

**THE PERILS OF PRIVATE SECURITY
IN INDONESIA: GUARDS AND MILITIAS
ON BALI AND LOMBOK**

7 November 2003



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THE PERILS OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN INDONESIA: GUARDS AND MILITIAS ON BALI AND LOMBOK

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The devolution of authority over some police functions to civilian auxiliaries and private security organisations should be a source of concern to those concerned about police reform in Indonesia. While much donor aid is going into community policing, the trend in parts of Indonesia seems to be to allow local civilian groups, untrained and unaccountable, to provide protection or fight crime instead of the police. The trend is worrisome under any circumstances, but particularly so given political tensions in the lead-up to the 2004 elections.

The dependence on civilian security groups is the product of three factors:

- ❑ the perceived breakdown in law and order following the collapse of the Soeharto government in 1998, combined with general distrust of the police, which has led in many parts of Indonesia to vigilantism and a demand for protection from private groups;
- ❑ a massive decentralisation program that has given far more political and economic power to local government, particularly at the sub-provincial level; and
- ❑ a shortage of police to cope with post-Soeharto problems, particularly after the formal separation of the police from the armed forces in 1999.

This report focuses on civilian groups on the neighbouring islands of Bali and Lombok.

In Bali, traditional ritual guards – *pecalang* – have taken on both a security role, as a police partner, and a political role, as the protectors of President Megawati Soekarnoputri's party, the PDI-P. But as

an ethnically Balinese force at a time of growing anti-migrant sentiment on Bali, the *pecalang* may prove to be a liability in maintaining law and order.

In Lombok, just east of Bali, traditional religious leaders – *tuan guru* – have acquired their own private militias – *pam swakarsa* – the size of which is an indication of an individual's mass following. As support from *tuan guru* is essential for anyone with political aspirations on the island, these militias have frequently been turned into protection forces for candidates. They are even more problematic when they also take on, as they tend to do, a crime-fighting role in the absence of an effective police force.

In both Bali and Lombok, following the fall of Soeharto in 1998, these groups were welcomed as part of a broader decentralisation program to reduce the role of the military in providing internal security. The public perception was that they were empowering local residents to protect their villages from crime and infiltration by political provocateurs. Over five years, however, they have become increasingly involved in extortion and violence to the detriment of legal and political reform in both provinces. While their standing has ebbed and flowed, they are likely to gain in influence in the run up to the 2004 elections as political parties rely on them to help with their mass mobilisation campaigns.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Indonesian government:

1. Increase the recruitment and training of community-based police to decrease dependence on civilian groups.

2. Disassociate from the police any civilian auxiliaries linked to a particular ethnic group religion or political party, discourage their formation under any circumstances, and see to it that none is involved in duties that involve criminal procedure and law enforcement.
3. Consider a program to train and incorporate members of existing private security groups into the police or the municipal guard units called *tramtib* (a civilian corps employed by district governments to enforce local codes and regulations).

To donors:

4. Explore ways to reduce the reliance of political parties on their own security forces, and help expose Indonesians from government and non-governmental agencies to models from other countries where the police have gradually taken back control of security and protection from private, politically-affiliated groups.
5. Work with the police to study the problem of overlapping jurisdictions of village, district, and municipal security organisations and develop clearer lines of authority.

6. Support education programs that present vigilantism not as an expression of cultural or political power but as an abuse of traditional values.

To Balinese government officials:

7. Cease the practice of using *pecalang* to collect taxes and conduct identity checks of migrants, which exacerbates tensions between Balinese and non-Balinese.
8. Revoke any local regulations that discriminate against non-Balinese, including local taxation.

To Lombok government officials:

9. Disband the *pam swakarsa* militias in Lombok and institute a highly visible initiative to improve local policing skills and the behaviour of police in the community.

Jakarta/Brussels, 7 November 2003



THE PERILS OF PRIVATE SECURITY IN INDONESIA: GUARDS AND MILITIAS ON BALI AND LOMBOK

I. INTRODUCTION

Their success in investigating the October 2002 Bali bombings and pursuing the Jemaah Islamiyah network has been a welcome boost for an Indonesian police force that has widely been derided as incompetent and corrupt. It has also encouraged the many donors who have made police reform a major element of their efforts to assist the country's democratisation process.

But that success has obscured a development which should disturb those concerned about police reform: the devolution of authority over some police functions to civilian auxiliaries. While much thought and many resources are going into community policing, understood as a way of integrating the police more closely into the communities where they work, the trend in some parts of Indonesia seems to be to allow untrained and unaccountable local civilian groups to provide protection or fight crime in place of the police.

This trend is the product of several developments after the Soeharto government fell in 1998, including a perceived breakdown in law and order, widespread distrust of the police, a shortage of police personnel, and the extensive effort to decentralise the country by devolving much political and economic power to local government, particularly at the sub-provincial level.

The reliance on civilian auxiliaries is thus both a top-down and bottom-up phenomenon. Many civilian auxiliaries were organised with the reformist hope of replacing the military by civilian security. Civilian or not, however, "security" in Indonesia continues to be defined by Soeharto's New Order methods of

intimidation and violence. The result is that these auxiliaries often exacerbate rather than reduce security problems when they are recruited from particular ethnic or religious groups, when they become an instrument to gain or maintain political power, or when they are composed largely of thugs. Some are all the above.

In this report, ICG examines the role of civilian auxiliaries in two areas: Bali and the neighbouring island of Lombok, in West Nusa Tenggara province.

In Bali traditional ritual guards called *pecalang* have been welcomed by the police as a good example of a community-based security organisation. But the *pecalang* are also seen as the protectors of President Megawati Soekarnoputri's party, the PDI-P, and as an ethnically-based force that aims to protect Bali from the sullyng influence of non-Balinese migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia.

In Lombok, private militias (*pam swakarsa*) emerged when the police failed to prevent a dramatic rise in crime following the onset of the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis.¹ Tied to powerful religious leaders on the island, the Lombok groups involved hundreds of thousands of men at their height in 1998-1999. While the influence of the most-feared groups has declined, for reasons explained below, there is

¹ The term *pam swakarsa* first appeared in national police legislation in 1997. The term itself means roughly "self-security". Intended to refer to a neighbourhood watch guard, it took on unanticipated political connotations in 1998 when then Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces General Wiranto applied it to a civilian guard backed by the army and drawn from known thuggish organisations that was used to provide security for the Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Jakarta.

concern that the 2004 election campaign could give them renewed importance and lead to violence.

The concept of civilian auxiliaries is not new in Indonesia. They have existed since Dutch colonial days. The current problem is that the lack of any system of control, supervision, or regulation means that they all too easily become a law unto themselves, particularly since they often develop independent funding through involvement in protection rackets.

As the 2004 elections approach, ICG believes the contribution these groups make to community security is overshadowed by the danger they pose as a source of conflict.

II. BALI

Since the end of the Soeharto government, the *pecalang* have increasingly taken on responsibility for local security at the expense of, but also with the full cooperation of, local police. Their metamorphosis from an occasional guard for ritual ceremonies to a civilian auxiliary of the police and a protection unit for political parties has had a significant impact on life in Bali and increased the risk of local conflict.

Ethnic tensions have increased since the provincial government began to employ *pecalang* to monitor non-Balinese migrants living in Balinese communities. Provincial regulations passed in 2001 have also empowered untrained *pecalang* to enforce local administrative regulations. The *pecalang* role as a security guard for Megawati Sukarnoputri's political party in 1998 and 1999 will most likely be repeated in 2004, possibly endangering free campaigns in Balinese communities.

A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The role that the *pecalang* have assumed needs to be understood in terms of Balinese history and traditional institutions.

During the nineteenth century, the island was divided into eight kingdoms that more often than not were at war with each other. The Dutch colonial government gradually conquered each, beginning in the north and finally including the smaller kingdoms in the south and west.

Balinese were staunch nationalists during Indonesia's war of independence from 1945 to 1949 but the Dutch legacy of favouring nobles over commoners continued to shape political and social life. Deep rifts between rival royal houses, communities, and clan groups often determined political associations. In the early 1960s, leftist land reform policies set supporters of then President Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, PNI) against those of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), adding to existing divisions.

The situation worsened in 1963, when Bali's sacred mountain, Gunung Agung, erupted, killing or displacing tens of thousands in the eastern part of the island. The severe economic impact, combined with

intense rivalry between the PNI and PKI, set the stage for the killing of some 80,000 Balinese suspected of PKI affiliations after a coup attempt on 30 September 1965 that the Indonesian army blamed on the communists.²

After Soeharto came to power, his New Order government made use of the traumatic memories of those killings. Mandatory surveillance of the families of former PKI and an intensified military presence in Balinese communities effectively ended a tradition of lively political debate. All energies were focused on economic development, with the military leading the way.

1. Traditional Institutions

Bali managed to maintain its traditional institutions in the face of a relentless push by the New Order for ideological and administrative conformity, in part because of the role those institutions played in its economic success.

The *banjar* or hamlet association, a semi-autonomous subdivision of a village (*desa*), is arguably the most important and binding social unit in Balinese society. Each consists of even smaller social units called *tempekan*. Crucial decisions regarding community taxes, religious festivals and the repair of community properties are made through a consensus of peers at monthly hamlet meetings.

The New Order government recognised the importance of the *banjar* and made it a vehicle for development programs and dissemination of government ideology. But it also tried to weaken the *banjar* role in governance. In particular, its reorganisation of local government through 1974 and 1979 laws ended direct community involvement in village-level decision making and election of village heads by dividing the functions of *banjars* and other Balinese institutions between *dinas* (official) and *adat* (traditional) duties.

Security was an official function. Supervision and surveillance of residents, particularly those with communist backgrounds, were coordinated through the *banjars*.³ At the village level, official functions included administering directives of the central, provincial, district or sub-district government. Each

village head appointed a *banjar*-level representative to serve as an intermediary for official matters between himself or herself and the hamlet.

Village officials continued to spend considerable time and money on religious and traditional affairs. Traditional functionaries maintained village temples, held rituals and coordinated with police and villages on holy days when rival villages used the same roads and facilities. Traditional officials at the village level would communicate information to *banjar* leaders regarding village, district, or province-wide rituals and festivals requiring their cooperation. These rituals entailed a heavy tax burden for Balinese during the late New Order when Bali's religious organisation, Parisadha Hindu Dharma, collected funds to hold massive province-wide rituals at Besakih, Bali's mother temple.

2. The Late New Order

By the early 1980s, Bali's beaches, art, and highly ritualised Hinduism had attracted large numbers of tourists and much-needed foreign currency. Fast-paced hotel and residential development drew numerous non-Balinese migrants. Crime increased, resulting in intensified community security efforts and increased anxiety among Balinese over the migrant influx.⁴

Around the same time, local policing measures (*siskamling*) were introduced at the village level. The government pressed each *banjar* to recruit local guards who were to be coordinated by the sub-district military command (KORAMIL). Communities were also forced to build security posts (*pos siskamling*) for these guards.

In response to rising crime, Balinese communities revived traditional punitive and warning measures, including the *kukul bulus*, a rhythm played on a wooden slit-gong indicating that a thief was in the village. Once sounded, all male villagers within earshot were required to arm themselves and hunt for the criminal, sometimes resulting in his death. Although *kukul bulus* was a particularly Balinese tradition, it fit in well with the neighbourhood watch strategies of the Soeharto government and gave new legitimacy to vigilantism.

² Geoffrey Robinson, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (Ithaca, 1995), p. 274.

³ ICG interview, February 2003.

⁴ ICG interview, November 2002, with Balinese elder involved in forming a community security patrol in Sanur in 1991.

The impact of that vigilantism was quickly evident. Strong anti-outsider sentiments flared when Javanese thieves destroyed and stole Balinese temple property in the Ubud area between May and July 1994. An Ubud resident told ICG that many Balinese believed the robberies were in response to the deaths of non-Balinese criminals killed by the mobs after *kulkul bulus* warnings.

In reaction to the thefts, however, non-Balinese residents – some say as many as twenty but probably fewer – were killed by traditionally dressed Balinese vigilantes.⁵ Ubud residents also ran identity-card checks called “sweepings” in search of the thieves.⁶

The Asian monetary crisis precipitated profound political transformations throughout Indonesia and helped lead to Soeharto’s fall in May 1998. In many areas it added urgency to the removal at village level of those associated with the New Order government.

But Bali’s situation was somewhat different. Its dollar-based tourist and handicraft economies became hugely profitable due to the weakened rupiah. Bali was the exception to foreign travel warnings, its cultural harmony seeming to guarantee a riot-free environment.⁷ There were changes on the horizon, however, most particularly in relation to Balinese support for Megawati Sukarnoputri and her Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).

The ruling party, Golkar, had dominated all New Order elections in Bali. Nevertheless, most Balinese had ties back to the PNI that had been led by Sukarno, Megawati’s father, whose own mother was Balinese. By 1996, when she became the symbol of popular opposition to Soeharto, Bali was one of the most pro-Megawati areas outside of Java. Soeharto, threatened by her popularity, engineered a split in the PDI and endorsed an attack on her party headquarters in Jakarta in July 1996.⁸

The pro-government faction under a man named Suryadi retained the old party name, while Megawati’s faction was renamed Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P), the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party. Suryadi became PDI’s standard-bearer for the 1997 election. As a sign of their loyalty, many of Megawati’s supporters in Bali boycotted the election but celebrated the PDI’s loss to Golkar as a victory.⁹ Support for Megawati grew even stronger after Soeharto stepped down, and the *pecalang* took on a new role as protectors of her party.

3. The Aftermath of the PDI-P Congress

During the New Order, the *pecalang* had played only an occasional and largely ritualistic role. They primarily appeared on the holiday known as *nyepi*, a day when Balinese are forbidden to leave their homes, to cook or to light fires. The traditional guards ensured they observed the rules. After the fall of Soeharto, however, as violence increased, public faith in the police and military plummeted, and the impact of regional autonomy legislation began to make itself felt, the interest in creating an island-wide *pecalang* security function grew.

The *pecalang*’s transformation to a civilian auxiliary of the police began with the PDI-P’s need for protection in the immediate aftermath of Soeharto’s resignation. In October 1998, Megawati chose Bali as the site for the first post-Soeharto PDI-P congress.

At the time, the neighbouring province of East Java was tense from the deaths between February and October 1998 of over 100 Muslim teachers and purported sorcerers at the hands of mysterious, often black-garbed, killers known as *ninjas*.¹⁰ Balinese feared similar strikes on the PDI-P congress and mobilised the *pecalang* to protect it from disruption. They were seen as preferable to the police or military, both of whom much of the public associated with Golkar. The congress proceeded smoothly, and the *pecalang*’s reputation rose.

⁵ ICG interview with Ubud resident, November 2002.

⁶ ICG interview with Ubud resident, November 2002.

⁷ In fact, Bali was not as conflict-free as its image suggested. In April 1994, for example, the Indonesian military forcibly suppressed a mass demonstration against plans to build a Soeharto family-backed hotel and golf course on temple and community lands near Tabanan, West Bali. There were periodic eruptions of clan violence linked to disputes over development plans.

⁸ “Kronologi Peristiwa 27 Juli 1996”, *Tempo interaktif*, 5 May 2000.

⁹ ICG interview, November 2002, with *Gegenjekan* singers in Subagan, East Bali who celebrated their loss as victory after Bali’s PDI followers boycotted the 1997 election.

¹⁰ No conclusive evidence emerged as to who was behind the killings, but they appeared to be directed at members of the Nahdlatul Ulama organisation. See Abdul Manan, Imam Sumaatmadja and Veven Wardhana, “Geger Santet Banyuwangi”, ISAI, Jakarta, January 2001.

Golkar supporters in Bali were not as pleased by the congress's success, especially because it was held in Sanur, a village comprised mostly of powerful high-caste Golkar supporters.¹¹ Less than two months later, Golkar announced plans to hold a mass rally. Tensions rose in late 1998, as PDI-P populists began to realise their party's power. Control over Balinese politics had shifted almost overnight, from Golkar, the dominant party in a political bureaucracy dominated by high-caste Hindus, to a PDI-P-dominated majority. A showdown between PDI-P and Golkar followers appeared inevitable until a government minister made an unfortunate gaffe.

In November 1998, Indonesia's Minister of Food and Horticulture and head of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) A.M. Saefuddin, said that besides being a woman, Megawati was a poor presidential candidate because she was "a Hindu".¹² In reaction, several Golkar district heads throughout Bali used their Hindu identity to unite Balinese across partisan and caste lines and publicly demand that Saefuddin resign.¹³

On 28 October 1998 over 10,000 Balinese, Golkar and PDI-P alike, gathered in an open square in Renon, Denpasar and ate together, wearing Balinese ceremonial dress. The large collective meal marked a settling of differences between PDI-P and Golkar, thanks in part to Saefuddin's gaffe.¹⁴ Shortly

thereafter, newspaper articles declaring "Hindus Arise!" appeared for the first time in public memory.¹⁵ After November 1998, Balinese blamed "external" or "foreign" factors for all political tension.

4. The Kuta Case

The empowerment of *pecalang* as security guards occurred, in many cases, well before provincial legislation formalised their role.

Transition from the Soeharto-era centralised state to a more traditional system of shared control did not necessarily mean better community security. This was evident in Bali when Indonesian military officials agreed to transfer the military's "management" rights over Kuta beach – one of the island's best-known tourist areas – to the local government.

In preparation for the transfer, scheduled for 11 May 1999, Kuta residents gave the non-Balinese vendors in the area a sense of how tough tradition can be. On the evening of 29 April, men wearing traditional Balinese dress cleared and burned hundreds of vendor stands lining the roads.¹⁶

Before the transfer, all Kuta traders and street-side vendors had been obliged to pay what was effectively protection money to the army cooperative, Pusat Kooperasi Angkatan Darat (Puskopad). When the military surrendered responsibility for Kuta and the surrounding area, the provincial government in turn gave the task to the traditional officials of the village, who, with Kuta's *pecalang*, were henceforth responsible for protection and "tax" collection.¹⁷

Although the transfer of security from the military to civilians was in theory a useful reform, there were serious problems in practice. The majority of Kuta's street vendors were poor non-Balinese from Lombok, Madura, Sumatra and East Java. Treated as second-class citizens, they were often blamed for crimes.¹⁸ The burning of vendors' stands and the tensions

¹¹ Former Minister of Mining and Energy Ida Bagus Sudjana was one such supporter. Bali's long term governor, Ida Bagus Oka, was another.

¹² "Saefuddin Menghadang Mega, Bali yang Berang", *Tempo*, 27 October – 2 November 1998. The minister's exact words (in translation) when interviewed about Megawati by the press on 14 October 1998, were: "Q: Are you prepared to compete with Megawati?" Saefuddin: "Megawati isn't so tough. I can beat her. She's a Hindu, you know. I'm a Muslim. Are the Indonesian people willing to be led by a Hindu President? I saw her praying at those temples." Megawati had prayed at a Balinese ceremony once in 1998.

¹³ "Pecat AM Saefuddin Atau Bali Merdeka: KNPI Bali Sampaikan Sikap lewat Pangdam Udayana", *Bali Post*, 18 October 1998. Bali's most pro-Golkar institution, the National Committee for Indonesian Youth (KNPI), demanded that Saefuddin resign or Bali would declare independence. By rejecting the accusation that Megawati was a Hindu, they were defending Balinese cultural (and Hindu) identity.

¹⁴ Throughout November 1998, Bali's streets were filled with empty coffins as an expression of anger against Saefuddin. (Balinese cremate their dead on large cremation towers. Coffins are used by Christians and Muslims.)

¹⁵ "Bangkitnya Gerakan Protes Umat Hindu: Wajar, setelah Lama Memaafkan", *Bali Post*, 28 October 1998.

¹⁶ "Ratusan Rombong Kaki Lima Dibakar: Ketenangan Kuta Terusik", *Bali Post*, 30 April 1999.

¹⁷ "Mulai 11 Mei, Pantai Kuta Dekelolah Desa Adat", *Bali Post*, 6 May 1999.

¹⁸ ICG interview with Denpasar activist, September 2002. He said: "Most people in Kuta think that all of the thieves in Kuta are from Java or Lombok. I knew a Balinese thief in the area once who joked that every time he steals something in Kuta he gets to be Javanese for a day".

between poor migrant labourers and Balinese villagers also sparked a public debate about the form that traditional Balinese governance would take under regional autonomy legislation passed in 1999. A key question was where non-Balinese would fit in.

5. Election Violence in October 1999

Anti-migrant sentiment increased as a result of the June 1999 national parliamentary elections. The lead-up to the poll in Bali progressed in a sea of red – the PDI-P's colour. There was little doubt who was going to win. PDI-P received 79.5 per cent of Bali's popular vote, Golkar 10 per cent.

Most Balinese assumed Megawati would become president, since her party had also received the most votes nationally. But on 21 October 1999, the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), chose Abdurrahman Wahid of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB). The day after the announcement, thousands of Megawati supporters poured into Denpasar where they burned tires, looted stores and destroyed the district head's office. Similar violence broke out in the PDI-P's traditional stronghold in the district capital of Singaraja and in Buleleng and Jembrana in the north and west of the island.¹⁹ In the weeks that followed, Balinese intellectuals blamed outside provocateurs for the violence. Others saw the riots as a form of protest against economic inequalities between Balinese and outsiders.²⁰ These sentiments intensified over the next year as political conflict and poverty brought more non-Balinese migrants into Denpasar than ever before.

B. SECURITY AND DECENTRALISATION

Together with decentralisation and the perceived inadequacy of the police, the anti-migrant sentiment helped spur the rise of the *pecalang*.²¹

Civilian auxiliaries were not a novel idea. During the New Order, Balinese had relied on civil guards, recruited and trained by sub-district military commands, and on municipal guards called *tibum*, in addition to the military and police. The *tibum* were active in Denpasar and district capitals where they were tasked with enforcing directives issued by local administrative officials. Their duties consisted of smashing vendors' carts and market stalls deemed in violation of local codes. Each year the guards worked hard to clear unlicensed market areas that might endanger their district's chances of winning awards such as the much coveted *adipura* cleanliness prize. Provincial regulations regarding prostitution, karaoke bars, and "entertainment zones" were also subject to inspection by *tibum* guards.

These forces were replaced in early 2001 by the Peace and Order Guard (Ketentraman dan Ketertiban or *tramtib*). *Tramtib* were civil servants with military-like uniforms. After January 2001, under the new decentralisation laws, districts had the authority to write their own ordinances governing the use of *tramtib* for enforcement of municipal codes and to hire people accordingly. Monitoring prostitution, gambling activities, unlicensed housing, market-stall placement and non-local migrants without updated residence permits or identity cards were all part of the *tramtib*'s responsibilities.

But often it was unclear where *tramtib* authority left off and *pecalang* jurisdiction began. In one incident in early 2003, *pecalang* from the village of Kesiman in eastern Denpasar actually arrested *tramtib* guards who were collecting protection fees from local prostitutes.²²

Changes in village structure also affected security. Provincial Regulation No. 3/2001 in Bali created what was called *desa pakraman*, which involved a blurring of the former distinction between official and traditional functions in the way village structures operated.²³ *Banjar* residents and officials were

¹⁹ "Kerusuhan di Bali akan Dibahas Dalam Sidang Kabinet", *Bali Post*, 31 October 1999. These are the same areas where a violent clash between PDI-P and Golkar supporters left two dead in October 2003.

²⁰ "Mencegah Amuk Massa", *Bali Post*, 1 December 1999.

²¹ Under the 2002 National Police Law, the police are required to coordinate with village officials on *pam swakarsa* matters. This has occurred to a limited degree but requires a more aggressive effort by the police.

²² "Pecalang Tangkap Lima Oknum Tramtib", *Bali Post*, 18 January 2003.

²³ The Balinese term for this inter-village diversity is *desa mawacara*. Each Balinese village possesses similar temple and ritual calendar systems but village ordinances differ quite dramatically across the island. In the past "*desa mawacara*" prevented New Order standardisation schemes from penetrating too deeply into village affairs. Ironically, regional autonomy legislation endangered this diversity because uniformity was necessary to empower village structures equally.

henceforth both involved in the monitoring, taxation and security of village residents, whether local or non-local, Balinese or non-Balinese.

The positive side was that Bali's populace acquired a new sense of entitlement and responsibility for their own communities; the negative side was that untrained villagers were involved in tasks normally reserved for government tax officials, police, municipal guards or military officers. A decade of growing anti-outsider sentiment also provided Balinese with the means and legal instruments to intimidate, punish and tax non-Balinese Indonesian citizens living in their communities.

The legal jurisdiction of *desa pakraman* remains unclear two years later. Regulation N°3 acknowledged the legal authority of the village- or hamlet-level ordinances drafted through debates and consensus over long periods of time. However, *pararem* – neighbourhood regulations – can be passed at the sub-*banjar* or *tempekan* level, often with only the signature of the local hamlet head, and are not subject to monitoring by higher-level officials.

Several communities, for example, reportedly are considering regulations imposing cockfighting taxes on all members of the community, whether or not they gamble.²⁴ Some regulations are tantamount to official extortion of migrants. As long as no one files a complaint, the ordinances go unchallenged.²⁵

A possible remedy to this problem may lie with the planned but not yet functioning province-wide network of *pakraman* councils. These have been mandated to hear, challenge or process complaints as they arise at the sub-district, district and provincial levels.²⁶ At no level in this structure, however, does

an advisory body exist which can hear complaints voiced by non-Balinese. The rights of non-Hindu residents living under traditional structures remain a neglected feature of Balinese village administration reform.

C. THE MIGRANT POPULATION

The *pecalang's* primary function over the past two years has been the regular policing and surveillance of non-Balinese in their communities. One author writes:

One of the two potential causes of the destruction of Bali is the population growth due to non-Balinese migration...*Pecalang* must provide strict enforcement of population ordinances. Ask [migrants] their identities. Do they have skills? Do they have a local Balinese sponsor? Do they have sufficient funds to survive in Bali or not? We should learn from the violent conflict between Madurese migrants and indigenous Dayak in Sampit, Central Kalimantan. If the number of migrants is nearly the same as the indigenous population the potential for hegemony and conflict becomes greater.²⁷

Pecalang are now seen not only as a village security body but also as a pro-active deterrent to increased migration and the eventual marginalisation of indigenous Balinese. Various forms of migration to Bali did, in fact, increase dramatically in the post-Soeharto years. Violent conflict in East Timor and Maluku in 1999 forced thousands to flee. Many of the displaced chose to live in Bali because of its noted religious tolerance. In fact, since the Jakarta riots of May 1998 in which ethnic Chinese were a target, thousands of wealthy Chinese-Indonesian families established temporary residences and built up businesses in Denpasar. The 17 January 2000 riots in nearby Lombok sent at least another 500 predominantly middle-class Christian Chinese families to Bali. By 2000, the influx of non-Balinese into already densely populated Denpasar had made Bali's regional government nervous.

²⁴ "Menjadikan Tajen Alat Pembangunan", *Bali Post*, 29 January 2003.

²⁵ *Tramtib* authorities act largely on mayoral ordinances that reflect directly on the manner of enterprise, licensed businesses or residential areas. Cockfights are conducted on *Pakraman* lands where *tramtib* have no jurisdiction so long as no complaints are filed against the cockfights by residents living adjacent to the activity. See Denpasar municipal legislation, UU Gangguan (HO) N°9/2001/Pasal 3 and 5.

²⁶ *Desa Pakraman* Legislation N°3/2001, "Bab IX/Majelis *Desa Pakraman*/Pasal 14", 2001. *Pakraman* councils will be established as a supra-village advisory body. Each village will choose two representatives to become members of the sub-district *Pakraman* Council. Each sub-district will send two representatives to join the district-level council and so on up to the provincial level. In principle, the council is

designed as a traditional judicial body that will mirror the governmental structure.

²⁷ I Ketut Widia, *Pecalang: Desa Pekraman di Bali*, (Penerbit SIC, 2002), pp. 16-17.

Initially, Balinese reactions to overcrowding were primarily cultural and religious. For instance, several Balinese officials publicly demanded that the island's elite, and migrant-dominated, Catholic schools change their Sanskrit (scripturally Hindu) names to Latin or other non-Sanskrit Christian names.²⁸ Plans to construct a bridge between Java and Bali fuelled fears that unemployed non-Balinese would flood across, seeking work.²⁹ Some of these anxieties were due to a decade of inter-communal tensions, while others were rooted in the dramatic increase in crime and new migrants to Denpasar after 1999.

In 2000, Denpasar had 12,929 registered migrants, according to government figures. Within one year, that figure had jumped to 30,264.³⁰ While this included migrants from other areas of Bali as well as non-Balinese, the trend was clear.³¹ Annual population growth in Denpasar reached 6.5 per cent, with only 2 per cent due to new births. (Denpasar's mean population growth from 1990 to 2000 was only 3.2 per cent.)³² The national census of 2000, which broke down Bali's population according to ethnicity and migrant status, put a non-Balinese face to the sudden rise in population and criminality in the island's capital and explained some of the Balinese concerns with overpopulation.³³ The simultaneous rise in non-Balinese migration and crime rates reinforced long-standing stereotypes of the Javanese, Sasak (from Lombok) and Madurese laborer communities on the island.

1. Migrant Ordinances

In 2000, concern over the migrant influx led the provincial government to employ *pecalang* to run identity card checks in areas where non-Balinese workers lived. The *pecalang* often threatened non-Balinese workers, pulling them out of their homes and forcing them to pay Rp.50,000 to 100,000

(U.S.\$7 to \$14) in fines – two to three days' wages.³⁴ A Javanese tofu seller in Denpasar told ICG, "The *pecalang* are authorities in the village. If I don't pay them, then none of the villagers will buy my goods. The police are easier to work with because they represent the government".

The definition of an "outsider" became more complicated with decentralisation and devolution of authority to local government. Most traditional ordinances did not discriminate in treatment of non-Balinese residents. It was easier, however, to tax non-Balinese workers than internal migrants.

Several difficult questions arose. Should non-Hindu migrants pay a share of the monthly dues for village road maintenance, temple repairs or other costs that, in a Balinese cultural framework, help maintain the security and safety of the village? Should non-local Balinese Hindus pay a double charge, to the traditional institutions of both their resident village and their "authentic" village where they remain formal members? These questions remain of vital importance to security on the island. Without consensus over who should pay village dues and for what reason, rampant extortion between rival *banjars*, sub-divisions, and villages is more frequent.³⁵

2. KIPEM Ordinances

In January 2000, Denpasar's local government issued a mandatory tax for all non-local residents. Each taxpayer received a temporary residence permit or KIPEM.³⁶ Every three months non-local residents had to extend this permit at a cost of Rp.70,000 (U.S.\$9.70) or more. These payments were initially considered government administration costs and were paid to village officials. Depending on the area, non-local residents often paid additional unofficial levies to *pecalang* or *banjar* heads each month of anywhere from Rp.10,000 to 20,000 (U.S.\$1.20 to \$2.40).³⁷

²⁸ "Ada Kemungkinan "Swastiastu" Diganti", *Bali Post*, 12 January 2000.

²⁹ ICG interview with former Golkar representative in Bali's regional parliament, November 2002.

³⁰ "Kota Denpasar", *Kompas*, 10 May 2002.

³¹ "Penduduk Pendetang: Antara Diperlukan dan Dimasalahkan", *Bali Post*, 2 December 2002.

³² "Results of the 2000 Population Census: Population Characteristics of Bali", November 2001, p. xix.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 41. For instance, 17 per cent (200,526) of the Denpasar population in 2000 were migrants. Of those, only 42,237 were Balinese migrants from outside Denpasar. The majority were non-Balinese. Over 20 per cent (120,000) of Denpasar's population were Javanese.

³⁴ ICG interview with Javanese student residents in Tanjung Bongkak, East Denpasar. October 2002. Currency conversions are based on values at the time of the events described; they thus vary in this report.

³⁵ ICG interview with *pecalang* in Sanglah, Denpasar. December 2002. The *pecalang* in question admitted that his fellow *pecalang* often charged random fees to non-Balinese migrants during the post-bombing period.

³⁶ KIPEM is an acronym for Kartu Izin Penduduk Sementara.

³⁷ ICG interview with Javanese labourers working in Cangu, West Bali, 4 November 2002.

The mayor's office in Denpasar ordered that all migrant residents pay a "migrant deposit fee" in addition to KIPEM costs. This was meant to cover a bus ticket to a migrant's home village so that, if he or she became unemployed or indigent, village residents and officials would not be burdened. The fee accordingly varied according to place of origin. For residency in the village of Dauh Puri Kelod in downtown Denpasar, for instance, the following deposits were required: East Java, Rp.68,000; Central Java, Rp.122,000; Yogyakarta, Rp.125,000; West Java, Rp.200,000; Jakarta, Rp.225,000; Lombok, Rp.68,000; Sumbawa, Rp.200,000; outer Indonesia, Rp.225,000.³⁸

On 30 October 2002, new directives from the mayor rendered all "resident deposit" charges invalid.³⁹ Non-local residents were required to pay only the quarterly identity card and residency permit costs. For many this was a relief. News soon arrived, however, that the new residency fees were to be raised to Rp.50,000 per resident every quarter for Balinese and Rp.100,000 (U.S.\$13) for non-Balinese. This made it prohibitively expensive for a migrant family of four to cover basic living expenses.⁴⁰

The residency permit charge may have protected Denpasar from overcrowding but not the island from terrorism. Dauh Puri Kelod village, despite its vigilance towards non-Balinese, was where Ali Imron, a key suspect in the Bali bombings and originally from East Java, once resided.⁴¹

Even though the "migrant deposit" fees and residency permit charges fell within the jurisdiction of government officials, collection was frequently delegated to the untrained and often thuggish traditional forces. This was made possible by a directive of Denpasar's mayor on 10 October 2002 – two days before the Bali bombing – that formalised

the involvement of *desa pakraman* in the monitoring of outsiders.⁴²

While the fees had been determined by the village heads in their official capacity, after 10 October they were subject to the influence of Denpasar's traditional village heads and *banjar* leaders as well. Their involvement further clouded the already murky questions over how the money was to be spent.

D. IMPACT OF THE KUTA BOMBING

On 12 October 2002 bombs exploded in the tourist haven of Kuta, killing 202 people, mostly non-Indonesian visitors. The bombing had disastrous effects on Bali's economy but provided *pecalang* with unchallenged legitimacy to deter migration. In addition to *pecalang*, provincial politicians also tasked their own political gangs to join the effort to keep outsiders from flooding the island.

A government priority, in the interests of restoring a sense of security, was an island-wide effort to "record and order the non-Balinese migrant population". As noted above, Bali's working class consisted mostly of labourers from the overcrowded or underemployed areas of East Java and Lombok. After the bombing, over 30,000 Balinese lost tourism-related jobs. Residency permit regulations and monitoring were now not merely efforts to protect Bali from overcrowding but also a means to protect employment.⁴³

Even before the bombing, regular meetings between the police, military and *pecalang* were held to prepare for security in the lead-up to the 2004 elections. The bombing led to the formalisation of the relationship between police and *pecalang*.⁴⁴ Within a week, Muslim migrant workers began to return to their hometowns to celebrate the end of the fasting month Ramadan. But many did not dare leave Bali for fear they would not be able to return since they had neither official identity cards nor a

³⁸ "Directive of the Denpasar Mayor's office concerning the ordering of migrant residents in Denpasar", No.593/2000, 4 December 2000. The fees were mandatory as of that date.

³⁹ "Directive of the Denpasar Mayor's office concerning the ordering of migrant residents in Denpasar", N°585/2002, 30 October 2002.

⁴⁰ A boarding room in Denpasar costs a minimum of Rp.300,000 to 500,000, with living costs at least another Rp.400,000. A large percentage of migrants removed to their home villages at the very least to apply for identity cards (KTP) needed to receive a formal residency permit.

⁴¹ ICG interview with a resident of the *banjar* adjacent to Bumi Asri, where Ali Imron was a registered resident, January 2002.

⁴² Speech presented to village, city and district officials by I Nyoman Sudiri, head of Forum for Inter-village Communication in Denpasar, 10 October 2000.

⁴³ ICG interview with Balinese tour leader in Glogor, Denpasar, December 2002.

⁴⁴ ICG interview with anthropologist Degung Santikarma, who attended a security meeting between Balinese police, military and *pecalang* heads in Denpasar to anticipate the drafting of a "code of ethics" for *pecalang* prior to the 2004 elections.

temporary residence permit. They had instead simply paid the migrant taxes enforced by local *pecalang* in the communities where they worked.⁴⁵

New government-backed gangs had emerged in Denpasar just one month prior to the bombing. The strongest was Forum Peduli Denpasar (Forum for Concern about Denpasar, FPD), which included several former members of a notorious gang from the 1970s and 1980s known as Armada Racun or the Poison Armada.⁴⁶ Largely organisers for the 1999 PDI-P campaign, these groups showed their support for Denpasar Mayor Anak Agung Puspayoga and were allowed to use Ubung, the city's busiest bus terminal, to secure payments from drivers and screen the identification of non-Balinese workers.

After the Kuta bombs, FPD also screened returning migrants and newcomers to determine whether they had jobs, valid travel documents, and sufficient funds to support themselves during their stay in Bali and whether they could show proof, in the form of a letter from a Balinese friend or employer at the village level, that they were legal residents and workers.⁴⁷ These efforts had an immediate impact. The number of residents seeking identity cards rose by 800 per cent, and between 12 October and early December 2002, over 8,000 non-Balinese migrants were sent home to Java.⁴⁸

The most forceful deterrent to non-Balinese returning from their holidays in December 2002 and January 2003 was news of the hike in temporary resident fees. Non-Balinese residents were charged as much as Rp.1 million in upmarket tourist areas such as Jembaran in South Bali.⁴⁹ The general cost quoted among Denpasar residents, however, was Rp.200,000 (U.S.\$22.50) per person per three months. Even this was unsustainably high for nearly all non-Balinese workers and their families.

⁴⁵ ICG interviews, Denpasar, November 2003.

⁴⁶ ICG interview with Armada Racun members from West Denpasar, December 2002. The gang was backed by one of the civilians involved in planning the execution of suspected communists in Denpasar in 1965. It disbanded in the mid-1980s.

⁴⁷ ICG interview with *tramtib* officer in Denpasar, March 2003.

⁴⁸ "Penertiban Marak, Pengurusan KTP meningkat 800 persen", *Nusatenggara Post*, 28 December 2002, and "Lebih dari 8,000 pendatang di Bali dipulangkan ke Jawa", *Kompas*, 4 December, 2002.

⁴⁹ ICG interview with tourism sector worker in Jembaran, Bali. December 2002.

The elevated fees were never administered but news of them was responsible for no small amount of confusion. While the amount of the "migrant deposit" depended on the origins of the migrant, the residency fees applied to all non-Denpasar residents, including Balinese. As a result, fights broke out in areas throughout Denpasar when local guards attempted to force fellow Balinese from adjacent villages to pay the same KIPEM cost as Javanese residents.⁵⁰

Finally, in January 2003, Balinese authorities decided that a much lower KIPEM fee would be applied to all Bali. Each non-Balinese migrant had to pay Rp.50,000 (U.S.\$5), each non-local Balinese Rp.5,000 (U.S.\$0.50), every six months.⁵¹ The difference was that the tax would apply to all districts, not only over-crowded Denpasar.

E. LOOKING FORWARD

Bali's *pecalang* are one example among many in Indonesia of an ethnically-based civilian guard set up to fill a security void and then given legitimacy through an officially-recognised role as an auxiliary to the police. The decentralisation process has been a particular spur to the formation of such groups.

Balinese police argue that the *pecalang* are critical for community security, which may be true, particularly as long as police capacity is low. The danger comes when such guards begin to constitute a form of authorised vigilantism; when they are allowed to discriminate against members of other ethnic groups; when there is insufficient training and supervision to ensure that they behave in a professional manner; or when they become affiliated to a particular political party.

The relationship between Bali's *pecalang* and the PDI-P is a source of particular concern as the 2004 elections approach. Before the 1999 elections the *pecalang* were perceived only as party sympathisers operating under a traditional guise. Their integration into village and security structures from 1999

⁵⁰ ICG interview with Balinese resident of Tanjung Bungkak, where many of these disturbances occurred, December 2002.

⁵¹ "Kesepakatan Bersama Gubernur Bali Dengan Bupati Walikota se-Bali" [Joint Agreement between the Governor of Bali and all District Heads and Mayors in Bali], N°453/2003, article 4.

onwards has given them real clout.⁵² No other security body can claim their island-wide coverage, and it is likely that both police and military will turn to them for help if tensions related to the elections or migrant-local relations erupt into violence.⁵³

III. LOMBOK

In Lombok, the emergence of private militias followed a different trajectory. Where the *pecalang* began as a ritual temple guard and metamorphosed into an integral part of the security structure, the groups known as *pam swakarsa* began as local crime-fighting forces and evolved into private militias for politically-affiliated religious leaders. The dangers they pose, however, are similar.

A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Lombok, with 2.4 million people, is one of Indonesia's most densely populated islands and one of its poorest.⁵⁴ Sometimes called "the land of a thousand mosques", it is overwhelmingly Muslim, and religious leaders, known as *tuan guru*, play a powerful political role. Ethnic Sasak Muslims constitute 92 per cent of the population but there are significant minorities of some 60,000 Balinese Hindus and 20,000 Sasak Buddhists, mostly in North Lombok, as well as a small number of Chinese Indonesian Buddhists, and 11,000 predominantly non-Sasak Christians.⁵⁵

Historically, western Lombok looked to Bali, while eastern Lombok had closer ties to ethnic Buginese kingdoms in Sulawesi to the north and Sumbawa to the east. For almost 150 years beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, two East Balinese royal houses colonised Lombok.

In 1891, however, a rebellion, led by Guru Bangkol, head of a Muslim brotherhood, broke out on the eastern part of the island. The Balinese eventually subdued it, but not before Guru Bangkol had invited the Dutch in to assist him. Just which parts of the local Sasak aristocracy sided with Guru Bangkol and which with the Balinese remains a matter of fierce debate in Lombok.

⁵² Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Bali Nomor 3 Tahun 2001, Pasal 14 (Provincial Regulation No.3/2001, Article 14).

⁵³ ICG interview with Denpasar *tramtib* official. February 2002.

⁵⁴ "Perlu Wawasan Ekonomi Perbaiki Kondisi NTB", *Bali Post*, 25 April 2003. The province of West Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Barat or NTB) still depends on the central government for 73 per cent of its fiscal budget. Given the seasonal drought, low education levels, and high rates of divorce and infant and maternal mortality in Lombok, a large number of ethnic Sasaks have sought work as manual labourers abroad (legally or illegally) or in neighbouring regions such as Bali or Maluku.

⁵⁵ Kanwil Departemen Agama NTB, 2000.

The arrival of the Dutch led to a gradual erosion of Balinese authority and the rise of Sasak noble houses in East and Central Lombok, through which the colonialists ruled and collected taxes⁵⁶ The unpopularity of these puppet nobles led to messianic rebellions in the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, they continued to rule until the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1941-1945). The Japanese military helped organise and train nationalists throughout the country to fight the Dutch, and many of Lombok's future political and religious leaders underwent such training.

Saleh Sungkar was one such figure. Head of Lombok's most important Muslim organisation, the Lombok Association for Muslims (Persatuan Ummat Islam Lombok, PUIL), during the Japanese occupation, he became an important reformer on an island dominated by colonial nobles and corrupt merchants.⁵⁷ He turned the local branch of Indonesia's largest Islamic party, Masyumi, which he chaired, into an organisation that welcomed commoners and nobles alike. As a result, several of the latter left Masyumi to join the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), where they enjoyed closer ties to the military and wealthy Balinese aristocrats.

Saleh Sungkar was mysteriously murdered in 1952. At the time, he was head of Lombok's district parliament. After his death, several fellow reformers joined Lombok's branch of the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party.⁵⁸ Many were killed during the 1965-1966 purge of suspected PKI members by Muslim youth groups, backed by the military.

1. The New Order

The Golkar party was eager to co-opt Lombok's clerics and community leaders. Historically, the latter had strong alliances to the large Muslim political parties, Nadhlatul Ulama and Masyumi. But in the 1971 elections, the most important of these sided with Golkar, reportedly as a sign of gratitude to Soeharto for his role in destroying the PKI. In return, the military and other government officials assisted them in their efforts to proselytise (*dakwah*) in North Lombok's traditionalist hinterland.⁵⁹

For instance, in Tanjung, a sub-district of West Lombok, the military vandalised several sacred sites and ancestral altars as part of a broader effort to dissuade Muslims from performing non-Islamic rituals. As late as 1974, soldiers from Tanjung's military command forced villagers to stand in rows on the community soccer field to profess their adherence to the prophet and holy book of their religion or be considered *kafirs* (infidels) – in effect communists.⁶⁰

Two of the most powerful of the Lombok proselytisers were Tuan Guru Mutawalli from Jeroaru, East Lombok, and Tuan Guru Haji (TGH) Zainuddin Abdul Madjid from Pancor, East Lombok, the founder of the largest Lombok-based religious institution, Nadhlatul Wathan (NW).

TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid was particularly associated with the development of educational institutions such as Islamic day schools (*madrasah*) and boarding schools (*pesantren*). Because he believed Soeharto deserved thanks for destroying

⁵⁶ The Dutch were already well established in areas throughout Indonesia but, with the exception of the North Balinese kingdom of Buleleng, Bali had yet to fall into their hands. Dutch control over Lombok severely weakened the ability of Balinese kingdoms to call on Lombok-based Balinese and Sasak conscripts in times of war.

⁵⁷ "Satu Abad Kota Selong", East Lombok Regional Government Publication, 1998. Lombok's most important religious leaders also founded important *pesantren* during this period. Lombok's largest is Nadhlatul Wathan in Pancor, Selong East Lombok. Others are Nurul Yakin in Praya founded by Tuan Guru Makmun (1931), Darul Qur'an in Bengkel (1940) founded by Tuan Guru Haji Hambali, and Assyidiyah in Gunung Sari founded by TGH Jafar.

⁵⁸ Sairul S. Lubis, "10 Tahun PKI di NTB", *Gelora*, 1962. Lubis writes: "Muhammed Baisir was upset about the political assassination of Saleh Sungkar, who was head of the local parliament for Masyumi at the time. In protest of Sungkar's death Baisir left Masyumi and formed the PKI".

⁵⁹ North Lombok is home to two relatively large communities of Sasak traditionalists called Wetu Telu and Buda. Wetu Telu communities practice a combination of pre-Islamic Sasak Hindu-Buddhism and a Sufistic version of Islam very different from the beliefs and practices of Islamic brotherhoods and modernist sects that developed in East, Central and West Lombok during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Buda, literally meaning non-Muslim in the local language, practice a form of Sasak ritualism with strong ties to Balinese Hinduism and, they argue, even stronger ties to archaic Indonesian forms of Indonesian Buddhism. Both groups were targeted for conversion by East Lombok's orthodox *tuan guru* during the late 1960s and 1970s. The *tuan guru* were assisted in their efforts, on many occasions, by the local military commands in Tanjung and Bayan sub-districts of the Northern region of West Lombok.

⁶⁰ The New Order government equated atheism with communism, so anyone who did not profess one of the major religions was automatically suspect.

the PKI, he served as Golkar's campaign manager in East Lombok for the 1971 and 1977 national parliamentary elections. Golkar won majorities in Lombok at both elections, and TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid represented the province of West Nusa Tenggara in the MPR.

In 1982, however, at a time when many Muslim leaders were unhappy with Soeharto government policies, TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid announced he was leaving it to NW's followers to determine their own choice of party.⁶¹ As a consequence, many of his supporters were arrested or intimidated, and government aid to NW schools was cut.⁶² TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid returned to Golkar in time for the 1987 election and remained a supporter until his death in October 1997.

NW grew more powerful than ever under his stewardship at this time, but when he died, a serious conflict erupted between his two daughters over who was to replace him, both as head of NW and as the political power of East Lombok.

2. Post-Soeharto Politics

After Soeharto fell in May 1998, Lombok's ethnic Sasaks faced grave problems stemming from the 1997-1998 economic crisis and political uncertainty. It was not just the death of TGH Abdul Majid that left a political vacuum but also a rejection of Jakarta-appointed officials. For almost 35 years, non-Sasak military governors had ruled West Nusa Tenggara, and Sasaks from East Lombok had only rarely been appointed to senior posts in the local government. In the late 1980s, when Sasak members of Golkar lobbied to have one of their own appointed governor, they were accused of subversive "primordialism" and subjected to surveillance.⁶³

In 1986 and 1987, for instance, the then governor of West Nusa Tenggara, a Javanese general named Warsito, ordered military intelligence to interrogate key members of the group of Sasak politicians later named the "Sasak Yellow Book Movement" (*Gerakan Buku Kuning Sasak*). The district parliament held a closed hearing to question those involved in the movement. Mesir Suryadi, a high ranking official in Golkar's provincial branch, was formally removed from his positions in the provincial parliament and the party. The pressure prevented Sasak politicians from developing a local elite.

Soeharto's resignation, the reform movement, and the decentralisation process opened up opportunities for local politicians and increased the political stakes. New efforts were made to get "native sons" into power. In October 1998, Harun Al'Rashid, from neighbouring Bima, on the island of Sumbawa, was elected governor by the West Nusa Tenggara provincial parliament, defeating the Sasak candidates. Although he was native to the province, many Sasaks feared that patronage would favour Bimanese and Sumbawans in the new administration. In 1999, however, East Lombok's district council for the first time elected a Sasak as district head (*bupati*).⁶⁴

Tuan guru who had been linked to Golkar made themselves available to new, smaller parties in Lombok, in which they had a stronger bargaining position than within the huge Golkar bureaucracy.

On top of the political jockeying, the economic crisis pushed crime to intolerable levels in Lombok, where theft has not always carried negative connotations.⁶⁵ Many Mataram youths spoke proudly of the *datu maling*, robber kings with networks in South and West Lombok and famous not only for thievery but also for bravery and magical prowess (*simbik*,

⁶¹ He called the choice "*ban-bin-bun*" meaning respectively *banteng* (bull, the symbol of the Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI); *bintang* (star, symbol of the Muslim United Development Party or PPP) and *bunut* (from the Sasak word for banyan tree, the symbol of Golkar).

⁶² Badri, Muhammad Nasihuddin, "Meniti Tapak Sejarah 66 Tahun Pondok Pesantren Darunnahdlatain Nahdlatul Wathan Pancor", Yayasan Pendidikan Hamzanwadi, 2001: p. 23-25.

⁶³ "Puluhan Tahun Terkubur, Organisasi Kedaerahan di NTB Menjamur", *Lombok Post*, 11 November 1999. During the New Order, promotion of a particular ethnic group for any reason was considered a violation of *Pancasila*, the state ideology.

⁶⁴ The importance of a Sasak governor may not have been so great as long as TGH Abdul Madjid was alive. Sasaks continue to tell a story of a senior Golkar official from Jakarta who came to East Lombok and demanded a great pro-Golkar parade. Without the support of TGH Abdul Madjid, the streets were empty. The Jakarta politician was then forced to pay homage to the Muslim leader before the parade could be organised.

⁶⁵ ICG interview with community elder in Tanjung, North Lombok, October 2002. Many of Lombok's most important rituals involve some form of theft. Ritualised elopement and *ketemuq* spirit-loss involve various versions of theft and recovery crucial to ritual life throughout the island.

wanen).⁶⁶ According to a North Lombok resident, when a thief from Bonjeruk village was killed by a vigilante mob, his body was returned with a hero's parade.⁶⁷

But whereas thieves were once respected for their abilities to outwit police and arrogant officials, sentiments changed during the economic crisis, which hurt Lombok badly. The number of migrant workers going abroad more than doubled.⁶⁸ The remittances they sent back widened the gap between their families and those with no workers abroad. Remittance wealth also increased the goods susceptible to theft in Lombok's villages.

The economic crisis likewise exacerbated tensions between wealthy urban Christian Chinese merchant communities and the impoverished Sasak peasantry.⁶⁹ As early as January 1998, Lombok's Chinese merchants closed their shops for fear of attacks by Central Lombok farmers who blamed them for the rise in the cost of rice and other basic commodities.⁷⁰

In February 1998, anti-Chinese riots erupted in Praya, Central Lombok, as elsewhere in Indonesia at the time. The Praya riots were followed by smaller clashes in 1999 and a very violent anti-Christian, anti-Chinese riot in January 2000 in Mataram that destroyed twelve churches and led to the effective displacement of ethnic Chinese to Bali and East Java.⁷¹ Although most Chinese families returned to their businesses in Mataram, ICG spoke with many

who keep their bags packed in case they must flee again to more "Chinese-friendly" areas such as Bali and Surabaya.

The demand for protection and personal security surged in response to the rise in crime and violence. It was in this political and economic climate that Lombok's civilian militias, or *pam swakarsa*, emerged.⁷²

B. THE EMERGENCE OF PAM SWAKARSA

The militias that came into being after 1998 were rooted partly in Lombok's outlaw traditions, partly in the powers of its religious leaders.

The first was Bujak, an acronym for *pemburu jejak* ("tracker"; literally, hunter of footprints). It was made up largely of ex-thieves who in 1994 had begun a "bounty service" in Central Lombok, using their old ties to track stolen goods and return them to owners – for a fee. Their services initially were limited to local residents, and were coordinated through the police.⁷³ They also provided protection in exchange for a monthly payment; customers received stickers showing that they were under Bujak's protection, a deterrent to criminals. The police disbanded the group in 1996, apparently because it was becoming too independent and intruding on police territory.⁷⁴

After theft rose in 1997, Bujak went back into business, again providing protection and retrieving stolen property. But many residents began to suspect it of organising theft for the purpose of securing bounty, and by early 1999, other militias were beginning to take its place.⁷⁵

⁶⁶ ICG interview with two young Sasak noble "toughs" in Mataram, November 2002. These two, after growing up with stories of the famous thieves of southern Lombok, switched their loyalties to anti-crime militias charged with hunting down the very thieves they once worshipped.

⁶⁷ ICG interview with Sasak elder of Pemenang, North Lombok, November 2002.

⁶⁸ According to records released to ICG by the NTB Department of Labour Office in Mataram, Lombok, the number of migrant workers sent abroad by the provincial office doubled from 10,264 in 1997-1998 to 20,893 in the crisis years of 1998-1999, the great majority to Malaysia, the cheapest destination. Remittance payments sent home increased even more dramatically.

⁶⁹ ICG interview with Chinese Indonesian elder in Mataram, Lombok, December 2002.

⁷⁰ ICG interview with Chinese Indonesian shopowner in Cakranegara, Mataram, November 2002. He said: "We poorer shop owners watch the activities of the richer ones who have strong connections to the military. When they [the protected Chinese] close up shop, we know trouble is coming".

⁷¹ "Two Die in Central Lombok", *Jawa Pos*, 15 February 1998.

⁷² "Umat Islam Lombok Dukung SI", *Lombok Post*, 5 November 1998. Lombok's most powerful *tuan guru* did gather with NTB's governor, Harun Al'Rasyid, and the then regional military commander based in Bali, Adam Damiri, to show support for the Special Session of Parliament and Habibie's presidency.

⁷³ ICG interview with police intelligence in Mataram, 14 December 2002. In July 1998, the police station of Janapriya, Central Lombok, was attacked by disgruntled community members who believed the police were involved in laundering stolen goods.

⁷⁴ ICG interview with Bujak member and activist from Praya, Central Lombok, November 2002.

⁷⁵ ICG interview, October 2002. Central Lombok Sasak nobles told ICG that the Bujak guard was re-activated in 1998, in part because the ancient weaponry of Central Lombok's

In the atmosphere of militant morality that characterised the aftermath of Soeharto's fall, it was not surprising that the two largest militias were led by the sons of Tuan Guru Mutawalli and the daughters of Tuan Guru Zainuddin Abdul Madjid. Tuan Guru Mutawalli's sons, Ukit and Sibaway, were believed to have inherited their father's charisma.⁷⁶ Ukit was perceived to have the father's magical abilities, while Sibaway was seen to have his religious power.⁷⁷ The brothers were based in Jeroaru, East Lombok, although Ukit often disappeared to his home in a nearby mountain forest. By January 2000, the brothers were leading Lombok's largest and most powerful anti-crime militia, Amphibi, which claimed more than 200,000 uniformed members.⁷⁸

Tuan Guru Zainuddin Abdul Madjid's daughters, Rahun and Raehanun, quarrelled even before their father died over who was to lead Nadhlatul Wathan (NW).⁷⁹ The extensive network of NW schools, properties, and influence made the question of a "legitimate" heir especially important, and both daughters had qualified sons and hundreds of thousands of supporters.

noble houses desired blood. The mystique of ancient weaponry is largely a noble (and not devout Islamic) concern in Lombok. Nevertheless, these same youths said that Bujak's guards were mostly thugs like them while Bujak's rivals, Amphibi, had militia members who were devout Muslims and, therefore, stronger and more disciplined.

⁷⁶ A contemporary of NW's founder, Tuan Guru Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, Tuan Guru Mutawalli was famous for his use of cultural idioms to persuade traditional Muslims to adopt orthodox doctrine. See Sven Cederroth, *The Spell of the Ancestors and The Power of Mekkah: A Sasak Community On Lombok* (Sweden, Acta Universitatis Goyhoburgensis, 1981).

⁷⁷ ICG interview with Amphibi leadership in Jeroaru, East Lombok, November 2002. Guru Ukit appears and disappears in mysterious ways. Known as an eccentric and friend to Balinese, Chinese, Christians and Buddhists alike, Guru Ukit also built a house in the magical forest, Gawah Sukaroh, and gave his sons pre-Islamic spirit names.

⁷⁸ Some say Guru Ukit came up with the name Amphibi as a symbol of the mystical communication between *lair/batin* (internal/external strength). He also created the logo. Meanwhile, TGH Sibaway explained that Amphibi was an acronym for *Amankan Pemerintah Hukum Indonesia Berdasarkan Iman* (Protect the Rule of Law in Indonesia Based on Faith).

⁷⁹ ICG interview with Selong resident, December 2002. In 1997, Rahun's daughter married Raehanun's son but they soon divorced. To many who know the conflict well, the divorce marked the beginning of deeper political rifts between the sisters.

In July 1998, less than a year after her father's death, the younger, Raehanun, held a congress and declared herself the new elected head of NW. Since then, the sisters and their followers have sided with different political parties, established their own militias, and clashed violently.

1. Amphibi: Moral Vigilantes

Based in Jeroaru, East Lombok, Amphibi's appeal came from the moral authority of the brothers Tuan Guru Sibaway and Guru Ukit, and from the absence of an effective police force.

Only six months after its formation Amphibi had transformed itself from a loose community patrol network into an organised security force. It made creative use of familiar security concepts such as *pos siskamling* and uniforms. The appeal of religious vigilantism, uniforms and militancy to Lombok's youth was high, something like that which attracted members to such groups as Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) in Central Java and Jakarta.⁸⁰

Moral legitimacy aside, Amphibi also demanded less money than its rival, Bujak – only Rp.1000 (U.S.\$0.10) per month from each subscriber to its security services. In return, it provided protection and returned recovered goods free of charge. Amphibi also made significant donations, as much as Rp.1,000,000 (U.S.\$120) to families of members who were killed by criminals or died of sudden illness.⁸¹ By July 1999, it had begun to register members for patrol duty to guard East Lombok communities.

While Bujak relied on bounty payments from the owners of stolen property, Amphibi actually charged its active guard Rp.120,000 (U.S.\$12) per member for the honour of wearing the orange organisation vest. Bujak relied on ties to criminals to recover lost goods while Amphibi used walkie-talkies to coordinate chases with other members. Each group

⁸⁰ See ICG Indonesia Briefing, *Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims*, 10 October 2001. Some Sasak activists believed that Amphibi's success was not due solely to nice uniforms and mystical mantras but owed much to the vacuum in religious leadership after the death of NW's founder, TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid. ICG interviews in Mataram Lombok, October 2002. East Lombok journalists commented that the death of TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid pushed marginalised Muslim Sasaks towards a more militant, rather than education-based, form of Islamic politics and mobilisation.

⁸¹ ICG interview with Amphibi member, October 2002.

of 30 Amphibi members had one walkie-talkie and access to transportation for quick mobilisation. Bujak possessed sacred weapons from Central Lombok's noble houses, while Amphibi members had mystically inscribed clothing to render them invulnerable to attack, thirst or fatigue. It was not long before the two groups had a showdown.⁸²

On 2 August 1999, only two months after the national election, Amphibi and Bujak fought a full-scale battle on the border between East and Central Lombok. "The beach, the forest, the fields of the village of Pene, Central Lombok were orange with our colours as we went to battle with Bujak", an Amphibi member in Jeroaru recalled.⁸³

Although neither side admitted either injury or fatalities, many people are believed to have died.⁸⁴ The victor was obvious to most when Amphibi ignored Bujak's regional boundaries in Central Lombok and began to open more security posts in Central, North and West Lombok. By December 1999, Amphibi claimed to have registered 220,000 active members, nearly 10 per cent of Lombok's population and 25 per cent of all working age males in East Lombok.⁸⁵

In addition to its community security programs, Amphibi targeted middlemen receivers of stolen goods more than individual thieves. It introduced a three-strike rule for criminals. If they confessed, first time offenders were given a warning at Amphibi headquarters. Second time offenders were detained in its Jeroaru prison, while third time offenders were

hunted down and executed. The judge who handed down the sentences of execution was Tuan Guru Sibaway himself. If criminals were caught red-handed and attempted to flee, Amphibi often killed them publicly.

2. Ababil

Amphibi was not without leadership problems and conflicts. In fact, a schism between rival leaders produced another *pam swakarsa*. This was largely due to a former policeman from Jeroaru, East Lombok, Haji Mahdi, in charge of managing Amphibi's assets and developing its investigative division. In late 1999, he formed an elite corps of trackers (*pelacak*) and hunters (*pemburu*).

Drawn from Lombok's most sophisticated criminals, they wore black uniforms and were provided special investigative training. One source called them "war troops" because of their red berets and military bearing. Haji Mahdi had first-hand knowledge of Lombok's criminal networks and began tracking down their leaders and key middlemen. However, his grand plans for drafting outlaws to track their comrades proved more expensive than anticipated, and how the money was spent was not well documented. An Amphibi leader said:

We criticised his methods, and instead of being transparent, he broke away, splitting Amphibi into those who sided with Haji Mahdi, who called themselves Amphibi Brigade, and those who sided with TGH Sibaway and Guru Ukit, who called themselves Amphibi Sejati.⁸⁶

The two camps asked members to choose between them. In the end TGH Sibaway and Guru Ukit's Amphibi Sejati kept control of the organisation. Haji Mahdi's faction was forced to leave Jeroaru and seek external support from a religious scholar, Tuan Guru Fadli Fadli, of Pesantren Attohiriyah Al-Fadiliyah in Bodak, Central Lombok.⁸⁷ Under its new leadership, Amphibi Brigade changed its name to Ababil.

⁸² ICG interviews with Amphibi leaders in Jeroaru, East Lombok, Bujak supporters in Sweta, Mataram and East Lombok activists and journalists familiar with the two organisations, their leaders and conflicts, October 2002.

⁸³ ICG interviews with Amphibi leaders in Jeroaru, East Lombok, 9-10 October 2002.

⁸⁴ One of the difficulties in writing about conflict from an empirical approach in Lombok is that very few people will admit how many died in any given conflict. Whether in the Penne battles, the Mataram riots (January 2000) or the Perampauan attacks (January 2001), neither side acknowledges its own losses while claiming the other side suffered badly. "Masyarakat Masih Tegang dan Terjadi Serangan: Butut Tawuran Massal Amphibi vs. Bujak", *Lombok Post*, 3 August 1999. Eleven injured men and one corpse were sent to the Selong Hospital according to the above article but Amphibi members claimed there were truckloads of severely injured.

⁸⁵ "Jumlah Penduduk dan Perkiraan Jumlah Tenaga Kerja dan Angkatan Kerja Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat Menurut Kabupaten 1998", National Census Survey, 1998.

⁸⁶ ICG interview with Amphibi members, 9-10 October 2002.

⁸⁷ "Ponpes Bodak Bentuk Pamswakarsa Ababil", *Bali Post*, 25 January 2000. Ababil was established as a *pam swakarsa* on 24 January 2000. Its name was an acronym for Amankan Bangsa dan Agama Berdasar Itikad Luhur (Protect the Nation and Religion Through Honourable Intentions). It was led in Bodak by Lalu Gede Jauharil Makmun Mutawalli. Ababil was to be one of several smaller *pam swakarsa* operating in Central Lombok such as Pujut, Bujak Patuh, Bujak Kumpul, Bumi Gora, Elang Merah and Srigala Anyar.

Governor Harun attended Ababil's inauguration ceremony in Bodak and said he supported it as a *pam swakarsa* to protect the people from chaos and thievery. Meanwhile, Muhaimin, a relative of TGH Sibaway, became the operational commander of Amphibi Sejati.

3. Balinese and Sasak Tensions

Under Muhaimin, Amphibi became more violent, expansionist, and corrupt. Its members attacked a Balinese community in December 1999, and a full-scale war between Balinese and Sasak Muslims was only narrowly averted during the anti-Christian Mataram riots of January 2000.

On 18 December 1999, 45 trucks full of Amphibi militia drove from East Lombok to Mataram in search of two Balinese men suspected of fencing goods for thieves in the hamlet of Sengkongo: I Gusti Made Padma, known familiarly as Si Kentung, and Mandra. Upon reaching the village Amphibi demanded that the men surrender.

Seeing over 1,000 armed men in the village, a landless old flute player, I Gusti Made Banjar, sounded the communal alarm by striking his wooden slit gong. Amphibi guards beat the old man to death. They captured Si Kentung in his home, cut off one of his hands and severely wounded the other. Mandra was apprehended without mishap and turned over to the police, although Amphibi produced no evidence of his alleged crime. Amphibi left the village later that day. Passing by the Mataram market of Bertais, it made victory rounds, waving Si Kentung's severed hand.

Muhaimin had close ties to the area – his wife was from the neighbouring village – but chose not to prevent the killing. The Sengkongo community leader (*kadus*) filed complaints with the police and seventeen other government offices in the following months but no effort was made to prosecute anyone for either I Gusti Made Banjar's death or the maiming of Si Kentung.⁸⁸

On the evening of the Sengkongo incident, Amphibi trucks paraded in Lingsar just north of Mataram, where a ritual battle of rice cakes between Sasaks and Balinese was to be held the following

afternoon.⁸⁹ The affair was barely mentioned in the local press for fear that Balinese would seek retribution against Sasak Muslims in Bali. Over the ensuing months, several meetings between Balinese Hindu leaders and Mataram's mayor inspired the formation of the Balinese *pam swakarsa*, Dharma Wisesa.⁹⁰

4. Perampauan's Thieves vs. Bongor's Amphibi

Sengkongo was not an isolated incident but part of a larger effort on the part of Muhaimin's Amphibi to track down 51 thieves from Perampauan, the village in which that Balinese hamlet is located.⁹¹ Using police terminology Amphibi called these thieves "T.O.", the Indonesian abbreviation for "operational targets".

Amphibi insisted that Perampauan village authorities surrender the 51 men or suffer the consequences. To communicate its resolve, Guru Ukit, Amphibi's founder and brother of Tuan Guru Sibaway, spoke with village leaders at the Perampauan mosque in February 2000, explaining that the thieves had to swear never to steal again in order to avoid T.O. status.

Sibaway himself came to Perampauan and swore in about seventeen residents in March and April 2000. The T.O. status was continued, however, and over the upcoming months, tensions rose between the village of Bongor, considered an Amphibi

⁸⁹ ICG interview with Balinese men at Lingsar temple, October 2002. The Lingsar rice cake battle is often explained as a cathartic opportunity for Balinese and Sasak young men to beat up one another without causing a conflict. In 1999, the Lingsar ritual was run by the police and military but because it was held during the fasting month, there were very few participants.

⁹⁰ "Sarosa Dharma Wisesa Diresmikan: Harus Mampu Cermati dan Tangkal Isu Provokasi", 5 February 2000. *Dharma Wisesa* was announced as the Balinese community's official *pam swakarsa* on 3 February, less than a month after the anti-Christian riots of 17 January 2000. *Dharma Wisesa* claimed to have over 60,000 members who, like *pecalang* in Bali, were given ritually charged weaponry. It was headed by traditional leaders I Gusti Putra Lanang of the Mayura Palace and Griya Pagutan (Ida Yoga).

⁹¹ Perampauan is famous for its criminals and a door-to-door service available for victims of robbery who are willing to pay 30 to 50 per cent of the value of the stolen articles as bounty for its return. Interview with Bambang, an NGO head whose motorcycle was stolen and then returned after he paid Rp.4 million (approximately 40 per cent of the bike's value) to one of the crime ring's operatives in Mataram.

⁸⁸ ICG interview in Sengkongo, 5 April 2003.

stronghold, and the neighbouring “thief village” of Perampauan. In part to forestall an Amphibi branch in their community, Perampauan leaders developed their own *pam swakarsa*, Perkasa Pengsor. It was limited to simple night security activities and did not operate outside the village boundaries.⁹²

The August 2000 killing of Haji Mustafa in Sengkongo pushed the tensions between Perampauan and Bongor even higher. He had taken over the trash collection duties formerly controlled by his cousin. Perampauan residents told ICG that the cousin, in revenge, joined Amphibi, which then charged Haji Mustafa with theft, sought him out in his home, and killed him in front of his wife.⁹³ Villagers refused to accept the murder and captured one of his suspected killers, an Amphibi man from Bongor, who in fact was not a perpetrator but admitted knowing one of those responsible. Haji Mustafa’s family refused to pursue the matter, but the murder and Perampauan’s interrogation of a suspect marked a key juncture in the conflict.

Amphibi continued to insist on entering Perampauan to seize those on its list of suspects. In November 2000, a Perampauan resident, Saida, was charged with stealing a flashlight from the Amphibi security post in Bongor and, as a result, had his house vandalised. He fled, and Perampauan residents counter-attacked Bongor, killing one person and wounding several others.

On 10 January 2001, Saida and two friends were ambushed by masked Amphibi members, according to Perampauan residents, in order to provoke a full-scale fight between them and Bongor Amphibi members in front of the Bongor mosque, during which hand-made firearms, arrows, machetes, spears and large fishing bombs were used. One Bongor man was shot and killed, and both sides suffered serious injuries.⁹⁴ Hearing of impending attacks on Balinese in Perampauan, the Balinese militia, *Dharma Wicesa*, came to Perampauan offering to

protect Balinese.⁹⁵ The residents rejected the offer, claiming they could protect their own village.

The morning after the Bongor battle, Perampauan residents stood watch as 6,000 Amphibi members from East Lombok arrived in trucks to launch a dawn attack. To everyone’s surprise, the villagers resisted and killed at least twenty of Amphibi’s front-line militants.⁹⁶ The successful defence was partly due to the presence of 30 armed policemen, who fired warning shots above the heads of the attackers.⁹⁷ Although Amphibi remains a significant factor on the island, the failure marked the beginning of its steady decline in 2001.

5. North Lombok Groups

Meanwhile, in North Lombok traditionalist Sasak Muslim communities (Wetu Telu) and Sasak Buddhist communities (Buda) voiced concern over Amphibi’s expansion into their region. Buda and Wetu Telu leaders alike explained that the Amphibi groups reminded them of the Islamic militants of the early New Order, who demanded that their communities abandon “primitive” traditions for orthodox Islam.⁹⁸ As a result, Wetu Telu and Buda communities in the sub-districts of Gondang and Bayan formed alternative *pam swakarsa* groups called Langlang Jagat (LJ), after the historical community guard referred to in their village charters.

Many LJ groups were not formally activated until April 1999 but the prospect of an alternative to Amphibi was enough to calm fears in their communities. In fact, all community members ICG interviewed in the north used “Amphibi” as a synonym for militia – for them LJ was North Lombok’s “Amphibi”. They were aware, however, of their weakness in the face of 1,000-man Amphibi convoys searching for fleeing criminals, and those fears intensified prior to and after January 2000.

⁹² ICG interview with head of Perkasa Pengsor in Perampauan, April 2003.

⁹³ ICG interviews with two sources in Perampauan, April 2002, both of whom said that Haji Mustafa’s death took place around August 2000.

⁹⁴ ICG interview with Perampauan combatant, April 2003. The dead youth was a university student whose mother was from Perampauan.

⁹⁵ ICG interview with lawyer responsible for assisting Perampauan residents prior to the January attacks, November 2002.

⁹⁶ ICG interview with two NGO leaders active in the conflict and cross-checked with the *Lombok Post* reporter who covered the event for the local press, October 2002.

⁹⁷ ICG interview with one of Perampauan’s combatants, April 2003. The police arrived to support Perampauan in part because Amphibi had so thoroughly humiliated them on Lombok.

⁹⁸ ICG interview with Buda leader in Tanjung, northern Lombok, October 2002.

6. The Mataram Riots

On 17 January 2000, five days after a demonstration in Jakarta for the same purpose, tens of thousands of Muslims poured into Mataram to attend a large religious rally protesting the deaths of Muslims in Maluku's communal conflict.⁹⁹ Videos of the violence at the hand of Christians in Maluku had been circulating in Lombok for a month, outraging many Muslims, particularly students at Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*).¹⁰⁰

The Mataram riots were not entirely spontaneous, however. The police and military had commissioned Amphibi to provide security for the rally, but Tuan Guru Sibaway pulled out at the last minute.¹⁰¹ He had initially backed the event and signed a petition demanding that Lombok's Christians condemn the deaths in Maluku,¹⁰² but he apparently heard subsequently that Amphibi was being set up to take the blame for attacks on Lombok's minorities.¹⁰³

After the rally, groups of men attacked Christian neighbourhoods and eleven churches in Mataram. Although formal Amphibi involvement was never

proven, people on the street claimed that its "invulnerable" troops were among the coordinators.

In the year following the riots, Amphibi branches multiplied. Its security posts could be found in Mataram, Gerung, and Ampenan in West Lombok and in Sekotong, in the southern part of Central Lombok. Rivalries between militias became a serious problem for the government. In January 2001 the district head of East Lombok, Haji Syadan, was forced to issue a directive denying the *pam swakarsa* permission to escort Muslim pilgrims to the airport for fear of violence.¹⁰⁴

Amphibi also began moving from protection and security into debt collection, divorce cases and land disputes. A particularly troubling incident took place in May 2002 when eighteen Amphibi members, hired by distant relatives, assaulted an elderly English widower in order to get him to surrender the rights to his late wife's property.¹⁰⁵

In June 2002 in Selong, East Lombok, an Amphibi member kidnapped and tortured a man named Amaq Inun so that he would make no further claims on land that he had been awarded by a court.¹⁰⁶ When ICG asked Amphibi heads in Jeroaru about these cases, they responded that they had little ability to control their branch members.

Amphibi's territorial expansion made it arrogant. Journalists who criticised its extortion practices and other activities received death threats.¹⁰⁷ In the view

⁹⁹ See ICG Briefing, *Violence and Radical Muslims*, op. cit.

¹⁰⁰ ICG interview with police intelligence officer, Mataram, December 2002. That riots were planned was an open secret in West Lombok because of the open nature of the provocation and widespread organising. Family members of Sasak police officers in Tanjung, an area north of Mataram, were warned not to travel to Mataram because there would most likely be riots.

¹⁰¹ ICG interview with Mataram activists and Jeroaru Amphibi leadership regarding Amphibi's last minute withdrawal, October 2002.

¹⁰² Achmad Fachrudin, *Jihad Sang Demonstran: Pergulatan Politik dan Ideologi Eggi Sudjana Dari Era Soeharto Hingga Era Gus Dur* (PT Raja Grafindo Persada, Jakarta, 2000), p. 257. The head of the Santo Antonius Catholic church, Remmy Giusnaga, received several threatening letters demanding NTB Christians make a statement condemning the killing of Muslims in Ambon. Remmy told the author, "The letter was signed by TGH Sibaway, who was listed as the head of Persaudaraan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia (PPMI) in West Nusa Tenggara". PPMI was the Muslim workers' organisation developed by Eggy Sudjana and other conservative Muslims closely tied to the army. TGH Sibaway denied having signed the petition.

¹⁰³ ICG interview with two senior nationalist leaders, January 2003. They said that two days before the riots they convinced the governor to speak with TGH Sibaway of Amphibi after they themselves heard of a plot originating in Jakarta to send mercenaries dressed as Amphibi to murder Christians and Balinese.

¹⁰⁴ "Kelompok Pam Swakarsa Dilarang Antar Jemaah Calon Haji", *Bali Post*, 29 January 2001. This was a formal ordinance showing that *pam swakarsa* were directly subject to the control of regional officials. The attempt failed but showed that Lombok's *pam swakarsa* had officially been categorised as *Linmas* (civilian protection) under the 1982 National Security Act. Another problem for the government involved complaints against *pam swakarsas* for obstructing communications through their control of walkie-talkie radio frequencies. "Takut Dikeroyok Pam Swakarsa, Aparat tak Razia Frekuensi", *Bali Post*, 8 January 2001.

¹⁰⁵ "Belasan Oknum Pamswakarsa Ditahan", *Lombok Post*, 15 May 2002. When the widower refused to surrender his wife's property, Amphibi attempted to take it by force from his home. During the trials of the eighteen Amphibi members implicated in the attack, hundreds of armed Amphibi sympathisers came with machetes and walkie-talkies yelling "Allahu Akbar". Mataram's municipal guards (*polisi pamong praja*) were mobilised to protect the court.

¹⁰⁶ "Amaq Inun Diculik Oknum Pamswakarsa", *Lombok Post*, 8 June 2002.

¹⁰⁷ "Lagi, Wartawan Jadi Korban Penculikan", *Tempo*, 22 July 2000. Simply for criticising the actions of the late TGH

even of many supporters, Amphibi's failed attack on Perampauan, its alleged corruption, and its failure to prevent the return of violent crime to Lombok's villages weakened its authority.

7. Amphibi's Relationship with Security Forces and Political Parties

At the same time that the local government was trying to incorporate it formally as a civilian auxiliary to the police, Amphibi was diversifying its operational units into "trackers" (*pelacak*), "hunters" (*pemburu*), and "judges" (*hakim*), thus appearing to mirror government institutions.

Amphibi leaders told ICG that in 2002 approximately 200 of their militants received military training at East Lombok's district military headquarters (KODIM).¹⁰⁸ This was less evidence of imminent mobilisation than of the army's interest in a future role for Amphibi in Lombok's security.

Amphibi remains Lombok's largest *pam swakarsa*. It has yet to side with a particular political party in advance of the 2004 elections but Golkar and the others are eager to enlist it, knowing that it could provide effective control over campaigning in many areas of the island.¹⁰⁹

C. SIBLING RIVALRY AND COMPETING MILITIAS

The rivalry between Raehanun and Rauhun, the two daughters of TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, created two well-organised but politically antagonistic factions within Lombok's largest religious organisation. During the New Order, Golkar might have chosen one sister. Multiparty politics and the opportunity for mass mobilisation in post-Soeharto Lombok, however, allowed both to organise their own militia and compete openly for support. The

size of those militias in turn became the most visible indicator of each sister's political strength.

In July 1998, as noted above, an NW congress in Praya, Central Lombok, elected Raehanun head of the organisation.¹¹⁰ Tensions intensified thereafter between the two sisters' supporters in Pancor, their home and NW's centre.

Rauhun, the elder sister, refused to recognise Raehanun's new position. Less than a month later, her supporters held a smaller NW congress in Pancor that chose her son, Tuan Guru Bajeng.

7-8 September 1998 became known as "Black Pancor Tragedy". On that day Rauhun's supporters in Pancor robbed and burned the shops and homes of Raehanun's followers. While Rauhun and her son remained in Pancor, Raehanun and her followers sought shelter in a *pesantren* in Kalijaga, East Lombok, where they remained until late 2001.

During her stay in Kalijaga, Raehanun made plans to build her own *pesantren*, in Anjani, East Lombok, the village that was the mystical centre of Lombok's messianic resistance movements against the Dutch during the early twentieth century.¹¹¹ Her organisation is now called NW Anjani, in contrast to Rauhun's NW Pancor.

In early 1999, NW Pancor appointed Rauhun's youngest son, Lutfi,¹¹² head of the 30,000-member organisation and developed a militia, Hamzanwadi. NW Anjani, not to be outdone, formed its own 50,000-strong militia, Hizbullah. The militias consisted of the devout followers of Rauhun and Raehanun. Unlike Amphibi, there were few reports of Hamzanwadi or Hizbullah involvement with anti-crime campaigns or efforts to assume police

Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, Rasimianto and lecturer Drs. Harapandi were kidnapped by *pam swakarsa* Hizbullah of NW Raihanun's camp in Anjani, East Lombok. ICG interview with *Lombok Post* reporter in Mataram, December 2002, who had been threatened four times in one year after reporting on Amphibi's extortion practices.

¹⁰⁸ ICG interview with Amphibi leaders in Jeroaru, East Lombok, 9 October 2002.

¹⁰⁹ "Golkar Lirik Pamswakarsa", *Bali Post*, 5 September 2002. Golkar's provincial head, Mesir Suryadi, saw *pam swakarsa* as useful tools for mobilisation.

¹¹⁰ ICG interview with journalist present at the rival NW Congress in Pancor, December 2002.

¹¹¹ Van der Kraan, Alfons, *Lombok: Conquest, Colonization and Underdevelopment, 1870-1940* (Singapore, 1980). According to a journalist interviewed in December 2002, Raehanun's supporters compared her evacuation from Pancor to Anjani with the prophet Mohammed's flight from Mecca to Medina. They believe that she will return to her father's *pesantren* in Pancor, as Mohammed did to Mecca. This will occur, some say, after her father's visage (*kharomah*) appears.

¹¹² Lutfi is also the son-in-law of the district head (bupati) of Central Lombok, Lalu Suhaimi, a nobleman. His status as head of both the Hamzanwadi militia and the PBB party branch in East Lombok make him politically influential as the 2004 election looms.

responsibilities. Instead, the rivals concentrated on defending their communities from each other.

1. Political Competition

The presence of the rival *pam swakarsa* set the stage for a new kind of conflict in Lombok. In preparation for the 1999 elections, Raehanun aligned herself with Golkar, her father's old party. Rauhun left Golkar for Partai Daulat Rakyat (PDR), a small party headed by Minister of Cooperatives Adi Sasono.¹¹³ What initially appeared to be a poor move - since PDR seemed to have little chance in the elections - proved astute.

According to several sources, Raehanun had support from 70 per cent of her father's followers. Nevertheless, when the votes were counted, Rauhun came out on top. Her sister's supporters received no seats in the provincial parliament (DPRD) and only one in Central Lombok's district council (DPRD II). They had no direct influence over the ten seats won by Golkar on the East Lombok district council.¹¹⁴ Rauhun's followers, however, got two seats in the provincial parliament as well as seats on the district councils in East, West, and Central Lombok and on the municipal council of Mataram.¹¹⁵

After the elections, conflicts between the sisters' militias intensified. From 1999 to 2002 they attacked each other on a number of occasions, producing deaths and destruction of homes and property.¹¹⁶ For

example, on 25 September 2000, a fight in Wanasaba, East Lombok, left four dead and several wounded. The violence went virtually unreported in the Indonesian press, in part because Lombok-based journalists were wary of possible retaliation from militia members.¹¹⁷

During the New Order, NW's affiliation with Golkar gave it real privileges but the new focus on local rather than national politics made the acquisition of controlling influence over smaller parties a more attractive option for the feuding sisters. Raehanun continued to enjoy strong popular support, but her poor performance with Golkar in 1999 had decreased her influence in local and provincial parliaments.

This changed when she adopted Rauhun's tactic of using a small national party to win important provincial positions. In August 2002, Zainuddin MZ appeared at Raehanun's *pesantren* to announce the provincial leadership of his new party PPP Reformasi (a reformist wing of the United Development Party).¹¹⁸ Raehanun and her NW Anjani cadres were allotted powerful positions. Haji Nukman, Raehanun's husband, was made the head of the party for the entire province while Raehanun went on the advisory board.

Not to be outdone, Rauhun left PDR for the more explicitly Muslim Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), headed by Justice and Human Rights Minister Yusril Ihza Mahendra. Lutfi, her youngest son and head of Hamzanwadi, was made the leader of PBB's party branch in East Lombok.

Party positions are not, however, the only means of securing power in Lombok's "charisma-oriented" politics.¹¹⁹ NW's founder, TGH Zainuddin Abdul

¹¹³ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton, 2000), pp. 146-150.

¹¹⁴ "NW Gugat Golkar, Soal Wakil di Dewan", *Lombok Post*, 19 August 1999. The head of the Central Lombok branch of NW (Raehanun), Lalu Mashudi, protested Golkar's allotment of only one seat in Central Lombok's district parliament to an NW Golkar candidate.

¹¹⁵ ICG interview with *Lombok Post* journalist in East Lombok, November 2002. NW had a stronger bargaining position at the provincial level within a small party than within a large national party such as Golkar. Rauhun (30 per cent of NW support) sided with PDR rather than face defeat against her sister in Golkar. She secured key positions in the provincial party leadership, two seats in the provincial parliament (DPRD), four seats in East Lombok's district council (DPRD II), two in Central Lombok, two in West Lombok and one in Mataram. Raehanun, on the other hand, received only a seat for herself at the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), one in the provincial parliament, and eight in the East Lombok district council.

¹¹⁶ "Rebutan Lokasi Pengajian, Empat Tewas", *Tempo*, 25 September 2000. "Merunut Sejarah Bentrok Warga NW Lombok Timur: Permusuhan Tersemai Sepeninggal Sang

Guru", *Bali Post*, 6 October 2000. The violence in Pancor in September 1998, Desi Kesik in June 2000 and Wanasaba in September 2000 are only a few of the unreported conflicts between NW *pam swakarsa* groups. Journalists have become very wary of writing about NW and their *pam swakarsa*. Those with knowledge of NW whom ICG interviewed requested anonymity.

¹¹⁷ "Lagi, Wartawan Jadi Korban Penculikan", *Tempo*, 22 July 2000. A journalist, Rasimianto, and a lecturer, Drs. Harapandi, were kidnapped by *pam swakarsa* Hizbullah of NW Anjani for writing articles criticising the role TGH Zainuddin Abdul Madjid played in party politics during the New Order.

¹¹⁸ "KH Zainuddin MZ: Jangan Ada Dusta di Antara Kita", *Antara*, 26 August 2002.

¹¹⁹ ICG interviews in Lombok all indicated a strong identification with "figure-worship" or, more specifically, the

Madjid, won elections for Golkar largely because he could rally support from other religious leaders with large followings. A key indication of the support base of each sister is their affiliation to often less politically active, but influential, religious leaders. Both Raehanun and Rahun have strong ties to other *tuan guru* with their own militias and mass followings.¹²⁰

The important role *tuan guru* play in the selection of local members of parliament has made the courting of them one of the few concrete means of guaranteeing political support in Lombok.¹²¹ For example, in February 2003, TGH Muchlis Ibrahim, a former Golkar politician and West Lombok's most prominent *tuan guru*, was reportedly trying to recruit the island's most powerful non-NW *tuan guru* and their *pam swakarsa* to support Partai Pembangunan Daerah (PPD) rather than side with Golkar or one of the warring sisters.¹²²

PPD, which largely consists of former representatives to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Jakarta, does not have a strong national following, but as with other parties that look to religious leaders to give them mass support, it made TGH Muchlis head of its provincial branch. That position could give him real bargaining power over the allocation of parliamentary seats if, in fact, his many former students and their followers agree to back his party.

public's willingness to support political parties or engage in conflict at the command of a leader, most often, a *tuan guru*.

¹²⁰ Although Rahun has the support of Tuan Guru Malafikrin, Raehanun has maintained close relations with arguably more influential religious leaders such as Tuan Guru Haji Muktar and TGH Mohammed Saleh of Kalijaga, East Lombok.

¹²¹ "Wajar Parpol Mengklaim Dukungan Pesantren", *NTB Post*, 26 March 2003. TGH Mustiadi Abhar of Pesantren Darul Falah Pagutan was quoted as saying, "If politicians want to make donations to *tuan guru* or claim their support what is wrong with that? Why shouldn't someone want to claim me? I am like a maiden waiting for her suitor".

¹²² ICG interview, 10 February 2002. TGH Muchlis reportedly has a grudge against both Golkar and Raehanun. He was denied chairmanship of Golkar's branch in West Lombok in 2000 because he was already holding a position in the MPR and was told he could not hold a district-level party position at the same time. He left Golkar as a result and expressed interest in leading PPP Reformasi, but he lost out to Raehanun, largely because her *pam swakarsa* and support base were greater than his in West Lombok.

2. The Election for Governor

Governor Harun Al'Rasyid, a former Golkar man turned PDI-P candidate, spent months in 2003 courting support from *tuan guru* (including the NW sisters) in his bid to be re-elected by the provincial parliament.¹²³ But on 20 July, the head of that body, Lalu Srinatha, came out of nowhere to win 28 out of 55 votes and become the province's first Sasak governor. He had been nominated by the PPP, a party with only six votes in the parliament, had no real party affiliation and lacked either a mass base or a clear patrimonial tie to Lombok's *tuan guru*.

The only explanation for his victory, according to activists in Lombok, is a cultural one. Srinatha is a noble from Sakra, from the line that ruled Selaparang, the last Lombok kingdom before Balinese colonialism arrived in the 1740s. His running mate was a Sumbawan, Thamrin Hayes, and their ticket replicated the Sumbawa-Sasak ties forged by the last Sakra rulers in the eighteenth century.

As remarkable as this may sound, it does explain why the *tuan guru*, Sasak activists and noble politicians have not openly contested the election of a candidate who represents ethnic Sasak political legitimacy but no known political interests.¹²⁴ Many Lombok activists claim that his election was the product of six months of careful preparation and alliance building. Nevertheless, everyone except the alliance planners was caught off-guard.

Several senior Sasak activists later told ICG that Srinatha's victory indicated a growing divide between pro-noble *tuan guru* and a group of more party-oriented *tuan guru* who backed Harun.¹²⁵

The dangers posed by rival *pam swakarsas* did not materialise in this election. While different groups travelled to Mataram to show their support for their respective candidates, police sealed off the city until the results were announced, and the militias, including NW Pancor (led by Rahun's son, who was backing Harun), were not allowed in.¹²⁶

¹²³ "Duet Harun-Saeful Muslim 'Didoakan' Pimpin NTB", *Lombok Post*, 25 February 2003.

¹²⁴ Srinatha was an important member of the 1986-1987 "Sasak Yellow Book Movement", when Sasak politicians attempted to replace NTB's military governor with a Sasak one.

¹²⁵ ICG interview in Mataram, 11 September 2003.

¹²⁶ ICG interview with police authorities, 12 September 2003.

The failure of PDI-P operatives in Jakarta to get Harun Al'Rasyid re-elected governor when they had managed to unseat popular candidates in much larger provinces suggests that traditional institutions on Lombok – the *tuan guru* and the local aristocracy – are forces to be reckoned with.

While many in Lombok are happy about this Sasak victory, there is very real concern among Lombok's ethnic minorities that the provincial parliament might now pass an "anti-vice" bill proposed in July 2003. Most gambling, prostitution and alcohol consumption is conducted in non-Muslim Balinese communities of western Lombok, and such a decree could produce serious communal tension.

D. LOOKING FORWARD

It is difficult to foresee the implications of Srinatha's upset win for the 2004 elections. The lack of violence suggests either that the police performed better than their reputation in Lombok would have predicted, that the result was engineered so as to render the use of private militias unnecessary, or that the potential for violence was overrated.

But as 2004 draws closer, the two sisters remain forces to be reckoned with, even though one backed a failed gubernatorial candidate. Any successful candidate for the parliament will need backing from *tuan gurus* with mass followings, and the latter are likely to continue to use *pam swakarsa* to measure their strength. The combination of such militias in a climate of increasing ethnic tensions is still a cause for concern.

IV. CONCLUSION

Lombok and Bali both must deal with the destabilising consequences of new political and security mechanisms in post-Soeharto Indonesia. During the New Order, the military had a monopoly on security while Golkar controlled politics. In their place, regional autonomy legislation and multi-party democracy have given legitimacy and purpose to new forms of political participation and locally-defined vigilante-style security. The primary danger on both islands is the empowerment of politically-affiliated civilian auxiliaries or private security forces in a way that undermines the authority of the police and may increase the potential for conflict.

After Soeharto stepped down in 1998, a decidedly more populist PDI-P majority replaced Bali's Golkar elite at the centre of political power. When PDI-P called on Bali's *pecalang* to protect its 1998 Party Congress, it marked a break with the military's 30-year monopoly over security on the island. While the rest of Indonesia faced serious economic problems and social unrest, the government lauded Bali for sustaining a "conflict-free" culture. Its affluence in a time of crisis ushered in a period of unprecedented recognition for traditional institutions, including the *pecalang*, that were believed to be the source of its stability.

Anti-migrant sentiment became institutionalised on Bali when Denpasar's municipal authorities forced non-Balinese workers to pay higher residential taxes than internal Balinese migrants. After the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002, island officials pushed the taxes for migrant workers even higher and imposed gang-run "screening" measures at ports and bus terminals to check identity cards and prevent migration from elsewhere in Indonesia. Although the provincial government lowered the taxes in January 2003, "migrant-Balinese" tensions remain high.

Pecalang continue to be viewed as both village-based and linked to PDI-P. Although Bali is strongly pro-PDI-P, several small nationalist parties have emerged to challenge its hold. Many Balinese fear that inter-village tensions will translate into partisan differences and cause

conflicts among rival *pecalang* guards during the 2004 elections.

Pam swakarsa in Lombok have both significantly increased the power of that island's *tuan guru* and severely weakened the authority of the police. Regular conflicts between rival militias have severed inter-communal ties and reinforced intra-communal loyalties.

The roles that *pam swakarsas* and *tuan guru* such as the NW sisters play in creating a more divisive political atmosphere make democratic and legal reform even more difficult on Lombok than elsewhere in Indonesia. When militias responsible for murder, extortion and kidnapping are headed by individuals who are also the island's moral and political leaders, efforts to control them become especially challenging. It appears that candidates on Lombok are finding that the support of key criminal leaders as well as of *tuan guru* and *pam swakarsa* is considered proof of political power. Thus, instead of ridding the island of crime, candidates now claim they will be able to direct it.

The power of *pam swakarsa* and their *tuan guru* has caused direct political criticism virtually to disappear from the Lombok media. This will make it very hard for residents to get reasonably objective information prior to the 2004 elections.

The existence and power of civilian auxiliaries in Bali and Lombok, as elsewhere in Indonesia, endanger police reform. The police themselves have shown a worrisome tendency to embrace these groups as representative of the local population, but the groups too often become a buffer between the police and community rather than a bridge. They also tend either to assume key police functions, such as crime fighting and security, or get involved in crime themselves.

The existence of these groups weakens police credibility and distorts the concept of community policing. It makes it more difficult for the government and donors to assess resource needs accurately and undermines the concept of the state as the main guarantor of security in a democratising country.

Moreover, these civilian auxiliaries, who often see themselves as – or come close to being – uniformed paramilitaries, risk becoming a source

of local conflict to the extent that they are associated with a particular ethnic group, region, or political party.

As is true of the hundreds of other groups like them in today's Indonesia, the involvement of *pecalang* and *pam swakarsa* in providing campaign security will be unavoidable during the 2004 elections. Unlike the hastily recruited party security of the 1999 elections, party paramilitaries and civilian auxiliaries are now deeply involved in extortion rackets, turf rivalries and competition for local political favour. Since 1999, mass mobilisation has become the primary nationwide means of displaying power and popular support, and it will be absolutely critical in 2004. The key to effective mobilisation may lie in strong relationships between political parties and the leaders of these private security forces.

The trick is to encourage the disbanding of these organisations without jeopardising freedom of association, and to improve the capacity of the police so that fighting crime and protecting the community do not have to be taken on by groups with an ethnic, religious, or political affiliation.

Jakarta/Brussels, 7 November 2003

APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA



APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 90 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. ICG also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a 12-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates thirteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Cairo, Freetown, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kathmandu, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo and Tbilisi) with analysts working in over 30 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents. In Africa, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: the Australian Agency for International Development, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Foreign Office, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the Luxembourgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan), the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund, the United States Institute of Peace and the Fundação Oriente.

November 2003

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