JEMAHAH ISLAMIYAH IN SOUTH EAST ASIA:
DAMAGED BUT STILL DANGEROUS

26 August 2003
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JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN SOUTH EAST ASIA: DAMAGED BUT STILL DANGEROUS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the South East Asian terrorist organisation based in Indonesia, remains active and dangerous, despite the mid-August 2003 arrest of Hambali, one of its top operatives.

Though more than 200 men linked or suspected of links to it are now in custody in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, JI is far from destroyed. Indonesian police and their international counterparts have succeeded in seriously damaging the network, but the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta on 5 August provided clear evidence that the organisation remains capable of planning and executing a major operation in a large urban centre.

The information emerging from the interrogation of JI suspects indicates that this is a bigger organisation than previously thought, with a depth of leadership that gives it a regenerative capacity. It has communication with and has received funding from al-Qaeda, but it is very much independent and takes most, if not all operational decisions locally.

New information suggests that JI was deliberately set up as a military organisation and that the division into units known as mantiqis and wakalahs – originally defined as districts and subdistricts – was actually a territorial command structure of brigades, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads.

All senior members of the central command trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, before JI formally existed. It was in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan mujahidin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf that they developed jihadist fervour, international contacts, and deadly skills.

Afghanistan veterans became the trainers of a new generation of mujahidin when JI set up a camp in Mindanao from 1996 to 2000 in a reciprocal arrangement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The recruits trained in everything from explosives to sharp-shooting and included not only JI members but also members of like-minded jihadist organisations from other parts of Indonesia, especially South Sulawesi and West Java. This means that Indonesia has to worry about other organisations as well, whose members have equally lethal skills but do not operate under the JI command structure. This background report describes the emergence of one such organisation in South Sulawesi that was responsible for the bombing of a McDonald’s restaurant and a car showroom in Makassar in December 2002.

The JI network is held together not just by ideology and training but also by an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seems like a giant extended family. Insufficient attention has been paid to the role the women of JI play in cementing the network. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure.

JI also depends on a small circle of pesantrens – Muslim boarding schools – to propagate jihadist teachings. Of the more than 14,000 such schools in Indonesia, only a tiny number are committed to jihadist principles, but there is a kind of JI “Ivy League” to which JI members send their own children. Chief among these is Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki, whose founder, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is believed to have been JI’s amir or top leader between late 1999 and 2002.
JI thus remains dangerous. The arrests of Hambali and others surely have weakened its ability to operate, and the Indonesian police and their international counterparts have made major progress in hunting down its members. But this is an organisation spread across a huge archipelago, whose members probably number in the thousands. No single individual is indispensable.

The one piece of good news is that there are some indications that internal dissent is building within JI. Members are said to be unhappy with recent choices of targets, including the Marriott hotel bombing that killed mostly Indonesian workers. There is disagreement about the appropriate focus for jihad and over the use of a practice known as fa’i – robbery of non-Muslims to support Islamic struggle. Internal dissent has destroyed more than one radical group, but in the short term, we are likely to see more JI attacks.

Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August 2003
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DAMAGED BUT STILL DANGEROUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains active and dangerous from its Indonesian base despite the recent arrests of some of its top operatives. On 5 August 2003, members of the South East Asian terrorist organisation bombed the Marriott hotel in Jakarta, clear evidence that JI is still capable of planning and executing a major operation in the heart of the capital.

Just a week later, one of JI’s most senior leaders and the most wanted man in South East Asia, Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, was arrested in Thailand, joining some 200 men linked or suspected of links to JI who are now in custody. Hambali’s arrest was unquestionably a major blow: he was JI’s top link to al-Qaeda and one of its major strategists and fund-raisers. But he was not indispensable, and JI is far from destroyed.

Indications from the interrogation of JI suspects suggest JI is larger than first believed, with a depth of leaders that allows it to make up losses and regenerate itself. The significance of the arrest will thus depend in part on the information that Hambali discloses and how that information is acted on, but JI does not depend on one man.

Documentary evidence from the mid-1990s and more recent interrogation of JI suspects suggest that JI has a rigidly hierarchical structure headed by an amir. In practice, however, members of the central command, the markaziyah, appear to be more important in setting policy and deciding on operations and are not constrained by the formal hierarchy. JI also maintains alliances with a loose network of like-minded regional organisations all committed in different ways to jihad. The Makassar bombings of 5 December 2002 were not the work of JI, for example, but they were carried out by men who had been trained by JI in Mindanao and who had the motivation, manpower, and skills to undertake a JI-like attack. JI has also made very pragmatic use of thugs (preman) as necessary, particularly in Ambon.

But JI is not operating simply as an al-Qaeda subordinate. Virtually all of its decision-making and much of its fund-raising has been conducted locally, and its focus, for all the claims about its wanting to establish a South East Asian caliphate, continues to be on establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. If, since 11 September 2001, and particularly since the Bali bombings, the aim has seemed more destructive than constructive, especially in terms of attacking the U.S. and its allies as the biggest enemies of Islam, the emphasis on jihad in Indonesia remains strong.

If some early accounts painted JI as an al-Qaeda affiliate, tightly integrated with the bin Laden network, the reality is more complex. JI has elements in common with al-Qaeda, particularly its jihadist ideology and a long period of shared experience in Afghanistan. Its leaders revere bin Laden and seek to emulate him, and they have almost certainly received direct financial support from al-Qaeda.

Both the core organisation and this looser network

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1 Wan Min bin Wan Mat, a JI suspect detained in Malaysia, told interrogators that once an Islamic state in Indonesia was achieved, members would work toward a larger daulah islamiyah nusantara encompassing Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, and then move on to restoring the Islamic caliphate. Wan Min interrogation deposition, 11 March 2003.
are bound together by history, ideology, education, and marriage. They share a commitment to implementing salafi teachings – a return to the “pure” Islam practiced by the Prophet – and to jihad. More than 200 members trained in Afghanistan from 1985 to 1995 and even more than that in Mindanao from 1996 to 2001. These bonds are likely to enable the network to survive police efforts to dismantle it.

It is sobering in particular to note that several leaders in the central command have not been identified, let alone apprehended. Senior figures with proven capacity to do serious damage, such as Zulkarnaen, the head of JI military operations, and the Malaysian national, Zulkifli bin Hir alias Musa alias Marwan, remain at large in the region, and the cell structure is probably more extensive than originally believed.

This report examines the ties that bind members of JI and its associate networks together, particularly the Afghanistan and Mindanao experiences, and assesses JI’s potential for conducting operations. It is based on examination of interrogation depositions of many of the suspects arrested in connection with the Bali bombings as well as confidential interviews with people close to the network. The former are valuable documents but ICG does not take the information within them at face value; several Bali suspects, in particular, have given misleading information to interrogators. But through cross-checking different accounts of the same incident, it is possible to get a reasonably reliable description of events.

II. THE NETWORK IN AFGHANISTAN

All of JI’s top leaders and many of the men involved in JI bombings trained in Afghanistan over a ten-year period, 1985-95. The jihad in Afghanistan had a huge influence in shaping their worldview, reinforcing their commitment to jihad, and providing them with lethal skills. Their experience there was also critical in terms of forging bonds among themselves and building an international network that included members of al-Qaeda. It is important to note that the process of sending recruits to Afghanistan began at least seven years before JI formally came into being. In many ways, the emergence of a formal organisation around 1992 merely institutionalised a network that already existed. Once JI was formed, however, the Afghanistan veterans became its elite.

A. THE KEY FIGURES

How many Indonesians trained in Afghanistan may never be known. One veteran estimated about 3,000, which is certainly too high.2 Those who later became JI were far fewer. One man said that their aim was to reach 300, the number of the Prophet’s Companions, and they never quite made it.3

This latter group had some very specific attributes. With a few exceptions, they were followers of Abdullah Sungkar, the man who together with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir founded Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki, in Solo, Central Java in 1971.4 The Sungkar connection meant they were also committed in one way or another to continuing the struggle of the Darul Islam movement to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia. And all trained in a camp led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan mujahidin commander with the weakest network inside Afghanistan and the closest ties with Saudi Arabia.

Each of these factors influenced the kind of training they received. Sungkar and other Darul Islam leaders began recruiting volunteers for Afghanistan in 1985 (or in some cases ordering their followers

3 ICG interview, March 2003.
4 See ICG Asia Briefing, Al Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia, August 2002.
to sign up). If the recruits already had a commitment to an Islamic state, rooted in Darul Islam, political developments at home reinforced it. Soeharto, then Indonesian president, had alienated many Muslims in 1982-1983 by his “sole foundation” (azas tunggal) policy, by which all Islamic organisations had to declare that five principles called Pancasila, and not Islam, was their sole ideological foundation. Then in 1984, a rally in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, by Muslims angered by both this policy and the desecration of a local mosque turned violent. The army opened fire, and many dozens were killed. Fury over the Tanjung Priok riot may have aided recruitment.  

Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were forced to flee to Malaysia in 1985 when the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision, and they faced immediate imprisonment. From exile, they decided they needed to strengthen their movement through building up its military capacity. Sending their followers to Afghanistan was the means to this end.  

As it happened, 1985 also marked the beginning of the bloodiest year in the entire Afghan war; Gorbachev had come to power in March that year and given the Soviet army one year to achieve what had eluded it in the previous six: victory. Recruitment of non-Afghan mujahidin, most Arab but some South East Asian, by Saudi-funded agencies intensified. One of those agencies was the Muslim World League, or the Rabitat al-Alam al-Islami, often called simply the “Rabitah”.  

In Indonesia and then in Malaysia after Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled there, it was the Rabitah that channelled funds for many, but not all, Indonesian recruits. Mukhlas, a JI leader indicted in the Bali bombings, for example, says he went at his own expense. All recruits were sent through the “services centre” (Maktab al-Khidmat) in Peshawar, set up in 1984 to provide the non-Afghan mujahidin logistical support. The Maktab was headed by Abdullah Azzam, a Jordanian-Palestinian whom Osama bin Laden regarded as a mentor and who became the chief ideologue of al-Qaeda. Mukhlas acknowledges Azzam as a major influence on his thinking, and many of his writings have been translated into Indonesian by Pustaka al-Alaq, a publishing house linked to Pondok Ngruki in Solo. Until the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan, the Indonesians sent by Sungkar all went through Azzam’s centre on their way to Camp Saddah, the Sayyaf facility in Khumran Agency, in Parachinar, Pakistan, on the border with Afghanistan.

Sayyaf, head of the Afghan faction called the Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan (Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan), was a proponent of very strict salafi Islam and had the full support of the Saudi religious establishment at the time Indonesian recruitment began. (Sungkar seems to have known him quite well, but it is not clear where they met.) Sayyaf was not only the mujahidin commander with the closest ties to the Saudis; he was also closest to Osama bin Laden. From the beginning of his interest in Afghanistan, bin Laden had associated himself with Sayyaf and was active in helping with the international

5 Berita Aacara Pemeriksaan Ahmad Sajuli, 30 October 2002. Sajuli lived in Tanjung Priok and frequently attended lectures by some of those involved in the riot.  
6 Sungkar and Ba’asyir were arrested on subversion charges in November 1978 and accused of working to establish an Islamic state. They were finally tried in 1982, sentenced to time served and released, but the prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court to reinstate the original sentence of nine years. In early 1985, the Court finally ruled in favour of the prosecution and ordered their re-arrest. See ICG Briefing, The Ngruki Network, op. cit.  
9 Ibid, p. 197.
recruitment of mujahidin. The early Sungkar recruits would all likely have met bin Laden through Sayyaf, and Mukhlas acknowledges proudly having done so.  

B. IMPORTANCE OF THE BATTLE OF JAJI, APRIL 1987

Indeed, Mukhlas claims to have taken part with bin Laden in a turning point of the Afghan war, the battle of Jaji, near Khost (sometimes grandly referred to as the Battle of the Lion’s Den) in April 1987 that Abdullah Azzam says lasted 22 days. It stopped a Soviet advance and has entered mujahidin legend. Bin Laden was certainly there; so were Abdullah Azzam and Sayyaf, at one point taking refuge together in a tunnel constructed by the mujahidin specifically to protect from air strikes.

Mukhlas told interrogators:

In 1987 I met Sheikh Osama bin Laden in Joji, Afghanistan, when it was being attacked by Russia; the snow was two metres high,” Mukhlas told interrogators. “When the mujahidin went on attack, I went with them, and it was Osama bin Laden who […] led the mujahidin.

The significance of the Indonesian presence at the battle of Jaji should not be underestimated. In addition to Mukhlas, the men who were to become top JI leaders and were in the Sayyaf camp at the time included Zulkarnaen, head of JI military operations (still at large); Hambali; Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusdan, believed to have replaced Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as JI amir, arrested in April 2003; Jabir alias Enjang Bastaman, killed in Bandung in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings; Mustopa, head of Mantiqi III, arrested in July 2003; and Mustaqim, a Ngruki teacher who ran the JI training academy in Mindanao and became director of the military department of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council. A man who never became a JI member but nonetheless was central to its activities, Syawal Yasin, alias Laode Ida from Makassar, was also in Camp Saddah.

These men would not only have bonded as Indonesians in such a new and strange environment. (Several speak in wonder of the snow, for example.) They would also have been inspired by the epic battle and seen it as reaffirmation that their cause was just, although few would have actually taken part in the fighting, as Mukhlas apparently did. Sayyaf repeatedly told the non-Afghan recruits that they should not go to the front lines, that it was more important for them to return to their own countries, well trained for jihad, than to die in Afghanistan. The Jaji battle also may have been an occasion for more mingling of mujahidin from different countries than was ordinarily the case. For example, one participant was the then sixteen-year-old Ibnul Khattab, later known as the amir of international mujahidin in the Caucasus, who went on to play a major role in Chechnya. Another was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Sayyaf’s secretary and “the shadow that never left his side”, who became a top al-Qaeda figure.

C. THE “MILITARY ACADEMY” AND ITS OFFSHOOTS

Sungkar’s first group of recruits in 1985 was small, perhaps less than a dozen. They joined forces with some recruits from Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI), also sent through Rabitah auspices. The second group in 1986 was much larger, some 50 to 60 men. These first two groups had the hardest task because they had to build facilities for everyone else. Initially they had planned to construct a separate military academy near Peshawar, but the area was too crowded with refugees, and they got an offer from Sayyaf to conduct their training

17 The MMI was established in August 2000 with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as head.
18 ICG interview with Afghanistan veteran, March 2003.
21 Abdul Qadir Jaelani, a well-known Muslim preacher (muballigh) in Jakarta, did the recruiting for GPI.
within Camp Saddah. Sayyaf provided the land, arms, and food; the Indonesians had to build the dormitories; a large kitchen; and training facilities, including an obstacle course.

The instructors for the first two groups were for the most part Afghans, Pakistanis, and Arabs. Sungkar appears to have been highly selective about the first Indonesians he sent. Most were well-educated, several from prestigious colleges such as Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta or the Surabaya Institute of Technology, and they were fluent in Arabic or English. It was tactically smart. For one thing, these men translated the training materials, so they became the instructors for the Indonesians who followed. (Zulkarnaen and Syawal were two of these instructors.) For another, they were of such high quality that Sungkar’s reputation with Sayyaf was enhanced, increasing the funding for recruitment.

Camp Saddah was divided into qabilah, the Arabic word for tribe. The South East Asians were considered one tribe, so Indonesians, Filipinos, Thais, and Malaysians trained together, with a combination of Malay and English as the languages of instruction. There was a Middle Eastern qabilah for Saudis, Egyptians, and Jordanians, and another for North Africans, particularly Algerians and Tunisians. There was not very much interaction among the different groups.

The full training program of religious and military instruction was three years, although shorter courses were available. The religious instruction was very much focused on salafi teachings, a return to the pure Islam practiced by the Prophet and his Companions. It emphasised aqidah (faith), tauhid (oneness of God) and most of all, jihad, using classic salafi texts such as those by Ibn Taymiyya. Abdullah Azzam’s writings, also taught in the camp, were a modern echo of Ibn Taymiyya’s arguments that jihad meant armed struggle and that it was legitimate to wage such a struggle against Muslims who deviated from the true Islam or refused to enforce the sharia (Islamic law). These teachings would have resonated with Indonesians from a Darul Islam background, whose efforts to uphold sharia, let alone establish an Islamic state, were repressed by the Soeharto government.

The third and fourth group of recruits, about 25 men each, arrived in 1987. They were not only able to use all the facilities built by the first two groups, but they were also the beneficiaries of generous funding. Each member reportedly got a monthly stipend of 300 Pakistani rupees, about Rp.30,000 at the 1987 exchange rate or U.S.$15. It was enough to live on, given that room and board were already covered.

One of the Indonesian veterans described the military component as follows:

First was explosives. We were taught about the nature of explosives and their chemical composition. Then we moved on to the question of detonators, including how to blow up different kinds of targets. Second was mines: land mines and anti-tank mines. We studied how to take them apart, how to plant them, and how to repair them. Of course we also learned how to shoot and how to drive tanks. Third was map reading. This was the part I really loved. We got topography lessons, learned how to use a compass, and how to draw contour lines. This is important because if you are going to use artillery weapons, you have to know how to read maps. Fourth was infantry tactics or war tactics. We studied urban guerrilla warfare, guerrilla fighting in the mountains, attacks, ambushes and the like.

The ceremony welcoming the fourth group was led by Mustafa Mashur, a top leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood whose books have been widely translated into bahasa Indonesia. Members of the fourth group also were the beneficiaries of a new “curriculum” including material not taught before such as sabotage. One instructor was an Egyptian, Muhammad Sawwki al-Istambuli, the elder brother of one of the killers of Anwar Sadat. Al-Istambuli, a leader of Gamma al-Islami, had fled Egypt after the assassination and come to Afghanistan around 1983 where he joined forces with Hekmatyar and Sayyaf. In the Sayyaf camp he was known as a particularly demanding trainer. “Even the toughest among the Indonesian mujahidin ended up vomiting and fainting when they were trained by him”, a veteran recalled. Zulkarnaen, the man who became JI’s military leader, was a particular protégé.

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22 ICG interview with Afghanistan veteran, March 2003.
23 Ibid.
24 ICG interviews, March and June 2003.
26 ICG interview, March 2003.
A fifth group, of about fifteen, arrived in 1988. That year, however, premier and mujahidin supporter Zia ul-Haq was killed and succeeded by Benazir Bhutto, who tried to expel the mujahidin from Pakistan. That coincided with the Soviet withdrawal, however, and the mujahidin just moved across the border, the Indonesians into a Sayyaf camp in Jaji, near Khost. Because of political uncertainties in Pakistan, no one came from Indonesia in 1989, but the pace picked up in 1990, with about 25 recruits.

The late 1980s and early 1990s were an important time for developing ties with like-minded individuals from other organisations who went through the Sayyaf camp, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Abdurajak Janjalani of the Abu Sayyaf Group named his organisation after the camp’s patron; he apparently was there from some time in 1989 through December 1990.

The final group of recruits who received the full three-year training came in 1991. It appears to have been one of the largest groups, with many Malaysians and Singaporeans as well as Indonesians. By then, fighting between the mujahidin had already broken out, the Soviets were gone, and not long afterwards, the funds from the Middle East started drying up. There was also a rift in the Indonesian ranks.

Sometime in 1992, the two senior leaders of the Darul Islam movement, Abdullah Sungkar and an Indonesia-based man, Ajengan Masduki, fell out. Sungkar accused Masduki of having Shi’ite and sufi tendencies and therefore of having strayed from salafi teaching. The rift spilled over into Afghanistan when Sungkar flew to the Sayyaf camp to ask those there to choose between him and Masduki. Everyone chose him, save for one who abstained – Imam Samudra. It may not be a coincidence that Imam Samudra got to Afghanistan not through Abdullah Sungkar but through another DI leader, Gaos Taufik, who maintained good relations with Masduki. For fence-sitting, Imam Samudra was forced to leave before his three years were up. The rift between Sungkar and Masduki resulted directly in JI’s creation as an organisation separate and distinct from Darul Islam.

In 1992, a mujahidin coalition government was set up in Afghanistan under the leadership of Burhanuddin Rabbani, but to the huge disappointment of all the mujahidin, who saw their hopes for a true Islamic state being dashed, it quickly fell apart. Before the real warfare reached eastern Afghanistan, however, JI set up another camp in the hills outside Torkham. A veteran told ICG:

After the Najibullah regime fell, I think it was in 1993, Sheikh Rasul Sayyaf acquired an allotment of land in the area around Torkham. Torkham is in a rocky, mountainous region and was very, very hot. We got permission from Sheikh Sayyaf to turn the land into a military training centre. We were freer here, not just because we could supervise ourselves but we could undertake any kind of training. Torkham was far from anywhere, so any kind of experiment was possible. You could blow up a mountain and it wouldn’t bother anybody. We had to sleep in tents, and it was even hotter.

A leader of the reportedly extremely well-equipped camp was Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a Ngruki graduate and JI member. He had a reputation of being an extraordinary Qu’ran-reading teacher, as well as having well-honed military skills. (He has also consistently lied in his interrogation depositions. When one veteran learned that al-Ghozi had told interrogators he studied in Lahore from 1990 to 1994, the veteran laughed and said, “From 1990 to 1994, he was in Afghanistan without a break – if he studied, it was at Rasul Sayyaf University!”)

Al-Ghozi became friends in Torkham with two MILF fighters, Salahudin and Habib, who worked with him on the Rizal Day bombing in Manila in December 2000. Indeed, it may have been here where the MILF leadership incurred an obligation to JI, in terms of having its members trained by JI instructors. Its decision to allow JI to set up its own camp within Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao may have been simple reciprocity. In any case, it appears to have been al-Ghozi who was designated by the JI command to shift the training to Mindanao when fighting made further training in Afghanistan untenable.

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27 Ibid.
28 ICG interview, March 2003.
29 ICG interview, April 2003.
D. THE AFGHAN ALUMNI

Some of the notable JI figures and associates among the Afghan alumni are the following:

1. The first class, 1985:
   - **Achmad Roihan alias Saad**, who was arrested in April 2003 in Palu; he is the grandson of Achmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. He was also a Ngruki lecturer, and deputy to Abu Fatih (Abdullah Ansori), head of Mantiqi II.
   - **Aris Sumarsono alias Zulkarnaen**, JI’s top military trainer and currently a key member of the markaziyah or central command. He was in Pondok Ngruki in 1979, and his wife continues to live there. He has been named as a suspect in many JI bombings, including Bali.
   - **Mohammed Faiq Hafidz**, from Semarang, a member of the Sudirman mosque group in Yogyakarta, 1982-83, thus a close associate of Irfan Awwas Suryahardy, Fihiruddin alias Abu Jibril, and Muchliansyah alias Solihin, all of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Hafidz was detained as a JI member by Malaysia in January 2002.
   - **Syawal Yasin alias Laode Ida** from Makassar. Syawal was recruited not through Abdullah Sungkar but through GPI and never became a JI member, although he appears to have been deeply involved in its activities. He was one of the most popular instructors for the South East Asians in the Sayyaf camp.
   - **Raja Husain alias Idris** Acehnese, thought to have been involved in the bomb that went off at Soekarno-Hatta airport in late April 2003. He is believed to be based in Riau. Not clear whether he has been detained.

2. The second class, 1986:
   - **Mohamad Qital**, a technical engineer from Surayaba Technical Institute. He was particularly skilled in weapons training and manufacture and was one of those who moved to Mindanao to train Indonesians after 1996. He is believed to head the wakalah for East Java and remains at large.
   - **Mustopa (Mustafa)**, original name, Pranata Yudha; head of Mantiqi III, arrested in July 2003 outside Jakarta. His father was a general in the Indonesian army. Nasir Abbas, a Malaysian detained in April 2003, was his deputy.
   - **Mustaqim**, a Klaten native who once taught at Ngruki. He reappeared in Mindanao in 1998 as head of the Islamic Military Academy and is still at large. He was, and perhaps still is, a teacher at Pesantren Dar us-Syahada in Boyolali.
   - **Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan**, arrested April 2003, son of Haji Moh. Faleh of Kudus, a Darul Islam leader who was arrested for alleged Komando Jihad activities in the early 1980s. Thoriqudin is suspected of being Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s replacement as head of JI. Studied at Universitas Negeri Solo and is an explosives expert.
   - **Suyono alias Abu Farauk**, arrested in July 2003, then released. Believed to be head of JI’s wakalah Lampung.
   - **Muchlas alias Ali Gufron**, one of the main suspects in the Bali bombing.

Others in this group include the thirteen who went with **Ahmad Sajuli**, an Indonesian from Jakarta who is currently detained in Malaysia. The group was recruited by a Jakarta-based Darul Islam leader named Ahmad Furzon alias Broto, who was close to the DI head, Ajengan Masduki.31

**Mohammad Aslam bin Yar Ali Khan**, the Singaporean detained by the Northern Alliance in 2001, whose activities provided the key to the arrests of other JI members by Singapore, was in Afghanistan in 1986 but it is not known which camp he was in or whether he had any connection with the Sungkar group.

3. The third class, 1987:
   - **Hambali**, chief strategist of JI and former

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31 The group included Abdul Salam, Lukman, Saiful, Jahe, Abdul Hakim, Hisbullah, from West Kalimantan, Musohan, and Hasan Abdullah (Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son-in-law).
leader of Mantiqi I, arrested in Thailand on approximately 15 August 2003, has been implicated in virtually every major criminal act undertaken by JI.

- **Muchliansyah alias Solihin**, came back to Indonesia with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1999 and moved to Pulau Baru, Kalimantan. He was arrested in August 2003.

- **Fihirudin alias Moh Iqbal alias Abu Jibril**, detained in Malaysia from June 2001, his deportation to Indonesia was imminent as this report went to press in late August 2003.

- **Jabir alias Enjang Bastaman** (killed in West Java Christmas Eve bombings of 2000. His father had been a Darul Islam fighter, and his brother had been imprisoned for Komando Jihad.

- **Muklis Yunos** of the MILF likely made contact with some of the Indonesians around this time, because he returned to the Philippines permanently in 1987 and was in Pakistan just before his return.

4. The fourth class, late 1987:

- **Usman alias Abbas alias Edy Setiono**, detained for the August 2001 bombing of the Atrium shopping mall in Jakarta, also involved in the bombing of the home of the Philippines ambassador to Jakarta, and the Christmas Eve bombinfs.

- **Asep Danu**, the son of Haji Danu Muh Hasan. The father had been one of the key DI/Komando Jihad figures, widely believed to have been in the employ of Indonesian intelligence or at least used by it; the son left training early, because he did not want to be under the coordination of the Sungkar group.

- **Nasir Abbas**, who reportedly “graduated” at the top of his class, was Mustafa/Mustopa’s deputy in Mantiqi III and arrested in April 2003.

- **Firdaus alias Ahmad Azzam**, arrested in Jakarta July 2003, accused of involvement in smuggling ammunition to Poso. Active as volunteer in the Islamic medical aid organisation Mer-C.

- **Zuhroni alias Nuim**, explosives expert involved in sending recruits to wage jihad in Maluku. Still at large.

- **Farihin**, married to the daughter of a DI leader from Cirebon; was detained in Palu, Central Sulawesi, in October 2002 for smuggling ammunition to be used in the Poso conflict.

This group also likely included:

- **Arkam/Arqom alias Haris alias Azmi**, a native of Sumbawa, who had a permanent resident card from Sabah. He became a military trainer in Afghanistan, specialising in sharpshooting, but by 1993 was back in Malaysia as part of the Sungkar group.

- **Iswandi**, an Acehnese. One of the names used by “Polem”, the Acehnese involved in the Medan Christmas Eve bombinfs of 2000 was Iswandi but it is not clear if this is the same person.

- **Ali**, an Indonesian who became an instructor, reportedly close to Hambali.

By this time, cadres from the first three groups had become instructors, and Zulkarnaen was head of the academy. The Indonesians were very proud that all instructors for the South East Asia contingent were their compatriots. The Moros, the veterans said, never did as well as the Indonesians, who even were asked to teach in other qabilahs.

5. The Fifth and Sixth Classes, 1988, 1990:

The fifth class entered in 1988. No one was sent in 1989 because of the political situation in Pakistan. The sixth class, which left in 1990, included:

- **Dedi Mulyadi**, detained in connection with Christmas Eve 2000 bombinfs in Ciamis, West Java.


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32 ICG knows that they were in Afghanistan at this time, but it is not clear when they arrived.
July 2003 and still at large.

- **Ali Imron**, involved in Bali bombings, left Indonesia with al-Ghozi.
- **Dul Matin alias Joko Pitono**, involved in bombing of the Philippine ambassador’s home, and the Christmas Eve and Bali bombings.
- **Holis**, West Java Christmas Eve bomber who got away. He took a three-month “short course” in Afghanistan, not the full three years.
- **Akim Akimuddin alias Suheb**, Bandung Christmas Eve bomber, killed in the premature explosion of that bomb.
- **Usaid alias Zainal Arifin alias Suwarso alias Saklo**, suspected of involvement in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Mataram, Lombok, together with Dul Matin. Native of Karanganyar, Solo, he married a woman from Bima, Sumbawa and reportedly died in Maluku. According to the interrogation of al-Ghozi, it was he who recruited al-Ghozi into JI, together with another man known as Jamaluddin (however, al-Ghozi depositions always mix fact and fiction).
- **Muhammad Daeng Lao alias Abu Urwah**, head of the military committee for Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, arrested in December 2002 bombings in Makassar.
- **Kahar Mustafa**, provided explosives for the Makassar bombings.
- **Syarifuddin alias Abu Jamiah**, commander of the military wing of a Makassar-based organisation, Wahdah Islamiyah.
- **Basir alias Abu Mukhlisun**, Ngruki graduate, Afghanistan veteran, instructor in Mindanao.

6. The last three-year class entered in 1991 and “graduated” in 1994. There were also many JI members who trained for shorter periods between 1993 and 1995. The training shifted to Mindanao sometime in 1996.

The following people left for Afghanistan in 1991:

- **Umar Besar alias Abdul Ghoni**, involved in the Bali bombings.
- **Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra alias Kudama**, key figure in several JI actions; stayed seven months only.
- **Suheimi**, detained in Malaysia in December 2001, alleged member of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM).
- **Jamsari**, detained in Malaysia.
- **Agus**, detained in Singapore, in Afghanistan for full three years.
- **Abdul Razak alias Farouk**, detained in Malaysia, completed three years.
- **Samsudin**, detained in Malaysia.
- **Moh. Jauhari bin Abdullah**, detained in Singapore, stayed five months.
- **Abdul Yusuf alias Dadang Suratman** born West Java, permanent resident of Malaysia, stayed five months in Afghanistan.
- **Abbas**, father of Hasyim, father-in-law of Mukhlas.
- **Hasyim bin Abbas**, Singaporean, stayed in Afghanistan five months.
- **Halim bin Hussein**, Singaporean, joined jihad in Maluku in 2000.
- **Sarjiyo alias Sawwad** arrested April 2003, involved in 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in Mojokerto, East Java.
Aris Munandar of KOMPAK-Solo, a Ngruki alumnus and classmate of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, producer of recruiting videos on Ambon and Poso.

Asep alias Darwin, involved in Atrium Mall bombing.

Muhajir, younger brother of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, involved in Mojokerto bombings with Sarjiyo, above.

A few non-Indonesians associated with JI were still arriving in Afghanistan from 1993 to 1995. They included:

Mas Slamet Kastari, head of the Singapore wakalah, who went in 1993; Zulkarnaen was still head of the academy at the time. The arrivals also included a group of Singaporeans, all now detained, who went for between two and nine months in 1994.33

Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani, the Malaysian injured in and arrested for the bombing of the Atrium shopping mall in Jakarta in August 2001.

Taufik has a particularly interesting history in Afghanistan, not only because he was one of the last arrivals before the Taliban took power, but also because he moved among at least three different camps. If his interrogation deposition is accurate, he arrived in Pakistan in 1993. In April 1994, he moved to “Camp Taibah” in Kunar for two weeks of firearms training. This may have been a camp set up by a Pakistani group called Markaz Da’wat-ul Irshad, which in 1993 established an armed wing, the Lashkar-i-Tayyeba, that is one of the groups since active in the violence in Kashmir. But one of its training camps was in Kunar and designed to train mujahidin from around the world.34

In August 1995, he moved to Khost (exact location not clear) for three months of artillery training, then to Camp Khaldan, the most famous of the al-Qaeda camps, for two weeks of anti-tank training. He was arrested on his return to Pakistan in February 1996 for not having proper travel documentation but he was released in October and returned to Malaysia.35

The shift to training in the Philippines in 1996 did not mean severing connections with Afghanistan. In 1998, JI paid for Mas Slamet bin Kastari and Jafar bin Mistooki from Singapore to visit Afghanistan for a month to look at the Taliban system of government. They returned home, deeply impressed.

At the beginning of 1999, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana and Hambali accompanied two Malaysian men, Zaini and Zamzuri, to Kandahar; Faiz and Hambali returned to Malaysia after two weeks, leaving the Malaysians for additional military training.36 Also in 1999, Singaporean Khalim bin Jaffar returned to Afghanistan for training, where he met Mohamed Atef, the late al-Qaeda military commander.37

In June 1999, Zulkarnaen called a meeting of the Afghan alumni, at an Islamic institute in Solo, his home base, at which he reminded them not to forget that they had gone for training in order to wage jihad. It was at this meeting that some of the early and later alumni appear to have met one another and joined forces.38

From April to August 2000, Hambali arranged for firearms and explosives training for Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan; Agus; Amran alias Henry bin Mansur (involved in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Batam); and Jafar bin Mistooki. At the same time, Dr Azahari, one of those wanted in the Bali bombings, was given special explosives training.

33 Mahfudz, Sobrani, H. Ibrahim bin Maidi, Moh. Nazir bin Mohammed Uthman alias Hameed, Mohamed Ellias (also seen as Elyas and Ilyas) alias Moh. Khan alias Deedat, Moh. Khalim bin Jaffar (Singaporean of Javanese descent), Rafi alias Yusuf, Husaini alias Iqbal, Syahrudi, and Rasyid.
35 Berita Acara Pemeriksaan Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dany, 27 November 2002, p.3
36 Interrogation deposition of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, 22 October 2002, in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
38 Interrogation deposition of Ali Imron in Abdul Jabar case, 26 February 2003. Ali Imron says the meeting took place before the violence in Ambon broke out, but in fact it was afterwards. A source from Indonesia’s National Intelligence Agency said the group was known as G272 to reflect the fact that there were 272 Afghan veterans in all. See “Bomb organisers fought in Afghanistan”, The Age, 3 December 2002.
By May 1996, Sungkar and some of the Afghan veterans had consolidated the structure of Jemaah Islamiyah and documented it in a book, General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah Struggle, that prosecutors invariably refer to by its Indonesian acronym, PUPJI.39

At the apex of the JI structure sits the amir, a position then held Abdullah Sungkar.40 Beneath him are four councils, a governing council (majelis qiyadah), a religious council (majelis syuro), a fatwa council, and a disciplinary council (majelis hisbah), all appointed by the amir and subject to his control. The governing council is headed by a central command (qiyyadah markaziyyah) that in turn exerts authority over the leaders of the four mantiqis and the heads of the wakalahs.41

The division into four mantiqis may have reflected the need to change gears as JI moved out of Afghanistan. Mantiqi I covered Singapore and Malaysia and was seen as providing the economic wherewithal for JI operations; Hambali was its head until early 2002, according to the testimony of detained JI members, when he was replaced by Mukhlas. Mantiqi II covered most of Indonesia and was considered the target of jihad efforts; it was reportedly led by Abdullah Anshori, alias Abu Fatih, who remains at large. Mantiqi III covered Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi and was responsible for training. It was led by Mustopa, the man arrested in a raid in mid-July 2003 outside Jakarta. Mantiqi IV, covering Papua and Australia, was responsible for fund-raising and was led by a man called Abdul Rohim. Hambali was the overall head of the mantiqis, according to one of the Singapore JI detainees.42

The mantiqis and their subdivisions have usually been described as a territorially-based administrative structure. Thus, the mantiqis were equivalent to regions, wakalah to districts, and so on, down to the fiyah or cells.

But ICG learned that it is probably more appropriate to think of JI as a military structure, befitting a guerrilla army, with brigades (mantiqi); battalions (wakalah); companies (khatibah); platoons (qirdas); and squads (fiyah). The size of the central command is not known but it includes Zulkarnaen and Afghanistan veteran Mustaqim and included Mukhlas, Mustopa and Abu Rusdan before their arrests.

JI also has a special operations unit, Laskar Khos, that came to public attention after the August 2003 Marriott bombing in Jakarta. Indonesian police said that Asmar Latin Sani, whose severed head was found on the fifth floor of the hotel, could have been a suicide bomber belonging to Laskar Khos. Indonesian police sources also reported that Mustopa, arrested in mid-July, had confessed to leading Laskar Khos, although if, as was reported, he only commanded about fifteen men, it may be that he was head of a sub-unit.43 ICG understands that Zulkarnaen, JI’s military chief, as the overall commander, has ultimate control over special operations.

Wan Min hinted at a special operations unit when he told police interrogators that even as a wakalah head he never knew plans for specific actions:

The jihad operations were run by a special team that was not directly connected with wakalah activities. These were all done in secret, and even though I was head of wakalah Johor, I wasn’t part of the operations team. The details of the jihad operations were never explained to me. If my people were needed, I was only told that certain personnel were going to be used, I wasn’t told for what purpose. This was to protect security.44

His testimony suggests that the special operations unit is not a suicide brigade per se, although suicide bombers have been systematically recruited into JI.

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39 Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah is the full title.
40 This was the position Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is said to have assumed in 1999, upon Sungkar’s death. He, in turn, was said to have been replaced as amir in late 2002 by Thoriquddin alias Abu Rusdan, arrested in Kudus in April 2003.
41 Bab III (Chapter 3), Tandhim (Organisation), PUPJI, as described by Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana in interrogation deposition, 13 December 2002.
42 Interrogation deposition of Hashim bin Abbas, 13 December 2002.
44 Interrogation deposition of Wan Min bin Wan Mat, 11 March 2003.
Hasyim Abbas, a JI member detained in Singapore, admitted being a member of JI’s special forces in 2000 at the same time that he was a military trainer, head of a qirdas, head of a fiah, and member of the leadership council of the Singapore wakalah.

The small group of field commanders continually recycled for JI bombings (see Appendix B) suggests that those commanders are by definition members of the special forces, since bombings are the kind of jihad operations mentioned by Wan Min. JI may have deliberately kept the membership limited. But it could also be that JI prefers to use experienced members as field commanders where it can, but has reserves that it can deploy as necessary.

The size and nature of Laskar Khos remains murky, however. One source told ICG that each fiah has below it a khos unit whose men report directly to the Laskar Khos commander. This would make the number of special forces much greater than ten or fifteen, especially when suicide bombers are added.

Responsibility for recruitment of the latter reportedly rests with senior Afghanistan veterans, who each try to meet a set target. Those recruited, who are mostly, but not exclusively, from conflict areas such as Poso, are given two months special training (tadrib) before being deployed. Not everyone is a likely candidate, however: JI looks for people who are already “ripe”, who have shown all the traits necessary but need a little extra reinforcement. Those selected need not be JI members; some Darul Islam members outside the JI structure have reportedly been trained as well.

While it is difficult to estimate the number trained thus far, ICG believes that suicide bombers have probably been involved not just in the Bali and Marriott operations, but in the December 2002 Makassar attack as well.45

While the JI structure may have been designed to meet the needs of a guerrilla group, the commanders at different levels clearly had non-military tasks as well. Some of the detained JI suspects from Malaysia told their interrogators that they took part in regular bimonthly meetings of the wakalah heads, who were responsible for collecting what amounted to a 5 per cent personal income tax. Wan Min describes his tasks as wakalah leader as administrative and religious:

My tasks after I replaced Muchlas were to give religious training to members via usroh;46 run the education program at Luqmanul Hakiem, run the dakwah [propaganda] program and recruit new members; and give a training program for new members.

Under Mantiqi I, there were active wakalaths in Singapore, Johor, Selangor/Kuala Lumpur, and Negeri Sembilan by 1996. In Indonesia, there were reportedly wakalaths in Jakarta, Medan, Pekanbaru, Lampung, Solo, Surabaya, Menado, Makassar, Poso/Palu, East Kalimantan, and Nusa Tenggara Barat.

Hashim bin Abbas, one of the Singapore JI detainees, told investigators that each subdivision had its own name. For example, he was a member of Wakalah Umar al Chatab in Singapore. It supervised two qirdas, Jibril dan and Mika’il. Under Qirdas Mika’il were three cells, named Hud, Ismail, and Daud.47

In addition to its description of the administrative structure of JI, the PUPJI manual also contains guidelines for recruiting new members and establishing relations with other organisations. According to the former, anyone can be a member of JI who is Muslim; subscribes to salafi principles, practices a pure form of Islam devoid of corruption or innovation (bid‘ah), and takes an oath administered by the amir or someone he so designates.48 There is thus in theory a clear means of distinguishing who is a formal JI member and who is not.

But JI’s network goes far beyond its formal members. According to Chapter XIV of PUPJI, JI can work with any other jamaah islamiyah – Islamic community – as long as it shares the same principles and goals. Any leader of a mantiqi or wakalah can establish relations with other

45 ICG interview, August 2003. On 4 August 2003, a bomb went off prematurely in Poso, Central Sulawesi, killing the bomber, but the man in question was reportedly a suicide bomber who may have been preparing an action at the time the accident occurred.

46 Usroh, meaning family, is the term given to small groups living strictly by Islamic principles.


48 Bab X (Chapter 10), Keanggotaan (Membership) in PUPJI, as described in interrogation deposition of Jafaar bin Mistooki, 13 December 2002.
organisations with the permission of the amir, and any JI member can work with another organisation with the approval of his mantiqi or wakalah leader. The groundwork was thus laid for establishing working relations with al-Qaeda on the one hand, and the MILF and Abu Sayyaf on the other, as well as for providing training to like-minded organisations in other parts of Indonesia.

It is only by understanding these alliances and the way they can be formed at many different levels that JI’s real nature can be assessed. For example, one source told ICG that JI was strongest in Central Java, East Java, and Lampung, where its members were far more numerous than, for example, in West Java, the homeland of the Darul Islam rebellion. But it turns out that in West Java, JI works closely with different factions of Darul Islam, whose leaders have a collegial relationship with JI counterparts and send their recruits to be trained by JI instructors though they operate outside JI control.

The same is true in South Sulawesi, where JI-affiliated organisations have been active but decision-making for jihad operations often takes place outside the JI command. The key organisation there is the Makassar-based Wahdah Islamiyah, some of whose members were involved in the Makassar bombings of 5 December 2002.

IV. THE MAKASSAR BOMBS

Just after sunset on 5 December 2002, the last day of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month, two bombs went off in Makassar. One exploded at a McDonald’s restaurant in the Ratu Indah shopping mall, killing a bomber and two patrons; another caused no loss of life but wrecked the showroom of a car dealership owned by Yusuf Kalla, the Indonesian government’s Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare, who had brokered a peace agreement – the Malino accords – to end the communal conflict between Muslims and Christians in Poso, Central Sulawesi.

With the Bali bombings still fresh in everyone’s mind, there was instant suspicion of JI. What emerged, however, was a much more complicated story. The perpetrators proved to be members of two South Sulawesi-based organisations, Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundullah, which cooperated with JI and may even have been modelled after it but were completely independent in terms of leadership. The fact that both appeared to have a largely local membership meant that recruiters could appeal to ethnic and regional pride without losing sight of jihadist aims.

A key figure in Wahdah Islamiyah is Syawal Yasin, who, as noted above, was in the first group of Indonesians sent to the Sayyaf camp in Afghanistan, together with Zulkarnaen. Like Zulkarnaen, he became an instructor of all Indonesians who followed, until the training in Afghanistan ended. The secretary-general of Wahdah Islamiyah was Muchtar Daeng Lao alias Abu Urwah, now in custody for the Makassar bombings. He was in the 1991 class of Indonesians in Afghanistan with Imam Samudra, and he trained with Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi in Torkham.

Both Wahdah Islamiyah and Laskar Jundullah appear to have had their own contact and communication with al-Qaeda operatives, probably dating from the Afghanistan years.

There are thus personal, historical, ideological and religious bonds linking Wahdah Islamiyah to JI but it is a separate organisation, and the Makassar bombings appear to have been conducted without much, if any, consultation with the JI leadership.

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49 Ibid.
50 ICG interview, August 2003.
A. WAHDAH ISLAMIYAH

That said, it is worth examining how the two organisations linked up. Wahdah Islamiyah was established in 1989, around the time that Hambali was completing his training in Afghanistan. Its original name was Yayasan Fatul Muin (The Fatul Muin Foundation), and it was founded by a man named Faturahman Daemugading alias Fatul Muin, who had been active in the Darul Islam rebellion under Kahar Muzakkar.

Two prominent members from the beginning were Syawal Yasin, operating from the religious school Pesantren Darul Aman in Gombara, Makassar, and Agus Dwikarna, the man arrested in March 2003 in Manila on charges of possessing of explosives.

Around 1992, Yayasan Fatul Muin changed its name to the Institute for Education and the Development of Islamic Propagation and the Economy (Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pengembangan Dakwah dan Ekonomi), better known as LP2DE. The name suggested an ordinary NGO. In fact, it was a military organisation, set up by Afghanistan returnees to train local recruits for jihad.

Around 1996, with the return to Makassar from the Middle East of a Muslim scholar named Zaitun Rasmin, the organisation changed its name again, to Wahdah Islamiyah, and became the driving force behind the salafi movement in South Sulawesi.

Wahdah Islamiyah seems to have adopted a structure very similar to that laid out in the PUPJI book for JI. Officially, Syawal Yasin was chief of staff of its military department from 1996 to 2000, reporting to the commander (amir muaskar), a man named Syarifuddin alias Abu Jamiah, also an Afghanistan veteran. Muchtar Daeng Lao was secretary-general in charge of military affairs, apparently the equivalent of a defence secretary.

But Syawal also appears to have maintained his own mujahidin network, separate from Wahdah Islamiyah. Some of the suspects in the Makassar bombings, for example, thought of themselves as members of Laskar Ustadz Syawal (Syawal’s militia). That militia extended, and perhaps still extends, through South Sulawesi, with the equivalent of wakalahs and subdivisions in Pinrang, Bone, Takalar and Enrekang.

Maintaining his own jihadist network would be consistent with Syawal’s reputation for safeguarding his authority. Although he had married the stepdaughter of Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s founder, he reportedly never formally joined JI because he did not want to defer to another amir. It may also be that just as Wahdah Islamiyah worked closely with JI but had a separate identity, Syawal worked both as part of Wahdah Islamiyah and on his own.

Syawal appears to have been instrumental in setting up training in Mindanao for recruits from Sulawesi – most of those involved in the Makassar bombings trained in the Philippines in 1997 and were met on arrival by both Syawal and Agus Dwikarna. As one of the longest-serving Indonesians in Afghanistan and one of the Sayyaf camp’s most popular instructors, he was also reportedly the first point of contact when al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq came to Indonesia from the southern Philippines in 1998.

After the conflict in Ambon broke out in January 1999, Wahdah Islamiyah split into two factions, one led by Zaitun Rasmin, the other by Agus Dwikarna, backed by Muchtar Daeng Lao and Syawal Yasin. The Zaitun faction said that the conflict was between kafir (infidels) and musyrik (idolaters), and Muslims did not need to defend musyrik. The Dwikarna-Daeng Lao faction argued

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51 It is extraordinarily difficult to pin down exact dates for the various metamorphoses of Wahdah Islamiyah: different sources given different years, and while ICG tried to determine the most credible, there is still room for error.

52 Muchtar Daeng Lao told interrogators that the general goals of LP2DE were to train soldiers and commanders, to produce mujahidin, to study military strategy, and to produce military experts in an Islamic context. The specific goals were to “restore enthusiasm for jihad”, to set up a communications forum among like-minded jihadists, “condition” Muslim brothers for jihad, and to become a means of transmitting the experience of the older generation of mujahidin to a younger generation. Interrogation of Muchtar Daeng Lao, 6 December 2002, p. 10.

53 Interrogation of Muchtar Daeng Lao, 6 December 2002.

54 Interrogation deposition of Ilham Riadi, 13 December 2002.

55 In Pinrang, the cells are reportedly in Pare-Pare, Polman, and Mamuju. The cells in Bone are in Sopeng, Sinjai, Pangkep, and Barru. In Takalar, they are in Jeneponto, Bantaeng, and Bulukumba. In Enrekang, they are in Tanah Toraja, Luwu, and Wajo.

56 ICG interview, June 2003.

57 ICG interview, Menado, April 2003.
that it was the duty of mujahidin to help Muslims regardless of the impurity of their practices.

It was after this split that Agus Dwikarna and those around him established Laskar Jundullah as a militia separate from Wahdah Islamiyah. Officially, Laskar Jundullah was the security arm of KPPSI, a Makassar-based organisation committed to the establishment of Islamic law in Sulawesi. In reality, it was a military force apparently established with the help of al-Qaeda, including al-Faruq.

According to a copy of a confidential report obtained by ICG, Laskar Jundullah by 2002 had established six “divisions”, with a goal of reaching a maximum strength of 2,000 men. The actual numbers were fewer, but the aim was to have divisions in Lompo Batang, Bau Kacang, Lati Mojong, Pasang Kayu, and Sulawesi Tenggara. Like JI, it also reportedly had a special operations unit.

The top figures in Laskar Jundullah were Dwikarna, Aziz Kahar Muzakkar, the head of KPPSI, Agung Hamid, who became the chief operative in the Makassar bombings and remains at large, Syarifuddin alias Abu Jamiah, who had commanded Wahdah Islamiyah’s military wing, and Hisbullah Rasyid, who was also involved in the Makassar bombings and helped arrange Omar al-Faruq’s identification documents in Makassar.

The communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso grew worse in 2000-2001, the number of al-Qaeda operatives in Sulawesi reportedly increased. But in an interesting example of the difficulties of keeping a united front, the Indonesians and Arabs reportedly fell out. Agus Dwikarna is said to have become dissatisfied with the al-Qaeda operatives because they kept interfering in internal Indonesian affairs, made no effort to understand the local political context, and their carelessness reportedly led to the Americans finding video documentation and other incriminating evidence in Afghanistan. The Indonesians chafed at efforts by the Arabs to impose a model for jihad that was at odds with what they believed would work in their country.

Laskar Jundullah reached its peak strength and influence during the Poso conflict in central Sulawesi.

B. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE BOMBING

A combination of U.S. actions in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 and later its plans for Iraq, as well as the signing of the Malino peace accords to end the Poso conflict in December 2001 set the stage for the Makassar bombings.

They were planned at a meeting during the first week of October 2002, before the Bali attack, at the home of Agung Hamid, a Laskar Jundullah leader who remains a fugitive. Those present, in addition to Agung Hamid, were Muchtar Daeng Lao, who had been introduced to his host through Agus Dwikarna in 2000; Hisbullah Rasyid, Anthon, and Ilham Riyadi, all of whom had met at the second congress of KPPSI in December 2002; and Masnur, Usman, and Dahlan, three members of Wahdah Islamiyah who had known each other since 1996-97.

According to those present, Agung Hamid raised the possibility of several targets. They included a Kentucky Fried Chicken outlet, the McDonald’s in the Ratu Indah Mall, and the automobile showroom, all in Makassar; a Christian cemetery in Toraja, a largely Christian area of northern South Sulawesi; a church in Toraja; a tower belonging to PT Inco, a Canadian-Indonesian nickel mine, in East Luwu, South Sulawesi, and an American-managed diving resort popular with foreign tourists in the Una-Unna islands in central Sulawesi.

The group decided on the McDonald’s and the showroom. The former was instantly recognisable as an American brand, and the planning was taking place at a time when many of the more conservative organisations were trying to organise a boycott of American products because of the threats of war against Iraq. The showroom was chosen because of the Sulawesi group’s unhappiness with the Malino accords, although it is not clear whether the discontent was with the agreement itself, which greatly reduced the possibility for using Central Sulawesi as a focus of jihad, or with the central government’s failure to implement some provisions.

59 Laporan Telaahan, 10 March 2002.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Interrogation deposition of Suryadi Mas’ud, 19 December 2002.
Agung Hamid selected the people for the mission, including Ashar Daeng Salam alias Aco, whose death caused serious tension between JI and Wahdah Islamiyah. He was reportedly recruited and trained as a suicide bomber by JI but “stolen” by Agung Hamid.63

V. TRAINING IN MINDANAO

As the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, Abdullah Sungkar made a decision, probably in 1995, to go through the MILF to set up training facilities in Mindanao. The Philippines were closer and cheaper than Afghanistan, and with funding from Sayyaf and the Rabitah at least temporarily unavailable, the training would have to be funded out of JI’s own resources.64 For start-up money, Sungkar asked the Singapore and Malaysia wakalah to contribute 20,000 Malaysian ringgit (RM) each (about U.S.$5,200).65 The arrangement with the MILF was probably made possible by personal ties. Sungkar was close to MILF leader Salamat Hasyim; so, reportedly, was Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi.66 (One of the suspects arrested for the 4 March 2003 bombing of Davao Airport in Mindanao, himself a member of the Abu Sayyaf Group, told his interrogators that the MILF and JI “had a standing agreement wherein the MILF will accommodate JI fighters in the former’s camps and in return, JI will help MILF guerrillas in conducting bombings in any targeted area until such time that Mindanao can attain its independence”.67)

It was probably an added advantage that there are at least 7,000 Indonesians in Mindanao, many there for generations and some traders who regularly cross between the Philippines and Indonesia through the Sangihe-Talaud islands, off the tip of

63 ICG interview, April 2003.

64 Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana testifies that at the beginning of 1998, Hambali asked him to transfer RM20,000 [$5,200] via Maybank in Malaysia to al-Ghozi at Camp Abu Bakar to fund operational activities. Faiz also levied a fee on JI members in Malaysia to purchase arms for the Mindanao training. He says he raised RM40,000 [U.S.$10,400] in this way and gave it to Hambali. In 2002, he says he transferred another RM20,000 from the Bank Simpanan Nasional in Malaysia to Sabah, where a man named Sulaiman took it out in cash and brought it to Camp Abu Bakar. Interrogation deposition dated 13 December 2002, p.15, in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.

65 Interrogation deposition of Hashim bin Abas alias Osman alias Rudy alias Moh Nuh alias Atan, 10 November 2002, p. 4 in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. He remembers the instruction as coming in 1997 or 1998, but it was clearly earlier.

66 Apparently every year during the haj in Mecca, there would be an informal meeting of mujahidin leaders from around the world, and this is where Sungkar and Hashim met regularly.

North Sulawesi.\textsuperscript{68} This meant that Indonesians would have no difficulty blending in, and there was a possible support structure in key transit points like General Santos City.

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was given responsibility for getting the training up and running, according to some of the Afghanistan veterans, but he only arrived in the Philippines in December 1996 – at least according to his own highly unreliable testimony.

Others had come earlier. For example, Sardjiyo alias Sawad, a man suspected of involvement in many JI bombings, told interrogators that following the completion of his training at the Sayyaf camp in 1995, he went directly to the Philippines from Afghanistan, changing planes in Kuala Lumpur and Manila, before finally arriving at Camp Abu Bakar. He says he stayed for two years in the MILF camp, fighting the Philippines armed forces.\textsuperscript{69}

Wan Min, a Bali bomb suspect, also testified that he was sent to Camp Abu Bakar for two months in 1996 while construction of JI facilities was still underway, and that the JI training there did not really begin in earnest until 1997.

\section*{A. Camp Hudaibiyah}

JI had its own Camp Hudaibiyah in a remote corner of the sprawling Abu Bakar complex, near the border with Lanao del Sur. The aim was to replicate the Afghanistan training as far as possible, with many of the same instructors: Afghanistan veterans Muchlas, al-Ghozi, Mustopa, Mustaqim, Mohamad Qital, and Syawal all went to Mindanao as teachers. An Indonesian named Muhajir alias Idris was also a trainer, and Haris alias Ahmad, an Indonesian resident in Selangor and member of Mantiqi I, coordinated the scheduling.\textsuperscript{70} MILF trainers also taught the recruits.

The regular JI program was three years for training new instructors, six months for regular “cadets”, but JI only managed to get in two groups of the three-year students before Camp Abu Bakar was overrun by the Philippines military in 2000. The military aspects of the six-month course included weapons training, demolition and bombing, map reading, guerrilla and infantry tactics (raids, ambushes, and the like), field engineering, leadership, and self-defence. The religion curriculum provided instruction in basic law, traditions of the Prophet, faith (\textit{aqidah}), worship (\textit{ibadah}), proselytisation (\textit{dakwah}), and, of course, jihad.

Non-JI members could take a one-year instructors’ course or a four-month short course, and many recruits opted for the latter. One young Javanese described the difference between the two courses as follows:

\begin{quote}
In four months, we only got an introduction to bombs and guns and lessons on how to use them, whereas at the academy level, people were trained how to make them.\textsuperscript{71}
\end{quote}

It is not clear how many Indonesians went through Camp Hudaibiyah, but there may have been several hundred. Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana told investigators that at the time he went to Camp Hudaibiyah in June 1998 for firearms instruction, there were twenty other Indonesian “cadets” undergoing training.\textsuperscript{72}

Information made available to ICG shows that in one course that lasted from May 1999 to February 2000, the firearms class was divided into three groups of eleven men each, all apparently Indonesians. The trainers included Abdul Hadi, Abu Bakar, Abdul Mukosid, and “Mr Benji” (almost certainly MILF leader Benji Midtimbang), the head of the Bedis Military Academy, the MILF’s training school within Camp Abu Bakar.\textsuperscript{73}

Just as the military academy in Afghanistan had been divided into \textit{qabilah}, the JI training in Mindanao was divided into Camp Solo (for recruits from Central Java), Camp Banten (for recruits from West Java) and Camp Sulawesi, also known as Muaskar al-Fateh.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{68} Communication with Indonesian consulate in Davao, Philippines, 2 July 2003.
\item\textsuperscript{69} Interrogation deposition of Sarjiyo alias Sawad alias Zaenal Abidin alias Ibrahim, 23 April 2003. Sarjiyo is suspected of involvement in the bombing of the Philippine ambassador’s residence in Jakarta, the Mojokerto Christmas Eve bombing, and the Bali bombing, as well as smuggling arms from the Philippines to Indonesia (twice) in 2000 and 2001.
\item\textsuperscript{70} Interrogation deposition of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, 22 October 2002, in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir.
\item\textsuperscript{71} Interrogation deposition of Joko Ardiyanto alias Luluk Sumaryono, 19 July 2003.
\item\textsuperscript{72} Interrogation deposition of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, 13 December 2002, p. 15.
\item\textsuperscript{73} ICG interview Manado, April 2003.
\end{itemize}
Each appeared to operate somewhat independently, especially in terms of the logistics for recruiting new mujahidin, taking them to Mindanao from Indonesia, and getting them back.

Camp Solo was pure JI, with links to both Pondok Ngruki and Pesantren al-Islam, the school associated with the family of Amrozi, the Bali bombing suspect.

The Sulawesi and Banten camps each drew on networks that were, for the most part, independent of JI.

Training in Mindanao continued after Camp Abu Bakar was attacked by the Philippine army in 2000. Two of the men arrested by the Indonesian police in July 2003 in connection with the discovery of a JI weapons cache in Semarang, for example, had trained in the Philippines in 2001. They described Camp Hudaibiyah as then consisting of numerous smaller camps, with largely Filipino instructors. Instead of training with 30 at a time as their predecessors did, they trained with only five or six, often a mixture of Indonesians and Malaysians.

B. THE SOLO NETWORK

One of the important recruiters for Mindanao training was Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, who at the time of his arrest in connection with the Bali bombings was a teacher at Pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan, East Java, the hometown of Amrozi. Mubarok was a 1989 Ngruki graduate and testified that he had been inducted into the group, then not yet called JI, in that year by Abdul Rochim at Ngruki by swearing an oath of loyalty to the amir. In 1990, he went to Afghanistan in the same group as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a Ngruki classmate. He would have been with al-Ghozi at the Torkham camp that included MILF fighters. In 1994, after returning from Afghanistan, Mubarok appears to have spent some time in Malaysia. He testified that he took another oath of allegiance to Abdullah Sungkar as amir in front of Zulkarnaen in Pahang, Malaysia in 1994.

In 1998, Mubarok reappeared in Menado, North Sulawesi, according to his own testimony, but it is not clear when he moved there or why. He testified that sometime that year he met Mustopa, the head of Mantiqi III covering East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sabah, and Mindanao. Mustopa went over the contents of PUPJI with him and appointed him head of the Menado wakalah. He told prosecutors that he did not do very much in that role – merely asked members to contribute 2.5 per cent of their income to the organisation as infaq and held a few swimming lessons on the beach at Malalayang. This is unlikely to be a straightforward account because Mubarok – and Menado – figure prominently in JI activities.

Later in 1998, he was asked (apparently by Zulkarnaen) to take seventeen recruits from Java to Camp Hudaibiyah for training. He taught religion there for one semester, from October 1998 to March 1999. He was also involved in five separate arms smuggling initiatives between 1999 and 2001, bringing weapons from General Santos City in Mindanao through the Sangihe-Talaud islands off the coast of North Sulawesi to Menado. Funds for the training came from JI-Malaysia; funds for the arms came directly from Zulkarnaen.

Mubarok’s main contact in Sangihe-Talaud was a fisherman named Sardjono Gabriel, from the village of Peta on Sangihe island. Sardjono had a brother-in-law named Jaelani who had joined the MNLF in the Philippines in 1973. In 1979, he was arrested by police in Sangihe-Talaud together with 25 other Filipinos, carrying an arsenal of rifles, grenades, and ammunition. It is not clear what happened to Jaelani and the other fighters, but this seems to have been Sardjono’s introduction to arms smuggling.

It is also unclear how or when Mubarok linked up with Sardjono, but in 1997, a Filipino named Haji Bial, who appears to have been a source of funds for

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74 The weapons cache was extraordinary: 1,000 non-electronic detonators, 25 electronic detonators, 30 sacks of potassium chlorate, each weighing 30 kilograms, other materials for making explosives, 19,000 5.6 mm bullets, and smaller quantities of other bullets. See “Laboratorium Perakit Bob di Semarang”, Tempo, 27 July 2003.

75 Interrogation deposition of Joko Ardiyanto, op. cit., interrogation deposition of Suyatno alias Heru Setiawan bin Imam Hakim, 16 July 2003. Two others arrested at the same time trained in Mindanao in 2000.

76 This presumably would have been a faction of Darul Islam, but Pamungkas does not say so explicitly.


78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 ICG interview, Menado, April 2003.
military training in Mindanao, stopped by Sardjono’s house. Not long afterward, Mubarok helped Sardjono purchase a boat that became the main means for taking recruits from Java across to Mindanao and bringing arms back. Mubarok helped Sardjono enrol his son, Syaiful Gabriel, in the Lamongan pesantren where Mubarok himself ended up as a religious teacher, after leaving Menado.

The arrest of four Javanese alumni of Mindanao in July 2003 sheds some additional light on the nature of recruitment for the Philippines. Machmudi Hariono alias Yusuf left for Camp Hudaibiyah in February 2000. Yusuf was then 24 and working in an auto repair shop in Jombang, East Java. He had learned about the possibility of getting jihad training from friends at Pesantren al-Islam, Lamongan, who told him to contact a man named Fahim, the director of the Darussalam Institute in Surabaya, who appears to have had close ties to Mustopa, the head of Mantiqi III.

Yusuf arranged his own passport, and Fahim arranged his travel. Instead of travelling through Menado, the way the earlier recruits had, Yusuf and four others went to Nunukan, East Kalimantan, crossed by boat to Tawao in Sabah, Malaysia, then on to Sandakan, Malaysia where they got a ferry to Zamboanga. From there they went to Cotabato and on to Camp Hudaibiyah. From the start of their journey, they had guides apparently all arranged by Fahim.

Yusuf told police that on arrival in Camp Hudaibiyah, he was given a new name, as were the others, that he was known by from that point on. He trained with about twenty others, a mixture of Indonesians from Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Java, and Filipinos. Yusuf only returned to Indonesia in May 2002. He did not say, and police did not ask, whether the entire time was spent at Camp Hudaibiyah, although that is highly unlikely. (He may have taken part in operations with the MILF as some of his fellow recruits did.)

When he left the Philippines, a guide took him to Malaysia, and he waited somewhere along the Indonesian-Malaysian border. The guide was operating under Mustopa’s instructions and gave Yusuf a card with an address in Kudus to which he was to go. The address proved to be the home of a friend of Mustopa’s, and Mustopa himself frequently visited. Yusuf apparently returned from the Philippines to be directly under Mustopa’s command.

Not only did Mustopa arrange the Kudus accommodation; he also arranged employment for Yusuf as a soap peddler, providing the goods for Yusuf to sell. Eventually, on Mustopa’s orders, Yusuf moved to Semarang, to the house that Mustopa eventually used as a JI explosives and ammunition depot.

From the interrogation depositions of the four Mindanao alumni, it does not appear that they went through a rigorous selection process, unlike some of the earlier recruits. It does seem, however, as though the all-expenses-paid training created an obligatory period of service to JI afterwards.

C. THE SULAWESI NETWORK

The Sulawesi network went to Mindanao through Wahdah Islamiyah. One of the first groups to leave for Mindanao after the JI camp was set up was led by Suryadi Mas’ud, who would later be arrested in connection with the Makassar bombings.

Suryadi, born in Makassar in 1972, became involved with Wahdah Islamiyah as early as 1990. In 1992 he dropped out from the mechanics technology faculty of Hasanuddin University, the local state university, and began to devote more time to Islamic activities. In April 1997 Suryadi left for Camp Abu Bakar with four others – Hasta, and three of the Makassar bombing suspects: Dahlan, Usman, and Hizbullah Rashid.

They left from Makassar for Bitung, in North Sulawesi, accompanied by a man named Kahar Mustafa, also later involved in the Makassar bombing, whose main role was that of “courier” –

81 One of these arms shipments was discovered in the woods near Lamongan after the Bali bombings.
82 Mubarok was arrested together with Ali Imron on an island near Samarinda, East Kalimantan, in January 2003.
83 All of the information about Yusuf comes from his interrogation deposition, 18 July 2003.
84 In his testimony in the Abu Bakar Ba’asyir case, Suryadi said that he knew Hizbullah Rashid and met him for the first time at Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar in 1990.
85 Hizbullah, a well-known document fixer, became better known as the man who got Omar al-Faruq a passport in Makassar. Usman had taken part in a six-month training session in Mindanao in 1989 and then reportedly went to Afghanistan for more of the same. “Pesan Osama di Balik Bom”, Gatra, 21 December 2002, p. 82.
taking recruits back and forth to Mindanao. Kahar was an Afghanistan veteran, in the same class as Muchtar Daeng Lao.

From Bitung, the group went by ship to Davao, where they were met by Syawal and Agus Dwikarna, then on to Cotabato. They stayed one night there at a pesantren, then continued to Camp Abu Bakar, together with a man, Syarifuddin, who almost certainly was the same Syarifuddin who commanded the Wahdah Islamiyah military forces.

They were not the first Indonesians to reach the camp since Muchtar Daeng Lao was already there. Suryadi and the others underwent training for six months – one of their instructors was Omar al-Faruq – then stayed on another month to help with the training of eight new recruits who had arrived from Sulawesi.

In December 1997, Suryadi returned to Indonesia with two men from Solo named Abdullah and Muaz, and a Filipino named Hussen. They went from Burias, General Santos City, using a traditional boat and landed at Nanusa Island in the Sangihe-Talaud archipelago. The village head of Nanusa became suspicious, and their bags were inspected. Police found that Abdullah and Muaz were carrying 66 detonators for bombs, and they were detained for a night. They managed to make an “arrangement” with the police, however, and the next day continued to Peta, the village where the Solo group’s chief source of transport, Sardjono Gabriel, lived. It later turned out that the 66 detonators had been intended for a major operation in North Sulawesi.

Suryadi’s group stayed with Sardjono for a night, then continued to Tahuna, the main town on Sangihe island, before going on to Menado. Suryadi and Hussen left the Solo men in Menado and continued on to Makassar.

Upon his return, Suryadi was asked by Syawal and Agus Dwikarna of Wahdah Islamiyah to take over Kahar Mustafa’s position as “courier” for Sulawesi recruits going to Mindanao. Suryadi was willing, particularly as he had started a business that involved buying cosmetics in the Philippines and selling them in Sulawesi. It was a standard feature of JI or fellow traveller recruits to become economically self-sufficient with a business, usually trade of some kind, which also provided a cover for jihad activities.

In March 1998, Suryadi took five recruits, from South and South East Sulawesi. He accompanied the group to Camp Abu Bakar, then returned after 21 days to Makassar. He took another Sulawesi group of five in July 1998, two recruits from Sumatra at the request of Syawal in December 1998, and another eight from Sulawesi in May 1999.

In September 1999, after the conflict in Ambon was well underway, Suryadi accompanied a group of eleven recruits from Sulawesi (from Sinjai, Enrekang, and Makassar). For the first time, he was asked to buy arms and bring them back to Indonesia. He was able to purchase two revolvers for Rp.3,000,000 (about U.S.$300). The money was provided by KOMPAK, an organisation set up as a charity to provide aid to the displaced but which became an important source of funds for the purchase of arms destined for Ambon and Poso.

In March 2000, Suryadi made his seventh trip to Mindanao, this time to rescue two West Java recruits, Abdul Fatah and Abdullah from Banten, who were stranded because of the assault on Camp Abu Bakar by the Philippine army. He could only reach Cotabato, where he stayed for five months. Two months after he arrived, in May, he met Imam Hanafi from KOMPAK-Solo, who had come to Mindanao to buy arms. Together they were able to purchase one AK-47, twelve U.S.-made M-16s, and one Philippine-made M-16.

Suryadi said the go-between was an Indonesian from Solo named Usamah, who was married to a

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86 At the time he was arrested for making the detonator in the December 2002 Makassar bombings, Kahar Mustafa was secretary of the Sinjai branch of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) and deputy head of the Sinjai branch of KPSI, the Committee for Upholding Islamic Law. See “Pesan Osama di Balik Bom”, Gatra, 21 December 2002, p. 83.
87 ICG interview, Menado, April 2003.
88 Interrogation deposition of Suryadi Mas’ud on 2 January 2003., These included a man named Zainuddin (who later died in an accident); Kalling, from Enrekang; and Abdul Somad, from Pinrang, in South Sulawesi.
89 ICG interview Manado, April 2003.
90 Their base in Menado was in Bahu, Malalayang, Menado, near the Sam Ratulangi University campus.
91 Suryadi Interrogation deposition in Abu Bakar Ba’asyir case, op.cit.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid and ICG interview, Manado, April 2003..
Filipina, lived in General Santos City, and was apparently a frequent visitor to Camp Abu Bakar. Usamah is likely an alias for Mustopa, then the leader of JI’s Mantiqi III, now under arrest in Indonesia. In August 2000, Imam Hanafi, Suryadi, the two men from Banten, and a Wahdah Islamiyah recruit from Enrekang, began the journey back.

The group boarded a ship for Bitung in General Santos City. They had packed the arms in a carton marked “tuna fish”, bribed Philippine customs agents, and successfully entered Indonesia. Suryadi parted company with the others in Bitung and continued on to Makassar, where he delivered the arms to Agus Dwikarna.94

From August 2000 to April 2001, Suryadi made no trips to Mindanao, reflecting the disruption to JI training that the Philippine army attack on Camp Abu Bakar had caused.95 In April, he went to Syawal and asked to be relieved of his duties as courier. Syawal, Agus Dwikarna, and Aris Munandar, the head of KOMPAK-Solo agreed, as long as he trained a man named Dahlan alias Asep as his replacement.96 This may have been the same Dahlan who went with Suryadi on his first trip to Mindanao in 1997 and was later involved in the Makassar bombings.

Suryadi agreed to take Dahlan to Mindanao and pick up a new arms shipment at the same time but Dahlan had no passport. Suryadi asked a friend, Kamaluddin, for help, who used the name and identity card of his nephew to get a passport for Dahlan in the name of Syamsul Huda. Since Kamaluddin himself wanted to go to Mindanao for training, the three left Makassar and headed for Menado, stopping in Pesantren Hidyatullah in Tomohon, North Sulawesi, on the way for more than a month because the regular ship to Mindanao was out of service.

The head of the pesantren, Kyai Saparuddin, asked Suryadi to take his son-in-law, Bakri, with them. After their arrival in General Santos City, Bakri and Kamaluddin were turned over to an MILF contact for training, while Suryadi and Dahlan went to see Usamah about buying arms and also to introduce Dahlan as Suryadi’s replacement. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was at the meeting and offered to sell his pistol at the same time. Suryadi told him to make arrangements with Dahlan and prepared to return home. He went first to Bitung, stopped at the pesantren in Tomohon to report that Bakri was set for training, and then returned to Makassar via Menado.97

In August 2001, Suryadi visited Jakarta, a few weeks after the JI bombing of the Atrium Mall. He went to the home of a man named Tono, one of the Banten recruits who had trained in Mindanao. At Tono’s home in Pandeglang, he found ten men from Banten, together with a senior JI figure from Malaysia, Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan alias Musa.98 All had been taking part in a training camp in Saketi, Pandeglang.99

The next day, Imam Samudra arrived. He was introduced to Suryadi as a leader of Kelompok Banten or the Banten Group, and Suryadi introduced himself as someone from the International Relations Department (of what organisation was not clear, perhaps Wahdah Islamiyah), with a particular expertise in the Philippines. He also said he had been asked to check out Libya as a source of arms and explosives.100 Imam Samudra asked about the prices of various weapons in the Philippines, then left.

After he left, Marwan asked Suryadi’s help in getting to Mindanao, because he was sought by Indonesian police. Suryadi was willing to consider the request because he was thinking about another trip to Mindanao in connection with his cosmetics business. The next day he secured some cosmetics orders from Glodok, in Jakarta’s Chinatown, then left with Zulkifli alias Marwan on a ship from Tanjung Priok bound for Makassar. Suryadi dropped Marwan off at Agus Dwikarna’s house, where he stayed for a week. Then Suryadi, his

94 ICG interview, Manado, April 2003.
95 Apparently because the JI camp was far removed from the main complex, it was not occupied or attacked and may have continued to function, but the assault would have made it close to impossible to bring in new recruits.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 He is the elder brother of Taufik alias Dany, the Atrium Mall bomber in detention in Jakarta, and is believed to be in the Philippines.
99 ICG Report, How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates, op. cit., suggested the training was designed to prepare recruits for jihad in Ambon or Poso. In fact, the training appears to have been designed as pre-departure preparation for Mindanao recruits.
100 Suryadi interrogation deposition, January 2003.
younger sister, and Marwan left for Menado. When they arrived, Suryadi accompanied Marwan to Sangihe, where he took him to meet Sardjono Gabriel and asked Sardjono to take him to Mindanao. He then returned to Menado and flew with his sister to General Santos City. They all met briefly after Marwan arrived, and then Suryadi and his sister returned to Makassar. Marwan, a senior JI operative, is believed still to be in Mindanao and may have been involved in the Davao airport bombing of March 2003.

Suryadi apparently had further contacts with the Banten group in Pandeglang because he testified that in late 2001 Imam Samudra asked him to blow up foreign facilities in Makassar. The plan never materialised because Suryadi could not find anyone to help him.

In the meantime, Dahlan, Suryadi’s replacement as “courier”, together with Bakri and Kamaluddin, returned to Makassar in October 2001 after four months of training. Kamaluddin went straight back to Makassar, while Dahlan and Bakri went to Pesantren Hidayatullah in Tomohon. They decided to put their training to use by going to Poso to fight. To raise funds for doing so, they resorted to fa’i, robbing infidels to raise funds for jihad.

On 25 October 2001, therefore, they rented a car with a Christian driver to go to Poso. Along the way, Dahlan asked to stop, the car pulled over, and Bakri shot the driver in the head. They hid the body in the back, and Dahlan took the wheel but they had only driven a few kilometres when their car ran into a Toyota Kijang vehicle. They panicked and ran, but forgot to take with them a bag containing documents about their training in Mindanao, some ammunition, and Dahlan’s passport in the name of Syamsul Huda. Police got the documents, but never caught Dahlan and Bakri. Dahlan eventually turned himself in in August 2003.

This long and complicated account illustrates the way JI interacts with other organisations, such as Wahdah Islamiyah, as well as the importance of traditional border crossing locations for JI, and of ensuring that the police and immigration officials assigned to these areas are both vigilant and incorruptible.

D. THE BANTEN GROUP

According to Suryadi, the Banten group consisted of Abu Gali and Imam Samudra as overall heads; Ustadz Hafidin, head of proselytisation and cadre development; and Abdul Fatah, whom Suryadi had “rescued” in mid-2000 after Camp Abu Bakar had been overrun, head of military training. These men all came from a faction of the Darul Islam movement; with the exception of Imam Samudra, it is not clear that they were JI members.

One of the problems with analysing JI strength in West Java is that many Darul Islam factions had links to it but operated under separate leadership. Gaos Taufik and Ali Murthado are only two of the names that frequently appear as leaders with their own recruits and political agendas.

The Banten group did its own recruiting of jihadists, although it is not clear that it did so in the name of JI. The recruits included three of the men involved in a gold robbery in Serang – Yudi, Rauf, and Amin – that preceded the Bali bombings. It was Heri Hafidin, the Ustadz Hafidin mentioned above, now detained, who introduced Imam Samudra to the young men in mid-2002, and according to their trial testimony, they thought that the robbery was to raise funds for Ambon, not an operation in Bali.

One source said that he had trained recruits in Gunung Balekambang, Garut in February 1999. All were the protégés of Ali Murthado, the Darul Islam leader mentioned above. This suggests that just as JI in Sulawesi took advantage of the Wahdah Islamiyah network established by Agus Dwikarna

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101 While in General Santos City, Marwan stayed with Oscar Makulandang, an Indonesian resident in the Philippines who as of July 2003 was detained in Camp Crame, Manila. He then went to Cotabato where he made contact with the MILF.

102 Suryadi interrogation deposition, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir dossier.

103 Gaos Taufik had been a fighter in Darul Islam in West Java in the 1950s. After DI’s defeat in the early 1960s, he moved with other ex-DI members to a village in North Sumatra. He was one of the many ex-DI fighters arrested in the late 1970s and charged with trying to revive the rebellion. He was imprisoned from 1977 until 1988, when he moved back to West Java. After his release, he apparently joined forces with a faction of the DI movement. Ali Murthado is a member of the DI faction headed by Kartosoewirjo’s son, Tahmid.

104 Ibid.
and Syawal, the Banten group tapped into long-established Darul Islam networks to get more young men trained as mujahidin. The result, again, was not an expanded JI, but a much looser and more flexible set of alliances.

As with the Sulawesi recruits, the men who went for training were also involved in bringing back weapons for the jihad at home. This was revealed in February 2000 when Indonesian police boarded a boat en route from Mindanao to Tahuna, in Sangihe-Talaud. One of the passengers fired a gun, and police came to search the boat. When the belongings of the Mindanao returnees were searched, it turned out they were carrying arms and ammunition. Three of the four men eventually tried and sentenced by the Tahuna District Court were from West Java and were returning from training in Mindanao. They were Agus Sugandi bin Abdul Rasyid alias Suganda, 28, from Pangarangan village, Lebak subdistrict, West Java; Hadidi alias Hadi bin Sahmat, 35, from Kedung village, Bojonegoro subdistrict, Banten; and Burhanudin alias Burhan, 30, from Limuncang, West Java.

The fourth man was Syawal, the Wahdah Islamiyah leader from Sulawesi, today one of the most wanted men in Indonesia. He was tried, convicted, and like the others, sentenced to eight months and fifteen days in prison. He was free by late 2000, and returned to Makassar, where he continued to aid the jihad in Ambon and Poso.

E. PUTTING THE TRAINING TO USE

From the beginning, the purpose of the training in Afghanistan and Mindanao was to enhance the ability of JI to wage jihad at home. But the Afghanistan training had international funding, and the outlook of those who took part was global. The veterans of Afghanistan were not only interested in the outcome of jihad in that country, but they also became deeply interested in developments in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and elsewhere. ICG talked to an Indonesian veteran of Afghanistan who returned home only because his application to go to Bosnia in 1994 was never acted on.105

The Mindanao training, on the other hand, was funded by JI sources, dominated by Indonesians, and particularly after the Ambon conflict broke out in 1999, appeared to be much more geared to training people to fight inside Indonesia than for jihad in Mindanao or elsewhere.

After Camp Abu Bakar fell, JI tried to move the training to Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 2001, even though some continued in Mindanao. Poso was far more attractive to it than Ambon, which it considered had an Islam that was diluted by too many traditional practices and too many mushrik (idolaters). The Muslims of Sulawesi were believed to have far more potential for true jihad. It is no coincidence that twelve JI members and associates were arrested in Palu, the capital of Central Sulawesi, in April 2003, and others have reportedly sought refuge there. The site of intense communal conflict in 2000 and 2001, outbreaks of violence there in mid-2003 may be a signal of renewed activity by jihadists.

105 An unknown number of Indonesians did reach Bosnia.
VI. THE ROLE OF PREMAN

From the outset, there was a tactical alliance within the JI network between purists and preman, between the ideologues and the criminal thugs. The relationship was important for funding, logistics, and additional manpower for waging jihad, but it made for some very incongruous partnerships.

From the 1950s, the practice of fa’i – robbing infidels or enemies of Islam to secure funds for defending the faith – had been accepted as permissible under Islamic law by members of the Darul Islam movement. Abdullah Sungkar and his followers incorporated fa’i in their teachings about jihad. Among the many robberies justified in this way were:

- the robbery in March 1979 of a vehicle carrying the salaries for teachers at the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta. Leading the robbery was a gang leader with Darul Islam connections named Musa Warman, known for his extortion of Chinese shopkeepers. A Ngruki teacher took part.

- The murder of a taxi driver and theft of his car and money in June 1985 in order to raise funds for Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in Malaysia. One of the perpetrators was a gangster named Safki with extensive ties to leading figures in Jakarta’s underworld.

- The already described 25 October 2001 killing of a Christian taxi driver and theft of his car on the Trans-Sulawesi highway, south of Menado, by two young men from Sulawesi trained in the JI camp in Mindanao in order to obtain funds for jihad in Poso.

- The hold-up of a gold and jewellery store in Serang, West Java on 29 August 2002 to provide extra cash for the Bali bombings.

- The robbery of a money changer in Menado on 12 November 2002 by Suryadi, a man who acted as “courier” bringing Indonesians for training to Mindanao and bringing arms back. Suryadi told police that the robbery, a month after Bali, was designed to finance activities to destabilise North Sulawesi, in accordance with Imam Samudra’s instructions.

- The robbery of the Lippo Bank in Medan on 6 May 2003 by a group of men suspected of ties to JI and the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Medan. They were arrested in June 2003.

- The planned robbery-murder of a Christian doctor and the robbery of several BCA banks in Semarang by four of Mustopa’s recruits. The crimes were thwarted by the arrest of the four in July 2003.

In some cases, especially where the money was badly needed, JI’s predecessors recruited preman for the work or took advantage of preman who had found a religious calling. Amrozi, convicted of the Bali bombing, had such a background. In other cases, as the robbing of the jewellery store in Serang indicates, fa’i was carried out by young men who had no criminal background but acted almost as a test of their courage and religious commitment.

JI has also worked with preman as needed to arrange illegal border crossings from Indonesia to Malaysia or the Philippines; to secure false identity papers; and to transport people and goods. A particularly good example of this appears to be the involvement in JI of Haris Fadillah, the father-in-law of the al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq, whose nom de guerre was Abu Dzhar. Haris Fadillah was a well-known preman and debt collector from Tanjung Pinang, Riau, a place from which many Indonesians leave to cross the Straits of Malacca to enter Malaysia illegally for work. Fadillah, who maintained a villa in Cisarua, West Java, also owned some boats in Tanjung Pinang that were apparently used to ferry migrants. In 1995 or 1996, he was recruited into Darul Islam, the movement that in some ways gave rise to JI, by Gaos Taufik, who keeps appearing on the fringes of the Ngruki network. Haris Fadillah’s recruitment was apparently controversial within JI ranks, partly because of his preman background and partly because he had no prior family links to Darul Islam. But because he helped people from the network flee to

106 ICG Asia Briefing, Al-Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia, August 2002, p. 8.
107 Ibid, p. 15.
Malaysia, these qualms were overcome.110

Through a process that remains unclear, Haris Fadillah became Abu Dzar, the commander of the Laskar Mujahidin in Ambon. (The nom de guerre was appropriate: Abu Dzar al-Gifari, one of the Prophet’s Companions, was originally a robber who took from the rich and gave to the poor.) He was known by JI members as someone who had connections in the army, and, as in other conflicts in Indonesia, individuals within the army were one source of weapons.111 It was also known that in addition to the many young men who joined Laskar Mujahidin out of determination to defend fellow Muslims, the militia’s ranks were swelled by preman.

In a treatise on jihad, Muchlas, a Bali bomber, explains that one of the many goals of jihad is to provide a means for sinners to repent. If criminals or gangsters want to find favour with Allah, they can become mujahidin. He also notes that he once encountered a Sufi in Ambon who challenged him on the composition of the Laskar Mujahidin, saying, “How can you call this a holy war, when even your commander is an ex-thug?” He said he merely replied, “So where are your forces and why don’t you become a commander instead of just counting your prayer beads?”112

But preman traditionally have had ties to the security forces, and taking preman into Laskar Mujahidin, or into other operations of JI, worked in two ways. It increased the possibility of infiltration by government intelligence, but it also increased the possibility of getting arms.113 The image of Laskar Mujahidin as an exclusive, well-trained, dangerous force composed of ideologically-driven jihadists will have to be somewhat revised. It apparently had more than its share of preman, which to the doctrinaire leaders of JI was acceptable as long as the ultimate end, waging jihad in the defence of Islam, was achieved.

The involvement of preman and the practice of fa’i mean that special care should be given to investigation of seemingly ordinary robberies that take place in areas where JI or its affiliates are known to have a presence, such as Poso and Palu in central Sulawesi, or where a substantial sum of money is taken and the victims are not Muslim.

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110 ICG interview in Sulawesi, April 2003.
111 ICG interview in Sulawesi, April 2003, confirmed by ICG interview in Jakarta, 3 July 2003.
113 The strange mixture of thugs, informants, and zealots in Laskar Mujahidin became apparent in the mysterious February 2003 murder in Ambon of Fauzi Hasbi. The gang that was arrested for the killing was led by a man known as Anto, who was a protégé of Abu Dzar and reportedly responsible for logistics and supply for Laskar Mujahidin. ICG interview Jakarta, June 2003.
VII. SCHOOL AND MARRIAGE: THE TIES THAT BIND

Long before JI existed, the training in Afghanistan forged bonds among the men who were to become its leaders. But as the network grew and extended beyond the relatively small number of people inducted into JI through formal oath-taking, secrecy and the need for mutual trust appear to have become more important. Schools and marriages became two instruments for strengthening ties among mujahidin and at the same time ensuring that the jihadist ideology was passed down to a new generation.

A. THE PESANTREN NETWORK OF JI

More than 14,000 rural Muslim boarding schools, known as pesantren or pondoks, are registered with the Ministry of Religion throughout Indonesia. Some 8,900 of these teach salafi principles; of these only a handful have anything to do with JI or radical jihadism. Most students in the schools that do have ties to JI emerge as pious, law-abiding citizens. To have gone to a JI-linked pesantren does not make one a terrorist.

But there is a network of pesantren that at once serves to propagate JI teachings, provide religious and occasionally military training to recruits, and shelter members and fellow-travellers who are in transit or are seeking refuge from the law. The pesantren that form this network fall into three groups:

1. The JI “Ivy League”

The JI prestige schools are those to which members send their own children. Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki, in Ngruki, Sukohardjo, Solo, is the most famous, but there are at least three others. Al-Muttaqien in Jepara and Dar us-Syahadah in Boyolali, both in Central Java, and Pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan, East Java, have close ties both to JI and to each other. Al-Islam was started with assistance from Pondok Ngruki. Prior to its closure in 2001, Lukmanul Hakim in Johore also would have been on the list.

Al-Muttaqien’s graduates include Mira Augustina, daughter of Abu Dzar and wife of Omar al-Faruq; her father reportedly sent eight other children, not all his own, to the same school. In his interrogation deposition, Mas Selamat bin Kastari, head of JI’s Singapore wakalah, told investigators that in April 2002, Muchlas had advised him to send his child to al-Muttaqien, headed by Ustadz Irfan. One of the teachers at al-Muttaqien is Solahudin Al-Ayubi, the brother of Farihin and Abdul Jabar (the first an Afghan veteran, detained in Palu, the second a suspect in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings).

Dar us-Syahadah is located in Kedung Lengkong village, Simo subdistrict, Boyolali. It has 380 students ranging in age from thirteen to 25 and was founded by the Yasmin foundation, an organisation that comes up repeatedly in the testimony of Bali suspects as an organisation linked to key JI figures, including Zulkarnaen. It reportedly conducted some kind of military training on the premises after the Ambon conflict erupted. One of the senior instructors is Mustaqim, the Afghanistan veteran who is head of the military department of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia.

Another key institution is the Al-Ikhlas Foundation, based in Gading, Solo, Central Java, which runs an Islamic university called Mahad Ali al-Ikhlas that includes study in memorisation of the Qu’ran. One of its directors is a man named Abu Dujanah, who, according to Ali Imron, is the secretary of the JI central command (markaziyah), suggesting that the command itself is or has been based there since it moved from Malaysia in 1999. Several former Ngruki lecturers teach at the school, although it has no direct institutional link to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s pesantren. It was at Mahad Ali that Zulkarnaen organised a meeting of JI alumni in June 1999.

2. The Hidayatullah network

The main pesantren of this network is Pesantren Hidayatullah in Gunung Tembak, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, but the network has 127 pesantren, several of which became places of shelter or transit for JI members at different times.

- Ali Imron stayed four days at Pesantren

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115 Interrogation deposition of Mas Selamat bin Kastari, 22 February 2003, in Abu Bakar Ba’asyir case dossier.

Hidayatullah in Melak, Kutai Barat, East Kalimantan in early November as he was trying to evade arrest. Farihin stayed in Pesantren Hidayatullah in Tondo, outside Palu, sometime in 2002 according to a witness in his trial for smuggling ammunition into Poso. At the time, the pesantren was housing Muslims displaced from the Poso conflict. The witness testified that Farihin gave lectures but never provided any military training to the students. While staying there, however, he obtained a new identity card showing him to be a resident of Tondo. The pesantren was able to apply collectively for Indonesian identity cards for all its residents, and Farihin was simply included in the list.

As described above, Suryadi, arrested in Menado for robbing a gold shop to finance bombings, had been working with Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Syawal since 1997 to ferry Indonesian recruits to Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao and bring back arms. Prior to a trip in June 2001, he stayed at Pesantren Hidayatullah in Tomohon, North Sulawesi for about a month while awaiting transport. KH Saparuddin, the pesantren’s head, sent his son-in-law with Suryadi for military training with the MILF. A pesantren for girls called al-Ikhlas, in Sedayu Lawas, Brondong subdistrict, Lamongan district, East Java. One of its teachers, Ustadz Azhari Dipokusumo, was arrested for hiding Bali bombing suspect Ali Imron. It is led by a man named Nukman Arief, who used to teach at the Pesantren Al-Islam in Lamongan. Pesantren Ibnul Qoyim in Yogyakarta, Java. Herlambang, a JI figure detained in Bali, hid his brother’s wife and child at this school when the brother himself was being sought by authorities.

3. Other pesantrens linked to JI

A number of other pesantrens have been cited in the testimony of JI suspects or in trial documents of persons, not all JI members, linked to JI-inspired bombings. These include:

- Pondok Istiqomah in Sempaga, Samarinda. Ustadz Yunus, a teacher at Pondok Istiqomah in Sempaga, Samarinda, transferred Rp.1,500,000 (about U.S.$150) into the account of Farihin when he was detained in Palu throughout 2001 in connection with an attack in Poso, Central Sulawesi. After the 2002 Bali bombings, in late October or early November of that year, Yunus also sheltered Ali Imron at Pondok Istiqomah as he tried to escape arrest in East Kalimantan, then helped him get to a small village where he was arrested on 13 January 2003. In his interrogation deposition, Ali Imron said that he knew Yunus from two years before, when he had apparently lived in Samarinda.

- A pesantren

B. Marriage Alliances

The JI organisation and the wider network is also held together by a complicated web of marriage alliances that at times makes JI seem like one large extended family. In some cases, JI leaders appear to have arranged marriages for their subordinates to serve the interests of the organisation. Three points are worth noting:

- Looking at the women of JI becomes important to understanding the organisation, the nature of its affiliations with other networks, and its ability to survive the arrests that have taken place since late 2001. More information is needed on the wives of all those arrested, where they studied, and the organisational affiliations of their parents.

- A number of marriages took place between

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117 Kepolisian Daerah Bali, Direktorat Reserse Kriminal, “Berita Acara Pemeriksaan Tambahan”, in the case of Ali Imron bin H. Nurhasyim, 25 January 2003, p. 2. He also makes reference to staying in a former Hidayatullah mosque in the jungle somewhere outside Samarinda but it is not clear whether the mosque was linked to the pesantren network.


119 Ibid, p. 27.

Indonesians and Malaysians. While this may have been natural given that so many Indonesian men were living in exile in Malaysia, it means that the bonds between the Indonesian and Malaysian parts of the organisation are particularly strong. If JI really had an organic institutional link with the MILF, instead of a relationship built on reciprocal assistance, there would probably be more Indonesian-Filipina marriages, but there seem to be almost none.

One criterion for formal membership in JI appears to be the reliability of the wife. Yazid Sufaat, the former Malaysian army officer, now detained, who is believed to have been involved in the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Medan, was never formally inducted because his wife was not considered trustworthy. One way as well, though: a man about whom some voiced doubts was taken into the organisation because of the impeccable lineage, in JI terms, of his wife; he proved to be a government informant.

A particularly good example of the marriage alliances is the Abbas family in Malaysia. Abbas, the father, was born in Singapore and became a permanent resident of Malaysia where he was involved in the religious study group around Abdullah Sungkar. He and his wife had six children. Of these:

- Hashim, a son, trained in Afghanistan, was involved in the Pekanbaru and Batam bombings with Imam Samudra in December 2000, and is now in detention in Malaysia;
- Farida, a daughter, married Mukhlas as arranged by her father despite the fact that she was a highly cosmopolitan and well-educated young woman;
- Nurhayati, a daughter, married Shamsul Bahri bin Hussein, also in detention in Malaysia, a man who may not have been a member of JI but was part of the religious study group in Johore; and

Moh. Nasir bin Abbas, a son, was arrested by Indonesian police on 23 April in Palu; he served as a deputy to Mustopa in JI’s Mantiqi III.

The key alliance was between Mukhlas and Farida, which may have helped draw Farida’s younger brothers into the network.

A second example is Ferial “Ferry” Muchlis, an Indonesian permanent resident of Malaysia, now detained there, who in 1998-1999 was the head of the Selangor wakalah. Ferry’s older sister is the wife of Wahyudin, the current head of Pondok Ngruki. Ferry himself married the stepdaughter of Abdullah Sungkar, a woman named Isnairin binti Abdul Rosyid, in 1987 in what appears to have been an arranged alliance. His wife may be the sister-in-law of Syawal, since Syawal is married to another Sungkar stepdaughter. Ferry, a native of Medan, North Sumatra, met Abdullah Sungkar in Germany in the late 1980s when he was studying at the Technische Fachhochschule in Berlin.

Other family ties include:

- Noralwizah Lee, one of Hambali’s wives, who is an ethnic Chinese Muslim from Sabah, is the sister-in-law of Dadang Suratman alias Abu Yusuf, believed to be a member of the JI central command;
- Farihin bin Ahmad, a JI leader convicted of smuggling ammunition to Poso, is married to the daughter of Cirebon Darul Islam leader Dudung Abdul Gani; marrying into a blue-blood Darul Islam family may have increased Farihin’s stature in the organisation;
- Noordin Top, a Malaysian wanted in connection with the Bali bombings, is married to the sister of a JI suspect.
- Moh. Jauhari, one of the Malaysian detainees, married Khairun Nisa on the instructions of Fihiruddin alias Moh. Iqbal, alias Abu Jibril. She is the daughter of Abdullah of Banting;
- The younger sister of Dul Matin, the Bali

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121 ICG interview, Sulawesi, April 2003.
122 This was Devi, who reportedly made the phone call that led to the premature detonation of the Bandung bombs on Christmas Eve 2000 in which Jabir was killed. Mukhlas interrogation deposition, 5 December 2002, p. 13.
123 Interrogation deposition of Moh. Jauhari in Abu Bakar Ba’asyir case dossier.
bombing suspect still at large, is married to another JI member, Hery Kuncoro, according to the interrogation deposition of JI detainee Hernianto.

- Hambali and Jabir personally supervised the search in West Java for a suitable wife for Umar, a JI member resident in Malaysia, and attended the wedding;  
- Ja’afar bin Mistooki, detained in Singapore, is married to the sister-in-law of a teacher at the now-closed Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem, Muchlas’s school in Johore; and
- Ali Imron’s niece, Ifanah, is married to Dadan, a teacher at Pesantren al-Islam.
- Amrozi’s wife is related to Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi.

Other interesting family connections also appear among the JI suspects. Muhajir, one of the JI firearms instructors at Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao, is the younger brother of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, for example.

**VIII. CONNECTIONS TO AL-QAEDA**

While many Indonesians still question whether JI exists as a formal organisation, most appear to have accepted that the men on trial for the Bali bombings were likely responsible for the crime and that Indonesia does indeed have some home-grown terrorists. What is much more difficult for many to accept is that those terrorists have links to al-Qaeda.

The arrest of Hambali could change this, but only if U.S. authorities quickly transfer him to Indonesian custody or at least give credible Indonesian authorities access to him.

It is clear that an Indonesian connection with bin Laden was established in the mid-1980s through Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and the Afghanistan training. Hambali provided the most important ongoing contact with the al-Qaeda leadership but he was not the only person with direct connections. Zulkarnaen, Syawal Yasin, and Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi have similar ties.

Few details have come out of the Bali trials that add to what is already known about reported al-Qaeda financing of JI activities, Wan Min asserted that Mukhlas told him that al-Qaeda provided funding for some JI operations.  

He testified that the Bali bombing realised a fatwa from Osama bin Laden as conveyed by Hambali, but he claimed not to know what the origins were of the U.S.$35,500 that he helped transfer to the bombers.

The way in which al-Qaeda systematically began to establish operations in South East Asia, beginning in the Philippines in 1991 through bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Mohammed Khalifa, has been well-documented. 

By 1994, a Malaysian named Wali Khan Amin Shah was a key member of the cell established in Manila by Khalifa and Ramzi Youssef, the man responsible for the December 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. Shah and Hambali were partners in a Malaysian business, Konsojaya SDN BHD,

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125 Interrogation deposition of Mukhlas, 8 January 2003.


established in June 1994, that provided funding for some al-Qaeda operations.\textsuperscript{128}

In January 2000, Hambali and Yazid Sufaat, now detained in Malaysia and suspected of involvement in the Medan Christmas Eve bombings, are reported to have hosted two of the September 11 hijackers in Kuala Lumpur, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi.\textsuperscript{129} JI also consulted with al-Qaeda about a proposed plan to blow up U.S. installations and other foreign targets in Singapore in 2000, a plan that was discovered through videos and other documents found in Afghanistan after the Taliban fled.

In addition to Omar al-Faruq, Reda Seyam (often miswritten as Seyam Reda), a German citizen of Egyptian origin who was arrested in Jakarta on 16 September 2002 and had previously lived in Bosnia and Saudi Arabia, is suspected of being an al-Qaeda operative. He had visited Jakarta twice before trying to establish permanent residency in August 2002, using journalism as a cover.\textsuperscript{130}

Seyam was apparently al-Faruq’s boss. He also was reportedly a financier of JI and the al-Qaeda conduit for channelling funds to it for the Bali bombing. That information reportedly came through interrogation of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, the al-Qaeda leader arrested in Pakistan on 1 March 2003.\textsuperscript{131}

The involvement of al-Qaeda operatives in the Ambon and Poso operations has been noted above. Their commander, and the leader of al-Qaeda operations in South East Asia more generally, appears to have been Sheikh Hussein al-Munawar, who reportedly left his Indonesia base shortly after 11 September 2001.

Despite these clear ties, JI’s relationship with bin Laden’s organisation may be less one of subservience, as is sometimes portrayed, than of mutual advantage and reciprocal assistance, combined with the respect successful students have for their former teachers.

\textsuperscript{128} Dan Murphy, “Filipino police find 1995 leads to Sept. 11 plot”, \textit{Christian Science Monitor}, 14 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{129} Christopher Kremmer, “Asia’s Most Wanted Man”, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, 26 October 2002.
\textsuperscript{130} Moritz Kleine-Brockhoff, “An Entry in the Diary of Reda S.”, \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, 17 November 2002.
\textsuperscript{131} Moritz Kleine-Brockhoff, \textit{Frankfurter Rundschau}, 17 July 2003.
IX. CONCLUSION

JI remains dangerous. The arrests that have taken place thus far – close to 90 people in Indonesia, 90 in Malaysia, and 30 in Singapore – almost certainly have put a crimp in the organisation’s activities, but they have not destroyed it. The markaziyah or central command of JI has lost a few of its members – Mukhlas, Mustopa, Abu Rusdan, and Hambali among them – but may well be still operational.

Zulkarnaen, the head of military operations; Mohammed Qital, the master technician from Afghanistan; and Mustaqm, head of the military department of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and an instructor in Afghanistan and Mindanao, are particularly important here, but there are likely others whose names have not yet emerged.

The wakalah structure is probably far more extensive than previously thought, stretching across Malaysia to Sabah and Sarawak as well as across the Indonesian archipelago.

The network of alliances, such as that between JI and the MILF in the Philippines or JI and Wahdah Islamiyah in South Sulawesi, means that even if some JI members lie low for the time being, others can work with the large pool of trained cadres that exists outside the JI organisation to undertake acts of violence. A new generation of salafi jihadists is also being raised among the children of JI members sent to study in the small circle of pesantrens that constitute the JI’s educational circle. That said, these pesantrens are a tiny fraction of the whole, and the religious education system in Indonesia must not be stigmatised.

The escape of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi on 14 July 2003 from what was supposedly a maximum security detention centre in Manila underscores the risks that complacency and corruption pose for the fight against terrorism. The danger is great enough already.

Finally, the arrest of Hambali in Thailand, while enormously important, is unlikely to sound the death knell of JI. This is an organisation that not only can survive the loss of a senior leader. It is also one that has trained so many people over decades that it retains a capacity across the region to engage in acts of violence through small groups, even without central direction.

The good news is that internal dissension within JI appears to be growing. The Marriott bombing, in particular, generated a debate about appropriate targets, but there were apparently already divisions over the appropriateness of Indonesia as a venue for jihad, once the Ambon and Poso conflicts had calmed down. The Marriott attack appears to have intensified that debate. Some JI members based in pesantrens have expressed concern that their ability to play the traditional outreach role in the local community is hampered by JI’s clandestine nature. And with so many JI leaders in prison, some sympathisers are worried that individual JI members are going off on their own, without sufficient control from the centre. Internal rifts have destroyed more than one radical organisation; perhaps they will seriously weaken this one.

Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August 2003
APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA
APPENDIX B

SUSPECTS IN INDONESIA BOMBINGS LINKED TO JI

A= Afghanistan veteran
N= Ngruki graduate

Names are in bold the first time they are used, but many of the suspects have been involved in more than one bombing. For more details on each individual, see Appendix D, Index of Names.

I. BOMBING AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR, JAKARTA

Edi Setiono alias Abbas alias Usman, (A)
Abdul Jabar
Dul Matin alias Joko Pitono alias Ahmad Noval (A)
Fathur Rahman Al-Ghozi alias Saad (A,N)
Sarjiyo alias Sawad (A)
Hambali (A)
Amrozi
Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok (A,N)
Farihin alias Yasir (A)
Ali Imron (A, N)

II. CHRISTMAS EVE 2000 BOMBINGS

Planning team:
Abdul Azis alias Imam Samudra alias Kudama alias Abu Umar (A)
Edy Setiono alias Abbas alias Usman
Asep alias Darwin (A)
Jabir alias Enjang (A, N)
Hambali

Christmas Eve Bombing - BATAM
Abdul Azis alias Imam Samudra alias Kudama alias Abu Umar
Dr. Azahari Husin (A)
Hashim Abbas (A)
Jafar bin Mistooki (A)
Iqbal bin Ngatno alias Basuki (A)
Sholeh
Andi alias Amran alias Henry bin Mansur

Christmas Eve Bombing - MATARAM
Dul Matin alias Joko Pitono alias Ahmad Noval
Christmas Eve Bombing – SUKABUMI

Umar

III. 30 DECEMBER 2000, RIZAL DAY BOMBING IN MANILA

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi
Muklis Yunos (A)
Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana

IV. 22 JULY 2001, BOMBING OF HKBP AND SANTA ANA CHURCHES, JAKARTA

Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani
Solahudin alias Agung (younger brother of Abdul Jabar of Christmas Eve bombings)
Rusli alias Ibrahim
Asep alias Darwin
Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra
Edi Setiono alias Abbas alias Usman

V. 1 AUGUST 2001 ATRIUM MALL BOMBING, JAKARTA.

Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani
Solahudin alias Agung
Edy Setiono alias Abbas alias Usman
Asep alias Darwin

VI. 9 NOVEMBER 2001 BOMBING OF PETRA CHURCH, NORTH JAKARTA

Ujang Haris
Aris Ariyanto
Wahyu Handoko bin Sukadir

VII. 2 DECEMBER 2001, THWARTED BOMBING OF CHURCH IN PENGKALAN KERINCI, PELALAWAN, RIAU

Basuki alias Iqbal bin Ngatmo
Imam Samudra

VIII. 21 APRIL 2002, BOMBING IN GENERAL SANTOS CITY, PHILIPPINES

Oscar Makawata

IX. 22 AUGUST 2002, GOLD STORE ROBBERY, SERANG

Abdul Rauf Alias Syam (N)
Yudi alias Andri Oktavia (N)
Agus alias Andi Hidayat
Amin alias Junaeedi
Iqbal alias Arnasani (suicide bomber)
Pujata
Supriyanto
Iwan

X. 12 OCTOBER 2002, SARI CLUB AND PADDY’S CAFÉ, BALI

Amrozi
Ali Imron
Ali Ghuftron alias Mukhlas (A, N)
Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra
Dul Matin alias Joko Pitono alias Ahmad Noval
Dr Azahari
Idris als Jhoni Hendrawan
Abdul Ghoni alias Umar alias Wayan
Ahmad Roichan alias Sa’ad (A)
Zulkarnaen (A, N)
Iqbal alias Arnasani

XI. NOVEMBER 15, 2002, BOMBING OF KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN OUTLET, MENADO, NORTH SULAWESI (JI-AFFILIATED BUT NOT JI)

Suryadi Ma’sud
Muhammad Tang alias Itang
Agung Hamid

XII. BOMB IN MCDONALD’S RESTAURANT, RATU INDAH MALL, AND AUTOMOBILE SHOWROOM IN MAKASSAR (JI-AFFILIATED BUT NOT JI)

Ashar Daeng Salam alias Aco (suicide bomber)
Agung Hamid
Muchtar Daeng Lao alias Abu Urwah (A)
Masnur
Kahar Mustafa (A)
Anton Lukman
Ilham Riadi
Usman
Lukman Hasan
Hizbullah Rasyid (A)
Suryadi Ma’sud (involved in planning, already in custody when bombing took place)
Mirjal alias Gozzy
Dahlan
XIII. 5 AUGUST 2003, JW MARRIOT HOTEL BOMBING, JAKARTA

Asmar Latin Sani (likely suicide bomber) (N)  
Tohir  
Dr Azahari  
Toni Togar  
Sardono Siliwangi  
Idris alias Ikhsan (arrested on 12 June 2003)  
Datuk Rajo Ameh (arrested on 29 April 2003)  
Purwadi (arrested on 11 June 2003)  
Muhammad Rais (arrested on 26 April 2003)  
Suprapto (arrested on 9 August 2003)  
Heru Setianto (arrested on 9 August 2003)  
Muchliansyah alias Solihin alias Mukhlis (arrested on 10 August 2003)  
Malikul (arrested on 10 August 2003)
APPENDIX C

SOME SENIOR JI MEMBERS STILL AT LARGE


Abu Fatih, nom de guerre for Abdullah Anshori alias Ibnu Thoyib. Head of Mantiqi II, he is brother of Abdul Rochim, a teacher at Ngruki. Trained in Mindanao.

Ustadz Afif Abdul Mazid, Longtime resident of Malaysia with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, now back in Indonesia. Is believed to be on markaziyah only because of religious knowledge and not to be involved in operational decisions.

Arkam/Arqom alias Haris, member of JI, a native of Sumbawa who reportedly stayed with Amrozi in Lamongan, East Java. Went to Afghanistan in 1991, became instructor in firearms and sharp-shooting as well as explosives. Had permanent residency in Sabah, Malaysia, where he worked as a traditional healer. According to one account, married to one of the younger sisters of Hambali’s wife, Noralwizal Lee; according to another, his wife is Javanese (but he may have two wives).

Dr. Azahari Husin alias Adam, aged 46, JI member from Mantiqi I, involved in Christmas Eve and Bali bombings. British-trained engineer; lecturer, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), author of books on multiple regression analysis. Board member of Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem in Johor. Explosives expert, trained in Mindanao and Afghanistan, held bomb-making classes in his house.

Basriy alias Abu Mukhlisun, Ngruki graduate, Afghanistan veteran, instructor in Mindanao.

Dadang Suratman alias Abu Yusuf, Indonesian, permanent resident of Malaysia, preacher, close to Abdullah Sungkar, reportedly married to Hambali’s wife’s sister. Senior JI figure but more for religious aspects than operational planning.


Mohamad Qital, reportedly head of wakalah East Java for JI, Afghan veteran, instructor in Mindanao, expert in firearms.

Muhajir alias Idris, younger brother of Fathurrahman al-Ghozi, instructor in Camp Hudaibiyah, the JI camp in Mindanao. Involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Mojokerto.

Mustakim/ Mustaqim, Member of JI central command, Ngruki graduate from late 1970s, teacher first at Ngruki, then at Pesantren Dar us-Syahada in Boyolali. Lived in Malaysia in late 1980s. Afghanistan veteran, 1996-97 taught at Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem in Malaysia; head of Camp Hudaibiyah, JI military academy in Mindanao, 1997-2000, selected as head of military department of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, August 2000. In his 40’s in 2003.

Noor Din Mochamed Top, Malaysian explosives expert, graduate of Malaysian Technical Institute (UTM). Reportedly involved in planning for Bali and Marriott bombs.


Zulkarnaen alias Daud, real name Aris Sumarsono, member of JI central command, about 40, resident of Solo, Ngruki student 1979, member of first group of Indonesians to go to the Sayyaf camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as a mujahid in 1985. Became head of military training for South East Asians there. Ran a pesantren in Pahang, Malaysia for about a year. Ran the al-Aman Foundation in Solo out of the house of Hernianto there. Active in coordinating JI military activities in Ambon.

Zulkifli bin Hir, alias Marwan alias Musa. Brother-in-law of Taufik bin Abdul Halim, the Atrium Mall bomber. Engineer, trained in the U.S. alleged head of Kumpulun Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). Rumored to be in Mindanao as of August 2003. Member of the markaziyah or central command of JI.
APPENDIX D:
INDEX OF NAMES

Abbas, see Edy Setiono.

Abdul Aziz, see Imam Samudra.

Abdul Ghoni, see Umar Besar.


Abdul Rochim (Rahim), reported head of Mantiqi IV, Australia.

Abdur Rohim (Rochim), teacher at Ngruki, said to have been inducted into Jemaah Islamiyah by Abdullah Umar in Pacitan, East Java. Brother of Abdullah Anshori. Accused of being part of Jemaah Islamiyah's fa'i division (raising funds by confiscating property of enemies of Islam) in 1984-85.

Abdullah Anshori, see Abu Fatih.

Abdullah Azzam, one of chief ideologues of al-Qaeda, ran Makhtab al-Khidmat from Peshawar, Pakistan, a kind of logistics service through which many foreign mujahidin passed on their way to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet army.


Abdurajak Janjalani, founder of Abdul Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, trained in same camps with top JI leaders.


Abu Dzar, nom de guerre for Haris Fadillah, commander of Laskar Mujahidin forces in Maluku until he was killed on 26 October 2000 in Siri-Sori Islam, Saparua. Father-in-law of Omar al-Faruq, father of Mira Agustina. He was of mixed Makassarese-Malay blood, born in Labo Singkep, Riau. Known as preman, or thug, and debt-collector. Brought into Darul Islam by Gaos Taufik 1995.

Abu Fatih, nom de guerre for Abdullah Anshori alias Ibnu Thoyib, alleged to be head of Mantiqi II. Fled to Malaysia in June 1986, joined Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, reportedly helped recruit volunteers for Afghanistan. From Pacitan, East Java, he is brother of Abdul Rochim, a teacher at Ngruki. Trained in Mindanao.

Abu Jibril, alias Fihirudin alias Mohamed Ibal bin Abdurrahman. Born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok. Became well-known preacher (muballigh) at the Sudirman mosque in Yogyakarta in the early 1980s. Fled to Malaysia in 1985, later joined by wife. Made frequent trips to Indonesia, appears on a video CD recruiting volunteers to fight in the Maluku conflict. Became a member of the executive committee of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in August 2000. Arrested by Malaysian authorities in June 2001 under the Internal Security Act (ISA) and charged with trying to establish a South East Asia-wide Islamic state. Released in August 2003 only to be arrested by immigration authorities in Malaysia. Deportation to
Indonesia expected as of this writing.

**Abu Rusdan**, see Thoriqudin.

**Abu Urwah**, see Muchtar Daeng Lao.

**Abu Yusuf**, see Dadang Suratman.

**Achmad Rohan**, grandson of Achmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. Member of first group of Indonesians to go to Afghanistan in 1985. He was also a Ngruki lecturer, and deputy to Abu Fatih (Abdullah Ansori), head of Wakalah II. Helped hide Muchlas after Bali bombings, arrested in Palu, Central Sulawesi, April 2003.


**Akim Akimuddin**, alias Suheb alias Asep, about 30, was one of the Bandung Christmas Eve 2000 bombers who died when the bomb went off prematurely. From Cikalang, Tasikmalaya, he lived in Afghanistan between 1987 and 1991, and went from there to Malaysia, where he met Hambali. Akim also had two tours of duty in Ambon as a member of the Laskar Mujahidin forces between late 1999 and 2001. He probably returned to West Java sometime in the late 1990s, and joined a militant group called Barigade Taliban or Taliban Brigade, led by Kyai Zenzen Zaenal (Jainal) Muttaqin Atiq. Kyai Zenzen appears on a list of officers of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) as a member of the Education and Culture Committee of the religious council (Ahlul Halli Wal Aqdi).

**Ali**, one of the Indonesians who became a military instructor in Afghanistan, reportedly close to Hambali.


**Ali Imron**, younger brother of Amrozi, graduate of the Islamic high school (madrasah aliyah) in Karangasem, Lamongan, East Java, in 1986, joined
his brothers in Malaysia in 1990, lived eight years there (with apparently a one-year break in 1995 studying in Pakistan), studied at the Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren in Johor. After his return to Indonesia, became a teacher at Pondok al-Islam in Lamongan. Reportedly drove minivan used in Bali attack from Lamongan to Bali. Studied for two months at Ngruki.


Amran, received firearms and explosives training from April to August 2000 in Afghanistan along with Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan, Agus, and Jafar bin Mistooki.


Aris Munandar, Right-hand man of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir at Pondok Ngruki. Born in Sambi, Boyolali, Java, graduated from Pondok Ngruki in 1989 (same year as Fathur Rahman al-Gozi). Fluent in Arabic and English. Active member of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and director of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah for Central Java. One of the founders of KOMPAK, and producer of its video CDs about the conflict in Poso and Maluku that were used as JI recruiting tools. Said to be a leading figure in the Jakarta branch of an Abu Dhabi-based charity called Darul Birri. Also active in Mer-C (Medical Emergency Rescue Center) a Muslim humanitarian organisation that sent assistance to Afghanistan after the American bombing campaign began in late 2001.

Aris Sumarsono, see Zulkarnaen.

Arkam/Arqom alias Haris, member of JI, a native of Sumbawa who reportedly stayed with Amrozi in Lamongan, East Java. Went to Afghanistan in 1991, became instructor in firearms and sharp-shooting as well as explosives. Had permanent residency in Sabah, Malaysia, where he worked as a traditional healer. According to one account, married to one of the younger sisters of Hambali’s wife, Noralwizal Lee; according to another, his wife is Javanese (but he may have two wives).

Asep, see Dahlan.

Ashar Daeng Salam alias Aco, Laskar Jundullah member from Poso who died in the Makassar bombings of 5 December 2002, apparently a suicide bomber.

Asmar Latain Sani, 28, alleged suicide bomber whose severed head was found in the Marriott Hotel after it was bombed in August 2003. Ngruki graduate.

Dr. Azahari Husin alias Adam, 46, JI member from Mantqi I, involved in Christmas Eve 2000 and Bali bombings. British-trained engineer; lecturer, University Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), author of books on multiple regression analysis. Board member of Luqmanul Hakiem pesantren in Johor. Explosives expert, trained in Mindanao and Afghanistan, held bomb-making classes in his house.

Azmi, see Arkam/Arqom.

Basyir alias Abu Mukhlisun, Ngruki graduate, Afghanistan veteran, instructor in Mindanao.

BROTO, see Ahmad Furzon.

Burhanudin alias Burhan, West Javanese involved in recruiting men to go to Mindanao for training in late 1990s.

Dadang Suratman alias Abu Yusuf, Senior Indonesian JI member, permanent resident of Malaysia, preacher, close to Abdullah Sungkar, married to Hambali’s wife’s sister.

Daemugading, see Fathurahman Daemugading

Dahlan, suspect in December 2002 Makassar bombings, Mindanao veteran, turned himself in to authorities in August 2003.

Dani. See Taufik bin Abdul Halim.

Dedi Mulyadi, one of the West Java bombers for the Christmas Eve 2000 operation, he was born in 1969 and went to Malaysia as a migrant worker in 1991. He was in Afghanistan 1991-1992, then returned to Malaysia where he worked until late 1994. He returned to Tasikmalaya and worked as a trader, then moved to Purwakarta and lived there until 1999 when he moved back to Tasikmalaya.


Enjang Bastaman, see Jabir.


Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir, born January 1966, trader, JI member detained in Palu for smuggling ammunition to the conflict there.

Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, younger brother of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, above, also Afghanistan veteran.

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, born in Madiun, East Java, he was arrested in Manila in January 2002 and sentenced to seventeen years on charges of illegal possession of explosives for his involvement in the Rizal Day bombing of 30 December 2000; escaped 14 July 2003. He graduated from Pondok Ngruki in 1989, trained in Afghanistan and was designated by JI to set up a training camp within the MILF’s Camp Abubakar in Mindanao in 1996. Lived in Malaysia and has a Malaysian wife. His father, Zaenuri, served time in prison for alleged links to Komando Jihad and worked as a contractor in Malaysia around the area of the Lukmanul Hakiem pesantren founded by Mukhlas. His younger brother, Muhajir, was involved in Mojokerto Christmas Eve bombings and is also an Afghanistan veteran. Involved in planning attacks on Singapore targets.

Faturahman Daemugading alias Fatul Muin. Follower of Sulawesi Darul Islam leader Kahar Muzakkar, active in Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi, founder of organisation that became Wahdah Islamiyah.


Fihirudin, see Abu Jibril.

Firdaus alias Ahmad Azzam, Jakarta-based JI member, accused of helping smuggle ammunition to Poso, worked in the Islamic medical relief organisation Mer-C in the logistics department. Afghanistan veteran.

Haji Danu Muh Hasan, close associate of Kartosuwirjo in the original West Java Darul Islam, key figure in Komando Jihad. Reportedly employed by state intelligence agency, BAKIN, in the mid-1970s and had close ties to the Siliwangi division of the army.

Halim bin Hussein, alleged JI member detained in Singapore.


Hamzah, see Thoriqudin.

Haris, see Arkam/Arqom, Azmi.

Haris Fadillah, see Abu Dzar.

Hashim Abbas, see Hasyim bin Abbas.

Hasta. Left for Camp Abu Bakar in April 1997 with Suryadi and three of the Makassar bombing suspects: Dahlan, Usman, and Hizbullah Rashid.

Hasyim bin Abbas alias Osman alias Rudy alias Moh Nuh alias Atan, 41, Singaporean citizen. Electrical engineering graduate from Singapore Polytechnic in 2000. Brother-in-law of Mukhlas. Involved in Christmas Eve 2000 bombing in Batam. Appointed treasurer of Singapore wakalah of JI. Served as a JI platoon commander before being dismissed by Mas Selamat Kastari when he refused to quit his job at Bystronic Asia Pte Ltd.

Henry bin Mansur, see Amran.

Heri Hafidin, senior member of Banten group, close to Imam Samudra. Graduate student at Gunung Jati State Islamic Institute, Bandung. Men involved in Serang gold robbery met Samudra through Hafidin.


Hizbullah Rashid, one of the three Makassar bombing suspects along with Dahlan and Usman. Trained in Camp Abu Bakar, Mindanao, beginning April 1997.

Holis, alias Udin. One of the plotters in the West Java Christmas Eve 2000 bombings, still at large as of December 2002. From Desa Leuwianyar Tawang subdistrict, Tasikmalaya.

Hussen, Filipino who traveled in December 1997 with Suryadi, Abdullah, and Muaz from General Santos City to Nanusa Island in the Sangihe-Talaud archipelago carrying 66 detonators for bombs.

Imam Hanafi, representative of KOMPAK-Solo, involved in arms purchases from Mindanao in May 2000.

Imam Samudra alias Kudama alias Abdul Aziz, key suspect in the Bali bombngs, arrested 21 November 2002. Born in Serang, Banten, graduated with highest honors in 1990 from the Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (MAN) I in Serang. In 1988, he became head of a Banten-wide association of madrasahs called HOSMA (Himpunan Osis Madrasah Aliyah). He was known within the madrasah association as a religious activist and reportedly became radicalized by one of the
teachers at his high school, former Darul Islam leader Kyai Saleh As'ad. Abdul Aziz left for Malaysia in 1990. His parents, Ahmad Sihabudin and Embay Badriyah, were strong supporters of the Muslim organization, PERSIS.


Isnairin binti Abdul Rosyid, 21, stepdaughter of Abdullah Sungkar who married Ferial “Ferry” Muchlis.

Jabir, alias of Enjang Bastaman, JI figure and friend of Hambali killed in Bandung in Christmas Eve 2000 bombing operation. About 40, he was from Banjarsari, Ciamis, graduated from Pondok Ngruki around 1990 and continued education at Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam (PTDI) in Tanjung Priok. Lived in Malaysia and had trained in Afghanistan, also visited Thailand. In 1996 he returned to Ciamis to marry, took his wife back to Malaysia that same year. He returned to Indonesia when his first child was about to be born in 1998 and stayed in the Bandung area thereafter. In 2000 he reportedly moved to Tasikmalaya but maintained regular contact with JI people in Malaysia.


Joko Pitono, see Dulmatin

Kahar Mustafa, Afghanistan veteran, said to have provided explosives for Makassar bombings, took Sulawesi recruits back and forth to Mindanao for training.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, top al-Qaeda figure, secretary to Abdul Rasul Sayyaf in Afghanistan.

Khalim bin Jaffar, JI Singapore detainee, Afghanistan veteran.

Kudama, see Imam Samudra.

Laode Ida, see Syawal Yasin.


Marwan, see Zulkifli bin Hir.


Mira Augustina, wife of Omar al-Faruq, daughter of Haris Fadillah alias Abu Dzar.

Mirjal alias Gozzy, suspect in Makassar bombings, December 2002.

Moh Iqbal, see Abu Jibril.


Moh. Nasir bin Abbas, see Nasir Abbas.

Mohamad Qital, reportedly head of wakalah East
Java for JI, Afghan veteran.

Mohamed Rais, part of JI Sumatra, arrested in May 2003 in Padang, believed to have taken part in meetings planning the Marriott Hotel bombing. Ngruki graduate. Reportedly responsible for recruiting two other people, including Asmar Latin Sani, the possible suicide bomber, for the Marriott operation.


Muaz, Solo recruit, trained in Mindanao.

Mubarok, see Utomo Pamungkas.

Muchiansyah alias Solihin alias Muklis, well-known muballigh active in Yogyakarta at Sudirman mosque in early 1980s. Helped found the newsletter ar-Risalah. Close to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, was key member of the Ngruki network in Malaysia, where he lived with his family, including two wives brought over from Indonesia in 1985. Named by Indonesian prosecutors as the coordinator of Jemaah Islamiyah operations in Jakarta in 1983-1985. Returned to Indonesia with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in November 1999, settled in Pulau Baru, Kalimantan. Arrested in August 2003 as Muklis.

Mustafa, see Mustopa.


Mustopa (Mustafa) alias Abu Thalout, original name, Pranata Yudha, senior JI figure, member of the central command, head of Mantiqi III. Studied medicine in Semarang before transferring to Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta to study veterinary science. Never got degree. Afghan veteran, instructor in Mindanao. Arrested 8 July 2003.


Noordin Moh, top Malaysian explosives expert, still at large as of August 2003, graduate of Malaysian Technical Institute (UTM). Reportedly involved in planning for Bali bomb.

Noralwizah Lee, Chinese-Malaysian wife of Hambali, originally from Sabah.

Nuim alias Zuhroni, Afghan veteran, head of his class, trusted aide of Zulkarnaen. Explosives expert and major recruiter for Ambon and Maluku conflicts.

Omar al-Faruq alias Moh. Assegaf, alleged Kuwaiti (although the Kuwaiti government has denied that he is a citizen) linked to al-Qaeda, whose confession of activities in Indonesia provided the cover story for Time Magazine, 23 September 2002. See Abu Dzar.

Raja Husain alias Idris, Acehnese based in Riau, member of first group of Indonesians to go to Afghanistan, together with Zulkarnaen. His cell is thought to have been responsible for bomb at Soekarno-Hatta airport in Jakarta, April 2003.

Rauf alias Abdul Rauf alias Sam bin Jahruddin, Bali bombings suspect, member of JI cell with
Imam Samudra. Born in Cipondoh, Tangerang, West Java, in 1981, he met Abdul Aziz alias Imam Samudra in 2001 in Bandung through a mutual friend. Rauf at the time was taking courses in journalism but he had attended Pondok Ngruki from 1992 to 1997. Reportedly helped make the Bali bombs.

Reda Seyam, German-Egyptian arrested in Jakarta on immigration charges, thought to be al-Qaeda operative, deported to Germany in July 2003.

Saad, see Achmad Roihan.

Safki, member of the Jemaah Islamiyah network in Jakarta in 1984-1985, involved in several violent crimes, fled to Malaysia briefly in 1985, then returned to Jakarta where he was arrested. He later committed suicide.

Salamat Hasyim, leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), friend of Abdullah Sungkar, died in Philippines of a heart attack 2003.


Sardjono Gabriel, fisherman from Sanighe-Talaud islands, involved in helping transport JI recruits to Mindanao for training.

Sayyaf, Abdul Rasul, head of the Afghan faction called the Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan (Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi-yi Afghanistan). Head of Camp Saddah where Indonesian recruits trained. Proponent of very strict salafi Islam and had the full support of the Saudi religious establishment. Also mujahidin leader closest to Osama bin Laden.


Solihin, see Muchliansyah.

Suganda, alias Agus Sugandi bin Abdul Rasyid, 28, from Pangarangan village, Lebak subdistrict, West Java. One of four men tried and sentenced by the Tahuna District Court in the Sangihe-Talaud islands north of Menado after being caught with arms and ammunition on a boat en route from Mindanao.

Suheb, see Akim Akimuddin.

Suheimi bin Muhtar, Malaysian citizen, taxi driver, JI member detained in Malaysia.

Sukri, Malaysian JI member, brother-in-law of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana.

Suprapto, arrested 9 August 2003 in connection with Marriott Hotel bombing.


Suyatno, see Heru Setiawan.

Suyono alias Abu Farauk, 41, alleged head of wakalah Lampung, arrested then released in July 2003.

Syarifuddin alias Abu Jamiah, military commander of Wahdah Islamiyah. Afghanistan veteran. Accompanied Omar al-Faruq to Aceh, 1998, where they were hosted by Fauzi Hasby.

Syawal Yasin, also known as Salim Yasin, Abu Seta, Mahmoud, Muhamad Mubarak, and Muhammad Syawal, member of first group of Indonesians to train in Sayyaf camp on Pakistan-Afghanistan border, became popular instructor there. Also helped establish training camp in Mindanao. Son-in-law of Abdullah Sungkar (married a stepdaughter), but not formally a JI member. Key figure in Wahdah Islamiyah, Makassar, said to have own laskar (militia) as well. Is alleged to have carried out military training at the Hidayatullah pesantren in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, together with Aris Munandar and Omar al-Faruq, for recruits going to fight in Poso and Maluku. Was reportedly al-Faruq’s first point of contact in Indonesia.

Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani, Malaysian convicted in the JI-linked bomb explosion at the Atrium Mall in Jakarta on 1 August 2001. Younger
brother of alleged KMM head, Zulkifli bin Abdul Hir.

Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan, born in Kudus, son of Haji Moh. Faleh, a former Laskar Hizbullah and Darul Islam fighter arrested in early 1980s as member of Komando Jihad. Afghanistan veteran, head of military affairs for Mantiqi II, frequent visitor to Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in Malaysia in 1990s, reputed to have replaced latter as amir of JI in 2002. Member of markaziyah (central command) of JI, same level with Zulkarnaen. Ran computer store along Kudus-Jepara road, Central Java, arrested April 2003. Also served as preacher in al-Jihad mosque in Prambatan Kidul.

Toni Togar alias Indrawarman, Ngruki graduate, arrested June 2003 in Medan in connection with Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Medan and an effort to rob a bank in the Medan area in 2003.

Tono, recruit from Banten, West Java, who trained in Mindanao. Apparently helped run training camp in Pandeglang, West Java, in 2001. Not clear whether JI or Darul Islam.

Ujang Haris, convicted in the November 2001 bombing of the Petra church in North Jakarta.


Usamah alias Mustopa/Mustafa.

Usman, see Eddy Setiono.

Ustadz Yunus, see Yunus.


Wahyudin, director of Pesantren al-Mukmin, better known as Pondok Ngruki. Son-in-law of Abdullah Sungkar.

Wan Min bin Wan Mat, born 1960 in Kelantan, Malaysia, former lecturer at the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM). Became member of JI in 1993. Arrested by Malaysian police 27 September 2002, before Bali bombs but took part in Bangkok meeting in February 2002 where idea was first discussed.

Wayan, see Umar Besar.

Yazid Sufaat, senior JI member detained in Malaysia, former Malaysian army officer, said to be responsible for the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings in Medan.


Yunus, teacher at Pondok Istiqomah in Sempaga, Samarinda. After the Bali bombings, sheltered Ali Imron at his school, then helped him get to a small village on island off Samarinda where both were arrested in January 2003. Also involved in channelling funds to Farihin for jihad in Poso, Central Sulawesi.

Yusuf, see Machmudi Hariono, arrested in connection with Semarang weapons cache.

Zainal Arifin, see Usaid.

Zaini, one of two Malaysians who went with Hambali and Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana to Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999.

Zaitun Rasmin, head of Wahdat Islamiyah Makassar.

Zamzuri, one of two Malaysians who went with Hambali and Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana to Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1999.
Zoefri Yoes bin Yunus, see Datu Raja Ameh.

Zulkarnaen alias Daud, real name Aris Sumarsono, about 40, member of JI central command, resident of Solo, Ngruki student 1979, member of first group of Indonesians to go to the Sayyaf camp on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border as a mujahid in 1985. Became head of military training for South East Asians there. Ran a pesantren in Pahang, Malaysia for about a year. Ran the al-Aman Foundation in Solo out of the house of Hernianto in Solo. Active in coordinating JI military activities in Ambon.

Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan alias Musa, brother of Taufik bin Abdul Halim, the Atrium Mall bomber. Engineer, trained in the U.S., alleged head of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM). Rumored to be in Mindanao as of August 2003. Member of the markaziyah (central command) of JI.

Zulkifli Marzuki, Malaysian citizen, accountant, sometimes referred to as secretary of JI, assistant to Hambali, owner of MNZ Associates, hosted meeting in October 2000 in Kuala Lumpur to plan Christmas Eve bombings, with Hambali and Mukhlas in attendance. Arrested June 2003 in Phnom Penh.
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August 2003

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APPENDIX F

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS

AFRICA

ALGERIA**

The Algerian Crisis: Not Over Yet, Africa Report N°24, 20 October 2000 (also available in French)
The Civil Concord: A Peace Initiative Wasted, Africa Report N°31, 9 July 2001 (also available in French)
Algeria’s Economy: A Vicious Circle of Oil and Violence, Africa Report N°36, 26 October 2001 (also available in French)

ANGOLA

Angola’s Choice: Reform Or Regress, Africa Report N°61, 7 April 2003

BURUNDI

The Mandela Effect: Evaluation and Perspectives of the Peace Process in Burundi, Africa Report N°21, 18 April 2000 (also available in French)
Burundi: Neither War, nor Peace, Africa Report N°25, 1 December 2000 (also available in French)
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The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program to the Middle East & North Africa Program in January 2002.
## APPENDIX G

### ICG BOARD MEMBERS

<table>
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<th>Position</th>
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<td>Stephen Solarz</td>
<td>Vice-Chairman, Former U.S. Congressman</td>
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<td>Gareth Evans</td>
<td>President &amp; CEO, Former Foreign Minister of Australia</td>
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<td>S. Daniel Abraham</td>
<td>Chairman, Center for Middle East Peace and Economic Cooperation, U.S.</td>
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<td>Morton Abramowitz</td>
<td>Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey</td>
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<td>Kenneth Adelman</td>
<td>Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<td>Richard Allen</td>
<td>Former U.S. National Security Adviser to the President</td>
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<td>Saud Nasir Al-Sabah</td>
<td>Former Kuwaiti Ambassador to the UK and U.S.; former Minister of Information and Oil</td>
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<td>Louise Arbour</td>
<td>Supreme Court Justice, Canada; Former Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>Oscar Arias Sanchez</td>
<td>Former President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987</td>
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<td>Ersin Arioglu</td>
<td>Chairman, Yapi Merkezi Group, Turkey</td>
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<td>Emma Bonino</td>
<td>Member of European Parliament; former European Commissioner</td>
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<td>Zbigniew Brzezinski</td>
<td>Former U.S. National Security Adviser to the President</td>
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<td>Cheryl Carolus</td>
<td>Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former Secretary General of the ANC</td>
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<td>Jorge G. Castañeda</td>
<td>Former Foreign Minister, Mexico</td>
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<td>Victor Chu</td>
<td>Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong</td>
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<td>Wesley Clark</td>
<td>Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<td>Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark</td>
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<td>Former Prime Minister of Belgium</td>
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<td>Former Swedish Ambassador for Humanitarian Affairs; Director of Social Mobilization and Strategic Information, UNAIDS</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Itamar Rabinovich  
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