

Peter Kreuzer

# Applying theories of ethno-cultural conflict and conflict resolution to collective violence in Indonesia

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Correspondence to:

PRIF · Leimenrode 29 · D-60322 Frankfurt am Main

Telephone: +49 (0)69/95 91 04-0 · Fax: +49 (0)69/55 84 81

Email: [kreuzer@hsfk.de](mailto:kreuzer@hsfk.de) · website: <http://www.hsfk.de>

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## Summary

In recent years especially, Indonesia has been shaken by recurrent waves of high levels of collective violence. The forms have varied from ethnically and religiously-motivated riots, causing several thousand fatalities, to internecine inter-communal warfare, in which whole villages were wiped out, as happened in the Moluccas in the past four years. We are also confronted with social practices of vigilantism and the selective killings of sorcerers. Last but not least on both the eastern and the western fringe of the vast Indonesian territory, we find secessionist movements engaged in more or less violent conflicts with the central state.

In the process of multi-dimensional transformation, Indonesia faces the very real danger of what might initially be interpreted as a temporary phenomenon accompanying democratisation and liberalisation and which may turn out to be a characteristic feature of a new kind of hybrid regime type in the making. Violence, in other words, once erupted might become stabilised insofar as the conditions conducive to its perpetuation are put in place in the process of transition.

In the search for an antidote to violence, it does not suffice to point to the after-effects of the authoritarian and violent legacy of the Suharto era. Violence, as will be shown, predates Suharto and is a characteristic feature of modern Indonesia. Similar patterns, albeit adapted to new social, political as well as economic environments, emerge over and over again. This repetitive structuration of collective violence is fed by certain basic features of Indonesian culture and institutional design.

By elaborating these general observations, the paper will apply the results of three major perspectives on ethno-cultural conflict and conflict resolution to the complex case of Indonesian collective violence. The three perspectives – centring on the psychological, the institutional and the cultural dimensions of collective violence – will be introduced, their most promising aspects described and then applied to Indonesia on the macro-level of conflict resolution. During this process, the opportunities as well as the limitations offered by these three ways of looking at collective violence, in the many forms in which this phenomenon emerges in Indonesia, will be evaluated.

The psychology-centred approach stresses the identity dimension of ethno-cultural conflict. Irrespective of significant differences with other points of conflict analysis and resolution, its protagonists argue that identity has to be treated as a basic need, which, if sought for by the members of a self-defined identity group, must be fulfilled to some degree, because otherwise it will be pursued irrespective of costs. Psychological approaches accept the relevance of economic, social and political dimensions, which partly cause, contribute to and aggravate a conflict, but argue that the autonomy of the identity dimension must be taken into adequate consideration, if conflict-resolution is to have any chance of success. To come to grips with this problematic, various kinds of third-party intervention are proposed. Most prominent are the different variants of strategies for resolution which centre around workshops, in which representatives of the contending parties are brought together under controlled circumstances: arena, players, structure,

process and content of communication, all are controlled by the third party. The design can aim at analytical problem-solving which focuses directly on devising new interpretations and new solutions to old and formerly intractable problems. Other approaches argue that the workshops must be separated from any context which reminds the parties of their roles as contenders in a conflict. They must be led to understand each other as human beings, with fears, emotions, wishes and needs instead, so that they are able to see the sameness of self and others and thereby surmount the tendencies to dehumanise and enmify the other, which are two necessary ingredients of recursive and large-scale inter-group violence. Such workshops aim specifically at the re-enactment of psychic traumata, collective fears and deeply (and sometimes unconsciously) held images of the collective self and others in order to make them visible and mutually understood.

Three aspects of ethno-cultural conflict highlighted by the psychological approaches, which are of special relevance to the case of Indonesia, are treated in some detail in the text: the role of collective traumata, of competing psycho-cultural narratives and of empathy-competence for the preponderant conflict style and its eventual re-formation in the direction of more civility and cooperation. A brief look at the main instruments makes clear that psychologically oriented theory, while being able to provide much input for the analysis of conflict genesis and dynamics, provides only a very small spectre of conflict resolution techniques, which, moreover, seem to work best on the local level and once the conflict has already gone soft. Even if they might play a significant role in the drawn-out processes of reconciliation, healing and the re-integration of fragmented societies in the aftermath of violence, they provide no viable avenue for the initial de-escalation of hardened intractable conflicts. Consequently, the use of psychological avenues for conflict resolution should be of interest in all those inter-communal conflicts, where the lines of confrontation have already gone soft, but the multiple underlying forces still exist. Work on traumata, empathy training and the re-imagination of commonalities as well as dividing lines is essential, if the very real danger of a return of violence is to be averted. Seen from a long-term perspective, it is extremely important that the arenas of commonality and communication built on this basis can be converted into an institutionalised form in which all groups in conflict develop a common interest.

The institutional approach, while also generally accepting the view that the psychic dimension is of prime importance in the development of ethno-cultural conflict, nevertheless centres on institutional remedies for the conflicts, because in the view of its protagonists, psychic predispositions are not malleable in the short and medium term. For them, it makes most sense to concentrate on those dimensions of conflict which can be manipulated and promise some positive effect in the short to medium term. Two basic schools may be differentiated according to the prescribed recipes for conflict management. The consociationalists propose a constitutional engineering which aims at guaranteeing group rights by providing political institutions with a group representation agenda: veto rights for all politically-organised ethno-cultural groups, territorial and personal autonomy arrangements guaranteeing the highest possible degree of internal self-rule, proportional representation of all ethno-cultural interest groups according to their strength, broad-based parliamentary government, to name just a few. Integrationalists share the power-sharing orientation of the consociationalists. They argue, however, that

political institutions ought to be structured in such a way that their *raison d'être* – the plural society and its political expression in ethnicised politics – is removed in the long term. Political institutions should, in their view, provide a centripetal counter-force against the centrifugal tendencies characteristic to plural societies.

They aim at providing institutional incentives for inter-group cooperation and concentrate much of their practical suggestions on different options for electoral engineering which promote cross-cutting alliances. Both approaches are clearly in favour of federal designs. Because of their antagonistic paradigms, they differ sharply on the concrete forms the federations should take. Consociationalists opt for carving up the unitarian states along ethnic lines, thereby constructing ethnically rather than homogenous states. Integrationalists opt for mixed, non-communal states which might promote intra-group rifts and foster inter-group alliances.

One possible recipe for the Indonesian problematic which can be derived from this literature is a need for the empowerment of the constituent parts of the Indonesian nation-state. As much political power as possible should be devolved from the federal to the state level (which, in the case of Indonesia, might at this point in time imply the devolution of further federal preserves on the one hand, but also a re-centralisation of some of the rights and duties which have been devolved to the district level in recent years). These measures of state-centred devolution should be supplemented with a strengthened political representation of the regions in the centre, so that enduring regional interest in national-level politics is safeguarded. It would also be sensible to open up avenues for the formulation and representation of purely regional, ethnic or religious interests in the field of parliamentary politics. All groups must have the right to form political parties. As long as they receive enough votes, it must be possible for them to press their cases in local, regional or national level parliaments. A corresponding, institutionally-grounded strategy of enhanced elite-cooperation is a sensible complement which could minimise the danger of political stasis resulting from mutually-incompatible aims. A further necessary ingredient of institutional redesigning should be a strengthening of the state, especially a rise in status, pay and the number of police forces. By creating an incentive structure which makes efficiency, rule-bound behaviour and clean-handedness pay, in terms of career and status, the police forces must be enabled to guarantee internal security in the medium term. This can hopefully counteract the pervasive tendency to privatise security and violence. Players, who do not abide by the rules or have problematic track records should not be punished in the first instance, but deactivated by means of a sensible retirement policy.

The cultural perspective does not offer a particular menu of conflict resolution techniques, but centres on the necessity to check the recipes for conflict resolution for their cultural commensurateness. Proponents of this approach criticise the fact that neither psychologically nor institutionally-grounded strategies give prominence to the cultural conditions under which their recipes are put to use. If, however, conflicts as cultural events are filled with, understood through and explained by specific cultural symbolism, then it should be of eminent importance to analyse these symbolic universes. Culturalists argue that the success or failure of the psychologically-grounded strategies as well as the

institution-centred strategies is firmly based in strategic adaptations to the culture of the recipient society. They may also need parallel exercises of a purposeful change in cultural values, norms, cognitions, schemes, emotive structures and suchlike. Oft-prescribed institutional engineering must be accompanied by the probably even more daunting task of cultural engineering.

A look at Indonesian culture reveals a corresponding explicit culture of conflict avoidance and an implicit need for violent conflict resolutions in highly critical situations. It is argued that the premium on conflict avoidance leaves the culture without any systematic way of dealing with fundamental conflicts between societal groups in a cooperative and non-hierarchical way. Strategies for compromise as well as options for long-term power-sharing are lacking. Therefore, it is an important long-term task to develop new strategies for devising win-win conceptions of problem-solving out of existing cultural practices and to emancipate the constituent parts of the polity, so that a public discourse between the different communities can be initiated, in which all parties can air their grievances and pursue their interests. Such a perspective begs the question of the cultural adequacy of the strategy of nation-building, which has been implemented in Indonesia during recent decades since the eve of independence. It is argued that Indonesia needs a multi-cultural if not a multi-national concept of the state and corresponding community, which should find its institutional expression in a future Federation of Indonesia. If such an attempt is eventually to succeed, it clearly needs a reformulation of the concept of the Indonesian nation, which until now is described in terms of a homogenous Indonesian people on a mythologised violent revolutionary path towards national sovereignty and a host of other violence-prone symbolic ingredients. These aspects clearly have to be demythologised, a task, which in the short term is up to the social scientists.

What is most needed in Indonesia is a change from the mere repetition of well-known theories-in-use and efforts to optimise strategies within the boundaries of the hitherto used paradigm, but a more fundamental inquiry, which at least contemplates the option of replacing some or most of those institutional and cultural patterns which led repeatedly to violence by alternative patterns. Obviously, there is no easy way out and no single strategy will suffice. Enabling ethnic representation while undercutting ethnic outbidding, empowering the regions while creating enough incentives to bind them to the centre, deconstructing the violent, centripetal tendencies as well as the authoritarian orientation of the national political culture and replacing them with participatory and cooperation-oriented symbol structures while safeguarding the vision of historical continuity and collective self-sameness, keeping the initially artificial flowers of interethnic contact in workshops alive and transforming them into creatures which, over time, display a modernised image of indigenous design and a robust health, are some of the foremost and, at times, contradictory tasks which have to be tackled if Indonesia is to have a realistic chance of surmounting violence, albeit not in the short nor medium term, but at least in the long term.

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## 1. Introduction: Indonesian violence and ethno-conflict research

Over the past few years especially, Indonesia has been engulfed in a vast amount and a staggering variety of collective violence. I will begin at the eastern borders in West Papua where the smouldering conflict over its inclusion into the fold of the Indonesian nation-state was rekindled and, from there, move on to the Molukkas, where thousands of people have died in internecine inter-religious fighting. Continuing the westward journey, I may also turn to inter-religious violence in Sulawesi and the apparent return of savagery to Kalimantan where heads are skewered on large poles to terrify the innocent and convey pictures of strength and resistance, only to finish in the far west of Indonesia in strife-torn Aceh, where the rebel movement GAM has been fighting for independence since the mid 1970s. Here, the last few years have seen an upsurge in ferocious violence, in the course of which several thousand people have been killed, thousands of others have lost their homes and human rights violations have abounded.

A ring of violence seems to be encircling the central island of Java. But violence is not just a phenomenon of the outlying areas. Violence has struck in the centre, too. We need only think of the anti-Chinese riots of 1998, of the killings of sorcerers and religious figures or, to draw closer to day-to-day life, the repeated cases of vigilantism and the much decried gang violence, the violence perpetrated by armed militias or even schoolboys, who seem to think that fighting members of other schools is a kind of sporting game.

Most of the above-mentioned examples of violent group behaviour point to the fact that violence is not a phenomenon of recent years. As Aceh, West Papua, the Petrus killings of the early 1980s, or the most horrendous of all killing fields, the massacres of 1965/66 illustrate, violence dates back to the early days of the Suharto era.<sup>1</sup> And, a look at the perpetrators of violence shows that, although the state and its security apparatus carry a heavy burden, a similar burden must be shouldered by civil society.<sup>2</sup> It would be too easy, however, to dump the responsibility for the predominance of violence solely at the door of Suharto and his New Order regime (1965-1998). If we go further back in history, we see a volcano of violent rhetoric in the speeches of President Sukarno (1945-1965), an exaltation of violence as identity-building device and a willingness to use violence for political purposes if deemed necessary.

To put it succinctly: violence, that is large-scale and deadly collective violence,<sup>3</sup> has been a companion to the whole era of modern Indonesian history. It has permeated all

1 For a short chronology on most of the above mentioned cases of social, that is collective, violence, see Appendix 2.

2 On the multiple forms of social violence, committed by private militias of varying shades, see Kees van Dijk. *The Privatization of the Public Order*. In: Ingrid Wessel, Georgie Wimhöfer (eds.). *Violence in Indonesia*. Hamburg, (Abera), 2001, pp. 152-167.

3 I restrict the term violence to a) social or collective violence and b) direct violence, which can be separated from the more inclusive concepts of structural and cultural violence. Whereas "direct violence is a fact; structural violence is a process; and cultural violence is a non-variant in so far as cultural phenom-

spheres of politics and has left its mark on all processes of social interaction. Therefore, although each incident of violence, each of the cases I mentioned has to be analysed in its own right, it must also be contextualised in this tradition of societal violence and the structures, institutions and culture which brought it into being and were formed by it.

In spite of a pressing need to do so, violence reduction and the civilisation of conflict behaviour have not been part of the central aims of policy-making in Indonesia until now. Democracy, however, cannot flourish in an environment, where many political players threaten to or actually use violent means, if other means have previously failed to bring about the desired results. Consideration of violence reduction from any systematic point of view should include a reflection on the reasons for societal violence and strategies, which aim at its civilised management and eventual resolution or transformation.

To this end, an informed look at the different strands of conflict, especially ethno-conflict research, seems a promising option. Taking note of the vast amount of theory-driven literature on ethno-cultural conflict and options for its resolution, it is rather interesting to note a similarly large amount of literature on concrete conflict cases, which however hardly ever take note of the results of the efforts of theoreticians. Strangely enough, ethno-conflict theory, conflict-resolution theory and individual cases are only seldom brought together in a systematic way to develop theory-driven strategies for violence prevention or the eventual mitigation of violent conflict. The following study intends to show that theories of ethno-cultural conflict and its resolution can successfully be utilised to develop strategies for conflict resolution for rather specific cases – they offer a structuring device for focused analysis and a raft of measures and moves from which appropriate steps can be chosen for each individual case.

Basically three perspectives – centring on the psychological, institutional and cultural dimension of ethnic conflict and its resolution – can be differentiated. In the following study I do not want to choose between them, but argue that all three approaches have indeed something to offer for the eventual surmounting of violence in inter-group conflict. If the civilisation of conflict should eventually succeed, the most promising aspects of all three perspectives ought to be brought out and a combination of strategies devised, so that psychological, institutional and cultural reframing can be used to stabilise one another.

In this study I will provide a discussion of some of the more important findings of the three main strands of ethno-conflict-theory and their implications for eventual conflict-management. The account on the findings of ethno-conflict research does not aim to

ena are modified over long periods” (Felipe E. MacGregor, S.J., Marcial Rubio C., Rejoinder to the theory of structural violence. In: Kumar Rupesinghe, Marcial Rubio C. (eds.). *The Culture of Violence*. Tokyo, New York, Paris (United Nations University), 1994, pp. 42-58, citation p. 52). Violence is in the first place deliberate, actual or threatened bodily harm. It includes deliberate damage to property, however, insofar as acts of violence aimed at the destruction/looting of property are suited to arouse the same kinds of emotion, they result in a similar state of cognitive restructuring of the environment and lead to similar behavioral consequences.

cover the theoretical field thoroughly, but to carve out those aspects which are of some significance for the case of ethno-cultural violence in Indonesia. Therefore, the theoretical perspectives will not be dealt with in isolation. They will be configured according to the needs of the Indonesian case from the outset. The discussion will concentrate on those aspects of theory which can be used for the development of strategies for violence-management in Indonesia. Therefore, not only the arguments on Indonesia, but the presentation of the fruit of ethno-conflict research will be coloured by the peculiarities of the forms violence takes in the Indonesian case. I will begin with the intricacies of the psychological dimension and then proceed to the problematic of the institutional and structural aspects of collective violence. Finally, I will finish with a discussion of the role culture plays in inter-group conflict. A short discussion on the feasibility of the proposed measures will conclude this study (chap. 5). Even though I will provide strategies for civilising the rather violent mode of ethno-cultural conflict in Indonesia, this study cannot provide answers to the individual cases, but instead it concentrates on the underlying commonalities which bind the cases together over time and space. I will only discuss the underlying fundamentals of the psychological, political as well as cultural make-up of Indonesian society, which in my view enable and promote the repeated recourse to violent means of conflict management. The detailed analysis of the multitude of different cases of violent ethno-cultural conflict is beyond the scope of my more limited effort. Therefore, it has to be pointed out, that this study can only provide some rough guidance for strategic decisions on the macro-level of politics. Although a number of strategies are proposed, the operationalisation for the Indonesian case can only be hinted at. Follow up work, which focuses at fleshing out in detail the strategies in terms of content, agency, process and time frame must partly precede and partly accompany any implementation even of the national level strategies. Local and regional level strategies, which focus directly on specific conflicts are still to be fleshed out, an endeavour, which is clearly beyond the scope of this study.<sup>4</sup>

Although it should seem evident, the meaning of the concept of ethnic, or ethno-cultural conflict (as I would prefer to call it) and conflict resolution, is not clear. Even a cursory look at the vast amount of literature makes it abundantly clear, that there are at times fundamentally different views on ethnic conflict and correspondingly large differences in the views held about adequate strategies for conflict resolution arising from these differences in perspective. Basically, research can be grouped under three perspectives according to the type of strategies they offer for conflict resolution.

➤ A first group could be called the psychological approach, which puts the identity dimension of ethno-cultural conflicts into the centrefold of analysis and treatment. They

4 One further caveat seems in order. This study does not aim at providing an overview of the genesis of Indonesian violence. The development of the concrete interaction between the different agents which collided in the political realm is not presented here. For a more action-centred view on Indonesian politics, see my *Politik der Gewalt – Gewalt in der Politik: Indonesien* (HSFK-Report 4/2000) Frankfurt, 2000.

basically argue that severe conflicts with a significant identity dimension cannot be managed without perpetuating the risk of violence. To ban the threat of violence, they have to be resolved and ultimately transformed. Consequently, psychological approaches centre on the reframing of the cognitive, emotive and motivational frames of the groups in conflict. In spite of significant differences between the authors, all agree on the need to build up or enhance the capacity for (strategic) empathy, to lay open and acknowledge mutual fears and accept the other groups' basic needs for identity, security and well-being as legitimate and non-negotiable.

➤ A second group centres on the structural and institutional designs of societies stricken by ethno-cultural conflict. Even though the authors of this school diverge on the question of causation, they agree on the remedies, which can help manage the conflicts more cooperatively and peacefully: the most promising recipes, they argue, will aim at constructive reengineering of the fundamental institutional design of the political systems, so that institutional incentives for cooperation and punishments for confrontational strategies aiming at ethnic outbidding are maximised. In a political system designed accordingly, even opportunistically motivated politicians will turn to cooperation and restraint, as only such behaviour promises rewards.

➤ A third group argues that the collective phenomenon of culture is neglected in the psychological as well as in the institutional approach although conflicts not only occur in specific cultural settings, but are cultural events themselves. Consequently, the authors argue that culture must be integrated in both the psychological as well as the institutional approach, because any failure to do so, produces incomplete and inadequate explanations of and remedies for violent conflict practices. From a culturalist perspective, all possible remedies have to pass the "culture test". Institutional design and psychological strategies for conflict resolution translate into political practice only in the interaction with the cultural traits of the society concerned. Institutional design does matter, however. The way it will influence political behaviour is fundamentally dependent on the specific cultural context: on the understandings of basic ordering principles (such as authority, power, participation, ruler and people). Psychological strategies for conflict resolution are helpful. The same strategies, however, can produce strikingly different results depending on the cultural background of the participants engaged. Therefore, there can be no universal recipe for conflict resolution. The underlying universal assumptions of non-destructive human interaction must be translated into adequate cultural forms for every single case. The "treatments" have to be adapted to the "patients".

All three perspectives aim at reframing the violence-enabling factors, they differ, however, on their judgement with respect to the minimal aim and consequently as well with respect to the sensible avenues open for reframing. Whereas institutional approaches confine themselves largely to devising new environments which maximise the chances for the civilised handling of inter-group conflict, cultural as well as psychological perspectives point to the fact that such institutional reframing is always open to being reversed or undercut by competing political players as long as there is no corresponding reframing of psychological and cultural predispositions toward conflict behaviour. Whereas psychological approaches commence by transforming fundamental psychologi-

cal concepts on groups and group processes, thereby keeping the universalistic orientation ingrained in psychology, culturalist perspectives point to the different content dimension of the cultural settings in which conflicts are enacted. Institutional approaches, while sometimes drawing from the other two for the analysis of conflict behaviour, commence from the insight, that neither psychological nor cultural environments are easily manipulated. The aim of reframing has to be confined to those variables which have the highest degree of manipulability and promise significant effects on conflict behaviour at the same time. They argue that this conditions are best fulfilled by the institutional set-up of the political system.

A large part of the argument will centre on the dimension of identity and its psychological, institutional and cultural representation. This is not to discount alternative explanations of or approaches to ethno-cultural violence. To be sure, there do exist structural inequities in a number of the cases mentioned in the text and they clearly provide some of the causes of conflict. We could also, at least in some cases, successfully apply some variants of class analysis. Nevertheless, two arguments will be put forward against centring on the socio-structural dimensions of ethno-cultural conflict in Indonesia.

Firstly, on a general level, these dimensions play no significant role in the theoretical literature on ethnic conflict summarised below. Irrespective of the rather different interpretations of ethnic violence given by proponents of the three strands of science, all insist on the centrality of the identity dimension along which the contending groups are opposed. Even for institutionalists, not to mention psychologists or culturalists, ethno-cultural conflict centres around identity needs which have to be met and mediated by some sort of design. So most researchers effectively argue in line with Burton, that the need for group identity, security and welfare are non-negotiable needs, which have to be safeguarded by any strategy aiming at conflict-resolution. Questions of equality, justice, participation and representation can only be dealt with after a formula for cooperative conflict management has been devised. Secondly, arguing from the country level, it is my contention that, in the Indonesian case, underlying the structural inequities and configuring "classes" in conflict are ethno-culturally determined group identities, according to which scarce resources are distributed. In one way, these identities are products of resource distribution, as they are stabilised by durable practice. In a more meaningful way however, these identities precede any form of resource distribution, as at any given time it has to be decided, which identity is valid for the purpose of distribution. Groupness creates the dividing lines between the in and out-group, which in effect provide the cognitive map according to which resources are distributed. Groupness also provides the safeguarding of human needs in terms of security, identity and welfare. What matters most for scientific analysis is the form groupness takes.

The different forms of groupness can be treated either as the causes or effects of social or economic structuration. Their continuity and change ought to be analysed as a process of continual (re-)construction. I argue that in the case of ethno-cultural conflict any attempt at changing patterns of violent conflict behaviour has to be based on devising a strategy for a purposeful reconstruction of group identities. To do so, it has to concentrate on the specifics of groupness as the cause for socio-economic structuration and agency.

Different forms of groupness rely on different symbolic forms which legitimate the way group members perceive reality and interact with their environment. Therefore, the forms in which groups constitute themselves play a central role for framing perception and action-style. In Indonesia, as in a host of other countries, ethno-cultural identity “is not just a mask for social class conflict; ... ethnic affiliations are not just a convenient vehicle by which elites satisfy their own class aspirations.”<sup>5</sup> In line with Horowitz and others, I argue that in a large number of cases “ethnic affiliations typically fulfil needs that might otherwise go unmet.”<sup>6</sup> They exhibit a family resemblance which differentiates them from all other imaginations of collective identity: ascription. Even though ethno-cultural identities can hark back on either language, descent, tradition or religion as constituting the unifying feature, any of these features is treated as if it were a natural, inborn quality of the group members. To be sure, ethno-cultural groups can “become more or less inclusive. Some small ethnic groups can merge with or absorb others, or are absorbed by them, producing larger, composite groups. Larger groups, on the other hand, may divide into their component parts ... Group boundaries thus grow wider or narrower by processes of assimilation or differentiation. ... ethnic identity typically embraces multiple levels or tiers, so that it is possible for an individual to claim more than one identity.”<sup>7</sup> Notwithstanding these observations, ethno-cultural groups always rely on a “significant element of descent”<sup>8</sup> and the fiction of some variant of extended putative kinship. Therefore, ethno-cultural identity can provide a more or less total primary configuration of the world, which differs categorically from configurations according to other symbolic universes (class, citizen, etc). Inevitably it has the same claim to legitimacy and primacy.

Whereas in the Western World the hierarchy of symbolic forms has been established, in Indonesia, as in a large number of other countries outside the First World, it is still up for debate. I argue that the legitimacy of an ethno-cultural symbolic universe can and should not be questioned in the first place, as this does not seem to be a fruitful avenue.

I will argue that in the case of Indonesia, democracy and peaceful conflict management is only possible (a) in a federal institutional set-up. Any unitarian design will, in the medium term, erode democratic participation. To democratise the polity and civilise the conflict behaviour of the competing groups, in my view, it is also necessary, (b) to accept ethno-cultural identities as partly political phenomena and enable groups defined in ethno-cultural terms to participate in a meaningful way in politics at the local, regional and national level. This entails (c) a reframing of the hitherto preponderantly assimilationist concepts of the Indonesian nation and people and (d) a demythologisation of the national history, which still contains extensive meaning structures, which praise and glorify violence, hierarchy and discipline. Still unfinished is also (e) the “invention of poli-

5 Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London (University of California Press), 2nd ed. 2000, p. 89.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 74, see pp. 74-83 for a more detailed analysis of the functionality of ethnicity.

7 *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 55.

tics”<sup>9</sup>. Whereas in neighbouring Malaysia, as Milner points out “the practice of politics is undoubtedly well established”<sup>10</sup>, the same cannot be said of Indonesia. Here politics was neither invented in the late colonial era in the first place nor had it a chance to develop during either the rule of Sukarno or Suharto. As an ideology as well as in practice, it is therefore still in its infancy. Whereas in Malaya, the discourse of power was significantly formed in the language of rule-bound political contest in the late colonial era with the corresponding practice following suit, in Indonesia, we find no counterpart to either discourse or the practice of politics right up to the present-day. There obviously was an anti-colonial discourse as well as a corresponding practice in late colonial Indonesia, but the answers given to the question regarding the contemporary as well as future rules of the power game were not politics and rule-bound contest, but unity, power, struggle and hegemony. In spite of more than 50 years of independence, the Indonesian social contract is still weak and woefully incomplete. A living contract would have to provide “the rules of the game to govern the distribution of the social pie and to achieve peaceful conflict resolution.”<sup>11</sup> Any effort at sustainable restoration of inter-ethnic peace “requires the re-constitution of the social contract.”<sup>12</sup> That means, that conceptions of participation, representation, as well as of justice and equity have to be debated and a fundamental consensus on them achieved in the medium term.

All these efforts should be supported by (f) a raft of measures which aim to prevent violence between ethno-cultural groups in all those regions, where significant inter-group tensions exist or where violence seems to be a major risk. In all cases, where politicians, community leaders and the public aim at sustainable reconciliation after the experience of large-scale collective violence, there is a dire need. Most suited to this task seem to be the different variants of psychologically-oriented workshops and other similar approaches.

## 2. Human psyche and ethno-cultural conflict

The psychologically-based literature on ethno-cultural conflict and its resolution is, as stated above, dominated by approaches which centre on the identity dimension of the conflict. Identity is, in the words of Burton, a basic need of collectivities and as such non-negotiable.<sup>13</sup> If this need is not met, the group’s members will strive for need-fulfilment irrespective of the possible adverse consequences. Recourse to utility-based calculation and rational choice strategies will be in vain, as members of a group which feel deprived

9 For an excellent study on this process in colonial Malaya, see: Anthony Milner, *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya*. Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1995.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 294.

11 S. Mansoob Mursheed, *Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment: An Introduction*. In: *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 39, No. 4, July 2002, pp. 387-93.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 392.

13 Two other non-negotiable needs would be security and welfare.

in their identity needs will go to great lengths to (re-)establish a meaningful and secure identity. Therefore, severe conflicts with a significant identity dimension cannot be managed, but have to be resolved and ultimately transformed. Otherwise, the threat of violence persists.

Psychological approaches accept the relevance of economic, social and political dimensions, which partly cause, contribute to and aggravate a conflict, but argue that the autonomy of the identity dimension must be taken into adequate consideration if conflict resolution is to have any chance of success. Their efforts aim precisely at unearthing this dimension and devising solutions whereby these needs can be met.

For the aims of this paper – offering some theory-driven strategies for the Indonesian case, there is no need to present an overview of the field. I will concentrate on portraying three variables of conflict (behaviour) instead, the adequate treatment of which is generally perceived to be of crucial importance to eventual success in any effort of conflict resolution and which, in my view, are central to the case of Indonesia: empathy competence, chosen collective traumata and competing psycho-cultural narratives.

### 2.1. Strengthening empathy competence

Empathy seems to be one critical variable the existence or absence of which can account for a significant amount of success or failure in the handling of conflicts.<sup>14</sup> Empathy and the related concept of role assumption<sup>15</sup> are seen as two of the most important inter-related mechanisms for reducing individual aggression.

Basically, empathy and role assumption<sup>16</sup> centre around the ability of putting yourself into the position of your counterpart in any form of social interaction. If role assumption is to work as a conflict-reducing device, central to this is not only the ability to take the role of the other, but also the willingness to take it in all, especially in its affective and

14 Closely related to but not identical to this focus on empathy and role assumption would be the question of the meta-communicational competence made available by cultural scripts and schemes for conflict behavior. Meta-communication basically refers to communication about the ongoing communication itself: discussing its rules, aims, structuration and suchlike.

15 These concepts are strongly anchored in social psychology as well as in the pragmatic tradition of sociology. After all, the idea of the central role of the other and the ability to assume the role of the other for the constitution of the individual (social) self has been developed by George Herbert Mead (see especially his: *Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint of a social behaviorist*. Chicago (Chicago University Press), 1934). Later prominence was given to these concepts by representatives of the symbolic interactionist tradition in sociology (e.g. Erving Goffmann), developmental psychologists such as Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget and psychiatrists (e.g. Erik Erikson). For a short overview, see Gisela Steins, Robert A. Wicklund, *Zum Konzept der Perspektivenübernahme: Ein kritischer Überblick*. In: *Psychologische Rundschau*, Vol. 44, 1993, pp. 226-239.

16 From a psychological perspective, three dimensions of role assumption have to be differentiated: visual-spatial (or perceptual), conceptual (or cognitive) and affective role assumption. The interest of conflict research centres on the second and third dimensions.



motivational dimensions. Being able to anticipate the cognitions, feelings and motivations of others adds a completely new dimension to strategically-designed social action. On the strategic level of social action, we thereby might optimise our own patterns of action, insofar as we obtain a more complete picture of the motivational structure of the other. On a further, not necessarily connected, level, we become involved with the emotive state of the other, and thereby partly restructure our own action according to the moral categories of adequacy, guilt and shame.

Empathy, however, is not to be confused with cognitive or emotional identification. As a conflict-structuring device, it has to be seen as an analytical ability or capacity. As Rothman hypothesises:

“analytical empathy could lead parties to accept that the other side, in ways quite similar to one's own side, is so deeply motivated to fulfil underlying needs and express their own values fully, to overcome past traumas and insure future safety and expression of identity, that coercion or suppression of those needs and values will probably be counter productive”<sup>17</sup>.

In this way, the chances that a foundation of sameness is developed by the sheer act of trying to see, interpret and feel as your opponent sees, interprets and feels are maximised, which later on can be used as a starting point for the construction of a growing universe of shared meanings, judgements and evaluations.

Building empathy is most important in conflicts which revolve around fundamental issues of identity.<sup>18</sup> As literature on the psychocultural prerequisites of constructive conflict resolution points out, empathy clearly facilitates “agreements with opponents whose aggression is defensively motivated.”<sup>19</sup> Empathy, although clearly an individual competence is partly culture-derived and dependent, insofar as its “typical” level and form are reflected in the cultural set-up of a given society and passed on by the enculturation of the group: some cultures open up more avenues for empathy whereas others foreclose role assumption and empathy in the scripts and schemes they provide.

## 2.2. Unearthing unresolved traumata

Vamik Volkan invented the concept of “chosen trauma”. He defines it as “the collective memory of a calamity that once befell a group's ancestors. It is ... a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defenses against unacceptable thoughts.”<sup>20</sup> Groups centring on a cho-

17 Jay Rothman, *Dialogue in Conflict: Past and Future*, in: Eugene Weiner (ed), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence* (New York: Continuum, 1998), pp. 217-235, citation p. 225.

18 See for example Marc Howard Ross, *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 169-170, Rothman, see above (footnote 17), pp. 224-227.

19 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 107.

20 Vamik Volkan, *Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism*, New York (Farrar/Straus/Giroux), 1997, p. 48.

sen trauma<sup>21</sup> largely define their identity “by the transgenerational transmission of injured selves infused with the memory of the ancestors’ trauma.”<sup>22</sup> Chosen traumas are “mental representations of a historical event that ... can bring members of a large group together.”<sup>23</sup> They become heavily mythologised over time and thereby act as central carriers not only of collective meaning (cognition) but also of emotion and affect. In respect to social action chosen traumas “bring with them powerful experiences of loss and feelings of humiliation, vengeance, and hatred that trigger a variety of unconscious defense mechanisms that attempt to reverse these experiences and feelings”<sup>24</sup>.

In trauma-oriented groups, the schemes derived from the unresolved confrontation with the traumatic experience result in a traumatised self-representation, which continues to bind the group to the cognitive, emotive and motivational schemes developed in the past. Therefore, trauma-oriented groups encountering conflict will tend to re-enact their trauma-derived scripts,<sup>25</sup> whereas other groups are more open to experience the novelty of new situations, devise new coping strategies and schemes. This psychoanalytical view of the role of different identity conceptions for social action is supported by social-psychological studies on the influence of relative deprivation on social perception and action. A large number of studies have showed that it is not so much individual (egoistic)

21 The concept of chosen trauma differs somewhat from the normal understanding of concept of collective trauma, which is more presence and action-centred. Veertzberger defines collective trauma as “a shattering, often violent event that affects a community of people ... , and that results from human behavior that is politically motivated and has political consequences. Such an event injures in one stab, penetrating all psychological defensive barriers of participants and observers, allowing no space for denial mechanisms and thus leaving those affected with an acute sense of vulnerability and fragility. Such traumatic events not only affect communities but sometimes also create communities, so that ‘otherwise unconnected persons who share a traumatic experience seek one another out and develop a form of fellowship on the strength of that common tie.’” (Yaacov Y.I. Veertzberger, *The Antinomies of Collective Political Trauma: A Pre-Theory*, in: *Political Psychology*, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1997, pp. 863-876, citation p. 864). In the case of trans-generationally transmitted traumata, the mechanisms working in traumatisation obviously are fundamentally different. Here it is not a sudden experience, but a long-term socialisation process, by which the traumatic “logic” is embedded in the collective history and implanted into the individual consciousness. The interplay between cognitive and emotive aspects however is basically similar to the ones of an acute traumatisation, which are summarised by Veertzberger: “no matter how important are the cognitive changes induced by traumatic events, it is affect, ‘the emotional brain’, that drives cognition in these situations, and not the other way around” (*Ibid.*, p. 866).

22 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 81.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

25 This analysis corresponds to the “group-think” hypotheses put forward by Janis. In the case of collective traumatisation one possible outcome is “community groupthink” (Veertzberger), which is characterised among others by “a growing closure and resistance to opinions that contest the dominant received wisdom about the causes for and meaning of the traumatic event ... . . . deindividuation sets in. Outgroups are viewed in stereotypic, mostly negative terms. ... communication across the divide becomes difficult if not impossible. The consequent intensification of between group hostility entraps the antagonists in self-defeating societal conflict, that hardens with time, as the traumatic event becomes embedded in societal consciousness and acquires mythical proportions that allow little flexibility for reinterpreting its meaning” (Veertzberger, see above (footnote 21) pp. 868-869).

deprivation that leads people to rebel, but fraternal deprivation. Neither political attitudes nor activities can be directly connected to any individual utility function. So “the political power of deprivation lies in the perception of collective ... deprivation. The picture that emerges ... is that citizens understand and react to the political world in terms of group interests, including the interests of groups they are not part of.”<sup>26</sup> Collective traumata, however, are representations of most extreme experiences of fraternal deprivation. Therefore, we should expect there to be significant differences in conflict perception and behaviour between trauma-oriented groups and other groups.

Let us now have a short look at violence in Indonesia: Wouldn't it make sense to perceive Indonesia as a traumatised society?<sup>27</sup> The national revolution, was not only a story of revolutionary fervour and heroic fighting, but also a story of treachery, of pitting Indonesians against Indonesians, of savage human rights violations, which are of importance not as violations of some abstract norm, but as living experiences of hundreds of thousands of people. Nobody, however, dared or dares to debate the ambivalent features of the heroic anti-colonial revolution. The violence of the enemy – that is the Dutch – could be seen as a first-rate traumatising experience. Even after their defeat, the Dutch provided the symbolic enemy in a large number of wars fought by the leaders of the young Republic: from the war against the independence-oriented South Moluccas in 1950 to the incorporation of Dutch-controlled Irian Barat (West Papua) in the early 1960s. Indonesian politics throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s were fixated with the arch enemy, the Dutch.

A similar logic applies to the great killings of 1965/66. Even now, after nearly four decades and the complete breakdown of the socialist or communist alternative to democracy and capitalism, communism is still anathema to the political class of Indonesia. What is the political class afraid of these days? Legalising communists would not only mean, that the killings in effect were illegal, it would also throw the fiction of novelty and innocence surrounding the new forces which emerged after the demise of Suharto open to question. Where were the *Banser*-militia<sup>28</sup> in 1965? What role did the student and espe-

26 Clark McCauley, *The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic Nationalism*, in: Daniel Chirot, Martin E.P. Seligman (eds.), *Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions* (Washington DC: American Psychological Association), 2001, pp. 343-362, citation p. 349.

27 This category might as well be applied to societal sub-groups. So the future behavior of the Papua should be to a large degree determined by their past traumatic experiences with the Indonesian security forces. If this determination is simply on the basis of lessons learned from a traumatic past or an expression of traumatising experiences, it must be evaluated by research. There is no determinism from experience to the way of coping. As I have argued, not all traumatic experiences evolve into a trauma, the way these experiences are integrated into the groups themselves and their worldview is always singular.

28 The *Barisan Serba Guna (Banser)*, founded in 1964, is the militia of the largest Muslim organisation *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)*. The initial purpose was to be able to counter the activities of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This militia seems to have been heavily involved in the slaughtering which commenced only one-and-a-half years later. Other similar organisations with an old history are the *Komando Kesiapsiagaan Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah (Kokam)*, the Vigilance Command of *Muhammadiyah* Youth, which provided protection for the reformist Islamist *Muhammadiyah* (founded in 1965)

cially Christian organisations play in the violence? What about the other militias supported by political parties and societal groups? All contemporary political players, not only the security forces, base their pretensions toward morality on very shaky ground. A further case in point would be the South-Molukkas, where we might speak of a double-traumatisation. For the Christians, the victory of the Republic over the Dutch amounted to a fundamental trauma, as they, with one stroke of history, not only lost their privileged position, but (at least in their own perception) feared for their sheer survival. Revolt and violent suppression followed, clearly demonstrating, that their future status was at the mercy of the central government. When in the 1990s the tide seemed to turn against Christian interests the old trauma was revived. What might have been interpreted in the context of a changing and modernising Indonesian society, was instead interpreted in the context of an assault on the already besieged position of the Christian community and their vested interests. From the point of view of the Muslim population of the southern Molukkas, however, the processes of the 1990s were nothing more than a belated recognition of the demographic changes which had reframed the political and economic environment, in which Molukkan politics took place. Christian fears and efforts to stabilise their societal position, however, were interpreted in the schemata of the late colonial and early republican era, too. Here, religious aggressiveness, the missionary drive and the history of Christian support for the colonial power and the later effort at secession combined to provide the interpretation for the situation of the late 1990s. In the Moluccas, the cognitive, interpretative and emotive patterns of the early 1950s had been partly frozen for the past four decades and were brought to prominence under the conditions of regional state failure.

### 2.3. Coping with competing narratives

Although we may assume that collective conflicts, as any kind of social interaction, were due to some kind of real causes, in a large number of cases these causes have been different for different groups of players and audiences and, more importantly, they often vanish as action-driving forces after a short period of violent conflict. What essentially drives action and re-action are assumptions about causes and links, interpretations of past ac-

and the now infamous *Pemuda Pancasila*, which originally had been founded as a resource for Sukarno's IPKI during the era of Guided Democracy. After the return to democracy in 1998/1999, the newly-founded parties had nothing better to do than establish their own forces to be able to compete with their competitors. The NU-affiliated Muslim PKB, for example, founded the *Garda Pemuda Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Garda Bangsa)*. Megawatis PDI-P as well as all the other parties can count on the services of various shades of so-called task forces (*Satuan Tugas – Satgas*). All of them receive some kind of (at least rudimentary) para-military training and style themselves in a rather narcissistic outfit signifying force and violence. Most of them "opt for an army-style uniform. ... In many cases boots and dark sunglasses complete the outfit. The PDI-P Satgas members dress in black and wear a red beret or some other form of headgear. ... The Pemuda Pancasila members dress in an orange and black-striped camouflage. The Kokam use green stripes and a green beret." (van Dijk. see above (Footnote 2), pp. 159-160).

tions. Whereas in cooperative relationships assumptions about causes and interpretations of past events might be developed as the shared beliefs of all parties to the relationship, the same processes are antagonistic and conflicting in non-cooperative conflicts. Causes and interpretations of the conflict are part of the conflict themselves as is the discourse on the rules of conflict-resolution.<sup>29</sup>

These different and competing narratives direct further interpretation and social action. It is not some objective reality, but the told and retold narratives, not so much the enclosed history, but the images, beliefs and values ingrained in these stories that provide the fundamental fall-back position to the parties in conflict, from which they perceive, judge and decide courses of action. Therefore, these narratives always carry a large load of emotional attachment and power.

I argue that the “real” causes of conflict are of negligible importance to the players and should only be of secondary importance for the observer interested in conflict resolution. They clearly have to be integrated in any analysis of the conflict, insofar as process-tracing, that is a reconstruction of the transformation of the frames of reference applied to the conflict by the parties over time, has to be founded and juxtaposed to all other available avenues of explanation. They should, however, only be given prominence to this extent, as they still pertain to the conflict-related self-image and other-image of the parties. Instead, the often competing narratives<sup>30</sup> constructed and believed by the parties to the conflict are of prime importance to the future relationship of the groups locked in protracted conflict. Violent conflict is, I would argue, not only caused by causes, as conventional wisdom would have it, but in the course of narrative production also produces its own causes.

Even if we accept for a moment that knowing the real causes of a conflict would be of some importance to its eventual resolution, we ought to realise that we should nevertheless not try to teach the “truth” to the parties to the conflict. Trying to convince people that they believe in the wrong causes is not a very encouraging strategy of conflict resolution, because people seldom listen, if told that their worldview is patently wrong. This strategy, for simple psychological reasons, will not work. Instead, we have to take the narratives developed and kept alive by the competing communities seriously.

29 This puts limitations on the endeavour of any scientist, who sets out to discover the real causes and processes of violence. In a fascinating effort at juxtaposing competing narratives of violence in North India, Paul Brass concludes, that we “can chart the interpretations, the contextualizations, the discourses of, by, and about violence and communalisms in India and the interests served by different representations of them, but we cannot certainly find the truth of events. It is a curious thing to have reached such a point, that the lies, the distortions, and the approximations to some truth have a greater reality – a verity that can be documented precisely – than the events themselves.” (Paul R. Brass, *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*, Princeton N.J. (Princeton University Press), 1997, p. 266).

30 On the phenomenon of competing psychocultural narratives, see, for example, Marc Howard Ross, *The Political Psychology of Competing Narratives: September 11 and Beyond*. in: [http://www.ssr.org/sept11/essays/ross\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssr.org/sept11/essays/ross_text_only.htm).

To come to grips with mutually hostile narratives we have to bear in mind that, although they build on past events and pre-existing narratives, there is always a wide variety of alternative narratives which might have been developed out of the same symbolic reservoir, the dominant narratives used as quarry for the dominant versions of reality. We have to acknowledge that the existing narratives, as dysfunctional in terms of conflict resolution as they might be, fulfil a real purpose for the members of the groups who believe in them. All narratives, even ones from the perpetrators of violence, have to be treated seriously, because they help us understand their emotional “hot spots”; narratives not only promote understanding of the deeper roots of complex conflicts; they also point towards opportunities for strategic intervention and identify barriers to change.”<sup>31</sup> Psycho-cultural efforts at conflict resolution aim at understanding this subcutaneous agenda of narratives and try to model the reaction in such a way that the fears and emotions are not negated but taken up and expanded upon, that fears are connected to new and positive emotions emphasising sameness, so that eventually the salience of different elements is influenced in such a way that a de-escalating and integrative symbolism grows in importance. In this way, peace work in workshops or in local inter-ethnic groups aims at the reevaluation of central values, core assumptions and fundamental attributions und ultimately reconciliation. So, there should be no denying of existing narratives. Instead, they should be supplemented and broadened so that in due course these narratives include a growing amount of information, emotion, meaning and symbolic structures which counteract the centrifugal, confrontational symbolical and emotional content by adding integrative aspects to the conflict and the relationship between the parties to the conflict. Therefore, the accusations and arguments brought forward by contending parties during times of violence should clearly not be relegated to the sidelines and interpreted as aberrations from an otherwise more peaceful normalcy.

One Indonesian example of the need to take the problematic of competing narratives seriously is the inter-ethnic violence which, on several occasions, broke out in West Kalimantan. Although the waves were separated by several decades, they followed a similar pattern, the perpetrators were the same, the victims however different. The first accounts of inter-ethnic violence can be found in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (1851-54, 1885), when the Dayaks were used by the Dutch and their Malay allies to fight unruly Chinese *kongsis*. The next prominent case of significant anti-Chinese violence dates from 1967, when the “Dayak Raids’ ... not only drove the Chinese agriculturalists from the rural areas of Kalbar, but directly or indirectly resulted in the death of thousands.”<sup>32</sup> The surviving Chinese, driven out of their homesteads, did not return. In their stead, Madurese arrived in the course of official and spontaneous transmigration over the following decades. These, in fundamental contrast to other immigrant groups (e.g. the Bugis) could not be integrated well into local society and, within a short time, conflicts proliferated. The persistent ten-

31 Ibid.

32 Mary Somers Heidhues, Kalimantan Barat 1967-1999: Violence on the periphery, in: Ingrid Wessel, Georgia Wimhöfer (eds). Violence in Indonesi., Hamburg (Abera), 2001, pp. 139-159, citation p. 141.

sions which characterised the inter-ethnic relations<sup>33</sup> exploded in early 1997, when “Dayaks waged what appeared to be a ritual war against Madurese communities, burning houses, killing inhabitants, and in some cases severing the heads and eating the livers of those killed.”<sup>34</sup>

Any attempt at resolving this problematic of recurring violence, has to take into account the fact that the different players and analysts provide fundamentally different narratives of the incidents and thereby situate them in completely different meaning structures, which cannot be reconciled. A large number of social scientists and most international NGOs, wary of the ethno-cultural dimension, interpret the conflict in terms of economic, social and political marginalisation. For them, the conflict is “a classic example of economic tensions manifested as ethnic tensions”.<sup>35</sup> Others argued that “fear of innovation and the dislocations of a time of transition were behind the various outbreaks of 1997, but there are problems with applying (t)his transition model to Kalimantan.”<sup>36</sup> Most analysts come up with multiple variables which, in their specific interplay, are said to be able to account for the violence. So, Mary Somers Heidhues brings the factors together:

- disenfranchisement of a group that sees itself as the original inhabitants
- increased competition for scarce resources
- a shrinking economic cake
- a political culture that rewards violence
- absence of a single standard of law and ethics for the nation
- myths of head-taking and martial traditions.<sup>37</sup>

Representatives of the Dayak community point out that the economic argument “is wrong”<sup>38</sup>. John Bamba, representing the Institut Dayakologi, argues that “whilst the marginalisation of the Dayak through the development and political process is a factor that can not be overlooked, it is interesting to note that you never hear a Dayak talk about the conflict in those terms.” He argues that there certainly is a coincidence of economic and political marginalisation and violence but no causal relationship. Purporting to speak for

33 Local and regional peace “treaties” abound; most prominent is the government sponsored Samalantan agreement of 1979.

34 Human Rights Watch, Communal Violence in West Kalimantan. (<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/wkali/Brneo97d-01.htm>).

35 According to Michael Dove, Dayak Anger Ignored, in: Inside Indonesia No. 51, July/September 1997, page 13. This line of reasoning is also present in the already cited Report of Human Rights Watch, *ibid*.

36 Somers Heidhues see above (footnote 32), p. 147.

37 Somers Heidhues, see above (footnote 32), p. 147. For a similar study which tries to integrate structural and cultural features see Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, Factors in Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Identity and Consciousness, and the Indications of Disintegrative Processes in West Kalimantan, in: Chaider Bamualim, Karlina Helmanita (eds.), Communal Conflict in Indonesia, Jakarta (IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta; KAS), 2002, pp. 125-153.

38 This and the following citations are all from: John Bamba. The Role of Adat in the Dayak and Madurese War. (paper presented at the INFID conference in Bonn 1998), [http://www.dayakology.com/publications/articles\\_news/eng/role.htm](http://www.dayakology.com/publications/articles_news/eng/role.htm).

the Dayak community, he paints a fundamentally different picture, gives completely different meaning structures to the conflict and develops a narrative, which has nothing in common with the other (“rational”) discourses on the conflict. He argues that reports generally have “presumed the presence of rational thought, people acting with intent and logic in an irrational manner, and on the basis of those actions being labelled as ‘head-hunters’ and ‘cannibals’. The more liberal approaches presume a return to ‘traditional’ means as a last resort response to oppression.” He continues however, that these interpretations are wrong because they do not grasp the motivational logic of the Dayak action: “The bloody conflict with the Madurese did not arise out of revenge, nor ethnic cleansing. It came about as the need for the Dayak to fulfil the obligations and demands of the *adat*, or indigenous laws. Failure to do so would have resulted in great misfortune being experienced by the whole Dayak community.” So, for the Dayak, there is an absolute duty to fulfil the demands of *adat*, which under any circumstances may not be compromised, even in the face of state law.<sup>39</sup>

“However, the Madurese are not prepared to accept the Dayak *adat*, and in fact belittle it. Failure to fulfil the *adat* process brings great misfortune upon the community concerned. One way to free the village from the consequences of not carrying out the *adat* is to take the burden of the *adat* on to their own shoulders. By killing the Madurese, and through that war, the Dayak have the reason to perform the *adat*. In this case, the killing of Madurese is not for purposes of revenge, but the need to fulfil the *adat* demands.”<sup>40</sup>

The interpretative lack of agreement is significant for conflict resolution, insofar as from the Dayak point of view, conflict resolution has only marginal connections to the betterment of their economic and political situation. They point to a rearrangement of the respective role of state law and *adat* instead: “It can be assumed that, should Madurese persons who transgress Dayak *adat*, whether through taking the life of a Dayak or otherwise, are prepared to accept the demands of the indigenous law that prevails, then there would not be any need for a war against the Madurese.” If this interpretation were true for the Dayak, then, no effort at betterment of their economic and social position could hinder a recurrence of violence, should the need to fulfil *adat* arise again.

39 This is corroborated by the ethnologist Masri Sareb Putra, who, without belittling the role of economic marginalisation argues that the cultural differences between the Dayak and the Madurese play a centre role. He, too, argues that customary law must reign supreme and the non-acceptance of customary law by the Madurese, that is their taking recourse to state law, lay at the root of the problem of the riots. When a group of Madurese migrants killed a Dayak, to the Dayak it was precisely the “failure to settle this issue on the basis of customary law (which; P.K.) made the cries of war unavoidable. The chief of the Dayaks issued ‘a red bowl’, indicating declaration of war, which had to be passed on to the war commander of each tribe. As soon as the red bowl was received, all Dayaks joined forces to fight against the attackers.” (Masri Sareb Putra, The Solution to the Sambas riots, in: The Jakarta Post 20 April 1999, (<http://www.thejakartapost.com/>). For a similar argument, see Setia Budhi, Unresolved and chronic problems led to Sampit riot (The Jakarta Post 3 March, 2001; <http://www.thejakartapost.com/>)

40 This interpretation is theorised by some anthropologists, who perceive the conflicts to have been “efforts by the local natives to cleanse their cultural domain from the pollutants” and thereby “regain their cultural rights of control over their traditional lands and spaces” (Parsudi Suparlan, Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Indonesia, in: *Kultur* Vol. 1 No. 2, 2001, pp. 41-57, citation p. 55).



#### 2.4. Instruments of psychological reframing

Even if the analytical power of psychological analysis is great, the number and efficacy of tools for reframing the psychocultural patterns of competing narratives and drama are limited. Time and time again, peace and conflict research led to the same few instruments of workshops, peace camps, peace education in one form or the other.

Prominent designs of conflict resolution techniques which centre on the psychological or psychocultural dimension are:

- the classical strategy of “interactive conflict resolution” (ICR) developed by Burton,<sup>41</sup>
- the analytical approach of Mitchell and Banks,<sup>42</sup>
- the psychoanalytically-inspired workshops developed by Vamik Volkan and the team of the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (University of Virginia),<sup>43</sup>
- the method of interactive problem-solving of Herbert Kelman<sup>44</sup>
- Paul Lederach’s efforts to develop an integrated framework for peace-building.<sup>45</sup>

In all these strategies, workshops play a crucial role. A constant feature of all approaches is their reliance on an initiating, guiding, mediating and controlling third party. Consequently, several of the authors have constructed elaborate handbooks on the design of such workshops and the appropriate steps from the diagnosis and the selection of participants to the arrangements and conduct of such workshops and the eventually necessary follow-up work.<sup>46</sup> Several problems and/or limitations are common to all efforts:

41 Burton initially called this a “controlled-communication workshop”. See: John W. Burton, *Conflict Resolution and Prevention*, New York (ST. Martin’s Press), 1990, and *Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook*, Lanham Md. (University Press of America), 1987 by the same author.

42 See: Christopher Mitchell, Michael Banks, *Handbook of conflict resolution: the analytical problem-solving approach*, London (Pinter), 1996.

43 Vamik Volkan, *The Tree Model: Psychopolitical Dialogues and the Promotion of Coexistence*, in: Eugene Weiner (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, New York (Continuum), 1998, pp. 343-368, Volkan, see above (footnote 20).

44 Herbert C. Kelman, *Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner*, in: Eugene Weiner (ed.) *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, New York (Continuum), 1998, pp. 310-331. On the foundational social-psychological perspective, see: Herbert C. Kelman, *Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict*, in: I. William Zartman, J. Lewis Rasmussen (eds.), *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington D.C. (United States Institute of Peace Press), 1997, pp. 191-237.

45 Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse N.Y. (Syracuse University Press), 1995; see also: *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D.C. (United States Institute of Peace Press), 1997 and: *Beyond violence: Building Sustainable Peace*, in: Eugene Weiner (ed.), *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, New York (Continuum) 1998, pp. 236-245 by the same author.

46 See for example: Mitchell/Banks see above (footnote 42).

The workshops did not work well on the macro- or meso-levels of conflict. The crucial cases reported by most of the prominent practitioners – e.g. Sudan, Israel-Palestinian conflict, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland and suchlike – quite clearly cannot be counted as success stories. In all of these cases, conflicts continued in spite of sometimes enduring intervention and repeated efforts to devise solutions through the proposed avenues and arenas. As all literature on the efficacy of workshops, peace camps and other forms of peace education shows, these mechanisms might be useful on the micro-level only.<sup>47</sup>

Workshops and similar instruments generally take effect only when the magnitude of violence has been reduced already. It is, as Donald Horowitz argues “easy to show that the disposition to engage in such activities is the result, rather than the cause, of a conflict already gone soft.”<sup>48</sup> That is: at the height of violence, nobody will participate in conflict resolution exercises. So, these strategies might be important in the aftermath of de-escalation, but they clearly do not help to change the path of violence.

The psychologically-oriented workshop recipes focus on fundamental psychological reframing which is based on a vision of positive peace. Aiming at and working towards fundamental value and attitudinal change can prove to be counter-productive, however, because it may lead to a corresponding neglect of short-term symptom or repression-oriented strategies which only try to build a negative peace. Operating solely from the premise that lasting civilisation of conflict behaviour is only feasible, if the value systems of the groups in conflict are significantly altered, may well be a road to nowhere, because, to cite Horowitz again: “many people will die as they wait for value change.”<sup>49</sup> So, psychological approaches clearly need additional measures which make a difference in the short term.

Workshops and related instruments also do not account for cultural differences. They basically propose one type of resolution mechanism for all kinds of societies and cultures. Avruch rightly criticises the fact that specialists in psychologically-oriented conflict resolution “codify, systematize, and administer. They create rules and compile rule-books. They privilege a particular discourse.”<sup>50</sup> In essence, they start from a basis of de-

47 The problem seems to be that up to now, there has been no promising strategy for spreading the cognitive changes reached at the individual and small-group level. As Argyris and Schön point out with respect to organisations, organisational learning, in order to occur, cannot only rely on learning agents – i.e. individual members of the organisation. The new discoveries, inventions, interpretations, and evaluations must be embedded in organisational memory. If the new schemes, images and evaluations are not encoded in the organisational map, then “the individual will have learned but the organization will not have done so” (Chris Argyris, Donald Schön, *Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective*, Reading, Mass. (Addison Wesley), 1978, p. 19.

48 Donald Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London (University of California Press), 2001, p. 514.

49 Horowitz, see above (footnote 48), p. 514.

50 Kevin Avruch, Introduction: Culture and Conflict Resolution. In: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Joseph A. Scimecca, *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. Westport Con, London, 1991, 1-17, citation p. 5. Lederach, who openly argues that conflicts and their resolution are always cultural events, is one of the few exceptions. Even he, however, treats culture as a negligible category in his proposals for

vising conflict resolution as a rational process, which aims at disclosing the unconsciously held bases of collective self and inter-ethnic perception by a standardized sequence of prescribed steps. It is exactly this paradigm of process-rationality which might collide with local practices under certain circumstances and at least, in certain cases, result in a return of violence and not its demise.

This short view on the main instruments makes clear that psychologically oriented theory, while being able to provide much input for the analysis of conflict genesis and dynamics, provides only a very small spectre of conflict resolution techniques, which, on top of that, seem to work best on the local level and after the conflict has already gone soft. Even if they play a significant role in the drawn-out processes of reconciliation, healing and the re-integration of fragmented societies in the aftermath of violence, they provide no viable avenue for the initial de-escalation of hardened intractable conflicts. Consequently, the use of psychological avenues for conflict resolution should be of interest in all inter-communal conflicts where the lines of confrontation have already gone soft, but the multiple underlying forces still exist. Work on traumata, empathy-training and the re-imagining of commonalities as well as dividing lines is essential, if the very real danger of a return of violence is to be averted. It is also important in high tension areas as a preventive measure. Seen from a long-term perspective, it is primarily important for the arenas of commonality and communication built up on this basis to be broadened and converted into an institutionalised form in which all groups in conflict develop a common interest.

### 3. Institutional approaches to the mitigation of ethnic conflict

Most of the ethno-conflict literature centres on the interplay of political structure, institutional design and ethnic violence. Institutional approaches, in the words of Donald Horowitz, try to steer a “realistic” course between

“the naiveté of those who would abolish ethnic differences in short order through ‘nation-building,’ the cynicism of those who would simply suppress those differences, and the pessimism of those who would counsel costly and disruptive partition as the only way out . . . . They entail measures to contain, limit, channel, and manage ethnic conflict, rather than to eradicate it or to aim at either a massive transfer of loyalties or the achievement of some consensus. They involve living with ethnic differences and not moving beyond them. All of these measures fall within the domain of political engineering. Not learning theory, but the theory of political incentives, inspires these more limited measures.”<sup>51</sup>

building peace. This is the more surprising as in his own studies on Latin American conflict resolution he acknowledged a prominent place for culture in the process of conflict resolution. See esp.: *Of Nets, nails, and Problems: The Folk Language of Conflict Resolution in a Central American Setting*. In: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Joseph A. Scimecca, *Conflict Resolution: Cross-cultural perspectives*, Westport Conn (Praeger), 1991, 165-185 by the same author.

51 Donald Horowitz, see above (footnote 5), pp.599-600.

The basic argument is that the structures of societies determine to a large degree the salience of the ethnic question and the development of inter-ethnic conflict. Institutional design, however, can aggravate ethnic lines of contention. It can also, however, mitigate conflict and even be employed as a problem-solving device. As societal structures are hardly amenable to purposeful change, these authors advise institution-oriented strategies, which are supposed to maximise incentives for cooperation as well as the costs of non-cooperative behaviour. They hope eventually to be able to provide a menu of strategies providing the violence-stricken societies with political systems, which enable them to reframe conflict in a non-antagonistic, more accommodative mode. None of these strategies supposes that the political players have to live up to some kind of extraordinary morality. They all start from the premise that political players try to maximise power, wealth and influence and the political system has to be designed in such a way as to make this competition fruitful and non-exclusive.

Beyond this commonality, however, clear-cut differences with respect to premises, analysis as well as prescriptions can be seen between two competing perspectives. One tradition – consociational power-sharing – is connected with the name of Arendt Lijphart. The other tradition – integrative power-sharing – has been advocated by Donald Horowitz in the now classical study on “Ethnic groups in conflict” (1985).

### 3.1. Consociational and integrative strategies for the resolution of ethno-cultural conflict juxtaposed

Both traditions of institutional engineering commence from the same idea, that democracy is not only the most peaceful political order, but it is also an order superior to all others because it manages and resolves conflicts in a civilised *and* participate way. So, democratic governance should be universalised. At the same time, however, we have to realise, as both traditions argue, that certain types of democracy and democratisation can lead to violence, to death and destruction in plural societies. Therefore, under certain societal constraints, only some types of democracy are feasible instruments for civilising conflict behaviour and erasing violence, whereas others might even exacerbate violence. It all comes down to the concrete “architecture of democracy”<sup>52</sup>. In relegating majoritarian democracy to the sidelines, both approaches argue unanimously that one of its constituent features – majority voting and decision-making – can lead to severe conflict in societies with structural minorities. Should some ethnic groups predominate over others by numbers, the minority groups are structurally marginalised, and therefore cannot hope to achieve their will and safeguard their interests in the parliamentary process. At best, they can fulfil the role of a permanent opposition – a nuisance to the ruling group, but nothing more. Such societies should establish power-sharing arrangements which guarantee that all important societal groups (including small minorities) receive their share of

52 Andrew Reynolds (ed.), *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy*, Oxford (Oxford University Press), 2002.

political power and can effectively counter all moves which threaten to undermine their vital interests. Consociationalists and integrationalists are divided, however, as to the means of this power-sharing and to the ends, which should be envisaged by power-sharing practices.

Consociationalists argue that the plural nature of the societies can hardly be influenced by political engineering. They point to the fact that there are hardly any examples of societies who have succeeded in overcoming their plural nature by taking recourse to purposeful political design.<sup>53</sup> Therefore consociational power-sharing is ready to accept the plural structure of society and a corresponding structuration of the political process. From this starting point, it sets out to devise institutional arrangements which maximise cooperation and participation of the groups in conflict.

As in plural societies, the elites of the competing societal groups do play a central role in all efforts of violence reduction, political engineering should be used primarily to construct an institutional setting which values inter-elite cooperation and inclusive bargaining. Consociationalists argue that the options for cooperative inter-elite behaviour are maximised if the following institutional features are put in place:

1. Governments should be based on a broad parliamentary majority (if possible, a grand coalition).
2. All political players should be invested with a right to veto all decisions affecting their fundamental interests.
3. All interests should be represented according to their respective strengths in all important political institutions on all levels as well as in the national and state administrations.
4. Devising autonomy arrangements guaranteeing the highest possible degree of internal self-rule should be a natural course of action.<sup>54</sup> Granting group rights is perceived to be a central means of managing the political process. Attractive solutions to end group discrimination are not only territorial rights, but less-often-sought-for personal autonomy. Personal autonomy refers to all arrangements which give special rights and responsibilities to individuals on the basis of group membership. The foundation of personal autonomy rights lies in the principle of "rule by the minority over itself in the area of the minority's exclusive concern"<sup>55</sup> The right of definition is to be vested in the group itself and not in the state players. Any group which constitutes a group and is legitimated by its group members at the polls has the right to lay claim to corresponding autonomy arrangements.

53 To be sure, there are countries which did change from ethnicised to non-ethnic politics, however, this has never been brought about by political engineering.

54 For a classical study of autonomy solutions, see Hurst Hanum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Right*, Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania Press), 1990.

55 Arendt Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, New Haven Conn (Yale University Press), 1977, p. 41.

Integrationalists also opt for power-sharing arrangements, albeit only as temporary solutions to the problem of ethnicised politics. They argue that these arrangements have to be structured in such a way, that they remove their own *raison d'être* – the plural society and its political expression, the ethnicised politics – in the long term.

Recipes for integrative power-sharing try to offer incentives for cooperative behaviour not only on the elite level, but on the level of the larger public, too. Integrationists focus their attention on the election system in order to produce arrangements “which fragment support of one or more ethnic groups, ... induce interethnic bargaining; encourage the formation of multiethnic coalitions; produce fluidity and a multipolar balance; and produce proportional outcomes.”<sup>56</sup> They aim at implementing “electoral institutions that have the potential for voting across ethnic lines and the election of candidates with perceived obligations wider than their own ethnic group, or the creation of parties that are multi-ethnic in character.”<sup>57</sup> They thereby try to counteract the centrifugal forces of ethnicity with strong centripetal tendencies arising from the design of the electoral system. These approaches aim at minimising the importance of ethnicity for political life. They stress the fundamental role of individual rights, which should be the only basis for insuring group rights. Individual equality is the declared basis of political organisation.

Both approaches opt for federal solutions. They advocate fundamentally different principles of federalisation, however. Whereas consociationalists favour solutions that

56 Timothy D. Sisk, *Powersharing and International Mediation in ethnic conflicts*, Washington D.C. (United States Institute of Peace Press) 1996, p. 42.

57 Bernard Grofman, Robert Stockwell, *Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy*, (<http://www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/stock.htm>). In mainly targeting the electoral systems, integrationists follow the lead of Sartori, who declared electoral systems to be “the most specific manipulable instrument of politics” (Giovanni Sartori, *Political Development and Political Engineering*, in: *Public Policy*, Vol. 17, 1968, pp. 261-298, citation p. 273; see also: *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, New York (New York University Press), 1994 by the same author).

In the view of the proponents of electoral engineering, “creatively-crafted electoral rules hold particular promise, because they structure the incentives and pay-offs available to political players in their search for electoral victory, making some types of behaviour more rewarding than others.” (Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*, Cambridge, New York (Cambridge University Press), 2001, p. 10. Consociationalists, however, are much more sceptical, not concerning the point that the appropriate rules might be beneficial, but about the chances of directed electoral engineering. They point to the fact that very often strong cultural opposition exists to certain electoral designs and that empirically fundamental reforms of electoral systems are hardly ever observed. So, electoral engineering seems possible on a rather modest degree only (Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford (Oxford University Press), 1994). In the critics' view, such an endeavour is bound to fail in all cases, where ethnicities are already politicised, because quite simply the incentive structure for the required consent of the ethnic elites is lacking. McGarry and O'Leary, long-time observers of the conflict in Northern Ireland argue that the notion of a new non-ethnic electoral design is “fundamentally utopian, especially if the relevant ethnic communities have already been mobilised behind different conceptions of nationalism.” (John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary, Introduction, in: McGarry/O'Leary (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts*, London/New York (Routledge), 1993, pp. 1-40, citation pp. 21-22).

follow ethno-cultural boundaries when drawing state boundaries, integrationists plead for the opposite recipe. They argue that state boundaries should criss-cross ethnic settlement patterns in order to open up fissures within ethno-cultural groups, which might be useful in counterbalancing the deep cleavages between the groups.

In my view, it is important, however, to realise that the different and sometimes contradictory avenues to conflict resolution offered by the two approaches should be interpreted not as a zero-sum game in which either consociational or integrative strategies win, but in terms of a problem-solving exercise, in which the choice of means has to be guided by detailed analysis of the concrete circumstances. Even if, in some cases, the integrative approach seems most promising in others, consociational arrangements might hold the key to success. In certain instances, an ingeniously-devised mixture of consociational and integrative institutions and practices might seem most advantageous. So, the different measures should be treated like a menu, from which each has to select a specific mixture of dishes according to his taste, his health and the peculiarities of his disease.<sup>58</sup> Should some of the dishes prove to be indigestible, they have to be replaced with better suited alternatives. That is, the process should be principled but incremental at the same time. Deciding on concrete arrangements always involves an evaluation of the “optimal tradeoffs between (a) making changes in those aspects of the incentive structures that are most easily changed and (b) making changes where changes are likely to have the greatest impact.”<sup>59</sup> These two, however, seldom go together. For the case of Indonesia, however, in my view, two strategies aiming in different ways at the betterment of participation and representation seem to evolve rather naturally out of the above-sketched approaches: a) federalisation and b) enhanced group representation. To work as violence-minimising devices, however, these measures have to be accompanied by c) a significant strengthening of the state on all levels of politics.

### 3.2. Empowering the parts I: Federalising Indonesia

Both lines of reasoning within the institutionalist perspective argue that federal designs bear important chances for mitigating ethno-cultural conflict in plural societies. Both argue that in the case of complex multi-ethnic societies within territorially large states, the concept of the unitary state with its very strong tendencies toward centralisation and homogenisation, should not be seen as the first option for either successful state or nation-building. It must be borne in mind, as Rupert Emerson stated in 1960, that: “the crux of the matter in a plural society is that it is not one people which is determining itself but two or more, and it should not be ignored that the United Nations Charter speaks in the

58 A rather comprehensive menu, from which one can choose is provided by the 1999 Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, which together with an Explanatory Note can be obtained either from: Project Unit, Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Hague, or by the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations.

59 Grofman/Stockwell, see above (footnote 57).

same breath of self-determination *and* of the equal rights of peoples. If they are actually to be equal, then the subordination of one to another is evidently ruled out.”<sup>60</sup> One fundamental question must be answered in all plural societies, and the answer determines the future fate of the state and society concerned to a large degree: “self-determination for whom?”<sup>61</sup> As Emerson clearly saw, it does not matter whether the state was manned by colonial or indigenous elites, as long as it was a functioning autocracy, “the component parts of a plural society may be able to live in a reasonable facsimile of peace with each other, but the transition to self-government (read also: democracy; P.K.) raises immediately the question as to the ‘self’ which will be doing the governing.”<sup>62</sup> Contrary to Emerson, who stresses “lack of national unity” as one of the prime reasons for the democratic as well as the national failure he observed more than four decades ago, it seems reasonable to hold responsible not the social fact, but the avenues chosen for the resolution of this problem.

Indonesia, since its inception, has, as the majority of newly-independent nations, consistently opted for maximising the degree of centralisation in both nation and state-building. The perceived “lack of national unity which ... threatens disruption ... is met by enforced centralization.”<sup>63</sup> Only in the last years of the Suharto era and especially during the interregnum of Habibbi, was a decisive turn toward devolution taken in respect of state-building. Even if Indonesia is currently grappling with the sometimes dire unintended consequences of the simultaneous devolution of political, administrative and economic power, these problems in my view should not lead to a scaling-down or to a retrenchment of this policy. What is needed instead is an integration of these policies into a fundamental long-term strategy for a federalisation of the unitary state. Indonesia ironically ought to turn back to the much despised Dutch concept of a federal state, associated with the name of the Dutch Lt.-Governor H.J. van Mook, who advocated a disproportional representation of the non-Javanese areas at the Center and the development of a host of “self-governing” institutions which would have guaranteed a high degree of local and regional autonomy. It is true that these plans were designed to counter the Indonesian Republic, they nevertheless contained a significant potential for participatory integration. As they were put forward by the arch enemy however, they were treated as a mere strategic device for continuing colonial control. Discussing their possible merits up to now has been considered something like an indecent proposal. However, as now that more than five decades have passed, it should be possible at last to discuss the chances and limitations of a federal design in a more rational manner. Old battles need not be fought forever – especially if the enemy has already left the trenches for decades.

60 Rupert Emerson. *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples*. Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard University Press), 1960, p. 330.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 336.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 342.

63 *Ibid.*, p. 278.



When, in 1998/1999, Indonesia embarked on the path of devolution and decentralisation, the policy was beset by serious flaws, as the district-level (*kabupaten*), rather than the state or provincial level was strengthened. The reason for this was that strengthening the provinces would eventually prove to be the first step toward the break-up of the Indonesian state, and had therefore to be avoided. This argument suggests that the provinces, once able to develop their own identity and formulate their regional interests, would quite naturally opt for severing the ties to the Indonesian state.

This insinuation in itself gives some food for critical thought. If it was true, this would mean that the Indonesian nation-state was of no use to the provinces, but merely a parasite living from their riches. Then nothing would speak against the dissolution of the Indonesian nation. However, the argument can also be turned upside down: If national-level politics can provide important services for the regions, then any utility-based calculation would lead to maintaining the Indonesian nation-state. In a first step, therefore, the way in which the central state can be useful to the regions ought to be figured out. In such a discussion, questions of security, well-being, justice and development would loom large. A needs-based discussion would, on the one hand, stress the principle of subsidiarity, but, on the other hand, argue for the benefits of integration.

A second line of thought on the probable repercussions of federalisation would look out for empirical evidence, from which the possible effects could be extrapolated in the case of Indonesia. This cannot be pursued in detail here, but suffice it to say that in “real world politics” there is only scant evidence of federalisation leading to secession. It might be a tempting theoretical line of thought, empirically, however, there are no convincing substantiations bearing out this theory.<sup>64</sup> There are problematic cases: Nigeria and the former Yugoslavia are cases in point. However, the break-up of Yugoslavia should, like the similar demise of the Soviet Union, not be interpreted in the context of the weaknesses of federal arrangements, but in the context of the insufficiency of enforced nation-building and the overlay of federal institutions by highly centralised patterns of rule and an all-powerful Center (organised in one hierarchically-organised party).<sup>65</sup>

From a cognitive point of view, enhancing the rights of the regions should not be seen in the context of an ad hoc answer to secessionist demands and granted on an exclusive

64 Prominent federal examples of Third World nation-building include Malaysia and India. Malay(si)a, with its federal design, in 1963 even succeeded to enlarge the state territory and incorporate a significant number of ethnic groups which had no ethnic affiliation with the major ethnic group. What prompted their willingness to participate in the Malaysian experiment was the readiness on the part of the federal level to grant significant rights to the regions and to safeguard the basic needs of all constituent groups in the respective territories (see, for example, the constitutional provisions on language, religion, internal migration or representation on the federal level). Even if the ethnicised system of political representation might have serious drawbacks, it nevertheless guarantees a sufficient amount of recognition for all ethno-political groups to make the option of secession seem non-attractive.

65 Nigeria might provide the most potent case against federalisation. I would argue, however, that a) Nigeria is a special case, b) without federalisation Nigeria might have either broken up or gone down the path to perpetual civil war decades ago. For reasons of space, however, this case cannot be elaborated upon in this paper.

basis, but be promoted to a fundamental policy of the Indonesian state. In this way, opposition from other regions to preferential treatments of regions with pronounced secessionist demands might be mitigated. Even if initially such a course might provoke fears of the break-up the Indonesian state, in the medium term, the two principles of integration and subsidiarity will show themselves to be non-antagonistic and supplementary. In a federal system, a minority “at the Center may be a majority in one or more states and may be in a position to rule these states, thereby mitigating its reduced influence or even exclusion at the center.”<sup>66</sup> In this way, federalisation might work as one device for the protection of structurally-handicapped minorities.

Moreover, the concrete logic of federation should develop out of the structuration of the regions. In accordance with Horowitz, I argue that in regions where ethno-cultural groups “are territorially separate and subethnic divisions are prominent, the case for an ethnically homogeneous state is strong.”<sup>67</sup> If, however, groups are intermixed, then federalisation should aim at the creation of ethno-culturally heterogeneous states. In the first case, the homogeneous character of the ensuing constituent states will lead to stronger intra-ethno-cultural conflict and competition, thereby mitigating the inter-ethno-cultural problematic. Heterogeneous states open up new avenues for inter-ethnic cooperation on the state level, because the state elites will have to work together in order to maximise common interests in the interaction with the federal government. With all these possible options forced open by a strategy of federalisation, the possible costs should not be discounted. One first victim of federalisation may be national orientation, which might be overpowered by growing parochialism. It must also be kept in mind that “devolution agreements are difficult to reach and, once reached, soon abort.”<sup>68</sup> Very often, the windows of opportunity, which in the early stages of a conflict might still favour a common future, close with the onset of violence. Experiences of violence often take their toll on people’s readiness to continue to live together in the same political community. In such cases only, a determined effort to grant the largest possible amount of autonomy and not to withhold strategic rights of taxation and the allocation of fiscal and other resources has a chance of success.

Federalisation can and should be accompanied by policies which bind the regions and the center together. That is, even though large tracts of responsibility can be devolved to the regions, the regions should have a strong presence at the center; they should be integrated into federal decision-making, they should be able to make a difference if they engage themselves at the national level and succeed in pooling their resources. A second chamber representing regional interests with considerable power of veto and the power to initiate national legislation is one possible answer to the need for regional representation at the center. Another would be a strong representation of the more problematic regions in the federal parliament. A third avenue could be to provide minority members from the

66 Horowitz, see above, (footnote 5), p. 617.

67 Horowitz, see above (footnote 5), p. 613.

68 Horowitz, see above (footnote 5), p. 623.

outlying islands with enhanced opportunities for advancement in the centrally-administrated public services: the armed forces, the police (if not devolved to the state level) as well as the federal ministries and agencies. The more the regions are represented on the federal level, the more likely it is that their representatives aim at working in the system and not against it, as in the case of separation, they clearly would have something to lose.

In the Indonesian context, the chances inherent in the federal option need a new approach toward party politics as well as the mobilisation of regional interests and their representation on the federal level.

### 3.3. Empowering the parts II: Encouraging parliamentary representation of regional, ethnic or religious interests within a consociational frame of elite bargaining

In view of the already exorbitantly high number of some 200 existing political parties in Indonesia, it might seem hazardous to propose a further chance for inflating their number. Nevertheless, I deem a new option for the representation of purely regional interests to be an exceedingly helpful device for defusing salient bonds of ethnic, religious or regionalist interests and identity.

A future revision of the new party law should explicitly aim at channelling regional or ethnic resentment into the fold of parliamentary politics which allow for the establishment of regional parties.<sup>69</sup> These can try to win a significant share of regional power by capturing enough seats in state assemblies. It must also be possible for them to press their case at the federal level as long as they are successful with their respective constituencies.

It is legitimate for Acehnese to feel something of an Acehnese identity and to express this in politics. If some Papua want to identify themselves as Papua and organise themselves accordingly, this must be possible for them. If regional parties are outlawed, if ethnic parties are frowned upon, these sentiments cannot be expressed within the fold of democratic parliamentary politics. I would underline the argument of the Lund commission, which stressed that the right to form associations “includes the freedom to establish political parties based on communal identities as well as those not identified exclusively with the interests of a specific community.”<sup>70</sup> Communal parties might be of decisive importance because “in some situations such communal parties may be the only hope for

69 Chances for such a law however are slim, as a revised Bill on political parties has just been endorsed in Parliament in early December 2002 by all factions. This Bill however “ensures that political parties will remain Jakarta-centric ... It ... leaves absolutely no room for debate about alternative forms of government, like federalism” (Power to the status quo. In: *The Jakarta Post*, December 9, 2002). As the Bill requires a party to be represented in at least half of all provinces and in half of the regencies in these provinces (Art. 2 (3)) and to establish its headquarter in Jakarta, local interests have no chance of autonomous political expression within the parliamentary system.

70 Lund Recommendations, see above (footnote 58), p. 8. (article 8).

effective representation of specific interests and, thus, for effective participation.”<sup>71</sup> Presently the avenues for discussion, the openings of the system for the input made by such parties are heavily restricted, although they should be wide open to defuse anxieties and enable participation. If regional interests on a communal base have no opportunity to express themselves in parliamentary politics outside the vested national parties, then such interests, if they are sufficiently marginalised, may become radicalised and turn to non-parliamentarian ways of expression, often associated with various shades of violence.

Indispensable to such an endeavour of pluralisation – and here we turn to the cultural dimension of conflict resolution – is a consensus on the basic rules of the democratic game. If we follow the analysis of Freek Colombijn and other anthropologists, this might be no small accomplishment as it would entail changing a pattern which seems quite common in Indonesia, i.e. a “lack of willingness to accept a defeat received according to established rules.”<sup>72</sup> Having lost according to the rules, too often the contest is simply carried on in other arenas, with other, non-consensual means.

If we accept the interpretation that the culture-based stress on conflict avoidance (more on this in the following chapter) collides with institutional designs based on competition – as democratic proceedings inevitably are – then we should think about precepts which enable us to dampen these situations in which conflicts are managed in open confrontation.

Colombijn illustrates this problematic with recourse to football matches which are “overt, unavoidable conflict in front of an audience”. In his interpretation, in such situations Indonesian “players quickly feel humiliated in public and the culturally prescribed self-control breaks down.”<sup>73</sup> Translated into the political realm, this problematic would require either a reduction of conflict itself, or enhanced possibilities for its settlement outside the public’s (audience’s) view, so that the contending parties could more easily a) resort to cooperative practices and b) consider face-saving devices, whereby in the public eye each decision is, at least symbolically, interpreted in terms of a win-win solution. The functioning of such elite-centred consociational collaborative practices rests on several basic requirements, a) that the fundamental needs of all elite groups have to be safeguarded and fulfilled and b) that every single group has a limited right of veto to stop all measures which impinge on its basic needs and a corresponding obligation to use this right sparingly, c) that the “elite cartel” is as inclusive as possible, and finally d) that, irrespective of affirmative action, costs and benefits have to be divided up evenly – no single group ever should have to shoulder deterioration as long as other groups improve on their situation.

71 Explanatory Note to the Lund Recommendations, see above (footnote 58), p. 24

72 Freek Colombijn, What is so Indonesian about Violence?, in: Ingrid Wessel, Georgia Wimhöfer (eds.), Violence in Indonesia. Hamburg (Abera), 2001, pp. 25-46, citation p. 33.

73 Colombijn, see above (footnote 72), both citations p. 36.

One last caveat, which applies to the strategy of federalisation as well as to the enhancement of parliamentary representation of regional interests at the center, must be mentioned: neither federalisation nor representation are recipes for good governance. Decentralisation might be helpful to overcome violence, but it might as well reproduce patterns of bad governance prevalent at the national level on the state and local levels of politics. In contemporary Indonesia we find a political system “in which negotiation between societal and state players takes place at many different levels all the way from the capital to the remotest village.”<sup>74</sup> The institutional system of control as well as the prevailing normative mindset, however, still follow authoritarian, hierarchical and center-oriented patterns to a large degree. The missing piece between political practice and the normative as well as institutional frame, in effect leads to large spheres of politics determined only by the exigencies of political power devoid of systemic control. If we, as van Klinken rightly suggests, should “view the Indonesian state less as an autonomous, highly centralized machine, and more as a multi-polar series of arenas of domination and resistance”<sup>75</sup> it might be of eminent use to give institutional form to these realities and thereby slowly subject them to the rules inherent in any variant of the federal idea. So, in the Indonesian case the rule set ought to follow the peculiarities and typical practices as there is no chance of success, if it is tried the other way round. Neither Sukarno, nor Suharto were able to maximise the potential of the centripetal, integralist state concept, they had put in place. Both cases ended up with the worst of both – the authoritarian center-oriented and the fragmented locally-centered – worlds.

However, decentralisation, federalisation and enhanced representation will, without strong state institutions lead only half the way to violence reduction. They might even provoke new violence, as new arenas and sinecures are made available for competing elites. Therefore strengthening the state is, in tandem with the reform of its institutions on all levels of politics, one of the central tasks of conflict-civilisation at the macro-level.

#### 3.4. Reforming and strengthening the police while safeguarding its interests

The appropriate action against the security forces who in the past (and sometimes even in the present) have been involved in heinous human rights violations should be most controversial as it involves fundamental value judgements and aims at the normative center of the rapid, political, administrative, economic and social transformation currently being experienced by Indonesia. Over the past few decades, Indonesia saw a proliferation of powerful agents of collective violence responsible for thousands, even hundreds of thousands of fatalities, for innumerable cases of torture, rape, and the destruction of villages as well as the physical and social environment. Most of these players profited from their

74 Gerry van Klinken, *Indonesia's New Ethnic Elites*, in: Henk Shulte Nordholt, Irwan Abdullah (eds.), *Indonesia: in Search of Transition*, Yogyakarta (Pustaka Pelajar), 2002 ([http://www.knaw.nl/indonesia/transition/workshop/ws\\_trans01d.html](http://www.knaw.nl/indonesia/transition/workshop/ws_trans01d.html)).

75 *Ibid.*, (footnote 74).

acts of violence. They were active as extortionists, sold and smuggled drugs, mixed up legal businesses with illegal practices and sometimes made fortunes on the sole basis of their capacity for violence. Agents of violence comprise large parts of the armed forces including special forces as *Kopassus*. They also include parts of the police force (for example *Brimob*), which until recently were under the control of the armed forces.

But it is not only the state security apparatus which is to be denounced in this context. We have to deal with a plethora of different players which, only to a small extent can be conceived as part of or instruments of the authoritarian political system. What should we do with all the militias and other armed groups which not only abound at the fringes of the state apparatus but are equally present in the political system? On top of that, a host of private business and societal groups with often rather questionable motives have built up and maintain private guards and more or less armed groups of thugs. We should be wary against simply victimising the security forces, as they are part of a larger system which has to be exposed and reformed. Paul Brass' comment on the situation in northern India could equally be applied to Indonesia. He criticises the fact that "we do not have a simple case only of the agents of an unjust state misusing their powers against innocent persons, but a social system in which all are engaged in such actions. ... we have a network of power relations among police, criminals, and politicians in which the use of force and violence is, if not routine, at least not something unexpected or exceptional."<sup>76</sup>

The dominant practice of treatment concentrates on state violence and its agents, that is the armed forces. Within this rather restricted range of action the urge to avenge the victims and seek justice is concentrated on a small number of highly symbolic cases and an equally small group of persons, which came to symbolise the evil of the old New Order State.

I argue that this preoccupation might not only be counterproductive but also problematic because it exonerates all other segments of society. Prosecuting a handful of generals is an ideal strategy to externalise guilt and evil, without having to question motives and typical patterns of action. After all, we should realise that, in the end, the police (but to a certain degree also the armed forces) never had the chance to act professionally as they were always perceived to be part of politics. On the one hand, they themselves postulated a political role for themselves. On the other hand, all kinds of politicians, be it on the national, regional or local level, expected them to act in a political way. In the authoritarian system, this means taking the side of the power-holder. In the new system (as during the times of Sukarno) this entails a process of taking sides. At present, there are several competing centres of power, all of which aim at instrumentalising the security forces, they have to take sides, they have to be political. Simply following orders does not suffice. Obviously, their calculations cannot be oriented toward law or order in the first place, but have to center on the relative power of the competing political groups. Simply

76 Brass, see above (footnote 29), pp. 274-275.

punishing individual officers however neither changes the system nor the need of these persons to calculate in political terms.

A look at the prevalent forms of violence shows a process of pervasive socialisation. Whereas during the authoritarian era, the state was the single most important agent of violence, this has been changed decisively in recent years. Now the vacuum of will and capacity to use violence left by the unsettled security forces is rapidly filled by other agents: party militias, private armies of politicians, businessmen and traditional leaders<sup>77</sup>, who can provide money and opportunity, hybrid organisations somewhere between community guard and organised crime and a plethora of outright criminal organisations.

To be sure, the modern Indonesian state never enjoyed the monopoly of violence. Under Sukarno as well as Suharto, the state was inevitably compromised by regular recourse and voluntary as well as forced cooperation with societal agents of violence. Large tracts of this hybrid violence were enclosed in a structured environment, which at times led to the escalation of violence, if the regime deemed it necessary to do so. And yet, violence was also partly contained in a process of rational consideration. Violence was limited if it was deemed dysfunctional. This limitation inherent in the authoritarian structuration of violence broke down with the demise of the autocratic system without being replaced by an alternative civilised structuration for the handling of conflict. The new political players continued a political style which rested on the will and ability to use violence, if deemed necessary. They, without exception, maintained their private militias, new political parties established security guards, which over time came to resemble the forces of the established organisations, albeit on a smaller scale.

At present, state agents of violence are delegitimised – their loss of status, prestige and respect is overwhelming – whereas the corresponding societal agents of violence not only continue to function, but even thrive in the democratic political system. Therefore, the partial monopoly on violence by the state is further undermined not only on the level of political action, but also in the area of belief and social order.

Three further arguments speak against the prominence given to taking a handful of generals to court. For one: the strategy will not work, as practically none of them will be convicted. As long as the leader of the former system Suharto is sacrosanct, prosecuting a few of his lieutenants leaves a rather bitter aftertaste. The light sentences will fuel public annoyance and further the delegitimation of state institutions.

The second more important argument aims at the destructive potential of the targeted elites. They are part of extensive networks which accommodate immense potential for spoiling any agreements or progress made in one or more of the multitude of regional conflicts. Any general who is targeted in the course of efforts to secure criminal responsibility can, and some certainly will, muster significant amounts of coercive power, with which to disrupt the often fragile peace and orderliness of public life.

77 Consider the sudden appearance of private armies fighting for the competing Sultans of Tidore and Ternate in the northern Moluccas.

A last objection to taking legal action centres on the need for state-strengthening and especially on the need to regain state control of violence. Any state – be it democratic or authoritarian – must rely on its security apparatus for the task of protecting citizens against threats from within and without the society. As long as the state does not want to privatise the control over inner security and open up large tracts of society to the rule of local strongmen he has to strengthen state capacity to assert the rule of law against resistance if necessary. In Indonesia, the only instruments which might eventually be able to achieve this are the much resented security forces. Semi-private forces so far have failed miserably in modern Indonesian history. Proof of this are the efforts of the early 1980s, when the Indonesian police force started an experiment by instrumentalising paramilitary gangs, militias and the forces of local strongmen in order to enhance public security.<sup>78</sup> Youths were provided with some rudimentary training, they were given official titles such as members of *Pam Swakarsa* (that is security guards). The aim was twofold: a) to better “control the gangs and a variety of organisations that had appropriated the task of neighbourhood protection” and b) “to discourage acts of communal violence against suspected thieves, sorcerers, and adulterers”<sup>79</sup>. The results proved to be contrary to expectations, however. On the one hand, lynchings and other forms of mob revenge were not reduced by the new means. On the other hand, it soon became obvious that the gangs were not infiltrated by the police, that the militias were not disciplined and converted into orderly security guards safeguarding neighbourhoods, but that the police were corrupted, and the state security apparatus and organised crime had become mixed up. There is no shortcut to police control and state-guarded security. Any effort to instrumentalise societal groups compromises institutional integrity and aims, and runs the risk of being exploited for private interests.

If above I argued that Indonesia is in dire need of better regional representation, I would now like to add that this strategy can only work, if the state institutions, foremost among them the police apparatus, are strengthened on all levels especially that of the state. Decentralisation and representation without strong state institutions can only lead part the way to violence reduction. In certain cases, it might even provoke new violence, as new arenas and sinecures are made available for competing elites. We should keep in mind that Indonesia, contrary to public perception, has the lowest policemen per capita ratio in the regional context of Southeast Asia.<sup>80</sup> Police forces must be strengthened twofold: in terms of quality as well as quantity.

78 This strategy was devised in the context of a newly developed system for guaranteeing local security in urban as well as in rural areas, which came to be called *Siskamling* (*Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan*, Environment Security System). Within this concept, public security should be enhanced by empowering local citizens “who were given the task of guarding their own village or neighbourhood” and integrated into a institutional form, which was called the Voluntary Security Guards (*Pasukan Pengamanan Swakarsa*, short: *Pam Swakarsa*) (citation see: van Dijk, see above (footnote 2), p. 155).

79 both citations from: van Dijk, see above (footnote 2), p. 155.

80 In 1994 we find the following ratios: Hong Kong 1:220; Thailand: 1:228; Malaysia: 1:249, Singapore: 1: 295; New Zealand: 1:416; Japan: 1:563; Philippines: 1. 665, Indonesia: 1.1,119 (Joshua Barker, State



Ultimately, security has to be entrusted to state security forces. If they are deprived of a significant section of their leadership, if they are constantly criticised for their failures and shortcomings, then their social prestige and the status of their members will suffer. For members of the services, incentives are not forthcoming, new recruits tend to be low quality, as the social prestige of the job is low, so they will tend to look for immediate opportunistic gratifications, as no symbolic gratifications (honour, social status, prestige) are apparent. In the end the cycle of violence, incompetence, arbitrariness, and corruption will continue. What is sorely needed is an enhancement of the social status of security forces. This has to be accompanied with, on the one hand, a betterment and regularisation of their payments and, on the other hand, a sustained effort toward the development or (in the case of the armed forces) the reconstruction of a organisational culture, which centres on a leitmotif of public service.

This is clearly a long-term perspective. In the short and medium term, the task is to regularise the behaviour of the security services and provide them with incentives for the cognitive and behavioural changes expected of them. For the old guard, this must not mean prosecution but retirement. Even though it might legitimately be argued that a good number of men certainly do not deserve a regular pension, political opportunism and the urge to overcome the system built up and held alive by these men, should provide enough incentives to swallow the bitter pill. It makes sense to make them neither heroes nor martyrs, but to let them sink into oblivion. Otherwise, as martyrs or heroes, they will continue to influence the future history of Indonesia. So, all efforts should aim at dismissing them, by pensioning them off and not perpetuating their central role by putting them behind bars. Justice and prudence sometimes simply do not go together.

At the same time, however, the staff reshuffle should be accelerated. As the direct interference in personnel matters is still anathema to the armed forces, there is an obvious need for intensive civil-military cooperation. The same applies to the police force. The problem, however, seems to be that, if necessary, the new powers-to-be, like the old ones, do not resist the temptation to use the agents of state violence for furthering their own interests. If this continues, we cannot expect a significant change in the ethos of the security forces.

One last point needs to be mentioned in this respect. I just have discussed the “software” of change, now I will turn to the hardware. In my view, anybody who believes that the military or the police would mend their ways while still underpaid and expected to finance 70% of their own budget is exceedingly naive. Even if they wanted to change, they could not for the obvious reason that they need the money they earn from legal as well as illegal business ventures to pay their salaries, significant proportions of their costs and some extra gratifications. Once more, while no incentives are forthcoming, the change in direction will not happen. To enhance discipline and the rule of law, and reduce

corruption, arbitrariness and violence, incentives such as adequate pay, social prestige, status and security must be offered.

All of this has only a chance of working if the political elite in the first place and the Indonesian society in the second is really determined to banish societal violence and, slowly but surely, delegitimise all private forms of organised violence. As long as all parties hold on to their militias, violence will remain in the political realm. It is equally important that the political elite realises that any reform of the police would mean a complete break with the past political-administrative relations. All too often, police reform is equated with gaining control over the police, not with professionalising them. Again, an analysis of Paul Brass, derived from the Indian experience, can be applied to Indonesia: "everybody acknowledges (that the police; P.K.) must be brought under control, for they do indeed contain a large force of dishonest, intimidating, terrorizing, and marauding elements. However ... all seek to bring the police under their own control: to oversee their recruitment, their posting, and their behavior, to insure that they act on one's behalf and not on behalf of one's enemies."<sup>81</sup>

#### 4. Culture and conflict behavior

The cultural approach to ethno-cultural conflict is more or less nothing more than a further specification of the psychological and institutional approaches: it requests them to check their recipes for cultural commensurateness. Disappointingly, neither the mainstream of the psychological or institutional efforts really carry out this "culture test". The vast majority of handbooks on conflict resolution offer standard recipes, which are supposed to be universally applicable. Lederach who, in a way, is the most culturalist among the psychologically-oriented conflict resolution practitioners gives only scant attention to culture in a monography devoted to "Conflict Transformation Across Cultures"<sup>82</sup> and completely loses sight of the cultural dimension of ethno-cultural conflict in the later development of an "Integrated Framework for Peacebuilding".<sup>83</sup> The same neglect can be said of the work of the institutionalist school. Although scholars like Donald Horowitz draw heavily on psychological categories for developing their models of ethno-cultural conflict, culture is hardly ever present in their studies.

Since the early 1990s especially, this deficiency has been criticised and alternative positions have been developed by a small number of social scientists, who tried to branch out into the sphere of culture. They argue that conflicts, as all other forms of social interaction are out of necessity cultural events. They occur in a specific cultural setting, are representations of, filled with, understood through and explained by specific cultural

81 Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 274.

82 Lederach 1995, see above (footnote 45).

83 Lederach, 1997, see above (footnote 45).

symbolism. They are “constituted largely by the taken-for-granted, common-sense understandings that people have about their world, including themselves and the other people who inhabit it.”<sup>84</sup> A cultural view on conflict therefore tends to accentuate the emic perspective, that is the beliefs about social and political conflict held by the members of the violence-inflicted society. A culture of conflict encompasses not only the cognitive, evaluative and affective dimensions<sup>85</sup> of conflict, but the behavioural patterns, the strategies of conflict management as well as its resolution provided by the specific culture. It “refers to culturally specific norms, practices, and institutions associated with conflict in a society.”<sup>86</sup> All cultures provide models of legitimate strategies for airing grief and soliciting support, all offer rather clear-cut if sometimes ambivalent meanings for loyalty, the duties of rulers as well as the ruled and sketches of the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate protest and rebellion. So, the same event, the same structural configuration might warrant peaceful protest in one culture, violent reprisal in another and submissive obedience in a third. Where Ross is concerned, I argue that although social structure might be “the main factor in determining who the opponents will be”<sup>87</sup>, it is a terrible predictor for “the overall level of conflict and violence”<sup>88</sup> and for the issues over which the opponents are ready to fight. It is culture, which “sanctions certain actions taken to pursue individual or group interests and disapproves of others.”<sup>89</sup> Therefore, from a cultural point of view it simply does not suffice to reconstruct the structural configuration of complex political conflicts, if we aim at an understanding of their developmental logic and try to devise recipes for their eventual resolution. If, as Leonard Doob once formulated rather succinctly, we really want to “resolve conflicts between members of ethnic groups who reside in the same society or in different societies, their expectations, interactions, and eventual acceptance or rejection of proposed resolutions are likely to be markedly affected by their cultural backgrounds as well as by their own unique way of behaving and assessing current problems.”<sup>90</sup>

84 Kevin Avruch, see above (footnote 50), p. 11.

85 This distinction goes back to Kenneth Boulding, who differentiated cognitive, evaluative, and affective images (*The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society*, Ann Arbor, (Univ. of Michigan Press), 1956)). In this categorisation, the cognitive images deal with our beliefs, the evaluative with the values we attach to our beliefs, and the affective images with “the emotional energy mobilized ... to defend highly valued beliefs under assault” (Dennis J.D. Sandole, *Virulent Ethnocentrism: A Major Challenge for Transformational Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era*, Paper prepared for the 43rd Annual convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2002, p. 8).

86 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 21. For short overviews on the concept of culture of conflict see also: Ross, *The Relevance of Culture for the Study of Political Psychology and Ethnic Conflict*, in: *Political Psychology* Vol. 18, 1997, pp. 523-544 and Ross, see above (footnote 30).

87 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. ix.

88 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. ix.

89 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 13.

90 Leonard W. Doob, Foreword, in: Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, Joseph A Scimecca, *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. Westport Conn, London (Praeger), 1991, S. ix.

If we deplore the high levels of violence in Indonesian polities, we must bear in mind that many forms and high levels of violence are not necessarily perceived as problematic by the members of the Indonesian society and polity. From the perpetrators' point of view, violence only becomes a liability for political and social action, if it cannot be sufficiently legitimised within their own reference group and therefore threatens to undercut their legitimacy and authority. For the members of a polity there is no urge to violence reduction in conflict management, if the political players and/or their audience deem this violence as legitimate. Therefore, under the same "objective" condition, the incentives for violence reduction can differ sharply between cultures.

The upshot is that in order to understand social conflict we need to reconstruct these cultural frames of interpretation and social action. Even if cultures were homogenous units this task would be rather complicated, as the very building blocks of cultures are symbols and patterns of order woven from interrelated symbols. Symbols, however, never convey singular meanings, but are plurivocal in nature. They consist of different layers of meanings, by which they are connected in and to different meaning systems. Therefore, although they clearly are not arbitrary they are always debatable. Their very nature does not allow us to think of them as directly "causing" behavior. Instead they should be seen as providing frames of reference, or glasses through which to view and understand social reality on which to act.

This notion of cultures of conflict becomes even more complicated, if we turn our attention to the problematic of the simultaneous existence of multiple cultures competing for the attention of and control over the same individuals. We have to realise that not only do members of almost all societies simultaneously take part in several cultures, but also a large number of conflicts take place between members of different cultures. In such cases of inter-cultural conflict, the chances of misunderstanding are high, as "each side relies on its own understanding of what is going on, reading unintended meanings into a situation."<sup>91</sup>

It can be argued, however, that in the case of protracted inter-cultural conflicts, there can also emerge a new culture of conflict management, which applies precisely to the conflict in question. Habitualisation of interpretative and behavioural patterns over time develop into reified patterns of order, in which the moves and counter-moves of conflict-management take place. In due time a new universe of inter-culturally shared meanings develops, which supports and perpetuates a stable set of social action strategies. Therefore, a specific kind of trust and security is generated, which is dependent on the continuity of the conflict. That is: intercultural conflict creates in due course the cultural patterns which safeguard the continuity of the very conflict.

91 Ross, see above (footnote 18), p. 13.

#### 4.1. A culture of conflict avoidance and the lack of alternatives to violent conflict resolution

A first point at which a cultural analysis could aim is the often proclaimed Indonesian culture of conflict avoidance, which is very often brought together with a so-called culture of tolerance. I would argue that it is precisely in this culture of conflict avoidance that one important root for the weak capacities for constructive conflict management lies. Conflict avoidance is possible in traditional societies, where there is basically only one worldview, shared by the rulers and the ruled and by the old generation and the young. Conflicts are generally not about the rules of the game, nor the normative foundation of the social order. A large number of conflicts can be settled by recourse to generally accepted standards, because the power of established authority prevails. Even rebellions do not usually challenge the underlying worldview of society, but only its translation into reality.

The problem with a culture of conflict avoidance under modern conditions, however, is essentially two-fold:

1. In modern societies, the taken-for-granted, definite, seemingly natural hegemonial cultural frame which unites all communities in a given setting (be it national, sub- or transnational) no longer exists. Different cultural communities interact in the same political system, younger generations challenge the worldview of the older ones by invoking alternative cultural scripts, and any given member of a modern society takes part in several cultures. That allows him to develop a certain cultural distance and view the cultures not only from within, but alternatively from the outside, that is from the other cultural systems he partakes in. Inter-group conflicts are often about the rules of the game and the validity of competing worldviews.
2. If a culture of conflict avoidance reigns supreme and fundamental conflicts arise, there is no systematic way of dealing with them in such a way that all conflicting groups can at least safeguard their essential needs – the conflicts tend to be solved by the use of violence by the hegemonial power.

A hegemonial culture of conflict avoidance will, at least in modern times, quite certainly periodically lead to efforts of violent conflict resolution. If we realise that in complex and, as in the case of Indonesia, differentially integrated, multi-cultural societies, conflicts over competing vital interests necessarily exist, then a culture, which tries to solve problems by avoiding their recognition will run into insurmountable difficulties as soon as the competing groups are no longer willing to accept the symbolical hegemony of the dominant power at the center. During the whole era of modern, that is Republican, Indonesia, politics has been a struggle for the concentration of power in the hands of one overarching power holder. Despite a large amount of bargaining, ultimately, this struggle has always been perceived as a pure zero-sum game by all adversaries, as all power has its specific place, and increasing one party's power means to take away power from other

power-holders.<sup>92</sup> The problem seems to be that Indonesian political culture neither provides a viable strategy for compromise nor a practicable option for conflict resolution or power-sharing, therefore permitting the durable existence of several centres of power with equal rights. The result has been a policy permeated with large scale violence which has been more or less systematically used by all contending parties in their quest for political as well as economic power. Ultimately, the other side of conflict avoidance seems to be a preference for hierarchical and authoritarian conflict resolution, which more often than not involves the threat or use of violence.<sup>93</sup>

#### 4.2. Local cultures of conflict and violence

Regarding the cultural dimension of violent group conflict, I find it especially important not to disregard the local or regional level too easily in favour of national interpretations. I find it equally important to realise, that, as local cultures are different in different parts of Indonesia, we have to think about these specifics of local circumstances, specific worldviews and cultural practices that brought violence into being and have to be the basis for its eventual disappearance. I would argue that the South and also, in some way, the North Molukkas are a case in point. Here, directly after the outbreak of the first wave of violence in early 1999 and 2000, explanations harking back to machinations of the Suharto clan, elements within the armed forces or regional elites abounded. Most observers used an instrumentalist perspective in trying to discount religion and ethno-cultural animosity as fully fledged reasons for the bloodshed. They argued that it was a self-serving political elite situated partly in Jakarta and partly in Ambon, Ternate as well as Tidore, and on the national level, which manipulated the fears and apprehensions of the local population for their own ends. In my view, although not thoroughly false, the argument does not hold much water.

92 This argument was put forward by the classical study of Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture*, in: Holt, Claire (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia*, Ithaca, (Cornell University Press), 1972, pp. 1-69. See also: Martin Klein, *Javanismus und Herrschaft in Indonesien: Zum Zusammenhang von Kulturinterpretation und Ideologie*, (Humboldt-Universität, Institut für Asien- und Afrikanwissenschaften, Südostasien Working Papers No. 6) Berlin, 1997. It is also underscored in the study of G. Moedjanto, *The Concept of Power in Javanese Culture*, Jakarta (Gadjah Mada University Press), 1990. Although Moedjanto somehow tries to connect the concept of royal power to notions of legitimacy (as wisdom and justice), he basically perceives it in an a-moral way. Summarising his research, he argues that the size of a king's power was characterised by territorial size, number of conquered territories and nature of tribute, the faithfulness of his officials, the imperial grandeur of ritual and magic heirlooms, the size of the army and the wealth of his titles and his fame (see p. 104). Ethical restraints on the use of kingly power did not exist.

93 Arguing from a psychological point of view, it also makes sense to point to the forces of suppression, whereby the emotions, the feelings of humiliation, impotence, anger and suchlike, as well as alternative interpretations of the societal worldview have to be suppressed and masked in the legitimate language of the ruling ideology in the process of conflict avoidance. The analogy of the volcano seems quite apt: in times of systemic crisis, the suppressed energy translates in explosive violence, because the top, provided by the hegemonic ideology of the system as well as by its repressive institutional power gives way and opens up large open spaces, which are up to grabs for all groups who are willing to take the risk.

The interpretations which stress the element of elite manipulation disregard the perception of the groups in conflict and do not address the aspect of mass response to the claimed for manipulation. Simply arguing that elites are self-serving with their attempts to manipulate the broad masses of the people does not explain why their machinations work, why, in certain cases, people who have been neighbours for decades take machetes to chop off the heads of their former friends, use fire to destroy their dwellings and rape or torture them. Elites embarking on the avenue of ethnic outbidding (as is the standard term in the respective literature) will always be around in times of crisis, but their efforts at the radicalisation of discourse and the eventual change from non-violent to violent means of conflict behavior, work only in rare cases. To prevent such elites from succeeding and to work out strategies which prevent repeated descents into violence, an in depth knowledge of the dynamics of mass-reaction, of the patterns of thought, which enable provocateurs to succeed, is indispensable.

In the case of the Moluccan violence, we should now in hindsight accept that the often-praised, inter-communal reconciliation doctrines of *pela gandong* and *larvul ngabal* were obviously in part nothing more than window-dressing. Is it a show of the strength or weakness of local practices, if a well-informed observer like Gerry van Klinken comes to the conclusion, that in the Maluku areas “being Protestant or being Muslim is not merely a door to a career, but is a state that roots a person in an exclusive life world; viewed from inside that world, the other – either Protestant or Muslim – is perceived as an enemy.”<sup>94</sup> To be sure, during the last few years the two contending groups fought for power, natural resources, status, local leadership and suchlike, but they had to fight because all of these necessary conditions of well-being were allocated within exclusive ethno-religious networks and there were no functioning social practices which enabled a peaceful and rule-bound interethnic bargaining process. Violence as a possibility had always been there over the past decades. The sudden turn toward violence in 1999 became possible because the cultural preconditions for civil war were already present. One central precondition was a tradition of fighting villages, as well as of proud reminiscences of wars fought and won (or lost) long ago. If, as van Klinken recounts, many village leaders “tell stories with gusto about inter-villages battles that took place in the seventeenth century”, if urban areas had robust clientelist ties with either Protestant or Muslim villages, which eventually manned the trenches and control posts, if rural men still have to live up to a tradition of martial valour, then it only needs a match to light the all-engulfing flames of internecine inter-communal war.

Any party which would have resorted to violence during the Suharto era, would have had to bear the brunt of the vastly superior repressive power of the state. Under the changed situation of a dramatically weakened political center, the removal of the former (authoritarian) rules of the game and the yawning gap in the field of rule-making and enforcement, made the move to use violence possible. The systemic crisis provided a new

94 Gerry van Klinken, *The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In*, in: *Indonesia* 71, April 2001, p. 12.

window of opportunity for the use of violence. The necessary preconditions, however, were given in the local worldviews and practices.

Under no circumstances, should we give in to the temptation to excuse or simply disregard the local people, which in one way or another took part in the killings, because we would then lose sight of an important variable of conflict behavior. This is even more necessary as the experiences of incredible violence suffered by many members of both communities as well as the culture of violence and war which by necessity shaped the perception and behavior of all players, added new layers of meaning to the already existing meaning systems which made the onslaught possible in the first place. If, in the Molukkas, over the past five decades both groups could not surmount their respective traumata and collective fears, it stands to debate that the experiences of the most recent past add to the prejudices, judgements and opinions, which divide local society along religious lines (or, in the case of the Northern Moluccas, sometimes predominantly along lines of traditional loyalty).

#### 4.3. Reframing the Indonesian nation and people

At the fringes of both the cultural and the institutional approaches, we find thoughts on how different conceptualisations of the nation and people can affect the proceedings of intra-state conflict management. Cultural approaches would stress that different cultural notions of community, authority, the respective role of individual, the group etc. coalesce in the conceptualisation of nation and people, and that therefore these concepts are centrepieces by which conflicts in the national political realm are structured and prefigured. Institutional approaches point to the special role, which the conceptualisation of nation/people has for the constitutional frame, in which certain practices (incentives and sanctions) of political action are reified. Therefore, in the view of both approaches, questions of appropriate “nation-ness” loom large for the possible management of violent conflicts.

One long-term strategy for tackling the phenomenon of violence in Indonesia could be to analyse, de-construct and reform the beliefs about and understandings connected to the Indonesian nation and people. The existing Unitarian national paradigm enforces certain understandings and disallows alternative visions of the Indonesian state and the Indonesian people. As the case of India illustrates, federalisation without a correspondingly (re-)framed concept of the nation does not suffice to reduce ethno-cultural violence. In India we on the one hand find a federal system, on the other hand, there can be no denial of pervasive and lasting ethno-cultural violence. This violence has, as in the Indonesian case, local causes and follows in parts a local logic. It rests however on the problematic contest between three ideologies for the control of the *whole* of Indian society and state. In India, all three ideologies – Hindu nationalism, Muslim separatism, and secularism – “have shared a common goal: unity of the entire population or of one of the two largest



segments of it into united wholes to contest for power at the Center.”<sup>95</sup> It is the concept of the nation-state, with its stress on unity that, in a context of strong ethno-cultural identity groups, produces the totalling tendencies, which in turn often lead to violence. What ought to be debated anew is the unitarian conception of the state as well as its harmony and unity-centred conception of the people. Such a discussion can, in the long run lead to an eventual reframing of the Indonesian concept of nation.<sup>96</sup>

From its beginnings in the 1930s, the Indonesian nationalist elite has basically relied on the unitary vision of an Indonesian nation and people. According to Sukarno, the Indonesians constituted a “Charaktergemeinschaft” (community united by common character). The Indonesian nation was not something to be invented in the process of nation-building, but has existed since time immemorial by the heavenly design of geopolitics: “the Indonesian Nation is the totality of all the human beings who, according to geopolitics ordained by God Almighty, live throughout the unity of the entire Indonesian archipelago from the northern tip of Sumatra to Irian. All of them, throughout the islands!”<sup>97</sup> From this point of view, there is no need, not even a right for self-determination for any community within the Indonesian nation. There never arose the need to ask the inhabitants of the multitude of islands if they wanted to participate in the Indonesian Nation, as this Nation was pre-ordained by geopolitics and the will of God.

As far as the two countervailing concepts of unity and diversity were officially juxtaposed, they were always asymmetrically connected, with diversity being allowed only within the fold of the idea of a unitary state and a correspondingly unitary people. At least in the political realm, there was always the tendency to deny the existing diversity by uniting it on a symbolical level – just look at the ideology-centred efforts of Sukarno with his variants of Nasakom, or the institution-centred strategies of Suharto Golkar.

In the end, ethnic as well as religious diversity had to be superseded by a newly designed *bangsa Indonesia*. All communal identities were de-politicised and supplanted by one overarching black-box of Indonesian identity. The bonds uniting the people of Indonesia should be neither ethnic nor religious identity, but territoriality and imagined common history. To this extent, they can be called largely civic. Nevertheless, this civic nationalism was a decisively illiberal brand on several accounts. It was highly intolerant of political demands and the expression of other, competing identities. The idea of popular sovereignty was purported to signify an order in which the actual sovereignty does not lie with the individual but with the collectivity.

95 Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 279.

96 For an excellent recent study on different variants of nationalism and their relationship to sub-national collective ethno-cultural identities, see David Brown, *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, ethnocultural and multicultural politics*, London/New York (Routledge), 2000.

97 Sukarno, *The Birth of Pantja Sila 1.6.1945*, in: Herbert Feith, Lance Castles (eds.), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press), 1970, citation p. 42.

From the point of view of a large number of small groups in the Indonesian polity, however, this strategy amounted to a denial of identity and interest representation. For all practical purposes, the imagined national community was construed as a continuation of the Javanese empires. Because Javanese history was in effect posing as national history, from the standpoint of the populations of the outlying areas the project of nation-building was perceived as a hegemonial endeavour designed to destroy their cultural identities. Nation-building as seen from the multiple minorities evolved as a strategy of cultural “domination by some other rival ethnic, racial, or linguistic community (the Javanese; P.K.) that is able to imbue that order with the temper of its own personality.”<sup>98</sup> To them, the unitary drive of the Indonesian republic clearly meant cultural, political and economic marginalisation by an overwhelmingly powerful center.

Contrary to the official founding myth, Indonesia is no natural entity, but an imperial construction, which emerged out of the power-play between the Dutch and the British. Sukarno’s myth of god-ordained boundaries should be deconstructed as a device for constructing and legitimising claims on territory and people(s). If the modern Indonesian state is meant to be something other than the simple successor to the former imperial power, his legitimacy cannot be founded at all, or at least in part, on the legacies of the former greatness of indigenous empires. Basing national history on imperial power means basing legitimacy on the dominant rule of one part over the other, at least on the symbolical level, subordinated parts. If imperial rule were to be the foundation of national consciousness, then Austria was to comprise Hungary, Romania and Serbia and several other eastern-European regions as well. The Soviet Union would still exist and Turkey could contemplate a return toward the Ottoman Empire. Now, there might be arguments for empires as regimes of authoritarian tolerance, but empires can certainly not pose as nations and their leaders would certainly not argue that their constituent parts form one people with one national identity. If Indonesia wants to constitute itself as a modern state, this, in my view, must be based on the conscious consent of all of her constituent parts.

Therefore, it might be very appropriate to review the Indonesian concept of nation as well as people. Probably, the Indonesian state could and should be regarded as a multinational state, a complex multi-cultural endeavour, in which the potential of all its constituent parts should be brought to the highest degree of fulfilment. If, therefore, people feel a need to express themselves politically in ethnic terms, this option must be open to them, because the urge to do so, implies an unfulfilled basic need. The urge for expression does not vanish, if it is made illegal or suppressed by force. Neither does a nation grow by force and violence, nor do national and subnational (be it ethnic or religious) identities exclude each other.

Contrary to those scientists who view the identity dimension of collective conflict as a mere surface phenomenon or as a category for mobilisation, which in fact does not con-

98 Clifford Geertz, *The integrative revolution: Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states*, in: Geertz (ed.), *Old societies and New States: The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa*, London (Collier-MacMillan), 1963, pp. 105-157, citation p. 109.

vey the real causes of conflict, I would argue that group identity is an important autonomous dimension of conflict. Therefore, I would call for a conscious acceptance of ethnic and religious identities as partly political phenomena. If the members of a group are disadvantaged because of their communal identity, even if they are only categorised as members of this communal group, or if they themselves feel the urge to identify with this identity group, then it seems sensible to offer them the opportunity to express group identity as well as group interests in the political realm. The freedom of individual choice is non-negotiable, however.

#### 4.4. Violence is glorious: on the need to reevaluate revolutionary history

One fundamental component of every political culture and especially every culture of conflict is the understanding of violence as a means of politics. In the case of Indonesia, we encounter a strange pattern of glorification and mythologisation of certain images of violence, which ought to be debated.

One often neglected fact, which differentiates Indonesia from all of its immediate neighbours, is the course of de-colonisation. Whereas Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines as well as Papua New Guinea (PNG) decolonised in a peaceful and negotiated way, the Indonesian decolonisation proceeded in a violent manner. Not only was the immediate decolonisation from 1945 to 1950 filled with violence and conflict, but also the preceding decades saw a rather antagonistic confrontation between nationalists on the one hand and the Dutch colonial administration on the other. If we take another look at Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines as well as PNG, we can see that this was not a necessary or seemingly natural course of history.

This violent course of history is meaningful not only as a social fact as such, but as a basis for a cognitive pattern which resulted in a mythologisation of the violent character of the Indonesian decolonisation and the glorification of violence as a legitimate political means.

To understand better, let us go back to the rule of former President Sukarno. He, and not just his successor Suharto, periodically took recourse to highly violent means of politics. Not only Suharto, but Sukarno as well, was ready to sacrifice huge numbers of people for an imagined common good. Sukarno was even proud of the extreme violence, by which the Indonesian nation-building came about. Far from deploring the need to wage an all-out war against the Dutch colonial overlord, in the course of which the Dutch, but also the multitude of Indonesian armed forces committed savage crimes against humanity, he on a number of symbolically highly-loaded occasions, argued that it was exactly this savagery, this excessive amount of violence and suffering, which in the end glorified the Indonesian nation and her anti-colonial revolution. To be categorised as a great nation, territorial size alone was clearly not enough. What was more important in the view of Sukarno was the correct mindset which had to be translated into a specific kind of political and social action. Social action signifying greatness had by definition a violent character. Greatness was intimately related with the will to be a hero. Greatness could be discerned by the will to struggle. It was not so much the success of reaching a precon-

ceived aim (for example independence) that counted, but the way chosen. Indonesia – in the words of Sukarno – was a great nation because it had not received its independence

“as a gift, we are not a nation that pleaded for independence. No, we are a nation that has waged a life and death struggle for independence, we are a nation tempered to the utmost in the struggle to build up independence, and we have emerged from this tempering as a nation that is mighty and strong.

And this is, why, Friends, as I said just now, we give thanks to the Almighty that fire rained upon us in this struggle of ours.”<sup>99</sup>

Such a rhetoric aims at glorifying violence, at glorifying suffering and sacrifice for something as intangible as the greatness of a nation. It sits strangely on top of the supposed Indonesian ideology of tolerance and harmony. That such images of violence could acquire a positive meaning, that they were officially sanctioned models for imitation, should set policy-makers and analysts thinking. Under Suharto, the rhetoric of the strong state, of the need to quell all dissent in the name of the national good continued to thrive.

One further aspect of the Indonesian revolution, which until the present time has had violent repercussions, is the extreme exaltation and mythologisation of the revolutionary youth, the Pemuda, which allows a host of radical, political players to pose as selfless and devoted activists for some kind of national or revolutionary cause. Here, it is enough to point to the multitude of paramilitary gangs and security organisations maintained by all political parties, by prominent politicians, companies and suchlike. Most disturbing should be the fact that the state itself made and still makes use of the services of private organisations of dubious reputation.

These two symbolic frames – violent revolution as well as violent youth – illustrate a basic need for a demythologisation of Indonesian modern history. The national myth of the nation, as well as the myth of the revolution and its most important agents until now only worked to perpetuate the threads of violence, so that now, in the light of a new, democratically legitimated Indonesia, it is high time to de-construct them as mythmaking and discard the violent undercurrents.

## 5. On the feasibility of purposeful change

One most basic question regarding conflict resolution is still in need of an answer: Which of the above-proposed measures has the highest feasibility and which provides the best chances for the civilisation of conflict management in the diverse cases of Indonesian societal violence? After all, the mere fact that mechanisms – be they psychology-, culture-, or institution-oriented – exist, “does not mean that they will be adopted.”<sup>100</sup> The

99 Sukarno, *The People's Command for the Liberation of West Irian* 19.12.1961, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, n.d., p. 6 (emphasis added P.K.).

100 Grofman/Stockwell, see above (footnote 57).

case of Indonesian violence is even more complicated than many others, insofar as ethno-cultural violence, that is violence between ethno-culturally defined groups, is only one segment of a more extensive phenomenon of a violent society. Large parts of Indonesia clearly face the danger of repeating the developments of India. Here, democracy evolved into a system where

“riots and other forms of localized violence appear to have been integrated into routine politics. They are anticipated by-products of election campaigns and mass mobilizations that precede them. ... Perhaps, then, we should consider riots themselves as part of the ‘traditional repertoire’ of political action, of both routine politics and movement politics.”<sup>101</sup>

The threat of repeating the Indian model, where riots as other forms of state and social violence have been regularised and become regular means to be used when seen necessary, clearly exists. As the Indian example shows, waiting for a strong civil society to solve the problem will not suffice. In India as in the case of the Philippines, a strong civil society exists: a multitude of organisations, a vast amount of free media compete for the attention of the public. Nevertheless, this civil society<sup>102</sup> is part of the system, is pervaded by repertoires of violence-prone social action. In the end we have to admit, that “(a)ll sides among the politicians are using the police against each other, while accusing the other side of doing that very thing, as if it were something exceptional.”<sup>103</sup>

The tasks of violence reduction and conflict civilisation are obviously highly dependent on the political class and their perception of politics. None of the above-mentioned measures will have any chance to change the patterns of violent conflict resolution decisively as long as the national political elite representing the major societal groups fails to realise that Indonesia is on a slippery slope, which may lead to the abyss of a durably violent society, that formal democracy is no antidote to violence and Indonesia may become trapped in some kind of perpetual transition. Simply moving away from authoritarianism does not end automatically at democracy and societal peace. It may well lead to a new regime type, which is stable in its very instability. This is illustrated by a large number of other examples from the so-called third wave of democratisation. To have a chance of surmounting the trap of perpetual transition, there is a dire need on the part of all significant elite groups for a fundamental consensus not on political content, but simply on the basic rules of the game. This, however, has hitherto not been achieved in Indonesia. What is needed most, however, is a willingness and an ability to learn, that is to cast in doubt old practices and interpretations. Indonesian politicians should ask themselves, why Indonesia – the state as well as society – time and again return to patterns of action, which culminate in violence. To be sure, the Indonesian republic in the 1950s managed to counter all efforts of resistance against the unitarian design for the state, but why have

101 Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 13.

102 I once more would concur with Brass who argues that civil society, law and order and criminality are in the context of Indian politics “word-weapons taken from a discourse without practices consistent with it.” (Brass, see above (footnote 29), p. 275).

103 Brass, see above (footnote 29), 275.

these strategies survived, which were only possible for the price of suppression and violence. They were re-enacted in the early 1960s in the fight for the inclusion of West Papua and later on in the 1970s in response to the invasion of East Timor. There has never been any degree of compromise orientation on the part of the state in its dealings with the demands of the Papua or the Acehnese, which were not just secessionist by a long way. In recent years, the strategy did change a bit, but the fixation on the unitary state was maintained undiminished. Probably the two aims of securing national unity and a unitarian state do not go together in the Indonesian case. What is needed is a change from the mere repetition of well known theories-in-use and isolated efforts of single-loop learning to the fundamentally different endeavour of extensive double-loop learning. What is needed is not just a willingness “to look for another strategy that will address and work within the governing variables”<sup>104</sup> of social and political action, but also more fundamental sorts of “inquiry, which resolve incompatible organizational norms by setting new priorities and weighting of norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together with associated strategies and assumptions.”<sup>105</sup> As long as learning occurs only in a rather restricted sense, there is a very real danger that the system itself becomes more and more characterised by “defensiveness, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-fuelling processes, and escalating error”.<sup>106</sup> As long as the (mostly unconscious) theories-in-use are to a large extent “shaped by an implicit disposition to winning (and to avoid embarrassment) (and the, P.K.) ... primary action strategy looks to unilateral control of the environment and task plus the unilateral protection of self and others”<sup>107</sup>, there is the very real danger, that all “actions we take to promote productive organizational learning actually inhibit deeper learning.”<sup>108</sup> One strategy to open up new arenas for learning could be the closure of the decision-making process, so that bargaining and learning can take place in a secure environment, which allows for experiments and open debate. Public processes on the contrary may fulfil a symbolic need for information and participation, but they also tend to exaggerate the need on the part of the decision-makers to adopt an uncompromising and rather extreme posture and their necessity to sell the compromises as victories for the own party. Both consequences of public policy processes can prove disastrous with respect to the chances of cooperative learning in fragmented societies.

Obviously, there is no easy way out and no single strategy will suffice. However, we should enable people identifying themselves along ethnic lines (that is in terms of common language, descent, religion, tradition, culture) to voice their grievances within the legitimate political arena of parliamentary politics. At the same time, ethnic outbidding

104 M.K. Smith/ Chris Argyris, Theories of action. double-loop learning and organizational learning, in: the encyclopedia of informal education ([www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm](http://www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm)).

105 Argyris/Schön, see above (footnote 47), p. 18.

106 Chris Argyris, Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and organization, San Francisco (Jossey-Bass) 1982, p. 8.

107 M.K. Smith/ Chris Argyris, see above (footnote 104).

108 Chris Argyris, Donald Schön, Organizational learning II: Theory, method and practice, Reading Mass. (Addison Wesley), 1996, p. 28.

should be undercut by argument, integrative practices on the elite level, and the well-directed and prompt amelioration of the most pressing grievances aired by these groups. In the case of Indonesia, this would need a further revision of the party law and an empowerment of the regions. Both might be feasible as parts of the political elite advocate such institutional redesign (albeit for different reasons).

Many more problems will be encountered by any effort to rethink Indonesian history and the historically derived patterns of political cognition and action. Nevertheless, as this is, at least in its beginning, essentially an intellectual task, it depends not so much on the politicians, but on the capacity of Indonesian intellectuals to attend to this problem. I would think that research and conferences on traditions of violence, on the worldviews and ideologies of former national leaders, Sukarno as well as Suharto, on the Campaign to Crush Malaysia, on highly critical turning points of modern Indonesian history (e.g. the 1965/66 killings) and the role of prominent societal organisations in them, on the image and history of the pemuda and a host of other similar violence-related research questions could provide fertile ground, from which a new, less dogmatic, more tolerant and pluralistic vision of Indonesia could grow.

Psychological as well as cultural workshops in my view develop their strengths not on the macro level of national politics but on the micro level. They are, therefore, especially apt instruments for tackling the problem of consolidating fragile peace arrangements between competing ethno-cultural groups. Most promising seem arrangements through which, over time, the workshops transform themselves into inter-ethnic institutions which can, in times of renewed stress, help to keep communication between the groups flowing and counter ever-present tendencies of ethnic outbidding. As the neighbouring Mindanao illustrates, however, a flowering of inter-ethnic respectively inter-religious institutions is not an antidote to the continuance of violent confrontation. Very often, the two phenomena simply coexist. Nevertheless, as promising means are in short supply, no effort can be spared. The workshop idea might also be helpful in instances of local violence, which can, at least in part, be traced back to the interplay of local culture and opportunity structure. Here, the various threads of culture, belief, power-play and structural impediments as well opportunities can be disclosed and possibly reframed. The limitation of such endeavours must be born in mind, however. So in his analysis of the Banyuwangi murders of 1998 one analyst concludes, that “in the villages ... belief in black magic remains as strong as ever. Villagers continue to fall ill and die as a result of black magic practices. Feelings of revenge continue to mount and the possibility of another uprising against the ‘bad’ of society always lurks dangerously on the horizon.”<sup>109</sup> In a similar argument Donald Horowitz in his masterful analysis of “The Deadly Ethnic Riot” concludes that “in most countries, there are incremental possibilities for preventing ethnic riots, but few deliberate paths to prevention. ... Although it requires only the absence of a single causal condition to avert a riot, many such conditions are difficult to manipulate, barring attitu-

109 Jason Brown, The Banyuwangi murders, in: *Inside Indonesia* No. 62, April-June 2000, (<http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit62/jason.htm>).

dinal changes that may develop over decades. The result of all this is that deadly ethnic riots can certainly be prevented or controlled at an early stage of their development, but many are not, and perhaps many never will be.”<sup>110</sup>

110 Horowitz. see above (footnote 48), p.521.




## Appendix 1: Anatomy of collective violence in Indonesia<sup>111</sup>

There still is no data available which would allow a clear-cut picture of the anatomy of collective violence of Republican Indonesia from the date of independence in 1945 to present-day. In recent months, however, a database covering the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was built up, which enables us to conduct some reliable categorisations for these years at least. Even though some details of the procedures are open to criticism, the results of the studies are absolutely clear and indisputable in respect to several crucial aspects of social violence in Indonesia. These can be summarised as follows:

Communalist violence is the single most important category of violence and accounts for 76.9% of all fatalities, the second most important category is separatist violence which accounts for 22.1% of fatalities. Taken together, these two categories account for 99% of all deaths. In terms of the relationship between incidents and casualties, communalist violence is the most severe; the number of casualties per incident is significantly higher than in all other categories (communal violence: 10.3 deaths per incident; separatist violence: 2.7 deaths per incident). Collective violence exploded with the demise of the Suharto's regime (see following table). Even if it can be argued that the level of violence during the years of Suharto rule has been underestimated, the tendency towards a steep rise in collective violence in the years of transition is obvious. This tendency is stable in respect to both categories – communal and separatist – violence.<sup>112</sup>

111 This overview draws heavily on the ground-breaking work of Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeuddin, who for the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR) developed a database on all forms of social violence for the years 1990-2001 and already provided a first analysis of the data (see: Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeuddin, *Anatomy of Social Violence in the Context of Transition: The Case of Indonesia 1990-2001*, (UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E), Jakarta, June 2002; Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeuddin, *Database on Social Violence in Indonesia 1990-2001*, Jakarta, April 2002.

112 For communal violence see: UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, *ibid.*, p. 35.


Table 4: Number of people killed in collective violence 1990-2001 (n) <sup>113</sup>

The tendencies, observed so far can be replenished and corroborated by the use of other data, which precedes 1990. Even if they are not strictly comparable, they provide a similar picture. Anti-Christian violence, measured by the number of destroyed or damaged churches rose during the reign of Suharto. This violence against symbols of community precedes the violence which is aimed against people (see the following table).

Table 5: Destroyed and damaged Christian churches 1945-1998 (n)<sup>114</sup>

113 See UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, *ibid.*, p. 29) Not included are the deaths, which occurred in the secessionist wars in Aceh and West Papua during the years 1990-1997, because prior to 1998 no precise data was available. It is estimated that in Aceh during the years 1989-1998 between 781 and 1321 people were killed in the war between GAM and the state security forces – in the four years from 1998 to 2001 1238 deaths are reported. For Papua, it is estimated that from 1969 to 1998 the estimates vary between 13,000 and 80,000 deaths, from 1990 to 1997 reportedly 14 people were killed, and in the short time span from 1998 to 2001, 118 deaths were recorded (see UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, *ibid.*, p. 44).

114 Indonesia Christian Communication Forum, *The Church and Human Rights in Indonesia*. Surabaya, o.J., p. 20. Reliable data for the years after 1998 is missing.



Interestingly enough, the majority of these anti-Christian outbursts happened in Java: during the years from 1945 – 1995, 72%, and in the following years 1996-1998, 82% of all recorded cases. Since we know that the casualty numbers for the years 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1997 had no anti-Christian background, we can infer that (at least in the 1990s) violence against the symbols of another religious community did not translate into violence against members of these communities. If we check the data for the regional distribution of collective violence against people, it turns out that the high and medium-conflict areas (with the exception of Jakarta) were all outside of Java. High-conflict areas (measured in number of deaths per 100 thousand population) were Maluku (93.4), Aceh (32.2) and Central Kalimantan (27.0). The highest scores among the medium-conflict areas are held by Central Sulawesi (17.2), Jakarta (13.5) and West Kalimantan (12.2). As in other comparable cases (e.g. India)<sup>115</sup>, social violence in Indonesia is a local phenomenon. Whereas in some districts, violence abounds, neighbouring districts and districts with a similar structural configuration remain largely violence-free.

It can be said, at least with respect to the Christian-Muslim relationship, that the violence against places of worship, which could be observed in the preceding years, did not simply translate into violence against people. Violence against people clearly erupted in different places in rather small areas at the fringes of Indonesia. The newly prominent category of “ethnic-religion-migration violence is concentrated in .... the provinces of Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and East Kalimantan. These six provinces contribute around 73% of deaths in social violence in Indonesia during the period of 1990-2001.”<sup>116</sup>

115 See for example: Varshney, Ashutosh, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. (Yale University Press), 2001, see also his paper: *The Relevance of International Research on Ethnic Conflict for Indonesia: Some Reflections*, (UNSFIR Working Paper: 02/05) Jakarta, June 2002.

116 UNSFIR-Working Paper 02/01-E, see above (footnote 111), p. 55.

## Appendix 2: Collective violence in Indonesia: Short sketches of several prominent cases

### *Communal conflict in the Molukkas 1999-2002*

Any analysis of the civil-war on the Molukkas<sup>117</sup> should differentiate between the region of Ambon, where violence erupted in early 1999 and North Maluku, which followed in October 1999. Fighting in Ambon broke out after a brawl between two people of different faith at a bus terminal on January 19, 1999, the holiest day of the Islamic calendar, Idul Fitri. The resulting fighting quickly changed into a religious confrontation, pitting Muslims against Protestants. Within days a large number of islands were engulfed in violence. Several waves of violence alternated with lulls until, in early 2002, a “final peace accord” was signed in Malino under severe government pressure. Every new wave of violence brought an enlargement of either the territory engulfed in violence, a change in the weapons used (from machetes and home-made guns to semi-automatic rifles) and an inclusion of new player groups (as the infamous Islamic militia Laskar Jihad, whose members arrived in June 2000 to reinforce the various Muslim groups). In the course of the fighting, a complete segregation between Christians and Muslims took place.

Fighting in North Maluku broke out in late August 1999 between several ethnic groups, which fought over the control of the local administration. By government decision a new district had been created, in which the original inhabitants of the region would have been in a minority position compared to the immigrant Makianese, who on top of this were well represented in the provincial bureaucracy. As the (Christian) indigenous inhabitants could not prevent government design, they turned to violence. Over time, they succeeded in driving away a significant degree of the Makianese settlers, who turned to the two cities of Ternate and Tidore. In a renewed explosion of violence on October 24 an entire Makianese settlement was burned to the ground, making refugees out of the rest of the Makianese population. It was at this point in time and in the two central cities of North Maluku, that the violent conflict changed its colours. In Ternate as well as in Tidore, the conflict was reframed as a conflict between Christians and Muslims. The

117 For additional information on this conflict, see for example: George Junus Adithjondro, *Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges*, In: Ingrid Wessel, Georgia Wimhöfer, *Violence in Indonesia*, Hamburg (Abera), 2001, pp. 100-128 (centers on the aspect of elite manipulation); Nils Bubandt, *Malukan Apocalypse: Themes in the dynamic of violence in eastern Indonesia*, in: Wessel/Wimhöfer (eds). *ibid.*, pp. 228-253 (provides a culturalist interpretation); Gerry van Klinken, *The Maluku Wars: Bringing Society Back In*, in: *Indonesia*, No. 71, April 2001, pp. 1-26 (centers on local political dynamics); Christopher R. Duncan, *The aftermath of civil war*, in: *Inside Indonesia*, no. 69, Jan-March 2002 (<http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit69/northMaluku.htm>), Jaques Bertrand, *Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia's Moluccan Islands*, in: *Pacific Affairs*, March 2002 (<http://www.indopubs.com/in.html>), Parsudi Suparlan, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Indonesia*, in: *Kultur*, Vol. I No. 2, 2001 esp. pp. 44-50 and Peter Kreuzer, *Politik der Gewalt – Gewalt in der Politik: Indonesien*, (HSFK-Report No. 4/2000) Frankfurt, 2000; see also the various ICG-Reports on the conflict, as well as reports by Human Rights Watch and the Indonesian human rights organization Tapol.

Makianese refugees and other Muslims started revenge attacks on the Christian minorities living in these overwhelmingly Muslim cities. A few weeks later, Christians in Tobelo, where they were the majority population attacked their Muslim fellow residents and massacred several hundred of them. The fighting was fuelled by a conflict between the traditional ruler of Ternate and his rival from Tidore for the seat of governor and control over the budget of the newly-established province of North Maluku. Both established so-called traditional armies engaged in the fighting together with extra-regional players as the *Las-kar Jihad* contributed to its further escalation. In the course of the conflict, as had happened in the Southern Moluccas before, the social space was partitioned between Christians and Muslims, without any neutral space left. North Halmahera became a Christian controlled territory, whereas Ternate as well as South Halmahera became Muslim domains. The capital of South Maluku, Ambon is unequivocally cut up in Muslims and Christian sectors, which are divided by one of the central roads. The bifurcation of society along religious lines, already prominent before the violence, seems now to be implacable.

#### *Communal conflict between Dayak and Madurese in Kalimantan 1997-2001*

A short coherent sketch of the history of this conflict is given in the text of this study (see p. 14ff). Below, therefore, is just a short sketch of the succeeding waves of violence which gripped the area since the first explosion of large scale violence in 1997.<sup>118</sup> The 1997 as well as the 1999 violence centred on Sambas in West-Kalimantan. The 1997 violence cost about 1000 lives and led to the evacuation of some 40,000 people. The 1999 riots were, in the words of Heidhues “less widespread, having almost the character of ‘mopping up’.”<sup>119</sup> They nevertheless turned 20-30,000 people into refugees in their own country. Two years later in early 2001, a new wave of anti-Madurese violence broke out, this time centring on the town of Sampit in the Central Kalimantan. This renewed violence cost several hundred, possibly more than one thousand lives and caused up to 50,000 Madurese to flee the island. During the violence, there were countless numbers

118 For further literature, see for example: Human Rights Watch, The horror in Kalimantan, in: Inside Indonesia, No. 51 July-Sept. 1997 (<http://insideindonesia.org/edit51/hrw2.htm>); Heidhues, see above (footnote 32); Ami Marzali., Ethnic Diversity in Conflict: A Socio-Economic Analysis of Social Violence in Kalimantan, and Syarif Ibrahim Alqadrie, Factors in Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Identity and Consciousness, and the Indications of Disintegrative Processes in West Kalimantan, both in: Chaider Bamualim, Karlina Helmanita (eds.), Communal Violence in Indonesia, Jakarta (IAIN Jakarta, KAS), 2002, pp. 19-32 and 125-153; Human Rights Watch, see above (footnote 34, on the 1997 violence); Michael Dove, Dayak anger ignored, in: Inside Indonesia No. 51 July-Sept 1997 (<http://insideindonesia.org/edit51/dove.htm>); John Bamba, see above (footnote 38); Chronology of violence in Central Kalimantan ([http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os\\_sampit\\_crono.asp](http://www.thejakartapost.com/special/os_sampit_crono.asp); on the 2001 violence); Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, Kuala Lumpur et al. (Oxford University Press), 1983, pp. 145-149 (on the 1967 violence). Two excellent studies are: Gerry van Klinken, see above (footnote 74) and International Crisis Group, Communal Violence in Indonesia: Lessons from Kalimantan, 27. June 2001, (<http://www.crisisweb.org/>)

119 Heidhues, see above (footnote 32), p. 147.

of intermittent small incidents, which either only involved the destruction of property or cost “only” a few lives. Even if the means of these acts of ethnic cleansing were deplored, the aims were supported by the local and regional state administrations. In a joint statement issued after the riots in 2001 by the local administration and the leaders of both Dayak and non-Dayak communities, all signatories agreed that the Madurese should be evacuated, which in effect means, that their chances for return were minimised. The community leaders went further in arguing that “the people of Central Kalimantan are prepared to hold a dialogue towards peace and reconciliation, but only after all Madurese leave all of Central Kalimantan.”<sup>120</sup>

### *The anti-Chinese riots of May 1998*

Since the beginning of the Asia Crisis in summer 1997, Indonesia has experienced harsh economic difficulties. Large numbers of people lost their jobs and, as a result of IMF-sponsored austerity programs, formerly subsidised prices for fuel were scrapped, and the numbers needing basic food rose significantly. Political discontent mounted and resulted in large-scale demonstrations. A first round of anti-Chinese demonstrations and small-scale riots broke out in many parts of Java in January and February 1998. The following two months passed without any significant incidents. Then, in early May, anti-regime demonstrations came to a head in Jakarta and many other cities. On one of these demonstrations four students were shot and killed on May 12, 1998 in Jakarta. A day later, rioting broke out against Indonesians of Chinese descent in Jakarta. Similar riots occurred in Padang, Palembang, Solo and Yogyakarta.<sup>121</sup> Whereas the riots outside Jakarta ended without large numbers of casualties, in the Jakarta riots, approximately 1,200 fatalities were counted. Most of these were rioters who, while looting supermarkets, got trapped on upper floors by fires started by the raging crowds.

Anti-Chinese riots are nothing new in Indonesia. What are new, however, are certain patterns which were exhibited during the Jakarta riots: most importantly, the systematic rape of Chinese or Chinese-looking women by groups of young men. The rioters were to a large extent members of the local (non-Chinese) population. The initial spark, igniting the riots seems to have been ignited in nearly all cases by provocateurs. Reports abound about small groups of young men wearing military-style boots which, using crowbars and similar instruments, “opened” the closed shutters of the stores. They also seem to have provided part of the gasoline bombs, with which the buildings were set on fire later on. The riots were followed by an exodus of tens of thousands of Indonesians of Chinese descent, who left for other south-east Asian destinations, a large part of whom have not yet returned.<sup>122</sup>

120 cited after: Minister defends temporary evacuation of Madurese. In: The Jakarta Post 5 March, 2001.

121 A few days earlier a anti-Chinese riot has broken out in Medan resulting in one fatality.

122 For further reading see for example: James T. Siegel, Thoughts on the Violence of May 13 and 14, 1998, in Jakarta, in: Benedict O’G. Anderson see above (footnote 80), pp. 90-123; John T. Sidel. Riots,

*The killing of magicians (ducun santet) 1998*

News about people suspected of practising black magic getting killed reappear quite regularly in the Indonesian press. The killings of 1998, however, had a hitherto unseen quality. Within a few months, probably up to 150 suspected magicians, and also a small number of local religious leaders, were killed in a small region in Eastern Java by unknown assassins who posed as Japanese-style Ninja. At the same time, the killings spread from the regency of Banyuwangi outward, until several other towns in East and Central Java were affected. Interpretations of the incidents were manifold and reached from local elite-conflict to efforts by the armed forces to destabilise the heartland of Indonesia up to revenge killings of the Communists or their descendants for the bloodbath of 1965/66. All explanations had one thing in common: they were completely lacking in proof.<sup>123</sup>

*The great killings of 1965/66*

In the years of guided democracy, president Sukarno succeeded in instrumentalising the two most important loci of political power – the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI) and the armed forces. Even though the two were existential enemies, both were used by him to further his aims and policies. This fragile balance was destroyed in September 1965, when parts of the CPI abducted several generals, whose dead bodies were found a few days later. Even though it is still unclear, whether the CPI really committed the abduction and killings, they were declared to be responsible and within a few hours, the worst reign of terror set in, which in the course of a few months cost the lives of several hundred thousand people, who were suspected to be either Communists or their sympathisers. The main perpetrators were neither the armed forces nor the police, but armed groups attached to various civil society organisations as religious organisations as well as student organisations. Hughes cites a local *Ansor* (militia of the NU) spokesman, who described the killing spree of late-1965 on Java: “So from October to January ... we took our revenge. We knew who were Communists, and we would go to the villages and *kampongs* and kill them. The people just went wild against the Communists.”<sup>124</sup> It is rather characteristic that at that time, as in other communalist conflicts, whole villages were wiped out by their neighbours – not only on Java, but on all other islands which make up Indonesia.<sup>125</sup>

Curch Burnings, Conspiracies: The moral economy of the Indonesian crowd in the late twentieth century. in: Wessel/Wimhöfer, see above (footnote 117), pp. 47-63. For a large number of often appalling descriptions of violence, see the homepage of the organization of the Indonesian Chinese ([www.huaren.org](http://www.huaren.org)).

123 For further literature, see for example: James T. Siegel, Suharto, Witches, in: *Indonesia*, Vol. 71, April 2001, pp. 27ff; Jason Brown, The Banyuwangi murders, in: *Inside Indonesia*, No. 62, April-June 2000 (<http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit627jason.htm>).

124 cited in: John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval*, New York (David McKay Company Inc.), 1967, p. 159.

125 For further literature, see for example: Cribb, Robert (ed.), *The Indonesian killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, Clayton (Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies), 1990; especially on Bali see: Geoffrey Robinson, *The dark side of paradise: Political violence in Bali*,

### *The Petrus killings of the early 1980s*

The Petrus killings started in earnest in March 1983. They were finished in 1985 and left several thousand suspected criminals dead. The killings were carefully planned, lists of victims were kept and the eliminated targets were ticked off. The proceedings are reminiscent of other countries where para-military groups carried out the dirty work for the state security apparatus. Victims were identified, visited by several men and, if not shot on sight, dragged away in a car. After one or a few days, their corpses would be found on the roadside or in public places, often disfigured by marks of torture. The method of killing the victims has been highly significant, because it was in this way that the state garnered the symbolic power and violence and integrated it into its own arsenal of power.<sup>126</sup> It is important that this kind of extra-judicial killing in these two years happened with the silent consent of the “people on the street” and the Indonesian mass media.<sup>127</sup> It speaks for itself that President Suharto in his memoirs published in 1989 could publicly declare that “the peace was disturbed. It was as if there was no longer peace in this country. It was as though all there was was fear ... We had to apply some *treatment*, to take some stern action. What kind of action? It had to be with violence. But this violence did not mean just shooting people, pow! pow! just like that. No! But those who tried to resist, like it or not, had to be shot ... Some of the corpses were left [in public places] just like that. This was for the purpose of *shock therapy* ... This was done so that the general public would understand that there was still somebody capable of taking action to tackle the problem of criminality.”<sup>128</sup>

### *Separatism in Aceh*

Aceh without doubt belongs to the promoters of the Indonesian idea during and immediately after the revolution. The Acehnese political elite’s view on the imagined nation differed from those of the national elite in Jakarta, however. Although Acehnese political

Ithaca/London (Cornell University Press), 1995 (esp. chap. 11, pp. 273-303). For an early study, which, although highly anti-communist in nature, already illustrates the dimension of the killings, see: John Hughes, see above (footnote 124).

126 On this analysis, see James T. Siegel, A new criminal type in Jakarta: The nationalization of ‘death’, in: Vicente L. Rafael (ed.), *Figures of criminalità in Indonesia, the Philippines, and colonial Vietnam*, Ithaca/New York (Cornell University Southeast Asian Program), 1999, 210-230; see also Barker, see above (footnote 80), pp. 41-45.

127 For further literature, see for example: Joshua Barker, see above (footnote 80); David Bourchier, *Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia*, in: Arief Budiman (ed.), *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*, Clayton Victoria (Monash University), 1990, pp. 177-212, Siegel, see above (footnote 126); Justus Van Der Kroef, *Terrorism by public authority: The case of the death squads of Indonesia and the Philippines*, in: *Current research on peace and violence*, no. 10, 1987, pp. 143-158.

128 Suharto, *Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya*. 1989, cited in: Geoffrey Robinson, *Rawan is as Rawan does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh*, in: Benedict R. O’G. Anderson (ed.), *Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia*. Ithaca/New York (Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications), 2001, pp. 213-242, citation p. 227-228.



leaders were strongly pro-Republican, they argued for a significant amount of autonomy for the regions and the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic state (*Negara Islam Indonesia*). When, in the early 1950s, it became clear that both wishes would remain unfulfilled, the *Darul Islam* rebellion broke out under the leadership of Teungku Daud. This rebellion lasted until 1962. After complex negotiations the rebels succeeded in winning recognition for Aceh as a special region (*Daerah Istimewa*) even though they had to concede defeat with respect to the issue of the Islamic state. From then on, peace ruled in Aceh for more than one decade.<sup>129</sup> In 1976, a new rebel movement – Aceh Merdeka – emerged under the leadership of, Hassan di Tiro, a grandson of Teungku Cik di Tiro, a hero of the Aceh war (1873-1903) against the Dutch. A few months after its inauguration, it declared independence. As the rebels' efforts to mobilise the Acehnese met with no success, their leader Hassan di Tiro, who had been living abroad since the 1950s and only returned in 1976 left Indonesia again in 1979 and formed a government in exile in Sweden, where he still resides in 2002. Until the end of the 1980s, the movement was no more than a small nuisance to the local and national authorities. In early 1989, however, the group resorted to armed attacks on military and police installations as well as civilians. Then a swift process of escalation set in: the government resorted to military campaigns, deployed new troops and declared Aceh a Military Operations Area (*Daerah Operasi Militer*, DOM). In the course of the military operations, civilians were killed, abused and their properties destroyed, widening the range of people sympathetic to the cause of the rebels. The state strategy of intimidation by means of systematic terror backfired in Aceh, as it did in most other cases. The violence escalated and the population really became the sea, in which the guerrilla of the Aceh Merdeka could swim. The social space was reduced to zero. Nobody could stand apart or claim neutrality, with the result that deep rifts emerged within the local communities whose members were forced to take sides and take part in the conflict (as informants, guides, and above all as victims). Aceh's DOM-status was finally revoked by President Habibbi in 1998. The conflict, however, did not end then, but contrary to expectation, escalated under the successive Presidents of Wahid and Megawati. After the at least temporary extinction of the flames of communalist violence in the Moluccas, Aceh remains the region with the highest ratio of violence.<sup>130</sup> How it will fare after the signing of an initial Peace Accord between the Indonesian state and the guerilla in the beginning of December 2002 remains to be seen.

129 The province had its share of the violence in 1965/66, when the various religious leaders gave to green light to their groups to eliminate suspected Communists and other leftist elements.

130 For further literature, see for example: Robinson, see above (Fn 128), pp. 213-242; Ariffadhillah, The Recent Situation in Aceh after the Joint Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, in: Wessel/Wimhöfer (eds.) see above (footnote 117), 2001, S. 317-334, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Between war and peace, in: Inside Indonesia no. 70 April-June 2002 (<http://www.insideindonesia.org7edit707otto1.htm>); and of course the reports by the ICG, HRW and Tapol. For the earlier years of the Acehnese rebellion, see: Tim Kell, The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, Ithaca/New York (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project no. 74), 1995.

*Separatism in West Papua*<sup>131</sup>

Separatism in West Papua goes back to the day Indonesia took control over the territory from the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTAE) on 1 May 1963. The promised “Act of Free Choice”, by which it was to be ascertained whether the Papuas really wanted to be integrated into Indonesia was delayed until 1969 and then only about 2000 representatives handpicked by the Indonesian government were allowed to opt for the inclusion of West Papua. To make sure that the results of the deliberations would be in accordance with Indonesian preferences, the local Indonesian military commanders made it clear that the delegates had families and belongings which might suffer in the case of recalcitrance. No wonder that every single delegate opted for integration. The UN, happy to close the book on West Papuan decolonisation, accepted the proclaimed results of the fraudulent act. Several local rebellions had already taken place between the withdrawal of UNTEA and the so called Act of Free Choice. All were crushed by the vastly superior fire power of the Indonesian armed forces. Nevertheless revolt followed revolt. Without any clear-cut centralization, the various West Papuan resistance groups managed to merge into the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM). The tough measures of the Indonesian armed forces “swelled the ranks of resistance.”<sup>132</sup> In 1970, the initially pro-Indonesian Seth Rumkorem, who eventually also joined the Indonesian army in 1962, graduated from Bandung military academy and became a member of the elite Diponegoro division, changed sides and formed a new guerrilla force. He was to become one of the most important military leaders of Papua resistance. During the following decades, the OPM led a low-level guerrilla war against the Indonesian security forces. Due to limited capabilities and serious internal infighting, these activities never threatened Indonesian control over the territory. Nevertheless, Indonesia responded with the violent suppression of all indications of criticism. Since the early 1970s, Indonesia had tried to secure control over West Papua by large-scale transmigration programs. Whereas in 1960, only 18,600 out of an estimated population of 736,000 (that is 2.5%) were non-Papuan, their numbers

131 For further information, see for example Robin Osborne, *Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Sydney (Allen & Unwin), 1985; explicitly anti-Indonesian but well-informed is the study by Kees Lagerberg, *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*, New York (St. Martin’s Press), 1979. On the nature of the OPM and their support structures, see for example: Peter Savage, *The National Liberation Struggle in West Irian: From Millenarianism to Socialist Revolution*, in: *Asian Survey* Vol. 18 No. 10, Oct. 1978, pp. 981-995 and R.J. May, *Sources of External Support for the West Papua Movement*, in: K.M. de Silva, R.J. May (eds), *Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, London (Pinter Publishers), 1991, pp. 158-180. For newer depictions, see for example: Benny Giay, *West Papuan strategies of resistance against Indonesian political and cultural aggression in the 1980s*, in: Wessel/Wimhöfer, see above (footnote 117), pp. 129-138; and especially the well researched studies by the International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua*, (ICG Asia Report No. 39), 13. Sept. 2002 (<http://www.crisisweb.org>), and: *Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya*, (ICG Asia Report No. 23), 20. Sept. 2001 (both: <http://www.crisisweb.org>). For the early history up to 1963, see for example: Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea*, New Haven/London (Yale University Press), 1966.

132 Osborne, see above (footnote 131), p. 38.

had already climbed to nearly 140,000 in 1982 and rose to about 450,000 in 1998.<sup>133</sup> Since the regime change in 1998, Papuan nationalism has been brought out into the open. The Papua argue that de jure West Papua has been sovereign as a nation and state since 1 December 1961, when, the decision of the National Committee on a national flag, an anthem and a name was realised by raising the Morning Star beside the Dutch Tricoloure. In the course of this ceremony "the new anthem was sung for the first time in front of the New Guinea Council and in the presence of the Governor of Dutch New Guinea and members of the Council"<sup>134</sup>. This view on Papuan independence is shared not only by radicals, but by large tracts of the established Papuan political elite in Jayapura. In the meantime, the Parliament in Jakarta, as in the case of Aceh, granted a special autonomy (*Otonomi khusus*) to West Papua, which, however, has to date not changed the Papuan aspirations to any degree. The most important organisation representing Papuan interests is no longer the OPM, but the Papuan Council (*Dewan Papua*) and its Presidium, which were created in mid-2000 and which up to now has been rather successfully uniting the mainstream of Papuan society in their efforts for eventual independence. However, President Megawati, daughter of former President Sukarno, who brought Papua into the fold of Indonesia, remains vehemently opposed. For her, as for her father "without Irian Jaya, Indonesia is not complete."<sup>135</sup>

133 ICG, 20 Sept. 2001, see above (footnote 131), p. 5-6. Even though the numbers are not completely comparable they, in spite of some reservations, convey a correct picture on the magnitude of change.

134 ICG, 20 Sept. 2001, see above (footnote 131), p. 4.

135 Megawati 1999, cited in ICG. 20 Sept. 2001, see above (footnote 131), p. 1.