

Conflict Studies Research Centre



**Cooperation in the
Israeli-Turkish
Defence Industry**

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September 2005

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Key Points

* The balance of cooperation between Turkish and Israeli defence industries over the last nine years does not fall on the side of Turkey. The Turkish defence industry has not yet accomplished what it set out to do when it signed the defence industry cooperation agreement with Israel on 28 November 1996, namely to be self-sufficient. Capabilities have not yet improved, in spite of expectations that the transfer of technology from Israel would provide it with the necessary know-how. Technology transfer alone has not been sufficient to improve the standard substantially.

* At the same time, the Turkish industrial market provided Israeli companies with a workload and very important income. However, the Israeli defence industry needs to listen to the complaints of its Turkish counterpart, otherwise it may lose further contracts in Turkey. The cooperation has been and still is that between a junior and a senior partner. Undoubtedly, the management of the Turkish defence industry and the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries will strive to change this into cooperation between equals. However, this may take longer than is presently anticipated.

* Cooperation in the military field has proved to be of a high quality, without ambiguities and with a very clear purpose. This has been and still is the driving force. In addition, cooperation included both countries' Western ally, the United States, demonstrating their determination to achieve not just interoperability in naval and air exercises, but also a better dialogue on strategic issues.

* The European Union tacitly accepted the cooperation between Turkey and Israel, although it remained cautious in its response. European politicians and military clearly understand that at present Europe has nothing to contribute to it. Nor could Europe match the military and financial assistance of the US to

both countries. As for the future of the EU's potential contribution to and impact on Israeli-Turkish cooperation, there are currently more questions than answers.

* Bilateral trade provides a necessary cushion and, as a result, brings a necessary balance. The increase in bilateral trade, from \$US18 million in 1987 to \$US2 billion in 2004, underscores its importance and further potential.

* The future of cooperation also appears secure because of the potential dangers from Syria and Iran to Israel, and Iran to Turkey.

Contents

Introduction

1. Cooperation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry: Industrial Scope and Intensity

- 1.1 Aircraft & Helicopter Upgrade. Unmanned aerial vehicles
Subcontracting Work
- 1.2 Tank Upgrade: M-60
- 1.3 Israeli Technology and Know-How Transfer to Turkey

2. Political Aspect of Cooperation in the Defence Industry & Its Military Component

- 2.1 Israel-US-Turkey
- 2.2 Israel-EU-Turkey: Chances & Prospects

3. US Reaction Towards Israeli-Turkish Cooperation: Dissatisfaction with &/or Fait Accompli?

4. The EU Reaction Towards Israeli-Turkish Cooperation: Muted but Acceptable &/or Ambiguous?

5. Looking into the Future

Appendix : Defence Company Websites

Cooperation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry

Eugene Kogan

Introduction

Israeli President Ezer Weizman was accompanied by more than twenty senior Israeli industry figures on his visit to Ankara in January 1994. Many of these officials represented Israeli defence industries. As a result, the first of a regular series of meetings between Turkish and Israeli industrialists was held in Tel Aviv in late February with the aim of identifying and establishing areas of co-operation. Defence featured strongly¹ on the agenda. It can be said that January 1994 was the starting point of co-operation between the Israeli and Turkish defence industries. The next milestone in the gradually expanding military-to-military co-operation was reached on 23 February 1996. As *Defense News* reported at that time, the agreement signed on that day included co-operation in military training (Turkish and Israeli cadets and officers attending each other's military academies), military exercises, defence technology and intelligence sharing.² I shall further expand on this issue in Section 2, below. The third milestone was reached on 28 August 1996.³ I shall expand on the issue of co-operation in the defence industry in Section 1. The fourth milestone relates to the joint military assessment project and will be dealt with in Section 2.

When the military co-operation between Turkey and Israel was first announced, in April 1996, the then Israeli Minister of Defence, Yitzhak Mordechai, stated that, 'When we lock hands, we form a powerful fist'. The report below will assess whether in fact the co-operation in the defence industry and in military matters has formed a 'powerful fist', or whether the locked hands merely produced loose grips. The author will also comment on the future of the co-operation, bearing in mind that 23 February 2006 will mark its tenth anniversary.

The report deals with the issue of co-operation between the two countries' defence industries and the military, and not with the issue of Israeli arms exports to Turkey. In addition, by and large, the report does not dwell on the Turkish defence industry per se. However, it does highlight certain capabilities of the Turkish defence industry and provides some conclusions as to the current and future states of the Turkish defence industry. [A number of open sources cited in the report very often misspell and/or do not provide the complete names of the Turkish defence companies. The author has carefully verified the names of the companies, where possible, via their websites, and has also provided the companies' English-language names. For a list of defence company websites, see Appendix.]

The author has tried to avoid any extensive discussion and analysis of the Israeli military incursions into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank territories and their impact on Israeli-Turkish relations. In addition, the issue of Turkey's role in the region is not discussed here. Such an analysis requires a different study. Also, the issue of Israel and Turkey's joint fight against terrorism and their co-operation in

intelligence matters is not discussed because it is beyond the scope of the report.⁴ However, one additional issue is discussed in the Conclusions, namely the importance of bilateral trade for the countries' current and future agendas. The trade will provide a solid infrastructure and balance vis-à-vis the expanded co-operation in the defence industries and military affairs.

1: Co-operation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry: Industrial Scope and Intensity

The Third Milestone

Vecdi Gonul, Turkey's Minister of National Defence in an interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly* noted that relations between Israel and Turkey have been developing in every field on the basis of mutual benefit. He also stated that 'Israel has state-of-the-art military technologies. The mutual close co-operation between the two countries in the defence industry field is considered to be beneficial.'⁵ He did not elaborate on the issue. However, it can be suggested that Israel's defence industry is gaining access to the Turkish defence market (as presented below) whereas Turkey, on the other hand, is acquiring the technologies and know-how to accelerate development of its own defence industry. Co-operation between the countries' defence industries is by and large concentrated in the aviation and armoured sectors.

1.1. Aircraft & helicopters upgrade. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) subcontracting work

Aircraft upgrade

Notwithstanding the problems of pricing and technical issues, Turkey has continued its co-operation with Israel. This may be explained by a lack of alternative options for the Turkish defence industry. The position of the European Union (EU) defence industry with regard to the Turkish defence complex has been and still is ambivalent. It can be said that the EU defence industry has no clear strategy in this regard. This issue will be dealt with in Section 2.2. The American defence industry continues to see the Turkish defence complex merely as a subcontractor and may not be interested in its further development.

In spite of the Israeli defence officials' good understanding of the lack of options for the Turkish defence complex, they have not exploited the Turkish predicament. On the contrary, it appears that the military and defence industry officials of both countries clearly understand the benefits of co-operating. As a result, Israel's Ministry of Defence is making a major effort to soothe its Turkish counterpart and save defence contracts that the Turks are threatening to cancel. For instance, Shaul Mofaz, Israeli Minister of Defence pledged to oversee an Elbit Systems Limited contract covering photo-reconnaissance systems for the Turkish Air Force after Elbit failed to meet the supply date. Elbit is under threat of losing a \$US35 million contract to sell its long-range Oblique Photography System to the Turkish Air Force. The company encountered difficulties in developing the system's real-time communications capability.

Both Israeli officials Shaul Mofaz and Amos Yaron, Director-General of the Israeli MoD, have tried to reassure Turkish officials by promising that the ministry will continuously oversee and assist the project.⁶ The two projects discussed below underscore the Israeli defence industry's technical failures and their underestimation of financial estimates (perhaps intentional to win a contract). The

Cooperation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry

author, however, has no evidence to back up this assertion. What is evident, though, is that the Turkish military officials have become very disappointed at the Israeli defence industry companies' mode of operation. However, at the same time, the F-4 upgrade programme, discussed below, did prove to be a successful.

F-4 Phantom: *Defense News* noted that the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Limited programme that angered Turkish procurement authorities was the \$US700 million programme that was launched in the late 1990s to upgrade 54 F-4 Phantom fighters for the Turkish Air Force. Turkish procurement officials have alleged excessive pricing of spare parts by IAI,⁷ however they have been satisfied with the F-4 upgrade programme as such. This point has been supported by Vecdi Gonul, who expressed satisfaction with IAI's upgrade of 54 F-4s to the Phantom 2020 configuration.⁸

C-130E: *Jane's Defence Weekly* reported in 2002 that Turkey and IAI had been negotiating a contract covering the avionics upgrade of seven C-130E transport aircraft in service with the Turkish Air Force Command (TAFK). The programme was worth \$US7.8 million at the time. Local defence industry sources said that IAI would have to provide additional funding if an agreement is signed, since the project could be accomplished for the new price,⁹ which had not been specified. Turkey's procurement office, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (also known as Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi (SSM) in Turkish, had decided in early April 2003 to end contract negotiations with IAI due to persistent differences over pricing and technical issues.¹⁰ In addition, in April 2003 the Undersecretariat ordered IAI's bid bond for the contract to be cashed in. The Ankara-based defence analyst said that this was the first time that the Undersecretariat had moved to cash in a contender's bid bond in the whole history of Turkish defence procurement. He also added that 'It reflects growing unease in Ankara about Israeli bidders'. A Turkish official said that although the contract was small in amount, it had strategic importance. Another official clarified the importance of the contract by saying that the contract could have paved the way for other similar contracts. One senior Turkish military official further added that, 'We are seriously concerned and disappointed over the way the Israeli defence companies are doing business in Turkey ... The situation is quite grim. There is a rapid erosion of trust which had taken years to build up.'¹¹

This decision of Turkey to cancel the \$US12 million contract with IAI was not discussed. It is not yet clear whether IAI will face a penalty after the original \$US8 million contract for the C-130E upgrade has risen to \$US12 million. *Janes Defence Weekly*, 4th June 2003.

F-4 Phantom (new batch): As a result, the Turkish Air Force wants the next batch of F-4s to be upgraded in a joint programme with IAI. IAI would provide the technology and perform the systems integration work at the 1st Air Supply and Maintenance Centre in Eskisehir, located northwest of Ankara. An IAI team will be sent to Eskisehir if the work is approved. The Turkish procurement official said that 'We are happy with the post-upgrade performance of our F-4s, and we do not want to waste time looking for options and eventually ending up with the Israelis'.¹² The Turkish Air Force has therefore started negotiations with IAI over a possible deal to upgrade Phantom fighters.¹³ On the other hand, a senior SSM source said that a local upgrade of the aircraft to Phantom 2020 configuration was within the industry's capabilities.¹⁴ In a later report, an SSM official, however, noted that 'The local upgrade programme does not rule out foreign technology support if and when there is need'.¹⁵ It can be suggested that there is a tacit understanding among the

Turkish defence industry officials that their country's aerospace facilities are able to do the work that six to seven years ago was done by a foreign company. Whether their assumption is correct and their ambitions can be fulfilled remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that the outcome of the ongoing struggle between the Turkish Air Force and the SSM will have long-term consequences for the aviation sector of the industry. The decision so far has not been made and, as a result, it can be suggested that the deliberation of the Turkish Minister of National Defence reflects the technical and financial difficulties that the Minister has to consider.

Helicopters upgrade

According to Internet sources, Israel Military Industries (IMI) Ltd has won a \$US110 million tender to equip Turkish Armed Forces' helicopters with electronic warfare systems.¹⁶ It appears that Turkey has awarded IMI a follow-up \$US57 million contract to equip its military helicopters with chaff-flare dispensers. However, this time IMI will be a subcontractor to Aselsan, which will integrate the dispensers on the helicopters.¹⁷

S-70 Blackhawk: Elbit Systems said it has received a \$US14 million contract from Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the upgrade of the Sikorsky S-70 Blackhawk helicopters of the Turkish Armed Forces Command. The programme will be implemented in two phases over 46.5 months, beginning with a 30-month development phase.¹⁸

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles subcontracting work

According to industry sources, the Turkish aerospace subsidiary, Tusas, will be the Turkish partner of Elbit Systems and Israel Aircraft Industries, splitting some 75% of the deal to purchase a network of Israeli UAVs and ground stations.¹⁹ *Defense News* further expanded on the issue of the UAVs' procurement and cited an SSM official who said that Turkey's local industry would provide sub-systems and services amounting to 30% [and not 75%] of the contract. The Turkish 'Yes' to the Israeli consortium for the UAV deal has caused suspicion from US industry sources.²⁰ For the US reaction, see Section 3.

1.2. Tank upgrade M-60

Industrial aspects

In April 2001, due to an economic crisis, Turkey froze plans to purchase a new tank. In early December 2001 Turkey cancelled negotiations with Israel to upgrade its 170 US-built M-60 tanks. The reason given was the large gap between the Turkish and Israeli pricing of the deal. According to Turkish officials, 'We asked the Israelis to decrease the price from \$US700 million to \$US550 million if they wanted the deal. However, our offer was rejected.' The officials further added that 'The Turkish participation in the project was valued at about \$US75 million. This suggestion was also found unacceptable. As a result, we cancelled the deal with Israel.'²¹

However, Turkey decided to resume talks with Israel on upgrading the tank. High-level Turkish sources said that Turkey attaches a lot of importance to Israel as a good friend. An additional source also added that, 'We believe a middle way will be found.'²² Between mid-January and early March 2002 Turkey put out a new tender for the M-60 upgrade. According to Internet sources, IMI won the contract, worth \$US700 million. As part of the deal, the company agreed to set up a production line in Turkey and to transfer technology for the manufacture of some of the components to Turkish companies. (For the issue of technology transfer, see

Cooperation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry

Section 1.3).²³ However, Israel rejected Turkey's demand that this include the procedures for manufacturing the armour. IMI committed \$US100 million to setting up a production line for the tank project in Turkey.²⁴ The tanks will be upgraded in a Turkish Army Repair and Maintenance Facility in the central Anatolian town of Kayseri; subcontracted Turkish companies Aselsan and Machines and Chemical Industry Corporation (also known as Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) AS in Turkish) will provide local input under IMI's leadership.²⁵ Officials in Tel Aviv and Ankara said that the upgrade programme would give Turkey the ability to mass produce the tank and key systems and components, many of which were developed for Israel's latest Merkava-4 main battle tank. After the initial cost of setting up an assembly line at Kayseri, the unit price for the improvements, currently about \$US4 million per platform, would decrease.²⁶

Political & industrial aspects

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Minister of Defence Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and the Israel Defence Forces Chief of General Staff Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz played key roles in the tender, intensively lobbying for the bid during visits to Turkey in 2001. In announcing the deal after a lengthy meeting on 8 March 2002, Turkey's Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said that his country chose the Israeli company because of the price it asked and its ability to finish the project on time.²⁷ Amos Yaron, Director-General of the Israeli MoD said that 'Israel's MoD views activation of this project as an important strengthening of strategic ties between the two countries'.²⁸ Yaron also said that the Turkish upgrade could serve as a springboard for more defence co-operation between the two countries. He noted that Turkey has the option of upgrading 'up to 1,000' M-60 tanks and is examining many other upgrading opportunities for the coming decade.²⁹ Amos Yaron appointed the head of the Merkava tank project at the ministry, Brigadier General David Angel, to head the team supervising the Turkish upgrade. Angel's appointment indicates that Israel and Turkey plan to increase their co-operation in tank development.³⁰

On 19 January 2005, Vecdi Gonul, Turkish Minister of National Defence, announced that Ankara was withholding a \$US93 million progress payment to the state-owned IMI, prime contractor for the M-60 upgrade programme, because of delays in delivering the first operational prototype of the refurbished main battle tank.³¹ There is a certain financial similarity between SSM's cancellation of the deal with IAI for the upgrade of seven C-130E transport aircraft mentioned above and the withholding of payment for the M-60 upgrade. Despite the political importance of the project for the Israeli defence establishment, IMI's technical failures may pose a serious problem to the development of co-operation between the countries. Furthermore, IMI's chances of winning the next contract may be less than they are presently expecting. Whether Amos Yaron's vision of expanding and increasing defence co-operation between the two countries is sustainable remains to be seen.

In early May 2005 a Turkish defence delegation watched a live-fire demonstration of an upgraded Turkish M-60 tank at the Israel Defence Force's armour base in southern Negev. Turkish defence sources said that they were 'impressed and satisfied' with the advancement of the project, which had previously suffered delays. According to a new timetable agreed between Turkey and IMI, the first prototype will be delivered to Turkey in early 2006, where it will continue tests. With the Turkish Land Forces Command seeking to modernise more M-60 tanks from its inventory, IMI is hoping to receive an additional contract for a yet-to-be determined number of platforms. An IMI source said that 'he is confident that an additional contract will follow'.³² It needs to be stressed that the statements of both

the Israeli and Turkish defence industry officials must be taken with a pinch of salt. They are both inclined to exaggerate their mutual satisfaction. The reality as presented above is a little different: it is far from satisfactory. To support the author's argument, the Internet sources noted that IMI employees have been intensifying their struggle against the Ministry of Finance. As a result, the IMI workers prevented tests of upgraded M-60 tanks, despite the fact that 45 Turkish Army officers came to Israel to witness the tests. Although the IMI official statement was that the Turkish tank upgrade project was going ahead as planned, and would continue to do so,³³ the latest episode embarrassed the Israeli defence establishment and also demonstrated that mixing internal conflict with external order can have potentially dangerous consequences for the customer. The customer can raise the legitimate question of whether the contractor can deliver the goods on time and prove their reliability. There is much at stake for IMI and for future co-operation in the armoured sector.

1.3. Israeli technology and know-how transfer to Turkey

Tanks

In addition to the advanced, frontline systems destined for the Turkish M-60 upgrade, Israeli officials said that Turkey would receive the requisite tools and industrial co-operation arrangements needed to establish its own tank production line. Amos Yaron, Director-General of the Israeli MoD said that, 'We obligated ourselves to transfer technology and know-how that will provide them with the infrastructure for tank production'.³⁴

Another idea, competing with the main battle tank purchase option, is to design and develop a national tank under the technology Turkey hopes to gain from the IMI-led upgrade programme. Under the proposal, Turkey could start manufacturing a tank of Turkish design with Israeli technology in seven to eight years, namely by some time between 2009 to 2010 and at an estimated cost of \$US4.5 million per tank.³⁵ In August 2004 the Turkish government commissioned a team from the Ankara-based FNSS Defence Systems Incorporation (also known as FNSS Savunma Sistemleri in Turkish), Arifiye-based Otokar Otobus Karaseri Sanayii AS (also known as Otokar) and Banisa-based BMC Sanayii ve Ticaret AS (also known as BMC) to do a feasibility report for the design and development of a national tank prototype, based on foreign technology, after 2010. The project lasted six to eight months, but a conclusive report has yet to be produced.³⁶ According to the later report, the consortium has completed its study and there are plans to manufacture 250 tanks, beginning in 2012.³⁷

Missiles

According to Eitan Yudelevich, director of corporate business development at the Haifa-based Rafael, the company's ongoing programme with Turkey to co-produce Popeye precision medium-range air-to-ground missiles is advancing smoothly. He further added that, 'Our partnership on Popeye has been a source of pride for us and a source of satisfaction for Turkish industry'.³⁸ It is known that the Elmadag-based Roketsan Missiles Industries Incorporation (also known as Roketsan Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret AS in Turkish) has been and still is a partner of Rafael in the co-production of Popeye missiles. In a later report, Turkish officials expressed interest in the future joint production of IAI's Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile system (ATBMs) and Rafael's AGM-142 Popeye 2 medium-range air-to-ground missile.³⁹

Aircraft

Most importantly, analysts said, the systems integration work for the upgrade programme of the F-4 fighter aircraft will be done by the Turkish company.

Cooperation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry

According to a London-based expert on Turkey, 'Apparently, the Turks aim to gain systems integration capabilities and end their foreign technology dependence with this move'. He also added that, 'At the same time it may turn out to be too costly and too slow'.⁴⁰ This underscores, however, the wishes of the Turkish political, military and defence industry leaderships to invest time and money and to improve substantially the quality and competitiveness of the defence industry.

UAV

Turkey plans to design, manufacture and flight test a new nationally developed UAV by 2010 under a Turkish Aerospace Industries-led programme worth \$US65 million.⁴¹

The Turkish political, military and defence industry leaderships are prepared to lay out the long-term strategic planning accompanied by an allocation of funds for the enhanced development of the national defence industry infrastructure. Although a plan to overhaul The Turkish defence industry has failed to be realised so far, Turkey has finalised decisions on the major arms procurement programmes for the next decade. Minister of National Defence Vecdi Gonul stressed that raising the participation of local industries in these projects to the highest level will be a priority.⁴²

2: Political Aspects of Co-operation in The Defence Industry & Its Military Component

Astoundingly enough, the Israeli defence establishment said that, 'Since 1996, when the strategic dialogue between Israel and Turkey began, a number of deals have been signed with the Israeli defence industry in order to "punish" EU member states, which have refused Turkey full membership'.⁴³ In addition, according to the Israeli MoD analysis formulated in recent weeks Turkey's progress toward membership in the European Union will negatively influence the strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel, and may halt Israeli arms sales to Turkey within a matter of months. At the same time, MoD opinion also asserts that Turkey still sees Israel as its partner in this part of the world and, therefore, where security and economic interests are concerned, there has been no change for the worse. To say the least, these reports in the Israeli daily *Haaretz* online leave the reader with mixed feelings. Both assertions are based on incorrect premises that are very simplistic and short-sighted. However, the opinion also asserts that Turkey still sees Israel as its partner. This is, after all, the accurate presentation. Since 1996 Turkey and Israel have been and still are strategic partners and their co-operation remains robust as a result of their strengthened and broadened defence and security ties.

Israeli defence experts believe that the Turkish Armed Forces will block any attempt by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to reduce the extensive defence co-operation between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Turkey and Israel have significant links and more deals to purchase Israeli-made systems on the agenda.⁴⁴ During his visit on 26 May 2003 Shaul Mofaz was reassured that the changes in the Turkish government would have no effect on procurements from Israel. Israeli defence industries had been concerned that the election of a pro-Islamic government in Turkey might impair Israel's defence exports to Turkey.⁴⁵ According to the *Haaretz*, the political changes in Turkey and the rise to power of the Islamic party has

caused no change in the relations between the Israel and Turkish defence establishments.⁴⁶

Turkey's strategic partnership with Israel remains on course, despite an unusually tough Turkish reaction against Israel's 2004 offensive in the Gaza Strip. On 25 May 2004 during a meeting in Ankara with Yosef Paritzky, Israel's infrastructure minister, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan labelled Israel a terrorist state. Erdogan also declined an invitation to visit Tel Aviv. Several days later, Erdogan described Israel's Gaza operations as 'state terror'. **But at the same time he also said that relations between the two countries would not be affected** (author's emphasis). On 1 June 2004 one senior Turkish military official said that, 'The security and military co-operation ... is multidimensional'. He added, 'Besides, when you talk of Turkish-Israeli ties, you must put the US into the picture. Washington is our only Western ally'. A Turkish diplomat in Washington confirmed that Ankara is determined to preserve its close co-operation with Israel. According to George Coats, a London-based expert on Turkey, 'It is a no-nonsense relationship between Israel and Turkey, particularly on defence procurement matters. Despite public ups and downs, Turkey still regards Israel as a major arms source. It believes it can get from Israel what it cannot obtain from the US.'⁴⁷ Coats, however, did not elaborate on the issue of what exactly that was. *Defense News* continued that senior Israeli defence officials insist that bilateral military-to-military as well as defence industry ties have become institutionalised, and are resilient enough to weather sporadic politically driven disagreements. At the same time, defence experts and industry officials cautioned against overconfidence, and insisted that co-operation must continue to be nurtured and cultivated at a senior level as well as at working levels. According to Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (also known as BESA) at Bar-Ilan University, he is 'not sure that the Israeli government, and particularly the Prime Minister of Israel, is paying enough attention to the Turks ... This relationship has to be constantly nourished, and I think that we are not doing enough in sending high-ranking military, defence and political officials to Ankara to explain what exactly it is we are doing in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank territories as part of our ongoing war against terror.'⁴⁸

An official from an American-Jewish group that lobbies for Israel in Washington said that, 'The Israeli-Turkish relations have a strong basis', and he 'did not think that they will be seriously hurt by a hitch. As a matter of fact, Turkish officials have assured us that there would not be a setback in ties.' Amos Yaron, Director-General of Israel's MoD said that, 'He did not expect the latest political flap of Turkey's recent cancellation of billions of dollars in new programmes to hurt Israeli-Turkish defence co-operation ties'. He further added that, 'He got the impression that the Turks cancelled some programmes because they wanted a larger share for their local industry. And if this is the case, we are willing to participate on programmes in which our technology and know-how will enable them to accomplish production in Turkey.'⁴⁹

It is very important to stress that, despite the criticism of Israel's policies and the labelling of Israel as a terrorist state, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also said that 'relations between the countries would not be affected'. Various analysts tend to focus by and large on the first half of this sentence and almost deliberately disconnect it from the second half.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Edogan recently told the *Turkish Daily News* prior to his departure for Israel (on 1 May 2005), 'Our good relations with Israel do not preclude us from making frank criticism'. He added, 'My visit will hopefully provide a new impetus to our relationship'.⁵¹

In spite of serious setbacks in the defence industrial field and certain political complications, the intensity of the co-operation has not decreased. Past and present Turkish governments have gone through hard times to justify their co-operation with Israel in the defence industry. However, it has always been the military that have convinced their governments to stick with Israel, whatever the circumstances. The military have clearly understood the benefits of such co-operation, and they also understand the constraints of co-operation with the EU and the US. One of the constraints included the on-and-off friction and very tense military relations with Greece that, since summer 2000, have improved substantially. Other constraints included the issues of human rights and the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (also known as Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkish), considered a terrorist group in Turkey. Although EU diplomats acknowledge the right of Turkey to defend itself against terrorism, at the same time they stress that it should not use too much military force. Neither issue is going to fade away from the agenda as quickly as the Turkish military would like. As a result, we may foresee a continuation in defence industry co-operation between the two countries.

At the same time, Israeli defence industry officials should listen very carefully to complaints from their Turkish counterparts and not take it for granted that co-operation will proceed as smoothly as before. If, for instance, as in the past, the Israeli defence industry officials do not pay sufficient attention to their Turkish counterparts, the Israeli defence industry stands a chance of losing new contracts. This is partly because the Turkish defence industry may try to work on its own and partly because, in the case of the armoured industry, it may turn to an alternative source of assistance, for instance, from Poland: the Polish armoured industry secured contracts with Malaysia and Nigeria not long ago.

The Second Milestone

According to Internet sources, Turkish-Israeli military co-operation was initiated to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. However, it is not an alliance. Because of their leading roles in the region, Turkey and Israel have a responsibility to establish a model for relations between regional countries. Turkey became a 'front country' in the region when new threats emerged after the end of the Cold War. This new situation led Turkey to become a 'strategy-producing' country. The initiation of Turkish-Israeli relations should be seen in this light.

Contrary to the beliefs of some, neither the US nor any other third party initiated the Turkish-Israeli co-operation or the 1996 military training and co-operation agreement. These were the initiatives of the Turkish leadership⁵² and the then Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin. Two agreements, of which some clauses remain secret, were signed in February and August 1996, under the auspices of Shimon Peres, who succeeded Rabin after Rabin was assassinated in December 1995. They provide for joint air and naval exercises, access to port facilities and the opportunity for the Israeli air force to train over the Anatolian plateau. The experience of flying over mountainous regions could be useful to Israel should it ever need to carry out an operation against Iran. The agreement also provides for co-operation in 'the fight against terrorism'.⁵³ Additionally, a joint system of surveillance has been put in place, with the help of the US, that includes ultra-sensitive receivers, cameras, satellites and the like. Exchanges of high-level officers have been stepped up, and in October 1997, the Israeli Chief of the General Staff, General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, was well received in Ankara.⁵⁴

The Israeli military, exactly like their counterparts in Turkey, attach a great deal of importance to military-to-military co-operation. *Defense News* noted that Israel's senior military and defence echelon is giving its personal attention to strengthening its strategic and co-operative relationship with Ankara. Major General Dan Haloutz, commander of the Israel Air Force, flew to Turkey on 15 May 2003 for what Israeli officials in Tel Aviv said was a positive round of meetings with Turkish military and defence officials. Moreover, Israeli and Turkish Minister of National Defence Vecdi Gonul played host to his Israeli counterpart, Shaul Mofaz, in a visit to Ankara in late May 2003. In recent years, Ankara has engaged in routine military-to-military exercises and exchanges with all branches of the IDF.⁵⁵ For instance, a delegation of Turkish Air Force pilots have flown Israel's Lavi prototype fighter to test a fire control radar system developed by Elta.⁵⁶ A squadron of Turkish F-16s was in Israel in June 1998 to receive training on testing grounds jointly run by the Israeli Air Force and the defence company Rafael. The range included various types of air-defence systems that Israel has acquired to duplicate enemy tactics to shoot down aircraft.⁵⁷

In late January 2005 the Israeli MoD delegation headed by Amos Yaron was in Turkey to meet with Turkish Defence Ministry officials. The series of discussions in Ankara saw the formulation of a joint work programme for the two armies in the coming year. The Israeli and Turkish defence establishments are considering broadening the co-operation that already exists between the two countries' air and sea forces to include the land forces.⁵⁸ Lieutenant General Hilmi Ozkok, Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, and his Israeli counterpart, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon, discussed expanded military co-operation, including the possible inauguration of joint ground force exercises, during two days of meetings in Ankara that began on 1 February.⁵⁹ While the two nations' air forces and navies have participated in combined exercises for years, including trilateral exercises with forces from the US (this issue will be dealt with further below), Turkish and Israeli ground troops have never trained side by side on the same soil.

According to an official in Jerusalem the possibility of Jewish and Muslim ground forces training together in the coming year or two is a manifestation of continuously strengthened strategic co-operation and arms trade ties between the two nations. Israeli military spokeswoman Brigadier General Ruth Yaron noted that Ya'alon's trip followed a visit by the Turkish chief of staff in 2003, and is aimed at 'strengthening the security and military contacts and co-operation' between the two militaries.⁶⁰

The Fourth Milestone

The *Turkish Daily News* stated in 1997 that Turkey and Israel, in a noteworthy development, had initiated a large-scale assessment project to evaluate threats against both countries, in an effort to prepare for and initiate joint measures in the event of future instability in the Middle East. During Minister of National Defence Turhan Tayan's visit to Israel, he participated in two important briefings entitled 'Response to Any Threat' and 'Developments in the Middle East'. A high-level military source noted that, since the region is like a chess board, Turkey and Israel must be prepared for all possible moves.⁶¹ According to military sources, in late May 1998 Israel and Turkey held strategic talks; these had been initiated in 1997. These meetings are believed to form the most important part of the strategic partnership. Usually held twice a year, Ankara and Tel Aviv utilise these conferences as an opportunity to evaluate threats to the region.⁶²

On 17 May 2005 Yigit Alpogon, Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council arrived in Israel for a three-day visit as guest of Giora Eiland, chairman of the National Security Council. During his visit, Alpogon met senior defence establishment officials, and held a dialogue on strategic issues with representatives of the National Security Council, the MoD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶³ The source stressed the crucial importance of the visit as 'the first of its kind in the history of Israeli-Turkish relations'. This is undoubtedly a clear sign of how far relations between the military and officials of the defence industry of both countries have progressed since their initiation in 1996. This is a remarkable achievement and in the future there may be very good prospects for further enhancement of the relationship. At the same time, the author agrees with Efraim Inbar's statement that, 'This relationship has to be constantly nourished...'

2.1. Israel-US-Turkey

In early May 1997 Deputy Chief of General Staff General Cevik Bir, accompanied by a group of twenty-six high-level Turkish officers, held numerous talks in Israel. During the meetings where defence industry co-operation and military manoeuvres were discussed, some American military officers reportedly attended as observers. A source said that the US was trying to monitor very closely the growing military ties between Israel and Turkey.⁶⁴ This can be interpreted as a normal American reaction, namely trust your friends, but verify their actions.

According to Alain Gresh, although restricted to search-and-rescue (SAR) exercises, Israeli-Turkish-US maritime manoeuvres code-named 'Reliant Mermaid' took place in the (eastern) Mediterranean in January 1998 and demonstrated US support for this alliance. The joint manoeuvres took place in the presence of the commander of the Jordanian navy.⁶⁵ The naval exercises have taken place every year since 1998; military observers from Egypt, Israel, the US and Jordan have also attended.⁶⁶ The appearance of Egyptian observers was important because Egypt on previous occasions had turned down the invitation to take part.

According to *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, in June 2001 the military co-operation between the three countries' air forces reached a peak. Several dozen aircraft participated in manoeuvres over the city of Konya, in central Anatolia. The media reported at that time that the Konya exercise demonstrated the will of the participants and their ongoing strategic co-operation.⁶⁷ In addition, the twelve days joint operations between the three countries, code-named 'Anatolian Eagle', demonstrated Ankara's ambitious goal of establishing a regional combat readiness centre on its territory.⁶⁸ Such trilateral military exercises have put in place a mechanism for advanced military co-ordination. Europe is too distant to involve itself in the Middle Eastern contingencies; it can be suggested that Europe is perceived as a soft power and NATO has become unpredictable.⁶⁹ It can be suggested that the decision-making process within NATO as a result of its recent enlargements has become lengthy and cumbersome.

According to Internet sources, Turkey and Israel are the strongest, most reliable US allies in the Middle East and their partnership benefits US strategic interests, including goals such as containing Iran and Iraq, as well as preserving pro-Western Jordan. Separately and combined, they are useful in checking aggression in their immediate neighbourhood, a goal shared by the US.⁷⁰

2.2. Israel-EU-Turkey: Chances & Prospects

What has been inconceivable up to now has turned into a reality, namely that on 18 June 2005 Israel participated in a naval NATO exercise in the Gulf of Taranto in Italy. The participants included NATO members France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the US.⁷¹ *Jane's Defence Weekly* elaborated on the Israeli Navy's participation in NATO's 'Sorbet Royal 2005' submarine exercise. It also noted that following the first-ever joint Israeli-NATO naval exercise, which took place in March 2005 in the Red Sea, Israel has been continuing to strengthen its relations with NATO.⁷² It has set a precedent for a potential EU military exercise with Israeli and Turkish participation. In June 2000, NATO held an exercise, 'Dynamic Mix', where a Turkish military contingent participated for the first time on Greek territory.⁷³ Undoubtedly, some taboos have been broken.

When individual EU member states do co-operate with Israel, then it is with one of the countries' defence industries, because of the high quality of their engineering skills, military experience and marketing successes. The Turkish defence industry lags behind and, as a result, does not attract similar attention. As a result, one can ask: 'Is the trilateral defence industry co-operation viable?' 'Under what conditions?' and 'When is it likely to happen?'

In military-to-military co-operation non member Turkey is shunned by the EU. At the same time, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union Force (EUFOR) includes Turkish military forces because, before EUFOR took over, NATO was operating in the area and Turkey was there as a member of NATO. Even now that Turkish EU membership negotiations have begun it will take another ten to fifteen years for Turkey to reach full membership. Thus, the prospects for trilateral military exercises as exist between Israel, US and Turkey appears to be small in the immediate future. The reticence of the EU is understandable, but neither Israel nor Turkey are likely to be bold enough to make the first move.

3: US reaction toward Israeli-Turkish co-operation: Dissatisfaction with &/or Fait Accompli?

One US business source familiar with Turkish defence matters noted that 'It appears that the Turkish government selected Israel Military Industries, the official Israeli upgrade company in 2000 as part of efforts to further develop its strategic ties with Israel ... If we remember that Turkey in the first place received the M-60 tanks from the US for free, it was not a fair decision to go for a sole-source deal with the Israelis.'⁷⁴ In other words, the US officials were very disappointed with the Turkish government's decision. In addition, the US has put pressure on the Turkish government to back off from this decision. In March 2002 IMI finally won the contract to upgrade the M-60 tank, beating several American companies, which were backed by heavy pressure on the Turkish government from the US administration. Throughout the negotiations, American companies and the US administration exerted pressure on Turkey to purchase American tanks. In response, Turkey pressed Israel to lower its prices, and IMI eventually agreed to cut the price from \$US1 billion to \$US700 million.⁷⁵

On the UAV contract, one US industry source in Ankara said that, 'There is evidence that the US contender for the competition was unfairly disqualified'. The same source further added that, 'General Atomic's offer was disregarded in practice because of contractual problems that the US company faced during the contest. No US bidder could have made a proposal under the terms and conditions specified by

SSM [the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries] for the UAV contract.⁷⁶ The contract called for the payload to be made by a local firm, and the state-owned Aselsan got the job. SSM asked the two bidders to grant warranties for the payload Aselsan will develop. According to the official, General Atomics refused to take technical and financial responsibility for a critical part that would be developed by a local company. The Israeli team agreed to it.⁷⁶ Undoubtedly, IMI and Elbit Systems work together with Aselsan on the M-60 upgrade and IMI and Aselsan's work on integration of the dispensers on the helicopters helped both sides to get to know each other and assess each other's weaknesses and strengths. As a result, IAI and Elbit Systems were ready to grant warranties to Aselsan. However, it can also be said that quite often the Israeli defence companies are ready to take a risk with the local manufacturer and, as a result, win the tender. The strict US rules and regulations as well as company policy are a good excuse to save face, but if the company is not ready to take a risk it is likely to lose the contract.

4. The EU reaction toward Israeli-Turkish Co-operation: Muted but Acceptable &/or Ambiguous?

Since the initiation of the Israeli-Turkish agreements in 1996 there has been no coherent EU policy toward co-operation between the two countries. But why not? This can be partly explained by the fact that Israeli-Turkish co-operation has in no way endangered EU policies in the Middle East or posed a problem to the EU in general. Even Greece, until very recently a staunch enemy of Turkey, has not complained or perceived any danger to itself as a result. In addition, neither Israel nor Turkey have ever wished to be perceived by the EU as a problem. Turkey is about to start EU membership negotiations, to which the Turkish government attaches great importance. At the same time, the EU has tacitly accepted that co-operation between the two countries exists and will continue for the foreseeable future. It is very difficult to foresee under what circumstances the EU might ask Turkey, as a future EU member, to decrease substantially its co-operation with Israel, however, it cannot be completely ruled out.

Since the EU eastward expansion accelerated in the early 1990s, various EU governments have been engaged in integrating new member states into the Union. In addition, the EU's constant engagement in resolving the Cyprus issue has distracted the Union from the issue of Israeli-Turkish co-operation. Both engagements have proved to be time consuming and have not yet been completed. At the same time, the management of the EU defence industries has been similarly preoccupied with the integration of six out of the ten new member countries' defence industries. As a result, Israeli-Turkish co-operation has been and still is not a EU top priority and it is unlikely to become so in the next five to ten years.

5: Looking to the Future

On 1 May 2005 Ehud Olmert, Israel's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry and Sami Guclu, Turkey's Minister of Agriculture and Villages signed a bilateral industrial research and development agreement, covering high-tech, electronics, space, agriculture and biotechnology.⁷⁷ It is important to underline three important aspects of the agreement: high-tech, electronics and space, because they point to the direction of further co-operation between the two countries. As far back as July 2002 officials from both countries said they had renewed talks on the

estimated \$US250 million spy satellite programme suspended in April 2001 in response to the Turkish government's wide austerity measures aimed at containing Ankara's economic crisis. The Turkish defence official noted that Ankara had requested information regarding the extent to which Israel's MoD would be willing to share technologies associated with the Ofeq-5 satellite.⁷⁸ The Turkish government consider the space issue to be of great importance. As a result, the Turkish authorities have drafted legislation to create a national space agency that could make hundreds of millions of dollars available for projects that include a high-resolution imaging satellite for intelligence gathering. According to Mutlu Sinman, Director of the Ankara-based Mint Fuarcilik, 'For the moment, Turkey aims to be one of the countries that have space agencies'. He added, 'But the long-term ambition is to be one of the countries with full space capabilities'.⁷⁹

Undoubtedly, bilateral trade also plays an important role in both countries' agendas and provides a balance vis-à-vis co-operation in the defence industry and in military affairs against future uncertainties. Bulent Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister in 2001, declared Turkish-Israeli trade to be 'in good condition'. He claimed that the volume of trade between the two countries had then exceeded \$US1 billion and also added that if tourism were factored in, the figure was over \$US1.5 billion.⁸⁰ According to *Briefing*, bilateral trade stands at \$US1.5 billion (at what date exactly was not specified) and Ehud Olmert predicted that it would rise to \$US5 billion (at what date exactly, he did not specify). In addition, there are also joint projects in construction, irrigation and agriculture, to name but a few.⁸¹

It can be suggested that, despite Israeli Minister of Defence Yitzhak Mordechai's upbeat statement in 1996, co-operation in the defence industry has not yet produced the fruitful results so eagerly anticipated by the Turkish industry managers. Although the political will and financial support to reshape the defence industry structure and to increase substantially its share in local industrial participation are there, the result of the last decade has not been favourable. According to Murad Bayar, head of SSM, "we are not yet in a position to design and develop military aircraft and helicopters and, as a result, we will continue to buy these platforms directly, but at the same time we will go for local solutions for mission computers and system integration on these platforms."⁸² The Turkish defence industry has thus chosen Israel as its main model: Turkey wishes to build up a highly sophisticated industrial base and to gain systems integration capabilities. Only time will tell whether in the next ten years the Turkish defence industry will make a real breakthrough in its development or if the carefully thought through plans will actually materialise.

At the same time, military-to-military co-operation between the two countries has, to a certain degree, changed the military balance in the Middle East and particularly relations between Turkey and Syria. Although *Briefing* noted that it is unlikely that Turkey and Syria will go for anything like strategic relations in the foreseeable future,⁸³ what if the regime in Syria changes? There are too many uncertainties in the Middle East and not even one of the improbable scenarios can be disregarded. A tacit military agreement between Turkey, Israel and Jordan has been reached, although neither the Turkish nor Jordanian governments are ready to divulge any information on this delicate issue. It is also important to note that any trilateral military relations between Turkey, Israel and Jordan has to bring the US into the picture. The European Union currently appears to be marginalized, even not taken into consideration, as it is not perceived to be a military power.

Cooperation in the Israeli-Turkish Defence Industry

It is, however, on the strategic front that the Israeli-Turkish relationship makes the most sense. In this, Israeli Minister of Defence Benjamin Ben-Eliezer was not exaggerating when he pinpointed Iran as a 'joint threat' – or at least, a joint rival. Nowhere has this been more evident recently than in the fast increasing tensions around the Caspian Sea. In this dispute, Turkey has been backing Azerbaijan against Iran.⁸⁴ The completion of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which carries Azeri oil to a Turkish Mediterranean port, and the construction of the Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline that will transport Turkmen gas directly to Turkey lessens the dependence of Central Asian republics on Moscow and Tehran, which opposed Ankara's energy aspirations. Israel and its lobby have supported Ankara's positions in Washington and, as a result, both countries have further expanded their robust defence industry and military-to-military co-operation. In addition, visiting Israel for the first time, on 1 May 2005, and meeting President Moshe Katsav, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said that, like Israel, Turkey was worried about Iran's continuing attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. 'You are not the only one threatened, but so are we and the entire world.'⁸⁵

Can we envision a continuing co-operation between Turkey and Israel in defence industry and military matters, for instance, for the next ten to fifteen years? Or, to put it another way, are the understanding of the benefits of mutual co-operation and the attachment of importance to such a co-operation sufficient reasons to keep the co-operation going for the next ten to fifteen years? Turkey attaches a great deal of importance to Israel's friendship. The question is whether Israel attaches a great deal of importance to Turkey as a good friend. This is not a rhetorical question, because the Israeli attitude cannot be taken for granted. This is not a partnership of equals when it comes to defence industry matters. This is co-operation between a senior and a junior partner and, as a result, it is understandable that the Turks wish to free themselves from 'the control of foreigners', whether they are Israelis, Europeans and/or Americans. This wish will have to remain on the country's agenda for years to come. There is, however, co-operation of equals when we refer to military-to-military co-operation. This has been and still is the driving force and will continue to be so until the military of both countries are satisfied with the results.

Mustafa Kibaroglu raised the extremely important question as to who can guarantee that Turkey will allow Israel to use its territory or its air space, for example fifteen years from now, if a missile attack from Iran or beyond were imminent?⁸⁶ He responded candidly.

'There is no serious reason for Israelis to doubt the commitment of a significant proportion of the Turkish population to the preservation of parliamentary democracy in the country. There is equally no reason to believe that that the powerful institutions in Turkey, the military being at the forefront, as well as academia, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and various interest groups may ever compromise the secular characteristic of the republican regime. The stance of the Turkish military is particularly important in this respect, because the agreement that was reached between the military establishments of Israel and Turkey back in 1996, and the security guarantees thereof will remain in force as long as both parties desire it. Both countries should do their utmost to build confidence between them.'⁸⁷

This is an extremely important task ahead for both countries and I fully support Kibaroglu's assessment, which also reinforces Efraim Inbar's earlier statement that 'This relationship has to be constantly nourished ...' at all levels. At the same time

the important question has not been asked by Kibaroglu, namely whether Turkey would allow Israeli aircraft to fly through Turkish air space to retaliate against a missile attack from Iran.

In February 1998 Turkey's ambassador to Washington, Nuzhet Kandemir, sent a message to Baghdad in admitting that Turkey **may allow** (author's emphasis throughout) Israeli aircraft to fly through Turkish air space to retaliate against Iraqi missile attack, if things became serious enough. Kandemir further said that Turkey would be **'very sensitive' to any Israeli request** to fly aircraft through Turkish air space to retaliate for Iraqi missile attacks that used chemical or biological weapons. He also added that, 'If things came to a stage where Iraq is using weapons of mass destruction against Israel, we will certainly **consider it**.'⁸⁸ So what is the real truth: 'may allow', 'very sensitive to any Israeli request' or just 'consider it'? Perhaps first and foremost they will consider it and then perhaps they may allow it, but there always remains an element of uncertainty that the Israeli government has to live with. According to the 1996 agreement on military co-operation, each country can deploy or temporarily station its land, air, and naval forces units in the other country's territory. For that purpose, they can use one another's air space, airports, and naval ports.⁸⁹ The agreement may sound plausible, however the military situation may force the Turks to think twice before giving a final 'Yes'. In the reality of Israel, however, it will not be acceptable that the Turks have to think twice.

Michael Eisenstadt provided a different and noteworthy scenario. Turkey could make a significant contribution should Israel try to strike at Iran's non-conventional weapons infrastructure, or find itself involved in a war with Syria. While the extent of Israeli-Turkish military co-operation in the event of a war with Syria would be situation dependent, current political realities rule out Israeli aircraft and warships operating from Turkish territory in wartime. Turkey would gain little by openly supporting the Israeli war effort, which would make Turkey a target for Syrian retribution (i.e. more terrorism) and Arab political censure. Turkey is therefore more likely to render assistance quietly to the Israeli war effort, providing intelligence, missile early-warning data, and refuge for damaged Israeli aircraft or warships. In this way, it will help Israel punish a troublesome neighbour and gain the good will of Israeli political and military leaders, without incurring major risks.⁹⁰

ENDNOTES

¹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 February 1994, 19; *Defense News*, 25 April-1 May 1994, 1 and 34. For a more elaborated account of the military ties between Israel and Turkey, see P Robbins, *Suits and Uniforms. Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 257-258.

² 17 June 1996, 3; 8 July 1996, 4.

³ *Defence News*, 2-8 September 1996, 56; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 September 1996, 5. The later report in *Defense News* (9-15 December, 9) published mistakenly that on 28 November 1996 David Ivry, Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defence (MoD) signed an agreement that was intended to bolster military exercises and launch new defence industry projects.

⁴ For those interested in the latter issue, see for instance, articles by Robert Frisk, Efraim Inbar & Ilan Berman, http://www.middleeast.org/archives/1999_02_24.htm; http://tsi.idc.ac.il/inbar_regional_implications.html; <http://www.meforum.org/article/504>. E Inbar, 'Israel-Turkish relations – business as usual', in *Contemporary Issues in International Politics*. Essay in Honour of Seyfi Tashan. Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004, 105-114. One important point needs to be stressed: Tsahi Hanegbi, Israel's Minister

of Public Security, who was in Turkey in December 2003, reached an accord under which Turkish police would for the first time train with Israeli police. Ibid; 111. Although police-to-police co-operation is not discussed in this report, it is nonetheless important to underline the extent to which the original military-to-military and defence industry co-operation has expanded since 1996. For an earlier report relating to a joint operation conducted by the two countries' police departments, see *Turkish Daily News*, 21 November 2001.

⁵ 18 May 2005, 34.

⁶ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 June 2003, 15. According to Yaron, the long-range Oblique Photography System, which allows Turkish F-4 fighters to peer hundred of kilometres into neighbouring Syria, Iraq or other countries without leaving Turkish air space and that had run into technical and integration problems in 2003, is now progressing 'To the full satisfaction' of our customer. *Defense News*, 7 June 2004, 12. However, according to the recent report in *Jane's Defence Weekly* it is still unclear whether the TAFC will open a tender to acquire the high-altitude long-range Oblique Photography System (also known as reconnaissance pods) now that the Israeli systems mounted on F-4s have failed to meet the requirement. The pictures received from high-altitude were unsatisfactory. 25 May 2005, 28.

⁷ A Turkish Ministry of National Defence official said that Ankara is paying more than \$US50 million a year for spare parts associated with the IAI upgrade programme. An IAI executive, noting that many traditional suppliers of spare parts for F-4 aircraft have gone out of business, said it costs IAI more to obtain the parts from alternate sources. 19 May 2003, 18. This explanation did not, however, satisfy the Turkish official. These aircraft are equipped with AGMs-142 Popeye medium-range air-to-ground missiles. The first 26 F-4s were upgraded in Israel and the remaining 28 were upgraded in Turkey at the 1st Air Supply and Maintenance Centre in Eskisehir (also known as Eskisehir Air Supply and Maintenance Centre, or HIBM in Turkish), located near Ankara. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 August 2004, 10. For an earlier report, see *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 7 August 1996. *Defense News* (9 December 1996, 9) reported that IAI carried out the main non-electronic modernisation tasks. Its subsidiary Elta Electronic Industries Limited (also known as Elta) produced the radar, while electronic countermeasures equipment was produced by Rafael Armament Development Authority (also known as Rafael) and Mikrodalga Elektronik Sistemleri AS (also known as Mikes).

⁸ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 May 2005, 15.

⁹ Ibid, 23 January 2002, 10.

¹⁰ http://www.defensenews.com/pgt.php?htd=i_story_1834990.html&tty=worldwide. For some parts of the account in this paragraph, see *Defense News*, 19 May 2003, 18. See also *Flight International*, 15 July 2003, 5.

¹¹ *Defense News*, 19 May 2003, 18.

¹² Ibid, 14 June 2004, 20.

¹³ *Flight International*, 6 July 2004, 17; 8 February 2005, 29; <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/570590.html>; *Flight International*, 17 May 2005, 23; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 May 2005, 15; 29 June 2005, 20.

¹⁴ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 11 August 2004, 10; 27 October 2004; 30 March 2005, 18.

¹⁵ SSM has already asked aerospace company Turkish Aircraft Industries (also known by its Turkish acronym Tusas) and military electronics company Aselsan Electronic Industries Incorporation (also known as Aselsan Elektronik Sanayii ve Ticaret AS in Turkish, hereafter Aselsan) to make initial studies for the upgrade programme. An SSM official familiar with the programme said that, in any case, the main contractor for the F-4 upgrades would be a local company. He further added that the chosen local prime contractor may at any time during the programme 'Buy technology and/or consultation from IAI'. *Defense News*, 15 November 2004, 22;

<http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=856620&fid=942>. For further problems associated with the question of who will be the prime contractor, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 January 2005, 15. In a later report, the Turkish industry source told *Jane's Defence Weekly* that, 'While in the previous contract the work was divided equally between Turkey and Israel, the Turks insist that in any new contract all of the modernisation work will be done in Turkey'. 18 May 2005, 15.

- ¹⁶ <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/12/23/News/News.40407.html>; <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/12/25/News/News.40533.html>; *Defense News*, 29 July 2002, 14.
- ¹⁷ *Flight International*, 10 September 2002, 22.
- ¹⁸ <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/A/JParticle/ShowFull&cid=1027506393791>.
- ¹⁹ Ibid; <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen>.
- ²⁰ *Defense News*, 25 April 2005, 17. *Flight International* (26 April 2005, 16) noted that Turkey's local industry involved TAI and local payload supplier Aselsan. According to <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/> and <http://www.isrjournal.com/story.php?F=658524>, on 18 February 2005 TAI and Tusas formalised the merger plan at an extraordinary general meeting. The new company's official name is Tusas Aerospace Industries Corporation. Turkish aviation sources said that the UAV programme may yet face delays because the entire team of Tusas officials who had been working on the UAV programme resigned when TAI absorbed their company in early 2005.
- ²¹ <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/12/02/News/News.39127.html>. For earlier reports on the negotiations of the M-60 upgrade, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 February 2000, 12; 29 March 2000, 14; *Defense News*, 19 June 2000, 3; *Turkish Daily News*, 1 December 2001; *Defense News*, 10 December 2001, 11; <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/12/25/News/News.40533.html>.
- ²² <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/12/25/News/News.40533.html>; see also *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 January 2002, 13.
- ²³ <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=139366&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&lis...> According to <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/283222.html>, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has permitted 800 Turkish construction workers to work in Israel as part of IMI's deal to upgrade the M-60 tanks. Under the military agreement that includes mutual procurement, the money that workers earn and send home will be deducted from the sum that Israel is obliged to spend in Turkey. This is certainly an innovative approach to how the overall amount can be reduced. It remains unknown, however, what this deduction exactly constitutes in actual monetary terms. According to the same source, heavy pressure was brought to bear by businessmen on IMI and on the government to approve the deal because Turkey is considered an important strategic target for Israel, both from the business and the diplomatic points of view.
- ²⁴ <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>, 9 October 2002.
- ²⁵ <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2002/03/10/News/News.44857.html>.
- ²⁶ *Defense News*, 18-24 March 2002, 8; <http://www.defensenews.com>, 1 October 2002.
- ²⁷ <http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2002/03/10/News/News.44857.html>.
- ²⁸ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 16 October 2002, 6.
- ²⁹ *Defense News*, 18 March 2002, 8; <http://www.defensenews.com>, 1 October 2002.
- ³⁰ <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>, 9 October 2002.
- ³¹ <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=629952&C=mideast>; *Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kur'er*, 18 February 2005; *Defense News*, 23 May 2005, 18.
- ³² *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 May 2005, 15. IMI had pledged to deliver the prototype in August 2004. For further problems in the delivery of the prototype, see *Defense News*, 23 May 2005, 18. The discrepancies between *Jane's Defence Weekly* report mentioned above and *Defense News* report that cited a great variety of technical problems that have not yet been resolved are glaring. The author has not yet found a clear explanation for the so different and in-depth reports. For the earlier report, which outlined a large variety of technical problems, see *Defense News*, 16 September 2002, 34.
- ³³ <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=932639&fid=942>.
- ³⁴ *Defense News*, 18 March 2002, 8. There is, however, one important hitch accurately described by the *Jane's Defence Weekly*: Turkey will not be able to export the modernisation programme since Israel has introduced restrictions on the export of the technology to Gulf countries, Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan, which are Turkey's potential export targets. 24 September 2003, 29-30.
- ³⁵ *Defense News*, 21 October 2002, 80.

³⁶ Ibid 23 May 2005, 18; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 May 2005, 27. For earlier reports, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 August 2004, 7; *Defense News*, 23 August 2004, 20; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 August 2004, 18; 27 October 2004, 7.

³⁷ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 May 2005, 27.

³⁸ *Defense News*, 19 May 2003, 18.

³⁹ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 May 2005, 15. For an earlier account of the issue of ATBMs and the change of US policy with regard to the Israeli-Turkish co-operative missile shield, see <http://www.meforum.org/article/504>. For earlier reports on the issue of the Turkish potential participation in the project, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 April 1998, 3; 2 February 2000, 12; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 9 August 2001.

⁴⁰ *Defense News*, 15 November 2004, 22. Turkey's dependency on imported key weapons systems currently stands at about 80%. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 6 July 2005, 14. In addition, *Jane's Defence Weekly* (30 March 2005, 18) cited Murat Bayar, head of SSM, who stated that, 'Due to dependency abroad on certain critical technologies, politically [Turkey is] under the control of foreigners'. Undoubtedly, Turkey will try to free itself from this.

⁴¹ *Flight International*, 26 April 2005, 16; 28 June 2005, 17.

⁴² *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 June 2005, 12; *Defense News*, 18 July 2005, 12. For the local development of a basic training aircraft by TAI, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 June 2005, 20; *Flight International*, 28 June 2005, 17.

⁴³ The material in this paragraph comes from <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/446844.html>. For additional negative assessment of Israeli-Turkish relations see <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen>, 6 July 2004.

⁴⁴ *Flight International*, 12 November 2002, 5.

⁴⁵ *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 June 2003, 15.

⁴⁶ <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/533875.html>. Erdogan made it clear to the Jewish organisation in America, which he met immediately after his electoral victory, that he is in favour of continuing the bond with Israel and even its expansion. Indeed, his government allowed for high-level contacts and visits to continue at all military and government levels. E Inbar, 'Israeli-Turkish relations'; 111.

⁴⁷ *Defense News*, 7 June 2004, 12; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 9 June 2004; *Defense News*, 14 June 2004, 20; *Briefing*, 19 July 2004. According to <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/473221.html>, during a visit to Israel Omer Celik, a Turkish parliamentarian and senior adviser to Erdogan, said that 'Our relations with Israel are based on very strong foundations, and when we see mistakes in the regional policy [of Israel], there is nothing more normal than criticism'. He further added that 'This does not mean there is a crisis or a problem in the relationship'. *Briefing* reiterated Celik's statement in its issue of 6 September 2004. Omer Celik's statement contradicted, in clear terms, the so-called signs of strain and/or cooling of relations between Turkey and Israel. For further information on this see *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 27 May 2004; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 9 June 2004; *The Economist*, 26 June 2004, 49; *Jane's Foreign Report*, 8 July 2004, 3-5; *Briefing*, 19 July 2004. For Prime Minister Erdogan's policy of ambiguity, namely, on the one hand, demonstration of open and harsh criticism of Israel and, on the other, the provision of reassurances to the Israeli politicians that the relations between the two countries would not be affected, see M Kibaroglu, 'Clash of interest over northern Iraq drives Turkish-Israeli alliance to a crossroads', *Middle East Journal*, 59:2 (Spring 2005), 261, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=9585>.

⁴⁸ *Defence News*, 7 June 2004.

⁴⁹ *Defense News*, 7 June 2004, 12. The whole article is very detailed and provides a good and in-depth analysis. The Moscow weekly *Evreyskoye Slovo* (26 May 2004), however, reported on the issue of the cancellation, on the eve of negotiations, of three of Turkey's largest programmes between Turkey and the EU member states as if the two issues were interrelated. Turkey wanted to show the EU member states that it has much to offer them in terms of military contracts if and when it becomes a member of the EU. This is a rather simplistic and very incorrect analysis. According to <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/473221.html>, during a visit to Israel, a member of the Turkish delegation and one of the Turkish Prime Minister's advisers on foreign policy, Member of Parliament Egemen Bagis rejected reports that the Turkish Prime Minister has cancelled defence contracts with Israel. He said that his government had put on hold a

number of tenders, which include those from American, Russian and European companies, in order to save money. It seems that Amos Yaron's explanation is the most plausible, namely that the Turks wanted a larger share for their local industry. The case of the next batch of the F-4 upgrade reinforces Yaron explanation.

⁵⁰ For example, see Haaretz and the *Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift*; 4 (July-August 2005), 547; <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/570590.html>.

⁵¹ <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/570590.html>.

⁵² For the indication that the impetus did not come from Israel as was perceived at that time by the Arab world, see A Gresh, 'Turkish-Israeli relations'; 190, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1300>; <http://www.meforum.org/article/504>. For a more balanced observation of Turkish-Israeli military co-operation, see P Robins, *Suits and Uniforms*; Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003, note 43, 257-258). According to <http://www.hf.uib.no/smi/pao/hawas.html>, the Turkish-Israeli agreement was originally concluded on 23 March (on 23 February, and not as was cited, 1996), and declared officially at the beginning of April 1996. As both Israeli and the Turkish officials have asserted, the agreement was neither a military bloc nor was it directed against any country. Later (when exactly, the source has not specified) Jordan declared that it was joining the new partnership. The notion that the agreement between Turkey and Israel has not been aimed 'at any third country' was stressed in articles by Jon Gorvett 'Turkey on a tightrope', *The Middle East* (October 2001), 21 and by Mustafa Kibaroglu, 'Turkey and Israel strategize', *Middle East Quarterly*, 9:1 (Winter 2002), 61. For a comprehensive view of the Turkish-Israeli agreement, see *Handelsblatt*, 26 August 2002. For an earlier clear, sharp and in-depth assessment of the Israeli-Turkish agreement from the Arab point of view, see *Turkish Daily News*, 17 June 1997; 18 June 1997. For the US assessment of the Israeli-Turkish co-operation, see

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1997/262.htm>.

⁵³ A Gresh, 'Turkish-Israeli-Syrian relations'; 189. The July 1996 issue of *Newsbrief* clarified the content of the first agreement. It noted that the agreement involves the sharing of intelligence on Syria and Iran, the upgrading by Israel of ageing US aircraft, joint air exercises involving air-to-air refuelling and the use of Turkey's air space for training, as well as joint naval exercises. 16:7, 49; *Defense News*, 8 July 1996, 4. The agreement was signed on 28 November 1996 by the then installed Benjamin Netanyahu's government.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 190. In early December 1997 Israel's Minister of Defence, Yitzhak Mordechai, began a visit to Turkey. *Turkish Daily News*, 9 December 1997.

⁵⁵ *Defense News*, 19 May 2003, 18.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 17 June 1996, 3.

⁵⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, 14 July 1998; 15 July 1998; 13 September 1998; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 September 1998. According to

http://www.middleeast.org/archives/1999_02_24.htm, the Israeli military craft are now training in Turkey, using Turkish bombing ranges, just as Turkish pilots are now flying in the skies over Israel. See also *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 August 2000; A Liel, 'Israel und die Tuerkei', *Internationale Politik*, 11 (2000), 32; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 9 August 2001; *Handelsblatt*, 26 August 2002; *International Herald Tribune*, 7 November 2002; <http://www.meforum.org/article/504>; M Kibaroglu, 'Clash of interest'; 260.

⁵⁸ <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/533875.html>.

⁵⁹ <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=629952&C=mideast>.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*.

⁶¹ *Turkish Daily News*, 1 May 1997.

⁶² *Ibid*, 22 April 1998.

⁶³ <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=914162&fid=942>.

⁶⁴ *Turkish Daily News*, 7 May 1997.

⁶⁵ 'Turkish-Israeli-Syrian relations', 190; A Liel, 'Israel'; 33;

<http://www.meforum.org/article/504>. At the same time, co-operation between Turkey and Jordan has been and still is strong. *Turkish Daily News*, 20 March 1998; 22 April 1998; 23 April 1998; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 April 1998, 6;

http://tsi.idc.ac.il/inbar_regional_implications.html; *Handelsblatt*, 26 August 2002; *International Herald Tribune*, 7 November 2002. This bilateral and perhaps trilateral co-operation including Israel is worth additional research, which is beyond the scope of this

report. For further reading, see http://tsi.idc.ac.il/inbar_regional_implications.html, particularly the subchapter on Jordan's link to the Entente. D Tschirgi, 'Turkey and the Arab World in the new millennium', in T Y Ismael & M Aydin (eds), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 109-110 and 111-112.

⁶⁶ *Turkish Daily News*, 14 August 2003.

⁶⁷ 9 August 2001. M Kibaroglu, 'Turkey and Israel', 63.

⁶⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, 6 July 2001.

⁶⁹ M Kibaroglu, 'Turkey and Israel', 64.

⁷⁰ http://tsi.idc.ac.il/inbar_regional_implications.html.

⁷¹ <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/589319.html>;

<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost...>

⁷² According to a US Navy announcement, fourteen nations including ten NATO members: Canada, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the US, and Israel, Russia, Sweden and the Ukraine took part in the 'Sorbet Royal 2005' submarine exercise. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 29 June 2005, 17. According to *Jane's Defence Weekly* (30 March 2005, Contents) the information pertaining to the first-ever joint Israeli-NATO naval exercise was published online that week. For the prospects for co-operation between Greece, Turkey and Israel, see

http://tsi.idc.ac.il/inbar_regional_implications.html.

⁷³ http://tsi.idc.ac.il/inbar_regional_implications.html.

⁷⁴ *Defense News*, 10 December 2001, 11; 18 March 2002, 8. For an earlier report indicating the US dissatisfaction with the deal, see *Briefing*, 4 September 2000.

⁷⁵ <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=139366&contrassID=2&subContrassID=1&sbSubContrassID=0&lis...> ??? to *Defense News*, 18 March 2002, 8, IMI did not beat several American companies, but only one: General Dynamics Land System (GDLS) of Sterling Heights, Michigan, a subsidiary of General Dynamics Corporation of Falls Church, Virginia.

⁷⁶ *Defense News*, 25 April 2005, 17.

⁷⁷ <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=909657&fid=942>.

⁷⁸ For a complete article, see *Space News International*, 22 July 2002, 21. For an earlier report on the issue of spy satellite sales to Turkey, see *Space News International*, 24 July 2000, 4.

⁷⁹ *Space News International*, 26 May 2003, 13.

⁸⁰ J Gorvett, 'Turkey'; 21; *International Herald Tribune*, 7 November 2002. It is important to note that trade between the two countries increased from a mere \$US18 million in 1987 to \$US620 million in 1997 because of a free trade accord (FTA) ratified in April 1997. *Turkish Daily News*, 7 February 1998; 8 September 1998. Since the ratification of the FTA, the volume of trade between Israel and Turkey has already started to increase. With the implementation of the FTA and the Agreements for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Protection of Investments signed in 1998, more opportunities for co-operation are coming up. In addition, Turkish-Israeli economic relations have started to move from simple trade relations to joint ventures and investments, which is a sign of mature mutual co-operation. For a complete article, see *Turkish Daily News*, 21 April 1999.

⁸¹ 19 July 2004. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* noted that in 2004 bilateral trade between Turkey and Israel (excluding defence industry goods) increased from \$US1.4 billion to \$US2 billion. Of these \$US2 billion, \$US1.2 billion constituted Israeli imports from Turkey, and \$US300 million the amount that Israeli tourists spent in Turkey. According to an *Associated Press* report (8 August 2002), Israel agreed to buy 50 million cubic metres of water from Turkey per year for the next twenty years. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Turkey's Minister of Energy Zeki Cakan reached the deal at a meeting in Jerusalem. A joint statement released after the talks said that, 'Although the final price has not been reached, a joint committee was set up to discuss and finalise the issue of water transportation from Turkey to Israel'. In the barren Middle East, water is a strategic issue as well as one of survival. In early March 2004 Israel signed an agreement to buy water from Turkey. For a complete article, see *Turkish Daily News*, 5 March 2004.

⁸² *Defense News*, 18 July 2005, 12.

⁸³ 19 July 2004.

⁸⁴ For a complete article, see J Gorvett, 'Turkey'; 21.

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- 85 <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/570590.html>.
86 M Kibaroglu; `Clash of interest`; 262.
87 Ibid; 263.
88 *Turkish Daily News*, 21 February 1998.
89 M Kibaroglu, `Turkey and Israel`; 64.
90 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1997/262.htm>.

Appendix: Defence Company Websites

1st Air Supply and Maintenance Centre in Eskisehir (also known as Eskisehir Air Supply and Maintenance Centre or HIBM in Turkish) – Website is not available
Ownership: state-owned

Aselsan Electronic Industries Incorporation (also known as Aselsan Elektronik Sanayii ve Ticaret AS and Aselsan) – <http://www.aselsan.com.tr>
Ownership: state-owned

BMC Sanayii ve Ticaret AS (also known as BMC) – <http://www.bmc.com.tr>
Ownership: private holding company

Elbit Systems Limited (also known as Elbit Systems) –
<http://www.elbitsystems.com>
Ownership: privately-owned by Federmann Enterprises

Elta Electronics Industries Limited (also known as Elta) – <http://www.elta-iai.com>
Ownership: state-owned

FNSS Defence Systems Incorporation (also known as FNSS Savunma Sistemleri) is a joint venture between US-based United Defence Industries Incorporation (recently acquired by British Aerospace (BAE) Systems) and Nurol Holding Company of Turkey – <http://www.fnss.com>
Ownership: private sector company, 51% owned by Nurol Holding Company, while 49% owned by United Defence Industries.

Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) Limited – <http://www.iai.co.il>
Ownership: state-owned

Israel Military Industries (IMI) Limited – <http://www.imi-israel.com>, website does not work properly, access via <http://www.globalsecurity.org> and <http://www.matimop.org>
Ownership: state-owned

Machines and Chemical Industry Corporation (also known as Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) AS) –
http://www.mkek.gov.tr/english/company_introduction2.htm
Ownership: state-owned holding company

Mikrodalga Elektronik Sistemleri AS (also known as Mikes) –
<http://www.mikes.com.tr>, Turkish-language site, English-language site is under construction.
Ownership: 72% owned by the state-owned Aselsan, for Aselsan, see above.

Mint Fuarcilik – <http://www.airex.org>, authorisation required, for further details, see <http://www.eso.org.tr/fuarlar/organizatorler.asp?h=M>
Ownership: state-owned

Otokar Otobus Karoseri Sanayii AS (also known as Otokar) –
<http://www.otokar.com.tr>
Ownership: private holding company

Eugene Kogan

Rafael Armament Development Authority (also known as Rafael) –

<http://www.rafael.co.il>

Ownership: state-owned

Roketsan Missiles Industries Incorporation (also known as Roketsan Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret AS and Roketsan) – <http://www.roketsan.com.tr>

Ownership: mixed. 35% private and 65% state

Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), this company has ceased to exist.

Turkish Army Repair and Maintenance Facility in Kayseri – Website is not available

Ownership: state-owned

Tusas Aerospace Industries Incorporation (formerly Turkish Aircraft Industries Incorporation also known as Tusas until its merger with TAI on 18 February 2005)

– <http://www.tai.com.tr>

Ownership: state-owned

Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (also known as Savunma Sanayii Mustesarligi or SSM) – <http://www.ssm.gov.tr>

Ownership: state-owned

Want to Know More ...?

See:

Altunistik, Melina Benli, 'Turkish policy towards Israel', in 'Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy', Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near Far East Policy, 2000

Robins, Philip. 'Turkish- Israeli relations: From Periphery to the Centre', The Emirates Occasional Paper, no. 41, 2000

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Author and not necessarily those of the
UK Ministry of Defence

ISBN 1-905058-38-1

Published By:

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United Kingdom

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ISBN 1-905058-38-1