Security, integration and identity change

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[Summary] In this working paper Pernille Rieker attempts to contribute to a better understanding of both how the EU functions as a security system and what kind of impact the integration process has on national security identities. While security has always been the main reason behind the integration process, security and integration have usually been studied separately. Integration specialists have given more attention to economy than to security, and security experts have studied traditional security institutions and overlooked the EU. Rieker attempts to combine these two theoretical traditions by drawing on a combination of recent work on security communities and international socialisation. While the development in the Nordic countries will be used as brief examples in the final part of the paper, a more detailed analysis of these countries’ security identities will follow in a forthcoming study.
Security, integration and identity change

By Pernille Rieker

As the European security context is changing, national security also gets a new meaning. The purpose of this paper is therefore to study the relationship between security, integration and national identity. Traditionally, European security has been concentrated on military power and territorial defence against potential aggressors, and national security policy has consisted in finding a way to take care of the national ‘security dilemma’. The policy alternatives were therefore either to take part in a military alliance or to opt for neutrality or non-alignment. However, with the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of bipolarity in Europe a broader security agenda emerged. There has also been an increased recognition of the reduced value and importance of military power in international relations. At the same time the European integration process was given new life and the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, which transformed the European Economic Community (EC) into a political union (EU), was an important change. In fact, political integration, covering more sectors than the traditional military one, seemed like a more appropriate security arrangement in a changed European security context.

While security has always been the main reason behind the integration process, security and integration have usually been studied separately. Integration specialists have given more attention to the economy than to the security, and security experts have studied traditional security institutions and overlooked the EU. In this paper I will attempt to combine these two theoretical traditions. My aim is to provide a better understanding of how the European integration process functions as a security system and how it changes the role of the state, the meaning of sovereignty, and a state’s security identity. In order to understand both how the EU functions as a security system and its impact on national security identities I will draw on a combination of recent work on security communities and international socialisation.

The paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part I discuss the concept and meaning of security. In the second part I explain the different security functions of the European integration process. Finally, in the third and last part of this
paper I will try to show how this integration process affects national identities by uncovering the causal mechanisms through which states comply with community norms.¹

Security studies and the concept of security

Security studies are often considered equal to strategic and military studies where the main attention is on the role of military force. This is why this field often is seen as a domain exclusively for experts in military strategy and warfare. However, security is much more than military force and defence. It also includes other aspects of human security such as environmental security, economic security, etc. Even though the end of the Cold War made ‘traditional’ strategic studies less relevant, the widened security concept is not something new. In fact, security has always been a complex concept and this was acknowledged long before the end of the Cold War. However, since security studies became an independent sub-discipline during the Cold War the ‘narrow’ understanding of security has been the dominant perspective. I will start this section by giving a brief overview of the main phases in the history of security studies before presenting an understanding of security that seems to be the most appropriate in the current European security context.

Four periods in the history of security studies

The history of security studies starts with the beginning of the academic organisation of international relations after World War I, and is often divided into four different periods. While security studies were not considered a sub-discipline separate from other and wider concerns of international relations during the first period (1918-1955), the second period, often referred to as the ‘golden age’ of security studies, coincided with the creation of an independent security discipline in the 1950s (1955-1985). In the middle of the 1980s a third period began, characterised by a critique of the ‘narrow’ concept of security developed during the ‘golden age’ (1985-1995). And

¹ While the development in the Nordic countries will be used as brief examples in this part of the paper, a more detailed analysis of these countries’ security identities will follow in a forthcoming study. It is the theoretical framework of this study that is presented in this paper.
finally, a fourth period, which has only scarcely begun, is represented by the arrival of a variety of anti-positivist theoretical positions (1995-).

The interwar period and the first postwar decade (1918-1955)
In this first period ‘security’ was understood as a multi-disciplinary and multidimensional problem which required the application of international law, international organisation, and political theory to the promotion of democracy, international institutions and disarmament. Brodie (1949), Herz (1950), Wolfers (1952) and Wright (1965) were some of the key scholars who explored the political, psychological and economic aspects of war and peace. This was the period before security studies became an academic specialisation, separated from the wider concerns of International Relations. During this period International Relations scholars believed that democracy, international understanding, arbitration, national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security were the most important ways to promote international peace and security. Except for a few scholars, such as Frederich Sherwood Dunn, Nicholas J. Spykman, Arnold Wolfers, Edward Mead Earle, and Harold and Margaret Sprout, the study of military force as an instrument of statecraft for promoting national security tended to be neglected (Baldwin 1995: 120).

With the onset of World War II this changed rapidly and national security became a central concern of scholars of International Relations. Although no single research question dominated the field during this period, four themes recurred. First, security was viewed not as the primary goal of all states at all times but rather as one among several values, such as economic welfare, economic stability and individual freedom. Second, national security was viewed as a goal to be pursued by both non-military and military techniques of statecraft. Third, awareness of the security dilemma often led to emphasis on caution and prudence with respect to military policy. Finally, much attention was devoted to the relationship between national security and domestic affairs, such as the economy, civil liberties and democratic political processes.

This period has often been referred to as a period with little interest in security studies, but as Baldwin emphasises the problem is rather that later descriptions of the evolution of the field have been blind to the work of scholars prior to 1955. He claims that ‘it is as if the field came to be so narrowly defined in later years that the questions
addressed during these early years were no longer considered to belong to the field of security studies’ (Baldwin 1995: 122).

The ‘golden age’ of security studies (1955-1985)
Unlike the previous decade, the so-called ‘golden age’ (Garnett 1970: 24) was dominated by nuclear weaponry and related concerns such as arms control and limited war. Whereas earlier research questions considered what security is, how important it is to other goals, and by what means it should be pursued, the new focus was on how to use a particular set of weapons. Contributors to this literature included Thomas Shelling, Glenn Snyder, William W. Kaufmann, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger, and others (Baldwin 1995: 123). Because of the Cold War and its policy relevance, this sub-discipline soon began to attract funds, journals and prestige, and as a consequence elevated the authority and influence of security studies beyond any of its sub-disciplinary rivals.

However, and perhaps paradoxically, there also occurred a short period of decline. This happened when the Americans turned their interest from the Cold War with the Soviet Union to the hot war in Vietnam. This decline did not last for long, however, and the renewal of Cold War tensions in the late 1970s and 1980s once again stimulated interest in security studies. Even though there were undoubtedly new insights during the first half of the 1980s, when traditional approaches to national security studies were being replaced by the new international security studies, the topics continued to reflect the preoccupation that had characterised the field since 1955 – the use of military means to meet military threats.

Another characteristic of this ‘golden age’ period is that the questions of international security and security policy were channelled in a singular conceptual and theoretical direction, within the boundaries of an objectivist political science. It was the arrival of civilian scholars in the field in place of military and diplomatic

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2 There were several reasons for this decline. In the first place security studies had been so preoccupied with US-Soviet relations, NATO, and nuclear strategy that they offered little help to those seeking to understand the Vietnam War. Second, security studies had become so preoccupied with war as an instrument of national policy that they had slighted the legal, moral, and other aspects of war emphasised in the interwar period. Third, the desire to be policy relevant had led some scholars into such close relationship with the policy makers that they ceased to be perceived as autonomous intellectuals, and came to be considered as part of the policy-making establishment. Finally, the decline of interest in traditional security studies was partially offset by increased interest in peace research during the 1960s and the 1970s (Baldwin 1995: 124).
professionals who had previously populated it, and their enthusiastic application of scientific method and modelling to the possible uses of nuclear weapons, which generated the think-tanks, research centres and university curricula which constituted the sub-discipline of security studies. The concept of ‘national security’ characterises the basic idea of this approach. The state is the primary actor and all states share the same ‘national interest’ in the pursuit of security, defined above all in terms of military power (Waltz 1979). For many decades, realist and neorealist writers have been characterised as uni-dimensional in their attention to military force as the central issue of security. Ignoring the writings from the first period, in particular the view of Arnold Wolfers, who rejects the essential link between security policy and coercive power (Wolfers 1962: 154), Walt reflects this tradition somewhat exaggeratedly by saying: ‘military power is the central focus of this field (…) security studies may be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force’ (Walt 1991: 212). Similarly Richard Schultz, charting the future of security studies within the same perspective, sees the programme for the 1990s as primarily concerned with the ‘threat, use and management of military force’ (Schultz 1993: 2).

To the primacy of the state and the military focus of its security policy, which define the elements of the ‘golden age’ period, must be added the context in which security can be attained. Self-reliance and independence in matters of security were basic to the notion of ‘national security’, as it was understood in the immediate post-war period. What needed to be secured was one’s own state against the threats and potential threats of other states. In view of the policy of nuclear deterrence, such a sense of self-sufficiency was inevitably modified in practice by the reality of mutually assured destruction, imposing recognition of mutual interest in survival. But neither the concept of ‘security regime’ (Jervis 1983) nor the mutuality of nuclear deterrence (Shelling 1960) escapes from the state-centred frame of reference which limits the scope of security in the national security tradition. Security in this period is a condition of the state, to be achieved by the state, through the instrumentality of state military power.

Towards a wider concept of security (1985-1995)
The narrowing of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessions of the Cold War provoked many reactions. Among the most important was
Barry Buzan’s *People, States and Fear* (1991, first edition 1983) and the critiques of neorealism in Robert Keohane’s edited volume entitled *Neorealism and Its Critics* (1986). The security thinking in this period is grounded in the common security idea from which the political science era departed. But in contrast to its precursor, it is formulated in terms of a number of interrelated theoretical propositions about the character and the levels of economic and political integration.

The dissatisfaction with the narrow security concept was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and 1980s (Mathews 1989; Ullmann 1983; Westing 1986; 1988). Indicative of this period was the 1989 issue of *Survival* (31:6) devoted entirely to ‘non-military aspects of strategy’. In the 1990s transnational crime and identity issues became an important aspect of security studies (Wæver, Buzan, Kelstrup and Lemaitre 1993).

With the end of the Cold War the traditional definition of security, concentrated on territorial defence, was challenged as never before. There was an increased recognition of the reduced value and importance of military power in international relations in general and between the European states in particular. The individual as opposed to the state was frequently seen as the main target of security policy and with no threat to national territories, the European security agenda was now dominated by a series of diffuse risks and challenges such as ethno-nationalist conflict, nuclear proliferation, migration, and transnational crime. This meant that the central role of the state in security and defence was challenged as never before.

But this issue-driven widening eventually triggered its own reaction, creating a plea for confinement of security studies to issues centred on threat or use of force. A key argument was that progressive widening endangered the intellectual coherence of security, putting so much into it that its essential meaning became void (Walt 1991).

**Critical** security studies (1995-)

This last period in the history of security studies has only scarcely begun and is characterised by a more fundamental critique of the controlling ideas of not only the ‘golden age’, but also of the preceding and following periods. A coherent and substantial body of literature, specifically addressing the problem of security, has not

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3 The term critical is here meant to imply more a critical orientation toward the discipline than a precise theoretical label.
emerged from the diverse orientations of critical theory, feminist theory, postmodernism, constructivism, but there are some important contributions (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998; Campbell 1998; Campbell and Dillon 1993; Enloe 1990; Huysmans 1998; Krause and Williams 1997; Lipschutz 1995; McSweeney 1999; Williams 1998; Wæver 1996b)

Despite their differences, these approaches share a number of common assumptions and positions: they understand structural constraint in cognitive, rather than exclusively material, terms; they view the international order as the construction of actors, and the task of the analyst as that of deconstructing the forms and concepts which constitute it; they see the role of identity, and its malleability as a social form, as significant for International Relations theory and substantive international relations.

Even though critical security studies are the most recent contribution to the field of security studies it is not yet the dominant perspective. The current state of the art in the field of security studies is difficult to define precisely since there are scholars writing within all traditions. The so-called ‘traditionalist’ way of looking at security is, in many ways, still the dominant perspective, at least in regard to the quantity of literature, of academic working in the field, and of the money allocated to research in the area of security. However, few scholars today are defending a narrow concept of security, which limits security exclusively to military matters and defence.

The concept and the logic of security
Although few scholars today defend the narrow definition of national security from the ‘golden age’ period, this does not mean that a consensus exists on what a more broadly constructed conception entails. As Helga Haftendorn notes, there is ‘no common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised, and what its most relevant research questions are’ (Haftendorn 1991: 15). Even for most of the security studies scholars from the ‘golden age’ period, there have been few attempts at a precise definition of security. Many have been satisfied with depicting security as an ‘essentially contested concept’ by referring to Gallie (1969). However, Arnold Wolfer, in an article from 1952 entitled ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol, did not dismiss the concept as meaningless or hopelessly ambiguous, but was rather concerned about the ambiguity of ‘national security’. He claimed that ‘national security’ could be a dangerously ambiguous concept if used without specification.
David A. Baldwin (1997) claims that such specifications will have to answer a matrix of questions concerning security for whom, from what threats, by what means, at what cost and for which values (p.12-18). According to Jef Huysmans (1998), however, such conceptual analyses of security are not enough. In his view the discussion of the meaning of security has been too narrow in the widening debate since it does not delve enough into the question concerning the real meaning of the concept (p.227). According to him we should therefore move away from approaching ‘security’ simply as a definition or as a concept, like Baldwin does, and instead interpret it as a so-called ‘thick signifier’. As he says, ‘interpreting security as a thick signifier brings us to an understanding of how the category “security” articulates a particular way of organising forms of life’ (p. 231). The Copenhagen School’s way of looking at security as a practice might be considered as a move in that direction. In their view it is not enough to identify referent objects and threats, but an issue also has to be articulated in a specific rhetorical structure in order to be a security issue (Buzan et al. 1998).

Referent objects and threats
In order to understand this logic of security, one often has to start by identifying referent objects and threats. The first step is to identify who or what are going to be secured. In fact, for more than three decades, the debate about levels of analysis has been central to much of International Relations theory. Levels are important because they provide a framework within which one can theorise, and they enable one to locate the sources of explanation and the outcomes of which theories are composed. Even though the state was the only and natural referent object during the ‘golden age’ of security studies, these state-centric approaches have been widely criticised. As Krause and Williams claim, ‘new issues and perceived threats, the twin dynamics of the fragmentation and integration of existing states, and the challenges to sovereignty from a range of transnational and subnational forces have provided considerable grist

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4 The Copenhagen School distinguish between ‘referent objects’, ‘securitising actors’, and ‘functional actors’. While referent objects refer to things/people that/who are seen to be existentially threatened and have a legitimate claim to survival, securitising actors refer to actors who securitise issues by declaring something/someone – a referent object – existentially threatened. Functional actors are actors who affect the dynamics of a sector by significantly influencing decisions in the field of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 36).
for current discussions of the nature of security and the adequacy of a state-centric
definition of the question’ (Krause and Williams 1997).

In other words, the recent attempts to broaden the neorealist conception of
security to include a wider range of political threats, ranging from economic and
environmental issues to human rights and migration, have been accompanied by
discussions intended to deepen the agenda of security studies by moving either down
to the level of individual or human security (McSweeney 1999) or up to the level of
international or global security (Haftendorn 1991; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Schultz
1993), with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points (Buzan
1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver et al. 1993). Others have remained within a state-
centric approach but have used diverse terms (‘common’, ‘co-operative’, ‘collective’,
‘comprehensive’) as modifiers of ‘security’ to advocate different multilateral forms of
interstate security co-operation that could ameliorate, if not transcend, the security
dilemma (Kupchan and Kupchan 1991).

In addition to the choice of level of analysis, it is also important to define the
scope of security. While some scholars have argued that the concept of security
should be expanded to include phenomena that in ordinary language often are seen as
threats to acquired values such as poverty, environmental hazards, pollution and
economic recessions (Mathews 1989; Ullmann 1983; Westing 1986; 1988), others,
like Stephen Walt, claim that a widened security concept ‘would destroy its
intellectual coherence, and make it more difficult to devise solutions…” (Walt 1991:
de Wilde have managed to reach a compromise between these two positions. On the
one hand they take seriously the traditionalist complaint about intellectual
incoherence by claiming that an international security issue must be understood in the
same way as the traditional military-political understanding of security where security
is about survival of a referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state) in
face of existential threats. On the other hand they disagree with the traditionalists that
the only or the best way to deal with such incoherence is the retreat into a military
core.

In their view a more differentiated picture of the primary units of the
international system is obtained by using a neo-conventional security analysis that
retains the traditional core of the concept of security (existential threats, survival), but
is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only military) and referent objects (not only the
This means that they propose a way of looking at security that manages to both widen and deepen the security agenda without destroying its intellectual coherence.

The logic of security

In addition to identifying different referent objects and different threats Buzan et al. also seek to establish coherence by exploring the logic of security itself. In their view an issue becomes a security issue only when it is presented as a threat. This means that ‘security’ is seen as a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue. When a (securitising) actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of ‘normal politics’, we have what they call a case of ‘securitisation’. However, a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitisation. This is what they call a ‘securitising move’. An issue is securitised only when it is accepted as such by society. In the language theory such a process of securitisation is what is called a ‘speech act’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 24-26).

According to the Copenhagen School securitisation is intersubjective and socially constructed. This means that it is the actor and not the analyst who decides whether something is to be handled as an existential threat. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). This means that something is designated as an international security issue because it can be argued that it is more important than other issues and should therefore have absolute priority.

In addition to the problem that the wider agenda risks intellectual incoherence it is also a problem that it tends to elevate ‘security’ into a kind of universal good thing. As Wæ ver (1995) has argued, this is a dangerously narrow view because the word security might extend the call for state mobilisation to a broad range of issues. At best security is a kind of stabilisation of conflictual or threatening relations, often through emergency mobilisation of the state. Although security in international relations may generally be preferable to insecurity, it might be better, as Wæ ver argues, to aim for ‘desecuritisation’, which means the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere. As we shall see in the following section there is a trend, in the current European security
context, towards a recognition of the European Union as the desecuritising actor in more and more sectors.

The EU as a desecuritising actor

Viewing integration as a possible security system points to the importance of overcoming the sub-disciplinary separation between integration theory and security studies. The reason why European integration has not been considered as a security system is perhaps that it in contrast to traditional security systems like collective security and collective defence does not fit the model of ‘sovereign equality’. In fact, an emerging European post-sovereign security system includes the EU as neither state nor international organisation; regions of various kinds; and non-members that relate to the EU, not as to an external, imperial threat but because they see the EU as holding some legitimacy on behalf of Europe and also in relation to them as not (yet) members. This system of overlapping authorities, asymmetries and non-like units naturally produces security in ways that deviates from classical security models (Wæver 1997: 23-24) In such a system the EU is increasingly constituted as the desecuritising actor, while the referent objects vary according to the sector. While one might talk about the European region as a heterogeneous security complex, the EU can be characterised by a tightly coupled security community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56-57).

Europe as a heterogeneous regional security complex

Since insecurity often is associated with proximity it is logical to advocate the regional level as the appropriate one for security analyses. It is for that purpose Barry Buzan (1991) has developed the concept of ‘regional security complexes’. The main assumption of this first (and rather traditional) version of regional security complex theory is that although the great powers may form a kind of global security complex amongst themselves, taking the whole planet as their region, lesser states would usually find themselves locked into a regional security complex with their neighbours. According to Buzan (1991), such a regional security complex may exist in four different forms: (1) a ‘normal’ complex characterised by a regional pattern of power rivalry; (2) a situation where great power interests dominate a region so heavily that
the local pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate (overlay); (3) centralisation of power in a region to the point where it is primarily to be seen as an actor in the global security constellation among the greatest powers; (4) a situation characterised by a low level of security interdependence where the local states have domestically directed security perspectives, and where there are not enough security interactions between them to generate a local complex (Buzan 1991: 197).

Since both a security complex characterised by overlay (a renewed ‘Cold War situation’) and a security complex characterised by a low level of security interdependence currently is unlikely to evolve in Europe, it is the European integration process that will determine which of the two other European patterns (integration or fragmentation) will unfold. Following this logic the EU becomes the most important security institution in Europe (Wæver 1997: 16) As Buzan et al. point out: ‘Regional integration will eliminate a security complex with which it is coextensive by transforming it from an anarchic subsystem of states to a single, larger actor within the system. Regional integration among some members of that complex will transform the power structure of that complex’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 12).

In their recent book Buzan et al. move beyond classical security complex theory by introducing a less state-centred version of the theory (1998: 201). The more general concept ‘unit’ is used instead of ‘state’ and instead of looking at the interdependence of security interests they study the interdependence of processes of securitisation. This book opens the analysis to a wider range of sectors, which means that the analysis is not reduced only to the political and military sectors. In addition, while the classical security complex theory addressed this issue simply in terms of patterns of amity and enmity, the authors of this book take an explicitly constructivist approach in order to understand the process by which issues become securitised. This means that integration is not only important in order to avoid the re-emergence of a European security complex characterised by balance of power behaviour between the European states, but it also provides a better framework for handling the new security challenges.

Buzan et al. distinguish two ways of moving beyond classical security complex theory. The first is by introducing what they call homogeneous complexes. A homogeneous complex theory retains the ‘classical’ assumption that security complexes are concentrated within specific sectors and are therefore composed of specific forms of interaction among similar types of units. This logic leads to different
types of complexes that occur in different sectors, which means that military complexes are made up predominantly of states, a societal complex of various identity-based units and the like. The second way of opening up the analysis is to introduce what they have called heterogeneous complexes. The heterogeneous complex theory abandons the assumption that security complexes are locked into specific sectors and assumes that the regional logic can integrate different types of actors interacting across two or more sectors. While a homogeneous security complex analysis offers the possibility of isolating sector-specific security dynamics, a heterogeneous complex analysis has the advantage of linking actors across sectors and enabling the analyst to keep the entire picture in a single frame, as well as keeping track of the inevitable spillovers between sectors such as the military, the environmental, the societal and the political sector. With its multiple actors and threats, post-Cold War Europe must be characterised as such a heterogeneous security complex.

The most important characteristic of this security complex is the European integration process and, as we shall see, the close links that have developed between the members of the European Community/Union since the beginning of the integration process seem to have many characteristics of what the recent literature on security communities refers to as a ‘tightly coupled security community’. A tightly coupled security community is a result of political and economic integration and pooled sovereignty and might be a useful perspective in order to understand the security mechanisms of the EU.

**The EU as a tightly coupled security community**

According to Karl W. Deutsch, ‘security communities’ arise out of a process of regional integration characterised by the development of transaction flows, shared understandings and transnational values (Deutsch 1957: 58). These transaction flows involve the regular, institutionalised interaction not only of national governments but of members of civil society as well. In his view, this interaction leads to dependable expectations of peaceful change, where states believe that disputes among members of the community will not be settled by force. Security communities, however, are not defined merely by the absence of war. They are also characterised by what Deutsch called a ‘we-feeling’ or shared identity. As states move toward community, they no
longer need to rely on balance of power mechanisms to protect their security. In such a community states focus on assurance rather than on deterrence. Collective security, joint military planning and integration, unfortified borders and free movement of people across borders and common definitions of both external and internal threats are all hallmarks of security communities.

Deutsch distinguishes between security communities that are ‘amalgamated’ and ‘pluralistic’. While an amalgamated community implies that two or more states formally merge into an expanded state, a pluralistic security community involves integration between independent states to the point where they entertain ‘dependable’ expectations of peaceful change. A pluralistic security community develops when its members possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions and mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we-ness’, or a ‘we-feeling’ among states (Deutsch 1957: 5-7). Despite its theoretical potential Deutsch’s ‘security community’ has not been considered as an important theoretical contribution neither to the history of security studies nor to integration theory (McSweeney 1999: 47). In fact, to later scholars of security studies it has proved more attractive for its label than its substance and as a theory of integration it was overtaken by the advent of neofunctionalism.

The cornerstone of neofunctionalism and the basis of its theory of security is the idea that co-operation in technical, economic areas must eventually spill over into the higher-political areas of foreign and defence policy (Haas 1958). The novel and contentious part of the neofunctionalist model was that the need to initiate and sustain co-operation could be managed and controlled by non-state actors, and that states are forced by the spillover mechanism to acquiesce in the pooling of sovereignty and the practice of co-operation. Even though neofunctionalism has been widely criticised, especially because neither states nor their polities have shown themselves to be willing puppets in the roles assigned to them by neofunctionalists, it still remains ‘the sole attempt to fashion a coherent and comprehensive theory of European integration’ (Sæter 1998: 11) While there is no doubt that neofunctionalism remains the major contribution to the conceptualisation of how and why states pursue integration, it still does not give any precise explanation of how this integration process functions as a security system.

Even though Deutsch’s ‘security community’ has been overshadowed by neofunctionalism as a theory of integration, the concept of ‘pluralistic security
communities’ has recently made a constructivist comeback that might be useful in order to understand the security dynamics of the EU. In an article published in 1997, Emanuel Adler argues that such communities are ‘socially constructed “cognitive regions” or “community-regions” whose people imagine that, with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end’ (Adler 1997: 250). In other words, security communities rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and are socially constructed because shared meanings, constituted by interaction, engender collective identities.

According to Adler, a constructivist approach is helpful in identifying this phenomenon, as well as discerning the many ‘strong’ multilateral institutional attributes, processes and consequences that would otherwise escape our attention. Shifting the focus of security studies away from states and towards transnational social, political, economic, ecological, and moral forces, Adler finds that the concept of pluralistic communities, coupled with a constructivist approach, offers a way to reorder our thinking about international security in the post-Cold War period (Adler 1997: 276). Once established, a community is based on an ‘inside-out model’, where states see their interests as best served by being inside the community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 119). Security is no longer defined exclusively as the protection of sovereign national borders from military threat. Rather, security is achieved through benefits accrued from participating in a ‘mature security community’.

According to Adler and Barnett, a ‘mature security community’ develops through three different phases. In an initial (nascent) phase governments do not explicitly seek to create a security community, but instead begin to consider how they might co-ordinate their relations in order to increase their mutual security. The second (ascendant) phase is characterised by the establishment of new institutions and organisations, which reflect both a tighter military co-ordination and a decreased fear that the other represents a threat. In turn, these networks result in cognitive structures that are deepening the level of mutual trust and lead to the emergence of collective identities. In sum, this phase is defined by an intensive and extensive network pattern between states that is likely to be produced by, and be a product of, various international institutions and organisations. A core state, or a coalition of states, remains important for stabilising and encouraging the further development of the security community. Finally, the third (mature) phase is characterised by the fact that
it becomes increasingly difficult for the members of this ‘region’ to think only in instrumental ways and to prepare war among one another (Adler and Barnett 1998:50-58). The emergence of such a community can be found in various indicators that reflect a high degree of trust, a shared identity and a common vision of the future. It is also important that there is low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and that there is a strong differentiation between those within and those outside the security community.

While these indicators represent the conditions for a mature security community to emerge, Adler and Barnett also distinguish between two ideal types of pluralistic security communities: ‘loosely coupled’ and ‘tightly coupled’ security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56-57). While the loosely coupled security community observes the minimal definitional properties - a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change - the tightly coupled one is more demanding in two respects. First, it constructs collective security system arrangements. Second, it possesses a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralised government, which means a post-sovereign system endowed with common supranational, transnational and national institutions. According to this definition of pluralistic security communities the transatlantic community (NATO) must be characterised as a loosely coupled security community, while the EU is a tightly coupled one, especially with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) becoming an increasingly institutionalised part of it. The OSCE, however, can not yet be considered as a mature security community, but since it is an important institution in order to contribute to the development of regional security communities it might be characterised as a security community-building institution.

In order to understand how the EU as a tightly coupled security community produces security it might be useful to distinguish between external and internal threats. The overall internal security argument is the one already referred to, which often is used by both EU representatives and state officials as ‘the peace argument’ of integration. This means that integration is perceived as the bulwark against a return to Europe’s past of balance of power and wars. Integration is thereby made an aim in itself because the alternative is a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy ‘Europe’ as a project and reopen the previous insecurity caused by balance of power, nationalism, and war (Wæver 1996a) This security argument must be considered as
the most important since it defines EU’s existence. One may claim that the integration process has managed to desecuritise the relations between the European states.

In addition to this overall internal security argument or desecuritisation there are several other internal security arguments in favour of continued and further integration. These arguments are sector based and further integration is often used as an argument in order to desecuritise potential threats towards different kinds of referent objects inside the union. Further integration in order to avoid economic insecurity is happening inside the so-called first pillar of the European Union concerning the economic integration. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the most important aspect of this pillar and the project has also been securitised by being linked to the existence of the EU as such. In fact, it has been claimed that the whole integration process is threatened if the EMU fails. Other threats linked to this pillar, which have been used as arguments for further integration, are the fear of increased unemployment, social marginalisation and pollution. Further integration inside the so-called third pillar of the European Union concerning ‘justice and home affairs’ has also been used as an argument in order to manage to combat internal threats such as terrorism, organised crime, international crime, drug trafficking, illegal immigration, xenophobia etc.

While internal threats are threats inside the security community, external threats are potential threats from outside the community that might threaten the stability of the security community as a whole. Here again the EU also has the role as a desecuritising actor. One may claim that the EU has at least two such external security functions (Wæver 1997: 20) The first is to be a disciplining power on the EU’s so-called ‘near abroad’.\(^5\) This disciplining role refers to the role of the EU in exercising (implicit) ‘power’ through its attractiveness to the eastern countries, and perhaps to the close South as well. This magnetism works already in East Central Europe, and the Stability Pact for Europe (the Balladur plan from 1993) together with the Stability Pact for the Western Balkans from 1999, are attempts to formalise this role. Especially the Western part of Eastern Europe has been strongly influenced or disciplined by being close to the EU. This magnet has clearly had an impact on

\(^5\) This kind of power is equivalent to what Iver B. Neumann and Michael C. Williams refer to as ‘symbolic power’. By ‘symbolic power’ they mean the power which legitimates certain conceptions of identity and what is understood as appropriate action by the actors concerned (Williams and Neumann 2000: 6).
foreign as well as domestic developments: politicians in these countries have known very well that the eyes of the EU were on them, and they knew what counted as good or bad behaviour regarding democracy, minorities, privatisations, and subregional relations. Since they have had expectations about gradually moving closer to and eventually joining the EU, it made sense to act according to anticipated Western reactions.

The second external security function is to have a potential role as direct intervenor in specific conflicts in the community’s near abroad. In order to become a credible desecuritising actor the EU has to be able to develop a military capability to intervene in conflicts that may destabilise the continent. Recent commitment by the EU members in this field indicates that the EU will have such a capability in 2003.

With both its internal and external security functions the EU as a tightly coupled European security community must be considered as the most important desecuritising actor in a heterogeneous European security complex where threats other than the military one have got increased importance. The advantage of this system compared to other and looser security communities, such as the OSCE and NATO, is that it is the result of a high level of political integration and pooled sovereignty. The high level of political integration together with the comprehensive character of the integration process (covering more sectors than only the military one) increases the capability to handle both internal and external security challenges. The relationship between NATO, the OSCE and the EU might be illustrated as follows:
While a pluralistic security community does not erode the state’s legitimacy or replace the state, the more tightly coupled it is the more the state’s role or identity will be transformed. How this happens will be the topic of the next section.

**Community norms and national identity formation**

Even though Adler and Barnett have succeeded in developing a model in order to explain how security communities occur and what their characteristics are, they come short of explaining how these communities affect national identities. However, their contribution is superior to those of mainstream systemic IR theorists, for whom identity and interest formation have not been an important concern. Both neorealists and neoliberalists take identities and interests as given. They define security in ‘self-interested terms’, support the assumption of the unified state actors, and focus on the
anarchical, systemic context of states. The problem with these theories is that actors and their identity – whether defined as states or as individuals – are taken as given. Structures are derived from actors’ intentions, resources, and strategies, which means that disputes over actors’ relative power and interests rather than the relative autonomy of structures dominate the debate. By privileging agency over structure in the analysis of integration, fundamental changes in the political order of Europe are excluded from view. Studying whether the integration process can or does transform the identity of actors as states or state representatives is, for instance, precluded from the start (Christiansen 1997: 26). Even though neoliberalists, as opposed to neorealists, think that international institutions and organisations matter, they focus only on their constraining effects on state behaviour and do not think that they may change interests and identity. While some integration theorists have gone further to assert an important role for transformations of identity and interests (Deutsch 1957; Haas 1958; 1964), they still lack a systematic theory of how such changes occur and had to privilege realist insights about structure while advancing their own insight about process. According to Haas, initially power-oriented governmental pursuits evolve into welfare-oriented action through the process of learning (Haas 1964: 47). He claims, in the words of Charles Osgood, that ‘when people are made to keep on behaving in ways that are inconsistent with their actual attitudes, their attitudes tend to shift into line with their behaviour’ (p. 112). However, he does not specify exactly how this shift takes place.

However, social theories seeking to explain changes in identities and interests do exist. The oldest stream of scholarship that might be positioned within this space is the Grotian tradition represented by Hedley Bull (1977) and the English School. From this perspective the international system is a ‘society’ in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Even though scholars in this tradition have not focused explicitly on how norms construct states with specific identities and interests, the sociological imagery is strong in their work, and it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially, by these norms. This means that these societal approaches are not so much unfruitful as they are incomplete and that they do not go far enough in imparting causality to social structure.
A constructivist analysis of the future of European security arrangements will suggest that four decades of co-operation may have transformed positive interdependence into a collective ‘European identity’ in terms of which states increasingly define their self-interests. Even if egoistic reasons were its starting point, the process of co-operating tends to redefine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of new intersubjective understandings (Wendt 1994: 384). This means that national identities are crucial for understanding politics. They cannot be stipulated deductively, but must be investigated empirically in concrete historical settings. When political identities are analysed in specific historical contexts one can trace the effects that changing identities have on political interests and thus on national security policies. The domestic and international environments of states are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities (Katzenstein 1996: 25).

The development towards a tightly coupled European security community has a great impact on member states and on ‘associated’ member states’ security identities and security orientations. The causal relationships between the security community on the one hand and national security identities, national security interests and national security policies on the other, may be illustrated as follows:

![Diagram showing the relationship between environmental structure, security policy, security identity, and security interest.](image)

Figure 2. Based on a figure in Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996: 53)

The tightly coupled security community defined as ‘environmental structure’ is characterised by certain norms and a certain culture. While norms mean collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity, culture means the cultural
context in which the state operates. A tightly coupled European security community consists of norms, values and rules set by the EU, which establish expectations about national security policy. The causal relationships, presented above, do not only concern national policy formation but also identity and interest formation. This means that the community’s cultural and institutional structure not only constrains national security policies but also shape security identities and interests. ‘Security identities’ refer to the images these states have of themselves and their distinctiveness vis-à-vis ‘others’. ‘Security interests’ do not refer to basic interests such as survival and minimal well-being, which exist independently of a specific identity, but instead depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. This means that states can develop interests in enacting, sustaining, or developing a particular identity. Constancy in an underlying identity helps to explain underlying regularities in national security interests and policy. Correspondingly, change in identity can precipitate substantial change in interests (Jepperson et al. 1996: 52-65).

Even though such a model provides a structural perspective on national foreign policy, it is difficult to have a preconceived notion of the way in which the causal mechanisms work in general. Whether norms lead to change in identities which in turn leads to change in interests and policies, or whether change in policies leads to a change in norms which in turn leads to a change in identities and interests, has to be determined through careful empirical process-tracing.

In this approach, the effect of international norms on national identity is given the main focus. However, changes in national identity may also be caused by domestic factors. One may distinguish between two different kinds of norms: international norms and societal norms. While international norms are defined as those expectations of appropriate behaviour that are shared by states within the international society or within a particular sub-system of international society/community, societal norms are defined as expectations of appropriate behaviour that are shared by the citizens of a state. Whether research focuses on the influence of international or societal norms depends above all on whether the aim of the research is to investigate similarities of foreign policies, given different interests, or differences in state behaviour, given identical international expectations of behaviour (Beoekle, Rittberger and Wagner 1999: 11-18). This means that
international norms will be the natural main focus when the aim is to study the impact of community norms on national security thinking.

What then are the conditions under which these international norms, rules and values are internalised in domestic practices? Scholars of international relations are increasingly interested in studying norms and ideas (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Jepperson et al. 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Kowert and Legro 1996 etc.), but few have yet demonstrated the actual impact of such norms on foreign (and security) policy. This means that the literature is underspecified with regard to the causal mechanisms by which these ideas spread. In the following I will try to specify the causal mechanisms that make states comply with EU norms, rules and values.

*Norm compliance through socialisation*

To be able to uncover the causal mechanisms through which social learning occurs one first has to decide who the ‘learners’ are. In its original, sociological meaning, socialisation is a ‘process in which a person grows into the society and culture surrounding him/her and, by learning social norms and roles, becomes an independent, competent social being’ (Beoekle et al. 1999: 8). Compared with this process, the characteristic of the socialisation process of foreign policy decision-makers is that two analytically distinct socialisation processes run simultaneously. Because foreign policy decision-makers are at the interface between the international and the national (societal) system, they face two different groups of socialising agents and, consequently, go through two different socialisation processes. Although focusing on either international or societal norms runs the risk of being blind to the reinforcing or counteracting influence of the other level, it may be useful to separate these two levels analytically in order to better discover the differences.

If we consider that it is the foreign and security policy decision-makers that are being socialised, this is principally an elite and not a mass phenomenon. This is consistent with Ikenberry and Kupchan’s (1990) argument that norms must take root within the elite community in order to have a consequential effect on state behaviour. They claim that ‘although normative claims articulated by the international or regional community may take root in the public at large, it is the ruling elites that must embrace these claims if they are to have a long-term and consequential impact on the behaviour of secondary states. While public opinion can influence elite
restructuring, it is through the dynamics of elite politics and coalition-building that socialisation takes place’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 293). This argument is perhaps even more appropriate for the socialisation of security identities than is the case for the socialisation of other identities where public pressure and social movements may be more important in order to make state authorities comply with international norms.

The socialisation process may vary not only according to which actors are being socialised, but also across states. A tightly coupled European security community may socialise both EU members and non-members that are strongly related to the EU through different agreements and associations. There are reasons to believe that these states go through very different socialisation processes. Even though the socialisation process is always difficult to understand, it may be even more difficult to understand how the non-EU members are being socialised without being an integrated part of the tightly coupled security community. However, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s conception of socialisation may give some indications. According to them, socialisation is a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted from one party to another. They conceptualise it as ‘the process through which national leaders internalise the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialised into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position’ (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 289)

\[\text{The EU may be characterised as a hegemon in its relations to potential member states. The socialisation process towards these countries may occur through what Ikenberry and Kupchan call ‘normative persuasion’. This means that the hegemon is able to secure the compliance of secondary states by ideological persuasion and transnational learning through various forms of direct contact with elites in these states (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 290).}\]

\textit{Passive or active ‘learners’?}

By defining the causal relationship between states’ environmental structures (here: security community norms) on the one hand and their national identities, interests and policies on the other, a structural perspective on foreign policy is presented. If we are satisfied with this, we may believe that states, only by being wholly or partly a member of a security community, are being socialised into a common identity which
in turn will make them comply with the norms, values and rules set by this community. Until recently, most social constructivists in International Relations followed such a logic, which often is associated with the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989; March and Olsen 1998). This is a kind of rule-guided behaviour that differs from instrumental rationality behaviour (‘logic of consequences’) in that actors try to do the ‘right thing’ rather than maximising or optimising their preferences. Such normative rationality implies constitutive effects of social norms and institutions. This means that these rules not only regulate behaviour but that they also constitute identities and interests.

Even though most constructivists insist on the mutual constitutiveness of structures and agents (see Finnemore 1996: 24), they often end up applying a structural approach in order to explain behaviour. Constructivists argue against individualism and claim that human agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings (culture). At the same time, they maintain that human agency creates, reproduces, and changes culture by the way of daily practices. This means that social constructivism, at least in theory, occupies a middle ground between individualism and structuralism. But since the mutual constitution of structures and identities/interests has been so difficult to operationalise, most of the controversy between rational choice and social constructivism has focused on the relationship between the ‘logic of consequences’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’. The result has been that social constructivists have tended to leave the microprocesses of the socialisation process underexplained. They tend to assume that once actors are interacting inside institutions, the diffusion and homogenisation of values will be automatic and even predictable, which leaves variation in the degree of socialisation across units unexplained. In order to understand why states comply, it is important to uncover the causal mechanisms through which these structures have their effects on agents.  

Even though the logic of appropriateness is often associated with a structural approach to the study of state behaviour, March and Olsen also talk about rule-guided behaviour as a conscious process. They claim that actors have to figure out the situation in which they act, apply the appropriate norm, or choose among conflicting

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6 These arguments have been emphasised by Jeffrey Checkel (1997; 1998; 1999) and Frank Schimmelfennig (1999b).
rules (March and Olsen 1989: 21-26). In order to arrive at a better explanation for how and why agents act the way they do one may introduce what Thomas Risse calls a ‘logic of truth seeking or arguing’ into social constructivism. According to such a logic of action, actors, when arguing about the truth, try to figure out in a collective communicative process whether their assumptions about the world and about cause-and-effect relationships in the world are correct, or whether norms of appropriate behaviour can be justified, and which norms apply under given circumstances (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 7).

According to Risse, arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Based on Habermas theory of communicative action, argumentative rationality also implies that the participants in a discourse are open to being persuaded by the better argument and that relationships of power and social hierarchies recede into the background.7 This means that the goal of the discursive interaction is to achieve argumentative consensus with the other, not to push through one’s own world-view and moral values. Since the validity claims of identities and interests are at stake in theoretical and practical discourses, an argumentative consensus has constitutive effects on an actor. This point helps to clarify the mutual constitutiveness of agents and social structure that social constructivism emphasises. Agents are not simply the puppets of social structures, since they can actively challenge the validity claims inherent in any communicative action. At the same time, they are social agents that produce the intersubjective structures of meanings through their communicative practices.

In this Habermasian sense, argumentative rationality is based on several preconditions. First, actors need the ability to empathise. Second, actors need to share a ‘common life world’, which consists of a shared culture, a common system of norms and rules perceived as legitimate and the social identity of actors being capable of communicating and acting. Finally, the actors need to recognise each other as equals (Risse 2000: 10). It is often claimed that international relations are anarchical and that

7 Argumentative rationality is different from ‘retorical action’ (Schimmelfenning 1999b). Actors engaging in rhetoric are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be persuaded themselves by the ‘better argument’ As Risse points out: ‘If everybody in a communicative situation engages in rhetoric –
there could be no common life world. In addition it is claimed that the relationship of power is always present in international relations. As Risse proposes, anarchy could itself be considered a limited common life world if this is the shared cultural background against which actors communicate in world politics. But in international relations there are also situations characterised by dense interaction patterns within highly regulated international institutions. This means that a tightly coupled European security community based on a collective identity and shared values and norms might constitute a common life world. However, the other condition about the absence of power relations is more difficult to fulfil. But even though the Habermasian condition of ‘equal access’ to the discourse is not met in world politics, this does not mean that those actors who are privileged to participate in the discourse of international organisations or in interstate negotiations never engage in truth-seeking behaviour and in arguing over norms. The real issue is not whether power relations are absent in a discourse, but to what extent they can explain the argumentative outcome (Risse 2000: 18).

As Risse argues, the various modes of social action represent ideal types that rarely occur in pure form in reality. Actors often act both strategically and discursively and by doing so they follow norms enabling this interaction in the first place. The logic of consequentialism is present to the extent that actors use rhetoric to convince others to change their interests, identities or views of the world. The logic of appropriateness prescribes what is considered a legitimate truth claim in a given public discourse and, thus, circumscribes the boundaries of this discourse. Finally, the logic of argumentative rationality and truth-seeking behaviour is likely to take over if actors are uncertain about their own identities, interests, and views of the world and/or if rhetorical arguments are subject to scrutiny and counter-challenges leading to a process of ‘argumentative self-entrapment’ (Risse 2000: 23).

**Socialisation through five phases**

One may argue that the three types of social action or causal mechanisms discussed above are all necessary for the enduring internalisation of norms. According to Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, the socialisation process is characterised by three

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the speaker, the target, and the audience – they can argue strategically until they are blue in the face and still not change anyone’s mind.’ (Risse 2000: 8).
different processes: a process of adaptation and strategic bargaining, a process of moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue and persuasion, and a process of institutionalisation and habitualisation. They argue that the significance of each mechanism varies with different stages of the socialisation process, and in order to be able to identify the dominant mode of social interaction in each phase of the socialisation process, they develop a five-phase ‘spiral model’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 22-35). This model specifies the causal mechanisms and the prevailing logic of action in each phase of the process. Risse and Sikkink argue that instrumental adaptation usually prevails in the early stages of the socialisation process, that argumentation, persuasion, and dialogue become more significant at a later stage, and that institutionalisation and habitualisation mark the final steps in the socialisation process. The model also contains hypotheses about the conditions under which they expect progress toward the implementation of norms, which means that the ‘spiral model’ accounts for the variation in the domestic effects of international norms.

This model is developed in order to understand the process through which states go to finally comply with human rights norms and builds upon previous work on transnational networks in the human rights area. In a study by Margret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink this process is referred to as the ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A ‘boomerang’ pattern of influence exists when domestic groups in a repressive state bypass their state and directly search out international allies in order to try to bring pressure on their states from the outside. The spiral model consists of several boomerang throws with diverging effects on the situation in the target country. It is a causal model, which attempts to explain the variation in the extent to which national governments move along the path towards norm compliance. The spiral model does not assume evolutionary progress toward norm implementation, but claims to explain variation and lack of progress (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 18).

The process through which states go to comply with human rights norms might be rather different from the process states go through to comply with norms and values set up by a security community. Risse and Sikkink argue that their model is ‘generalisable across cases irrespective of cultural, political, or economic differences among countries’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 6), but they say nothing about the generalisability of the model across policy areas. In spite of this, it might be possible to imagine a similar process of socialisation happening inside a security community.
According to Risse and Sikkink, a socialisation process starts when actors adapt their behaviour in accordance with the norm for initially instrumental reasons. This means that, in the beginning, they use arguments in order to further their instrumentally defined interests, that is, they engage in rhetoric as Schimmelfenning defines it (1999a). The more they justify their interests, however, the more others will start challenging their arguments and the validity claims inherent in them. At this point, governments need to respond by providing further arguments. They become entangled in arguments and the logic of argumentative rationality slowly but surely takes over. Processes of argumentation and persuasion rather than instrumental bargaining prevail when actors develop collective understandings that form part of their identities and lead them to determine their interests (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 16).

The following presentation of the socialisation process is based on Risse and Sikkink’s five-phase model, although adapted to the security policy area. This model shows how community norms may influence political change through a socialisation process that combines instrumental interests, material pressures, argumentation, persuasion, institutionalisation, and habitualisation. The developments in the Nordic countries, which are used as brief examples here, will be further developed in a forthcoming study.

Phase 1: Traditional security concerns prevail
The starting point in the socialisation process of national security thinking is a situation where traditional security concerns still are dominant. In this phase the traditional security rhetoric is still being used by the political leaders even though the international context has changed.

To use the example of the Nordic countries, the governments in these states were among the slowest in Europe to appreciate the dramatic change that had taken place at the end of the 1980s. Even though the European revolution in 1989-90 was very much what the peace-minded ‘Norden’ had been asking for, and therefore ought to have hailed enthusiastically, the Parliamentary Defence Committees in all the four bigger Nordic countries were to present reports on long-term defence plans in late 1989 or 1990, which were more traditional than anywhere else in Europe, at least in
their practical conclusions. The reason for this may be that the European transformation may have been perceived as a painful loss to such central parts of Nordic identity as ‘lower tension than in Central Europe’ or ‘more détente-oriented than Central Europe’ (Wæver and Wiberg 1992: 33). This was a special regional situation dependent on the Cold War situation, and usually referred to as the ‘Nordic balance’ (Brundtland 1981).

Phase 2: A new security discourse and defence of traditional policy
In the second phase a new political discourse starts to be heard. This means that some groups at the domestic level are adopting this discourse and trying to lobby this with the authorities. Even though the initial reaction by the political leaders is a defence of the traditional policy, this defence may be seen as a demonstration that a process of socialisation is already under way. If the socialisation were not yet under way, the state would feel no need to defend the traditional policy.

Even though the new security discourse came later to ‘Norden’ than to the rest of Europe (or the transatlantic community), it started to be adopted, especially by ‘security experts’ and politicians, throughout the 1990s. In Norway, Sweden and Finland the traditional national security identity was questioned when the question of EU membership was put on the agenda. In Denmark this process started a little bit earlier with the ratification process of the Maastricht treaty. When Finland and Sweden decided to apply for membership in the European Union, these two countries moved further in the socialisation process (to phase three). European integration was now seen as a better way of assuring their interests in a new international context. Denmark, who first refused to ratify the Maastricht treaty and then accepted a ‘light’ version of the treaty, stayed in this phase into recently, together with Norway, who voted against membership in the European Union.

Phase 3: Instrumental change
In the third phase of the socialisation process the domestic political leaders realise that adopting the new way of thinking and changing their policy is important to obtain influence and to assure (traditional) national interests in a changed international context. In this phase, governments start to adopt the new security discourse. In the
beginning, the arguments resemble the logic of rhetorical action whereby justifications are used to further one’s interests without being prepared to really challenge the validity claims inherent in these interests. This means that what dominates is instrumental adaptation to both domestic and international pressure. Domestically this means that certain groups will press for compliance with international norms because it is perceived to be in the state’s interests. Internationally, the community itself will try to convince states to comply with community norms. At this stage actors incrementally adapt to norms in response to external and internal pressures, initially for purely instrumental reasons. Slowly but surely, governments become entrapped in their own rhetoric and the logic of arguing takes over.

The decision to apply for membership in the EU marked a fundamental change in both Finnish and Swedish security policy. In the beginning it was seen as the best possibility to secure national interests in a new international setting. The core in both Finnish and Swedish security policy has for a long time been military non-alignment and a credible self-sufficient defence. As long as the European integration process did not imply principles of collective defence, membership in the EU was not perceived to be in contradiction to these traditional principles. With the end of bipolarity in Europe, Finnish and Swedish membership in the EU must be understood as a search for a new stability, but also as a search for a new security identity. The important thing for Finland is to avoid a return to the old bipolarity, and for Sweden a European integration independent from the USA and open to the east seemed like an acceptable solution. For Denmark and Norway the entrance into this phase took place later than in the other Nordic countries, and is probably due to these countries’ membership in NATO. However, after the acceleration of the European integration process in areas like security and defence, Norway and Denmark also started to reconsider their traditional security identity. A fear of being marginalised in European security was felt and while Denmark started to reconsider their ‘opting out’ from security and defence in the EU, Norway started to work for an agreement with the EU in security and defence very much like the EEA agreement or the Schengen agreement. A change towards a broader definition of security has also started to be acknowledged in all of the Nordic countries, a change that automatically makes European integration even more interesting.
Phase 4: Persuasion

In the fourth phase governments are being convinced/persuaded that norm compliance is the ‘right thing’, and not only an instrumental adaptation to a changed international context. The transfer to this phase will be dependent of the knowledge available about the new situation. If political objectives and ‘technical’ knowledge are combined to reach the conception of what constitutes one’s interest, much is done (Haas 1990: 9).

In this phase national governments might then change their rhetoric, gradually accept the validity of international norms and start engaging in an argumentative process with their opponents, both domestically and abroad. This means that a second type of social action, which concerns the argumentative discourses, dominates the socialisation process at this stage. While adaptation refers to an instrumental adjustment to international norms irrespective of discursive practices, socialisation through discourse emphasises processes of communication, argumentation, and persuasion.

Even though Sweden and Finland still are very much attached to the policy of neutrality, the understanding of neutrality has been redefined during the last years in order to fit with the European integration process, a process that now also includes security and defence. Much indicates that Sweden and Finland are already to some extent persuaded that European integration is the ‘right thing’ and, as long as article V of the Brussels treaty is not integrated into the EU, they have no problems with the development of a tightly coupled European security community. The importance of the European Union in an international environment characterised by a broader concept of security is also acknowledged. While neutrality still is an important part of the Finnish and Swedish security identity, Atlanticism has a similar signification to Norway and Denmark. However, generally speaking, the move away from this traditional security thinking has begun and the arguments in favour of the European Union as a more suitable security system in today’s Europe are starting to be heard. A concrete example is in the military sector where these countries probably will start an argumentative communication inside the community once the structures for their participation are in place.
Phase 5: Institutionalisation

In the fifth, and last, phase of the socialisation process the international norms are institutionalised in domestic discourse and we see rule-consistent behaviour (logic of appropriateness). In this phase technical knowledge is becoming common knowledge and we are now talking about learning and not only adaptation to external changes. The terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘learning’ are used here in accordance with Ernst B. Haas (1990). While ‘adaptation’ is used in order to define changes that seek to perfect the matching ends and means without questioning the theory of causation defining the task, ‘learning’ is used to define the situations in which an actor is induced to question the basic beliefs underlying the selection of ends. Learning involves the penetration of political objectives and program by new knowledge-mediated understandings of connections (Haas 1990: 36). The more the political elites accept the validity of norms and the more they engage in a dialogue about norm implementation, the more they are likely to institutionalise these norms in domestic practices. The final stage of this socialisation process is when these norms are ‘taken for granted’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904).

While all of the Nordic countries have started a process towards this phase, they are not yet there. The change in the policy discourse is still very much characterised by adaptation rather than real learning and the community norms are therefore not yet institutionalised. One may perhaps claim that Sweden and Finland as full members of the EU, including the security and defence area, are closer to entering this phase of the socialisation process than Denmark and Norway, which are either outside the union or inside but with an opting out from security and defence. However, all of the Nordic countries are still very much attached to their traditional security orientation.

Social constructivists have been criticised for not being able to ‘unpack’ the socialisation process (Schimmelfenning 1999a: 234). They have been criticised for being unable to explain how, and under which conditions, the socialisation process takes place. The five-phase model applied here, based on a model developed by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999), is an attempt to meet this challenge.
Conclusion
This paper has suggested a way of understanding both how the EU functions as a security system and how this system, defined as a tightly coupled security community, contributes to changes in national security thinking. In the current heterogeneous European security complex, the EU becomes more and more important as a desecuritising actor. A high level of political integration combined with the comprehensive character of the integration process produces security in a more efficient manner than other, traditional and more loosely coupled security systems. Such a tightly coupled security community also has great impact on national security identities. One may argue that community norms influence political change through a socialisation process that combines different forms of social action, and that each of these is dominant at different stages of the socialisation process. While an instrumental logic often is the starting point, an argumentative logic takes over when the traditional national ideas are challenged and the risks of being persuaded by the challenging arguments increase.

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