

**INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER:
WHY SALAFISM AND TERRORISM
MOSTLY DON'T MIX**

13 September 2004



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INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER:

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

One result of the "war on terror" in Indonesia has been increased attention to the country's links with religious institutions in the Middle East and the puritanical form of Islam known as salafism. Particularly outside observers but some Indonesians as well tend to assume that salafism is alien to Indonesian Islam, is growing by leaps and bounds, and is dangerous, because it promotes violence. All three notions are misleading. This report, the first comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon in Indonesia, concludes that most Indonesian salafis find organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group responsible for the Bali bombings of October 2002 and almost certainly the Australian embassy bombing of September 2004, anathema. Salafism may be more of a barrier to the expansion of jihadist activities than a facilitator.

The term salafism describes a movement that seeks to return to what its adherents see as the purest form of Islam, that practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and the two generations that followed him. In practice, this means the rejection of unwarranted innovations (*bid'ah*) brought to the religion in later years.

The strictest salafis in Indonesia:

- ❑ are religious, not political activists;
- ❑ eschew political or organisational allegiances because they divide the Muslim community and divert attention from study of the faith and propagation of salafi principles;
- ❑ reject oath-taking to a leader -- central to the organisational structure of groups like JI;

- ❑ believe it is not permissible to revolt against a Muslim government, no matter how oppressive or unjust, and are opposed to JI and the Darul Islam movement because in their view they actively promote rebellion against the Indonesian state; and
- ❑ tend to see the concept of jihad in defensive terms -- aiding Muslims under attack, rather than waging war against symbolic targets that may include innocent civilians.

While some involved in terrorism in Indonesia, such as Aly Gufron alias Mukhlas, a Bali bomber, claim to be salafis, the radical fringe that Mukhlas represents (sometimes called "salafi jihadism") is not representative of the movement more broadly.

The report examines the rise of salafism in Indonesia, noting that far from being alien to Indonesian Islam, it is only the most recent in a long history of puritanical movements, and looks at the role of Saudi funding in its expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. As important as funding is the close communication between Indonesian salafis and their Middle Eastern mentors, most but not all of them Saudis.

Indonesian salafi leaders rarely decide issues of doctrine or practice without consulting their teachers. Laskar Jihad, the militia established to wage jihad in Ambon was forced to disband after one important Saudi scholar concluded it had strayed from its original purpose. The fact that the Saudi sheikhs most frequently consulted by Indonesian salafis are themselves close to the Saudi government is another brake on any attraction within the movement to Osama bin Laden.

A major split within Indonesian salafism is between "purists", who reject any association with groups or individuals willing to compromise religious purity for political goals, and more tolerant and inclusive groups willing to acknowledge some good even in deviant teachings. The "purists" categorically reject the Muslim Brotherhood and its Indonesian offshoot, the political party PKS, as well as organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jemaah Tabligh, and Darul Islam. Not only will they not interact with them, but they also reject funding from any source that has deviant organisations among its grantees.

Ironically, this means that the most "radical" of the salafis are the most immune to jihadist teachings, and the more "moderate", those more open to other streams of thought, may provide slightly more fertile recruiting grounds for the jihadis.

That said, ICG's information suggests that most salafi jihadis are not recruited from salafi schools but rather from schools linked to Darul Islam or JI itself; urban mosques; and areas with a history of communal conflict. The report examines the few concrete cases known of salafis who have crossed into or out of JI. Drawing on their own writings, it looks in depth at the difference between salafis and salafi jihadis.

More than ever, there is need for an empirical study of the educational backgrounds of known JI-members, but ICG concludes that salafism in Indonesia is not the security threat sometimes portrayed. It may come across to outsiders as intolerant or reactionary, but for the most part it is not prone to terrorism, in part because it is so inwardly focused on faith.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Increased attention to Indonesian links with religious institutions in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, and to the salafi movement, the propagation of a puritanical form of Islam often identified with Saudi funding, is a by-product of the "war on terror". In discussions on Indonesian Islam, there are often suggestions that salafism is an alien phenomenon, is growing by leaps and bounds; and is dangerous, because it promotes violence. All three assumptions are misleading.

The majority of Indonesian salafis are religious but not political activists. Indeed, the strictest of them eschew any form of political allegiance or organisation altogether because it suggests -- or can lead to -- divisions within the *ummat*, the Muslim community.

To most Indonesian salafis, an organisation like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group responsible for the Bali bombings of October 2002, and almost certainly the Australian embassy bombing of September 2004, is anathema not just in terms of ideology and tactics but also because its organisational structure and clandestine nature run counter to the idea of a single community. Salafis do not recognise any form of leadership or hierarchy other than the commander of the faithful (*amir ul-mukminin*). They reject the notion of oath-taking to a leader that is central to membership of organisations like JI or its progenitor, Darul Islam.¹

If there is any tendency toward violence on the part of the religious activists, it is "rooted in [the] ambition to

dictate, control and correct individual behaviour, and takes the form of occasional punitive actions against individuals or groups regarded as 'bad Muslims'".² Most Indonesian salafis would not even go that far.

That said, things become complicated when some -- but by no means all -- of those involved in bombings in Indonesia also claim to be salafis, indeed to uphold a purer form of the faith than their non-violent brethren. (Aly Gufron alias Mukhlas, a JI ideologue and Bali bomber, is in this category.) A key difference between the two groups is over their understanding of jihad and the circumstances in which it is justified. In Indonesia, as internationally, the salafi jihadis, as they are sometimes called, are the extreme fringe of the salafi movement, determined to attack Western targets in retaliation for perceived aggression by the West, or what Indonesians more frequently term a "Christian-Zionist conspiracy", against Muslims around the world. This more radical wing of the international salafi movement emerged as a product of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and it is no coincidence that the top JI leaders are Afghan veterans. The jihadis, however, are not representative of the salafi movement more broadly.

Though funding from Saudi organisations and individual Saudi donors has financed much of the institutional framework of salafism since the early 1980s, the movement has strong historical precedents in Indonesia. It is a widespread myth that Indonesian Islam has always been moderate, pluralist, and tinged with elements of indigenous culture. That myth ignores the fact that a puritanical element has been consistently present, as in all religious traditions.

¹ See ICG Asia Briefing, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, the Case of the Ngruki Network*, 8 August 2002, corrected on 10 January 2003.

² ICG Middle East Briefing, *Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History*, 20 April 2004.

Salafism, therefore, should not be seen as the ideological basis of terrorism. Before examining why the two are so often conflated, however, it is important to understand what salafism is.

II. WHAT IS SALAFISM?

The term salafi is confusing in Indonesia, because it is used in two ways. The Ministry of Religion, in categorising Muslim educational institutions, uses it to mean schools where only religious subjects are taught. It does not mean that those schools have a particularly puritanical bent or in any way follow salafi teachings. Indeed, most are likely affiliated with the moderate, Java-based organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama.³

The term is used increasingly, however -- and throughout this report -- to describe an international movement that seeks to return to what is seen by its adherents as the purest form of Islam, that practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and the two generations that followed him.⁴ They cite *hadith* or traditions of the Prophet in support of the view that the further away from the time of the Prophet, the more impure Islam became: "the best of you are those with me, and the group that comes after, and the group that comes after them";⁵ and "there is not a year or a day when the one that follows is not worse than the one before it".⁶

In practical terms, this means rejection of unwarranted innovations (*bid'ah*) of doctrine and practice that Muslims brought to the religion in later years. At one level this involves rejection of any of the four schools of law on which mainstream Islamic orthodoxy relies in favour of a direct and literal interpretation of the

³ ICG Asia Report N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003 left the impression that some 7,000 of the schools registered with the Ministry of Religion were salafi in the doctrinal sense; in fact, they are salafi in the sense of having no secular curriculum.

⁴ Indonesian salafi scholars note that each generation is calculated to have lasted 100 years, so the salafi period covers the first three centuries after Mohammed's *hijra* or flight to Medina. One tradition says that the Prophet patted the head of an orphan and said, "May you live as long as 100 years", and indeed the child lived to be 100.

⁵ Hadith Riwayat Bukhary No. 2652, Hadith Riwayat Muslim No. 2533 from Sahabat Ibnu Mas'ud in Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, *Prinsip-prinsip Aqidah Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah*, Pustaka at Taqwa, 2000, p.2. The religious teachers most respected by present-day salafis are the Prophet himself, his companions (including the first four caliphs (Abu Bakar, Umar ibn Khatab, Usman ibn Afan, and Ali ibn Abi Thalib) and their followers, including the founders of the major law schools (Syafi'i, Hambali, Malik, and Hanafi) and the *hadith* compiler, Buchori.

⁶ Aboebakar Aceh, *Salaf al-Salih Muhyi Atharis/Salafi*, Kelantan, Malaysia, 1976, p.22.

Quran and *hadith*. While the terms salafism and Wahabism are sometimes used interchangeably, many salafis see themselves as having taken purification of the faith one step further. The Wahabis look to the Hambali school of law for guidance, the most conservative of the orthodox schools, and in the views of some, rely too heavily on "weak" *hadith*, or traditions attributed to but not proven to have originated with the Prophet.

At another level, adherence to salafism means a rigid code in terms of dress and personal appearance, with men required to grow beards and head-to-toe coverage for women in the presence of anyone outside their immediate family. At still another, it means rejection of some inventions and developments that strict Quranic interpretation seems to ban, such as photography, most forms of music, conventional banking, and elections. Certain phenomena, like television, radio, and the Internet, are considered acceptable by some salafi scholars if they are used to propagate salafi teachings.

As noted, most salafis shun any hint of formal organisation, because devotion to an organisation and its cause can detract from one's devotion to Islam. A highly pejorative epithet often thrown by salafis at fellow Muslims is *hizbiyah*, party-like, as in political party. The word is used in particular to describe followers of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan ul-Muslimin*) in Egypt and similar organisations. Not only do members of the Brotherhood focus too much on organisation, but in the interests of achieving their political goals, they also embrace members who are not strict salafis, thus tacitly accepting forbidden practices. The term *ikhwani* (brotherhood-like) is thus equally pejorative, and in Indonesia, is used by some salafis to stigmatise members of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), many of whose leaders were indeed inspired by the Egyptian organisation.

Such a stance obviously militates against any effort to bring salafi groups under a single umbrella. In Indonesia, the closest approximation of an organised salafi network was the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, a network of some 80 schools brought together by salafi leader Ja'far Umar Thalib. It was under the Forum's aegis that the militia Laskar Jihad was established in 2000 to defend Muslims in the communal conflict in the Moluccas.⁷

Almost from the outset, however, the Forum was riven by rivalries and even at its height was more a coalition of like-minded but fully autonomous units than a formal association.

Salafis are also characterised by a particular *manhaj*, or methodology. This includes an emphasis on *tasfiyah* or purifying Islam from forbidden elements such as innovation (*bid'ah*); idolatry (*syirik*); superstition (*khurafat*) and other deviations. It also stresses *tarbiyah* -- training Muslims to understand and practice the purest form of Islam.⁸ Education in various forms is a critical part of salafi methodology, starting with kindergartens, where children learn to memorise verses of the Quran, through *pesantrens* (boarding schools) to *mahad ali*, local Islamic tertiary institutes; to universities or apprenticeships to salafi teachers.

Four of the most important destinations for study abroad by Indonesian salafis are the Islamic University of Imam Muhammad ibn Saud in Riyadh; the Islamic University of Medina; the Ummul Qura University in Mecca; and Punjab University in Lahore. (More Indonesians study at al-Azhar in Cairo than anywhere else in the Middle East but it is not known as a salafi school.)

The real cachet, however, comes not from attending formal institutions but through individual study with salafi mentors in the Middle East or Pakistan, through a practice known as *mulazamah*. The names of seven or eight salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia are particularly golden in salafi circles, and any Indonesian who studied with one of them can bask in reflected glory.⁹

In addition, salafis frequently organise special religious training programs (*dauroh*). In Indonesia, the instructors are sometimes local, sometimes brought from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, or elsewhere,

⁷ For background on Laskar Jihad, see ICG Asia Report N°31, *Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku*, 8 February 2002.

⁸ Syeikh Ali Bin Hasan bin Ali bin Abdul Hamid Al Halaby Al Atsari, *Tashfiyah dan Tarbiyah* (Indonesian edition, Muslim al Atsari, Ahmad Faiz, translators), Solo, April 2002.

⁹ They include, among others, the late Abdullah bin Baz, Muhammad Nashiruddin al-Albani, and Muhammad bin Shalih al-Utsaimin (Uthaimin), as well as several men who are still actively teaching: Rabi' bin Hadi al-Mudkhali; Muhammad bin Hadi; Shalih bin Fauzan al Fauzan; and one scholar based in Yemen, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i. Studying with the same teacher does not guarantee harmony of views. Two Indonesians, Yazid Jawwas and Umar Sewed, both studied with Utsaimin but ended up on opposite sides of a major doctrinal debate within the salafi movement.

and they can focus on a particular target audience -- students, for example -- or subject, such as the Arabic language or the role of women in salafi thought.

One time-honoured training method appears to be on the wane among Indonesian salafis: the *halaqah* (religious study circle). This was a means by which religious teachers could select a handful of the most promising students from a larger group for advanced instruction. Among politically active salafis, including the jihadist groups, this became a clandestine means of selecting members and establishing cells. Because salafis believe that religious outreach should not be conducted in secret, and because the *halaqah* is regarded by some salafi teachers as encouraging exclusivity, it appears to have been increasingly abandoned in favour of regularly scheduled religious gatherings (*pengajian*) open to whomever wants to come.¹⁰

A key doctrinal point separates salafis from salafi jihadis in Indonesia, as elsewhere. It is a central tenet of mainstream salafi thinking that it is not permissible to revolt against a Muslim government, no matter how oppressive or unjust.¹¹ The penalty for rebellion is death.¹² This means that most salafis, if forced to choose between the Saudi government and Osama bin Laden, would choose the former.¹³ In Indonesia, most salafis are opposed to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Darul Islam movement because they actively promote rebellion against the Indonesian state. This does not mean that salafis reject the idea of jihad -- quite the opposite. But they tend to see jihad in defensive terms, as coming to the aid of Muslims under attack, rather than as waging war against symbolic targets, including attacks on innocent civilians. (Many salafis saw jihad in defense of Muslims in Ambon as obligatory.) They see a jihad in which the enemy is

attacked first (*jihad thalab* or *jihad hujum*) as permissible only if it is ordered by the ruler of a Muslim government.

Strict salafis also oppose the idea of democracy on the grounds that power rests with God, not the people, and the only acceptable laws are those laid down by God and the Prophet, not those created by man. While most salafis reject the concept of elections accordingly, some argue that if an election is likely to put in power a government that would harm the interests of the *ummat*, it is permissible to vote to prevent that government from being elected.¹⁴ The Forum Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah allowed its members to vote in Indonesia's 1999 parliamentary elections, and Wahdah Islamiyah, a Makassar-based salafi organisation, has given a green light to members to participate in the elections in 2004.

¹⁰ ICG interview, Yogyakarta, April 2004. See also Syeikh Abdussalam Bin Barjas Abdulkarim, *Wajibnya Taat Pada Pemerintah* (Malang, 2000), pp. 102-139.

¹¹ Muhammad Umar Sewed, "Kewajiban Taat Kepada Pemerintah", *Asy-Syariah*, 12 February 2004, http://www.asysyariah.com/syariah.php?menu=detil&id_online=141.

¹² Syeikh Abdussalam Bin Barjas Abdulkarim, op. cit., pp. 82-88.

¹³ ICG asked one salafi teacher how salafis explained Muhammed Abdul Wahab's revolt against Arabian rulers in the late eighteenth century.. He replied that Abdul Wahab was only a preacher, and it was not he who led the rebellion but rather ibn Saud, who adopted Abdul Wahab's teachings and led the revolt that resulted in the creation of the House of Saud.

¹⁴ "Fatwa Syaikh Nashiruddin Al Albani and Surat Syaikh Kepada FIS", in Syaikh Abdul Malik Al Jazair, *Haramkah Partai, Pemilu, Parlemen?* (Yogyakarta, Ramadan, 1419H), p. 70.

III. THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA

The puritanical "cleansing" of Islam has a long history in Indonesia, as does close interaction between Indonesian scholars and Middle Eastern mentors. Literalist interpretation of the Quran may not reflect mainstream practice, but historically it is a well-established tendency within Indonesian Islam. That said, the salafi movement that arose in the 1980s in the country did not consciously build on the past, and its leaders saw little to admire and much to condemn in earlier movements. Thanks to assistance from the Gulf states, the new movement had access to resources and educational opportunities hitherto unimaginable, and it made good use of them to increase its ranks rapidly.

A. ORIGINS

Salafi scholars themselves trace the movement back to the so-called Padri Wars in Sumatra from 1803 to about 1832.¹⁵ It began when three local leaders from West Sumatra, who were in Mecca when the Wahabi movement occupied it in 1803, returned to teach the Wahabi message, including cleansing Islam of all impurities, returning to strict interpretation of the Quran and *hadith*, and eradicating vice from daily life, including cockfighting and tobacco. Men were required to grow beards and wear turbans, women to cover their faces. The men leading this purification drive undertook armed assaults against villages that would not accept the new teachings, and in the process, undermined the old social order and established a new one more conducive to trade. The Padri Wars changed the political, economic, and social fabric of large swathes of West and North Sumatra, and it was only when pilgrims returning from Mecca in the 1820s began reporting that Wahabi influence had sharply declined that the strict controls in Padri strongholds began to relax.¹⁶ The influence of Middle Eastern developments on one of the earliest

"purifying" movements was thus immediate and direct.

Indonesian students returning from Cairo's Al-Azhar University at the turn of the 20th century brought with them the ideas of the Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduh, who called for renewal of Islam through return to the sources of fundamental truths -- the Quran and the *hadith* -- combined with the appropriate adaptation of Western political concepts, such as democracy. Abduh, not a favourite with today's salafis, was the inspiration for Indonesia's most influential reform movement, Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912.¹⁷

From the outset, Muhammadiyah, which developed into one of Indonesia's largest Islamic organisations, was more progressive than puritanical, more modernist than fundamentalist, with a particular focus on improving the education and welfare of its members through construction of schools and hospitals. But perhaps because of its origins in a back-to-basics approach to Islam, it has always had a conservative wing, and people of a Muhammadiyah background are well-represented among the salafis today.

Mohammed Abduh and his successor, Rashid Rida', were also the inspiration for the emergence of a much more puritanical organisation, Persatuan Islam or Persis. Founded in 1923 in Bandung as a discussion group to explore new currents in Islamic thought, it became a prominent voice for cleansing Islam of innovations and for the application of the principles of the Quran and the *hadith* to contemporary conditions. Its focus was scholarly research, with particular emphasis on religious ritual and the surrounding law. It also made a point of trying to reach and educate the Muslim public about Islam, through public meetings, study groups, and various publications containing fatwas and essays.¹⁸

In 1936, Persis set up a school, the Pesantren Persatuan Islam in Bandung, which later moved to Bangil, East Java, and can perhaps be considered the first salafi school in Indonesia. It was the only *pesantren* that explicitly opposed teaching any of the

¹⁵ Some go further back. Ja'far Umar Thalib in an article entitled "Pasang Surut Menegakkan Syari'ah Islamiyah", gives credit to the Acehnese Sultan Iskandar Muda (1603-1637) for being a pioneer of *tajdid* or renewal. See *Salafy*, special edition No.40, 1422/2001, pp. 2-12.

¹⁶ Christina Dobbin, *Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy, Central Sumatra 1784-1847*, Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies, Monograph Series No.47 (1983), pp.128-187.

¹⁷ Ja'far Umar Thalib calls Abduh a rationalist/mu'tazilite who took an oath of allegiance to "Jewish Zionist Freemasonry", and says his movement was a deliberate effort by international Zionism to block the growth of salafism led by Muhammad Abdul Wahab. See "Pasang Surut Menegakkan Syari'ah Islamiyah", op. cit.

¹⁸ Howard M. Federspiel, *Islam and Ideology In The Emerging Indonesian State: The Persatuan Islam, 1923 to 1957* (Leiden, 2001), pp. 15, 21-22.

four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*mazhab*), and focused almost exclusively on study of the Quran and the *hadith*.¹⁹ Today it is very much part of the salafi movement, and some of the leading salafi figures have studied there, including Ja'far Umar Thalib (who is more charitable to Persis than to other reform movements). A few of the Bali bombers had Persis family backgrounds, most notably Imam Samudra.

Al-Irsyad is another organisation that continues to feed into the salafi movement. It emerged in the early 1900s as an association of the growing Arab-Indonesian community, mostly from the Hadramaut region on Yemen, under the leadership of a Sudanese, long resident in Mecca, Ahmad bin Mohammad Surkati (sometimes seen as Soorkati). Al-Irsyad focused on education for the Hadrami community but also was committed to purifying Islam and Islamic practices from innovation and idolatrous practices.²⁰ Surkati, a disciple of Rashid Rida', is now seen in retrospect by Indonesian salafis as having been too accommodating to non-salafis, a fatal flaw.²¹ But a number of al-Irsyad schools, particularly in central and east Java, today form part of the core of the salafi movement, and there is a disproportionate presence of men of Hadrami descent among the salafi leadership.

The three decades following Indonesian independence in 1949 were lean ones for Islamic puritanism, in part because of the political climate. A series of regional rebellions against Jakarta, waged in the name of Islam, made President Sukarno and the army suspicious of all groups on what they called "the extreme right". While Persis, parts of the al-Irsyad organisation, conservatives within Muhammadiyah, and others kept aspects of the puritanical vision alive, there was little evidence of anything resembling a salafi movement.

It was only in the 1980s that such a phenomenon began to develop, largely because of four factors: the availability of Saudi funding; the development of campus-based groups that spurred the growth of a Muslim publishing industry; the war in Afghanistan; and the establishment in Jakarta of the Institute for the

Study of Islam and Arabic (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA) as a branch of the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh. Today's salafis, in fact, do not see themselves as carrying the torch of earlier efforts to purify the faith. The movement that emerged in the 1980s, in their view, was a clean break with the past.

B. DEWAN DAKWAH ISLAM INDONESIA AND THE CAMPUS MOVEMENT

Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia -- DDII (The Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia) -- founded in 1967 became a vehicle for the spread of salafism, although it now is sharply criticised by purists as too conciliatory to "innovators" and those of an *ikhwani* persuasion.²²

DDII's influence initially came through the international contacts of its founder, Mohamed Natsir, who had been active in Persis as a young man, was a leading figure in the Indonesian independence movement, a former prime minister, and former head of the Masjumi party.²³ He had been instrumental in the effort, ultimately unsuccessful, to insert into Indonesia's constitution the so-called Jakarta Charter requiring all Muslims to obey Islamic law. Once Masjumi was banned, Natsir turned to finding ways to promote Islam through non-party mechanisms, and DDII was the perfect instrument. (He reportedly said, "Before we used politics as a way to preach, now we use preaching as a way to engage in politics".)²⁴ He became vice president of the Karachi-based World Muslim Congress (Mutamar al-Alam al-Islami) in 1967 and a member of the Jiddah-based World Muslim League (Rabithah al-Alam al-Islami) in 1969.

DDII became the main channel in Indonesia for distributing scholarships from the Saudi-funded

¹⁹ Martin van Bruinessen, "'Traditionalist' and 'Islamist' pesantren in contemporary Indonesia", Paper presented at the ISIM workshop on "The Madrasa in Asia", 23-24 May 2004; Federspiel, op. cit.

²⁰ Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, *The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands East Indies 1900-1942* (Ithaca, 1999), pp. 54-63.

²¹ ICG interview, Jakarta, May 2004.

²² It is also criticised by the purists for supporting the concepts of democracy and elections. But some Indonesian salafi leaders like Yazid Jawwas and Abu Nida', who themselves are castigated by the purists for being *ikhwani* or *sururi*, remain close to DDII, in part because they owe their religious education to its assistance. ICG interview, July 2004. As of 2004, Jawwas remained on the list of DDII proselytisers (*da'i*).

²³ Masjumi, Indonesia's largest Muslim political party, was banned by Sukarno in 1960.

²⁴ "Dulu berdakwah lewat jalur politik, sekarang berpolitik lewat jalur dakwah", quoted in Lukman Hakiem and Tansil Linrung, "Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah: Dokumentasi Perjalanan 30 Tahun DDII", Jakarta 1997.

Rabithah to study in the Middle East.²⁵ In the early 1970s, it opened an office in Riyadh to facilitate links with Saudi Arabia. The head of the office was Ustadz Abdul Wahid, an alumnus of the Persis *pesantren* in Bangil. The DDII-Rabithah link was also instrumental in providing funding for Indonesians who wanted to fight as mujahidin in Afghanistan.

DDII was also responsible indirectly for encouraging the translation of works by major salafi thinkers into Indonesian. Natsir saw three major targets of Islamic outreach (*dakwah*) activities: *pesantrens*, mosques, and university campuses. In 1968 he conceived of a training program aimed at university instructors who themselves were graduates of Muslim student organisations. The program began with 40 instructors from universities in the Bandung area who assembled at a dormitory for Muslim pilgrims in Kwitang, outside Jakarta. In 1974, DDII began a more systematic campus-based initiative called Bina Masjid Kampus.²⁶ Some of Indonesia's best-known Muslim scholars and activists took part, most of whom were not salafis but Muslim intellectuals, interested in international developments, like Amien Rais, later chair of Muhammadiyah and speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly.

Bina Masjid Kampus became particularly influential in 1978, when the Soeharto government in effect closed down university political life, and campus mosques became a refuge for would-be activists. The Iranian revolution intensified an already strong interest among the alumni of DDII programs in political thought from around Muslim world. Over the next decade, DDII helped distribute Indonesian translations of books by such writers as Hasan al-Banna and Yusuf al-Qardawi of the Muslim Brotherhood; Sayyid Qutb, one of the main ideologues of Islamic radicalism; and A'la Maududi of Pakistan. The intellectual ferment of the late 1970s and early 1980s on university campuses, together with newly available scholarships to study in the Middle East, helped lay the groundwork for salafi recruitment in Indonesia throughout the 1980s.²⁷

²⁵ According to a brochure DDII published in 2004, it has sent 500 students to study abroad since 1967. Almost all would have gone to the Middle East or Pakistan.

²⁶ The most important product of this program was called Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training for Islamic Propagation Warriors) based at the Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology.

²⁷ ICG interview, May 2004. See also A.M. Lutfi, "Gerakan Dakwah di Indonesia", in Bang Imad, *Pemikiran Dan Gerakan Dakwahnya* (Jakarta, 2002) and Lukman Hakiem

The conflict in Afghanistan also helped. From the Soviet Union's invasion in 1979 through its retreat in 1989, the struggle of the mujahidin inspired Muslims across Asia. Men who later became JI leaders trained in camps run by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the mujahidin commander with the closest ties to Saudi Arabia and consequently, the most funding. Sayyaf and the men around him, like Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, inspired the trainees to become salafi jihadis.²⁸

Many Indonesians who went to Afghanistan, including Ja'far Umar Thalib, trained under another Saudi-funded mujahidin commander, Jamil ur-Rahman. These men tended to become salafis but not jihadis, and few of them joined JI.²⁹

C. LIPIA

Of all the agencies for the spread of salifism in Indonesia, none has been more important than LIPIA. In early 1980, the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University in Riyadh, which had branches in Djibouti and Mauritania, decided to open a third, in Indonesia. It sent an instructor, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a student of the top salafi scholar in the world, Sheikh Abdullah bin Baz, to Jakarta. Bin Baz urged his protégé to meet with Mohammed Natsir on arrival.³⁰

Natsir welcomed the idea of Jakarta's hosting an extension of a major Saudi university. Not only would it help strengthen local capacity in Islamic law, it would also give far more Indonesian students access to the kind of instruction available in Saudi Arabia.³¹ He agreed to facilitate the project, and by the end of 1980, a new institute based on salafi principles was up and running.³²

and Tamsil Linrung, *Menunaikan Panggilan Risalah: Dokumentasi Perjalanan 30 Tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia*, Jakarta, 1997.

²⁸ See ICG Report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, op. cit., and ICG Asia Report N°43, *Indonesia Background, How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Works*, 11 December 2002.

²⁹ Other well-known salafi leaders who trained under Jamil ur-Rahman were Abu Nida' and Shaleh Su'aidi of Yogyakarta, Ahmad Fa'iz of Kebumen, and Abu Ubah, of Riau.

³⁰ Aay Muhamad Furkon, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi Dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Teraju Publishers, 2004), p. 173.

³¹ Ibid.

³² The original name was Lembaga Pendidikan Bahasa Arab (Institute for Arabic Language Study).

The new school followed the curriculum of its parent university, and many of the faculty were salafi scholars, brought from Saudi Arabia. It provided full scholarships, covering tuition, housing, and a stipend that by Indonesian standards was extraordinarily generous (100 to 300 rials per month, roughly \$27 to \$82)³³. Promising graduates received scholarships to continue their studies at the master's and PhD level in Riyadh.

The first LIPIA students included men who have become some of Indonesia's best-known salafi leaders.³⁴ Many students became Muslim preachers (*da'i*), on university campuses, among other places, and there was a particularly strong relationship between LIPIA and outreach activities on the campus of the University of Indonesia in Jakarta.³⁵

But in the early 1990s, a split developed within the faculty, passed on to the students, between the purists of the salafi movement and those who were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna, pioneered the concept of a political movement (*harakah*) aimed at the transformation of Muslim societies and based on the construction of model communities, built up from small groups (*usroh*, literally family) of ten to fifteen people who would live by Islamic law.

The concept of *usroh* communities spread rapidly on Indonesian campuses in the early 1980s, just as the Soeharto government's targeting of political Islam intensified. Not only was the concept adopted by many of the campus groups set up by DDII as a way of organising Islamic study, but it also became the theoretical basis for the establishment of what amounted to political cells for more explicitly anti-government activities. Abdullah Sungkar, later to found JI, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir started the *usroh* communities in Central Java.³⁶

Within LIPIA, the influence of the Brotherhood increased steadily. Several of the most popular instructors subscribed to its basic tenets, and the LIPIA library began filling up with books by leaders of the Brotherhood or those supportive of its aims.³⁷ Some LIPIA students influenced by Brotherhood during this period went on to become leaders of the Justice Party, now the Prosperous Justice Party, a political movement set up very much along Brotherhood lines (and that is sometimes referred to as the *tarbiyah* or education movement).³⁸ By the early 1990s the purists, concerned about keeping the focus on religious as opposed to political activities, were upset at the influence of *hizbiyah* thinking in LIPIA.

In fact, the basic methodology of the purists and the political activists was almost identical. Both placed heavy emphasis on education and recruitment. Both used *dauroh* – training program in Islamic studies -- to draw in more followers and increase their religious knowledge. But purists believed that the Brotherhood was sullyng Islam by being too accommodating to "innovators" in the interests of achieving political goals. As one scathing critic put it, "Everyone's a friend, no one's an enemy, they yell, 'There's no East, there's no West, there are no Sunnis, no Shi'as, what's important is Islam!'"³⁹ But by tolerating deviants, the purists said, the Brotherhood was undermining the principles of *aqidah* (faith).

Rather than fight a losing battle in LIPIA, the purists around 1995-1996 began to discourage their followers from attending the school. By the time that decision was taken, however, LIPIA's influence on the spread of the salafi movement was already huge, in terms of the sheer numbers of graduates. By June 1998, the school had produced 3,726 students; by 2004, the number would be closer to 5,000.⁴⁰ Not all became committed salafis, of course. Ulil Abshar Abdalla, for example, the founder of the Liberal Islam Network -- in some ways, the antithesis of the salafi movement -- is also a LIPIA graduate. But overall, no single institution did more to propagate salafism in Indonesia.

³³ Figures denoted in dollars (\$) in this report are in U.S. dollars.

³⁴ Among them are Abdul Hakim Abdat, a *hadith* scholar from Jakarta; Yazid Jawwas, of Minhaj us-Sunnah in Bogor; Farid Okbah, a director of al-Irsyad; Ainul Harits, Yayasan Nida'ul Islam, Surabaya; Abubakar M. Altway; Yayasan al-Sofwah, Jakarta; Ja'far Umar Thalib, founder of Forum Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah; and Yusuf Utsman Baisa, a director of al-Irsyad Pesantren, Tangerang.

³⁵ Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta, 2002), fn. 202, p. 206.

³⁶ See ICG Briefing, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*, op. cit.

³⁷ Aay Muhamad Furko, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Ideologi Dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer* (Penerbit Teraju, 2004), p. 173.

³⁸ Fenomena Partai Keadilan.

³⁹ Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, "Sururiyyah terus melanda muslimin Indonesia", 15 March 2004, at www.salafy.or.id/print.php?id_artikel=546.

⁴⁰ The June 1998 figure appears in *Mimbar Ulama*, Vol.20, No.238, pp.13-16.

D. THE RISE OF SALAFISM IN YOGYAKARTA

Many elements discussed above -- DDII, LIPIA, and study in the Middle East -- come together in the story of how one scholar came to occupy a prominent position in the salafi movement.⁴¹ Chamsaha Sofwan, known now as Abu Nida', was born in 1954 in Gresik, East Java. He went to elementary school at a madrasah run by the Nahdlatul Ulama organisation near his home, then continued his education at a Muhammadiyah teacher training academy in the same area. Around 1976, he went to the Karangasem Pesantren in Paciran subdistrict, Lamongan, East Java. At the time, it was participating in a DDII program to send some students to remote areas as religious preachers (*muballigh*).⁴²

Abu Nida' was selected to be sent to West Kalimantan. He went first to a DDII training program in Darul Falah Pesantren in Bogor, near Jakarta, where he and other *muballighs* were trained in teaching methods, basic agricultural skills, rural sociology, and Dayak culture.⁴³ The aim was to spend two years spreading the faith in animist areas of the interior while providing rudimentary agricultural extension services. The young missionaries were confronted not only with a deeply-rooted indigenous belief system, but also with Christian missionaries competing for the same souls. Abu Nida' stayed the two years and left behind a mosque in the village he was working in as a measure of his accomplishment.

After working for a while as a *muballigh* at DDII headquarters in Jakarta, he received a scholarship through DDII to study with salafi teachers at the Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh. While there, he helped Ustadz Abdul Wahid at the DDII office, and since Abdul Wahid was the liaison between DDII in Jakarta and many Islamic organisations in the Middle East, he acquired a wide range of contacts, particularly among Islamic funding agencies. It was through the DDII office in Riyadh that Abu Nida' was introduced to the Kuwaiti-based organisation, Jum'iah Ihya at-Turots al-Islami (Revival of Islamic Heritage Society), at-

Turots for short, whose representative in Indonesia he eventually became.⁴⁴

After completing his studies in 1985, Abu Nida' left for the Pakistan-Afghan border to join Jamil ur-Rahman for three months.⁴⁵ He returned to Indonesia to teach at Pondok Ngruki, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's *pesantren*, outside Solo, Central Java.⁴⁶ In 1986, he married a Ngruki student and moved to Sleman, Yogyakarta, where he taught briefly in a DDII-run *pesantren*, Ibnul Qoyim, and began to make a name for himself as a salafi teacher. He was reportedly concerned by the extent to which Islam in the Yogyakarta area had been corrupted by "innovations". He felt that young people had been lured away from religion by the negative impact of modernisation, and existing Islamic organisations lacked any capacity to cope with these problems.⁴⁷

Abu Nida's *dakwah* activities brought him into close association with an instructor in the sciences faculty of the premier academic institution in Yogyakarta, Gajah Mada University. Saefullah Mahyudin was then the head of DDII in Yogyakarta and introduced Abu Nida' to students, mostly from the science and technical faculties of Gajah Mada, who were active in the campus mosque and called themselves Jamaah Salahudin.⁴⁸ Students of that group, together with some of Abu Nida's fellow alumni from the Middle East, eventually formed the core of the Indonesian branch of at-Turots, which was organised in 1988 and legally established as a foundation (*yayasan*) in 1994.

In the meantime, however, Abu Nida' and some campus activists began holding one-month *dauroh* sessions at the Ibnul Qoyim Pesantren to propagate salafi teachings. Members of the *dauroh* then formed smaller study circles of ten to fifteen to

⁴¹ Much of the information in this section, particularly on the career of Abu Nida', is based on the research of Drs. Sabarudin, M.Si, for the State Islamic Institute in Yogyakarta. Sabarudin's report, "Jama'ah at-Turots al-Islami di Yogyakarta", was published in 2000 and made available to ICG by Dr. Greg Fealy of Australian National University.

⁴² Sabarudin, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ ICG interview, Yogyakarta, March 2004. The at-Turots presence in Indonesia is complicated. An at-Turots foundation run by Abu Nida' in Yogyakarta was described to ICG as the Indonesian branch of the Kuwaiti group but it is legally independent. There is also the at-Turots South East Asia office in Jakarta, which funds a wider group of schools and reports directly to Kuwait. See Section IVA and VI below.

⁴⁵ Abu Nida' clearly kept in touch with the Afghan commander, however, because in 1992, more than six years after he returned from Afghanistan, Jamil ur-Rahman asked him to send more Indonesian students to study the salafi *manhaj*. Sabarudin, op. cit., p. 43.

⁴⁶ Concerning this *pesantren*, see ICG Briefing, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia*, op. cit.

⁴⁷ Sabarudin, op. cit., p.41.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p.43.

proselytise throughout Java and into Sumatra and Kalimantan.⁴⁹

Abu Nida' worked closely in all of this with teachers from the al-Irsyad Pesantren in Tengeran, Salatiga, a school that since its opening in 1986 had become a major salafi centre. Its head was a leading salafi scholar, Yusuf Baisa, and one of its prominent teachers was Ja'far Umar Thalib, who taught there from the time he returned from Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1989 to 1993. Abu Nida' at the outset also worked with leading figures of the *tarbiyah* movement, despite the misgivings of salafi purists. He was even willing initially to cooperate with members of Darul Islam, as long as the aim was to spread salafi principles.

This cooperation was short-lived, and in 1990, a split took place between Abu Nida' and some of the Gajah Mada activists. He believed they were getting too close to the political activism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the *tarbiyah* movement, and straying from the only true objective of purifying the faith. The split culminated with a struggle between the two groups for control of a mosque near the medical faculty of Gajah Mada University. The *tarbiyah* activists won, and Abu Nida' moved closer to al-Irsyad.

By the mid-1990s, Abu Nida' and a few others around him were being criticised by salafi purists for betraying the movement by themselves becoming too open to *hizbiyyah* influence.

IV. THE DYNAMICS OF DISSEMINATING SALAFI TEACHINGS

The main vehicles for spreading salafi teachings go back to Mohammed Natsir's troika: *pesantrens*, mosques, and university campuses. As Middle Eastern money, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was critical to all three, it will be interesting to see how the post 9/11 funding cutbacks affect the growth of the movement.

A. PESANTRENS

The *pesantrens* are most important. From a handful of salafi institutions in the early 1980s, such as the long-established Persis school in Bangil, East Java, there are hundreds today, as graduates set up their own, often with links to their alma maters.

The alumni network of the al-Irsyad Pesantren mentioned above makes an interesting case study. As noted, the *pesantren* was established in Tengeran, Salatiga, not far from the Central Javanese provincial capital, Semarang, in 1986, took on its first students in 1988, and produced its first graduates in 1992. Its original director was Yusuf Baisa, like many salafi leaders, an Indonesian of Arab (Hadrami) descent. Baisa was a graduate of the Persis *pesantren* in Bangil and went on to LIPIA about the same time as Ja'far Umar Thalib. He subsequently studied in Riyadh.

The main objectives of the *pesantren* since its founding have been:

- ❑ to train instructors in Islam and Arabic who can then be placed in Muslim schools and *pesantrens*;
- ❑ to prepare *muballigh* to propagate salafi methodology in the public at large;
- ❑ to implement a religious outreach program to rid Islam of innovation, idolatry and superstition; and
- ❑ to conduct *dauroh* programs and other forms of training.

Outreach work is part of the standard curriculum, and students are expected to teach in the local community while completing their studies, or in kindergartens,

⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 46.

mosques, orphanages, prisons and other institutions with which the *pesantren* has links.⁵⁰

After graduation, students are meant to complete a two-year community service assignment (*Khidmah Dakwah dan Taklim*), in effect, voluntary religious teaching, either locally or in areas as far away as Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, and before its independence, East Timor. Of the 22 graduates in 2001, six stayed at the *pesantren*, eight went slightly further afield in Central Java, one each went to Sumbawa, Riau, Makassar, and East Kalimantan, and the rest to West or East Java. Of the 34 graduates the next year, two went to Sumbawa, one to East Kalimantan, one to Riau, and the rest stayed on in Java, in most cases, apparently with other salafi *pesantrens*.⁵¹

Internationally, the school maintains ties to the Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia, from which it has received accreditation (*mu'adalah*) for its teaching program. It has also received help from the Saudi government to bring in foreign teachers and support some of its activities, and from at-Turots in Kuwait.

The at-Turots network in Indonesia is another interesting case. Founded by Abu Nida', it now has several schools with more in preparation. Officially, only five institutions are owned and operated by Abu Nida's at-Turots Foundation in Yogyakarta (Yayasan Majelis At-Turots al-Islami).⁵² But there is a much wider informal network of schools that also receive funding from the Kuwaiti charity, much of it channelled through the Southeast Asia branch office of at-Turots in Jakarta.⁵³ At least two of these focus on recruiting students from predominantly non-

Muslim areas and pride themselves on the number of converts (*mualaf*). Recruiting is said to be particularly strong in West Timor, Flores, and Mentawai, a small, largely Christian island off the coast of Sumatra. Each student recruited is expected to stay at the *pesantren* for six years, after which males have an opportunity for fully-funded study abroad, usually at either the Islamic University in Medina or the Islamic law faculty of Punjab University in Lahore. They are expected to return eventually to their places of origin, with the hope that each will eventually establish a new *pesantren* or at least a mosque.⁵⁴

Yayasan al-Huda, another salafi institution set up in 1998 in Ciomas, Bogor, originally concentrated on producing memorizers of the Quran. In the interests of religious outreach, it set up not only kindergartens but also Radio Al-Imam Swaratama, whose broadcasts reach well into West Java.

B. MOSQUE CONSTRUCTION

Construction of mosques is an important form of outreach, because the funder can often determine the ideological orientation of the imam. The main salafi *pesantrens*, or *pesantren* networks, became intermediaries for grants from the Middle East. In 1996-1997, for example, the at-Turots network channelled funds from the International Islamic Relief Organisation in Dammam, Saudi Arabia to build six mosques.⁵⁵

Yayasan al-Huda set ten conditions for helping channel funds for the construction of 42 mosques between 1998 and 2004. Among them were that it work with the local community to manage the endowment (*wakaf*) to ensure there was no deviation from the teachings of the Quran and the *hadith*, that it would have the right to appoint preachers and the imam of the mosques, and that it would supervise all education and outreach programs. In effect, if a salafi foundation builds a mosque, it ensures that salafi teachings prevail.

⁵⁰ For example, al-Irsyad works closely with nine mosques, 24 Muslim kindergartens, and two detention centres. It has partnership arrangements with two Islamic academies (mahad aly) in Solo and Salatiga, with LIPIA, and with a state Islamic academy (STAIN) in Salatiga.

⁵¹ Information made available to ICG.

⁵² They include the Islamic Centre bin Baz in Bantul, Central Java; the Jamilurrahman al-Salafy Pesantren, also in Bantul; a clinic and maternity hospital; the magazine *al-Fatawa*, and an agency providing travel services and education for pilgrims to Mecca.

⁵³ They include Ahmad Faiz's Imam Buchori Pesantren, run by the Yayasan Lajnah Istiqomah; Aunur Rofiq's Mahad al-Furqon in Gresik, run by the Lajnah al-Furqon al-Islami; Pesantren Ibnu Taimiyyah in Pontianak, West Kalimantan; Pesantren Ibnu Taimiyyah in Bogor; the Ukhuwah al-Muslimin Pesantren in Cisaat; and the al-Imam Pesantren outside Makassar.

⁵⁴ ICG interview, April 2004.

⁵⁵ These mosques were, on Java, Amar bin Yasir in Tengaran, Aisyah in Cilacap, Istiqomah in Purwokerto, and al-Furqon in Sukoharjo, as well as Abu Bakar in Balikpapan and al-Imam n Medan. The International Islamic Relief Organisation in transliterated Arabic is Haiatul Ighatsah.

C. PUBLICATIONS PROGRAMS

Salafi teachings have also been disseminated through magazines and books published by the salafi community, including translations of the writings of the great Saudi salafi scholars.⁵⁶ Yayasan al-Sofwah alone is reported to have distributed 1 million free books around Indonesia since its founding in 1992.⁵⁷ Most major streams of salafism in Indonesia have their own websites, often with links to Middle Eastern and U.S.-based sites, and most have their own magazines as well that digest complicated points of religious law and doctrine. These exacerbate rifts within the movement, however, as much as they propagate salafi principles. But the focus on publishing is also indicative of the highly literate community that forms the basis of the salafi constituency in Indonesia: these magazines are not produced for visual appeal or designed for the rural poor. The target audience appears to be very much an educated middle class.

⁵⁶ These publishing houses, all Java-based, include Cahaya Tauhid Press in Malang; Pustaka Azzam (Jakarta); Pustaka al Sofwah (Jakarta); Pustaka al-Haura (Yogyakarta); Maktabah Salafy Press (Tegal); Penerbit an-Najiyah (Sukoharjo); Oase Media (Yogyakarta); Media Hidayah (Yogyakarta); Pustaka Imam Buchori (Solo); Darul Hadits (Depok); Penerbit al-Mubarak (Cileungsi, Bogor); Pustaka Imam Syafei (Bogor); Darul Falah (Jakarta); Pustaka Arafah (Solo); Pustaka at-Tibyan (Solo); Pustaka al-Atsary (Bogor); Darul Haq (Jakarta); Pustaka Progressif (Jakarta); Najla Press (Jakarta); Cendekia (Jakarta) and Elba (Surbaya).

⁵⁷ See www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatlayanan&id=29.

V. DISPUTES WITHIN THE SALAFI COMMUNITY

The bitterness of splits and recrimination within the salafi community is striking but not uncommon to any radical faction that professes to maintain the ideological purity of the larger whole. Most disputes in Indonesia focus on the degree to which religious purity has been compromised, in the view of one side, by the other being too accommodating to individuals with a greater tolerance for imperfection. In some cases, the real source of friction may be competition for Middle Eastern funding. The divisions are illustrated by a few examples.

A. JA'FAR UMAR THALIB VS. YUSUF BAISA

Ja'far Umar Thalib is best known today as leader of the now defunct Laskar Jihad but he was also a leader of the salafi movement throughout the 1990s. It is partly as a result of the doctrinal divisions within the movement that he fell from grace in 2002-2003.

Ja'far was an early LIPIA student, entering in 1983, and became head of the al-Irsyad student movement there. In 1986, before graduation, he fell out with one of his teachers and left for the Maududi Institute in Lahore on a DDII scholarship. Again, he fell out with his teachers, left, and, in 1987, joined the struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.⁵⁸ For two years, he studied and trained with Jamil ur-Rahman on the Pakistan-Afghan border. He dates his own adoption of salafi methodology to January 1990.⁵⁹ As noted, he taught in the al-Irsyad Pesantren, run by Yusuf Baisa, for two years, before leaving for Yemen in 1991 to study with a noted salafi scholar, Sheikh Mukbil ibn Hadi al-Wad'i, in Dammaz.⁶⁰

When he returned from his studies in 1993, Ja'far, with the help of other salafi leaders, founded the Ihya us-Sunnah Pesantren in the village of Degolan,

⁵⁸ Sukidi Mulyadi, "Kekerasan dibawah Panji Agama: Kasus Laskar Jihad dan Laskar Kristus", 2003, at www.scripps.ohiou.edu/news/cmdd/artikel_sukidi.htm.

⁵⁹ Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Orang-orang yg Meninggalkan Akhlaq Ahulussunnah wal Jamaah," May 2004, unpublished tract.

⁶⁰ Among other things, Sheikh Mukbil was noted for his uncompromising stance toward the Muslim Brotherhood, a position he passed on to Ja'far, who had once been fascinated with the Brotherhood's radical ideologue, Sayyid Qutb. Sukidi, op. cit.

Sleman district, Yogyakarta on land endowed for religious purposes by a cousin of a former commander of the Indonesian armed forces, Admiral Widodo. He also received financial assistance for the *pesantren* from an individual Saudi donor.

Ja'far had just returned from Yemen when his former colleague, Yusuf Baisa, issued a statement at a large gathering held in the al-Irsyad mosque in Tenggara towards the end of Ramadan that to be effective, *dakwah* should build on the organisational skills of the Muslim Brotherhood, the wisdom of Jemaah Tabligh, and the knowledge of the salafis, in terms of understanding the faith (*aqidah*).⁶¹ Some of those present reported Baisa's statement to Ja'far, puzzled that Yusuf would find any value in either the Brotherhood or Jemaah Tabligh, a South Asia-based *dakwah* organisation that many salafis regard as tainted by "innovations". One of those innovations is a policy called *khuruj*, which requires members to engage in *dakwah* three days of every month or three or four months of every year.

Ja'far was reportedly extremely upset with Yusuf since he considered the salafi movement had exemplary organisation and did not need to turn to the Muslim Brotherhood or any other group for anything. Rival camps formed, and Abu Nida' was asked to mediate. Yusuf and Ja'far attended a "clarification" meeting at Ja'far's house, chaired by Abu Nida' and joined by three other salafi leaders.⁶² Yusuf acknowledged his error and agreed never again to suggest in public any benefits of *hizbiah* groups like the Brotherhood and to warn his followers of their dangers. If he genuinely believed they had good attributes, he would mention this only in closed meetings with senior salafi leaders wise enough to draw their own conclusions. Yusuf also agreed to announce to salafi activists that he had returned to the true path, thereby ensuring that the movement stayed united. He did so at a packed meeting in June 1994 in the Utsman bin Affan Mosque near Ja'far's house, and their rift was considered settled.

But Yusuf sparked Ja'far's ire again a few months later. In a lecture at the al-Irsyad Pesantren about the concept of justice, he recommended the writings of several salafy scholars whom Ja'far labelled *sururi* or *sururiyyah*, a purist epithet derived from the name of Mohamed Surur, a former Muslim Brotherhood

member who returned to the salafi fold, but in the eyes of the purists, retained *hizbiah* tendencies.⁶³ Yusuf had reportedly urged his students to read books by and listen to the cassettes of those scholars, which Ja'far considered as betraying his commitment not to expose young salafis to such material. (Two of the scholars in question, Salman al-Auda and Safar al-Hawali, had been critics of the Saudi alliance with the U.S. during the Gulf War and were imprisoned by the Saudi government about the same time this debate was taking place.)

But Yusuf then went further, inviting a leading figure from the at-Turots organisation in Kuwait, Sheikh Abdurahman Abdul Khaliq (sometimes seen as Kholiq), to the al-Irsyad Pesantren in 1994. In a lecture attended by some leading salafi scholars in Indonesia, Sheikh Abdul Khaliq turned the tables on Ja'far, saying those who were quick to brand other scholars as *sururi* were in fact the biggest dangers to the salafi movement. He praised Muhammad Surur and a Brotherhood leader, Yusuf al-Qardawi, who were among Ja'far's favourite targets. As a result, the salafi movement split. The purist camp was led by Ja'far and Umar Sewed, the more tolerant camp by Yusuf. The latter camp, in fact, also considered the Muslim Brotherhood to have deviated from salafism, but was willing to criticise without rejecting it wholesale.

The feud took a turn for the worse in October 1995, when Ja'far lectured on "The Danger of Sururism and Its Slander" at the Utsman bin Affan Mosque. His camp claimed that Yusuf's followers tried to prevent people from attending, but the lecture still drew hundreds. Ja'far used it to slam the deviationism of Abdul Khaliq. A week later, it was Yusuf's turn. He rejected Ja'far's arguments, saying the principle of justice required that salafis acknowledge the contributions of some *hizbiah* groups.

The depth of the hostility between the two men was cause for concern among other salafi leaders, and Yazid Jawwas of Bogor, supported by two Surabaya businessmen, tried to bring them together. A reconciliation meeting was held in Tawangmangu, outside Solo, in November 1995. Those present agreed on three points:

- the dispute was over understanding and interpretation of salafi principles, and so should

⁶² They were Taufik Hidayat of Palembang, and Ali Wartono and Agus Rudianto, both from Banyuwangi, East Java.

⁶³ Mohamed Umar as-Sewed, "Sururiyyah terus melanda muslimin Indonesia", 24 March 2004, at www.salafy.or.id.

be settled in a scholarly discussion scheduled for only this purpose;

- Ja'far's conflict with some of the other salafi teachers in Yogyakarta was personal and should be settled by both sides agreeing to forgive; and
- a leading salafi sheikh from Jordan, Ali Hasan Abdul Hami al-Halabi al-Atsari, who was close to the Medina-based giant of salafi thought, Sheikh Muhammad al-Albani, should be brought to Indonesia for a dialogue with all salafi leaders in the country in order to heal the Yusuf-Ja'far rupture.

The Tawangmangu meeting, however, did little to smooth relations, and both men continued to preach as though no reconciliation had been attempted. In early 1996, Ja'far began publishing the magazine *Salafy* to propagate his views. Yusuf brought in an Egyptian scholar, Sheikh Syarif bin Muhammad Fuad Hazza, to teach at al-Irsyad Pesantren, who had once worked at the at-Turots office in Jordan and did not hesitate to let his high regard for Abdul Khaliq be known.

Not long after his arrival in Indonesia, Sheikh Syarif called Ja'far and said he wanted to visit. Ja'far agreed, and Syarif came with three other salafi scholars in tow. The meeting started out as a social call but quickly became heated after Syarif mentioned that Sheikh Albani, a scholar revered by Ja'far, was guilty of "innovation." He encouraged some students to shave their beards, he said, and others had wives who did not even wear full chadours. When Syarif called Sheikh Abdul Khaliq the better salafi, Ja'far threw him out of the house.⁶⁴

The feud grew worse. Yusuf held a discussion at al-Irsyad critiquing a book that lashed out at *sururi* leaders and singled out Ja'far's teachers for particular criticism.⁶⁵ Ja'far accused Yusuf of speaking filth and published an article in June 1996 in *Salafy* entitled "Sururi Slander is Splitting the *Ummat*".⁶⁶ Syarif responded by challenging Ja'far to agree to a

mubalahah, which in Islamic tradition is a mechanism to resolve deadlocked arguments. Both sides pray to Allah, asking for an indication of which side is right and wrong. It is believed that the side in error will suffer a calamity.

Syarif sent a letter to Ja'far in Arabic inviting him for a *mubalahah* on 29 June 1996 at the al-Irsyad Pesantren -- Yusuf's home turf. It was the salafi equivalent of a challenge to a duel. Yusuf translated the letter into Indonesian and circulated it widely around the Yogyakarta area and beyond. Not only salafis, but members of the Brotherhood, Jemaah Tabligh, Darul Islam, and other organisations knew of the challenge.

The letter took Ja'far and his followers by surprise, even more so when they learned how many people were planning to attend. They decided to accept the challenge but not on the date specified. On 14 June, without prior warning, a convoy of Ja'far, his family and followers, and his fellow purist, Umar Sewed, arrived at al-Irsyad.

Syarif had little option other than to go through with the *mubalahah* after afternoon prayers. Yusuf arrived only after sunset, and Ja'far immediately challenged him to take part in a *mubalahah* as well. He refused, and Ja'far's entourage left, to prepare a written response to the original challenge that outlined the weaknesses and dangers of *sururiism* and noted that the *mubalahah* had already happened. They circulated this to all in the salafi movement before 29 June.

After the *mubalahah* (which produced calamity neither for Ja'far, Syarif nor Yusuf), the split deepened. Ja'far urged all salafis to stand with him or against him. Eventually, all salafi teachers in his camp came together in an informal network later known as the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah (FKASWJ). Its members had several characteristics in common besides being on Ja'far's side in the dispute. Most had studied either in Yemen, with Sheikh Muqbil; at the Islamic University in Medina; or with Ja'far himself.⁶⁷ Many had also come together before at training programs or other *dakwah* activities.

⁶⁴ Ja'far Umar Thalib and Moh. Umar Sewed, *Buku Putih*, op. cit.

⁶⁵ The book was *Al-Qutbiyah Hiyal Fitnah Fa'rifuha* by Abu Ibrahim bin Sulthan al-Adnani. Among the teachers he criticised were Sheikh Tabi bin Hadi al Madkhali from Medina and Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al Wadai from Yemen.

⁶⁶ A translation of the full article is available on the ICG website. See Appendix C below.

⁶⁷ A complete list of names, with their educational backgrounds, is available in the supplementary materials on the ICG website. See Appendix C below.

B. THE RISE OF THE FORUM KOMUNIKASI AHLUSSUNNAH WAL JAMAAH

The Forum itself was formed after Ja'far called for mass rallies (*tabligh akbar*) in Yogyakarta and elsewhere in Central Java beginning in late 1998 to disseminate what was in effect the salafi interpretation of recent political developments in Jakarta -- somewhat odd, coming as it did from the leader of the purist camp. His interpretation was summarised in a written tract, "Sikap Politik Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah", that stressed there should be no rebellion against Muslim leaders, and the authority of those in power should not be openly challenged. This responded to what Ja'far saw as the need to prevent a conspiracy by non-Muslims to overthrow Soeharto's successor, President Habibie, a devout Muslim, although he also made a cause celebre by defending a parliamentarian who had been sharply criticised for calling the then presidential candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri a Hindu.⁶⁸

The largest of these rallies was in Solo on 14 February 1999, a month after the Ambon conflict erupted. Before thousands, Ja'far issued a seven-point exhortation to the *ummat*:

- do not be swayed by the terror tactics of Islam's enemies or the tyranny of a minority trying to foment rebellion;
- fight any effort to undermine the unity of the Indonesian state and people;
- support in full the legally constituted government;

⁶⁸ ICG interview, March 2004. A.M. Saefuddin, minister of agriculture from the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), in late 1998 charged that Megawati was a Hindu, not a Muslim. Ja'far gave an interview to *Forum Keadilan* magazine in which he said: "when Hindus were ranting about Saefuddin's case, we saw that Muslims were getting scared of coming to Saefuddin's defence, because they were being terrorised by PDIP. We didn't care what party Saefuddin was from. What mattered was that what he said was true, that it was not right for Indonesia to be led by a Hindu. If Hindus were offended, that was their problem. In fact, because Muslims stayed silent, Hindus felt they could demonstrate not only in Bali but also in Java, where Muslims are in the majority. Because of this, we decided to act. We called a mass rally in front of the provincial parliament in Yogyakarta and said we supported the statement of A.M. Saefuddin. If there are people [who] don't agree, let them fight us". "Ja'far Umar Thalib: 'Keresahan Juga Terjadi Di Kalangan Kyai NU'", *Forum Keadilan* No.3, 23 April 2000.

- obey a government led by a devout Muslim man, in accordance with the decision of the second Congress of the Indonesian *Ummat*, 3-7 November 1998, that it was impermissible under Islamic law for a woman to be president;⁶⁹
- be prepared to make war against any government headed by a non-Muslim, unless by doing so they would cause greater harm to the *ummat*;
- support the order of the Commander of the Armed Forces to shoot demonstrators on sight, because according to Islam, the government has the right to take firm action against anyone who threatens the security of the state; and
- do not place high hopes in elections, because democracy was a disaster being imposed on Muslim countries.⁷⁰

Ja'far's involvement in these activities caused friction with other salafi leaders, particularly Abu Nida' and Ahmad Faiz, another scholar close to the at-Turots network.⁷¹ Two days before the Solo rally, Abu Nida' and those around him circulated a flyer to colleagues in the salafi community and elsewhere with the responses of two salafi scholars, Sheikh Ali Hasan from Jordan and Sheikh Ubaid al Jabiri from Saudi Arabia, to questions Abu Nida' had raised about the rallies. Obviously, the judgment of these two men depended on the information that Abu Nida' had sent them but they concluded that engaging in "political tricks like this" was not in accordance with the salafi *manhaj*, and Ja'far should first have discussed his plans with scholars.

But it turned out that Ja'far *had* consulted Saudi scholars and based on the information he had provided was told to go ahead. Ja'far's camp said that before the rallies, he had tried to call the most respected salafi scholars in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh bin Baz and Sheikh al-Utsaimin, but failed. Then he contacted Sheikh Abu Yasir Khalid ar-Radadi in Medina to seek his help in getting through to bin Baz and others but as the February date grew closer with no answer, he called another contact in Medina,

⁶⁹ The first Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia was held in Yogyakarta in 1945.

⁷⁰ "Sikap Politik Ahlussunnah Menurut Pemahaman Salafus Shalih", tract distributed at the Tabligh Akbar, later printed in *Salafy* No. 30, 1420, 1999, p.44.

⁷¹ Ahmad Faiz, a fellow student with Abu Nida' at the Imam Muhammad Ibnu Saud University in Riyadh, now runs the Imam Buchori Pesantren in Solo, Central Java.

Usamah bin Faisal Masri, explained what he wanted to do, and asked if Usamah could get approval from the sheikhs. Two weeks before the rally, Usamah called back to say seven top religious scholars had issued a fatwa that the rally was permissible.⁷²

Shortly after the rally, Ja'far and Umar Sewed went to Saudi Arabia on the haj and met with salafi scholars there in an effort to reinforce their position, not just on the rallies but also on various issues of concern to the Forum, including the notion of a woman president and the conflict in Maluku.⁷³

It was striking that Forum members rarely acted without consulting first with ulama in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, not just because this was standard salafi practice, but also because it bolstered the position of Ja'far's camp in its feud with other salafi scholars. The problem was that rival camps did the same thing, and in all cases, the Middle Eastern ulama were totally dependent on the information each side provided them.

For example, Forum members were avowedly opposed to democracy but were allowed to take part in the 1999 election based on a fatwa from Sheikh Nashiruddin al-Albani (published in Ja'far's magazine, *Salafy*) that while no one should be encouraged to run for parliament, if some candidates were enemies of Islam, it was permissible for the *ummat* to vote for Muslim candidates because it would be worse for the *ummat* if no one opposed anti-Islamic forces.

But Ja'far's rivals argued that Ja'far had betrayed the salafi movement because he neglected to include fatwas that ran counter to his own position. They cited the fatwa of Sheikh Abdul Malik Ramadhani al-Jazairi, who insisted that elections should be shunned as an "innovation".⁷⁴

Ja'far's opponents suspected that his stance had less to do with principle and more with his friendship with the head of the PPP, the Muslim political party,

in Yogyakarta. If the Forum allowed its members to vote, many in that area would support the PPP.⁷⁵

C. LASKAR JIHAD

When Ja'far Umar Thalib and Umar Sewed made the haj in mid-1999, as noted, they made a point of consulting Saudi religious scholars about the conflict in Maluku. The consensus was that waging jihad to defend Muslims against their attackers was an individual obligation (*fardu 'ain*), but the nuances were interesting.⁷⁶

- Sheikh Abdul Muhsin al-'Abbad, a *hadith* scholar from Medina, said it was desirable for Muslims to help protect fellow Muslims but that a Maluku jihad should meet two conditions: it should not endanger or hurt other Muslims and should be defensive -- Muslims should not be the first to attack.
- Sheikh Ahmad an-Najmi, a member of the ulama council, said it was obligatory to help oppressed Muslims but it was important not to rush into battle without adequate preparation and consultation. The first step should be to choose someone to meet with those in authority and invite them to discuss the problem. If they agreed to defend the Muslims, they deserved obedience. "If they refused, and if you had the necessary resources and strength, then it is permissible for you to rebel against them and form a separate Muslim government. But if you don't have the requisite strength, you should just be patient".⁷⁷ He also said if the mujahidin did not have a leader (*imam*), they would have to appoint someone temporarily to lead the battle.
- Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi, Ja'far's teacher in Yemen, said Indonesian Muslims had an individual obligation to defend fellow Muslims, as Muslims outside Indonesia had a collective obligation to help, but he set six conditions: that Muslims have the capacity to fight the kafirs; that the jihad not lead to conflicts within the Muslim community; that mobilisation for the jihad be based purely on religion; that the jihad be based on salafi principles and not be

⁷² *Salafy* No.33, 1420, 1999, p.17. The seven were Abdul Muhsin al Abbad, Abdul Rahman Muhyiddin, Shalih Suhaimi, Muhammad bin Hadi al-Madkhali, Abdullah al Muthariffi, Ibrahim bin Amin ar-Ruhaili, and Abu Yasir Khalid Radadi.

⁷³ *Salafy* No. 33, 1420, 1999, p.53. Teachers at the University of Medina reportedly issued a fatwa that a woman president was illegal, just as a sinner as president was illegal, but that if a woman president was elected, salafis could not rebel against her.

⁷⁴ Abdul Mu'thi al-Medani, "Membantah Seleberan Fitnah," *Salafy* No.33, 1420, 1999.

⁷⁵ ICG interview, Yogyakarta, April 2004.

⁷⁶ The views of the ulama are reported in "Menepis Rekayasa Fatwa Seputar Jihad di Maluku", *Salafy* No.34, 1421, 2000, pp.8-9.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

conducted "under *hizbiyyah* flags"; that it not distract Muslims from studying the true religion; and that it not be used for personal gain or to obtain political positions.⁷⁸

- Sheikh Rabi' bin Hadi al-Madkholi from Medina said the jihad was an obligation for all Muslims because their brothers were being attacked by Christians, and jihad to help Muslims under attack for religious reasons was always obligatory. (But he said later that he had also set out a consultation process that should be followed and that Ja'far reportedly failed to heed.)
- Sheikh Salih al-Suhaimi in Medina said the first priority should be to advise the Muslim community on salafi methodology, and only if this could continue should a jihad be contemplated. If Muslims did not have the capacity to wage jihad, they should make peace with the kafirs as the Prophet did with idolaters.
- Sheikh Wahid al-Jabiri said it was permissible under Islamic law to defend Muslims under attack, "but you know better than I what is happening in your country".
- Finally, Sheikh Muhammad bin Hadi al-Madkhali, also in Medina, said, "If your government tries to prevent you from waging jihad to protect your brothers, then you must not obey".

After the receipt of these fatwas, Ja'far took the decision to form Laskar Jihad out of the youth who were the security guards for the Forum during the mass rallies earlier in the year. He proclaimed the Muslim year 1421 the Year of Jihad, and on 30 January 2000, at a rally in Yogyakarta, the Forum issued a resolution giving the government three months to settle the Moluccan conflict. On 12 February, he sent seven Forum members to Ambon to investigate the nature of the conflict and simultaneously establish posts for recruiting mujahidin. On 6 April 2000, after the government had failed to meet his deadline, he announced formation of Laskar Jihad.⁷⁹

The dissolution of Laskar Jihad two years later was also based on consultation with ulama in the Middle East, but it was linked as well to international developments following the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Laskar Jihad Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah", DPP FKASWJ Divisi Penerangan, 2001.

There is no question that after 11 September, salafi leaders became increasingly concerned about repeated (and false) accusations in the media that Laskar Jihad was linked to terrorism. If Ja'far had been consistent about anything, it was his disdain for Osama bin Laden as a *khawarij*, a deviant whose blood could be shed under Islamic law (*halal darahnya*). But some Forum members were concerned that if Laskar Jihad was accused, however unfairly, of links to al-Qaeda, the whole salafi movement could suffer.⁸⁰ Ja'far's very public gloating over the World Trade Centre attacks and his calls for America to be crushed, while expressing widely shared sentiments, did not help matters.⁸¹

But far more important than these concerns was the conviction of some Forum members that Ja'far, through his activities with Laskar Jihad, had violated deeply held salafi principles.⁸² They believed that Laskar Jihad increasingly was taking on the characteristics of a political organisation, that Ja'far was consorting with politicians far too often, and that by becoming a high-profile media personality, beloved of television cameras, he was wilfully transgressing salafi strictures against the representation, in art or photographs, of living creatures.

One Forum member wrote to Sheikh Rabi' in Medina outlining concerns about Ja'far's behaviour. To follow up, the Forum sent two of Ja'far's most vocal critics to Medina in September 2002 to consult Sheikh Rabi' directly. The sheikh refused to receive them but was reportedly angry at Ja'far and sent two cassettes back with them containing his discussion with two other salafi scholars, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Rokhani and Abdul Malik Ramadanu al-Jazairi, about the impropriety of Ja'far's actions. In addition, the delegates were entrusted with a third cassette, to be delivered directly to Ja'far, which instructed him to disband Laskar Jihad.

Sheikh Rabi' told Ja'far:

....We had previously issued a fatwa permitting jihad but we had set forth conditions for that jihad....Then they went ahead and rushed into a jihad that violated my conditions. There was

⁸⁰ ICG interview, Jakarta 2004.

⁸¹ "Mampuslah Amerika!", *Laskar Jihad*, October 2001, at <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/laskarjihad/message/60>.

⁸² Ustadz Lukman Baabduh, Ustadz Usamah Masri, and Ustadz Dzul Akmal were among Ja'far's critics. Baabduh, from Jember, had studied, like Ja'far, with Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al Wadi'i from Yemen. Mahri, from Malang, is a graduate of the Islamic University in Medina, Saudi Arabia.

criticism from all fronts, but we defended Ja'far and his friends...in the context of a greater good, which they achieved by opposing the enemies of Allah in Ambon....We regarded it as a salafi jihad, until I received [a letter] outlining instances of deviation, into which Ja'far and his friends have fallen. I examined these deviations and felt ill, because the salafi jihad had changed to become an *ikhwani* jihad, no different than the jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood....

....I am not happy with this *ikhwani* jihad because it means that people are not being taught according to the salafi manhaj....I hope you understand this, that you realise the political games being played and not get taken in by them, because the fruits will all go to the Brotherhood and not to the salafi movement....If you continue, it means you have joined the Brotherhood..., and the real salafis will shun you.⁸³

Ja'far met twice with leaders of the Forum after receiving Sheikh Rabi's cassette, and on 3 October 2002 -- more than a week before the Bali bombings -- the leadership decided to disband not only Laskar Jihad but also the Forum. While Ja'far accepted the decision, he reportedly continued to maintain that regardless of what happened to the organisations, it was still incumbent on all Muslims to wage jihad in the Moluccas. His critics in the Forum, led by Lukman Baabduh and Umar Sewed, considered this wilful disregard of orders from a leading salafi sheikh, and they began to treat him like an outcast. Ja'far's participation in several public events attended by non-salafis further incensed the purists, who considered even exchanging greetings with "innovators" forbidden under Islamic law.⁸⁴

⁸³ ICG translation of a transcript from the cassette sent by Sheikh Rabi, which Ja'far's detractors circulated within the salafi community. The entire transcript is available in the collection of supplementary materials available on the ICG website. See Appendix C below.

⁸⁴ These included a program at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, entitled "One-Day Reflection", which was attended by Christian priests, Buddhist monks, and well-known artists, and the dedication of a *pesantren* (Pesantren Tawwabin) on the grounds of a prison in Tangerang, outside Jakarta, promoted by Habib Rizik, of the Islamic Defenders Front, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council. Ja'far's involvement in a public *zikir* (recitation of the name of Allah) at the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta with well-known television preacher Arifin Ilham to mark Indonesia's national day celebrations in August 2003 aroused particular anger. Salafis were opposed to the political nature of the event, the

The purists designated Ustadz Mahri again to report these heretical undertakings to Sheikh Rabi', who promptly issued a fatwa effectively declaring Ja'far a non-salafi. A detailed account of Mahri's conversation with Sheikh Rabi' was posted on salafi websites under the title, "Ja'far Umar Thalib Has Left Us".⁸⁵

Ja'far immediately wrote a bitter rebuttal attacking his former protégés, whom he claimed to have helped get scholarships to Medina and introductions to famous salafi sheikhs. These "pubescent youths" were now using the latter as rubber stamps to justify whatever they wanted to do, including hostile actions against him.⁸⁶

After the dissolution of the Forum and his falling out with some of the salafi figures who were once part of it, especially Umar Sewed, Ja'far lost much of his following, to the point that when violence broke out in Ambon again in April 2004 and Ja'far threatened to revive Laskar Jihad, few thought he could mobilise any of the old rank-and-file. Since mid-2003, Ja'far has focused largely on his *pesantren*, Ihya as-Sunnah, on teaching in regularly scheduled religious study groups, with a particular focus on the founder of Wahabism, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, and publishing the magazine *Salafy*.

D. CURRENT DIVISIONS WITHIN THE SALAFI MOVEMENT

With Ja'far's marginalisation, the salafi movement is left with two main divisions: the "purists" led by Umar Sewed, Lukman Baabduh, Dzulqarnain Abdul Ghafur al-Malanji and other former members of the Forum; and the non-Forum salafis. The Sewed group is probably the most exclusivist and quickest to brand fellow salafis as *sururiyah*, *hizbiyah*, or *ikhwani* -- as it does all of the groups listed below. The group runs a website⁸⁷ and publishes the magazine *Syariah*.

The non-Forum salafis include several networks:

- Yayasan al-Sofwah, and the group around Yazid Jawwas and Abdul Hakim Abdat, who are close to but not institutionally linked to al-Sofwah.

sufi-like practice of a public *zikir*, especially when combined with the use of loudspeakers, and the appearance of Ja'far at such an event with such prominent "innovators".

⁸⁵ Qumar Su'aidi, "Ja'far Umar Thalib Telah Meninggalkan Kita," 29 April 2004, at www.salafy.or.id.

⁸⁶ Ja'far Umar Thalib, "Orang-Orang yg Meninggalkan Akhlaq AhlulSunnah Wal Jamaah", May 2004, unpublished.

⁸⁷ www.salafy.or.id.

- Abu Nida', Ahmad Faiz, and the at-Turots network. Abu Nida's group publishes the magazine *al-Fatawa*, Ahmad Faiz's the magazine *As-Sunnah*. A third magazine, *al-Furqon*, is published by a group around Annur Rofiq of Mahad al-Furqon al-Islami, Gresik, who is part of the same network.
- Yusuf Baisa and the al-Irsyad network (very close to at-Turots but not part of the network). The al-Irsyad foundation has been criticised for holding national congresses and meetings, proof to the purists of *hizbiyah* leanings, and for printing photographs in its magazine of salafi scholars such as Sheikh bin Baz.

In the view of all of the above, not only is the Muslim Brotherhood (and therefore everyone in the Prosperous Justice Party) beyond the pale, but so is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, whom Umar Sewed refers to (echoing Ja'far on this) as KGB -- Khawarij Gaya Baru, or New Style Khawarij.⁸⁸

For Sewed and those close to him, there is little difference between al-Sofwah, at-Turots, and al-Irsyad. In their view, all are willing to compromise salafi principles in the interests of building their own organisations and take money from *hizbiyah* donors such as at-Turots in Kuwait and al-Haramain in Saudi Arabia. (While some in the West may see al-Haramain as a vehicle for propagating extreme Islamic thought, the most rigid of the salafis in Indonesia castigate it precisely for its support of Osama bin Laden.)⁸⁹ The three networks are also seen as sullyng the salafi movement by trying to bring the purists into closer contact with "innovators". Yazid Jawwas's contacts with the DDII are cited as one example.⁹⁰

There is virtually no difference in what the salafi schools teach or the books they study. The *pesantrens* most vilified as *hizbiyyah* or *sururiyah* require their students to learn basic salafi principles from bin Baz, for example. The virulence of the attacks is, therefore, all the more striking. Only rabies-infected dogs would dare to challenge salafi sheikhs, says one tract, and at-Turots is spreading the rabies.⁹¹ The author goes on to

make rude word plays on the names of all the Indonesians he has placed in the at-Turots camp.⁹²

The antipathy of salafis like Sewed to at-Turots is likely in part a reflection of the stance of their own mentors in Saudi Arabia and Yemen toward the Kuwaiti founder, Abdul Khaliq. One broadside against Abdul Khaliq was published on a British salafi website, quoting Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi, Ja'far's teacher, from a cassette recorded in 1995. He accuses Abdul Khaliq of trying to split the salafi community by liberally throwing around dinars in Kuwait, Indonesia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sudan:

Establish centres and [at-Turots] will pay for it. I say it is a mistake to give money to [at-Turots] since they use it to split up the Ahlulussunnah. They split up the Ahlulussunnah in Jeddah and they split up the Ahlulussunnah in Sudan, and they call his companions the Jamaa'ah of self-interest. Here we have a group of the dregs whom he has also beguiled with his dinars, not with his ideas.⁹³

One reason for the antipathy may be political and not theological. Saudi Arabia's collaboration with the U.S. in the first Gulf War not only led to the rupture of relations between the Saudi rulers and Osama bin Laden; it also divided the salafi sheikhs. Most of the sheikhs now castigated as *sururiyah*, including Abdul Khaliq and Mohammed Surur himself, were on reasonably good terms with the likes of Sheikh Muqbil and Sheikh Rabi' before the war.

But in 1990, following the invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi government sought U.S. protection against Saddam Hussein, and the kingdom's compliant council of ulama, led by Sheikh bin Baz, issued a fatwa making it permissible to request assistance from an infidel in order to resist another infidel. A number of well-known salafi sheikhs criticised the fatwa, saying the ulama had no understanding of current conditions and were letting themselves be politicised by the Saudi government. Surur, then living in England, went further: "It never ceases to

⁸⁸ Muhammad Umar Sewed, "Sururiyyah terus melanda muslimin Indonesia", 2 March 2004, at www.salafy.or.id.

⁸⁹ Dzulkarnain Abdul Ghafur al-Malanji, "Ulama barbaris tolak JI (Jum'iyah Ihya' ut Turrots) -- II", 15 March 2004, at http://www.salafy.or.id/print.php?id_artikel=552.

⁹⁰ Sewed, "Sururiyyah terus melanda muslimin Indonesia", op. cit.

⁹¹ Dzulkarnain, "Ulama barbaris tolak JI -- II", op. cit.

⁹² Yazid Jawwas becomes Yazid Hawas (suggesting lust); Abdul Hakim Abdat becomes Abdul Hakim Abjat (suggesting simple-minded) and instead of a *hadith* specialist (*ahli hadith*), he is termed an *ahli hadats* (suggestion expertise in indigenous tradition rather than Islam), and so on.

⁹³ "About Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaaliq & the Jam'iyyah Ihyaa at-Turaath", Purifying the Way, at www2.essex.ac.uk/users/rafiam.

amaze me that people who speak about *tauhid* turn out to be slaves of slaves of slaves of slaves, and the master of them all is Christian".⁹⁴

The pro-Saudi sheikhs retaliated with their own accusations. Sheikh Muqbil, for example, accused Abdul Khaliq of having printed an article in the at-Turots magazine, *al-Furqon*, that claimed Saddam Hussein was a good Muslim. Muqbil, who elsewhere terms Abdul Khaliq a *mubtadi'* (innovator), says:

Yes, by Allah, [he calls] Saddam the Baathist (Communist) a believer, but when he struck [Kuwait], then what O brothers? He changed [in Abdul Khaliq's view] from being a believer to being a kafir. We declared Saddam a kafir before and after....⁹⁵

These recriminations notwithstanding, the fact remains that some of the ulama involved in the Gulf War fatwa, like bin Baz, the most revered of salafi teachers, became the targets of criticism from their own followers. These ulama, their critics said, were too narrow in their thinking and not aware of what was going on in the world around them. It was better to be not just an expert in law or *hadith* but to have at least some awareness of current events. The reaction of the pro-Saudi ulama was to brand the critics *sururi* or the more Arabicised *sururiyah* and the first use of that epithet seems to date from this dispute. (Indonesians on the bin Baz side of the rift defined *sururi* as men who paid more attention to the *koran* -- newspaper -- than the Quran.) Despite some high-profile backtracking by the pro-Saudi ulama, the rift that emerged in 1990-1991 deepened over time.⁹⁶

In 2004, Umar Sewed picked up the theme that Abdul Khaliq was trying to discredit the Saudi rulers when he noted that according to the at-Turots leader, first Clinton and now Bush were *thogut* (violators of Islamic law), and so were Arab leaders who prayed in the direction of the White House instead of toward Mecca. By extension, according to Sewed, Abdul Khaliq would brand as *thogut* all the Saudi sheikhs revered by the salafis, including

bin Baz and Utsaimin. Sewed also suggested that Abdul Khaliq's dislike of Saddam Hussein was a newly minted by-product of the Iraq war, and that he was basically a first-class hypocrite.⁹⁷

This kind of diatribe raises questions about how many other political undercurrents are masked by the epithets *hizbiyah* and *sururiyah*. But it also underscores how much the divisions within the salafi movement in Indonesia mirror and are extensions of rifts in the Middle East, in part because salafis of whatever persuasion are in constant contact with their mentors by telephone and email. The antipathy of the great salafi sheikhs of Saudi Arabia and Yemen toward Abdul Khaliq (and vice-versa) is reflected in the hostility of their Indonesian followers toward Abu Nida', the founder of at-Turots in Indonesia.⁹⁸

Yusuf Baisa is also despised by the purists because he defended Abdul Khaliq and others branded as "*sururi* preachers" and denigrated the salafi greats.⁹⁹ When two well-respected salafi scholars from Jordan, Sheikh Ali Hasan and Sheikh Salim al-Hilaly, accepted an invitation to speak at a school in the al-Irsyad network, Ma'had Ali al-Irsyad in Surabaya, one Indonesian purist was so upset that he sought guidance from his teacher in Yemen, Sheikh Yahya al-Hajuri, on how to react to the presence of the two men in such a well-known "*hizbiyyah* stable".¹⁰⁰ Sheikh Yahya promised to ask the men what possessed them to go there.

⁹⁴ Ja'far Umar Thalib and Moh. Umar Sewed, *Buku Putih*, op. cit., p.9.

⁹⁵ Dzulkarnain, "Ulama barbaris tolak JI -- II", op. cit.

⁹⁶ Sheikh bin Baz approved a petition sent to King Fahd in May 1991 that obliquely criticised arbitrary actions by the ruling family and the decision to turn to a kafir force (the U.S.) He returned to the side of the government, however, when the Council of Ulama, of which he was a member, criticized the young clerics who had made the petition public.

⁹⁷ Sewed, op. cit. In fact, Sewed got his sources wrong: it was not Abdul Khaliq but Mohammed Surur who talked of Arab leaders praying in the direction of the White House.

⁹⁸ When asked if the split between Abdul Khaliq and Sheikh Rabi' was personal or a question of *manhaj*, Dzulkarnain stressed that it was the latter. If it were personal, he said, there would be no need for so many other salafi ulama to take the side of Sheikh Rabi'. Dzulkarnein, "Ulama barbaris tolak JI (Jum'iyah Ihya' ut-Turots) - I", 15 March 2004, at www.salafay.or.id.

⁹⁹ In an article entitled "Syaiikh Yahya -- Siapakah Abu Nida'?", Baisa is accused of defending Sayyid Qutub, Salman al-Audah, and Safar al-Hawali as well as Abdul Khaliq. Qutub urged the overthrow of regimes that were blocking the emergence of an Islamic state; al-Audah and al-Hawaly were imprisoned in Saudi Arabia for protesting against Saudi Arabia's alliance with the U.S. during the first Gulf War and other criticisms of the Saudi government. 29 April 2004, at www.salafy.or.id/print.php?id_artikel=661.

¹⁰⁰ "Syaiikh Yahya -- Siapakah Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat?", 29 April 2004, at www.salafy.or.id/print.php?id_artikel=663. Ma'had Ali al-Irsyad is led by Abdurrahman at-Tamimi, a graduate of the Islamic University of Cairo. Two of its best-known teachers, Mubarak Bamu'allim and Salim Ghonim, are graduates of the Islamic University of Medina.

VI. FUNDING

Like salafi organisations around the world, those in Indonesia benefited from the explosion of funding from the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s. The rapid expansion of mosques and schools would not have taken place without it, and the cutback in funding from some Saudi charities following the 9/11 attacks has placed several of these institutions in serious financial straits.

In general, funding from the Middle East has taken three forms: foundation grants from large organisations like Rabithah Alam Islami, al-Haramain or at-Turots; individual donors, who contribute through *infaq* (donations) and *zakat* (alms); and direct government assistance, from Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states.

The first two are linked, because individual donors often go through the big organisations. For example, the at-Turots network in Indonesia received funding through Rabithah Alam Islami in 1999 for ten mosques, but the funds originated with individual Saudis' donations to Rabithah. In 1996-1997, the Southeast Asia office of at-Turots in Jakarta received funding for four mosques in Central Java and one each in East Kalimantan and North Sumatra from donors making contributions through another Saudi foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organisation. It also received contributions from a donor named Sheikh Jabiri, who gave directly.¹⁰¹ Pesantren Darul Istiqomah, in Maccopa subdistrict, Maros, South Sulawesi, got Rp.600 million (roughly \$60,000) from at-Turots to build a mosque, but the source of the grant was in fact al-Haramain.¹⁰²

Donors from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, or other Gulf states can earmark funds for Indonesia because of chance encounters with Indonesians making the pilgrimage to Mecca, contacts established through educational institutions, or most frequently, the recommendation of salafi sheikhs with ties to their former Indonesian students. The constant communication between salafi teachers in Indonesia and their Middle Eastern mentors thus has economic consequences: excommunicating Ja'far Umar Thalib would have meant an end to funding for his *pesantren* from any of the organisations that relied

on recommendations from the salafi sheikhs who criticised him.

The need for recommendations also means that funding can be another way of reinforcing existing divisions within the salafi movement. A former member of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlulussunnah Wal Jamaah circulated two lists of religious teachers (*ustadz*): "Trustworthy Ustadz" and "Dangerous Ustadz". The first consisted of former Forum members, the second of those branded as *sururi*. But anyone who took money from at-Turots or al-Haramain automatically fell within the latter category.

"Purists" like Umar Sewed will take money only from individual donors, but they can use creative mechanisms for solicitation, including Internet appeals, aimed at both foreign and domestic contributors. In an interview with a Jakarta magazine in 2000, Ja'far gave a glimpse of the tactics used to raise funds for Laskar Jihad.

We set up an international committee which is already operational. We sent two people to the Middle East -- Yemen and Saudi Arabia -- to meet with ulama there. The ulama give recommendations on how to seek funding. Then we also sent someone to New Jersey [U.S.], to attend a congress of Ahlulussunnah wal Jamaah from all over the world. We supplied our delegate with a funding proposal, as well as with films and VCDs about Ambon.¹⁰³

The reliance of salafi schools on Middle Eastern funding, particularly for construction of new buildings, publication of salafi books, and the scholarships abroad that ensure a regeneration of teachers, raises a question about how strong the movement will be if funding continues to decline.

The cutbacks stem from several factors. Assets of the large Saudi charity, al-Haramain, were officially frozen in March 2002 on suspicion of links to terrorism, though the Indonesian branch (originally called Yayasan al-Haramain, later Yayasan al-Manahil), which channelled money to many of the major salafi institutions, continued to function until early 2004 when it was formally listed as a banned organisation by the U.S. government and the United Nations.¹⁰⁴ Other

¹⁰¹ See www.atturots.or.id/realisasi.htm.

¹⁰² "Koboi Mabuk Membakar Lumbung", Gatra, 20 February 2004.

¹⁰³ See <http://groups.google.com/groups?q=ja%27far+umar+thalib&hl=id&lr=&ie=UTF-8&sel>.

¹⁰⁴ On 22 January 2003, the U.S. and Saudi governments requested the "1267 Committee" of the UN Security Council

major funders, like at-Turots, saw their branches in Pakistan and Afghanistan included on UN and U.S. lists as supporting terrorism in early 2002.¹⁰⁵

The listings had no legal impact on the activities of South East Asia branch offices in Jakarta, but informal reports suggested that less funding was available. The head of the International Islamic Relief Organisation in Jakarta noted in July 2004 that he was not getting any new transfers of funds from Saudi Arabia, and he was rapidly using up available monies.¹⁰⁶ Indonesian banks were showing a distinct reluctance to cash checks or open bank accounts for Saudi customers without extensive crosschecks and validation.

ICG was told that individual donors, especially from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, continue to find ways of making contributions. Since a further downturn in the Saudi economy or a political crisis there could affect even that source of funds, however, many of the larger schools are looking at ways to achieve self-sufficiency through locally solicited contributions or commercial initiatives. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how the aggressive expansion of the 1990s can continue without the same level of financial support, and there could be political consequences if jobs dry up for those trained in salafi institutions.

to include Yayasan al-Haramain on the committee's list of organisations linked to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In early 2004, it turned out that the U.S. had mistakenly included another organisation with a similar name in the request. This was the al-Haramain Institute for Service to *Pesantrens* and the Study of Islam (Lembaga Pelayanan Pesantren dan Studi Islam or LP2SI) in South Jakarta, which is a perfectly respectable organisation, not connected to the Saudi charity, and run by the head of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Hidayat Nurwahid. On 26 February 2004, the U.S. embassy in Jakarta announced that LP2SI had been erroneously included, and the U.S. would request that it be removed from the UN list. Hidayat Nurwahid, in explaining to the press that there was no link whatsoever between his institute and the Saudi charity, noted that because the charity was a salafi institution, it forbade any involvement in politics. Nurwahid's institute would never have been funded by al-Haramain because of its links to the PKS. See "AS Akui Bersalah", *Radar Sulteng*, 27 February 2004.

¹⁰⁵ On 9 January 2002, the U.S. Treasury announced that the Afghan Support Committee's offices in Peshawar, Pakistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan and the offices in both countries of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) were diverting funds to terrorist activities. RIHS is the English name for at-Turots. "Treasury Reports Progress Against Terrorist Financing, Blocks More Assets", at www.useu.be/Terrorism/ECONNews/Jan0902ONeillTerroristAssetsBlock.html

¹⁰⁶ ICG interview, July 2004.

A. DEWAN DAKWAH ISLAMIYAH INDONESIA

Dewan Dakwah is not, strictly speaking, a salafi institution. It is sometimes described by salafis as following a *manhaj sanasini* (anything goes methodology), although it does have some strict salafis on its board. A 1997 report gives some idea of the largesse it was receiving from the Middle East at the time.¹⁰⁷ Between 1992 and 1997, the report states, DDII was able to complete the following construction projects:

- 42 mosques, funded by Bait al-Zakat, Kuwait;
- 98 mosques and one orphanage, working with the Asia Muslim Committee of Haiah Khairiyah Islamiyah, Kuwait;
- eight mosques, two madrasahs, and three wells working with at-Turots through LIPIA;
- seventeen mosques, funded by Lajnah Alam Islami Jamiyah Islah Ijtima'i, Kuwait;
- one mosque, funded by Sunduq Takaful li Ri'ayatil Asro wa Usar Syuhada, Kuwait;
- ten mosques and five madrasahs, funded through the Rabithah Alam Islami's Jakarta office; and
- 180 other projects, funded by Syarikah al-Rajhi in Saudi Arabia.

It worked with the Iqra Foundation in Jiddah to provide scholarships to students to train at medical faculties inside Indonesia. Bait al-Zakat in Kuwait and the Wakf Department of the Kuwaiti government helped underwrite its program for training more than 270 *da'i* (preachers). Its teacher training program was funded by Syaikh Zaid ibn Sulthan al-Nahyan Foundation in Abu Dhabi. It also worked with the International Islamic Relief Organisation in Jiddah and the Jam'iyah Dar ul-Bir in Dubai.¹⁰⁸ Organisations willing to be a little more eclectic than the purists clearly had a greater choice of funding sources.

¹⁰⁷ Lukman Hakiem and Tamsil Linrung, *Memunaikan Panggilan Risalah, Dokumentasi Perjalanan 30 Tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, Jakarta, 1997, p.35.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

B. THE INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANISATION (IIRO)

For their part, the Middle Eastern-based funding organisations appear willing to be broadminded about their grantees, as long their money somehow furthers their religious ends. They are not particularly bothered about whether an Indonesian salafi leader is branded as *sururi* by his colleagues.

The Rabitah al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim League) and its organisational sibling, the Haitaul Ighatsah (International Islamic Relief Organisation, based in Jiddah), for example, have funded institutions across the salafi spectrum, from the militant Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar to the al-Sofwah Foundation that has been branded *sururi* by the purists. They have also funded a wide range of purely charitable activities.

Both have been linked in different countries, at different times, to terrorist activities. Osama bin Laden's brother, for example, was involved in setting up a branch of IIRO in the Philippines in the early 1990s, which became a cover for al-Qaeda operations there.

But IIRO in Indonesia appears to be a genuine charity, funding the construction of mosques, schools, and orphanages as well as providing assistance to victims of natural disasters.¹⁰⁹ That said, it is also very consciously a vehicle for the propagation of salafism, and individual members of some of its grantee institutions have had ties to the radical wing of the salafi movement.

1. Yayasan al-Sofwah

One grantee, for example, is Yayasan al-Sofwah. This foundation, which runs one of the largest salafi *pesantrens* in Indonesia, was set up in the early 1990s by a Saudi named Muhammad Khalaf, from Unaizah,

Al-Qosim. Khalaf was reportedly close to one of the great salafi teachers in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Utsaimin; he was also closely tied to al-Muntada, the Islamic charity founded in 1985 in Britain that some salafis castigate as *sururi*. Indeed, al-Sofwah and the scholars around it are also branded as such by salafi leaders once close to the Forum, particularly those who became Ja'far's strongest critics.¹¹⁰

Khalaf's contact in Indonesia was the DDII, and he approached its officials with an offer to set up a donor institution under their auspices that would channel funds to promote salafism in the country. DDII very politely turned him down, in part because some of its members were close to the Muslim Brotherhood and would not take kindly to overt support for their bitterest opponents.¹¹¹ It was suggested to Khalaf that he approach a LIPIA graduate who had just returned from study in Saudi Arabia, Abu Bakar M. Altway. Altway enthusiastically backed the project, as did other salafi leaders in Jakarta, including Abdul Hakim Abdat and Yazid Jawwas, and in November 1992, the foundation that became al-Sofwah was established.¹¹²

It has three major divisions: *dakwah*, education, and social affairs. The most important is the first, and as one of its initial programs, it aimed to recruit 100 preachers, to travel around Indonesia teaching basic principles of salafism. Because the foundation guaranteed financial support for the preachers and their families, the recruitment program was a major success. Most of those recruited were recent graduates of either LIPIA or institutes in the Middle East.

The education department of al-Sofwah included a sophisticated long-distance learning project, where students could consult the instructors via fax, telephone, email, or regular post. As of 2004, the program had 2,000 alumni¹¹³ and a tertiary institute (Mahad Ali) with a diploma program for high school graduates. The Mahad Ali sponsors specialised training programs (*dauroh*) which become a vehicle for developing new preachers.

¹⁰⁹ According to its own statistics, in 2003, IIRO helped support 506 orphans in nine orphanages in Java, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and South Sumatra. It had constructed 309 mosques and received proposals to build another 421. It had also provided funds for the construction of 170 bathing and toilet facilities. It had provided stipends to 117 *da'i*, 100 of them for a period of eight months each, underwrote training in Quran memorisation, and provided free medical care to poor patients, with a particular focus on treatment of infants and children. "Laporan Legiatan Badan Bantuan Islam Internasional (IIRO) cabang Indonesia Tahun 2003 Serta Rencana Kegiatan Tahun 2004", back cover, *Sabili*, Edisi Khusus, July 2004.

¹¹⁰ See quotations from Umar Sewed and Dzulqarnain Abdul Ghafur al-Malanji in Abu Rifa al-Puari, "Salafi Pecah Belah", at www.hayatulislam.net/printerfriendly.php?id=118_0_1_0, 27 March 2004.

¹¹¹ ICG interview, Yogyakarta, June 2004.

¹¹² Its original name was Yayasan al-Muntada but Muhammad Khalaf later changed this to al-Sofwah.

¹¹³ According to the al-Sofwah website, www.alsowah.or.id.

2. Wahdah Islamiyah

Another IIRO grantee is Wahdah Islamiyah (WI), a Makassar-based salafi organisation that has produced many of the militants there, such as Agus Dwikarna, Suryadi Masoed, and Syawal Yasin. The men who became jihadists left WI to do so, but the organisation was seen within the salafi movement as leaning toward salafi jihadism, particularly after the conflicts in Ambon and Poso erupted.¹¹⁴

One of WI's tenets, for example, is that jihad against infidels is a requirement of all good Muslims, and that whoever dies without waging jihad, or having the intention to wage jihad, dies a hypocrite.¹¹⁵ At the same time, however, as early as April 2002 -- before the Bali or Makassar bombings -- it explicitly rejected the use of violence outside the battlefield, including acts such as bombing public buildings.¹¹⁶

WI was founded by a group of Makassar-based alumni of Middle Eastern and South Asian universities. Most were graduates of the Islamic University in Medina, but Punjab University in Lahore, Umul Qura University in Mecca, al-Azhar in Cairo, and LIPIA were also represented. It was initially established as a foundation, as most nongovernmental organisations are; in April 2002, it formally registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs as a mass organisation.

WI has become a large and influential operation, thanks in part to generous funding, not only from IIRO but also from al-Haramain, which, as of 2003, had given it over Rp.500 million (roughly \$50,000). It boasts 26 branch offices, mostly in South and Central Sulawesi but also in Kalimantan, Ambon, Ternate, and Yogyakarta, with twenty more in preparation in mid-2004.¹¹⁷ The primary task of each branch is the

dissemination of salafi teachings. Each branch is expected to have a leader, a fluent Arabic speaker who can serve as language instructor, two men sufficiently skilled in religion to guide intensive religious study for a circle (*halaqah*) of ten to fifteen people, and at least one person knowledgeable about computers.¹¹⁸ Not all the branches fulfil these requirements, but there is clearly a systematic approach to the recruitment and development of salafi cadres.

WI maintains a school modelled after LIPIA, the Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab), most of whose teachers are in fact LIPIA graduates. The curriculum tracks that of the Ibnu Saud Islamic University in Riyadh and the Islamic University of Medina. Its preachers are responsible for the Friday sermon in 60 mosques across the city of Makassar, and it maintains 150 *tarbiyah* (religious study groups) on Makassar's many campuses.¹¹⁹ It has a magazine, a radio station, and 130 preachers who work outside Makassar.

¹¹⁴ See ICG Report, *The Jemaah Islamiyah Network in Southeast Asia*, op. cit.

¹¹⁵ www.wahdah.or.id/wahdah/manhaj.php.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, but downloaded in May 2004 and since deleted from website. ICG has a hard copy.

¹¹⁷ The branches were in Enrekang, Bone, Palopo, Limbong (Luwu); Wotu (Luwu), Bulukumba, Wonomulyo, Mami, Jeneponto, Pnrang, Sidrap, Sinjai, Takalar, Soppeng, and Gowa, all in South Sulawesi; Palu, Toli-toli, and Parigi, Central Sulawesi; Kendari and Raha, Southeast Sulawesi; Gorontalo, Ambon, Ternate, Tarakan, Pontianak, and Yogyakarta. The planned branches, where "guidance" was going on, included five in Luwu district, South Sulawesi (Bajo, Limbon, Soraoako, Masamba, Mangkutana, and Tande); Pengkep, Selayar, Tator, Bantaeng, and Belawa, all

South Sulawesi; Poso, Jakarta, Surabaya, Aceh, NTB, Papua, Bandung, Balikpapan, and Samarinda.

¹¹⁸ See www.wahdah.or.id/wahdah/jurnal/index.php?session=detail&&id=6; and Al Bashirah Magazine, 3rd Edition, Shafar Raibul, 1424.

¹¹⁹ See www.wahdah.or.id/wahdah/aktifitas.php.

VII. SALAFIS AND SALAFI JIHADIS

Salafis and salafi jihadis share a similar determination to restore the purity of the faith. They both regard themselves as guardians of that purity and as the one group of Muslims who will gain access to heaven after the Prophet's warning, according to a *hadith*, that the community will split into 73 factions, only one of which will find favour with Allah.

They differ on four key issues. One, as noted, is whether it is permissible to rebel against Muslim governments. Salafis say no, salafi jihadis say yes. A second is on organisation. Salafi jihadis, in order to achieve their political goals, need a level of organisation that to salafi purists, smacks of "party-ism". Salafis tend to define the concept of jihad in broad terms as the taking of whatever actions are necessary to improve one's own faith; salafi jihadis define it as battle. Finally, they differ on tactics and acceptable methodology for achieving their aims, particularly with respect to jihad.

Aly Gufon alias Mukhlas, the convicted Bali bomber, outlines these differences very cogently from the perspective of a salafi jihadi in a treatise he wrote in prison, "The Bali Bomb Jihad: a Defence".¹²⁰ He says that there are those among salafis who maintain that the immediate goal is not jihad, but education (*tarbiyah*) and purification (*tashfiyah*), and only Muslims with the requisite level of understanding should embark on jihad.¹²¹ He dismisses such people as "sufi salafis". If the Prophet had waited until all his followers were steeped in knowledge, he says, they never would have defeated the kafirs in Medina. To treat jihad as something which only the educated can attempt is, therefore, an innovation (*bid'ah*). Jihad should be seen as every much an obligation for Muslims as prayer, alms, fasting, and the pilgrimage; it is a means to acquiring religious knowledge, not contingent on it.¹²²

¹²⁰ Aly Gufon alias Mukhlas, *Jihad Bom Bali: Sebuah Pembelaan*, April 2003. The handwritten manuscript, dated April 2003, appears to have been written as a defence plea but it was never actually used in court. ICG has a copy.

¹²¹ He defines salafis as "the group that bases its understanding of Islam, and especially the issue of *aqidah* and within that *tauhid*, on the Quran and *as-Sunnah* [the way of the Prophet] according to the understanding of the salafi ulama including Ibnu Taimiyah, Ibnu Qayyim, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, Abdul Aziz bin Baz, Muhammad Solih Uthaimin, Nashiruddin Albani, Muqbil al-Wadi and others". Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

He writes that there are many other reasons some salafis put forward to explain their reluctance to go to war, including that the blood of many Muslims could be shed without achieving any clear objective. All these reasons amount to putting higher priority on personal opinion than on the *sunnah* [the tradition of the Prophet], which mandates jihad.¹²³ But even if almost all the people on earth refuse to wage war, there will always be a vanguard (*thoifah mansuroh*) who will go to war and who are the closest of all the ummat to the Prophet himself. The salafi jihadis, including those who fight in Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Philippines, Ambon and Poso -- and by implication the Bali bombers -- are part of that vanguard.

Salafis and salafi jihadis agree that in the absence of a true commander of the faithful worldwide, any jihad can only be defensive (*dafai'i*), rather than offensive, but they have radically different notions of what constitutes defensive. For many salafis, including Ja'far Umar Thalib's mentors in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, a defensive jihad is permissible when Muslims are under attack, and the faithful have the capacity to fend off the attackers.

But for salafi jihadis, according to Mukhlas, the best form of defence is attack. The aim of jihad, moreover, is not simply to protect other Muslims, but also to destroy any obstacle in the way of upholding Islam and to strike fear into the hearts of all enemies of Allah, among whom should be included all hypocrites, idolaters, and kafirs. He terms those who have the power to create fear *irhabiyuun* and notes that the best English translation of this is "terrorists".¹²⁴

In all of this, he draws inspiration not from Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian leader of the Muslim Brotherhood frequently cited as the ideologue of radical Islam, but from the thirteenth century scholar Ibn Taimiyya. Qutb, after all, was an *ikhwani* -- his writings are disdained by Indonesian salafis as too political and too closely linked to the Brotherhood, and they were rarely used in JI training. Ibn Taimiyya, by contrast, and particularly his *Majmu al-Fatawa* vol.28, provided the basis for much of the teachings of Abdullah Azzam, the al-Qaeda theoretician, whose twelve-volume series on training for jihad became a staple of JI study sessions.¹²⁵ It is Ibn Taimiyya who

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Dr. Abdullah Azzam, *Tarbiyah Jihadiyah*, (al-Alaq, Solo, 2000). The series is a compilation of Azzam's writings and speeches.

calls jihad an individual obligation for all Muslims (indeed, the first obligation after faith itself is repulsion of the enemy aggressor), and who says that if it is not possible to fight kafirs without killing Muslims, then those killings are permissible.¹²⁶

A. SALAFI VS. SALAFI JIHADI IN INDONESIA

In many countries, there is a defining moment, often linked to domestic repression, when the split between salafis and salafi jihadis takes place. In Algeria, for example, the government's refusal to honour the results of the 1992 election sent many salafis into the jihadist camp. In Indonesia, the history has been much more complicated. In the mid-1980s, when Indonesians began to be recruited to train in Afghanistan, Muslims around the world saw the struggle against the Soviet Union as a legitimate jihad; there was no obvious ideological split on the issue within the salafi community. Darul Islam, the one group committed to the use of violence against the Indonesian government, was, until JI was formed from its renegades, not considered a salafi organisation. But the Afghanistan experience married the commitment to jihad of the old Darul Islam members with the salafi Islam of their Afghan mentors, particularly Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. There was little impact on the salafi community in Indonesia more broadly, however, until 1998-1999.

Three events took place during those two years which brought the split that had afflicted salafi communities elsewhere home to Indonesia. One was the February 1998 fatwa by the World Islamic Front, led by bin Laden, calling for attacks on Americans and their supporters, and a jihad against Christians and Jews; the second was the fall of Soeharto (May 1998) and the return of the JI leadership to Indonesia (late 1999); and the third was the outbreak of communal conflict in Ambon (early 1999).¹²⁷

The February 1998 fatwa by all accounts convinced the Malaysia-based division of JI (Mantiqi I), led by Hambali, to try to implement its instructions in the region. This led to a rift in the organisation between those loyal to Hambali and a more cautious wing worried about squandering scarce resources on risky

activities.¹²⁸ At the time the rift emerged, however, it seemed to be a difference more over tactics than doctrine, and Hambali's opponents within JI included several whose orientation was more to the old Darul Islam, with its long-term goal of working toward the creation of an Islamic state by force in Indonesia, than to strict salafism. We know there had been efforts by some salafi teachers in Java in late 1999 to inculcate JI members further with the salafi *manhaj*, but the fact remains that JI's expanding presence in Indonesia does not seem to have occasioned much concern within the broader salafi community.

There are several possible explanations for this. Because few Indonesians were aware of JI's involvement in violence, there would have been little reason to question the bona fides of those JI members who dressed, lived, prayed, and studied like other salafis. On the other hand, some in the salafi movement could have seen JI as so much an extension of Darul Islam, and therefore beyond the pale, that the question of its tactics dividing the salafi movement never really arose.

It was different in Sulawesi, where from the mid-1990s, a struggle emerged within the group known as Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) over whether it would take a salafi or a salafi jihadi stance. From 1989 to 1992, it seemed to be dominated by men inspired more by the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi, with some Afghanistan experience thrown in, than by strict salafis. In 1992, salafi jihadis, led by the Afghan veterans, definitely got the upper hand. In 1996, with the return to Makassar from the Middle East of a salafi scholar named Zaitun Rasmin, the organisation turned into a driving force for strict salafism.¹²⁹

Shortly after violence erupted in Ambon in January 1999, WI sent a four-man team to Ambon to assist the Muslim victims and assess the role it might play. Two members of the team had already received military training in Mindanao and immediately took an active part in the fighting.¹³⁰ The other two were religious teachers (*ustadz*) who were shocked to find that the local mujahidin were using amulets and reciting mantras to ward off evil. To the salafis, this was idolatry. On their return to Makassar, they reported that there was no need for other Muslims to go to the

¹²⁶ Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, "The Islamic Ruling on Defending Muslim Land Under Attack", at <http://geocities.com/sadiqurnet/defending-muslim.html>.

¹²⁷ The February 1998 statement can be found at www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm.

¹²⁸ See ICG Asia Report N°74, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004.

¹²⁹ ICG Report, *Jamaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, op. cit.

¹³⁰ These were Suryadi Mas'ood and Hasta, later arrested for involvement in the Makassar bombs of December 2002.

aid of the Ambonese, because this was in fact a war between *kafir* (infidels, in this case, the Christians) and *musyrik* (idolaters, the local Muslims).

The salafi jihadis in WI rejected that conclusion. They argued that Muslims should not be left to be slaughtered simply because they were ignorant about some aspects of Islam. Citing Ibn Taimiyya, they maintained that if the only way to wage jihad was with sinful troops, it was obligatory to go forward with them. Eventually the most committed jihadis, led by Agus Dwikarna, left WI, but the organisation reportedly retains an uneasy mixture of salafis and salafi jihadis.¹³¹

The Ambon conflict brought the salafis and salafi jihadis in Indonesia into direct confrontation more generally. As noted, Ja'far Umar Thalib secured approval from some of the most revered salafi scholars in the Middle East to send fighters to wage jihad in defence of their beleaguered brethren in the Moluccas. By 2000, fighters backed by senior JI members and representing a salafi jihadi perspective were also on the ground, and it was not long before the two groups were clashing, verbally and in a few cases, physically. The salafis saw the struggle not only as a defensive jihad but as a way of protecting the state from Christian separatists. Salafi jihadis saw Ambon as a part of a broader jihad against Christian/Western interests. Beginning in May 2000 with a fairly amateurish attempt to target Christian churches in Medan in avowed vengeance for the killing of Muslims by Christians in Ambon, JI began the chain of bombings that eventually led to Bali in October 2002 and the Marriott Hotel in August 2003.

With the eruption of violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, following so soon on the Ambon conflict, sympathy for the salafi jihadi approach seemed to be more apparent. But the interesting fact is how resistant, by and large, the salafi network was to approaches by jihadist groups. The period of most intensive JI recruitment in Indonesia, 2000-2002, coincided with the period of greatest solidarity within the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah, whose members were so doggedly opposed to anything that smacked of political organisation.

Thus while JI leaders put a high premium on indoctrination of new recruits into the salafi *manhaj*, those recruits were more likely to be either young men from families affected by the violence, or from

those associated in the past with Darul Islam or its various offshoots, or from other organisations that had provided some kind of community: mosque youth groups, Jemaah Tabligh, student organisations -- but rarely salafi pesantrens. A former JI member confirmed to ICG that salafi schools were poor sources for recruits, but there is some interesting documentary evidence as well.¹³² In 1999, the Central Java *wakalah* (administrative division) of JI produced a detailed list of 368 religious leaders in the province whom they had approached to see if they had any inclination to support JI activities. Only eight on the list were strict salafis, and only one showed any interest.¹³³

B. THE CIMANGGIS BOMBS

The group involved in a bomb-making class in south Jakarta in March 2004 provides an interesting case study. On 21 March, an explosion took place in a private house in Cimanggis, used by a study group under the leadership of Ustadz Aman Abdurahman. Aman, a native of Cimalaka, Sumedang, West Java, was a graduate of the state Islamic high school (madrasah aliyah negeri) in Ciamis. A stellar student, he received a scholarship to LIPIA and graduated with an honours degree in Islamic law. In June 2000, he became the imam at the mosque of the Yayasan al-Sofwah complex in Lenteng Agung, south Jakarta, the group led by Yazid Jawwas.

While one man who knew him well told ICG that Aman came across as weak and unimpressive in person, others said his scholarship was so remarkable that he knew more about *hadith* than some of the Saudi sheikhs, and his leadership derived less from charisma than from the extent of his knowledge.

All agree that he grew increasingly radical and too quick to accuse fellow Muslims of being *kafir*, drawing on criteria set forth by Muhammed Abdul Wahab.¹³⁴ In 2003, his behaviour was of such concern

¹³² ICG interview, August 2004.

¹³³ "Daftar Kyai/Ulama/Tokoh Masyarakat di Wilayah Wakalah Jawwas", 22 July 1999.

¹³⁴ According to Wahab, there are ten ways in which a Muslim can effectively renounce his declaration of faith (*shahadah*): using idolatry in worshiping Allah; using someone else as a mediator with Allah; refusing to treat idolaters as *kafirs*, or questioning their *kafir* status, or approving their deviant approach; believing that there is a purer path to Allah than the one shown by the Prophet or believing that there is a law superior to his; demonstrating hatred of the Prophet's law;

¹³¹ ICG interviews, August 2004.

to the directors of al-Sofwah that he was persuaded to resign. This generated protests at al-Sofwah, to the point that some twenty to 30 students joined Aman in the new study group (*pengajian*) that he set up in Cimanggis.

By all accounts, it was these followers who encouraged the unimpressive Aman to take a more militant stance. Once he did, his group attracted the attention of the remnants of an offshoot of Darul Islam, Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN), responsible for a series of violent actions in 1999.¹³⁵ Simply using bombs in the name of Islam does not make an organisation salafi jihadi; many members of AMIN are more thugs than religious activists. The people around Aman appear to have been real salafi militants, however, and they gradually pushed him toward a more extreme stance. He then decided to move away from strictly religious training to providing more concrete military skills to his followers.

This was easier said than done. For one thing, Aman, unlike many other jihadists, had no personal experience to fall back on. He had no training in either Afghanistan or Mindanao, and he had not taken part in the fighting in Ambon or Poso. He wanted to prepare his followers to wage war, but had no capacity himself for so doing. One of his students, therefore, introduced him to a JI member who had worked in Poso and was happy to impart his skills to the new group. As a cover, they formed Al-Azhar Nature Lovers, an informal association that would allow them to undertake outdoor training without arousing suspicion. They began to hold regular physical training sessions on the University of Indonesia campus in Depok.

Using leftover materials from Poso, the JI member began teaching Aman and his followers about explosives, but before the instruction had advanced very far, chemicals used in bomb making that had been hidden behind the refrigerator in the Cimanggis

house where the study sessions were taking place spontaneously combusted, blowing the roof off. In short order, the police arrested Aman and most of his followers.

C. CROSSING OVER AND CROSSING BACK

Despite the doctrinal barriers between salafism and salafi jihadism, there is some crossover both ways in Indonesia. Aman Abdurahman is one example of a salafi who became a jihadi, but there are also examples of JI members who appear to have given up violence and joined salafi *pesantrens*. (There are also JI members who have joined non-salafi, non-violent groups.)

While we cannot answer the question "What turns salafis into salafi jihadis?", we can do slightly better on the question "What kind of salafis have been successfully recruited as jihadis?" The answer appears to be that very, very few, if any, students from the most rigid salafi schools, those termed purists, have found their way into JI or like-minded organisations. Paradoxically, the salafi schools that are more open to other streams of thought -- those most likely to be branded as *hizbiyyah* or *sururi* by the purists -- may be more fertile recruiting grounds. Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar is a case in point, but Aman Abdurahman was from al-Sofwah, one of the *sururi* schools.

One factor may be the willingness of these schools and their teachers to accept a degree of organisation and hierarchy that is shunned by the purists. But perhaps as importantly, by not accepting the most pro-Saudi sheikhs as infallible, the slightly more open salafi leaders and their followers may be more willing to entertain views of political events that are closer to bin Laden's.

This may be one of the ironies of salafism -- that the most radical are in fact the most immune to jihadist teachings, while the more tolerant, those willing to see a little good in otherwise deviant groups, may be more susceptible.

That said, it still seems to be the case in Indonesia that the best recruits for jihadist organisations come from outside the salafi ambit altogether, and that family ties to Darul Islam or JI itself, or previous experience with violent conflict, including as street gang members, may ultimately be more important clues to who becomes a salafi jihadi than religious orientation.

denigrating the Prophet's teachings; using black magic; helping idolaters, especially in attacking Muslims; believing that there are any human beings who are beyond the reach of the *sharia* law; deviating from the religion of Allah.

¹³⁵ AMIN claimed responsibility for an explosion at the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta in 1999 and an attack on Matori Abdul Jalil, now Indonesia's defence minister. The head of AMIN reportedly was also involved in the creation of a group called the Abu Bakar Battalion, designed as a fighting unit to assist Muslims in Ambon but some of whose members subsequently became involved in training in Mindanao and developed links to jihadist groups.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The salafi movement in Indonesia is not the security threat that it is sometimes portrayed as. It may come across to outsiders as intolerant and reactionary, but for the most part, it is not prone to terrorism, in part because it is so inwardly focused on faith.

But this could change under the following conditions:

- ❑ salafi mentors in the Middle East changed their stance on the permissibility of jihad against the West;
- ❑ the Saudi Arabian government went into crisis, rupturing the ties between the salafi sheikhs and the state;
- ❑ Saudi and Kuwaiti funding sources dried up to the point that salafi schools became more dependent on sources more sympathetic to jihad, though it is unlikely that a change in funders would be in itself sufficient to force a doctrinal leap; or
- ❑ another major communal conflict erupted in Indonesia in which large numbers of Muslims were being killed.

There is a tendency on the part of many outside Indonesia to believe it is the war in Iraq and the policy of the U.S. in the Arab-Israeli conflict that are fuelling jihadist sentiment in the Muslim world, but anti-U.S. sentiment does not appear in Indonesia to be turning more salafis into jihadists. Salafism does not automatically translate into violence, and in Indonesia, at least, the salafis are far more focused on verbal sniping at each other, as well as on purifying the faith, than on uniting against Washington.

In some ways, the purist salafis are a more potent barrier against jihadis like JI than the pluralist Muslims who often become the recipients of Western donor aid. The kind of young men attracted to JI are far more likely to listen to the preaching of a salafi graduate of the University of Medina than to a cosmopolitan intellectual with a degree from an American, Australian, or British university. If salafi jihadis believe they are making bombs to destroy the enemies of Islam, strict salafis whose commitment to the purity of religion is beyond question may have more success in convincing them, using the same texts, that their interpretation is wrong.

There is no way that salafis will ever be allies of those engaged in the war on terror but as this report shows, salafis are not the same as jihadists, Saudi funding does not automatically mean support for terrorism, and the terms "radical" and "moderate" when used with respect to Islam confuse more than they clarify.

The solution to jihadism is not aiding salafis, but it may not be aiding religious "moderates", whatever they are, either. Ultimately, it may be futile to try and use religion of whatever stripe to fight a phenomenon that is one part religion and three parts politics. It might be more productive to analyse the educational background and employment history of everyone in Indonesia now in custody for crimes related to the activities of jihadist organisations. Using that information as a base, it would be useful to develop programs in a few geographic areas -- Jakarta, Solo in Central Java, Makassar in South Sulawesi, the Palu/Poso area of Central Sulawesi, for example -- that include the elements that JI and like-minded organisations can offer: a sense of community; an outlet for anger; a means of deepening religious knowledge; vocational training; and a feeling of actively assisting besieged Muslims, whether in Indonesia, Mindanao, southern Thailand, Iraq, the West Bank and Chechnya.

Salafism is not the source of the problem, and jihadism itself is far too complex for simple, silver bullet solutions.

Southeast Asia/Brussels, 13 September 2004

APPENDIX A: MAP OF INDONESIA



APPENDIX B:

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

amir ul-mukminin: commander of the faithful, term for leader of the entire Muslim community.

Angakat Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN): an offshoot of Darul Islam whose members have been linked to violence in Jakarta and Poso.

aqidah: faith.

at-Turots, see Jum'iah Ihya at-Turots al-Islami.

bid'ah: unwarranted innovations.

Bina Masjid Kampus: Guidance for Campus Mosques, a program set up on Indonesian college campuses in 1974.

da'i: Muslim preacher.

dauroh: training program in Islamic subjects.

Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII): The Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia.

fatwa, pl. fatawa, an opinion based on Islamic law.

Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah (FKASWJ): a loose grouping of "purist" salafi scholars led by Ja'far Umar Thalib. Laskar Jihad, the militia that fought in Ambon and Poso, was formed under its aegis.

Gajah Mada University: a university in Yogyakarta, one of Indonesia's top educational institutions.

hadith: tradition of the Prophet.

Hadrami: describing one who comes from the Hadramaut, in Yemen. Most Indonesians of Arab descent are of Hadrami origin.

Haiatul Ighatsah: the Indonesian transliteration of the Arabic name of the International Islamic Relief Organisation.

halaqah: religious study circle.

harakah: movement, in the sense of political movement.

hizbiyah: "party-like", an epithet used by salafi Muslims in Indonesia to describe individuals or organisations that have allowed political interests to distract them from attention to religion. It also refers to religious organisations that have a *jemaah* (community) separate from the larger community of

the faithful. This would include JI but would also include Jemaah Tabligh. The term is applied particularly to organisations that look to an imam to whom followers pledge loyalty.

Ikhwan ul-Muslimin: the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation anathema to salafi Muslims.

ikhwani: "brotherhood-like", an epithet used by salafi Muslims to disparage groups involved in political organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood.

infaq: contributions to Muslim organisations.

International Islamic Relief Organisation: a charity based in Saudi Arabia, some of the branches of which have been linked to support for terrorism.

al-Irsyad: the Arab Association for Reform and Guidance, an association established in the early 1900s to work on behalf of Arab-Indonesians.

jihad: holy war.

jihad thalab or *jihad hujum*: a jihad in which the faithful can attack the enemy first, permissible only if ordered by the imam or ruler of a Muslim government.

Jum'iah Ihya at-Turots al-Islamiyah, sometimes seen transliterated as Jamiat Ihia al-Turath al-Islamiya (Revival of Islamic Heritage Society): a Kuwaiti charity that funds many salafi institutions in Indonesia.

khawarij: a radical, puritanical sect, active beginning in the seventh century, that rejected any man-made law and rebelled against (and killed) Ali, the Prophet Mohammed's son-in-law and fourth caliph. To strict salafi adherents, the term is a damning epithet, since it evokes comparisons to men who broke with the Prophet's practices and murdered some of his companions. Ja'far Umar Thalib used the same term to refer to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda after 11 September 2001.

Khidmah Dakhwah dan Taklim: a community service program for religious outreach, performed by students at some salafi schools in Indonesia.

Laskar Jihad: a militia formed in 2000 under the auspices of Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah to fight in the Moluccas.

Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA: school set up in Jakarta in 1980 that became major vehicle for the propagation of salafism.

manhaj: methodology. Strict salafis say that salafism is not a movement, it is a methodology for practicing Islam in its purest form.

Masjumi: Indonesia's largest Muslim political party in the 1950s, banned by Sukarno in 1960.

mubalahah: method of settling deadlocked disputes.

muballigh: Muslim preacher.

Muhammadiyah: Indonesian Islamic welfare organisation, founded in 1912.

muhsinin: religious donors.

mulazamah: practice of individual study with religious mentors.

Muslim Brotherhood, see *Ikhwan al-Mulsimin*.

Mutamar al-Alam al-Islami: World Islamic Congress, based in Karachi.

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS: Prosperous Justice Party, an Indonesian Muslim political party inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Persatuan Islam (Persis): a puritanical Islamic reform movement founded in 1923 in Bandung.

pengajian: religious study meeting that can take on aspects of a rally.

pesantren: Indonesian Islamic boarding school.

Rabithah al-Alam al-Islami or more commonly, Rabithah: the World Muslim League, based in Jiddah.

Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, see Jum'iah Ihya at-Turots al-Islamiyah, above.

salafism: a Muslim reformist movement aiming to return Islam to the purity of the religion as practiced by the Prophet Muhammed and the two generations that followed him.

salafi jihadism: the radical fringe of salafism determined to target Islam's enemies through violence, aimed in particular at the United States and its allies.

sururi or *sururiyah*: adjective derived from name of Mohamed Surur and used to connote someone who pretends to be salafi but in fact is closer to the Muslim Brotherhood. Surur was a member of the Brotherhood who left to return to the salafi fold, but according to strict salafis, continued to accept some Brotherhood practices.

syirik: idolatry.

tabligh akbar: mass religious rally.

tarbiyah: education; the drive to recruit cadres among Indonesians inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood became known as the *tarbiyah* movement; its members formed the leadership of the Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS.

tasfiyah: purification.

thogut: violator of Islamic law.

ummat: the community of the Muslim faithful.

ustadz: a religious teacher, used as a title of respect for a scholar.

Wahabism: a puritanical reformist movement that originated in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century, and is sometimes used casually as a synonym for salafism.

Wahdah Islamiyah: grassroots Muslim organisation based in Makassar, South Sulawesi.

wakaf: religious endowment.

zakat: alms for the poor.

APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION

1) SURURI SLANDER IS SPLITTING THE UMMAT

By Al-Ustadz Ja'far Umar Thalib

Sururiism is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) interpretation that is being propagated among AhlulSunnah wal Jama'ah salafis. The word is derived from the name of an individual, Muhammad Surur bin Nayef Zainal ABidin, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood from Syria. He went to Saudia Arabia and lived there for some 20 years and called himself a salafi. He then moved to Birmingham, England, where he was constantly spreading Brotherhood teachings among the salafis, first via the magazine *al-Bayan*, then by the magazine *as-Sunnah*. Muhammad Surur wasn't alone in his spreading of deviant teachings. There were others who originally had been members of the Muslim Brotherhood then said they had become salafis, such as Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq of Kuwait. Then there were others influenced by Brotherhood thought, such as Dr. Safar al-Hawali in Mecca, Dr. Muhammad Said al-Qahthani in Riyadh, Salman bin Fahd al-Audah in Buraidah Qasim, Aidh al-Qarni, Abdul Hadi al-Misri and others. They all fly the flag of AhlulSunnah wal Jama'ah.

Muslim Brotherhood Thought

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by a man named Hasan al-Banna in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is a movement characterized by a particular orientation of thought as well as a political movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state, in the form of an Islamic caliphate.

Looking at the writings of Hasan al-Banna and other Brotherhood figures, we can conclude that the basic principles of their thought are as follows:

1. Unite various mass organisations and political organisations working for an Islamic victory in different spheres. They can find a common position that all find acceptable. (Majmu Rasa'il Hasan al-Banna, pp.179-182).
2. Restore the Islamic caliphate. This is the basic principle of the Muslim Brotherhood, and because of it, they advocate a united international movement. (p.178 in the same book).
3. As-Salaf and al-Khalaf should get together [the salafi movement and the pro-caliphate movement].

These three principles of the Muslim Brotherhood are enough to outline the nature of their thinking. This kind of thought has become trendy among the movements that march in step with the Brotherhood, such as Jemaah Tabligh, Hizbut Tahrir, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), the Darul Islam movement and so on.

Principles of the Salaf us-Shalih with respect to Sunnah and Innovation

The original salafis bequeathed their principles to the AhlulSunnah wal Jama'ah. These heirs are called AhlulSunnah wal Jama'ah because they are so determined to respect, study, and implement, as well as defend, the teachings of the Prophet. To defend this tradition is to reject all efforts to cloud an understanding of the Prophet's practices. This principle can be understood from the verses of the Quran and the *hadith* of the Prophet, as well as from the statements of his companions and their followers.

[Several citations of the Quran and hadith follow]

These show that the teachings of the Prophet must be given higher priority than the unity of the ummat. That unity should not be used as a pretext for obstructing efforts to implement the Prophet's teaching, but instead,

unity should be seen as a means to bring those teachings into effect. Likewise the obligation to reject innovations must be given higher priority than other interests, because rejection of innovations is part of experiencing and defending the Prophet's practices. The most important part of rejecting innovations is to reject the innovators [*ahlul bid'ah*].

The late Fudhail bin Ayyad, Allah have mercy on him, said, "If you see an innovator walking along a path, take another path. Allah will not accept works carried out by innovators. For whosoever helps an innovator in his innovations is truly helping to destroy Islam."

The Danger of Muslim Brotherhood Thought for Salafi Principles

The three principles of Muslim Brotherhood thinking, as outlined above, if allowed to put down roots within the salafi community, will sooner or later destroy salafi precepts because they are so contradictory to them. Let us examine the first principle of the Muslim Brotherhood – that all Islamic movements should unite to ensure the victory of Islam. This first principle will destroy the understanding of those loyal to the AhlulSunnah wal Jama'ah, because the hatred of salafis toward innovations and innovators will have to be replaced with loyalty to them if these innovators seek the "victory of Islam". The enthusiasm of salafis to defend the practices of the Prophet will have to cease in the interests of their joining a union with the enemies of As-Sunnah because everyone has agreed to ensure that Islam wins. The victory of Islam will have to take place according to the lowest common denominator rather than according to the practices of the Prophet.

This kind of thinking was the basis for the Brotherhood's rush to support the Shi'a revolution in Iran, closing their eyes to all manner of non-belief that characterised that revolution and its hatred of the Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah. This also caused Umar Tilmitsani, the head of the international Muslim Brotherhood to suggest a union between Sunni and Shi'a, whereas in fact, this would constitute a union between Sunnis and kafirs. This was also the suggestion of Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasher, the current head of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the stance taken by other Brotherhood figures, including Dr. Yusuf al-Qardhawi, Fathi Yakkan, and others. This extreme position is worse than the principles articulated by Hasan al-Banna. This principle, which is called *wihdatul fikrah* (unity of thought), is now moving towards *wihdatul harakah* (unity of the movement). This will mean destruction of the principle of *al-wala wal bara'* (loyalty to the good and shunning of the bad) of individual Muslims. If there is a Muslim whose own position is less extreme than that of the Muslim Brotherhood, we fear that he will be pulled toward the latter or toward even a more radical position.

The second principle of the Muslim Brotherhood is to restore the Islamic caliphate as a fundamental of their methodology (*manhaj*). This means that the basis of their thinking is essentially political, and all of their efforts are directed toward this particular political interest. This is why so many of them take a political approach – that is, a wishy-washy approach -- toward many problems of the ummat, why they play with words, and are not straightforward in accepting the good and shunning the bad. This also gives rise to a two-faced stance in many matters in a way that just confused ordinary Muslims. All of this is undertaken to preserve the unity of Brotherhood ranks.

This principle also gives rise to political confusion and bloodshed within the Muslim ummat, because the umat is continually infused with political suspicions and bewildered by the branding of its governments as kafir. This has been experienced by the people of Egypt, Afghanistan, Algeria, and Indonesia, as well as dozens of other countries. The incidents that have taken place recently in Saudi Arabia have also been perpetrated by people of this persuasion.

AhlulSunnah wal Jama'ah knows that the basis for their struggle is to uphold the principle of the oneness of God (*tauhid*), to worship Allah and to end idolatry, to uphold the *sunnah* and to end innovation. The Islamic caliphate constituted Allah's promise to those who were struggling for all of the above.

This was the instruction of Allah: [quote An-Nur 55-56] [excerpts from *hadith*]

All of this shows that the Ahlus Sunnah believe that the essence of their *manhaj* is the struggle to cleanse the faith of all elements of idolatry and vice and to remove the filth of innovation from its practice, so that their faith

and practice will be accepted by Allah. The Ahlus Sunnah believe that if Muslims truly carry out their belief and works properly, and if they give thanks for the blessings of Allah that have been bestowed on them, then it is impossible that Allah will not fulfil his promise. Muslim leaders who purify the faith and keep it clean of idolatrous elements must keep their actions clean of innovations and hate them accordingly. They cannot tolerate idolatry and innovations in the interests of keeping the ummat united under a single imaginary leadership to fulfil the ideals of an Islamic caliphate. I emphasize here that the motto of this struggle is thus to deceive the ummat by promoting something that in fact does not exist in the real world.

In fact, the unity of *salaf* and *khalaf* on the basis that the two have the same goal of sanctifying Allah is itself an innovation which aims to confound salafi propagation by undertaking all means to confuse the understanding of the Muslim faithful about their own religion. This kind of confusion was perpetrated by the khalaf in the form of Mu'tazilism, Asharism, Jahmiyism, and other groups of innovators. The intention of these khalaf to sanctify Allah must go beyond simply the move to unify the ummat, because Allah can only be sanctified in a way desired by Him and his Prophet. Because of this, salafis strongly reject the khalafs who have strayed from the way of Allah and his Prophet in their effort to sanctify him.

It is thus clear that the principles of Hasan al-Banna handed down in this haphazard fashion to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and those allied with it, are in utter contradiction to salafi principles. For this reason, *salafi dakwah* is always denigrated by leading Brotherhood figures, who give the impression that this *dakwah* hardens the heart, divides the ummat, and shows how angry the Brotherhood people are in fact toward salafi preaching.

Conclusion

At a time when *salafi dakwah* is being attacked around the world in general and within the Islamic world in particular, Brotherhood people suddenly appear in salafi guise, men such as Muhammad Surur, Abdurrahman Abdul Khaliq and others. Many salafis have been taken in by these people. They have the impression that salafi teachers are slow-witted people under the control of governments that are puppets of the U.S. The three principles of the Brotherhood are spread by these people. The Brotherhood is praised to the skies, to the point that their leaders are considered reformist thinkers and given all sorts of honorary degrees. These people consider any criticism of them to be slander, and take the accusation of "innovation" to be the same as declaring them kafirs. The result is that the salafi movement has been split into groups for and against the poisoning of thought within the salafi community. In Saudi Arabia, it has gone so far that the split has led to the beating of three well-known ulama in a mosque when they were teaching. The perpetrators of the beating were salafi youths poisoned by the Brotherhood's teachings.

In Indonesia, several preachers (*da'i*) of this movement who have called themselves salafis have welcomed the Brotherhood that labels itself as salafi. Because of this, I strongly recommend to all Muslims in general and salafis in particular to pay more attention to the science of religion and to be more vigilant about the spreading of Brotherhood thought. I urge them to pray to Allah and ask his blessing and seek his protection from the deviant teaching and to strengthen the sincerity of all those who purport to be obedient to Him to pursue their study of religion.

2) A DIRECTORY OF SALAFI CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS AND PESANTRENS

Note: salafis in Indonesia are divided into two large groups. The strictest and most intolerant of what they perceive as deviant teachings include the men who from 2000-2002 were associated with the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah (FKASWJ) led by Ja'far Umar Thalib. The others, referred to here as the Non-FKASWJ group, are slightly more willing to associate with groups that do not share their interpretation of salafi principles. Ironically, it is the first, more "radical" group that appears to be most immune to jihadist teachings.

A. FOUNDATIONS AND PESANTRENS OF THE FKASWJ GROUP

1. Mahad Al Anshar, Sleman, Yogyakarta

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Pesantren to produce salafi preachers: for male students over the age of 16

Instructors:

- Al-Ustadz Abdul Mu'thi (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wadi'i, Yemen).
- Al-Ustadz Abdul Jabbar (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi Al-Wadi'i, Yemen).
- Al-Ustadz Muhammad Ihsan

Address: Wonosalam, Sukoharjo, Ngaglik, Sleman, Yogyakarta (0274) 897763

2. Pondok Pesantren Terpadu Ibnul Qoyim, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Three-year program to train salafi preachers, for males over the age of 15

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Abdirrahman Askari (Student of Sheikh Muqbil, Yemen).
- Ustadz Abu Ahmad Mu'alim Shabari
- Ustadz Abdul Salim Sungkar
- Ustadz Abdul Halim (graduate of Minhajus Sunnah school, Muntilan, Magelang)
- Ustadz Abu Abdillah Al Barobisy (graduate of Minhajus Sunnah school, Muntilan, Magelang)

3. Pondok Pesantren Ta'dhimus Sunnah, Ngawi, East Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Pesantren for women and girls over the age of 15

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abdul Hadi Lahji
- Ustadz Rifai
- Ustadz Asasudin

Address: Dusun Grudo RT 01/02 Grudo, Ngawi, East Java Tel. (0351) 748913

4. Pondok Pesantren Difa'anis Sunnah, Bantul, Yogya

Instructors:

- Ustadz Muhammad Ikhsan (director of the pesantren and also student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi)
- Ustadz Abdul Jabar (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi Al Wadi'i, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: Dlinggo, Bantul

5. Yayasan As Salafi, Samarinda, Kalimantan Timur

Activities:

Instructors:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Ustadz Abdul Aziz As Salafi

Address: Yayasan As Salafi, Samarinda, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712

6. Pondok Pesantren Minjahus Sunnah, Magelang, Central Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Tadribul Du'at Program (Program to train salafi preachers)
- Program Tahfizul Qur'an (Quran memorisation) for girls

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abdurrahman Wonosori (student of Sheikh Muqbil)
- Ustadz Abu Bakar
- Ustadz Muhamad Sarbini (student of Sheikh Muqbil)

Address: Jalan Raya Yogya-Magelang KM.3 Batikan, Pabelan, Mungkid Tel. (0293)782005

7. Yayasan Abu Bakar Shidiq, Ambon, Maluku

Activities:

Instructors:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Ustadz Yasiruddin (student of Sheikh Muqbil, Yemen)
- Ustadz Abdussalam
- Ustadz Shodiqun

Address: BTN Kebun Cengkeh, Batumerah, Ambon, Maluku Tel. (0911)353780

8. Ma'had Al Bayyinah, Gresik, East Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- School for training salafi preachers (for boys over the age of 15)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Agus Su'aidi (director)

Address: Jl. R. Mas Sa'id no. 6 Sedagaran, Sedayu, Gresik. Tel. (031) 3940350

9. Mahad Ittiba'us Sunnah, Magetan, East Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- School for training salafi preachers (for boys over the age of 15)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Muhammad Assasudin, Lumajang
- Ustadz Suyuti Abdullah
- Ustadz Muslih Zarqani
- Ustadz Muhammad Rifa'i
- Ustadz Ahmad Santoso
- *Address:* Jl. Syuhada No. 2 Sampung, Sidorejo, Plaosan, Magetan Tel. (0351) 888958

10. Darus Salaf Foundation, Sukoharjo, Central Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Development of a Darusalaf pesantren underway

- Development of Muslim housing complex underway

Instructors:

- Ustadz Bukhori (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi)
- Ustadz Fauzan (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi)
- Ustadz Idral Harits Abu Muhammad (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi).

Address: Jl. Raya Solo-Purwodadi, Sukoharjo, Central Java. Tel. 08156745519 atau Tel (via Ibnu Taimiyah Mosque) 0271 722357

11. Ittiba'us Sunnah Foundation, Sukoharjo, Central Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Marwan Irfanuddin

Address: Tawang, RT 02 RW 01, Weru, Sukoharjo Tel. 08179475816

12. Minhaj Al Firqotun Najiyah Foundation, Bau-Bau, Sulawesi Tenggara

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)
- *Kajian Rutin Keislaman* (general Islamic teachings)

Instructors:

- Abdul Jalil
- Ustadz Chalil

Address: Jl. Betoambari lrg. Pendidikan No. 155c, Bau-Bau, Sultra Tel. (0402) 24106

13. Ta'dzimus Sunnah Foundation, Pekanbaru, Riau

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)
- *Kajian Rutin Keislaman* (general Islamic teachings)

Instructors

- Ustadz Abul Mundzir Dzul Akmal (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Ustadz Dzulqarnain

Address: Jl. Semangka No. 42, Sukajadi, Pekanbaru, Riau. Tel. (0761)46611

14. Ma'had Abu Bakr Ash-Shidiq, Jojoran, Surabaya, East Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Development of a salafi housing complex in Sidoarjo

Instructors:

- Al-Ustadz Zainul Arifin
- Al Ustadz Hariyadi, Lc. (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Al Ustadz Muhammad Irfan
- Ustadz Muhammad Barmen (student of Sheikh Muqbil)
- *Address:* Jl.Jojoran I Blok K 18, Surabaya Tel. (031)5921921

15. Pesantren Al Furqon, Kroya, Central Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- School for training salafi preachers
- Women's pesantren

Instructors:

- Ustadz Muslim Abu Ishaq Al Atsari (director pesantren, Student of Sheikh Muqbil)
- Ustadz Syaiful Bahri
- Ustadz Tsanin Hasanudin

Address: Jl. Lawu RT. 22, RW 3, Kroya, Cilacap, Central Java Tel. (0282)492412

16. Al Atsariyah Foundation, Temanggung, Central Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Qomar Sua'idi, Lc. (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)

Address: Jl. Gatot Subroto, gang Mawar No.13, Bangun Sari, Temanggung Tel. (0293) 493301

17. Ma'had As Salafi, Jember, East Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Tahfidzul Quran Program (Quran memorisation classes for children between the ages of 10-15)
- Institute of Islamic and Arabic studies (similar to LIPIA)
- Special 4-5 year program to train salafi preachers (for males over the age of 15)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Ruwaifi bin Sulaimi, Lc. (director; graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Ustadz Lukman Baabduh (student of Sheikh Muqbil, Yemen)
- Ustadz Assasudin (student of Sheikh Muqbil, Yemen)
- Ustadz Yasir
- Ustadz Hamzah
- Ustadz Bahrul Ulum
- Ustadz Muslim Tamam
- Ustadz Miftahul Arifin

Address: Jl. Mh. Thamrin Gg. Kepodang No.5, Gladak Pakem Tel. (0331) 337 440 Jember

18. Ta'zhim As Sunnah Foundation, Perawang, Riau

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Quranic study for young children
- Quran memorization school for children between the ages of 4-13.

Instructors:

- Ustadz Dzul Akmal

Address: Jl. Lima No. 84 KPR II PT IKPP Perawang Tel. (0761)92378

19. Pesantren Anwaru Sunnah, Kebumen, Central Java

Instructor:

- Ustadz Abdul Mu'thi, Lc. (student of Sheikh Muqbil i, Yemen)

Address: Petanahan Kebumen.

20. Hidmatu Sunnah Foundation, Cilacap, Central Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Muslim Abu Ishaq AL Atsari (director of Al Furqon pesantren in Kroya Cilacap)

Address: Yayasan Hidmatus Sunnah - Cilacap, Jl. Urip Sumoharjo No.202 Tel. 0282 543 634

21. Anshorus Sunnah-Batam Foundation

Activities:

- Salafi religious and general training

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Abdirrahman Muhammad Wildan, Lc.

Address: Jl. Bengkong Indah Blok D-22 Batam 29432 Indonesia Tel /Fax: (0778) 425034

22. Forum Dakwah Ahlus Sunah Wal Jamaah Bandung, West Java

Activities:

- Quranic study for young children
- Salafi religious and general training
- Publication of the Jum'at Al Wala Wal Bara Bulletin

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Hamzah Yusuf (Student of Sheikh Muqbil, Yemen)

Address: Jl. Sekelimus VII no 11 Buah Batu Bandung - Indonesia Tel. (022) 7563451

23. Suni Salafi Foundation, Medan, South Sumatra

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)

Instructor:

- Ustadz Muhammad Ali Ishmah Abu Mu'awiyah

Address: Jl Pertempuran Lingk.8 No.8E, Pulobrayan, Medan, Sumatera Utara Tel. (061) 6852795

24. Pondok Pesantren Dhiya'us Sunnah, Cirebon, West Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- *Pesantren* for boys 15 years and over

Instructors:

- Ustadz Muhammad Umar As-Sewed.
- Ustadz Abu Abdillah Salim.

Address: Jl. Dukuh Semar Gg. Putat RT 06/03 kel. Kecapi, kec. Harjamukti, Cirebon – West Java. Tel. (0231) 222185 or 08156426593

25. Majelis Taklim dan Dakwah As Sunnah (School of general studies and preaching of the Sunnah), Malang, East Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Usamah Mahri (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Ustadz Faishol Mahri
- Al Ustadz Abdurrohim
- Ustadzah Ummu Abdillah
- Ustadz Ahmad Khodim

Address: Jln. S. Supriyadi 5 F Malang, Tel. (0341) 348833, e-mail: as_sunnah@telkom.net

26. Pondok Pesantren An Nur, Ciamis, West Java

Activities:

- Education of orphans from Poso and Maluku

- General studies
- Religious studies
- Training of candidates for salafi preaching

Instructors:

- Ustadz Khatib Abu Najm (head of school; former student of Sheikh Muqbil)
- Ustadz Khotib Muwahid (student of Sheikh Muqbil)

Address: Jln. Raya Sindanghayu Ds. Banjarsari 02/II no 70 Ciamis, West Java, Tel. (0265) 651233/(0265) 773759

27. Wahdah Islamiyah, Makassar, South Sulawesi

Activities:

- Management of a maternity clinic
- Production of Al Basyiroh magazine
- Establishment of Islamic study circle to train cadres
- Organisation of social welfare activities
- Distributor of charitable funds
- Distribution of funds to build mosques
- Management of an Islamic educational institution from kindergarten to high school level
- Management of the School of Advanced Islamic and Arabic Studies (STIBA), Makassar

Instructors:

- Ir. Muhammad Qosim Saguni
- Ustadz Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, Lc.
- Ustadz Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, Lc.
- Ustadz Muhammad Yani Abdul Karim, Lc.
- Ustadz Bahrun Nida' Muh. Amin, Lc.

Address: Jln. Abdullah Dg. Sirua No. 60 Makassar Tel: (0411) 430808, 434317 Fax: (0411) 449035

Website: www.wahdah.or.id

28. Ma'had Ihya' As Sunnah, Yogyakarta

Activities:

- Islamic education for female students
- Training of candidates for salafi preaching (for young men)
- Publication of a salafi magazine
- Radio Salafi FM
- Kajian Rutin Keislaman (regularly scheduled Islamic study groups).
- Dauroh (training program in Islamic subjects)

Instructor:

- Ustadz Ja'far Umar Thalib

Address: Jl Kaliurang km.15 Degolan (in front of the Utsman bin Affan mosque) Degolan, Umbulmartani, Ngemplak Sleman, Yogyakarta 55582 Tel. 0274-895790.

B. FOUNDATIONS AND PESANTRENS OF THE NON-FKASWJ GROUP

29. Minhajus Sunnah Pesantren in Bogor, West Java

Activities:

- Training program to produce salafi preachers

Instructors:

- Ustadz Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas (student of the late Sheikh Muhammad bin Shalih Al-Utsaimin)
- Ustadz Arman Amri, Lc. (alumnus of the Religious Studies Faculty at the University of Islamic Propagation, Medina)
- Ustadz Badru Salam, Lc. (alumnus of the Hadits Faculty at the Islamic University of Medina)

Address: Jl. Raya Dramaga Belakang Gudang Bulog Darmaga, Bogor, West Java Tel. 0251-623761, Mobile 08156887807, e-mail: minhajussunnah@yahoo.com

30. Pondok Pesantren Jamilurrahman As Salafi, Yogyakarta

Activities:

- I'dad Lughowi Program: one-year program with the aim of basic mastery of the Arabic language.
- Mualamin/Mualimat Program: two-three year program, advanced level of the I'dad Lughowi program, and should be completed directly afterward. The aim of the course is for the student to have memorized at least twenty of the thirty juz (sections) of the Quran, and to understand salafi teachings so that he is able to become a preacher in the future.

Instructors:

All instructors are graduates from Saudi Arabian and Pakistani universities as well as LIPIA (the Institute for the Study of Islam and the Arabic Language) in Jakarta. They include:

- Ustadz Abu Nida' (alumnus of the Imam Muhammad Ibnu Sa'ud University in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia)
- Ustadz Arif Syarifuddin, Lc. (graduated from Pakistan)
- Ustadz Abu Mush'ab
- Ustadz Abu Sa'ad

Address: Sawo, Wirokerten, Banguntapan, Bantul, Yogyakarta.

Contact person: Ustadz Abu Mush'ab (Tel. 08122745705) or Ustadz Abu Sa'ad (Tel. 08122745704)

31. Pesantren Al I'Tishom, Karawang, West Java

Activities:

- Memorisation of the Quran and the *Hadits*. This program is aimed at children.

Instructors:

- Ustadz Achmad Rofi'i, Lc.
- Ustadz Aslam Muhsin, Lc. (honours graduate of the Hadith Faculty at the Islamic University of Medina)

Address: Jl. Pesantren Al-I'tishom No.1 Dusun Kedongdong, Kondang Jaya, Klari Karawang, West Java, 41371 Tel. 0267-433801, 433803, e-mail: shoom@telkom.net

32. Ma'had Assunnah in Surabaya, East Java

Activities:

- Pesantren and study groups

Instructors:

- Ustadz Mubarak Bamu'allim, Lc. (alumnus of the Islamic University of Medina; former teacher at the Ma'had 'Ali Al-Irsyad in Surabaya)
- Ustadz Salim Ghanim, Lc. (alumnus of the Islamic University of Medina; former teacher at the Ma'had 'Ali Al-Irsyad in Surabaya and Ma'hads Al-Furqon Gresik)
- Ustadz Nurul Mukhlisin Asyrafuddin, Lc. (alumnus of the Islamic University of Medina; official of the Nida"ul Fithrah Missionary Foundation)
- Ustadz Ma'ruf Nur Salam, Lc. (alumnus of the Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University of Jakarta; former teacher at the Ma'had Al-Furqan institute, Gresik)
- Ustadz Ahmad Sabiq, Lc. (alumnus of the Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University of Jakarta and former teacher at the Ma'had Al-Furqan institute, Gresik)
- Ustadz Ridwan Abdul Aziz (Nida"ul Fithrah Missionary Foundation)

33. Ma'had Ihya As Sunnah, Tasikmalaya, West Java

Activities:

- Special one-year language intensive Arabic language program.
- Two-year preparation program, designed to train salafi preachers

Instructor:

- Ustadz Abu Qotadah (student of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi di Dammaz, Yemen)

Address: Jl. Terusan Paseh - BCA No 11 Tasikmalaya Tel. 0265-310754

34. Ma'had Al Furqon Al Islami, Gresik, East Java

Activities:

- Training of salafi preachers
- Special training program (I'dad Sholihah) for female students
- Publication of *al-Furqon* magazine

Instructors:

- Ustadz Aunur Rofiq, Lc. (director of the Ma'had Al Furqon; alumnus of the Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University, Riyad).
- Ustadz Ma'ruf Nur Salam, Lc. (alumnus of the Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University in Jakarta; teacher at the Ma'had Al-Furqan Gresik).
- Ustadz Ahmad Sabiq, Lc. (alumnus Muhammad Ibnu Saud Islamic University in Jakarta; teacher at Ma'had Al-Furqan Gresik).
- Ustadz Salim Ghanim, Lc. (alumnus of the Islamic University of Medina; teacher at Ma'had 'Ali Al-Irsyad Surabaya and Ma'had Al-Furqon Gresik).

Address: Ma'had Al-Furqon Al-Islami, Srowo-Sidayu, Gresik, East Java Tel. 031-3949156 - Fax. 031-3940347

35. Pondok Pesantren Imam Bukhori, Solo, Central Java

Activities:

- Quran memorisation program
- Educational Program equivalent to junior high and high schools
- Publication of *As Sunnah* magazine
- Publication of books

Instructor:

- Ahmas Faiz Asifudin Lc. (director)

Address: Jl Raya Solo - Purwodadi Km 8, Selokaton Gondangrejo, Solo 57183 Tel. 0271-665450, 761016, 08122593225, 08156734302

36. Al Kahfi Foundation, Batam, Riau

Activities:

- Religious and general instruction

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Fairuz, Lc. (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Hanin Prasetyo

Address: Perumahan Mampang Blok C No. 3 Batu Aji, Batam Tel. (0778) 391441

37. As Sunnah Foundation, Cirebon

Activities:

- Education from kindergarten through junior high school

Instructor:

- Ustadz Abdul Malik

Address: Jl. Kalitanjung 52 B Cirebon, 45143 Tel/Fax. (0231) 483543

38. Pesantren Al Furqon, Pekabaru, Riau

Instructor:

- Ustadz Armen Halim Naro, Lc. (graduate of Islamic University of Medina)

39. Mahad Ali Al'Irsyad, Surabaya, East Java.

Activities:

- Training of salafi preachers for high school level
- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)

- Religious study

Instructors:

- Ustadz Mubarak Bamu'allim, Lc. (graduate of Islamic University of Medina)
- Ustadz Salim Ghanim, Lc. (graduate of Islamic University of Medina)

Address: Jl. Sultan Iskandar Muda 46, Surabaya Utara (Tel: 3298993, 3286649)

40. Pondok Pesantren Al Ukhuwah, Sukoharjo, Central Java

Activities:

- Program for training of salafi preachers
- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Aris Sugiantoro
- Ustadz Abu Umar Basyier Al Maedani
- Ustadz Abu Abdillah Abdurrohimi
- Ustadz Mukhlis Ibnu Hadi
- Ustadz Abu Hasan

Address: Ponpes Al Ukhuwah, Sanggarahan, Joho, Sukoharjo, Solo, Tel. 0271 592089

41. Yayasan Ihya'u Al Sunnah, Bandung, West Java

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)

Instructors

- Ustadz Abu Haidar Al Sundawy (Director)

Address: Yayasan Ihya'u Al-Sunnah, Jalan Bima 90 Bandung Tel/Fax. (022) 6044495

42. Pondok Pesantren Abu Hurairah, Mataram, NTB

Activities:

- High school level education and instruction in salafi manhaj
- Memorisation of the Quran
- Islamic training

Instructors:

- Ustadz Fauzi Athar (graduate of Mecca, Saudi Arabia)
- Ustadz Mukti Ali, Lc. (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Ustadz Sofyan B. Zen (graduate of Mecca, Saudi Arabia)
- Ustadz Mansyuri, Lc. (graduate of the Islamic University of Medina)

Address: Jl. Soromandi No, 1 Lawata, Mataram, NTB Tel. (030) 642404

43. Pesantren Imam Syafii, Cilacap, Central Java

Activities:

- Education at D-3 (post high school diploma level) for training of salafi preachers.
- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Amuji Muhayyat (graduate of Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, Saudi Arabia)
- Ustadz Izzudin Karimi (graduate of LIPIA Jakarta)
- Ustadz Ahmad Fadhilah Mubarak (graduate of LIPIA Jakarta)
- Ustadz Endang Abdul Hakim (graduate of LIPIA Jakarta)
- Ustadz Al-Ma'ruf Hajar (graduate of LIPIA Jakarta)
- Ustadz Musa Nabhan (graduate of LIPIA Jakarta)

Address: Jl. Sumbawa No.70 Cilacap Central Java Tel/Fax. (0282)536053

44. Pesantren Al Imam, Sukabumi, West Java.

Activities:

- Education for children 5-18 years old
- Takes in converts (*mualaf*) from Ambon dan Mentawai

Instructors:

- Ustadz Buchori Muslim

Address: Pupunjul, Desa Cikembar, Sukabumi Tel. (0266) 321789

45. Yayasan Mutiara Islam, Bogor, West Java

Activities:

- Elementary education
- Islamic training
- Development of tertiary institute for Islamic study, Mahad Ulumuddin

Instructors:

- Ustadz Zainal ABidin Syamsuddin, Lc. (graduate of LIPIA Jakarta; studied with Sheikh Bin Baz)

Address: Perumahan Limus Pratama Regency, Jl Tegal Raya Blok H5 No.38 Cilengsi, Bogor Tel. (021) 70738042

46. Yayasan Nida'ul Fithrah, Surabaya, East Java

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)
- Training preachers, sending them to remote areas
- Publication of bulletin, *Muwadhaf*
- Radio As Salam FM

Instructors:

- Ustadz. Nurul Mukhlisin Asyrafuddin, Lc. (alumnus of the Islamic University of Medina)
- Ustadz Ridwan Abdul Aziz
- Ustadz Ainul Haris
- Ustadz Nurul Muklisin
- Ustadz Ahmad Sabiq (graduate LIPIA; also staff of Mahad al-Furqon Gresik)

Address: Storefront shop "Galaksi Bumi Permai", Blok G6 No.16, Jalan Arief Rahman Hakiem No.20-36 Surabaya

47. Yayasan Qolbun Salim, Malang, East Java

Activities:

- Kindergarten
- Arabic instruction
- Islamic training
- Instruction in salafi principles
- LAGZIS (Lembaga Zakat, Infaq dan Shodaqoh, institute for the collection and distribution of charitable contributions)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Amrozi
- Ustadz Mashrukhin
- Ustadz Agus Hasan Bashori

Address: Jl. Sunan Kalijogo Dalam no.9, Malang 65144 Tel. (0341) 586387

48. Pesantren Islam Al Irsyad, Tengaran, Salatiga, Central Java

Activities:

- Training of instructors in Arabic language and Islam for religious schools and *pesantrens*
- Training of salafi preachers
- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)
- Sending salafi preachers out to preach in mosques and prisons

Instructors/Instructors:

- Ustadz Nizar Sa'ad Jabal, Lc.
- Ustadz Yusuf Utsman Baisa

Address: Desa Butuh, Kec. Tengaran, Kab. Semarang, Central Java

49. Yayasan Majelis At Turots Al Islamy, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)
- Running Pesantren Jamilulrahman, the Bin Baaz Islamic Centre, and other educational institutions
- Sending salafi preachers off to other areas for religious outreach
- Publishing the magazine *Fatawa*
- Running the At Turots Al Islamy treatment centre and maternity clinic

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Nida'

Address: Jl. Wonosari Km 10, Sitimulyo, Piyungan, Bantul, Yogyakarta Tel/Fax. (0274) 522964

50. Yayasan Al Sofwa, Jakarta

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects) and *Majelis Ta'lim* (more general religious training)
- Management of Pesantren Imam Syafi'i in Cilacap
- Sending preachers off to other areas for religious outreach
- Free distribution of the Quran and other religious books
- Management of charitable contributions like zakat (alms)

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Bakar M. Altway

Address: Jl.Raya Lenteng Agung Barat No.35 Postal Code: 12810 Jakarta Selatan - Indonesia Tel. 62-21-78836327, Fax. 62-21-78836326

Website: www.alsowah.or.id

51. Islamic Centre Bin Baaz, Yogyakarta

Activities:

- Education for children from kindergarten through high school

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Nida'

Address: Jl. Wonosari Km 10, Sitimulyo, Piyungan, Bantul, Yogyakarta. Tel/Fax. 0274-522964

52. Ath Thoifah Manshuroh Foundation, Kediri, East Java

Activities:

- Collecting charitable contributions (alms, etc)
- Running the Al Manshur *pesantren* and orphanage, with educational programs for children from kindergarten through high school
- Running the Islamic housing complex Al Mawaddah in Kediri
- Running a public health clinic, with free examinations and treatment

Instructors/Instructors:

- Masruhin Sahl (chair of the Foundation)
- Ustadz Arif Fathul Uluma, Lc.
- Ustadz 'Aunur-Rofiq, Lc.
- Ustadz Sya'roni Abu Izzam

Address: Jl. Pare Papar Km. 5 Tegowangi Plemahan Kediri Tel. (0354) 394947

53. Yayasan Islam Al-Huda, Ciomas, Bogor

Activities:

- Training in memorisation of the Quran
- Radio Al-Iman Swaratama
- Al-Iqtishod treasury for collection and distribution of charitable contributions
- Training preachers for religious outreach and Friday sermons
- Mosque construction
- Quranic kindergarten
- Running the Al-Hidayah dakwah academy and Islamic high school

Instructors:

- Ustadz Takdir Syamsuddin Ali

Address: Raya Cimanglid, Desa Sukamantri, Kecamatan Ciomas, Kabupaten Bogor

54. Pondok Pesantren As Sunnah, Makassar, South Sulawesi

Activities:

- *Dauroh* (training program in Islamic subjects)
- Publication of magazine, *An Nashihah*
- Training of salafi preachers

Instructors:

- Ustadz Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain
- Ustadz Abdillah Khaidir
- Ustadz Lukman Jamal
- Ustadz Shobaruddin
- Ustadz Mustamin

Address: Jl. Baji Rupa No 06 Makassar Tel/Fax. 0411-878368

55. Mahad Ibnu Abbas As Salafi, Solo, Central Java

Activities:

- Training of salafi preachers, for young men over the age of 15

Instructors:

- Ustadz Khalid Syamhudi (graduate of Islamic University of Medina; former instructor of Ma'had Jamilurrahman Yogyakarta; also on the staff of the *As-Sunnah* magazine, Solo);
- Ustadz Azhar Rabbani

Address: Mesjid Baitul Musthafa, Beku, Kliwon, Masaran, Sragen, Solo Tel. 0271-881394

3) THE SALAFI "PURISTS"

The individuals listed below, alphabetically by first name, are all former members of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah (FKASWJ).¹³⁶

1. Al Ustadz Abdullah (based in Purwakarta)

Address: C/- An Najah Agency, Jln Kapten Halim no 40 Pasarebo, Purwakarta, West Java HP 08129764361

2. Al Ustadz Abdul Azis As Salafi (director of Majelis Ta'lim Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah, Samarinda, East Kalimantan)

Address: Yayasan As Salaf, Samarinda, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712

3. Al Ustadz Abdul Hadi Lahji (last position was teacher at the Ta'dhimus Sunnah *pesantren*, based in Ngawi)

Address: PP Ta'dhimus Sunnah, Dusun Grudo RT 01/02 Grudo, Ngawi, East Java. Tel. (0351) 748913.

4. Al Ustadz Abdul Halim (teacher at the Ibnul Qoyyim *pesantren* in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan and graduate of the Minhajus Sunnah Muntilan *pesantren*, Magelang)

Address: Pondok Pesantren Ibnul Qayyim Jl.Projakal Km.5, 5 RT 29 No.111, Batu Ampar, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712

5. Al Ustadz Abdul Jabbar (previously a teacher at the Difa' anis Sunnah Bantul *pesantren* based in Dlingo, Bantul; former student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: PP. Difa' anis Sunnah, Bantul

6. Al Ustadz Abdul Mu'thi al Maidani, based in Sleman, DI Jogjakarta (former student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: PP. AL Anshar, Dusun Wonosalam, kel Sukoharjo, Ngemplak, Sleman. Tel. (0274) 897519.

7. Al Ustadz Abdul Mu'thi Sutarman (based in Kebumen)

Address: C/- Abdullah (Kunto Wibisono), Rumah Bp. Rulin, Rt 02/XI Desa Kewarisan, Panjer (dekat pintu KA/belakang cuci mobil), Kebumen Tel. (0287) 382255

8. Al Ustadz Abdurrazaq (based in Banyumas)

Address: C/- Abu Husain, Sokaraja Kulon Rt 8/5 Sokaraja, Banyumas, Central Java Tel. (0281) 692428

9. Ust. Abdurrahim (based in Makassar)

Address: C/- Jamaluddin Mangun, Jl Biring Romang Raya no.11, Perumnas Antang, Makassar, South Sulawesi. Tel. (0411) 492605

10. Al Ustadz Abdurahman Mubarak (Al Atsari Publishing, Mubarak Press, based in Cileungsi, Bogor)

Address: Depan pasar Cileungsi, No.10 Rt 2 RW 10, Kp. Cikalagan, Cileungsi, Bogor 16820

11. Al Ustadz Abdurrahman asal Wonosari (previously a teacher at the Magelang Minhajus Sunnah *pesantren*, based in Muntilan, Magelang; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen).

Address: Ponpes Minhajussunnah, Jl. Raya Jogja-Magelang Km. 13 Batikan, Pabelan, Mungkid Tel. (0293)782005 HP 0818269293

12. Al Ustadz Abu Abdillah Al Barobisy (previously a teacher at the Ibnul Qoyyim *pesantren* in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan; graduate of the Minhajus Sunnah Muntilan *pesantren*, Magelang)

Address: PP. Ibnul Qayyim Jl.Projakal Km.5,5 RT 29 No.111, Batu Ampar, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712

¹³⁶The list is taken from "Daftar Ustadz yg Terpercaya", <http://www.freelists.org/archives/Salafi/12-2003/msg00017.html>.

- 13. Al Ustadz Abu Bakar** (previously a teacher at the Minhajus Sunnah pesantren, based in Muntilan, Magelang)
Address: Ponpes Minhajussunnah, Jl. Raya Jogja-Magelang Km. 13 Batikan, Pabelan, Mungkid Tel. (0293) 782005 HP 0818269293
- 14. Al Ustadz Abdussalam** (based in Ambon, Maluku)
Address: Yayasan Abu Bakar Shidiq, C/- Husein, BTN Kebuncengkeh, Batumerah, Ambon Maluku Tel. (0911) 353780
- 15. Al Ustadz Abdus Shomad** (based in Pemalang, Jateng; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: C/- Emy Jamedi, Jl. Dorang 1/83 Perumnas Sugih Waras Pemalang, Central Java Tel. (0284) 322771
- 16. Al Ustadz Abu Hamzah Yusuf** (based in Bandung, West Java; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Jl. Sekelimus VII no.11 Bandung, West Java Tlp. (022) 7563451 C/- Ali Jln Plesiran no 57A Dago, Bandung, West Java Tel. (022) 2509282
- 17. Al Ustadz Abu Najiyah Muhaimin / Nurwahid** (translator based in Semarang, Central Java)
Address: Musadun, Jl. Bukti Cempaka XI no 32 Sendang Mulyo, Tembalang, Semarang (Mobile 08122891753). Contact: C/- Abu Fauzan, Jl. Rambutan V/11A Semarang Tel. (024) 8440770
- 18. Al Ustadz Abu Karimah Asykari** (previously a teacher at the Ibnul Qayyim *pesantren*, based in Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: PP. Ibnul Qayyim Jl.Projakal Km.5,5 RT 29 No.111, Batu Ampar, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712
- 19. Al Ustadz Abu Sa'id Hamzah** (previously a teacher at the As Salafi di Jember *pesantren*, based in Jember, East Java)
Address: Jl. MH Tamrin Gg. Kepodang No.5 Jember Tel. (0331) 337440
- 20. Al Ustadz Abu Rumaisho'** (based in Kendari)
Address: C/- Abdul Alim, Jl.Pembangunan No.12, Kel. Sanwa, Kendari Tel. (0401) 328568
- 21. Al Ustadz Abu Ubaidah Syafruddin** (based in Sorong, Papua; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Jl. A Yani no.40 Masjid Raya Al-Akbar, HBM, Remu, Sorong, Papua Tel. (0951) 323115
- 22. Al Ustadz Abu Usamah Abdurrahman bin Rawiyah an Nawawi asal Lombok** (former director of the Minhajus Sunnah Magelang *pesantren*, based in Muntilan, Magelang; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Ponpes Minhajussunnah, Jl. Raya Jogja-Magelang Km. 13 Batikan, Pabelan, Mungkid Tel. (0293)782005 HP 0818269293
- 23. Al Ustadz Adi Abdullah** (based in Lampung)
Address: Purwosari Link VII Rt 20/8 Purwosari, Metro Utara, Lampung HP: 08154016031
- 24. Al Ustadz Adib** (based in Wonosobo)
Address: C/- Yusuf, Jl. Bismo 151 Sumberan Utara Rt1/22 Wonosobo, Central Java
- 25. Al Ustadz Ahmad Khodim** (publisher at Cahaya Tauhid Press, based in Malang)
Address: Jl. Lesanpuro No. 31A Malang, East Java Tel. (0341) 710755, Mobile 0818274197

- 26. Al Ustadz Ali Basuki, Lc** (based in Aceh; graduate of Jami'ah Islamiyyah Medina/Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia)
Address: C/- Azhari, Jl.Tgk.Diblong Lorong Permata No.10 Kp.Mulia I Banda Aceh, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Tel. (0651) 21514
- 27. Al Ustadz Agus Su'aidi** (director of Ma'had Al Bayyinah, based in Gresik, East Java)
Address: Ma'had Al Bayyinah, Jl. R. Mas Sa'id no 6, Sedagaran, Sedayu, Gresik 61153 Tel. (031) 3940350
- 28. Al Ustadz Ahmad Kebumen** (based in Kebumen)
Address: C/- Abdullah (Kunto Wibisono), Rumah Bp. Rulin, Rt 02/XI Desa Kewarisan, Panjer, Kebumen Tel. (0287) 382255
- 29. Al Ustadz Ahmad Hamdani** (based in Tangerang) - Sekarang belajar di Ma'had Sheikh Yahya Al Hajuri, Dammaj, Yemen
Address: Perum Kroncong Blok DP4 no 2 Jatiuwung, Tangerang.
- 30. Al Ustadz Abu Najm, Al Ustadz Khotib Muwwahid** (based in Ciamis, West Java)
Address: Ponpes An-Nur Al Atsari, Kedung Kendal, Banjarsari Ciamis, West Java Mobile 08157178642
- 31. Al Ustadz Assasudin asal Lumajang** (instructor, Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah, Magetan, East Java, based in Magetan; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Jl. Syuhada No. 02 Sampung, Sidorejo, Plaosan, Magetan, East Java Tel. (0351) 888958, (0351) 888651
- 32. Al Ustadz Azhari Asri** (based in Nunukan, East Kalimantan; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Nunukan, East Kalimantan
- 33. Al Ustadz Banani**
Address: C/- Suprayogi, BTN Karya Indah Blok I No. 2 Rt 42/15 Simpang 4, Sipin, Telenai Pura, Jambi Tel. (0741) 65956
Address: Yayasan Abu Bakar Shidiq, C/- Husein, BTN Kebuncengkeh, Batumerah, Ambon Maluku Tel. (0911) 353780
- 34. Al Ustadz Budiman**
Address: C/- Ahmad Budiono, Jl. Urip Sumoharjo No. 202 Cilacap Central Java Tel. (0282) 543624
- 35. Al Ustadz Bukhori (student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)**
Address: Yayasan Darus Salaf, Jl. Raya Solo - Purwodadi, Sukoharjo, Central Java HP 08156745519 Contact: C/- Ahmad Miqdad, Masjid Ibnu Taimiyah, Jl. Ciptonegaran Sanggrahan Grogol Sukoharjo Solo Tel. (0271) 722357
- 36. Al Ustadz Chalil**
Address: Jl. MH. Thamrin no. 72, Kel. Batara Guru, Kec. Wolio, Buton, Southeast Sulawesi, Tel. (0402) 22452
C/- Abdul Jalil, Yayasan Minhaj Al Firqotun Najiyah, Jl. Betoambari lrg. Pendidikan No. 155c, Bau-Bau, Southeast Sulawesi Tel. (0402) 24106 HP. 081 643163668
- 37. Al Ustadz Fauzan** (student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Yayasan Darus Salaf, Jl. Raya Solo - Purwodadi, Sukoharjo, Central Java HP 08156745519 Contact: C/- Ahmad Miqdad, Masjid Ibnu Taimiyah, Jl. Ciptonegaran Sanggrahan Grogol Sukoharjo Solo Tel. (0271) 722357
- 38. Al Ustadz Hamzah Kuningan**
Address: C/- An Najah Agency, Jln Kapt. Halim no 40 Pasarebo, Purwakarta, West Java. Mobile 08129764361
- 39. Al Ustadz Hannan Bahannan** (publisher, Maktabah Salafi Press, based in Tegal; graduate Yemen).
Address: Maktabah Salafi Press, Jl. Gajahmada no 98 Tegal, Central Java Tel. (0283) 351767, 08159213962

40. Al Ustadz Harits Abdus Salam

Address: PP. Ibnul Qayyim Jl.Projakal Km.5,5 RT 29 No.111, Batu Ampar, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712

41. Al Ustadz Hariyadi, Lc. (graduate of Jami'ah Islamiyyah Medina/Islamic University Islam of Medina, Saudi Arabia)

Address: Masjid Abu Bakar Ash-Shiddiq, Jl. Jojoran 1 Blok K no. 18, Surabaya Tel. (031) 5921921

42. Al Ustadz Idral Harits Abu Muhammad (student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: Yayasan Darus Salaf, Sukoharjo, Central Java

Contact: C/- Ahmad Miqdad, Masjid Ibnu Taimiyah, Jl. Ciptonegaran Sanggrahan Grogol Sukoharjo, Solo Tel. (0271) 722357

43. Al Ustadz Isnadi

Address: Palembang, South Sumatra

44. Al Ustadz Luqman Ba'abduh (previously director of the As Salafi *pesantren* in Jember, East Java; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: Jl. MH Tamrin Gg. Kepodang No.5 Jember Tel. (0331) 337440

45. Al Ustadz Mahmud

Address: C/- Fredi Santoso, Desa Wanadadi Rt 1/5 Wanadadi, Banjarnegara 53461 Mobile 0812 2724680

46. Al Ustadz Marwan Irfanuddin

Address: Yayasan Ittiba'us Sunnah Sukoharjo, Tawang Rt 02 Rw 01 Weru Sukoharjo, Central Java Mobile 08179475816/081329035280

Contact: C/- Ahmad Miqdad, Masjid Ibnu Taimiyah, Jl. Ciptonegaran Sanggrahan Grogol Sukoharjo Solo Tel. (0271) 722357

47. Al Ustadz Muallim Shobari

Address: Pondok Pesantren Ibnul Qoyyim Jl.Projakal Km.5,5 RT 29 No.111, Batu Ampar, Balikpapan, East Kalimantan Tel. (0542) 861712

48. Ust. Muhammad

Address: Jl. Wirakarya No.1-5 Minasate'ne, Pangkep, Sulsel Tel. (0410) 323855

49. Al Ustadz Muhammad Afifuddin As-Sidawi

Address: Ma'had Al Bayyinah, Jl. R. Mas Sa'id No. 6, Sedagaran, Sedayu, Gresik 61153 Tel. (031) 3940350

50. Al Ustadz Muhammad Ali Ishmah Abu Mu'awiyah

Address: Yayasan Sunny Salafi, Medan.

Contact: C/- Safiril Usman, Jl Pertempuran Lingk.8 No.8E, Pulobrayan, Medan, Sumatera Utara Tel. (061) 6852795

51. Al Ustadz Muhammad Umar As Sewed (student of Sheikh Muhammad Shalih Al Utsaimin, Saudi Arabia)

Address: Ponpes Dhiya'us Sunnah, Jl. Dukuh Semar RT 6, Rt 06/03 Kel. Kecapi, Kec.Harjamukti, Cirebon, West Java Tel. (0231) 222185/200721

52. Al Ustadz Muhammad Barmen (student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: Masjid Abu Bakar Ash-Shiddiq, Jl. Jojoran 1 Blok K no. 18, Surabaya Tel. (031) 5921921

53. Al Ustadz Muhammad Ikhsan (director of Pesantren Difa' anis Sunnah, Bantul)

Address: PP. Difa' anis Sunnah, Bantul, Central Java

54. Al Ustadz Muhammad Irfan (based in Surabaya)

Address: Jl. Pulo Tegalsari 8 no 40 A, Wonokromo, East Java Tel. (031) 8288817, Mobile 08155046204

- 55. Al Ustadz Muhammad Sarbini** (former head of the Minhajus Sunnah *pesantren* in Magelang; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: Ponpes Minhajussunnah, Jl. Raya Jogja Magelang Km. 13 Batikan Mungkid (0293)782005
- 56. Al Ustadz Muslim Abu Ishaq Al Atsari** (director of Pesantren Al Furqan Kroya; student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)
Address: PP Al Furqan, Jl. Lawu RT 22, RW 3, Kroya, Cilacap 53282 Central Java Tel. (0282) 492412
- 57. Ustadz Muslikh** (instructor at Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah, Magetan, East Java)
Address: Jl. Syuhada No.02 Sampung, Sidorejo, Plaosan, Magetan, East Java Tel. (0351) 888958, (0351) 8886512
- 58. Al Ustadz Nurdin** (instructor at Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah, Magetan, East Java)
Address: Jl. Syuhada No.02 Sampung, Sidorejo, Plaosan, Magetan, East Java Tel. (0351) 888958, (0351) 888651
- 59. Al Ustadz Qomar Su'aidi, Lc.** (editor, *Asy Syariah* magazine and instructor in Pesantren Al Atsariyah, based in Temanggung; graduate of Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia)
Address: Yayasan Al Atsariyah, Jl. Gatot Subroto gang Mawar no 13, Bangun Sari, Temanggung Tel. (0293) 493301.
Contact: C/- Abdurrahman Tatag Jl. Mujahidin Gg. V No. 27 Rt 04/IV, Temanggung, HP 08156582390
- 60. Al Ustadz Ridwan**
Address: C/- Fredi Santoso, Desa Wanadadi Rt 1/5 Wanadadi, Banjarnegara, Central Java 53461 HP 0812 2724680
- 61. Al Ustadz Rifa'i** (teacher at the Ta'dhimus Sunnah *pesantren* in Solo)
Address: PP Ta'dhimus Sunnah, Dusun Grudo RT 01/02 Grudo, Ngawi, East Java Tel. (0351) 748913, HP 0816562158.
- 62. Al Ustadz Rifa'i asal Magetan** (previously a teacher at the Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah in Magetan, East Java)
Address: Jl. Syuhada No. 02 Sampung, Sidorejo, Plaosan, Magetan, East Java Tel. (0351) 888958, (0351) 888651
- 63. Al Ustadz Ruwaifi bin Sulaimi, Lc** (Former director of the As Salafi *pesantren* in Jember, East Java). Graduate of Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia
- 64. Al Ustadz Salman**
Address: C/- Miftahul Ulum, Jln Gunung Agung, Lingkungan Padang Udayana no 21 Denpasar, Bali Tel. (0361) 413969
- 65. Al Ustadz Saifullah**
Address: Yayasan Abu Bakar Shidiq, C/- Husein, BTN Kebuncengkeh, Batumerah, Ambon, Maluku Tel. (0911)353780
- 66. Al Ustadz Shodiqun**
Address: Yayasan Abu Bakar Shidiq, C/- Husein, BTN Kebuncengkeh, Batumerah, Ambon, Maluku Tel. (0911)353780
- 67. Al Ustadz Suyuthi Abdullah** (former teacher at the Ma'had Ittiba'us Sunnah in Magetan, East Java)
Address: Jl. Syuhada No. 02 Sampung, Sidorejo, Plaosan, Magetan, East Java Tel. (0351) 888958, (0351) 888651
- 68. Al Ustadz Syaiful Bahri** (former teacher at the Al Furqan *pesantren* in Kroya)
Address: PP Al Furqan, Jl. Lawu RT 22, RW 3, Kroya, Cilacap 53282 Central Java Tel. (0282) 492412
- 69. Al Ustadz Tsanin Hasanudin** (former teacher at the Al Furqan *pesantren* in Kroya)
Address: PP Al Furqan, Jl. Lawu RT 22, RW 3, Kroya, Cilacap 53282 Central Java Tel. (0282) 492412
- 70. Al Ustadz Usamah bin Faishal Mahri, Lc.** (graduate of Jami'ah Islamiyyah Medina/Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia)
Address: Jl. Papa Putih No.26 Malang, East Java Tel. 0341-404637, HP 08179419885

71. Al Ustadz Yasiruddin (student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: Yayasan Abu Bakar Shidiq, C/- Husein, BTN Kebuncengkeh, Batumerah, Ambon, Maluku Tel. (0911)353780

72. Al Ustadz Zainul Arifin (student of Sheikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al Wadi'ii, Dammaj, Yemen)

Address: Masjid Abu Bakar Ash-Shiddiq, Jl. Jojoran 1 Blok K no. 18, Surabaya Tel. (031) 5921921

73. Al Ustadz Zuhair Syarif

Address: C/- RT.01/V Dusun II Marga Sakti, Padang Jaya, Bengkulu Utara, Bengkulu

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. ICG also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a 12-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.icg.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates nineteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito, Sarajevo, Seoul, Skopje and Tbilisi) with analysts working in over 40 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents. In Africa, those countries include Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda,

Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Indonesia, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia and the Andean region.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: the Agence Intergouvernementale de la francophonie, the Australian Agency for International Development, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Foreign Office, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the Luxembourgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the New Zealand Agency for International Development, the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan), the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund, the United States Institute of Peace and the Fundação Oriente.

September 2004

APPENDIX E

ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2001

CENTRAL ASIA

Islamist Mobilisation and Regional Security, Asia Report N°14, 1 March 2001 (also available in Russian)

Incubators of Conflict: Central Asia's Localised Poverty and Social Unrest, Asia Report N°16, 8 June 2001 (also available in Russian)

Central Asia: Fault Lines in the New Security Map, Asia Report N°20, 4 July 2001 (also available in Russian)

Uzbekistan at Ten – Repression and Instability, Asia Report N°21, 21 August 2001 (also available in Russian)

Kyrgyzstan at Ten: Trouble in the "Island of Democracy", Asia Report N°22, 28 August 2001 (also available in Russian)

Central Asian Perspectives on the 11 September and the Afghan Crisis, Central Asia Briefing, 28 September 2001 (also available in French and Russian)

Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, Asia Report N°25, 26 November 2001 (also available in Russian)

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001 (also available in Russian)

Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace, Asia Report N°30, 24 December 2001 (also available in Russian)

The IMU and the Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, Central Asia Briefing, 30 January 2002 (also available in Russian)

Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Asia Report N°33, 4 April 2002

Central Asia: Water and Conflict, Asia Report N°34, 30 May 2002

Kyrgyzstan's Political Crisis: An Exit Strategy, Asia Report N°37, 20 August 2002

The OSCE in Central Asia: A New Strategy, Asia Report N°38, 11 September 2002

Central Asia: The Politics of Police Reform, Asia Report N°42, 10 December 2002

Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistan's Failing Dictatorship, Asia Report N°44, 17 January 2003

Uzbekistan's Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, Asia Report N°46, 18 February 2003 (also available in Russian)

Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development, Asia Report N°51, 24 April 2003

Central Asia: Last Chance for Change, Asia Briefing, 29 April 2003

Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir, Asia Report N°58, 30 June 2003

Central Asia: Islam and the State, Asia Report N°59, 10 July 2003

Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation, Asia Report N°66, 31 October 2003

Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Engagement, Asia Report N°72, 22 December 2003

The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004

Tajikistan's Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, Asia Briefing, 19 May 2004

Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, Asia Report N°81, 11 August 2004

NORTH EAST ASIA

Taiwan Strait I: What's Left of "One China"?, Asia Report N°53, 6 June 2003

Taiwan Strait II: The Risk of War, Asia Report N°54, 6 June 2003

Taiwan Strait III: The Chance of Peace, Asia Report N°55, 6 June 2003

North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy, Asia Report N°61, 1 August 2003

Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might Look, Asia Report N°75, 26 February 2004

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Priorities for Reconstruction and Development, Asia Report N°26, 27 November 2001

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