

**STORM CLOUDS OVER SUN CITY:  
THE URGENT NEED TO RECAST  
THE CONGOLESE PEACE PROCESS**

14 May 2002



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## **STORM CLOUDS OVER SUN CITY: THE URGENT NEED TO RECAST THE CONGOLESE PEACE PROCESS**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

After seven weeks of negotiations at Sun City, a partial agreement was reached on 19 April 2002 between Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC (Mouvement pour la libération du Congo) and the government of Joseph Kabila. The agreement represents the end of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the context of the Lusaka peace accords. However confusion reigns. The negotiations are not complete and the future of the Democratic Republic of Congo remains uncertain.

The accord, struck by the majority of delegates from unarmed opposition groups and civil society, and approved by Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe, is the beginning of a political realignment in the DRC conflict. Most notably it heralds the end of the anti-Kabila coalition and confirms the isolation of the RCD (Rassemblement congolais pour la Démocratie) and its ally Rwanda. The Kabila government and the MLC actually concluded the accord by default, due to the intransigence of the RCD on the question of power sharing in Kinshasa, and, in the background, the failed negotiations between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda over the disarmament of the Hutu rebels known as ALiR (Armée pour la libération du Rwanda). This accord transformed the discussions between the Lusaka signatories into a bilateral negotiation with a Kabila-Bemba axis backed by the international community on one side, and a politically weak RCD, backed by a militarily strong Rwanda on the other.

The new partners announced that they would install a transition government in Kinshasa on 15 June, declared the Lusaka accords 'dead' but committed themselves to continuing negotiations

with the RCD and Rwanda. The RCD, its cohesion and existence threatened, tried to break its isolation by forming an alliance with the UDPS (Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social) of Etienne Tshisekedi, and is talking up threats of renewed hostilities and partition of the country.

It is highly desirable that negotiations with the RCD be finalised before the transition government is installed. President Mbeki of South Africa, as next president of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and of the African Union (AU), should become joint leader of the process, on condition that he receives a clear mandate from the parties to the dialogue and from the regional countries that have given their support to the Kabila-Bemba partnership, i.e. Angola and Uganda. The neutrality of South Africa has indeed been questioned by the Congolese who were stung by its apparent support for the RCD at Sun City.

The Sun City talks may also mark the beginning of a real regional discussion on the security and economic issues at the heart of the Congolese conflict. In particular, the issue of Rwanda's security is finally on the table – the disarmament of the Rwanda Hutu militias based in the DRC – as well as the issue of the Congo's security – the withdrawal of the RPA (Rwandan Patriotic Army) from the DRC itself. These are both part of the Lusaka accords. It is also time to discuss the long-term security of the region, especially the reconstruction of the Congolese state, and the rights and responsibilities of that state.

As soon as a political accord on power sharing is reached, the indispensable coordination of all these

different dimensions of the peace process should be assured by the appointment of a high-profile Special Envoy of the United Nations' Secretary-General. The mandate of the Special Envoy should be to supervise the implementation of an inclusive agreement on political transition; to coordinate UN activities on DDRRR (disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement of armed groups); to ensure cooperation between the various UN institutions involved in the Rwandan and Congolese peace processes (ICTR, MONUC, the expert panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC); and to prepare the agenda for a regional conference on security and sustainable development in the Great Lakes.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **TO THE SIGNATORIES OF THE LUSAKA PEACE ACCORDS AND MEMBERS OF THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION:**

1. Entrust President Mbeki with mediating the conclusion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. This process could build on results obtained by the facilitator of the Lusaka process, Ketumile Masire. It should also be based on a compromise between the power-sharing proposal known as 'Mbeki II' and the accord struck between the Congolese government and the MLC.
2. Give the mediator a mandate to obtain a preliminary accord between Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe on conditions to be met for them to support a transitional power-sharing agreement in the DRC. Once this agreement is obtained, the new mediator could once again bring together the parties to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and finalise an inclusive power-sharing agreement.
3. Immediately cease all military deployments that could reignite hostilities, and any resupply of armed groups in the Kivus.

### **TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS:**

4. Appoint a high-profile Special Envoy for the Great Lakes with the responsibility to guide and press for the application of the Lusaka peace accords and to ensure cooperation between the various UN institutions involved in the Rwanda and in the Congolese peace process.
5. Give the new Special Envoy a concurrent mandate to negotiate between Rwanda, the government of DRC, Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe on the application of a DDRRR program as well as the permanent withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Congo.
6. Equip MONUC with a specialist conflict resolution team to assist humanitarian aid agencies in gaining access to the Kivu and Ituri regions and to establish reconciliation programs between local communities.

### **TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRC, THE MLC AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES:**

7. As a crucial test of credibility, immediately arrest and deliver to Arusha the leaders of ALiR who are wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and suspend all supply of ALiR forces on Congolese territory.

**Brussels/Nairobi, 14 May 2002**



## STORM CLOUDS OVER SUN CITY:

### THE URGENT NEED TO RECAST THE CONGOLESE PEACE PROCESS

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The partial failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue meeting at Sun City, South Africa, from 25 February to 19 April, has thrown the Congolese peace process into dangerous confusion. The limited agreement for a transition government, struck between Joseph Kabila's government and Jean-Pierre Bemba's *Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo*, backed by the majority of delegates from unarmed political opposition groups and civil society, and approved by Angola, Uganda and Zimbabwe does not in itself offer any real solutions to the Congo's problems.<sup>1</sup> Essentially, this agreement marks the beginning of a political realignment, most notably the end of the anti-Kabila coalition, and seals the isolation of the *Rassemblement congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) together with its intransigent ally Rwanda. Unless this isolation is quickly broken, it could lead to renewed hostilities by a cornered Rwanda or, even more likely, to the partitioning of the country with a rebel movement proclaiming itself master of a third of the DRC.

The outcome of the talks is clearly a failure for the facilitation team under Ketumile Masire, who proved incapable of steering the negotiations between the belligerents. In two and a half years of talks and despite the bitter failure of the Addis Ababa meeting in October 2001,<sup>2</sup> seven million dollars were spent without the facilitation team

ever managing to face up to its shortcomings. South Africa became involved in last minute negotiations in order to protect the investment it had made in funding part of the dialogue, but lost credibility in the eyes of the Congolese by recommending a plan that ostensibly favoured the RCD.

Sun City probably marks the end of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the context of the Lusaka peace accords. However, the agreement may signal the start of a real dialogue between the Congolese and genuine negotiations between countries in the region over security and economic issues. In particular, the time has come to tackle the issue of Rwanda's immediate security, notably the disarmament of Rwandan Hutu militia based in the DRC, and the security of the Congo, which means withdrawing the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) troops from the DRC itself, both of which are part of the Lusaka Accords. The time has also come to discuss the Congo's long-term security, in particular the reconstruction of the Congolese State and the rights and responsibilities that come along with sovereignty. Negotiations are therefore far from over. There is also an urgent need to change the methodology of the peace process, to deliver more effective mediation that prioritises political negotiation and coordinates the various political, security and economic dimensions of the conflict, as well as dealing with the regional, national and local issues on the agenda.

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<sup>1</sup> See, in particular: IRIN, "RDC: Récapitulatif des résultats du dialogue intercongolais," 25 April 2002.

<sup>2</sup> See ICG Africa Report n°37, 16 November 2001: "The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: political negotiation or game of bluff?"

## II. “PLACE YOUR BETS!”: THE DIALOGUE AT SUN CITY OR BOTSWANAN ROULETTE

### A. FROM ADDIS ABABA TO SUN CITY: LACK OF POLITICAL PREPARATION CONTINUES

After the failure of the Addis Ababa talks, when the Congolese government walked out at the end of a week-long negotiation in protest at the lack of adequate representation from the delegations present, the international community stepped in to try and defuse the situation. The first attempt came in November 2001, at the initiative of Kofi Annan. The three belligerents, who were attending a session of the joint military commission in New York, were invited to take part in an informal meeting chaired by the UN under-secretary general for political affairs Ibrahim Fall. They then agreed to meet again in order to settle the issue of the composition of delegations once and for all. At the same time, there was also genuine political mediation over the issue of power-sharing. An agenda was set for this informal meeting to tackle not only the issue of delegations, but also to discuss the organisation of elections, the new political order, national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Congo.

A month later, the three parties resumed their discussions in Abuja, Nigeria, and made significant headway on the issue of the composition of delegations for the dialogue. A preliminary agreement was reached on representation of the Mai Mai, religious orders, traditional chiefs and the unarmed opposition.<sup>3</sup> The practicalities of

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<sup>3</sup> Six representatives were allocated for the Mai Mai and seven for the religious orders, to be included in the *Forces vives* component. The belligerents also decided to recommend to the Facilitation team the redistribution of seats for the unarmed political opposition delegation in order to resolve the problem of including its representatives based inside and outside the country but who were not represented at Addis Ababa. In July 2001 at Gaborone, the fifteen parties authorised to represent the unarmed political opposition launched a bid to take over the entire delegation that was due to go to the Dialogue, excluding all other political groups, to the great annoyance of politicians who remained in Kinshasa and the unarmed opposition based outside the country. Five seats were consequently allocated to the unarmed opposition based

selecting Mai Mai delegates and new representatives from the unarmed political opposition would be decided at a later meeting. However, nothing else was agreed upon for the remaining items on the agenda. By then, the debates over power-sharing in the transition government were already moving to centre stage, and in hindsight, the Abuja meeting was a warning signal for the future blockages at Sun City.

The MLC rebels proposed a revolving presidency every three years, giving the seat of prime minister to the unarmed political opposition and the presidency of the Parliament to the *Forces vives de la nation*. The government immediately rejected the proposal, stating that the post of head of state was neither vacant nor negotiable. Instead, it put forward the idea of two vice-presidencies for the two rebel elements, giving the seat of prime minister to the unarmed opposition and the presidency of Parliament to the *Forces vives*.<sup>4</sup> Faced with the government's intransigence over the presidency issue, the MLC promptly declared that it was no longer interested in attending another meeting, while the RCD flexed its military muscles and declared that it intended “to continue the fight to the final victory”.<sup>5</sup> The summit between Joseph Kabila, Jean-Pierre Bemba and Adolphe Onosumba, which was supposed to prepare the ground for an eventual political agreement, was thus postponed indefinitely.

In the wake of the meeting, the so-called radical unarmed opposition (UDPS, FONUS, MPR-Fait privé, PALU, PDSC, MNC-L) vehemently

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outside of the Congo, at least thirty for the fifteen parties present at Addis Ababa, and another twenty for the remaining groups who were still excluded from the Dialogue. In the end, the three belligerents reached an agreement to reduce their own delegation to fifty-five participants, which matched the number given to the unarmed political opposition. Exceptionally, the number allocated to the *forces vives* increased to seventy one representatives, while the RCD-ML retained its original number of nine. It was also agreed that the traditional chiefs would be incorporated into the belligerents' delegations. Thus, the total number of participants dropped from three hundred and thirty to three hundred. See “Minutes of the consultations between the Congolese signatory parties of the Lusaka Accords”, Abuja, 7 and 8 December 2001.

<sup>4</sup> “The unspoken issue of the Abuja meeting: the belligerents battle for the presidency”, *Le Phare*, 12 December 2001.

<sup>5</sup> “The DRC to keep up hostilities”, AFP, 8 December 2001.

opposed the Abuja recommendations, arguing that they violated the principle adopted at Lusaka in May 2001, granting each group the freedom to select its own delegates<sup>6</sup>. The radical faction also condemned Joseph Kabila's attempt to undermine it by trying to incorporate parties linked to the government into its contingent. In effect, since 4 December, Joseph Kabila had been entering into parallel "consultations" with certain members of the unarmed political opposition<sup>7</sup> and was pressuring the Congo-Brazzaville government to prevent the radical opposition from holding a private meeting in Pointe-Noire on 18 December 2001.<sup>8</sup>

In January, the Belgian government tried to stem the growing malaise in the ranks of the unarmed political opposition and civil society, which felt increasingly squeezed out of the negotiations, by organising talks between the two groups in Brussels. A consensus was reached on a number of key points that were later included in the final resolutions at Sun City and in the Bemba-Kabila framework agreement. These included a short transition of no longer than thirty months; the acceptance of Joseph Kabila as head of state but with the appointment of a prime minister; the creation of an Independent Electoral Commission, a High Authority for the Media, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a Human Rights Monitor and a commission to oversee the contracts signed during the two wars; the drafting of a transition Constitution, maintaining a highly decentralised but unified state after transition, etc. The Congolese government participated in the Brussels talks as an observer, but the UDPS, the FONUS and the two rebel movements refused to attend.<sup>9</sup> By then, the tensions that would later cause gridlock at the Sun City dialogue had well and truly taken root.

However, bowing to international pressure, the three belligerents agreed to meet again from 4-8 February in Geneva. From the outset, the RCD asked the government to make a solemn

commitment to stop supporting the war in Kivu. The government responded by saying that it wanted to defer the issue until the next meeting of the joint military commission in Luanda. In the light of this, the RCD decided to suspend its participation in the talks, but remained there to monitor progress as an observer. This left the MLC and the government alone to continue negotiations, which led to an agreement over the system of choosing the Mai Mai delegation and the division of political seats within the RCD-ML.<sup>10</sup> However, no consensus was reached over the method of designating the twenty extra delegates from the unarmed political opposition.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, discussions continued over most of the questions raised at the Brussels meeting. Although no concrete accord was reached, it allowed the MLC and the government to move closer to an agreement on the principles and timeframe governing the transition, on future elections and on the guidelines for establishing a national army.

In the end, although the political preparation for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue at Sun City was far more advanced than it had been at Addis Ababa, it was still insufficient. The issue of who would make up the additional list of the unarmed political opposition was the breaking point for the MLC.<sup>12</sup> The RCD was none the happier with its failure to get an agreement on halting the war in the East since the meeting of the joint military commission that was due to be held in Luanda on 11 February was postponed indefinitely by the Angolan government.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> "Unarmed opposition rejects conclusions of Abuja", *Le Potentiel* 12 December 2001.

<sup>7</sup> "Joseph Kabila returns to pre-talk discussions for Inter-Congolese Dialogue", AFP, 12 December 2001

<sup>8</sup> "DRC: Opposition parties accuse government of preventing a meeting", AFP, 19 December 2001.

<sup>9</sup> "Accord reached in Brussels between the non-belligerents", IRIN, 21 January 2001.

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<sup>10</sup> They suggested to the Facilitator that each belligerent send him a list of four Mai Mai who, under his facilitation, would choose between them the six representatives to take part in the negotiations. They also proposed that for the RCD-ML, three seats should be allocated to the RCD-National faction headed by Roger Lumbala, two to the RCD-ML-Bunia faction headed by John Tibasiima, two to the RCD-ML-Beni/Butembo under Mbusa Nyamwisi and a further two to the RCD-ML/Kisangani faction led by Professor Wamba dia Wamba.

<sup>11</sup> "Minutes of the informal consultations between Congolese parties signatories to the Lusaka Accord over representation at the Inter-Congolese negotiations", Geneva, 4-8 February 2002.

<sup>12</sup> "Dialogue: The MLC calls for change in opposition representatives", AFP, 12 February 2001.

<sup>13</sup> "Talks in Luanda between belligerents of DRC conflict annulled", AFP, 11 February 2002.

As a consequence, the pre-dialogue summit between Joseph Kabila, Jean-Pierre Bemba and Adolphe Onosumba, aimed at finalising a preliminary political agreement essential to the success of Sun City, never took place. Moreover, the parallel meetings held in the wake of the Addis failure between the leaders of Angola, Uganda, the DRC and Rwanda failed to achieve a *rapprochement*. Angola and Uganda's initiative to set up a united bloc dubbed the CAUR (Congo, Angola, Uganda and Rwanda), based on the same coalition that had overthrown Mobutu in 1997, failed when Rwanda refused to be included, on the grounds that it doubted the bloc's ability to tackle the problem of ALiR disarmament.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, despite all these uncertainties, Ketumile Masire still maintained the date of 25 February for the start of the Dialogue.

## B. CHRONICLE OF BLOCKAGES FORETOLD

The new chapter in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, when it resumed on 25 February at Sun City, was characterised by a series of blockages, many of which were the direct result of insufficient political preparation for the meeting. The first ten days of the dialogue were paralysed by unresolved quarrels over the composition of the unarmed political opposition delegation. The MLC refused to participate in the debates until the issue had been satisfactorily resolved. The only solution proposed by the facilitation team was to increase the overall number of delegates to 359.<sup>15</sup> After this, the clash between the government and the rebel movements over the question of power-sharing blocked all the work of the Legal and Political Commission.

The RCD-Goma and the MLC had gone to Sun City with one common priority: replacing Kabila as leader during the transition period, while the government went there with its aim of validating

Kabila's Presidency. The delegates had to continue their work for a short period in the absence of the government. On 14 March, troops serving the RCD and the RPA entered the coastal town of Moliro, on Lake Tanganyika, creating the perfect pretext for the government delegation to walk out of the talks. Predictably, in the absence of a basic agreement over the common interests of the foreign belligerents, war continued to rage in the East, and the belligerents resorted to military intimidation in order to gain political ground.

The RCD-APR's invasion of Moliro turned out to be a public relations disaster for Rwanda. It was sanctioned by Security Council resolution 1399, demanding the immediate withdrawal of troops from the town. In the end, however, Kigali succeeded in convincing MONUC to request the departure of the Forces armées congolaises (FAC) from Moliro, pulling off a crippling military humiliation for Joseph Kabila just as he was promoting himself as the incontestable transition leader. Moreover, a week after withdrawing from Moliro, the RCD protested strongly against the return of FAC units to the town. This not only served to highlight MONUC's total inability to guarantee the permanent demilitarisation of a strategic position but also gave the RCD another reason not to pull out of Kisangani<sup>16</sup>. For the Dialogue, the Moliro episode signalled quite clearly that the Sun City talks would be played out according to the power relations on the ground.

A new stalemate emerged in the Dialogue at the end of March, two weeks before the end of the negotiations, over the question of creating a national army. The government withdrew its participation in the Defence and Security Commission after categorically refusing to adopt a resolution to restructure and integrate the armed forces into any other base than the existing government army. Instead, it demanded that the structure of the FAC be maintained and units from the rebel forces be integrated into it. This position was obviously unacceptable for the two rebel movements, which called for a complete merger of the three forces.

In the end, the complete lack of mediation between the belligerents and their foreign allies did nothing

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<sup>14</sup> ICG interviews with representatives of the Ugandan government, Kampala, January-February 2002.

<sup>15</sup> The composition of each delegation was increased to sixty-eight participants, and the RCD-ML's to sixteen. The group of 15 parties present in Gaborone obtained three representatives instead of two, and the group of twenty additional representatives from the internal unarmed political opposition was reduced to eighteen, excluding two controversial figures: the alternative leader of the UDPS, Kibassa Maliba, and the former Mobutist loyalist Vunduawe Te Pemako.

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<sup>16</sup> Since June 2000, several Security Council resolutions have called on the RCD to demilitarise Kisangani.



to resolve the deep-rooted conflicts, and since Ketumile Masire had always perceived his role as being extremely minimalist, and more logistical than political, the key debates were totally paralysed. Masire was not even capable of putting to good use the exceptional team of commissioners at his disposal (Mustapha Niassa, Abdusalam Abubakar, Amadou Ould Abdallah, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and Albert Tevoedjré), mainly because he had simply failed to draw up a strategy to involve them. Indeed, several of the commissioners were so disgruntled with the situation that they decided to leave Sun City in the middle of the debates.

Luckily for the Dialogue, pressure from Congolese public opinion and the unarmed components (civil society and political opposition) succeeded in getting the negotiations back on track, and work was at least able to continue in four out of five commissions (social, cultural and humanitarian affairs, economy and finance, peace and reconciliation and security and defence). In addition, international pressure and the intervention of South-African President Thabo Mbeki a few days before the end of the negotiations put the question of President Kabila's status back on the agenda, resulting in the signature of a minimum transition agreement between two of the three belligerents.

For the most part, the results achieved during the forty-five days of negotiations were technical resolutions assessing the requirements for international aid and reconciliation. All of the commissions postponed discussions of the politically sensitive questions, and left them to be dealt with by future transitional bodies. The Economic and Financial Commission, for example, deferred the issue of revising commercial contracts signed since the first Congo War to a parliamentary investigative committee due to be set up during the transition. Likewise, the Peace and Reconciliation Commission decided to leave the citizenship debate to the transitional national assembly, whilst recognising the validity of "rights acquired" by communities and nationalities that made up the Congo at independence. The task of identifying nationals and carrying out a census of "immigrants, refugees and infiltrators" was also left to the transitional government.

Similarly, the Defence and Security Commission left it to the transition government to create a mechanism to organise the "restructuring and

integration of the armed forces" from troops belonging to current FAC (government) units, Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC, Adolphe Onosumba's RCD-Goma, Mbusa Nyamwisi's RCD-Mouvement de libération (RCD-ML), Roger Lumbala's RCD-National and the Mai Mai forces. The real stakes of the negotiations were therefore left entirely to the Legal and Political Commission, which was in a complete impasse for most of the talks since the government spent five weeks demanding recognition of Kabila as a precondition to talks on power-sharing, while the RCD and MLC insisted on his withdrawal.

### C. THE WINNING TICKET

The official negotiations over power-sharing did not begin until Monday 8 April, four days before the official closing date, and after the arrival of Thabo Mbeki. They lasted twelve days. During the preceding weeks, no draft document had been submitted for discussion, and President Mbeki put forward his two plans, "Mbeki I" and "Mbeki II" in a context of total lack of preparation. The first turning point came on his first official day in Sun City, when the Congolese government, buoyed up by international support for the special status of President Kabila, announced its return to the negotiating table with a power-sharing proposal. The next day, on April 9, the MLC abandoned its precondition of a *tabula rasa* for power-brokering in Kinshasa, and declared that it accepted Kabila as president. On the same day, however, the RCD announced in a press conference that it was sticking to its non-negotiable position of rejecting Kabila.

The next turning point in the dialogue came when President Mbeki put forward his second proposal, "Mbeki II". Because it was clearly and disproportionately favourable to the RCDs demands, it spurred the government and the MLC to reject all possibilities of a RCD-Goma "victory" and to speed up the negotiations. The plan included offering RCD-Goma a first vice-presidency, putting it in charge of the ministries of defence and the interior, the security services and of organising the elections. For Jean-Pierre Bemba and Joseph Kabila, the South African mediator had not left them much more than the job of inaugurating flower shows. The two leaders counter attacked by producing a joint alternative proposal that dramatically reduced the political ambitions of

RCD-Goma. In a show of nationalism, the counter-proposal received the instant backing of the majority of participants, who were eager to avoid power-sharing solutions dictated by the RCD and above all, its ally Rwanda.

The political progress that emerged from Sun City was obviously not just down to luck. Between Addis Ababa and Sun City, all the participants and their allies were busy preparing strategies and forging important contacts. Regular meetings were held between Luanda and Kampala, Kinshasa and Gbadolite for most of the year, with encouragement from the United States, France and Belgium. These produced a consensus on several issues, including backing for the special status of President Kabila during the Dialogue, the need to withdraw foreign troops, especially those around the mining capitals of Lubumbashi, Mbuji Mayi and Kisangani, the reunification of the Congo and its transition towards elections<sup>17</sup>. For its part, certain members of the RCD called for the resurrection of the AFDL axis. Rwanda, shored up by its alliance with South Africa, also maintained contacts with Kinshasa over the question of ALiR disarmament and power-sharing. Despite all this, however, the intransigence and general suspicion of the protagonists, and the absence of any real mediation, meant that the contacts eventually turned sour. The two competing camps rallied in favour of the Dialogue, each side hoping that it could eventually count on the support of the unarmed opposition. The MLC, which had initially given its support to the RCD, was clearly in a better position to persuade participants to back a solution that they would see as strictly Congolese.

However, numerous attempts were made to include RCD in negotiations and to produce an inclusive agreement. Even the British Secretary of State Claire Short, among others, attempted to broker a compromise between the government and the MLC. Yet there was no doubt that it was RCD-Goma and Rwanda's surprising readiness to accept failure that caused the MLC and Joseph Kabila to conclude the talks without them.

The accord struck by the government and the MLC, supported by the civil society and the

majority of the political opposition, remains a framework agreement. It allots the presidency to Joseph Kabila president, the seat of prime minister to Jean-Pierre Bemba and the presidencies of the National Assembly and the Senate to RCD-Goma and the unarmed political opposition, respectively. But in reality, the agreement is completely un-operational. The responsibilities of each transitional body are ill-defined and consist only of a series of guiding principles that are too vague to allow a real balance of power within the executive. The MLC and the government therefore suggested giving the post of vice-prime minister in charge of the defence to RCD-Goma, but exactly how power-sharing would be divided between the defence minister, the head of state, the prime minister and vice-prime minister remains to be defined. One of the key proposals in the MLC-government agreement, inspired by the Mbeki plan, was to create a Higher Council for Defence which would be presided by the head of state but allow equal representation for each of the three belligerents.<sup>18</sup>

The door has been left open for RCD-Goma, which should seize the opportunity. As the signatories of the accord openly admitted, finalising proposals for the agreement will require at least two or three months of supplementary negotiations.<sup>19</sup> If the partial agreement as well as the work that was accomplished in the commission and adopted in plenary become inclusive, this could constitute the basis for a serious discussion on a shared political plan, but only if all the participants agree to play the game.

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<sup>17</sup> ICG interviews with representatives of the governments of Uganda, France, Belgium and America, October-April 2002.

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<sup>18</sup> ICG interviews with representatives of the MLC and the government, Sun City, 12 April 2002.

<sup>19</sup> ICG interviews with representatives of the MLC and the government, Sun City, 12 April 2002.

### III. "GAME OVER"?: NO NEW POLITICAL ORDER ON THE HORIZON FOR THE CONGO

#### A. THE KABILA-BEMBA WAGER

The partial agreement between the government and the MLC was the minimum result required to save the face of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue that began badly, was poorly organised and expensive. It allowed the peace process to move forward after being blocked by the political and military dimensions of the Lusaka accord, and also put an end to the Congo's marginalisation on the international scene. Over the last ten years, Mobutu's Zaire then Laurent Kabila's DRC have been subjected to a de facto embargo, making them easy prey for the expansionist appetites of neighbouring countries. The international community, particularly the France-Belgium-United States troika, felt that it was time to put an end to the disintegration of the country and to reduce the role of neighbouring countries in proportion to their size and strategic interests. The success of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and recognition of Joseph Kabila as head of state were necessary in order for Western governments to resume normal diplomatic and economic relations with the DRC and for international donors to resurrect international the aid that had been suspended under Mobutu and Kabila the elder. Such were the objectives behind the troika's efforts to broker an agreement, even a partial one, at Sun City. No sooner had the accord been signed, than the World Bank and the DRC government signed a loan agreement amounting to some 450 million dollars to finance the budget and economic reforms and 454 million dollars to fund the reconstruction of social and economic infrastructures<sup>20</sup>. On 3 May, the director general of the IMF, Horst Koehler, was in Kinshasa, declaring that the IMF wished to "help the DRC overcome the difficult situation it has been faced with for so long," through a DDRRR (demobilisation, disarmament, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement) programme and a triennial programme based on the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)<sup>21</sup>.

The troika backed the accord in the hope that it would secure Kabila's power and allow him to re-establish the state's authority in the Equator and eastern province and recoup MLC troops to start building an army. Angola had already been given the green light from the United States, France and Belgium to take an active part in the reorganisation and reinforcement of the FAC. It was thought that an alliance with Jean-Pierre Bemba could change the balance of power with Rwanda and cause Kabila to withdraw his support for ALiR, even perhaps for the Burundian rebels in the CNDD-FDD.

Keeping Joseph Kabila at the helm was Kinshasa's only real demand at the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. The Sun City accord also gratified the personal ambitions of Jean-Pierre Bemba by offering him the position of prime minister. But the accord also achieved other important political results. Firstly, it represented a political victory for Kabila on the issue of sovereignty. By winning the backing of the MLC, the RCD-ML and the RCD-N, the president could claim that he was including the Equateur, the eastern province and a part of north Kivu in the governmental party, and thus symbolically re-unifying 60 per cent of the country. Moreover, this allowed him to squash the anti-Kabila coalition and isolate Rwanda, which was perceived more clearly as the enemy of Congolese unity. Secondly, the Sun City accord gave Kinshasa an undeniable military advantage. Not only would MLC soldiers be joining the ranks of the FAC to become a far more powerful military force, but the zone occupied by Rwanda would be officially encircled by hostile troops to the north, west and south.

Finally, the deal satisfied the Kinshasa-Luanda-Kampala axis, which had emerged over time as the driving force behind the peace process. Angola, which had long been reluctant to accept Bemba due to former connections of certain ex-Mobutists, MLC members, with UNITA, finally approved his return to Kinshasa in exchange for specific guarantees. First, that it would be in no-one's interest to see political dinosaurs from the Mobutu era return to power, and that a new generation of politicians, even the sons of Mobutist politicians,<sup>22</sup> should be given priority in the new government.

<sup>20</sup> *La Référence plus*, Kinshasa, 4 May 2002.

<sup>21</sup> IRIN, 3 May 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Jean Pierre Bemba is the son of Saolona Bemba, an influential businessman under Mobutu.

This condition was strongly supported by the Americans.<sup>23</sup> Secondly, there was a clear recognition that the accord would only stand up if Bemba abandoned his presidential ambitions, and did not use his men to overthrow a weakened Kabila. Jean-Pierre Bemba had actually been heard several times before and during the Dialogue comparing his military achievements to Kabila's, and boasting that he was better suited to lead the nation than the president. In exchange for its support, Uganda asked Angola to force Kabila to flush out his "hardliners" and especially his pro-Zimbabwean entourage.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, the political achievements described above were a double-edged sword, a fact that obviously weakens the accord. The Sun City agreement is not rooted in a shared vision or a common plan between its signatories. Simply dividing up political posts and privileges is not enough to establish a "new political order in the Congo". Mbusa Nyamwisi of the RCD-ML, Roger Lumbala of the RCD-National and most representatives of the unarmed political opposition and civil society who gave their backing to the framework agreement did so out of opportunism. The accord offered them a political conversion, revenge against the Rwandans or quite simply a chance to return to Sun City with a post. For certain members of the MLC, fatigue with the Gbadolite "forest" and the desire to return to their affairs in Kinshasa lent convenient impetus to the political imperative to "restore the integrity of the national territory". Unfortunately, the distribution of posts bore too great a resemblance to the 1991 National Conference and echoed the failings of the Mobutist system and its leisured political class. The rapid negotiation of a transition constitution – which is still ongoing – is no substitute for a real vision for the future of the country.

Moreover, as previously mentioned, the calculation was based on the presumption that Jean-Pierre Bemba and Kabila's allies would be able to boost Kabila's military presence with Angola's support, reduce Zimbabwean influence and allow the government to abandon its reliance upon the ex-

FAR.<sup>25</sup> Yet no real guarantees have been put forward to back up this ideal DDRRR scenario that might be sufficient to appease the conscience of the West. Kabila's so-called "partner" Angola, despite clearly having the resources, has not taken control of the airstrips where small planes carrying provisions for the ALiR still take off and land in the Kivus. Nor has it begun arresting genocide suspects living in the capital Kinshasa, where it has total police control, and transferring them to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as requested again in January by the tribunal's registrar Adama Dieng. Finally, the country has yet to demonstrate its potentially decisive influence over the future of Congolese affairs as a replacement for Robert Mugabwe's Zimbabwe.

Furthermore, the young age of the new generation of politicians, especially President Joseph Kabila, provides no guarantees that one day the Congo will not slide back into a classic power structure such as that used during Mobutu's leadership. In other words, the construction of a central power base in the capital, propped up by external aid and international military and diplomatic support, which has little real control over the country. It is not impossible that a young Joseph Kabila, lacking a solid political base and supported by the international community like Joseph Mobutu in 1965, with no army of his own or the ability to wield his authority over the country, might quickly become complicit, even against his will, in building exactly the same type of prebendary police dictatorship in Kinshasa. It must be recalled that one of the major causes of the two wars in the Congo was the abandonment of national structures and the role of the state, and that it is only by building strong institutions and a legitimate government that such a recurrence will be prevented.

Moreover, although a formal consensus was reached by the external participants over neutralising the Mobutists, the price to be paid for boosting Kabila's power may be to hand back power to some of them. There are two reasons for such a concern. If no agreement is reached with Rwanda, Kabila's government will need to rally all the support it can muster. The wealthy former Congolese backers, who boast a vast network of

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<sup>23</sup> ICG interviews, U.S. State Department participants and observers of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Sun City, April 2002.

<sup>24</sup> ICG, Ugandan diplomats, 24 April 2002.

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<sup>25</sup> ICG interview, U.S. State Department 15 April 2002.

political and business relations, would be a welcome crutch, all the more so because they are set on taking revenge on Rwanda after being overthrown and chased into exile in 1997. They have a bad reputation but would at least seem less criminal and embarrassing than the ex-FAR, which the Kinshasa regime is still backing militarily to drive the APR out of Kivu. In such a scenario, it would still be possible to claim, as did President Kabila in a recent interview in *Le Soir*, that he is “opening the door to reconciliation.”<sup>26</sup>

The other possibility is that Jean Pierre Bemba could call on the same backers to bolster his own power with respect to his burdensome patron, Uganda, or his partners and political adversaries, the government and the RCD, by resorting either to a putsch or to elections. Uganda’s objective for supporting Sun City was obviously to come out from the dialogue a “winner” and to be seen as the driving force behind an accord that allowed a peaceful political transition for the Congolese, while at the same time teaching Rwanda a political lesson.<sup>27</sup> Uganda was evidently convinced that Joseph Kabila’s weak political base meant that he would not pose a threat to the transition and that its protégé Bemba would be well-placed for the elections in two years’ time. At the same time, however, the possibility of Bemba’s rapid rise thanks to his Congolese connections is embarrassing for the Ugandan leadership. Relations between the MLC and Uganda have changed since the Ugandan army put a check on Bemba’s military ambitions. Museveni also increased the number of rebel groups under his protection, and justified this by saying that: “a good hunter rears many hunting dogs because he cannot know in advance which one will be the best.”<sup>28</sup>

It is clear that the MLC, which took the lion’s share in the Sun City accord, is keen to set up the transition government as quickly as possible so it can establish itself in the country before the principle of power-sharing is called into question. In Kinshasa, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s father, Bemba Saolona, has already begun interviewing future

candidates for ministries and the management of quasi-government companies. Olivier Kamitatu, who arrived in Kinshasa as soon as the accord was signed, is already seeking teams for the eight MLC ministers who will participate in the transition government. Having observed all this, the Ugandans now seem reluctant to see the government up and running quite so quickly, and are calling for the creation of a commission to draw up a list of areas of agreement and disagreement so as to keep the MLC – government negotiations ticking and also play for time.

The Kinshasa government is also dubious of Bemba’s real intentions, and would doubtless prefer a triangular relationship between itself, the RCD and the MLC to a tête-à-tête with the MLC. It increasingly favours the idea of re-examining the Sun City accord in light of negotiations on the transition constitution, which are due to take place in Matadi in the month of May.<sup>29</sup> This wait-and-see position could be motivated by the willingness to leave the door open to the RCD, but also by the president’s unease at seeing some of his prerogatives escape him, right at the time when he himself is attempting to consolidate control over his government. In the same interview with *Le Soir*, he claimed that he was not ready to share control of the army, although the framework agreement provides for the creation of a higher council for defence.<sup>30</sup> Bemba himself is concerned about his own personal safety, and has requested a praetorian guard of some 3,000 men for his return to Kinshasa.

Nevertheless, the two partners seem intent on setting up their government and the transitional national assembly first, and negotiating with Rwanda afterwards. Kabila and Bemba have each written a letter to President Mbeki requesting him to take note of the new dynamics that have emerged since the Sun City talks, and to agree to change the framework of negotiations.<sup>31</sup> In their letters, they state that the new government will be installed on 15 June and invite Mbeki to assist in mediating bilateral negotiations with Rwanda. The Congolese government also called on the RCD to

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<sup>26</sup> President Kabila’s interview with the newspaper *Le Soir*, 3 May 2002.

<sup>27</sup> ICG interview with representatives of the Ugandan government, 10 May 2002.

<sup>28</sup> “M7’s dog that broke away from the Pack”, Charles Onyango-Obbo, *The East African*, 29 April 2002.

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<sup>29</sup> *Le Potentiel*, 4 May 2002.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with President Kabila, *Le Soir*, 3 May 2002.

<sup>31</sup> The letter from President Kabila was handed to president Mbeki to by the minister Katumba on 7 May 2002.

“take the leap towards nationalism with a view to becoming a signatory of the accord,” but at the same time accused Rwanda of reinforcing its troops in the RCD-occupied territories.<sup>32</sup>

In this critical phase of the peace process it is essential that the international community promote clear principles of good governance and encourage the participants to commit to upholding them. From this perspective, the objective is clearly not to provoke a systematic witch-hunt of Mobutists. Politicians, businessmen or top civil servants who served under the Mobutu regime and now hold positions of responsibility are not necessarily an enemy of good governance in the Congo. Moreover, the country will not be able to do without the skills and experience of a large number of professionals from the Mobutu era. For example, a number of young FAZ officers who were trained abroad have recently been promoted to the FAC headquarters in the hope that they can take charge of reforming the army. The international community should nevertheless make sure that the struggle for democratisation that began in the 1990s is not completely forgotten. Certain people, both soldiers and politicians, are the symbols of a disgraceful past, the practices of which should never be allowed to reoccur. The Congo is too badly in need of effective resource management to see its riches squandered, as in the past. In the same vein, it is vital not to confuse state authority with a police regime. The Congo needs a legitimate administrative and political system, which is recognised as such by the whole population, and not a harsh police regime that monitors the political activities of the unarmed opposition or civil society. Such clear principles for good governance must be promoted and maintained by the international community at all costs.

## **B. THE “PAX RWANDANA” OPTION**

Although the Bemba/Kabila scenario carries the risk of incomplete negotiations and a return to all-too-familiar patterns, the alternative proposed by the RCD and its Rwandan ally does not offer much more hope for peace. Initially, the Rwandan strategy in the Congo was certainly governed by

security interests motivated by the 1994 genocide and the existence of a threat from the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe in the Congo. Now, the presence of more than 25,000 ALiR<sup>33</sup> soldiers in the Congo continues to pose an undeniable security problem for Rwanda and the Kagame regime, especially since these soldiers are increasingly courted by the Hutu and Tutsi government opponents. However, since 1996, other interests, both economic and political, have cropped up in addition to the Rwandan presence in the Congo. Consequently, Kigali has come to view the Kivus as a crucial area to control and hold onto at any cost, ignoring the hatred that this policy may incite.

At first, the RCD was quick to criticise the Sun City accord, alleging that the agreement was the result of foreign manipulation and a coup d'état against the Lusaka accords. It called for an immediate return to Sun City and the continuation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue under the auspices of the Masire facilitation team. It also immediately formalised the alliances established during the dialogue and created the Alliance for the Preservation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ASD), which brought together the RCD, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) headed by Etienne Tshisekedi, the “Dynamic for a Neutral Transition” headed by Raphaël Katebe Katoto (DPTN), the Congolese/Lumumba National Movement (MNC/L) headed by François Lumumba, the Lumumbist Progressive Movement (MLP), and the Party for a New Society (RNS), among other parties. The creation of the ASD was an attempt to harness the legitimacy of those who were traditionally opposed to Mobutu and to hide behind a legalistic and formalistic attitude as the defender of the Lusaka accords. Such an attitude, moreover, left the door wide open to all those who were unhappy with, and felt excluded from, the Sun City accord. It is noteworthy in this respect that all the leaders of this alliance were candidates for president or prime minister: Tshisekedi (UDPS), Katebe Katoto (DPTN), François Lumumba (MNC/L), Ruberwa (RCD).

Realising that its strategy was not working, the RCD then declared that it was ready to accept Kabila and to negotiate under a reduced team with presidents Mbeki, Mwanawasa of Zambia and

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<sup>32</sup> “Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of reinforcing its troops in eastern DRC”, AFP, 11 May 2002.

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<sup>33</sup> The April 2002 MONUC report on the armed groups indicates that there are 12,000 ALiR in the Kivus.

Masire serving as mediators, but insisted that the post of Prime Minister be reserved for the RCD. Unfortunately for the RCD, its attitude during the Sun City negotiations did not lend credibility to this position, nor did its track record of agreements with the Kinshasa government since Kabila came to power in January 2001.<sup>34</sup> For a year, the international community encouraged direct negotiations between President Kabila and President Kagame, and between government and RCD teams with two subjects on the agenda: the disarmament of the ex-FAR, who were supported by the FAC, and power-sharing in Kinshasa. President Kabila had even offered the RCD the position of Prime Minister before the first round of the Addis Ababa dialogue, proposing Adolphe Onusumba, president of the RCD, for the post. However, the Congolese Tutsi minority in the RCD and their Rwandan allies refused, claiming that it was up to them to choose a Prime Minister, not Kabila. The problem, in fact, was that the RCD-Banyamulenge refused to let Onusumba, a native of Kasai, represent them. Prior to the opening of the Sun City dialogue, Paul Kagame and Katumba Mwanke, the Congolese Minister to the President's Office, held a meeting that produced no results. During the meeting, Paul Kagame stated that he would not withdraw his troops from the Congo<sup>35</sup>, with or without the dialogue.

At Sun City, any number of strategies were employed to weaken Joseph Kabila, be it public discussions about his alleged Tutsi origins or the show of force by the RPA and the RCD in Moliro. Shortly after Sun City, James Kabarebe published an interview in *Jeune Afrique*, in which he talked about Joseph Kabila's "timidity", his "lack of leadership skills", the fact that he had taught Kabila everything and that he had pushed Kabila senior to appoint him deputy chief of staff of the army. Kabarebe even claims that Joseph Kabila complained about his own entourage after the death of his father.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, since the occupation of Moliro, the sound of marching boots

has continually echoed around the Great Lakes regions. Troop movements have either been confirmed by MONUC or criticised by the belligerents at every one of the strategic routes leading from the territory controlled by the RPA and the RCD-Goma to the territory controlled by the government, the MLC, the RCD-ML and the RCD-National. From North Katanga, Maniema, Kasai, North Kivu to the eastern province – no region has been spared.

In order to try and explain the inflexibility of the RCD in the power-sharing negotiations, their objectives and negotiating strategies must be examined, as well as the situation in zones occupied by the RCD and the RPA. First, in terms of security aspects, the RCD's position is clearly influenced by the Rwandan position on the issue of disarming the ALiR. Rwanda has constantly asked the Kabila government to disarm the ALiR as a prerequisite to any negotiations whatsoever. The Congolese government first wants a guarantee of a Rwandan withdrawal before giving "this gift to Kagame." Distrust continues to smoulder on both sides.

Beyond this specific demand, however, the RCD negotiating position reflects a greater desire for control over Congolese political and military life. Their position aims to establish a new army made up of troops from the three armies based on a quota system, and their objective is to take control of the Ministry of Defence<sup>37</sup>. The RCD would thus be able to integrate part of its troops, some of whom were recruited just before Sun City, and which, for the most part, is made up of Tutsis from North Kivu, Rwandan Tutsis and Congolese Hutus, into the Congolese army. They would also be able to stake a greater claim in national and local military command. The government is opposed to this solution. Referring to the Lusaka accords, it proposes the integration of the rebels into the FAC structure, which would allow it to maintain command of the army and to ensure the break up of RCD units.<sup>38</sup> Azarias Ruberwa responded to this proposal in Sun City on Monday, March 25, saying "we will not allow ourselves to be selected to send

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<sup>34</sup> See ICG Africa Report no. 38 of 14 December 2001, "Disarmament in the Congo: Jumpstarting the DDRRR to prevent further war."

<sup>35</sup> ICG interview with participants at the meeting, 24 April 2002.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with James Kabarebe: "Kabila is not fit to lead", *Jeune Afrique / L'Intelligent*, No. 2155-2156, 29 April – 12 May 2002.

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<sup>37</sup> ICG interviews with members of the RCD-Goma, October 2001, and in Sun City, April 2002.

<sup>38</sup> "Political and Legal Commission: still in an impasse", *Agence Information Dialogue* (ADIA) newsletter, www.cire.be, 3 April 2002.

a few troops to the FAC. We need to merge”.<sup>39</sup> Officially, the RCD demand in terms of security is focused on monitoring the activities of the ex-FAR in the Congo. In reality, this demand also serves to negotiate greater overall control over the security machine. This objective corresponds to an old Rwandan plan, dating back to 1996, when James Kabarebe was appointed chief of staff of the FAC, with the objective being to set up a new army for the DRC. Taking over the Ministry of Defence would ensure control over the military intelligence services, the ability to monitor threats to Rwandan security, as well as greater access to economic opportunities. This plan would also guarantee that allies remained in the FAC, with whom Rwanda could cooperate in the Kivus, and the zones that border Rwanda.

The second objective of the negotiations is to lead the Congolese to accept immediate federalism. The RCD has already established a provincial assembly in North and South Kivu and supports “immediate implementation of a federal system throughout the Congo.”<sup>40</sup> Of course, federalism means sharing resources with the provincial authorities. The RCD is especially greedy in this respect. Within the legal and political commission, the RCD’s vision of a new political order revolved around a federal system of 26 provinces, with 40% of the budget allocated to the central government, 50% to the states and only 10% allocated to equalisation!<sup>41</sup> At the same time, since the signing of the Lusaka cease-fire and the obligation to transform the war strategy into a strategy of intensive military occupation, Rwanda has been actively seeking out politicians who can act on its behalf and with whom it can form an economic partnership to exploit the resources. Rwanda has encouraged the emergence of the movement in North Kivu headed up by Victor Ngezayo, a wealthy businessman who is now trying to rally together all the Congolese who reject RCD authority but who are willing to negotiate the Rwandan presence with Kivutians.

The third objective is to obtain dual citizenship for the Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi minorities who have been transplanted to the Congo in the successive

waves of immigration to the Kivus.<sup>42</sup> Here again, this measure would help strengthen the Rwandan presence in the Kivus by allowing Rwandans or Rwandan allies to hold local government positions. The RCD has already appointed many Banyarwanda in zones controlled by its troops. Furthermore, the ex-FAR Hutus who have been reintegrated into the RPA and those who will benefit from the DDRRR program, at least 40,000 in all, are not necessarily welcome in Kigali at a time when President Kagame is seeking to consolidate his power domestically. These Hutus could remain in the Congo and take advantage of its riches. A strong Hutu and Tutsi presence in the Kivus would give Rwanda more control over the economy, in particular, coltan mining and the agricultural resources in the Kivus.

The three objectives all lead to the same interpretation: the Inter-Congolese Dialogue should result in the establishment of a local government favourable to neighbouring Rwanda, and even the legalisation of the Rwandan influence in the Kivus. The alliance formed after Sun City seems to be following the same logic, by extending this alliance strategy to local politicians in Kasai and Katanga. The ASD with Etienne Tshisekedi, François Lumumba and Raphaël Katebe Katoto, who refused to support the MLC-government framework agreement, bears the seeds of federalism. Under this scenario, the South Katanga native Katebe Katoto, who is already suspected of having fomented an attempted putsch against Joseph Kabila in September 2001, along with the Etienne Tshisekedi’s Luba from Eastern Kasai, and François Lumumba’s Mutetela from eastern Kasai, could act as privileged allies. Any separatist or regional uprising backed by the RPA’s power would considerably weaken Joseph Kabila. Nevertheless, this strategy is also a recipe for disaster, since it attempts to renew ties with the Katanga, Kasai and Kivu separatists from the 1960s but does not have the resources to bring the entire population of these provinces into the project. Katebe Katoto, a native of Lubumbashi, would only be able to rally a portion of South Katanga, and would necessarily be opposed to the Balubakat of North Katanga, represented by minister Mwenze Kongolo, who are in power in Kinshasa and are supported by Zimbabwe. He

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<sup>39</sup> ADIA newsletter, March 25, 2002.

<sup>40</sup> “The RCD Rebels Want Peace and a New Political Order”, AFP, 22 February 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Assessment report, 5<sup>th</sup> week of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Berci, March 2002.

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<sup>42</sup> “The Citizenship Issue, A Key Debate in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue”, AFP, 21 February 2002.



would also be opposed to the ex-Katanga tigers from South Katanga, who are supported by Angola. Etienne Tshisekedi, from Eastern Kasai, is also opposed to the Batetela from Eastern Kasai, who are represented in Kinshasa by minister Léonard She Okitundu.

The RCD and Rwandan calculation for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue is therefore simple. Either the maximalist positions adopted at Sun City secure the aforementioned results for the RCD, or the dialogue revives regionalist dynamics, prevents lasting reunification of the Congo and sinks the country into general chaos, thereby justifying Rwandan occupation of the two Kivus for several years to come.

Unfortunately, this ambitious strategy is just as unacceptable as it is likely to fail. Rwanda has had a poor track record in the Congo, especially in the Kivus. Two successive wars in 1996 and 1998, major human rights violations, violent occupation, its exploitation of Congo's natural resources through force, and above all, contempt and ongoing humiliation have turned the Congolese against Rwanda and the Tutsis in particular. The objective of establishing federalism, dual citizenship or creating a new army is facing resistance from the Congolese, who do not want the terms of their political system to be dictated to them while the RPA continues to exploit and occupy the Congo. In fact, Rwanda's goal of establishing a zone of Rwandan influence is thwarted by its own occupation strategy, which unites the Congolese. This occupation seems to have done more for Congolese nationalism in six years than the thirty years of Mobutu rule.

Moreover, the fiasco of the RCD and Rwanda in the Congo goes well beyond the mere failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City. Rwanda's ally, the RCD, only exists politically by virtue of its signature on the Lusaka accords. Furthermore, its political base is splintering: part of the Banyamulenge minority in South Kivu, whose survival against the "genocidaire forces" has often been presented by Kigali as an additional reason for its presence in the Congo, is openly rebelling against the RCD. One week before the dialogue, Masunzu, a munyamulenge officer who deserted the RCD forces, launched a military operation against the RCD garrison that controlled the Minembwe airport in South Kivu. Masunzu is allegedly the military leader of the Federalist

Forces Front (FRF) headed up by Müller Ruhimbika, a munyamulenge Kigali opponent since the beginning of the second war in the Congo. The Munyamulenge leader rejects in particular the RPA occupation of the Kivus, denounces its acts of violence and is calling for the mobilisation of Kivutians of all stripes against the war of aggression. Since 1997, many Banyamulenge have, in fact, felt betrayed by the RPA due to the RPA's purging of Banyamulenge from Rwandan units and the plans to permanently occupy the Kivus that they attribute to Rwanda. For them, these plans have become a much greater factor of insecurity than the traditional hostility from their Bavira, Babembe and Bafulero neighbours, against whom they know how to defend themselves.

After failed attempts involving the Burundian authorities to mediate between the RCD and Masunzu, the RPA decided at the beginning of April to take direct action and to regain control of the high plains of South Kivu. At present, there are no reliable figures as to the exact death toll caused by the fighting. However, the three-week campaign was not enough for the RPA to take full control of the situation and the sounds of heavy artillery fire could still be heard from Uvira at the end of April. The RPA suffered losses and several dozen wounded were allegedly evacuated from Minembwe directly to the hospital in Bukavu. Moreover, in the middle plains, the alliance between Masunzu and the Mai Mai commander from Uvira, Nyakabaka, proved to be especially dangerous for the RPA and RCD soldiers, who were caught in the crossfire. Recently, the latter seem to have regained control of the strategic routes leading from the high plains. However, the involvement of Hutu soldiers in the military operations was perceived by the Banyamulenge as an unbearable humiliation, not only because this meant that Rwandan Tutsis were not doing the Banyamulenge the honour of fighting for them, but because the Hutu occupation of the high plains was deemed to be true colonisation. No matter what the case, this blatant dent in the credibility of the RPA as the defender of the Tutsi minority in the Congo could only convince Kigali to rid itself of the RCD, which was incapable of garnering any popular legitimacy, even among the Banyamulenge, and to find other Congolese allies.

The Banyamulenge example is suggestive of Rwanda's inability to form lasting alliances with

the Congolese. The Congolese in the AFDL, under Laurent Kabila, rejected Rwandan domination once they got to Kinshasa. Since 1998, the RCD has split into several different movements which have all gone off in search of other sponsors. The leadership of the RCD-Goma has changed hands three times in three years and currently there are six RCD factions, which means the original core is melting away.<sup>43</sup> Contacts with Mai Mai groups or traditional Kivu leaders never produced a lasting agreement with the Rwandan government. Rwanda's obsession with security, its militaristic ideology and its desire to resolve domestic political problems by force and by instrumentalising the Congo has prevented it from accurately analysing the political situation and the interests of its Congolese allies. Any satisfaction with the "Pax Rwandana" in the Kivus or in Kinshasa would be a guarantee of chaos for the Congo.

### **C. THE OVERSIGHTS OF SUN CITY**

The Kabila-Bemba and the "Pax Rwandana" scenarios are both scenarios by default, one drawing its centre of gravity from the west and the other from the east. They are scenarios by default because neither one proposes a credible solution to the two major causes of the Congolese conflict: the lack of a nation state and the consequences of the Rwandan genocide. They are also default scenarios because the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was designed to transfer the military battle to the political arena and to be an obligatory and superficial formality in order to obtain a post and not as a true strategy for rebuilding Congolese authority throughout the country. It should be noted that every leader in the Congo since the assassination of Patrice Lumumba has come to power and maintained power thanks to foreign support. As the country is not "organised," it is logical that the regional and international war of influence in the Congo continue.

#### **1. Local Conflicts**

The Lusaka accords make no mention of local conflicts and the need to rebuild both national and local government. Yet the breakdown of the

Congolese state under Mobutu has led to a total disintegration of the political, economical and social environment of the country, especially in some of the outlying regions far from the central government such as the Kivus, Ituri or Katanga. In some cases, this deterioration has caused violent conflicts, such as the ethnic cleansing of the Baluba by the South-Katangans in Lubumbashi in 1991 or the cleansing of the Banyarwanda in Masisi in 1993. These local conflicts worsened when the two successive wars in the Congo complicated them by increasing the number of armed parties, the number of available weapons and the number of opportunities to exploit and gain power by force.

In the Kivus, a dozen Mai Mai groups are mixed in with the armed Rwandan Hutu groups of the ALiR and the Burundian Hutu groups of the FDD. The RCD and RPA leadership together is unable to control either group, particularly as both groups are mining the same coltan and are selling each other arms. In South Kivu the Banyamulenge now have their own rebel group, as mentioned above. In Ituri, the conflicts between the Hema and the Lendu over land and natural resources have been fuelled by the interests of local shopkeepers and Ugandan army officers, and the appearance of mercenary militias who are hiring out their services to the shopkeepers. In theory, this territory is controlled by the RCD-ML with backing from Uganda. However, the distrust between Mbusa Nyamwisi and John Tibasiima within the RCD-ML, which reflects the conflicts of interest between the Nande and Hema communities, has already led to serious incidents. The result of this fragmentation is advanced militarisation of the society and the emergence of an economy of war, destroying all civil authority.

Rebuilding local government obviously requires a resolution of the conflict in Kinshasa. However, the restructuring of the national government throughout the DRC should automatically be accompanied by a process of local reconciliation and a dialogue between the national authorities and protagonists in the local conflicts. Power sharing in Kinshasa should not come at the expense of maintaining the warlords in the eastern part of the country, and should include clear and credible terms for restoring civilian order and authority in the country.

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<sup>43</sup> RCD-Goma, RCD-Kisangani, RCD-ML, RCD-NL, RCD-Original and RCD-Authentic, with the latter two appearing during and after Sun City.

## 2. Regional Rivalries

The framework agreement between the MLC and the Congolese government is a direct reflection of a shift in regional alliances and illustrates the growing isolation of Rwanda, the only party to the conflict that still has security concerns. The agreement also crystallises the rapprochement between Angola and Uganda, which Zimbabwe has no choice but to accept for the time being since it is too crippled by its own internal political problems. However, this model could either bring about partial peace, or it could fuel a new war of influence in Kinshasa.

Efforts must now be made to prevent any settling of accounts between the neighbouring countries at the Congo's expense. Kampala's over confidence vis-à-vis the partial agreement between the government and the MLC in Sun City, and the isolation of the RCD is starting to resemble the beginnings of Uganda's revenge on Rwanda. President Museveni wants to show that his political solution will prevail this time in Kinshasa, unlike the first war, which saw the Rwandan influence triumph along with Kabila in 1997. Indeed, despite efforts by the United Kingdom to mediate, the two enemy brothers of the Great Lakes continue to compete with each other. Pursuit of this leadership squabble may well be at the expense of the Congolese people, who are the main victims of the three clashes in Kisangani. The two capitals should be reminded that before they can assert any sort of regional political power, they must first pay for the destruction of Kisangani, and that their military violence in the Congo will not go unpunished.

At the same time, echoing the Uganda-Rwanda leadership quarrel is the quiet rivalry between Angola, South Africa and Zimbabwe for the leadership of SADC and the dividends of peace in the Congo. South Africa, the preferred ally of Kigali, is perceived by Luanda not as a neutral mediator, but as a rival trying to use the peace process to establish its political influence in central Africa. The South African minister of defence went to Kinshasa in September 2001 to propose a plan to the Congolese government for military and security cooperation that aims to reorganise and strengthen the FAC. This was an alternative to the current plan spearheaded by Angola. Similarly, the second draft agreement proposed by Thabo Mbeki in Sun City was submitted for approval by the Rwandan government. This plan also

accommodated the ambitions of the RCD "beyond all expectations",<sup>44</sup> by providing for an all-powerful vice presidency similar to that of Paul Kagame under Pasteur Bizimungu. Luanda did not appreciate this attempt by South Africa to impose a Rwandan solution on the conflict.

Moreover, at the opening of the Sun City proceedings, President Mbeki clearly stated South Africa's motivations for wanting to host and finance a major portion of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. South African investors stand ready to stream into the country as soon as the Congolese agree on the political future of their country. In particular, restoration of the Inga hydroelectric dam and expansion of its production capacity has been slated as a priority regional development project for southern Africa under NEPAD,<sup>45</sup> and South African businessmen clearly intend to take charge.

However, Zimbabwe sees South African economic penetration of the Congo as a danger. Robert Mugabe has often stressed the fact that his military partnership with the Congolese government is a long-term investment for Zimbabwe. In addition to the fact that Zimbabwean soldiers have accumulated personal wealth from the mining of diamonds in Kasai, the government of Zimbabwe sees the Congo as a new frontier where it can find the resources it needs to rebuild its economy, which has been devastated by the suspension of international aid. In fact, South Africa's economic ambitions for the Congo directly conflict with those of Zimbabwe, whose leaders are still bitter over the Mozambican experience in which they claim they financed the lion's share of the war effort but were robbed of the benefits of reconstruction by South African companies. Once again, the Congolese peace process may be crippled by the political and economic rivalries between SADC members. Since South Africa is neither an objective nor an impartial mediator, it must provide guarantees before it is given the task of finalising the political agreement for the

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<sup>44</sup> ICG interview with a representative from the RCD military headquarters, Sun City, 12 April 2002.

<sup>45</sup> "New Partnership for Development" (NEPAD). Continent-wide project pushed by Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria and Wade of Senegal to stimulate private investments in Africa and to promote regional integration of infrastructures and domestic markets.

Congolese transition. In particular, it must win the support not only of the foreign belligerents, but also of the five parties to the dialogue.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION: MOVING BEYOND LUSAKA WHILE ADHERING TO THE PRINCIPLES**

The failure of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue calls into question the imposed framework of Lusaka and demands that the negotiations be refocused on the essential themes of the agreement. The complementary and inextricable nature of the three pillars of the Lusaka accords (disarmament of the negative forces, withdrawal of foreign troops and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue) cannot be overlooked.

##### **A. NEUTRALISING THE GENOCIDAIRES: AN ISSUE THAT CANNOT BE IGNORED**

None of the negotiations on power sharing in Kinshasa or the withdrawal of foreign troops will succeed unless the issue of disarming the Rwandan Liberation Army (ALiR) is tackled in a credible and practicable way. The Congolese government continues to support the ALiR, which shows that the war has not ended. This issue must be resolved within the context of an overall political solution to the conflict through continued mediation between Rwanda and the Kinshasa government and its allies.

It is therefore urgent that Kabila and Bemba demonstrate as quickly as possible their determination to stop the ALiR leaders. As long as political inconsistency continues to reign in Kinshasa over the issue of arresting, disarming and re-supplying the ALiR in the Kivus, Kigali will have no trouble refusing to sign a political agreement. Moreover, Kigali knows perfectly well that no one will come to chase the RPA troops out of the Kivus *manu militari*. Of course, the return of 25,000 - 29,000 Rwandan Hutu soldiers still living in the Congo does not only depend on the goodwill of Joseph Kabila. It will depend more on the political openness of Rwanda domestically and Paul Kagame's ability to ensure their reintegration. However, until the criminal leaders of the ALiR have been arrested and transferred to Arusha, there can be regardless of political negotiations with Kigali, no matter how much regional or international pressure is applied.

The only possible way to resolve this issue now is strong, determined international mediation that

results in a pact of non-aggression between Rwanda and the DRC. Kabila will not abandon the ALiR until he is sure that his power is guaranteed and his country liberated, and Kagame will not demilitarise the Congo until he has concrete proof of goodwill on the part of the Congolese government. The creation of a buffer zone patrolled by joint Rwandan-Burundian-Ugandan-Congolese units in order to ensure the security of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, as proposed by the Security Council during the latest meeting of the joint security committee in Luanda, is only a last resort. Unless the United Nations imposes a mandate of forced disarmament, these patrols will not be a lasting solution to Rwanda's security problem and will not allow for the definitive withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the Congo. It is crucial that the Congolese government take the initiative and start by handing over a symbolic number of genocidaires to the ICTR, and immediately suspend all deliveries of arms and ammunition to the ALiR in the Kivus. In so doing, the government would prove that it is ready to take responsibility for the sovereignty it is demanding.

## **B. RESTORING THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND GUARANTEEING GOOD GOVERNANCE**

The issue of security in the Congo is not limited to the DDRR of the so-called "negative" forces. The Congo is currently undergoing a drastic crisis in terms of State authority, which is fostering crime and social destruction throughout the whole country. Warlords who control parts of the country's natural resources are taking the destiny of entire regions into their hands on a daily basis. The stakes of peace in the Congo include the restoration of local political and administrative power that is recognised by the people as being legitimate and that works on behalf of the people.

To this end, the international community needs to be prepared to make a humanitarian, economic and police investment, which would lessen insecurity and jumpstart the rural economy. In order to become legitimate partners of the international community, local governments must be elected, independent from the power rivalries between the warlords in Kinshasa. Local elections must be seen as a high-priority objective for the transition, even higher than the rehabilitation of infrastructures or any other major project, so as to quickly move the

dynamics of reconciliation into gear between the Congolese communities that have been traumatised by the war. However, in some of the more urgent cases, such as in Ituri or in the Kivus, the people need urgent humanitarian assistance.

Consequently, any candidate for office in Kinshasa must be forced to immediately contribute to providing relief to the people in the zones he or she controls. It is urgent that this forgotten chapter of the Lusaka accords and the power sharing agreement be written. A truce between the Mai Mai leaders and the Banyamulenge in the Kivus, and the Hema and the Lendu in Ituri must be negotiated and any new attempt at political manipulation by the various factions of the DRC, the government, Uganda or Rwanda must be punished. To this end, a team specialised in mediation and local conflict resolution must be put together without haste within the MONUC.

The Congolese cannot ignore the fact that the fundamental source of the conflicts and the economic and social breakdown of their country is linked to the management of their resources. This issue lies at the heart of the conflicts in the Kivus and Ituri and must be taken into consideration in the negotiations on power sharing between the parties to the dialogue and in those leading to full withdrawal of foreign troops. Local, regional and national governance is crucial in order to bring an end to the three dimensions of the conflict. The "Congolese Far West" must give way to a system of healthy economic competition, where the use of force, corruption and intimidation to extract the country's riches are no longer the norm. This system must necessarily be open to the Congo's neighbours and be just as advantageous for local, regional and national economic operators.

## **C. IMPLEMENTING A NEW SYSTEM OF MEDIATION**

Conscious of the military threat that the complete isolation of Rwanda represents, the international community may be tempted to halt implementation of the MLC-government framework agreement and to take the time to convince Rwanda and the DRC to come back to the negotiating table under a system of mediation that has not changed. However, neither Angola, Uganda nor Zimbabwe will tolerate the signing of a political agreement without being consulted first. A preliminary

agreement between the foreign belligerents is required before any new negotiations between the Congolese can be resumed. The pressure applied to Rwanda by using negotiation dynamics in which it risks being excluded must also be maintained. If this dynamic is broken, Kigali will be justified in feeling that at any rate, there can be no political agreement without Rwanda and will attempt to buy time.

The current rumours of plans to establish an alternative government in Kisangani made up of the various political forces remaining in Pretoria fall under this scheme. This new diversion could allow Kigali to buy time, to counter attack the government-MLC framework agreement and to further put off the deadline for withdrawal of its troops from the Congo. The international community must not give Rwanda the opportunity to develop such delaying tactics. However, pressure and threats are not enough to prevent Rwanda from doing so. The international community must also demonstrate its determination to thoroughly resolve the problems in the Congo.

The DRC must now negotiate that which it has always claimed to be its only concern, namely the scope of the powers and responsibilities to be attributed to the various transition institutions in order to meet the security needs of the Banyamulenge minority and to ensure that a new dictatorship is not created. A message along these lines must be clearly sent to the DRC and to its mentors. However, the government-MLC framework agreement can only be transformed into a peace agreement if the negotiations continue under a mediator who knows how to manipulate the carrot and the stick. Angola and Uganda cannot be left in charge of setting up a government in Kinshasa and continuing the negotiations. Impartial mediation must be reintroduced into the negotiations in order to reassure the DRC and Rwanda that an agreement will not be reached at their expense. This mediation team must succeed the Masire team and continue the work begun by President Mbeki, while also taking into account the lessons learned from the Sun City failure. Indeed, negotiations must be played out as much between Luanda, Kampala, Harare and Kigali, as between Kinshasa, Gbadolite and Goma, while also preserving representation from the unarmed political opposition and civil society. In addition, the negotiations must take into account the

realignment of Congolese and foreign belligerents, while acknowledging the fact that Kigali is the last country still defending its security interests and that its concerns cannot be ignored.

The most appropriate format and type of mediation to reach a true peace agreement must be determined now as a matter of urgency. The facilitation team headed up by former president Ketumile Masire proved to have too many weaknesses to be given this task. South African president Thabo Mbeki also lost part of his credibility when he tried to manoeuvre the negotiations during the final week in order to place the priority on Rwanda's security interests. However, South Africa, the host country for the dialogue and the regional and international guarantor of Rwanda's security, has to be actively involved in this mediation and Ketumile Masire may be asked to give his blessing to the results. Yet, as the future president of SADC and the OAU, South Africa now needs to establish its neutrality and its ability to truly contribute to finalising the negotiations by obtaining the mandate to do so from all the Congolese and their natural rivals in southern Africa, which are Angola and Zimbabwe, without challenging the results obtained from the Kampala-Luanda axis.


Ideally, a high calibre special envoy of the UN Secretary-General should be appointed as quickly as possible to take over the process and provide coordination of the various elements of the peace process, which up to now has been lacking. The mandate of this envoy should be to support the application of an inclusive political agreement and to ensure coordination between the activities of the MONUC and those of the panel on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. The envoy could also cooperate with ICTR investigators and begin preparing the structure and the specifications for a standing regional conference on security in the Great Lakes, which at the end of the peace process, would ensure cooperation and guarantee that the Congo applies the principles of good neighbourliness to all its neighbours and that these neighbours apply the same principles among themselves. The outcome of the peace process, the full and definitive withdrawal of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo, must be reinforced by the implementation of a permanent mechanism for security and defence cooperation between the Congo and its neighbours. Only this type of

mechanism, bolstered by good neighbour agreements providing security for the Congo and its neighbours, can guarantee that the DRC will not once again become a source of destabilisation for its neighbours or a victim of their domestic problems, as in the past. The shortcomings of the Lusaka accords must be overcome now and the

peace process must be revived before negotiations flounder again or before the Congo plunges into widespread chaos.

**Brussels/Nairobi, May 14, 2002.**

APPENDIX A





## APPENDIX B

### ACRONYM LIST

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<b>AFDL:</b>	Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation. A rebel movement that Rwanda and Uganda launched against Mobutu Sese Seko in October 1996 under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila.	<b>MCL:</b>	Congo Liberation Movement. Rebel movement launched in August 1998 under the patronage of Uganda and led by Jean-Pierre Bemba.
<b>ALiR:</b>	Rwandan Liberation Army. Hutu rebel movement inherited from the ex-Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interahamwe who committed the 1994 genocide of the Tutsis.	<b>MNC-Lumumba:</b>	Congolese-Lumumba National Movement. Lumumbist party headed by François Lumumba.
<b>CODEP:</b>	Collective of Pluralist Democratic Opposition. Pro-government Congolese political platform led by Raymond Tshibanda.	<b>MPR-fait privé:</b>	Peoples Movement for the Revolution- <i>Fait privé</i> . Legacy of the pro-Mobutu party led by Catherine Nzuzi wa Bombo.
<b>CPP:</b>	People's Power Committees. Political mobilisation structures of Korean inspiration created by Laurent-Désiré Kabila.	<b>PALU:</b>	United Lumumbist Party. Congolese political party led by Antoine Gizenga.
<b>DCF:</b>	Federalist Christian Democracy. Congolese political party under Venant Tshipasa.	<b>PDSC:</b>	Christian Social Democrat Party. Congolese political party led by André Boboliko.
<b>FAC:</b>	Congolese Armed Forces. DRC's regular army.	<b>RCD:</b>	Congolese Alliance for Democracy. Rebel movement launched in August 1998 under the patronage of Rwanda to overthrow Laurent-Désiré Kabila, which then split into 6 different RCD factions.
<b>FAR:</b>	Rwandan Armed Forces (army of Juvénal Habyarimana).	<b>RCD-Goma:</b>	Congolese Alliance for Democracy-Goma. Faction of the rebel RCD movement based in Goma and led by Adolphe Onusumba, under Rwandan patronage.
<b>FAZ:</b>	Zairian Armed Forces (army of Mobutu).	<b>RCD-Kisangani:</b>	Congolese Alliance for Democracy-Kisangani. Faction of the rebel RCD movement formerly based in Kisangani and led by Prof. Wamba dia Wamba. Currently on the verge of disappearing.
<b>FLC:</b>	Congo Liberation Front. Political movement that was supposed to bring together the various rebel factions under the patronage of Uganda (MLC, RCD-ML).	<b>RCD-ML:</b>	Congolese Alliance for Democracy-Liberation Movement. Faction of the rebel RCD movement headed by Mbusa Nyamwisi and based in Isiro under Ugandan patronage.
<b>FONUS:</b>	Innovative Forces for Union and Solidarity. Congolese political movement headed by Joseph Olenghahkoy (RCD-Kisangani).	<b>RCN-NI:</b>	Congolese Alliance for Democracy-National. Faction led by Roger Lumbala.
<b>FSD:</b>	Front for the Survival of Democracy. Pro-government Congolese political movement led by Eugène Diomi Ndongala.	<b>ROC:</b>	Congolese Opposition Rally. Pro-government political platform led by Z'ahidi Ngoma.
<b>HCR-PT:</b>	High Commission of the Transition Republic-Parliament. Legislative body put into place by Mobutu after the Sovereign National Conference of 1992-1994.		
<b>MSDD:</b>	Solidarity Movement for Democracy and Development. Congolese political party led by Christophe Lutundula.		

- ROM:** Moderate Opposition Rally. Congolese pro-government political platform led by Patrice Aimé Sesanga.
- RPA:** Rwanda Patriotic Army. Rwanda's regular army.
- RPF:** Rwandan Patriotic Front. A political-military movement under Paul Kagamé, current president of Rwanda.
- UDPS:** Union for Democracy and Social Progress. Congolese political party led by Etienne Tshisekedi.
- UNAFEC:** Congolese Union of Nationalists/Federalists. Pro-government political platform led by Honorius Kisamba-Ngoy.
- UNITA:** Union for the Total Independence of Angola. Rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi.
- UPDF:** Uganda People's Defence Force. Uganda's regular army.
- FRUONAR:** United Front of the Non-Armed Opposition. Platform of the government opposition based in Kivu and led by Rwakabuba Shinga.

## APPENDIX C

### ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

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The International Crisis Group (ICG) is a private, multinational organisation committed to strengthening the capacity of the international community to anticipate, understand and act to prevent and contain conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, [www.crisisweb.org](http://www.crisisweb.org). ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are at Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven field offices with analysts working in nearly 30 crisis-affected countries and territories and across four continents.

In *Africa*, those locations include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, Algeria and the whole region from Egypt to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Foundation and private sector donors include The Ansary Foundation, The Atlantic Philanthropies, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Ford Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Ruben and Elisabeth Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

June 2002

## APPENDIX D

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\*Released since January 2000

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