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From Internationalization of Terrorism to the Internationalization of Anti-terrorism


The Role of the Summer Olympic Games

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From Internationalization of Terrorism to the Internationalization of Anti-terrorism

The Role of the Summer Olympic Games

Andreas Selliaas

[Summary] The academic literature on international relations and international sports studies has long ignored the linkages between sports and international relations. The present contribution seeks to remedy this shortcoming in the literature on international relations and international sports studies, focusing on the relationship between terrorism, anti-terrorism and the Summer Olympic Games, and examining the role of terrorism and anticipated terrorist actions in the organization of the Olympic Games. In this article we show that the anti-terrorism measures undertaken before, during and after the Olympic Games since 1972 have gone from failure to success. The development of anti-terrorism measures has resulted in Olympic Games that have been held without terrorist attacks aimed at political change. Failures in previous Games have been evaluated and have served to promote new developments in the fight against terrorism in later Games. The Munich disaster alerted everyone to the importance of Olympic security; since then, the Olympic Games have become the standard-setter for national organization and international cooperation on anti-terrorism in society in general.

From Internationalization of Terrorism to the Internationalization of Anti-terrorism: The Role of the Summer Olympic Games¹

'[i]n the more innocent days, Olympic Village security had focused mainly on keeping the male athletes out of the female section', Dick Pound (IOC) 2004: 12

Introduction

The academic literature on international relations and international sports studies has long ignored the linkages between sports and international relations (Levermore & Budd 2004). Also recent handbooks on international relations and sports studies demonstrate this point.² Not surprisingly, then, the relationship between sports and international terrorism is also poorly covered.³ The present contribution seeks to remedy this shortcoming in the literature on international relations and international sports studies, focusing on the *relationship between terrorism, anti-terrorism and the Summer Olympic Games*, and examining the role of terrorism and anticipated terrorist actions in the organization of the Olympic Games. The research question in point is: *to what extent can we say that the anti-terrorism measures undertaken before, during and after the Olympic Games have been successful?*

Several researchers claim that conflicts and developments in sports reflect conflicts and developments in society in general (see for example Värynen 1982; Galtung 1982; Lapchick 1986; Boniface 1998; Maguire 2000; Beacom 2000). However, analysis of anti-terrorist preparedness before, during and after the Olympic Games in Munich 1972, in Atlanta 1996 and in Athens 2004 shows that the national and international anti-terrorism measures undertaken, before, during and after the Olympic Games have learned from these events. In this article I demonstrate that the anti-terrorism measures undertaken in relation to the 1972 Munich Games, the 1996 Atlanta Games and the 2004 Athens Games triggered the establishment of three completely new organization structures – nationally and globally – in the fight against terrorism:

- national anti-terrorism units in Europe after the 1972 Munich Games
- intra-institutional cooperation in the USA after the 1996 Atlanta Games

¹ This paper was presented at the 9th ISHPES Congress *New Aspects of Sport History* in Cologne 9 September 2005 in the panel 'Sport, Globalisation and Peace Promotion'. My thanks to Anders G. Romarheim, Tore Bjørgo and Geir Arne Fredriksen for comments on the first draft of this paper, and to the *Norwegian Consortium for Research on Terrorism and International Crime*, for financing the project.

² See for instance Carlsnaes et al. 2002; Lüschen & Sage 1981; and Coakley & Dunning 2000. In the two first handbooks there is no reference to sport and international relations whatsoever. Of forty-four chapters in Coakley & Dunning's 2000 handbook, only three chapters mention the relationship between sport and international relations in relation to other topics (Politics and Sport [13], Sport and Nationalism [22] and Sport and Globalization [23]).

³ The literature on terrorism and sports focuses mainly on how terrorist organizations use sports as a means of preparing for future operations (see for example Wedemeyer 1999).

- a new global anti-terrorism cooperation network before and during the 2004 Athens Games.

A study of the anti-terrorism measures in relation to these three Olympic Games can make clear the concrete results of the anti-terrorism work conducted in relation to these Games, while also illustrating the differing security environments and differing security logics of three separate eras: the Cold War era (Munich); the post-Cold War era (Atlanta) and the post-9/11 era (Athens). In 1972, terrorism was seen as a matter of national concern, handled by local police and paramilitary units. In 1996 terrorism was of international concern, but handled by national security units, whereas by 2004 terrorism had become an issue of global concern, to be dealt with globally.

This article cannot present an exhaustive assessment of the role of the Olympics in the fight against terrorism. By discussing only three Games we can hardly draw general conclusions on the role of the Games in the fight against terrorism. Including, for example, the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936 and/or the Olympic Games in Barcelona 1992 in the analysis would probably enable a more multi-faceted answer to our research question. Nevertheless, an evaluation and a comparison of the 1972, 1996 and 2004 Summer Olympics can provide us with a good sense of the perceptions of terrorism and the security environment in the three eras, and an understanding of the various paradoxes and dilemmas related to the security organization of the Summer Games in these periods.

Methodology remarks

If we are to evaluate the success of anti-terrorism measures, we have to define what we mean by ‘success’. We also have to define what we mean by ‘terrorism’ and ‘anti-terrorism’.

What kind of terrorism?

Some have argued that it is impossible to define terrorism in a way that can cover all its varieties (see Laqueur 1987: 11–12); indeed, others have argued that it is fruitless even to attempt a comprehensive definition (see Schmid & Jongman 1988: 6). All the same, we will have to distinguish terrorism from other types of violence and from other types of political acts if we are to evaluate the success/failure of terrorists and to evaluate whether measures taken to prevent terrorism have proven relevant, necessary and sufficient. Here we will employ Hoffman’s (1998) definition of terrorism to evaluate the success/failure of the anti-terrorism measures taken in relation to the Olympic Games: terrorism will be defined as the *deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change* (Hoffman 1998: 43). We will use this definition even though it excludes some terrorist acts, like attacks made by individuals with or without a political agenda. In other words, we will discuss to what extent the organizers of the Olympic Games (local and national authorities and the Olympic Movement) have managed to prevent terrorists from *deliberately creating and exploiting fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change*.

What is a success?

Our evaluation of success/failure will focus only on visible anti-terrorism measures and the visible presence/absence of terrorist acts. This distinction is important, because it affects the terminology and approach of this study: this is a study of *anti-terrorism*, not *counter-terrorism*. Counter-terrorism can be defined as active operations intended to pre-empt, neutralize, or destroy terrorists and their organizations – they are offensive measures. Anti-terrorism, by contrast, comprises defensive measures taken at, for example, borders, ports and airports, designed to detect and stop terrorists (Hoffman & Morrison-Taw 2002: 25; Naftali 2005: xiii–xiv). This is a debated distinction. Some analysts say it is difficult or even unnecessary to make a distinction between defensive and offensive measures. Intelligence is often the basis for anti-terrorist measures, making it hard to draw a line between defensive and offensive measures. Nevertheless, I have chosen to stick to this distinction.

The Summer Olympic Games represent the single largest social gathering to be protected from terrorists (in the Athens Olympics, a total of 202 nations participated!) and each is different from the previous one (*altius, citius, fortius!*). Successive Olympic Games involve increasing security concerns, and the lessons and experiences from each one are passed on to the next – modified, improved and combined with the very latest technology in the field of security. Olympic security has often served as the technological driver of new developments for use in the broader security context.⁴ The Olympic Games are not an experiment, but a real-life exercise and test for official authorities and various non-governmental organizations. This means that security cooperation before, during and after Olympic Games can benefit anti-terrorism in other areas afterwards. The lessons learned can involve both successes and failures. Failure to prevent one terrorist attack can start a process towards the more effective and credible organization of terrorist prevention in the future. In that respect we must evaluate the successes and failures of Olympic security both in the short run and in the long run.

The asymmetry of media attention

When discussing terrorism we also have to consider the relationship between *terrorism and media attention*. Terrorism cannot be understood solely in terms of violence or threat of violence: it also has to be understood in terms of media attention. Without media attention and widespread notice, it has been held, terrorism would not exist (Juergensmeyer 2000: 139). Nor is it only the terrorists that are dependent on media attention to succeed. Those dealing with anti-terrorism also have to demonstrate their capability to control, detect and prevent terrorists to their audiences, so they can give the impression that the terrorists have not succeeded and will not succeed. This can best be done through various media channels and through presence on the ground. There is, however, an *asymmetry* between the terrorist and the anti-terrorist. While terrorists can scarcely get enough attention, ‘anti-terrorists’ have to balance their presence in the media and on the ground. Too much in the way of visible security measures can be counterproductive, creating fear rather than assurance among those to be protected

⁴ Ryan, Peter (2002) ‘Ready for anything’, *Stadia*, no. 17.
http://www.stadia.tv/archive/user/archive_article.tpl?id=20020712133113.

(Romarheim 2005). Moreover, if the organizers of the Olympic Games spread fear, then the terrorists can abstain from making threats to succeed in their goals. In that case we could claim that it is easier for the terrorists to succeed than the organizers of the Olympics.

From regional to national anti-terrorist organizations – Munich 1972

Modern, international terrorism emerged for the first time on July 1968, when three armed Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Israeli El Al flight headed from Rome to Tel Aviv. This hijacking differed from previous hijackings in three ways: First, the flight was selected with the aim of getting a trade: exchanging the hijacked passengers for Palestinian terrorists imprisoned in Israel (as well as German terrorists imprisoned in Germany). Second, the nationality of the flight was deliberately chosen, to force Israel to communicate directly with the hijackers. Third, the terrorists managed to make the hijacking into an international media event that directed the focus to Palestinian political claims (Hoffman 1998: 67–68).

The organizers of the Munich Olympics were not up to date with the latest developments in (international) terrorism. It seems they were more interested in providing a favourable contrast between the 1972 Olympics and the 1936 Nazi Olympics in Berlin, than in focusing on effective anti-terrorist measures. The organizers, though claiming to organize the most secure Olympics ever, sent out security personnel who were casually dressed, unarmed and relaxed in style. It is hard to say to what extent this relaxed approach to security was to blame for the events that occurred during the Games, when eight heavily armed members of the Palestinian Black September organization made their way to the Israeli Olympic team. However, the desire to present an image of friendly informality devoid of any traces of association with 1936 proved incompatible with the security requirements of the day. These low-key security arrangements undoubtedly helped the Black September group to enter the Olympic Village without much trouble (Taylor 2004: 155–156).⁵

The poor security arrangement during the Olympics in 1972 could have been a motivation in itself for the terrorists to attack the Olympic Village. However, the main motive was triggered by the power of modern international terrorism: enormous media attention in the case of spectacular operations (Hoffman 1998: 71).⁶ The Munich terrorist action began on 5 September 1972, when eight terrorists entered the Israeli section of the Olympic Village, immediately killing two athletes and taking nine others hostage. They offered to exchange the hostages for 236 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and five other terrorists being held in Germany; and they required a guarantee of safe passage to any Arab country (except Lebanon and Jordan). They also threatened to kill one hostage

⁵ In fact, it was US athletes returning from a night out that helped the terrorists over the main gates into the Olympic Village (Taylor 2004: 156).

⁶ The planning, however, had a peculiar reason. Previous to the Games the PLO had officially contacted the IOC, twice requesting that a team of Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete. A newspaper report made the terrorists aware that the IOC had confirmed that it would not allow Palestinian athletes to compete in the Olympic Games in Munich. This angered the members of the Black September Organization, who felt impelled to do something about it – so they started planning a terrorist attack. Two of the terrorists took jobs in the Olympic Village to gather inside information (Taylor 2004: 168–169).

every two hours if their demands were not met. The rescue operation was conducted by the Bavarian police – not the German federal police – and without any involvement of foreign police or anti-terrorist units. After several rounds of negotiations, the result was the deaths of all the hostages and five of the terrorists, although the three remaining terrorists surrendered.

Clearly, the Bavarian authorities' handling of the situation was a dismal fiasco. The failure to save hostages provided stark proof of what a serious threat international terrorism had become, and how inadequate West German (and European) counter-terrorist capabilities were (Hoffman 1998: 71–75; Taylor 2004: 183). From this acknowledgement came the establishment of special anti-terrorist units in several European countries. West Germany set up a detachment of its border police, *Grenzschutzgruppe Neun* (GSG–9). In France, the *Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale* (GIGN) was created within the Gendarmerie Nationale. In Britain, the elite *Special Air Service Regiment* (SAS) was given permission to establish a *Counter Revolutionary Warfare* detachment with a specific anti-terrorism mission. The establishment of these units proved to be a success. Five years later, the GSG–9 commandos successfully released all eighty-six hostages on board a Lufthansa flight that had been hijacked en route from Mallorca by a mixed team of Palestinian and West German terrorists, without harm to any of the hostages (Hoffman 1998: 72; Wilkinson 1986: 144). In 1980, Britain's SAS units successfully resolved the six-day siege at the Iranian embassy in London, rescuing nineteen of the twenty-one hostages and killing five of the six terrorists (Hoffman 1998: 73).

By contrast, the USA decided not to follow the examples of its European allies, and established no special, elite counter-terrorist unit of its own. However, the terms 'counter-terrorism' and 'international terrorism' entered the vocabulary of Washington in 1972, as the government set up its first groups to manage the problem. The State Department established two departmental committees to deal with terrorism: one to stimulate and coordinate international action against terrorism, the other to protect foreign persons and property in the USA. Furthermore, it set up an ad hoc interagency group to coordinate intelligence data regarding terrorist organizations and their activities, and to improve exchanges of such information with other governments. Meanwhile, the CIA began systematic reporting on international terrorism. The agency quickly created a team of mid-level analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence, to gather what they could on terrorist organizations around the world (Naftali 2005: 55). One reason why the USA handled the situation differently could be that, at the time, it viewed terrorism as a primarily European phenomenon, due to the frequent terrorist attacks carried out by IRA, ETA, Red Brigade etc.– all in Europe.

The organizers of the 1972 Olympics *were not able to protect the Games from exploiting fear through violence in the pursuit of political change*, so in that respect the Games were a failure for the organizers. In the long run, however, the drama in Munich instigated a process towards the creation of new units to combat terrorism in several European countries as well as in the USA. The European units, trained to solve Munich-type scenarios, succeeding in handling similar situations some years later. In other words: the

failures of Munich helped national authorities in Europe to see the necessity of national anti-terrorist units to combat terrorism. Moreover, the 1972 Games fostered a new premise concerning the organization of the Olympic Games. It had become reasonable to anticipate that without effective anti-terrorist measures in relation to future Olympic Games, they would be a perfect target for future terrorist attacks as well.

New inter-institutional cooperation on anti-terrorism – Atlanta 1996

Federal authorities in the USA feared that Atlanta, Georgia, would become a prime target for terrorists during the 1996 Summer Olympics. There were several reasons for this. The bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building and the use of poison gas in the Tokyo subway system in 1995, as well as the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, had created anxiety about threats from unconventional weapons.⁷ Moreover, in the wake of four suicide bombings in Israel in March 1996, killing sixty-two people, the federal authorities feared Iranian-sponsored terrorism against the USA.⁸ The suicide bombings triggered the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) to establish a team to examine what Iran might do and how the USA could move to deter and prevent attacks from Iran.⁹ As a result of this examination, five serious security gaps were uncovered only four months before the Games in Atlanta (Clarke 2004: 105–107). First, in the Olympic Village there was a nuclear reactor with spent fuel on site, but preparations for the Games had included no extra security measures to protect the site. Second, some of the trains passing underneath the Olympic Stadium carried explosive and other hazardous materials, yet there were no search plans for these trains. Third, there existed no plans for responding to chemical, biological or radiation incidents. Fourth, there were no plans for searching for guns, or setting up stationary walk-through magnetometers. Five, no extra measures were taken to prevent hijacking of aircraft, to detect hijacking or to deter hijacked aircraft from passing over the Olympic Stadium.

As a result, the Atlanta organizers and the CGS took immediate measures to reduce vulnerability. They engaged the US Customs Service to provide flying radar platforms and to place Secret Service snipers on board Blackhawk helicopters to warn off, or take out, planes threatening the Games. The Defense Department agreed to set up a joint air coordination post with the Federal Air Administration (FAA) and to place radar on a hill outside Atlanta, and also agreed to have National Guard fighter planes on alert. A response team for dealing with chemical, biological, or nuclear incidents was created. Special medical stocks were moved in, as were decontamination units, together with thousands of protective suits and hundreds of detection and diagnostic packages. Personnel from the Energy Department's nuclear labs, the Health and Human Services Department, the Army's chemical weapons command, and the Defense Department's Joint Special Operations Command commandos worked together in a task force at an air base outside the city, where an interagency command post was created. The Secret Service also began to survey every Olympics venue for vulnerabilities, and developed a

⁷ 'Counter-Terrorism to Be Olympic Event', *Washington Post* 23, April 1996.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/bombing/stories/terror.htm>.

⁸ Israeli intelligence believed that Hezbollah and Iran had a role in the attacks.

⁹ The CSG was chaired by the National Security Council and served to share information and coordinate the response to terrorist threats against US interests, whether at home or abroad.

plan for searching everyone entering them. Hundreds of Secret Service personnel were moved to Atlanta and hundreds of FBI agents were also added, patrolling the streets undercover and sitting in key locations with rapid-response SWAT teams. The Transportation Department persuaded the railroads to reroute dangerous material cargos and to allow additional railroad police to check the trains. Flights into Atlanta were accorded special passenger screening; the Energy Department ordered a temporary shutdown of the nuclear reactor, and the removal of nuclear waste (Clarke 2004: 108–109).

Despite these security measures, the Atlanta organizers failed to stop a lone bomber from striking. One individual managed to detonate a small bomb in a public square, killing two persons and injuring 111. Even if this cannot be categorized as a ‘terrorist attack’ according to our definition of terrorism, it revealed a major failure in security. However, in the long run the measures taken before and during the Games, later called the *Atlanta Rules*, marked the start of a successful anti-terrorism cooperation among various authorities, and the Atlanta Rules were used to create ‘National Security Special Events’. In the following years, the CSG designated several occasions as being National Security Special Events – including the 2000 Republican and Democratic National Conventions, the 2001 Presidential Inauguration, the 2001 United Nations General Assembly, the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, and Super Bowl XXXVI in New Orleans, the 2004 State of the Union Address, and most recently the Sea Island G8 Summit, the memorial services for former President Ronald Reagan, the 2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions and the 2005 Presidential Inauguration.¹⁰ In the preparation and conduct of such National Security Special Events, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, NSA, Customs, Immigration, Diplomatic Security, Coast Guard, and Defense Department cooperate to detect and prevent terrorism. (Clarke 2004: 109)

This development shows that federal and local authorities *managed to prevent terrorist organizations from using the Olympic Games as an arena for terrorism*. However, they failed to prevent a lethal bomb from being detonated at a public arrangement outside the venues. Some have blamed the organizers; it has also been pointed out that the USA operated the security alone, financed and organized primarily by the private sector, a combination that made the security arrangements defective.¹¹ Nevertheless, the lesson learned from the anti-terrorist campaign before, during and after the 1996 Games started a new way of thinking about terrorist prevention and a new way of organizing anti-terrorism in the USA. This new approach to preventing terrorism has been successfully applied in connection with large events of national and international importance.

The internationalization of anti-terrorism cooperation– Athens 2004

The Athens Olympics were the first Summer Games to be held since the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’ on the USA in 2001. Alleged Al Qaeda links to the November 2003 bombings in Istanbul and the 11 March 2004 bombings of commuter trains in Madrid heightened

¹⁰ ‘Fact Sheet: 2005 Presidential Inauguration – National Special Security Event’, *U.S. Department of Homeland Security*. <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4100>.

¹¹ Kovalycsik, Kevin (2003) ‘Homecoming dream. Bringing the Olympics back to Athens’, *Stadia*, no. 22. http://www.stadia.tv/archive/user/archive_article.tpl?id=20030514161226.

the awareness of the organizers of the Athens Games of a possible international terrorist threat, although Al Qaeda had made no specific or known threat against the Olympics (Migdalovitz 2004: 3). Moreover, the US State Department had stated in August 2003 that there was no information to substantiate a verifiable Al Qaeda presence in Greece. However, on 15 April 2004, Osama bin Laden offered Europeans a 'peace treaty' if they would withdraw their troops from Muslim countries within three months. Since the Games were to be held just weeks after this deadline would expire, it intensified concerns that they might be intended as a symbolic European target for Al Qaeda (ibid. 3–4).

Other factors contributed to the fear of terrorist attacks. Historically, Greece has a poor record of dealing with terrorism, and has been home to ideological terrorist organizations that have assassinated businessmen and state officials as well as US and British diplomats and intelligence operatives (Kassimeris 2004: 12). Following the convictions in 2003 of 19 members of the November 17 group, blamed for 23 killings and dozens of other attacks since 1975, the Greek authorities claimed they had crippled the most dangerous domestic terrorist threat. However, three bombs that went off just 100 days prior to the Games in 2004 spread insecurity among the organizers, even though some analysts saw the bombs as less an intimation of things to come and more as a political provocation aimed at embarrassing the government.¹² The controversies over the war in Iraq were also an obvious source of concern, and many observers considered the nationals from countries participating in and supporting the US- led war in Iraq ('the coalition of the willing') to be at high risk during the Olympics. The vulnerability of the Games was compounded by the huge number of possible entries into Greece and its weak border and passport controls. Greece has thousands of islands in the Aegean, Ionian and Mediterranean Seas, and is located close to Middle Eastern and Balkan hot spots.

Partly because of this security context (and partly because of poor national organization of the Games at all levels), the Greek authorities recognized early on that they needed all the help they could get. Security agreements were signed with 22 countries, many of them previous Olympic hosts. Heading the security efforts was an international committee chaired by Greece and supported by the USA, Britain, Australia, Israel, Spain, France and Germany. They shared information on terrorism threats, security and protection. In addition Greece hired terrorism security experts who brought in their own teams to conduct risk assessments of all Olympic venues and other potential targets. Law enforcement and intelligence agents from the USA, Israel, Germany and Britain were among those who came to Athens to instruct in anti-terrorism measures, including how to prevent or respond to a chemical or biological attack. Others were trained in VIP protection, in evasive driving techniques and in hostage rescue. One sophisticated and technologically advanced command and control center (provided by Science Applications International Corporation, SAIC) was also used; it involved infrastructure to secure several locations including sporting venues, the athletes' village, and ports where cruise visitors would be staying. SAIC also provided various security command centre, including the central command facility. Many of the systems provided were the same as

¹² 'Greek capital hit by triple blast', *BBC News* 5 May 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3684967.stm>. 'How Safe Is Athens?', *Time Magazine*, European edition 17 May 2004. <http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901040517-634646,00.html>.

those used at the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics.¹³ The European Union also permitted Greece to enforce stricter immigration controls than otherwise allowed under the Schengen Agreement on free movement of EU citizens.

In addition to all these measures, the Greek authorities requested military assistance from NATO, resulting in the launch of the NATO operational activities titled *Distinguished Games*. This assistance was supplementary to Greek national operations and was intended to demonstrate Allied solidarity in contributing to security for NATO members. NATO's support to Greek authorities included the deployment of AWACS aircraft for airspace surveillance of airspace, as well as maritime surveillance through NATO's Operation Active Endeavour (OAE).¹⁴ The mission of the operation was to conduct naval operations in the Mediterranean. OAE is one of the measures resulting from NATO's decision to implement Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which allows expansion of the options available in the campaign against terrorism;¹⁵ Thirdly, there was the deployment of elements of the NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Battalion (MN CBRN Def BN); and fourthly, enhanced intelligence sharing.¹⁶ The main areas included exchange of information about terrorism, extremism, crime and corruption, weapons of mass destruction, weapons smuggling, and tracking vessels carrying suspected terrorists and persons with extremist and criminal ties.¹⁷

Thus we can say that the Athens Games, in the short term, proved a success as far as anti-terrorism was concerned. At least terrorists did not succeed in *deliberately creating and exploiting fear through violence in the pursuit of political change*. It is difficult, however, to predict what the long-term effects of this success will be. Central to the future organizers of the Olympic Games will be the costs of securing such events, as well as the willingness of spectators and athletes to participate in a sporting event where there is an ever-increasing focus on security and terrorism. Perhaps this heightened focus on security

¹³ 'Security Challenge: Athens Olympics 2004', *Homeland Defense Journal* No. 3 (April). http://www.homelanddefensejournal.com/euro/Athens3_04.pdf, 13–17. Delays in installing a secure communications network (Tetra), however, resulted in several planned software applications being scrapped and the training of security officials shortened to a few weeks from the six-month period agreed with the IOC. SAIC came into a dispute with the Greek government over the terms of the contract. Greek police chiefs refused to accept the SAIC package because of missing components, and a legal battle was expected. See 'All eyes on security', *Financial Times* 12 August 2004.

¹⁴ The OAE formally began on 26 October 2001.

¹⁵ Prior to the Olympics in Athens, more than 41,000 ships had been tracked during this operation (Garden 2004: 13).

¹⁶ It should be noted that NATO does not have its own intelligence service.

¹⁷ 'NATO Assistance to Greece: "Distinguished Games"', *JFC Naples Factsheets* 071204. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/DistGames.htm. 'EADRCC assistance to Greece', *JFC Naples Factsheets*, 071204. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/EADRCC.htm. 'Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 7 Larissa, Greece', *JFC Naples Factsheets* 071204. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/CAOC.htm. 'NATO AWACS will fly over Greece', *JFC Naples factsheets* 071204. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/AWACS.htm. 'Task Force Endeavour', *JFC Naples Factsheets* 071204. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/TaskForceE.htm. 'Multinational (MN)CBRN Task Force (TF)', *JFC Naples Factsheets* 071204. http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/CBRN.htm

will make the Olympics less interesting – not only for participants and organizers, but also for terrorists?

Conclusions

Returning to our research question, we can now offer some answers. The anti-terrorism measures undertaken before, during and after the Olympic Games since 1972 have gone from failure to success. The development of anti-terrorism measures has resulted in Olympic Games that have been held without terrorist attacks aimed at political change. Failures in previous Games have been evaluated and have served to promote new developments in the fight against terrorism in later Games. The Munich disaster alerted everyone to the importance of Olympic security; since then, the Olympic Games have become the standard-setter for national organization and international cooperation on anti-terrorism in society in general. Of course, only time will show whether the measures taken during the recent Summer Olympics will be adopted in the 2008 Beijing Games, and if the Beijing Games will in turn help to establish yet new ways of countering terrorism.

The security problems and terrorist threats have remained much the same as before, but we can note a greater willingness to invest more in security and access control. However, an ever-increasing investments spiral in international cooperation on intelligence, military cooperation and international policing may prove counterproductive as a defensive anti-terrorist strategy, for several reasons. Firstly, rather than creating the feeling of a safe environment it can lead to fear among the people to be protected. Secondly, it can lead to an exaggerated focus on one specific arrangement (the Olympic Games), with a parallel under-focus on other possible targets: terrorists can stay away from the Olympics and concentrate on other unprotected or under-focused targets. Thirdly, the rising costs may act to deter bidders for the Games: the security costs may be beyond the means of many potential host countries. In other words: *we can never be too secure, but we can spend too much on security.*¹⁸

The future will show if the increasing focus on security does indeed result in a fortification of the Olympics and in prohibitively expensive Games. Perhaps the solution might even be to follow the arguments offered by previous IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch, who claimed that it would be easier to provide a secure environment in closed societies or in dictatorships. From this perspective, it would better for the Games to be held in such countries, because the organizers would have nothing to worry about: there can never be a security problem (Pound 2004: 95–96). Who knows? Maybe Beijing ought to arrange all the Olympic Games in the future?

¹⁸ Thanks to Anders G. Romarheim for bringing this aspect to my knowledge.

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Internasjonal politikk kommer fire ganger i året og er det fremste tidsskriftet i Norden på sitt område. Når store begivenheter endrer det internasjonale landskapet, når skillene mellom nasjonal og internasjonal politikk viskes gradvis ut eller når norsk utenrikspolitikk endres, ønsker Internasjonal politikk å være helt i front med å utforske denne utviklingen. Tidsskriftet publiserer fagartikler, debatt og essays både fra Norge og nabolandene. I 2004/05 har vi så langt brakt artikler om bl.a. USA – imperium eller hegemon?, Kyoto – et mislykket prosjekt?, Afrikanske konflikter, Westfalermyten, Ikkespredning, nordisk sikkerhetssamarbeid og konfliktløsning i Sudan samt et dobbeltnummer om Norge i 100 år etter unionsoppløsningen.

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Nordisk Øst-forum kommer fire ganger i året og er det ledende skandinaviskspråklige tidsskriftet på sitt felt. Tidsskriftets ambisjon er å dekke politisk og samfunnsmessig utvikling i en region i stadig rask endring – Sentral- og Øst-Europa og det postsovjetiske området. Tidsskriftet publiserer fagartikler, essays og bokomtaler. Første nummer i 2005 er et temanummer om utviklingen i landene mellom et ekspanderende EU og Russland: Ukraina, Hviterussland og Moldova. Det inneholder artikler av ledende nordiske eksperter på de tre landene og gi bakgrunn for blant annet den pågående krisen i Ukraina.

Fra og med nr 2 - 2005 vil Nordisk Øst-forum være fagfelleverdert. I dette nummeret ser vi bl.a. på Euro-parådets behandling av Tsjetsjenia-konflikten, skilsmissemellom tsjekkere og slovakere, hviterussisk historieskrivning, FNs habitatagenda i en russisk kontekst og miljøreformer i Latvia.

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