothing to do with diplomatic interventions, some ended in victory, a larger number petered out without any assistance from the outside at all.

<sup>41</sup> Walter, *Committing to Peace*; Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 269-292; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); and Stephen John Stedman, Donald S. Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, ed., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

<sup>42</sup> This section draws heavily on Lotta Harbom, Stina Högladh, and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 43 (September 2006): 617-631.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> UCDP's category of "negotiated settlements" includes both peace agreements and ceasefires. In the 1990s, perhaps surprisingly, peace agreements—which are often preceded by ceasefires and which include de facto ceasefire provisions—had a slightly higher failure rate (45%) than ceasefires that were signed without a formal peace agreement (41%).

<sup>45</sup> Evaluating the impact of negotiated settlements is a highly complicated process. UCDP's coding rules can both overestimate and underestimate the positive impact of peace settlements. In the fall of 2005 the Human Security Centre commissioned a review of the UCDP conflict terminations dataset from Stanford University's Bethany Lacina. The review noted that UCDP's definition of a negotiated settlement did not count settlements unless they were signed in the year that the fighting stopped, or the calendar year that followed. So settlements that took two or more years to negotiate did not appear in the dataset. Recoding the data from 1989 to 2005 to include the missing settlements, Lacina found that the probability of negotiated settlements failing was actually 56%, not the 47% indicated by UCDP's coding rules. But she also pointed out that UCDP's strict definition of agreements meant that settlements that dramatically reduce overall levels of violence between the parties, but still incur 25 fatalities in any postsettlement year, will be counted as a failure. For detailed descriptions of UCDP's definitions, see UCDP, *Armed Conflict Terminations Codebook*,

[http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP\\_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20Termination%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/publications/UCDP_pub/UCDP%20Conflict%20Termination%20Dataset%20Codebook.pdf).

<sup>46</sup> Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, 78, no.4 (July/August 1999): 36-34.

<sup>47</sup> To be more precise, conflicts that end in victories have a 15.5% chance of reoccurring within five years; those that end in negotiations have a 28.7% of reoccurring within five years. Stanford University's Bethany Lacina (background note commissioned by the Human Security Centre), using data from 1989 to 2005, has argued that negotiated settlements that fail in the first year should also be included in UCDP's conflict terminations dataset—UCDP excludes them. Over a five-year period fully 56% of negotiated settlements, using this more expansive definition of a peace agreement, fail, compared with just 15.5% of wars that end in victory.

<sup>48</sup> Chester Crocker, "A Poor Case for Quitting," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.1 (January/February 2000): 183-186.

<sup>49</sup> Edward Luttwak, "Stay Home," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2000, 36-44.

<sup>50</sup> Some wars may simply peter out with neither a victory nor a peace agreement.

<sup>51</sup> See Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 75.

<sup>52</sup> For an explanation of the term, "mutually hurting stalemate," see William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

<sup>53</sup> Walter, *Committing to Peace*, 85.

<sup>54</sup> Luttwak, "Give War a Chance", 36-44.

<sup>55</sup> For a rare statistical finding that external intervention may help achieve victory (for rebels in this case) see, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Mans Soderberg, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 253-273.

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<sup>56</sup> Patrick M. Regan and Ayesgul Alydin, "Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 5 (October 2006): 736-756.

<sup>57</sup> Fen Osler Hampson, Chester A. Crocker, and Pamela Aall, "If the World's Getting More Peaceful, Why Are We Still in Danger?" *Globe and Mail*, 20 October 2005, A25. The authors were responding to the findings of the 2005 *Human Security Report*. The claim that today's wars are more intractable than those of earlier years is supported by the findings of a 2004 study of the duration of 122 civil wars between 1945 and 1999 by James Fearon. Fearon found that the average length of ongoing wars had increased from some two years in 1946 to 15 years in 1999—suggesting that they were indeed becoming more intractable. See James Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last Much Longer Than Others?" *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 275-301. Note that Professor Fearon's dataset only covers civil wars, not the minor armed conflicts that UCDP includes, and that it only extends to 1999, not 2005.

<sup>58</sup> "Excess" here refers to death rates that exceed the "normal" death rate prior to the outbreak of conflict. See International Rescue Committee, "The Lancet Publishes IRC Mortality Study from DR Congo; 3.9 Million Have Died: 38,000 Die per Month," 6 January 2006, <http://www.theirc.org/news/page.jsp?itemID=27819067> (accessed 28 November 2006).

<sup>59</sup> This is based on data from the Independent Evaluation Group, *Engaging With Fragile Estates: An IEG Review of the World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress* (Washington, DC: IBRD/WB, 2006).