Understanding South African Political Violence

A New Problematic?

André du Toit

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Preface

Political violence has deep historical roots in South Africa. But if violence has figured prominently, it usually has not proved too difficult to make sense of it: the violence of conquest, the violence of frontier wars, the violence of apartheid and of the struggle against apartheid, the criminal violence of gangs and the ritualized violence of faction fights. Understanding such types of violence has consisted in relating the pathologies and instrumentalities of violence in appropriate ways to these primary social processes and political phenomena. The extent and intensity of current political violence is, however, more difficult to comprehend. This essay, by André du Toit, is in part an attempt to provide an interpretation of the “new political violence”.

At one level, the current process of transition has resulted in a shift from the politics of violence to the politics of negotiation. At another level, however, the process has been marked by increasing political violence in the black townships. The incidence of interracial violence has been more limited. The current patterns of violence need to be understood in part in the context of local struggles that are independent of the “master narrative” of violence. They are also not unrelated to the processes of modernization generated by apartheid and to the rapidly diminishing expectations from the negotiations currently underway.

The paper places political violence in the context of attempts and steps toward modernization that date back to the seventeenth century. The earlier forms of violence involved warfare between isolated communities, the expansion of the frontier, the formation of the modern state and the suppression of resistance to colonial rule by the Boers and the Zulus. The key feature of African resistance to oppression in the twentieth century was, however, its non-violent character. The resistance was based on demands for full incorporation in the modern state with civil and political rights of citizenship. Even the enforced recourse to violence after the imposition of apartheid did not represent a rejection of the values and ideals of the modern political state and society.

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Dharam Ghai, Director
April 1993
Introduction

Political violence has in recent years become a dominant and pervasive feature of South African politics and society. In various ways this has been a complex and paradoxical development: the violence has been central to the national scene, with open and dramatic conflicts leaving large numbers killed and maimed (e.g. in populist insurrections against the apartheid state, or conflicts between supporters of the African National Congress (ANC) and Inkatha), but it has also proliferated in marginal contexts, largely unnoticed by anyone except those directly concerned (e.g. in local feuds or “faction fights”); surprisingly, the violence has been strikingly absent in some contexts where it was most feared and predicted (e.g. by blacks against whites), while it has erupted elsewhere in unexpected contexts and forms (e.g. the revival and use of traditional “cultural weapons”); often the very agents of this new violence have been unclear and its purposes hotly contested (cf. the allegations about the presence of a “third force”). Understanding South African political violence has become both an urgent challenge and a special problem.

This paper will make a number of different moves aimed at opening up the problem of understanding political violence in South Africa in contemporary, historical and discursive perspectives. First we will need to make some preliminary conceptual clarifications as to the specific sense of violence at stake, as well as to just what is involved in the problem of “understanding” this violence. Next we will briefly survey the most recent period so as to give some substantiation to the suggestion that in an important sense we are currently confronted with a new and more elusive problem in understanding South African political violence, as well as to gain some idea of how and when this new problematic has come about. The upshot of these introductory sections will be that the task of understanding current and past political violence is an eminently historical project, and the major part of the paper will be concerned with an attempt to provide an analytical framework for this purpose. It will be argued that an understanding of political violence in South Africa needs to be located with respect to four different historical contexts: i) the pre-modern context of frontier conflict; ii) the modernizing period of centralized state-formation; iii) the post-1948 period of apartheid and resistance to apartheid; and iv) the current transitional period on the verge of a post-apartheid South Africa. With reference to this periodization of the history of political violence in South Africa, we will trace the emergence of a “master-narrative” structuring conventional understandings of political violence in relation to the general project of modernization. It will be argued that it is in so far as the current proliferation and escalation of political violence confounds the expectations embedded in the earlier “master-narrative” that we are confronted with a new and urgent problem in understanding political violence in South Africa. Critical reflection and analysis on this turn of events should help to clear the way for a better understanding of both present and past political violence in South Africa.

Some conceptual preliminaries

The proposition that understanding South African violence has become a special problem needs to be focused more precisely. We need i) to distinguish the specific sense of “violence” which is at stake, and ii) to clarify just what is involved in the problem of “understanding” this violence.

Firstly, then, the relevant sense of political violence that needs to be understood. Violence, of course, can take many forms. In the most literal sense violence involves the causing of physical injury or harm to others. Typically, though, violence extends to more
metaphorical senses involving violations of rights and personal integrity as well as expressions of outrage or liberation from bondage (Degenaar, 1990; Garver, 1970). Much violence is not overtly or directly political; we distinguish personal and family violence as well as criminal violence. Political violence is typically differentiated from other forms of violence by claims to a special moral or public legitimation for the injury and harm done to others, as well as by the representative character of the agents and targets of these acts of violence (du Toit and Manganyi, 1990). Some kinds of political violence also have a notable symbolic and discursive character: these deeds of violence acquire and generate special public significance resonating far beyond the immediate harm or injury done (Apter and Sawa, 1984).

These features of political violence will no doubt be of particular relevance to any understanding of violence. But what is involved in “understanding” violence? This is not simply self-evident. Indeed, violence as such is often contrasted to rationality and meaningful communication; mere violence is easily termed “senseless”. This would seem to indicate that violence as such cannot be understood. Yet there are familiar ways in which violence may be morally justified, e.g. in self-defence, or in which it can have instrumental rationality. In these ways, at least, violence does not pose particular difficulties to our understanding.

Political violence, too, is commonly contrasted to the politics of negotiation and democracy. Still, violent resistance against tyranny or in a liberation struggle is commonly recognized as justifiable. And in other circumstances, too, the instrumental uses of political violence are well known and widely practised. These are ways in which we understand the uses of political violence only too easily and well.

It is when political violence escalates and proliferates in ways which seem to confound the conventional criteria for moral legitimation and do not readily make sense in terms of instrumental rationality either, that we are confronted with a more radical problem of understanding such political violence. It is in this radical sense that understanding political violence in South Africa now poses a special challenge and problem. This paper aims to contextualize that problem and make some preliminary moves towards exploring it.

In the rest of this introductory section we will first sketch just how the new problem itself has come about in the current situation. The main part of the paper will consist of a broad overview of the pre-history of the present so as to clarify the nature and context of this new problem of understanding South African political violence.

**The new context of South African violence**

Political violence is not, of course, by any means a novel phenomenon in South African society and history; indeed, South Africa has a long and especially violent history. But if violence has figured prominently, it usually has not proved too difficult to make some sense of it: the violence of conquest, the violence of frontier wars, the violence of apartheid, the violence of the struggle against apartheid, not to forget the criminal violence of gangs or the ritualized violence of faction fights, etc. All these forms of violence could without too much difficulty be located and justified or criticized from familiar moral, social and humanitarian perspectives. Until recently there seemed little or no apparent difficulty in understanding (at least in principle, though not, of course, always in detail) what the functions and purposes of such political violence were, or how they derived from and were related to other social processes and political forces. Significantly, if violence was a familiar phenomenon in many different contexts, this was rarely seen as a “problem” in its own right. Thus, the violence of apartheid was generally understood as part of the pathology of apartheid; the problem, at root, was not so much
the violence engendered by it, but apartheid itself. Similarly, the turn to political violence in the struggle against apartheid was justified and criticized from moral, political and strategic points of view, but precisely for those reasons it was also conceived as embedded in, and subservient to, these larger concerns. In short, until quite recently the problem was not so much the phenomenon of political violence itself, but (violent) conquest, the (violence of) frontier wars, the (violence of) apartheid and of the struggle against apartheid, etc. As such, there was no categorical difficulty in understanding the problem of violence; in large part such understanding consisted in relating the pathologies and instrumentalties of violence in appropriate ways to these primary social processes and political phenomena. Violence was not “the” problem per se.

Of late, though, we have been confronted with the phenomenon of political violence in a different sense, as a major “problem” in its own right, a disturbing phenomenon that can not readily be understood in relation to familiar criteria of legitimacy and rationality. Understanding this new phenomenon of political violence is problematic in ways which were not the case concerning political violence in the past. This development is not unconnected with the dramatic process of political transition currently under way in South Africa, and has to be located and explored in that context.

With the 1990s South African history has evidently reached a critical juncture, a basic political transition from minority rule and apartheid to a non-racial and more democratic “new South Africa” (du Toit and Slabbert, 1991, with reference to O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). The transitional process has, in a number of ways, departed from earlier trends and patterns of conflict, and has developed some paradoxical features of its own especially in relation to the question of political violence. In particular, the transition has involved both a significant turn from political violence and a marked escalation of political violence. This paradoxical turn of events needs to be briefly unpacked.

At one level, the transition has meant a turn from the politics of violence to the politics of negotiation. Instead of a continuation of the violent power struggle to wrest control of the state from an entrenched, privileged and powerful minority by means of popular insurrection, armed struggle and international sanctions, the transitional process has taken the essentially non-violent form of a sustained attempt to reach a negotiated settlement and to introduce a new constitutional order. At another level, however, the transition has been marked by an increase and proliferation of political violence. The new politics of negotiation has itself been threatened by sustained and increasing political violence. Significantly this has not come only, or even primarily, from the reactionary “white right-wing” or at the racial interface of the privileged minority of whites and the majority of poor and previously rightless blacks. Rather it has emerged in the form of apparently endemic political violence in the black townships.

The very nature and purpose of this proliferation of political violence is intensely controversial: it is hotly disputed on all sides whether this proliferation of political violence should be understood as “ethnic” conflicts with deep cultural and historical roots, or as a power and ideological struggle between contending political organizations, or as the sinister work of a “third force” behind the scenes, or as a consequence of poverty, social disruption and the general lack of political authority, or as some combination of all of these. This paper will not attempt to settle these controversies. For our purposes it is the paradoxical nature of the transitional process, as involving both a turn from violent polarized conflict between the major political protagonists to the politics of non-violent constitutional negotiation as well as, at other levels, a proliferation and escalation of political violence which need to be introduced, if only briefly, and related to each other. For it is in this double relation that the problem of understanding the current political violence may best be located.
First, then, the dramatic turn to the politics of non-violent constitutional negotiation. On 2 February 1990, a date which has become a symbolic landmark in recent South African history, President F.W. de Klerk announced in his opening speech to Parliament such major measures of liberalization as the unbanning of long proscribed resistance organizations including the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), the release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela, the return of the exiles, recognition of the rights to public protest and demonstrations, etc. (du Toit, 1991). These measures were specifically introduced to enable a process of political negotiation, involving the ANC and other previously banned organizations as well as “terrorist” leaders such as Mandela and Slovo. It was generally understood as opening the way for the negotiated introduction of a new and democratic constitutional order.

Since 1990 this process has made substantial strides: the initial pre-negotiation contacts or “talks about talks” between the Government and the ANC leadership resulted in the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes during 1990, and paved the way for the formation by the end of 1991 of CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa) as a forum for negotiation involving a range of “representative” political groupings. This progress has not been altogether smooth or uninterrupted. In mid-1992 CODESA was temporarily suspended due to a failure to resolve some crucial constitutional issues. But by the beginning of 1993 serious negotiations regarding the introduction of a shared transitional authority were again under way, and the first ever popular national elections were expected to take place within a year. These developments are all the more remarkable if viewed against the background of the increasingly violent build-up of South African political history over the preceding decades.

The accession to power in 1948 of the National Party (NP) and the subsequent imposition of the policy and ideology of apartheid, in the place of earlier more pragmatic and paternalistic versions of segregation and white supremacy, led to successive decades of increasingly violent and racially polarized conflict (Horrell, 1971). Following the massacre of blacks protesting the pass laws at Sharpeville in 1960 and the subsequent banning of mainstream African political organizations such as the ANC and PAC (Pan-Africanist Congress), the NP government increasingly had to rely on coercive measures to maintain the apartheid order. The security forces were expanded and given extensive and discretionary powers by statute. A renewed round of political activity and protest initiated by the Black Consciousness (BC) movement in the early 1970s resulted in the student revolts in Soweto in 1976. This was met with savage repression by the state, culminating in the death of Steve Biko and the banning of a range of BC organizations by the end of 1977. The early 1980s saw another cycle of populist resistance leading to the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) and issuing in the country-wide popular uprisings of 1984-1987 (Cobbett and Cohen, 1988). The NP-controlled state saw this in terms of a “total onslaught” which was to be met by a “total strategy” involving an increasing militarization of (white) South African society. Under the (newly introduced) executive presidency of P.W. Botha, who relied heavily on the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the security forces, the “securocrats” increasingly commanded the key decision-making structures in the state, with the National Security Council usurping key functions from the cabinet while Parliament itself became increasingly marginalized (Swilling and Phillips, 1988; cf. Frankel, Pines and Swilling, 1988). By the second half of the 1980s the ANC, historically long committed to non-violent and constitutional methods, was giving prominence to the “armed struggle” in conjunction with internationally imposed sanctions and popular mobilization aimed at making the country “ungovernable” as a prelude to taking power (Lodge, 1986). The NP-controlled state responded by the imposition of successive states of emergency, deploying troops in the townships and the construction of a national network of Security Management Centres.
The SMCs were supposed to co-ordinate policy and security action under military control and potentially provided an alternative to the existing structures of civilian rule.

On either side, the inherent logic and dynamic of these developments pointed to a dénouement of increasingly violent confrontation: for the ANC/UDF and the populist “liberation movement” the narrative structure of the “struggle” promised a (quasi-) revolutionary culmination in taking power and control of the state, thus ending apartheid and ensuring majority rule. And for the white minority the defence of power and privilege inexorably pointed to the formation of a reactionary and militarized “garrison state” explicitly based on superior coercive forces and/or an unending civil war. (These were not, of course, the only developments taking place: a sequence of indirect and unofficial contacts initiated by intermediaries and involving some key political agents prepared the way for later open negotiations. But if off-stage different narratives were being prepared, the dominant narrative on the national political scene remained that of increasingly violent confrontation).

It is these mutually reinforcing dominant narratives and the concomitant sets of expectations they tend to generate which have been confounded by the developments connected with 2 February 1990. To some extent these developments had been prefigured by events during 1989, including the release of Govan Mbeki and a few other long-term political prisoners. But from 1990 the NP-government, now under the unambiguously civilian-based leadership of F.W. de Klerk, definitely signalled a comprehensive shift from rule by coercive force to a more “political” approach seeking the negotiated settlement of conflicts. Instead of deploying political censorship, emergency powers, bannings and detentions without trial as before, the NP-government now committed itself to public negotiations with its former “terrorist” enemies. It allowed those who had formerly been hounded as “communists” and “traitors” some access to the mass media, and recognized (though not unconditionally) the rights of formerly proscribed political organizations to organize, demonstrate and protest in public, etc. In principle, if not quite yet in practice, this amounted to renouncing the coercive maintenance of minority rule; henceforth the protection of power and privilege would be sought through negotiated settlements and constitutional guarantees. For its part, the ANC has suspended, if not yet finally disbanded, the “armed struggle”. Following the return of its leaders from exile and/or their release from prison, the ANC began the difficult process of transforming the “liberation movement” into a more conventional party political organization (Sachs, 1992). The familiar quasi-revolutionary discourse and symbolism of populist mobilization increasingly gave way to strategic considerations and the technical intricacies of developing policy positions on a range of social, economic and educational issues (Muller and Cloete, 1991). Together, then, these complementary moves amounted to a comprehensive and bilateral change of strategy and tactics such as could well be symbolized by the Peace Accord publicly signed and sealed in September 1991. Somehow the violent confrontation which had increasingly threatened to engulf the political landscape had been averted and transformed, incomprehensibly and almost miraculously but also unmistakeably, into the makings of an amicable settlement. Where the dominant narratives had been pointing to an inexorable and possibly catastrophic climax of political violence, the scene had almost overnight been changed into a triumph for diplomacy and rational persuasion as former foes sat down to reason together and increasingly discovered common ground (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

However, this is not quite a full or accurate picture of current developments and it would be grossly misleading to suggest that political violence as a phenomenon of South African political life has been contained and defused. Instead, it is increasingly recognized that the continuing levels of proliferating political violence during 1990 and from 1991-1992 now constitute a basic threat to that very process of ongoing political negotiation just
outlined (Simpson et al., 1991; Schlemmer, 1991; Amnesty International, 1992). The Peace Accord of September 1991 actually had a much more ambiguous significance than that suggested above; rather than the final termination of hostilities between the main agents involved in national conflict, it represented a not altogether concerted attempt, at once tentative and somewhat desperate, of some political and civil leaders to regain some measure of control over the proliferating incidents of political violence at the local and grassroots levels. The subsequent history of the Peace Accord has not been a major success story; more often than not the Peace Accord structures have failed to function effectively and to prevent or contain violent conflicts at local levels.

This brings us, in the second place, to the other major turn of recent developments relating to political violence. For, quite simply, 2 February 1990, the release of Mandela, the return of the exiles, the suspension of the armed struggle as well as the lifting of emergency powers, and the subsequent negotiation process leading to CODESA and beyond has not brought an end to, or even a lessening of, actual political violence “on the ground”. By any count the current spread and intensity of political violence is at similar and higher levels than during the worst years of 1985-86: during 1990 and 1991 more than 6000 people were killed in incidents of political violence (Survey of Race Relations 1991/2, 1992). The months following the release of Mandela in fact saw a sharp escalation of violent conflicts in the Natal Midlands, where political violence pitting factions of Inkatha against groupings allied to the UDF/ANC had become endemic since 1987 (Graham, 1991; Bekker, 1992). By mid-1990 these violent confrontations had spilled over to the Transvaal with local civil wars between residents and hostel dwellers in townships on the West Rand and in the Vaal Triangle (Seekings, 1991). The press tended to report this as an ethnic war between Zulu and Xhosa, a power struggle between Inkatha and the ANC, and/or the results of destabilizing efforts of a “third force”, evidently both imposing preconceived notions and failing to make much sense of these deeply disturbing developments (Fordred, 1991). In the weeks and months that followed, reports continued of apparently senseless massacres of train commuters by masked gunmen with automatic weapons in Soweto, bloody feuds and confrontations in urban townships, squatter camps and isolated rural communities. Despite a range of sustained efforts by various bodies and agencies to monitor, mediate and settle this recurrent political violence, the pattern continues. In the early months of 1992 deadly “taxi wars” raged in the Western Cape after the latest in a long series of negotiated accords had collapsed; in March the township of Alexandra bordering on Johannesburg and Sandton, long considered one of the most stable black urban communities, erupted in urban warfare between township residents and the inmates of the huge Madala migrant labourer hostel. In June, following the breakdown of the CODESA talks, the massacre in Boipatong dominates national news as did the massacre in Bisho at the beginning of September. These were only the most prominent and dramatic events; according to official statistics 2,465 people died in incidents of political violence during 1992 (Cape Times, 13/2/1993).

If the casualties mounted, public perception of the significance of the violence also changed in important ways. At one level the ongoing violence is increasingly being accepted as simply part and parcel of the political landscape, with new tidings of death and destruction leaving little lasting impact on the public mind. Whereas the face of South African politics was irrevocably changed for a decade and more by the traumatic shooting of 69 people at Sharpeville in 1960, and the picture of the slain Hector Peterson on June 16, 1976 became a potent symbol of the student revolts countered by repressive violence, in 1992 it is hardly front page news if the daily casualties of “unrest-related incidents” run into double figures. The scenes of carnage from Alexandra during one week (Weekly Mail, 3/4/92; Sunday Star, 5/4/92) are quickly forgotten when they are overtaken by news of soldiers on the rampage in the squating settlement of Phola Park in...
the next week (Weekly Mail, 10/4/92; Sunday Star, 12/4/92). This amounts to more than just a process of becoming hardened and insensitive to the stream of reports about shoot-outs, killings, petrol-bombings, abductions, massacres, hold-ups, raids and counter-attacks which never seem to let up. The very context and significance of all this political violence itself has changed.

Until the end of the 1980s, i.e., in the context of the struggle against apartheid and from the perspective of the “liberation movement”, pain and suffering, detention and torture, even death, could make definite political sense (Manganyi and du Toit, 1990). This was not only the case from a participant perspective, in the sense of activists who were personally prepared to go to gaol, be tortured or even to die for the “struggle”. The significance of such sacrifices could also be understood by sympathizers as well as by critics or opponents. Even the use of the brutal “necklace” killings could to some extent at least be understood, though certainly not justified or condoned, as extreme expressions of collective outrage when used against known political enemies or traitors. The escalation of political violence was conceived as a regrettable but unavoidable function of the deepening popular resistance against the apartheid state and the illegitimate minority régime. Making the country “ungovernable”, with all which that entailed in practice - from the targeting of collaborators to the social costs of rent and consumer boycotts - was an intelligible aim as a prelude to taking power and the coming of majority government. For its part, the apartheid régime, its functionaries, supporters and critics, also had ready ways of making sense of the uses of coercion and violence against “terrorists” and the “total onslaught”. If there was an escalation of political violence in the South African conflict, there was little problem for participants and observers alike to make prima facie sense of it.

In the current context, i.e., following the liberalizations after 2 February 1990 and with the transition from authoritarian rule to the politics of negotiation under way, the continuing political violence can no longer be framed or understood in quite the same ways. If the armed struggle has been suspended and the state no longer insists on imposing apartheid but lifts the state of emergency and begins to open up political spaces, then it is not so easy to see what the functions and significance of continuing violence. In these circumstances, the high level of political violence is no longer necessarily perceived as a threat to the state itself; if anything, there is a pervasive suspicion that those still in power may even benefit from it. The escalation and proliferation of political violence in the townships is portrayed in the media as “black-on-black violence”, with the implication that this is primarily a problem for and threat to the black communities and their political organizations and leaders. On all sides, political leaders and organizations systematically tend to shift the responsibility for the violence to others: while the NP-government insists that the violence is the responsibility of black leaders, the ANC blames it on Inkatha (who returns the compliment) and castigates the government for not using the full resources at its disposal, suggesting as well that a “third force” (i.e., covert state agents) may be behind much of the violence. Whatever the truth to these allegations and counter-allegations may be in each case - and it is likely that no party is either entirely blameless or fully in control of all its agents and supporters - it is also clear that much of the violence can no longer readily be harnessed to an intelligible public cause. Individual agents will no doubt have their reasons for what they do, but both the larger context and the specific sense of much of this political violence remains unclear. Since it is neither made clear what could legitimate such violence, or who and what the targets and agents might represent, people have to cast around to make any sense of much of the ongoing political violence. Consider such cases as that of political killers who in cold blood and at random mow down train commuters with automatic weapons, or indiscriminately massacre those holding a wake for a loved one. Typically these terrible events tend to be interpreted, if at all, by directly or indirectly reviving earlier frames of
reference, e.g. by insisting that the “armed struggle” is continuing, or that some “third force” is pursuing hidden agendas. If they cannot be interpreted in these terms, then we are confronted with a different kind of political violence from that we knew in the time of the “struggle” against apartheid. This is the violence of “warlords” and “hit squads”, and it is much closer to the criminal violence and gang wars that is such an endemic feature of South African society.

This, then, is the paradoxical double turn in the history of political violence in the current South African context. At one level, a violent and polarized political conflict appeared to be building up to a dramatic climax, but was then overtaken by a series of liberalizing initiatives facilitating the politics of negotiation. At other levels, though, there is a proliferation of sustained political violence which can no longer be framed in the same ways as before. This continuing political violence is increasingly identified as a major problem in its own right, a problem that may come to threaten the transitional process itself. Understanding this new political violence is a basic challenge in the current context.

Among other things, the challenge of understanding current and past political violence is an eminently historical project. Our current difficulties in making sense of the new political violence may in large part be due to expectations generated by the narrative structures presumed to be inherent in the pre-history of the present. Conversely, these difficulties of understanding the present may, and perhaps should, bring us to reconsider some of the assumptions in our understanding of the history of political violence which have gone largely unquestioned in the past. It is for these reasons that this paper now turns to an overview of the history of political violence in South Africa with a view to articulating the macro-narrative conventionally assumed to be inherent in it.

**Historical Context and Legacy**

The overall trajectory of political violence in South Africa exhibits a number of striking and surprising features. As a colonial and post-colonial society South Africa of course has a long and bitter history of political violence: from the outset, colonial settlement and “encroachments” on the land met with resistance from the indigenous peoples; for nearly 200 years the Cape colony was a slave society and forced labour practices persisted much longer still; the spread of trekboer communities into the interior could be secured only by the deployment of corporate violence in the form of commandos, leading to a virtual extermination campaign against the San peoples by the end of the eighteenth century; the first conflicts between trekboers and Xhosa on the Eastern Cape frontier in the 1780s led to a century and more of “frontier wars”, including the internecine “holocaust” or Mfecane uprooting settled communities in the interior from the 1820s, and eventually concluded with the violent conquest of the Zulu, BaSotho, Pedi, Tshwana and other indigenous communities; Afrikaner resistance to British imperial rule culminated in the South African War of 1899-1902; during the twentieth century the modern South African state brought the coercive imposition of minority rule, “white supremacy” and apartheid; and the anti-apartheid struggles of the second half of the twentieth century evolved from political protest to popular insurrection and the “armed struggle”. This violent history is not simply one of endemic strife or a succession of arbitrary and irrational conflicts. It is possible to discern, at least from the vantage point of the present, a certain overall shape and thrust to this violent history, one informed by narrative structures at both the macro- and micro-levels. No doubt there are a many different and localized narratives, and each of these will be contested in many particulars. But diverse strands of the story and contrasting vantage points may still share common assumptions and contexts. It is the
overall shape and thrust of that narrative structure, the basic trajectory of this long history of political violence, that is relevant to our problem of understanding the “new” political violence in the current transitional context. In an important sense that overall narrative structure provides a framework for the history of South African political violence that promises a different dénouement from what seems currently to be happening. Quite simply, the extent and intensity of political violence is currently increasing at an exponential rate precisely at the historical moment that it might be expected to be defused and to decrease; instead of the peaceful dénouement promised by our implicit understanding of the earlier narrative, we are confronted by an escalation and intensification of political violence in a range of unexpected contexts and a variety of “irrational” forms. But this raises some quite general questions: What was this narrative shape, if only implicit and presumed, of that overall history of South African political violence? And how and why is it currently somehow going wrong? This section will only attempt a sketch of the former question, leaving the more substantive investigation of the latter for later sections.

The history of political violence in South Africa may best be periodized in relation to two central themes: on the one hand that of industrial development and the rise of the modern state, and on the other hand that of apartheid and resistance against apartheid. Primary industrialization may be dated from the mining revolution following the discovery of diamonds around 1870 and gold in the 1880s, while modern centralized state formation was consolidated with Union in 1910. The apartheid period is conventionally taken to start with the accession to power of the NP in 1948, with the transition from apartheid signalled by de Klerk’s landmark address of 2 February 1990. Accordingly, we may distinguish four major periods: (i) the pre-modern and pre-industrial period of frontier wars conventionally dated from the initial confrontations of trekboers and Xhosa on the Eastern Cape frontier in the 1780s - though not forgetting the even earlier period of Khoisan resistance to colonial settlement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Marks, 1972) - and closing with the suppression of the Bambatha rebellion in Natal in 1905; (ii) the modernizing period effectively dating from Union in 1910, with white minority rule exercised through a centralized state coupled to the modern sector of the economy (i.e., commercial agriculture and mining capital, or the “marriage of maize and gold”), and white supremacy tempered by paternalistic notions of trusteeship and segregation; (iii) the apartheid period from 1948 with Afrikaner nationalists taking command of the state and attempting to restructure society according to an explicitly racist ideology and policy, and countered by popular resistance developing from the determinedly non-violent “Defiance Campaign” of 1950 to the “armed struggle” and popular insurrections of the 1980s; and (iv) the transitional period of liberalization and political negotiations on the way to a post-apartheid order and a constitutional settlement since 2 February 1990.

Prima facie there might seem to be good reason for our analysis to focus only on (iii) and (iv), but (i) and (ii) also deserve some attention at this stage. First, the crucial problem of the historical significance of political violence in relation to the process of modernization can best be grasped in terms of the overall trajectory, or macro-narrative, of this entire historical development including the pre-apartheid and pre-modern periods as well. Secondly, though it will be argued that the significance and dynamics of political violence in the pre-modern period was qualitatively different from that under the aegis of the master-narrative of the modernizing period and beyond, the pre-modern period also left a rich legacy of symbols, heroic figures, narrative elements and historical analogies available for retrieval in later contexts. Thirdly, there are senses in which the radical uncertainties and ambiguities inherent in the dynamics of the current transitional process are comparable to the pre-modern context of conflict on the open frontier rather than to the more settled conditions and familiar constraints of the modern periods.
The period of frontier violence in a pre-modern context

The frontier has been closely associated with the roots of political violence in South Africa. This should not be overstated or oversimplified: the frontier was not the scene of violent conflict only, but also of complex patterns of interaction through trade and barter and of partial incorporation through labour and tribute (Wilson, 1982). Still, the fact remains that for a century and more, from the closing decades of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, indigenous resistance to colonization and conquest issued in a long series of frontier wars, first on the Eastern Cape frontier and then in the interior of Southern Africa. (Indeed, much of the story of South Africa until 1870 can persuasively be told by focusing on the frontier - see Mostert, 1992.) Liberal historiography notoriously stressed the decisive contribution of this “frontier tradition” to the making of modern South Africa, in particular tracing the racist attitudes and ideologies of twentieth century white South Africa to the formative experiences of violent conflict on the frontier (MacCrone, 1937, 1961; Walker, 1933). More recently this view has been strongly challenged by a radical and revisionist historiography (Legassick, 1980) insisting on capitalist development and urban industrialization after 1870 as crucial to the making of modern South Africa, including the socio-economic and ideological origins of apartheid. While disagreeing on the relation of apartheid to capitalism and modernization, both liberal and radical historians agree that the frontier period should be conceived as essentially pre-modern. This has significant consequences for the understanding of frontier violence.

Pre-modern frontiers may best be conceptualized as zones where processes of interspersed colonization occurred in conditions marked by weak political authority and the relative absence of institutionalized social constraints and resources (Giliomee, 1981). Though involving interaction by people from different communities, frontiers should by no means be confused with modern boundaries between states. The colonizing frontiers were rarely stable conditions, and we may distinguish between the period of the “open” or pioneering frontier, and that of the “closing” frontier as colonization was consolidated. On the pioneering or open frontier conflicting claims to the land, or disputes regarding cattle, game or barter, had perforce to be settled with the limited coercive resources locally available to individuals or groups. The settlement of conflicts and disputes was thus relatively unconstrained by institutionalized norms or government controls, and recourse to individual or corporate uses of violence was typically marked by discretionary and arbitrary actions. On the early South African frontier, however, this occurred in a context of a relative balance of power: the colonists’ advantages in having horses and guns were largely neutralized by the prevailing demographic ratios. Frontier violence, at least on the open frontier, thus tended to be at once unconstrained and of limited extent, given the relative lack of power.

On both counts this was to change on the closing frontier with the consolidation of settlement and the extension of colonial and imperial authority. On the one hand, greater resources for corporate violence and military action became available, decisively changing the balance of power in the favour of the colonial forces. On the other hand, the extension of imperial and colonial authority increasingly subjected frontier communities to the instruments of law and order while also establishing institutionalized social constraints. Thus on the Eastern Cape frontier, for instance, the previous balance of power was decisively tilted in favour of the colonial forces by the introduction, at the time of the Forth Frontier War in 1811-1812, of the imperial British army, with its massive resources of manpower and superior weaponry. However, this also meant that the colonial commandos, henceforth under imperial direction and control, to their immense chagrin were no longer able to operate on their own account as semi-autonomous forces with essentially discretionary powers (MacLennan, 1986). More generally, frontier violence in pre-industrial South Africa needs to be understood and
located in relation to the changing contexts in the transition from the open pioneering frontier to the closing of the frontier and the coming of more settled colonial society. In South Africa, as compared to North America, for example, the period of the open frontier tended to last considerably longer in relative isolation from the centres of capitalist expansion and industrial development. But eventually, if successively and unequally, the various frontiers did close, and we can trace the different processes of economic closure (i.e., land shortage and a shift from a subsistence economy to intensive agricultural cultivation and commercial farming), growing social stratification, and political closure (i.e., the imposition of a single source of authority) (Giliomee, 1981, 1989). This transition from the open and pioneering frontier to the closing and settled frontier thus provides the historical context for understanding pre-modern frontier violence.

Understanding frontier violence is by no means obvious: if violence was a pervasive feature of life on the pre-modern frontier, it was also highly complex and elusive. A marked characteristic of violence and strife in the context of the open frontier was its systematic ambiguity and uncertainty (du Toit and Giliomee, 1983). Individual and communal disputes might concern specific issues or events, but they typically had unclear and complex roots. Conflicting claims on land, like disputes about trading or labour practices, were complicated by different and unfamiliar cultural traditions (e.g. divergent notions of land and ownership assumed by the colonists and the indigenous peoples) and compounded by divergent practices and conceptions of social and political incorporation (e.g. the Xhosa practice of incorporation through inclusive acculturation and the colonial custom of kinship exclusion and differential incorporation). In the absence of recognized authority structures, individual disputes readily generated corporate uses of coercive force seeking to resolve the multiplying uncertainties and ambiguities by decisive action, though perforce only with the limited resources locally available. In these circumstances, one archetypal theme of frontier conflict became that of the attempted negotiation resulting in (pre-emptive) massacre: much the same dynamics recur in a series of different variations from the massacre of a Xhosa clan following the “tobacco trick” of Commandant van Jaarsveld at the beginning of the First Frontier War of 1781, through the massacre in the midst of ongoing negotiations of the elder Landdrost Stockenstrom and his men by Xhosa forces at the start of the frontier war of 1811-1812, to the most famous massacre of all, that of the Trekker leader Piet Retief and his company at the hands of the Zulu chief Dingane in 1838. The significance of such frontier violence is easily misjudged from the vantage point of modern and settled society, with its conventional polarity of rational negotiation as against political violence, making the massacres appear as extreme and unambiguous instances of irrationality and barbarism. Understood in the context of the open frontier the rationality of the attempted negotiation was as ambiguous as that of the pre-emptive use of overwhelming force: “Both the massacre of the unsuspecting adversary and the brave and trusting venture to continue discussions in the midst of possibly extreme danger are rooted in the same ambiguities” (du Toit and Giliomee, 1983: 131). In short, in the pre-modern context of the open frontier it cannot be taken for granted that the relation between political violence and rationality had the same significance as that taken for granted in the context of modernity. (Interestingly, in the context of the radical uncertainties and many ambiguities of the current transitional process, the frontier themes of the need for negotiations which may well end in massacres have acquired a new relevance, though sometimes with surprising role reversals, e.g. Mandela-as-Retief venturing into the lair of de Klerk-as-Dingane! Karon, 1990.)

In the context of the closing frontier the nature, scope and significance of frontier wars and of violent resistance to conquest was transformed in a number of ways. In his history of the Xhosa people, The House of Phalo, Peires has charted some of the successive stages of this progression. (A much fuller account is provided by Mostert, 1992.) In the
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pre-colonial period, war had a definite cultural meaning in Xhosa society, expressing the social roles and significance of warriors (“the old heroism”). But if raids and counter-raids were frequent, actual wars, conducted in traditional battle formations, were relatively rare and constrained. Pre-colonial wars were relatively bloodless and did not lead to destruction of productive resources (Peires, 1981). The initial clashes with colonial forces on the open frontier were marked by a relative balance of power, with some Xhosa incursions effectively pushing back trekboer settlement and Boer commandos having rather mixed successes in sporadic engagements during the Second and Third Frontier Wars. It should also be stressed that during this period the pattern of conflict was by no means only that of Xhosa versus colonists; instead it involved complex and shifting alliances in which some trekboers at times combined with certain Xhosa chiefs, while at other times the Khoisan would join forces with the Xhosa (Mostert, 1992). The pattern of frontier conflict was changed after 1811 by the impact of the British imperial army with its massive resources and cold-blooded professionalism. British forces brought a much more ferocious level of warfare to the frontier, one in which crops were destroyed and communities uprooted and expelled rather than incorporated. In response the Xhosa learned to avoid formal battles and began to use natural cover and guerilla tactics while “prophets”, claiming ritual powers capable of undoing the secrets of the white man’s superior firepower, gained increasing prominence (Peires, 1981; Mostert, 1992). In 1819 Nxele, a religious leader and charismatic figure who claimed that he could turn bullets into water, led thousands of Xhosa warriors in broad daylight in a frontal assault on the military outpost of Grahamstown. The assault nearly succeeded; large numbers of Xhosa warriors were mowed down in their ranks by military firepower; Nxele was captured, banished to Robben Island, and drowned while attempting to escape some years later - his return to deliver the Xhosa people from the conqueror was still fervently expected generations afterwards. The Sixth Frontier War of 1834-1835 and the War of the Axe (or Seventh Frontier War) of 1846-1847 further stepped up the extent of actual slaughter and destruction, with the casualties of battles such as those of the Gwangqa in 1835 running into the thousands. The decisive factor, though, proved to be the imperial army’s capacity and determination to destroy crops, provisions and supplies systematically as a strategy of war, bringing the Xhosa people to the edge of starvation: “the Xhosa were defeated less by firearms than by the infinitely greater logistical resources available to the Colony” (Peires, 1981: 158). The Eighth Frontier War, which began in 1850, was even more terrible and destructive, a war in which the British killed men, women and children alike and the Xhosa tortured prisoners to death and mutilated the corpses of their foes. “For black and white alike it was a war of race, perhaps the first of its kind” (Mostert, 1992: 1077). Frontier violence had come a long way since the time of “the old heroism”.

The Xhosa also learned some lessons about the uses and the limitations of political violence from this history. From an early stage they began to adapt their traditional weapons and military strategies, and soon acquired and learned to use guns and horses. Even so, the more direct means of violent resistance to conquest repeatedly proved inadequate. In this context the Xhosa increasingly had recourse to a variety of other strategies and ever more desperate means. Thus, in the War of the Axe, Sandile opted for a more political ploy by declaring a “unilateral peace”, i.e., the Xhosa did not surrender, but refused to go on fighting. This Xhosa policy of “passive resistance”, amounting to an insistence that they were at peace with the Colony while refusing to admit that they had been defeated, caused considerable frustration and incomprehension in colonial circles (Peires, 1981). Following the even more destructive Eighth Frontier War and the imminent annexation of a substantial part of Xhosaland as British Kaffraria, the Xhosa resorted to even more desperate expedients with the “national suicide” of the Xhosa cattle-killing movement of 1856. The prophecies of Mlanjeni, like that of Nxele earlier, had been a major inspiration of the bitter war of 1850 (Mostert, 1992). Now, inspired by
the dreams and visions of a young girl, Nongqwawuse, a large part of the Xhosa people destroyed their crops and killed their cattle, already infected by a mysterious lungsickness disease, in the fervent belief that this would bring about the resurrection of their ancestors, driving the colonial invaders into the sea and restoring the bounty of pre-colonial society. The actual result was a national catastrophe, with many thousands dying of famine and the colonial government under Sir George Grey exploiting the circumstances to consolidate conquest and solve the needs of the colonial labour market. In retrospect, Xhosa oral tradition and black political opinion until this day have emphatically insisted that the cattle-killing movement had been a conspiratorial plot by the arch-imperialist Grey, “hiding among the reeds” and tricking the superstitious young girls with mirrors, a version of the events which has proved to be quite impervious to all evidence absolving Grey from any prior involvement, if not from subsequently ruthlessly exploiting the tragedy to colonial advantage (Peires, 1989b, 1990). In the historical context of the closing frontier, though, the cattle-killing movement may well be construed, instead, as an extreme form of resistance to colonization, an attempt to mobilize the deepest resources of culture and religion in order to undo the historical reality of conquest: “If Xhosa had once used guns and spears in their protest against colonialism they now employed the full weight of the past in the poignant rejection of an oppressive present” (Crais, 1992: 210). The “violence” of this extreme form of resistance is deeply ambiguous, at once an act of deliberate self-destruction and of radical regeneration, with an apparent (ir)rationality of its own. Recovering the significance of this national tragedy has proved, at least from the retrospective vantage point of modern South Africa, an altogether elusive task defeating the best efforts of even the most conscientious historians (cf. Peires, 1990).

If the “Spirit of Nongqawuse” represents the elusive and deeply ambiguous legacy of a lost mode of pre-modern resistance to conquest and colonization, then its counterpart, the equally ambiguous imposition of “civilization” at gunpoint, may best be represented by what is usually described as the “histrionic” behaviour and rhetoric of Colonel (later Sir) Harry Smith as military commander following the Frontier Wars of 1835-1836 and 1846-1847. Smith, the swashbuckling imperial “hero of Aliwal”, was not content merely to defeat the Xhosa with superior firepower and the systematic destruction of their crops and provisions. He was determined to communicate the full social and political significance of conquest to his defeated foes. In a series of theatrically staged public ceremonies he made Xhosa chiefs kneel before him and kiss his feet, literally placing his heel on their necks; he forced them to choose between two ceremonial staffs symbolizing “Peace” and “War”; blew up a wagon filled with dynamite to demonstrate the imperial might at his command and challenged traditional rain-makers publicly to expose their ineffectiveness in the face of rational enquiry (Lehman, 1977; Harington, 1980; Mostert, 1992). Smith’s “play-acting” had a serious purpose: by adapting ceremonial themes and customary elements to devise his own rituals and symbols, however crude, he was articulating a potent political discourse intended to be that of bringing “civilization” to primitive and ignorant savages. In the context of the pre-modern frontier, though, this discourse of “civilization” was deeply implicated in the violence of conquest itself. Addressing the assembled Xhosa Chiefs in 1836, i.e., immediately following the savage slaughter and destruction inflicted by his conduct of the Sixth Frontier War including the notorious murder of the paramount chief Hintza, Smith staged what was at once a victorious power play and a celebration of the virtues of “civilization”. On the one hand he made it clear to the defeated chiefs that he intended to “take them out of the bush” and teach them no longer to “eat up” each other. On the other hand he insisted that this imposition was a free and voluntary act on their own part:

You have all lately been received, at your own request and humble desire, and
in the mercy of his Excellency the Governor, as British subjects. ... You tell
me that you are naked and ignorant, that I must teach you to clothe yourselves, to know good from evil, that you are willing to learn and that you wish to be real Englishmen (Smith, 1903: 378-379).

A decade later in another address to the Xhosa chiefs in 1848, now as Governor as well as military commander, Smith articulated the colonizing aims inherent in this discourse of civilization even more explicitly:

Your land shall be marked out and marks placed that you may all know it. It shall be divided into counties, towns and villages, bearing English names. You shall all learn to speak English at the schools which I shall establish for you. ... You may no longer be naked and wicked barbarians, which you will ever be unless you labour and become industrious. You shall be taught to plough: and the Commissary shall buy of you. You shall have traders, and you must teach your people to bring gum, timber, hides, etc. to sell, that you may learn the art of money, and buy for yourselves. You must learn that it is money that makes people rich by work, and help me to make roads. You tell me many of your youths desire to go into the colony as servants, they shall be allowed to do so (cited in Peires, 1981: 166).

Ostensibly, in its explicit thematic concerns, this discourse aimed at systematically linking conquest and colonization with the shift to agricultural cultivation, the coming of education and literacy, wage labour markets, industrialization, capitalist development, and the social progress of modernization in general. However, in the context of the pre-modern frontier Smith’s discourse of “civilization” was not able to transcend its ambiguous implications in violence. Peires recounts how the Xhosa Chief Maqoma, who had reluctantly been drawn into war, offered to shake hands with Smith, only to be ordered to the floor. “Tradition has it that as he lay prostrated before the jeering spectators, Smith’s foot on his neck, Maqoma said, “You are a dog, so you act like a dog. This thing was not sent by Victoria, who knows I am of royal blood as she is” (Peires, 1981: 166).

In the colonial context the relation between the values of “civilization” and the violence of frontier conflict and conquest had, of course, always been deeply problematic. Leading spokesmen of the organized missionary movement such as Dr. John Philip, director of the London Mission Society, freely admitted to the close links between missionary work and the spread of imperial influence, agricultural industry and consumer markets but were also foremost in indicting the violence of colonial dispossession, frontier violence and forced labour practices. This was made possible by the central claim and assumption that missionary work as such was essentially non-violent:

While our missionaries beyond the borders of the colony ... are everywhere scattering the seeds of civilization, social order, and happiness, they are, by the most unexceptionable means, extending British interests, British influence, and the British empire. ... The materials of our conquests, made in this way, will bear examination. Triumphs gained by such weapons occasion no tears, and present no disgusting details: they are the triumphs of reason over ignorance, of civilization over barbarism, and of benevolence over cruelty and oppression (Philip, 1828: Vol. I, ix-x).

The historical anthropologist Comaroff has argued that we may distinguish three different and competing models of colonialism in the South Africa of the early nineteenth century: the state model primarily concerned with administrative control but not necessarily with any attempt to civilize the indigenes; settler colonialism founded on forcible dispossession and violent subordination; and the civilizing colonialism of the mission concerned with a colonization of the mind and implying a comprehensive transformation of indigenous society and culture (Comaroff, 1989; cf. Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991). To the extent that the latter remained distinct from the former, an unambiguous
opposition between “civilization” and frontier violence could still be maintained. By mid-century and with the closing of the frontier, though, the colonial state not only imposed its superior force in the face of determined resistance to conquest but increasingly itself began to assume a civilizing mission with regard to its newly conquered subjects. It is this intimate fusion of conquering force and civilizing mission which made the imperial discourse of Smith, and to a lesser extent of his successor as Governor, Sir George Grey, so deeply and uncomfortably ambiguous. It would only be towards the end of the nineteenth century, in the context of more substantial industrial development, a modernizing economy and centralized state formation, that the “civilizing mission” of late-Victorian imperialism could find more coherent articulation (Schreuder, 1976). In the context of the pre-modern frontier, though, as Smith’s dramatic performances and bombastic rhetoric showed, the actual violence of conquest could not yet seamlessly be absorbed in a discourse of civilization and progress.

It remains to deal briefly with another controversial staple of pre-modern South African history crucial to the understanding of the origins and significance of political violence then as now, the Mfecane or “holocaust” which convulsed indigenous societies in the interior of South Africa for a decade from the late 1820s. The Mfecane was an extraordinary sequence of intense and sustained political violence which temporarily depopulated whole regions and displaced or scattered entire communities - thus fortuitously opening large areas of the interior for colonial settlement just as the “Great Trek” of the 1830s was about to get under way. It has commonly been depicted in South African history books and popular literature as a traumatic but spontaneous development somehow originating from within these black societies themselves; today the Mfecane can be seen as, in a sense, the original case of massive “black-on-black” violence. Historians have argued that the Mfecane had its origins in the rise of Shaka (the “Black Napoleon”) and the Zulu conquest state, that the brutal attacks and atrocities of Zulu warriors on neighbouring tribes set in motion a chain reaction in which marauding bands from displaced communities in turn attacked others and so generated waves of political violence spilling over much of the interior of Southern Africa (Omer-Cooper, 1966). This is one of the great legitimating myths of South African political history which has long sustained the claims of the ruling white minority to a right of settlement in the heartland of South Africa; against the backdrop of the Mfecane, white settlement on the Highveld can be made to represent the values of civilization as well as the guarantor of law and order in the midst of what would otherwise be a savage war of all against all. Indeed, some are already seeing the current spread of political violence in the black communities as the beginnings of a contemporary Mfecane, now that the harshest aspects of white domination and apartheid are being relaxed. It is therefore of considerable relevance that the historian Julian Cobbing in a series of recent research papers (Cobbing, 1988, 1991, etc.) managed to upset a great deal of this conventional picture of the nature and origins of the Mfecane, forcing a rethink of the roots of so much political violence in the nineteenth century. In effect Cobbing has gone back to the documentary sources, mostly colonial, for the accepted historical accounts of the Mfecane; he re-examined these sources closely and critically, asking penetrating questions about the actual purposes and interests which these accounts may have served. What he has uncovered is very different from the conventional view of the Mfecane and suggests a much more complex story, a story in which Shaka and the Zulu warriors played a considerably smaller role compared to the invasions of slave raiders from Delagoa Bay, marauding Griqua bands spilling over the colonial frontiers, colonial traders and imperial military officers up to all sorts of ventures in the interior which had to be kept out of the public view, all in different ways contributing to what was by no means a spontaneous emergence of “black-on-black violence”. Many of Cobbing’s specific claims are still a matter of heated debate among historians, but about the larger picture there can be little doubt: the political violence of the Mfecane was not unrelated to the general processes of conquest and colonization.
which forcibly disrupted the societies of the South African interior from the early nineteenth century. This is not to say that, historically, blacks in South Africa were only innocent and passive victims and were not also the agents of much political violence and of many atrocities. What it does mean is that the violence of the Mfecane cannot begin to be understood in isolation from the actions, interests and interventions of some of those same colonial groupings who subsequently claimed to represent the forces of law and order and the values of “civilization”. With that we are once again referred to the constitutive context of the pre-modern frontier with its elusive and deeply ambiguous connections between violence and civilization.

**Political violence and non-violence in the context of modern state formation**

The many and deep ambiguities of political violence in the context of the pre-modern frontier were progressively resolved, in the course of the making of modern South Africa, by the early decades of the twentieth century. The crucial take-off for primary industrialization and the shift to intensive agriculture and commercial farming took place in conjunction with the mining revolution following the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley around 1870 and of gold on the Witwatersrand in the 1880s. To a limited extent these developments had been predated some decades earlier in the Cape Colony. By the mid-nineteenth century the original Eastern Cape frontier had effectively closed, while the colonial economy began to be incorporated into world markets and the basic infrastructure of a modernizing colonial state had been put in place by the 1840s (Peires, 1989b; du Toit, 1987). However, in the Cape Colony itself this was a fitful and gradual process The Great Trek in the 1830s had opened a series of new frontiers in the interior which would only begin to close by the final decades of the nineteenth century. The Trek had also spawned a number of fragmented and relatively weak settler states, including the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In the event it was in these Boer republics, not in the more developed Cape Colony, that diamonds and gold were discovered. The mining revolution and the beginning of substantial industrialization thus occasioned major political conflicts in a contest for control of modern state formation (Marks and Trapido, 1981). These conflicts came to a head with the South African War of 1899-1902. Only following the military defeat of the Boer Republics did the conditions exist for the formation of Union in 1910 as a modern centralized state under white minority rule.

This process of modern state formation was characterized by a distinctive trajectory in its relation to political violence. Initially, it brought a major escalation in both the extent and intensity of such violence. But once a centralized modern state was established this achieved an increasingly effective measure of control, amounting to the comparative elimination of overt political violence from public life for a substantial period of several decades. Both sets of developments may be briefly sketched.

The closing decades of the nineteenth century saw a substantial escalation in military resistance by indigenous societies with colonial and imperial conquest finally achieved only after serious setbacks in successive wars with the Pedi, Ndundza-Ndebele, Basotho and Zulu (Denoon and Nyeko, 1984). These campaigns differed markedly from earlier conflicts on the pre-modern frontier: tribesmen had availed themselves of the opportunities of working on the mines in order to acquire large numbers of guns, while imperial armies and even republican forces increasingly made use of automatic weapons and other modern technology such as explosives (Pienaar, 1991). Even so, a certain balance of power persistend and these frontier conflicts were by no means onesided affairs: in the Transvaal some northern settlements had to be evacuated in the 1860s, and the war against the Pedi had to be abandoned in 1876; the British army itself suffered a traumatic defeat against the Zulu at Isandhlwana in 1879; and continued African independence was perceived to pose a serious threat to settler security in general into the 1880s (Denoon and
Nyeko, 1984). But by the end of the century the power of the Zulu as well as the Pedi, Sotho and other independent African polities in the region had been broken and conquest achieved, though with substantial increases in casualty figures and human suffering compared to earlier frontier wars (Guy, 1979; Delius, 1983; Pienaar, 1991). The most extensive warfare, however, arose from the anti-imperialist resistance of the Boer republics, which determinedly contested imperial efforts to impose a modern state structure as a centralized political authority. The British annexation of the Transvaal in 1876 was undone by the “miraculous” victory of the Boer forces at Majuba during the war of 1880-1881, and the Transvaal and Free State Republics were only finally defeated after the South African War of 1899-1902 had brought modern warfare to the subcontinent on a quite unprecedented scale. During the latter years of the war the Boer forces employed effective guerrilla strategies against the vast manpower of the imperial British army. The imperial forces resorted to extensive “scorched earth” policies and interned substantial numbers of civilians in concentration camps. (Fatalities among women and children came to some 25,000 - significantly more than the number of casualties recorded in combat.) It was the impact of these “methods of barbarism” which finally brought the republican “bitter-enders” to concede defeat at the Treaty of Vereeniging (Warwick and Spies, 1980; Spies, 1977; Pakenham, 1979). Altogether, the opening decades of the modern period thus saw a great increase in the extent and intensity of political violence reflected even at the crudest level of casualty figures. Though these are very hard, often impossible, to come by for the pre-modern period, it is clear that a statistical graph of casualty figures would show a steady rise from a low base throughout the nineteenth century, with a sharp increase from the 1870s and an exponential increase at the turn of the century.

A similar graph, continued into the twentieth century, would show a dramatic downturn immediately following the South African War, continuing at a notably low base line for decades after Union. What this indicates is that with the achievement of a modern centralized state, albeit under white minority rule, the nature and significance of political violence had been effectively transformed. The new state immediately set about the creation of a unified defence force, a single police force and a centralized modern bureaucracy (Seegers, 1991; Kruger, 1961). Significantly, the major instances of violent resistance or insurrection against this state - the Rebellion of 1914, the Rand miners revolt of 1922, and the right-wing Ossewa Brandwag movement during the Second World War - issued from internecine conflicts within the ruling white minority itself. With the defeat of the Bambatha rebellion of 1906 (Marks, 1970), the period of violent resistance to conquest on the part of the indigenous communities had come to an end; henceforth the mainstream of African resistance would take specifically political and constitutional forms within the structures available in the new centralized state, as signalled by the formation of the Natives National Congress (later African National Congress) in 1912. (There were, of course, those who determinedly continued to resist the option of incorporation, e.g. in the independent African churches.) The new Union government was able to implement such drastic measures as the Land Act of 1913, driving large numbers of African sharecroppers off the land and henceforth restricting African land ownership to the Reserves, without meeting violent resistance of any consequence (Plaatje, 1916). African soldiers fought as part of the SADF in the First World War, and the charismatic Clements Kadalie mobilized a populist labour movement in the ICU (Industrial and Commercial Workers Union) during the 1920s, but neither had a lasting impact on the national scene. As the new Union of South Africa was effectively made into a “White Man’s Country”, it proved extraordinarily successful in maintaining the trappings of public order over the subordinate majority. In this context, more militant movements or popular resistance typically took the form of “hidden struggles”, often in rural areas removed from national attention (Beinart and Bundy, 1987). On the occasions when the state made overt use of massive force, as in the Bulhoek massacre of 1921 or the punitive
action against the Bondelswarts of 1922, this tended to take place in out-of-the-way locations. During the 1920s and again in the 1940s there were a number of local revolts or riots. Still, compared to both earlier and later periods, the total number of such violent episodes between 1910 and 1950 was extraordinarily low. This is not to say that there were not many forms and practices of institutionalized violence prevalent in various spheres of South African society; on the contrary, the social history of modern South Africa during the early twentieth century is in large part a history of such violence (Van Onselen, 1991). Even so, the point is that in the context of the modern South African state, at least for the first half of the twentieth century, actual and overt political violence was effectively contained to a minimum.

The relative diminution of overt political violence with the coming of the modern state is so notable a development as to require some comment; it is also of considerable relevance for the understanding of South African political violence, both before and after. At a basic conceptual and normative level the modernizing process involved a comprehensive reorientation with regard to the function and significance of political violence. This took place both on the part of the ruling white minority group, on the one hand, as well as that of the mainstream leadership and political organizations representing black political aspirations, on the other hand. Essentially, on both counts, the modern state came to represent the central values and processes of economic and industrial development, social progress and political legitimacy. To the ruling white minority, control of a modern state apparatus legitimated their uses of power and imbued it with a progressive and universalistic significance. And to the modernizing leadership of the black majority, precisely because they were still largely excluded from it, inclusion in the modern state came to define the goals of legitimate political action. On this view political violence then appears as an anomaly or worse, as running counter to the very thrust and aspirations of modernity itself. In this modernizing context the option (and reality) of violence thus came to be systematically inhibited, repressed and denied, both by the ruling minority group commanding the state and even more by the mainstream political leadership and organizations claiming to represent the subordinate majority. We must briefly outline the two parts of this complementary set of developments.

Historically the modernizing state in post-colonial South Africa was heir to the colonial state founded on (fiercely contested and sometimes belated) conquest and frontier violence. As we have seen, the political self-understanding of such conquest was articulated, by imperialist figures such as Sir Harry Smith, in terms of the economic, social and cultural goals of full incorporation, famously expressed in the words of Governor Sir George Grey in his address to the Cape Parliament in 1855 as the duty of making the Xhosa “part of ourselves” (Grey, 1855). In the context of the pre-modern frontier the ideal of full incorporation expressed the ambiguous aggression of a “civilizing mission” as a form of cultural imperialism, i.e., of a stated intention to colonize consciousness as well as the land. In the modernizing context of the (post) colonial state, and on the basis of conquest as a historical reality, this translated as the (intensely controversial) “liberal” ideal of full assimilation, i.e. the eventual social, cultural and political as well as economic incorporation of the conquered societies. To significant sections of the minority settler communities this liberal ideal proved increasingly unacceptable; while accepting the need for incorporation of the conquered indigenous peoples, they had quite different notions about the aims and terms of such incorporation. By the late nineteenth century two alternatives to the liberal or assimilationist model of full incorporation had been articulated, that of “white supremacy” or differential incorporation and that of indirect rule or segmental incorporation (Reitz and Shepstone, 1892). However, in some respects white supremacist aims, as well as certain aspects of indirect rule, were not fully compatible with the modernizing state and economy; they still belonged to the pre-modern and
colonial context. During the opening decades of the twentieth century various elements of these models were fused and re-articulated in terms of the emergent policy and ideology of segregation. Two developments in particular proved crucial. On the one hand, economic planners and advisers began to conceptualize the African “homelands” as potential labour reservoirs for the modern economy and the migrant labour system as functional to mining and capitalist development, thus bringing the continuing existence of the homelands and of migrant labour in line with the aims and values of modernity (Cell, 1982; Greenberg, 1980). And, on the other hand, the paternalistic notion of trusteeship, conceived in terms of communities at different “stages” of a long-term process of social and political development, made it possible to reconcile adherence to liberal principles of full incorporation in the long run with the historical and political realities of differential and segmental incorporation in the short term (Dubow, 1989). By 1917 General Smuts was able to articulate the basic elements of “separate development” as a framework for race policy in the South African context, the separatist elements evidently informed by traditional assumptions and attitudes of white supremacy, but now integrated into a modernizing framework of development and rationalized in terms of paternalistic notions of trusteeship as the “white man’s task” (Smuts, 1917). Segregation thus emerged as a policy serving the interests of the leading edge of the modernizing sector of the economy, i.e. mining capital and commercial agriculture, and as an ideology articulating the paternalistic responsibilities of the (white minority) political leadership in command of the modernizing state. On both counts segregation could be projected as somehow ultimately in line with the universalized values of social and political progress. In the process the historical reality of political violence, underlying and informing this segregationist state as actually a form of sectional white supremacy based on conquest and exploitation, disappeared from view.

The complement of this development can be traced in the political self-understanding of those African individuals, groupings and organizations who would increasingly provide the core elements of mainstream black political opposition and resistance in the course of the twentieth century. Confronted, by the end of the nineteenth century, with conquest and white supremacy as, for the time being, irreversible historical realities, the alternative to collaboration or accommodation could no longer be that of (violent) primary resistance to conquest itself, but had to take the form of (political) secondary resistance on the basis of incorporation: “The era when Africans could realistically hope to defend themselves through their traditional institutions, the phase of primary resistance, was over. Secondary resistance ... is undertaken by a people who are conquered and at least partially incorporated into an economic and political structure controlled by the victors” (Cell, 1982: 264). Evidently the realization that resistance could be pursued even after conquest, but now by (non-violent) political means, was a positive discovery for blacks in the process of being incorporated into the colonial economy and subjected to the colonial state. This discovery is recorded as an alternative to violence in the report of the Xhosa newspaper Imvu Zabantsundu of the reception given by a “large representative and important gathering of Natives” to a deputation reporting back after making representations on the pass laws to the colonial Parliament in Cape Town in 1889:

Today they have found a capital plan of campaign against the whites - to fight them by means of the law. ... If a similar thing had been done when the guns were taken, war would have been avoided. ... They have taught us a great lesson of which we had previously been ignorant. Whenever we felt aggrieved at what Government did to us we hurled the assegai, the result being orphans, but today a victory had been won although there were no orphans (Karis and Carter, 1972: 16).

But if resistance could thus be continued by other and political means, its object could no longer be the restitution of the traditional pre-colonial polities, nor could this be
conducted on the basis of traditional cultural resources or customary authority structures. For blacks, too, political action had to be premised on claiming the rights due to them as British subjects, thus taking incorporation as a point of departure for future protest and resistance. In effect this also resulted in throwing into a special strategic prominence the relatively small group of mission educated, literate men, the Jabavus, Dubes, Semes, Plaatje - a tiny Westernized elite of teachers and professionals together with the beginnings of a black petty bourgeoisie. In relation to the majority of Africans at that time they were quite unrepresentative, a marginal grouping in a highly ambiguous intermediary position. But, as those who had actually internalized the values of mission and “civilization”, who had acquired the basic skills needed in the modernizing economy and state, and who could express the political aspirations of blacks in the terms required by the modern world, they represented the leading edge of that process of development, progress and modernization on which (they assumed) everyone was now in principle embarked. Certainly this political elite took the lead in fashioning the imagined community of a unified African “nation” or “people” - corresponding to the centralized modern state then in process of formation with Union - and in founding the precursor of the ANC in 1912 as a nationally representative political organization (Karis and Carter, 1972: 61-73). As such their political ideals and objectives were wholly oriented towards that modern state in which they were determined to claim full and equal rights, appropriating as their own the liberal ideal of full and equal incorporation. It went without saying that such rights could be won only by constitutionalist and non-violent methods. From this perspective the option of political violence thus appeared as wholly in contradiction to their basic moral and political commitments in the context of the modern state. And so the ANC and other mainstream black political organizations, precisely as modernizing political movements, came to represent the institutionalization of the politics of constitutional and non-violent protest for decades following Union. These protests were generally of little avail, given the de facto lack of effective political rights and representation for blacks under white minority rule. But each successive defeat were taken to underscore the legitimacy of the overall objective of securing full and equal rights.

In this context the increasingly segregationist turn of the South African state, whose ambiguities enabled whites to reconcile white supremacy and differential incorporation with ideas of progress and development, was a cause of great frustration and alarm for the mainstream black political leadership (Jabavu, 1928). The explicitly retrogressive step of the actual removal of the constitutionally entrenched Cape African common franchise by the Hertzog bills in 1936 came as a political and ideological trauma, a foundering of the very foundations on which all political action and aspiration had been based. “The structure of European political morality has suddenly tottered and collapsed from above our heads down to its pristine level of the jungle that obtained two thousand years ago. Might is still right ... “, said the venerable Professor D.D.T. Jabavu in his address to the All African Convention called in protest to the Hertzog bills in 1936 (Karis and Carter, 1973: 48). And Selby Msimang, a founding member of the ANC, expressed the same sense that the liberal ideal of full incorporation itself had now been shattered: “My friends and countrymen, let us now admit, both publicly and in our conscience, that Parliament and the white people of South Africa have disowned us, flirted and trifled with our loyalty. They have treated us as rebels, nay, they have declared that we are no longer part of the South African community” (Karis and Carter, 1973: 57). It was from this time that we begin to find the articulation of a radical rejection of the mainstream politics of constitutional and participatory politics by sections of the All African Convention (AAC) and the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) as well as the ANC Youth League. Significantly, though, this did not yet take the form of any turn to political violence, but rather of the principle of non-collaboration and the strategy of boycott (Karis and Carter, 1973).
In some ways the non-violence of this more radical non-collaborationist version of political resistance could be reinforced by another distinctive strand of modern South African protest politics, that of Gandhian non-violent resistance. Gandhi had pioneered the doctrine and strategy of *Satyagraha* or non-violent resistance in South Africa from 1906, specifically in protest to the “Black Act” as a segregationist measure directed by none other than the British administration, assumed to embody the epitome of modern progress and civilization, against the (modernizing) Indian merchant class. Taking his stand expressly on the supposed rights of British subjects and on the universal values of “civilization”. Gandhi saw the discrimination inherent in this segregationist measure as amounting to a denial of the very objective of full and equal incorporation: “It is designed to strike at the very root of our existence in South Africa. It is not the last step, but the very first step to hound us out of the country” (Gandhi, 1928: 101). Gandhi, of course, sought to infuse the non-violent resistance of *Satyagraha* with a special moral authority and even a distinct religious significance, and not without some success. He insisted that, as such, the committed and principled non-violence of *Satyagraha* was quite different from the merely tactical non-violence of passive resistance, deemed a strategy of the weak and powerless (Gandhi, 1928). As a political strategy the practice of Gandhian non-violent resistance of course relied on a much more complex dynamic than simply his professed faith in the spiritual and non-coercive power of love and suffering; it was shrewdly premised on the commitment of the modernizing state to certain universal moral principles and political standards, and designed to turn these dialectically into resources for protest and resistance (Parekh, 1989). Where these particular conditions did not prevail, for example in the pre-modern context of frontier conflict or faced with a ruling group or state with no pretence of any commitment to such shared moral and political values, the Gandhian strategy of resistance would have had little or no strategic purchase. In its assumption of a shared public commitment to universal principles and civilized standards, the Gandhian tradition thus very much belonged to the period of the modernizing South African state of the early twentieth century. The Gandhian tradition of non-violent resistance would persist into the 1950s and the Defiance Campaigns with resolute attempts by the Congress movement to put the principles of *Satyagraha* into practice in the face of considerable odds (Kuper, 1957). More than just the specific influence or legacy of Gandhian notions, this testifies to the extraordinary hold which the basic orientation to full incorporation in the modernizing state, understood as representing the values of constitutional politics and excluding all political violence, continued to exercise over the mainstream movements of black resistance in the modern period.

**Political violence in the context of apartheid and resistance to apartheid**

The question of political violence was reopened in the context of apartheid and the struggle against apartheid, though in a peculiarly complex and quite distinctive fashion. That the apartheid era brought major changes in the constitutive relations between the state, resistance and the incidence of political violence can be gauged at the crudest level of the rise in overall casualty figures. The statistical graph, which had remained at a low base level throughout the modern era since Union in 1910, could be shown to start rising from the early 1950s. Exact figures are hard to come by, but from the Durban riots of 1949, the shootings in Witzieshoek in 1950 and the East London riots in 1952 to Cato Manor and the Pondoland risings of the late 1950s (Mbeki, 1964) the number of casualties during this decade may well be higher than the total for the previous four decades put together. But it was pre-eminently the massacre at Sharpeville in 1960 which symbolized a traumatic and historic watershed in national political life; with the beginnings of sabotage campaigns, the national state of emergency, the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd and the Johannesburg station bombing during the early 1960s it became clear that a new and entirely more violent era was under way. Soweto 1976 was to symbolise a further qualitative rise in this graphic increase of political violence, but even this would be dwarfed by the scale, spread and intensity of the
popular insurrections from 1984 to 1987 (Indicator Project South Africa, 1989) and sustained into the 1990s.

The turn to political violence and the armed struggle was complicated in a number of ways. It was by no means a return to the lost historical context of the pre-modern frontier: both apartheid and the struggle against apartheid were essentially products of a modernizing age. On the one hand the apartheid state, even if now explicitly pursuing a racist policy and ideology, did not renounce the aims and assumptions of modernizing the economy and society. In complex and often paradoxical ways apartheid was articulated as consistent with and functional to the imperatives of capitalist development, industrial growth and social and political progress (Adam, 1971). If the apartheid state increasingly relied on the actual use of massive coercive force against its opponents, then this was always carefully legalized, while alleged “hit squads” were systematically kept out of public view (Laurence, 1990; Pauw, 1991). On the other hand, the resistance against apartheid, reluctantly committed to ever more radical and violent means, essentially understood itself as representing the authentic values and aspirations of modern progress and equality which it perceived to have been betrayed and distorted by apartheid. To the extent that the struggle against apartheid continued to be led by the same mainstream black leadership and organizations which historically had been so deeply committed to the goals of full and equal incorporation into the modern state and society, and thus to essentially constitutionalist and non-violent political means, the turn to violence and the armed struggle proved extraordinarily difficult at a number of levels, psychologically, morally and symbolically. The same was true of other political forces, for example white liberals, drawn into the anti-apartheid alliance. In this context the turn to violent resistance could be, and was, articulated in a number of different ways, but evidently its rationality and intelligibility were that much more readily grasped to the extent that this could be represented as serving the same ends and values of the earlier modernizing project. If the mainstream political organizations were forced to resort to political violence in the struggle against apartheid, this did not mean a rejection of the values and ideals of the modern political state and society on their part. On the contrary, such political violence was conceived as a necessary evil precisely for the sake of realizing these same goals. Conceptually, morally and politically this turn to violence was no smooth and easy process; for black nationalists as much as white liberals it involved a great deal of anxious soul-searching, protracted strategic debates and comprehensive ideological reconstitution (Feit, 1971; Barrell, 1990; du Toit, Jr., 1990). Eventually, though, it could and did produce an understanding of the function and significance of political violence that could be reconciled with the general aims and values of social and political modernization as well as the historical commitment to the politics of protest and non-violence. It was primarily this understanding of political violence that came to inform and structure the ANC and more generally the commitment of the mainstream “liberation movement” to the “armed struggle” against apartheid.

If this provided some of the dominant strands of the master narrative in the historical turn to political violence, it was by no means the full story. At different levels and in a number of ways the history of political violence during the apartheid era proved a much more complex affair. The political leadership of the mainstream anti-apartheid movements were not always able to determine and contain the strategy and significance of the turn to political violence in terms of their own understandings of this. From the early 1950s the ANC itself began to be transformed into a more widely based movement of popular resistance and by the 1980s the mainstream anti-apartheid movement was mobilized on explicitly populist terms. This increasingly involved a variety of different social groupings and a range of political constituencies, some of them much more marginal to the overall process of modernization than the traditional leadership and social base of the ANC itself. At the same time, strategic and ideological conflicts divided the anti-
apartheid movement while the effects of severe state repression and co-optative intervention led to a fragmentation of political leadership, organization and orientation. Altogether, the history of black politics during the apartheid era is an exceedingly complex story (Lodge, 1983a, 1983b; Fine and Davis, 1990; Lodge et al., 1991). This had substantial implications for the political practice of both non-violent protest and violent resistance against apartheid. Already with the more populist Defiance Campaign of the early 1950s the Congress movement experienced serious problems in containing popular protest within the constraints of passive resistance, and the populist violence during the East London riots proved a major embarrassment, effectively bringing the public campaign of non-violence to a halt (Kuper, 1957; Mager and Minkley, 1990). Similarly, once the turn to violence had been taken, the mainstream liberation movement could not entirely define and contain the thrust of popular violent insurrections, as on “bloody Thursday” of the Sebokeng riots in 1984 (Rantete, 1984) or with the proliferation of “necklace killings” in the mid-1980s. At crucial junctures “spontaneous” popular mobilization for both non-violent and violent protest and resistance dramatically erupted: tens of thousands of blacks marching with the charismatic young Philip Kgosana from Langa to Parliament in Cape Town in 1960 (Lelyveld, 1985: 315ff; Kgosana, 1988), the Durban strikes of 1973 (Institute for Industrial Education, 1974), or the insurrection of the Soweto school children in 1976 (Kane-Berman, 1978). As the resistance against the imposition of apartheid deepened a range of different social groupings and local communities were drawn into protracted “struggles”, some of them, such as rural communities threatened with dispossession of their land and forced relocation (Claassens, 1990) or squatter communities battling against officials enforcing the pass laws and urban influx control (Cole, 1987), much more marginal to the dynamics of modern South Africa. These local conflicts tended to generate their own dynamics, constitutive symbolisms and distinctive political terrains, fashioned in struggle and violence, which were not always compatible with the imperatives of the national liberation movement.

Throughout this period, too, the master narrative of mainstream protest and resistance to apartheid, and its implicit understandings of the significance of political violence and non-violence, had to contend with a number of rival interpretations and alternative constructions which both complicated and undercut its coherence and thrust. Even during the 1950s the Congress Alliance, symbolically constructed around the founding text of the Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People at Kliptown in 1955 (Karis and Gerhart, 1977), had increasing difficulty in reconciling the different historical and political projects of its constituent elements. On the one hand, there were the vanguard Marxists of the (largely white) Congress of Democrats opposed, on the other hand, by the hardline “Africanists” including some prominent figures of the Congress Youth League which had radicalized the ANC in the 1940s (Gerhart, 1978). These complex ideological and organizational tensions had diverse roots, but also implied different historical understandings of the function and significance of political violence. Thus the Marxist reading of the Freedom Charter tied this in with complex and sophisticated ideological projections of the “two stage-revolution” demanded by a socialist future (Hudson, 1988), which in turn had to contend with other ideological orthodoxies on the left (Fine and Davis, 1990; Alexander, 1986). The Africanists, on the other hand, implicitly harked back to the pre-modern legacy of violent resistance to conquest and colonization, though without casting this in any definite strategic or political form (Karis and Carter, 1973; Karis and Gerhart, 1977). (In this connection it is significant that Mandela’s own classic speech from the dock in 1962, in other ways such a powerful summation of the mainstream turn from protest politics to violent resistance, also included some elements harking back to the pre-modern heroic age of traditional African societies - Mandela, 1986.) Similarly the Black Consciousness movement from the early 1970s, inspired by the charismatic figure of Steve Biko, implied both a certain withdrawal from premature direct engagement in violent resistance as well as a deliberate radicalization of resistance
through a comprehensive political conscientization aimed at undoing some of the historical legacy of conquest and colonization (Biko, 1978; Nolutshungu, 1982). If many of these diverse elements fused during the populist anti-apartheid insurrections of the 1980s, seemingly within the framework of the overall master narrative provided by the mainstream understanding of the “struggle” as a liberation movement, they did so in somewhat inchoate and relatively unexamined ways.

The irruptions of political violence during the apartheid era also included a number of episodes which hardly fit into the master narrative at all. Thus the Durban riots of 1949, involving massive destruction and slaughter in clashes between Zulus and Indians, occupies a shadowy place in the margins of the story of the apartheid era (Webb and Kirkwood, 1949). Though perhaps the single most violent episode in modern South African history, it just did not fit into the modern understanding of resistance against the apartheid state. Looking back from the vantage point of the post-apartheid violence of the 1990s, we can discern other episodes of violence which also do not quite fit. Thus in certain rural areas of Natal, such as Msinga, an endemic culture of faction fighting, in some ways harking back to pre-modern times, tenaciously persisted for generations and erupted with renewed ferocity in the 1980s (Clegg, 1981; Alcock, 1988; Minnaar, 1990). Some of these episodes had a tenuous connection with various of the ideological tendencies diverging from the political mainstream. The Poqo insurrections of the early 1960s, for example, would seem to have had a certain “Africanist” inspiration (Lodge, 1983a, 1983b). And the attack also at that time on white residents in Paarl, a rural town in the Western Cape, communicated a powerful symbolism challenging the modernizing ethos of the mainstream understanding of the turn to violent resistance. Likewise the emergence of right-wing vigilante factions in black communities at the height of the populist anti-apartheid struggles of the mid-1980s, such as the *witdoeke* who razed the squatter camps of Crossroads and KTC in 1986 in apparent collusion with security forces of the state, represented anomalous developments for which the master narrative hardly allowed (Cole, 1987; Haysom, 1986). And by the end of the 1980s the proliferation of political violence in the Natal Midlands, not only as a power struggle between the UDF/ANC and Inkatha, but also an institutionalization of “war lords” and endemic factional feuds seemingly beyond the control of any political leadership or the forces of public law and order, announced the new problematic of political violence that would come into national prominence in the post-apartheid era (Kentridge, 1990; Minnaar, 1990; Stavrou and Shongwe, 1989).

**Revisiting the new problematic of understanding political violence in post-apartheid South Africa: An agenda for research**

In the light of this broad overview of the macro-narrative embedded in the history of South African political violence, and of some of its various complications and anomalies, we may now return to the problems posed in the opening sections. To some extent it may now be possible to clarify the puzzles signalled in what was there termed the new problematic of understanding political violence especially in the transitional context to a post-apartheid South Africa. And we may also be in a better position to identify a possible agenda for further research on this new problematic.

In the introductory section our preliminary conclusion had been that we seemed to be confronted by a double turn in the history of political violence in the current South African context. At one level, it seemed that the climax to the escalation of violent and polarized political conflict that had so long been in the making had been overtaken by the politics of negotiation and rational compromise. But, precisely when these developments in turn could be expected to bring the earlier cycle of violence to an end, at another level there was a proliferation of sustained political violence, now robbed of much of its earlier significance and rationality. It was this dual set of developments which posed the problem
in understanding the new political violence. Our subsequent historical survey served to contextualize and flesh out this initial statement of the problem. In particular we traced the emergence of a “master-narrative” linking political violence and the general project of modernization in particular ways. This master-narrative was understood as pointing to certain dénouements, and it is the confounding of these “expectations” by various more recent developments which may account for our failure to “understand” much of the current political violence.

Consider first the “surprising” turn from political violence in national politics, in the sense that the climactic violent confrontation to which the struggle against apartheid appeared to be building up was overtaken by the politics of negotiation especially since 2 February 1990. This may be rendered a little more intelligible by reflecting on the fact that, as we have seen, the apartheid state and resistance to apartheid had, in their different ways, both remained committed to the basic aims and assumptions of modernization. Critics of white minority rule who saw the racist ideology and policies of apartheid essentially as a legacy of the pre-modern frontier missed the crucial historical point; in Heribert Adam’s seminal phraseology, apartheid actually was a form of “modernizing racial domination” (Adam, 1971). Likewise, the mainstream black political leadership and organizations, while reluctantly turning to political violence and the armed struggle in resistance against apartheid, throughout remained committed to the overall objectives of seeking full and equal incorporation into the modern economy and state. Despite the escalating cycle of violence and polarized conflict which ostensibly pitted them against each other, as the NP government’s “total strategy” confronted the ANC’s “total onslaught”, the main protagonists in fact shared a similar commitment to modernity. This provided a framework for a political reconciliation of sorts. Once the ruling white minority had disavowed its own racist ideology and policies and enacted the liberalizing measures which then enabled the ANC and other mainstream black organizations to participate in the political arena and to suspend the armed struggle, little remained in the way of “normalizing” the politics of negotiations in amicable political settlements and constitutional accords.

The more serious question remains why, then, in these circumstances, did the earlier cycles of political violence not come to an end. How are we to understand the apparent proliferation of “irrational” violence at a time of such momentous political breakthroughs? Our survey in the previous sections could suggest at least two possible lines of inquiry here. First, as we saw, the master narrative projected by the mainstream of the resistance movement in its understanding of the “rational” turn to political violence did not necessarily fully inform all the critical confrontations or many local struggles that developed on the ground. These often generated their own historical self-understandings and dynamics; they created their own micro-narratives and concrete symbolisms; in and through the violence of the “struggle” its very terrain was reconstituted in ways which did not necessarily fit seamlessly into the master narrative. (For a particular and suggestive case study, cf. Thornton, 1990.) The dramatic political breakthroughs signalled by 2 February 1990, the release of Mandela, the return of the exiles, etc. made possible - at an abstract conceptual level and in the context of national politics - a reconciliation process with former political enemies and oppressors. But this did not necessarily make the same kind of historical and political sense in local contexts or at grassroots levels. Thus, to young “comrades” who had been forged in the struggle during the populist insurrections of the 1980s (Sitas, 1991), or to the soldiers of Uhmkonto we Sizwe who had their military training and political schooling in far-flung base camps (Davis, 1987), the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes hardly fit into everything they had learned or come to expect from their own direct involvement in the “liberation movement”. Similarly the powerful mythic narrative generated around the anticipated release of Mandela pointed to a certain dénouement, that of the charismatic liberator returning in triumph from decades of
banishment to take political power. What actually transpired was very different: Mandela as skillful negotiating figure making necessary compromises at CODESA or as international fundraiser for an ANC involved in the difficult transition from liberation movement to organized and competitive party politics.

In the current transitional context gaps have opened between the unexpected dialectical turn taken by the master narrative at the level of national politics, and the anticipated outcomes continuing to be projected by the micro-narratives of concrete struggles in various local contexts. These gaps may well be relevant to the continuing irruption of “irrational” political violence in this transitional context. In short, it may be necessary to reopen an investigation into the significance of the historic turn to violent resistance against apartheid, but this time in terms of a micro-analysis of the meanings generated by various local struggles and concrete confrontations with a view to asking what the cumulative contribution of these are to the new and “irrational” violence proliferating in the transition to the post-apartheid era.

Secondly, we saw in passing that the history of political violence during the apartheid period also included elements and episodes which did not really fit at all into the modernizing framework of the mainstream resistance against apartheid. Among these are such divergent instances as the Poqo insurrections, the endemic faction fights in certain rural areas of Natal as residual legacies from the pre-modern period, and anomalous developments such as the rise of right-wing vigilante movements, comsotises and “warlords” in a range of black communities. Significantly these involve, in the modern setting, more marginalized groupings who might even be rendered increasingly superfluous by a “normalizing” of the apartheid state. In the current transitional context, with an end to the dominant anti-apartheid struggle apparently in sight and incorporation of previously excluded groups into the modern state and the modern sector of the economy and society imminently and publicly on the agenda, these “peripheral” conflicts may well become more acute. It is increasingly becoming clear on all sides that there are distinct limits to what the modern state and economy can deliver in the South African context. Notwithstanding the universalist promises inherent in the process of modernization, actual limitations on resources and real constraints on growth mean that these promises will not, and indeed cannot, be delivered to all. While the representatives and constituencies of the mainstream black political movements are well positioned to participate in and benefit from a “deracialized” modern economy and state in South Africa, the same is less true of various other social groupings, while some may be pushed even further to the periphery in the process. In this context the proliferation of the “new” political violence, frequently involving such marginalized groupings in conflict with mainstream elements fully committed to modern incorporation, may begin to make a different kind of sense (though from a modernizing perspective remaining “irrational”). Of particular significance, for example, is the way in which the issue of “cultural weapons” - the “symbolic” assegais and fighting sticks traditionally carried by Zulu men - emerged since 1990 as a central theme in the conflicts between more traditionalist Inkatha supporters and the modernist ANC. Apart from their physical uses in actual incidents of violence, these “cultural weapons” also hark back to a pre-modern culture, drawing on the symbolism of violent resistance to conquest and colonization. This can generate a rich and potent set of political meanings, the more so in a context where the mainstream liberation movement is no longer as free to capitalize on the AK-47 as actual and symbolic weapon of the “armed struggle”. This new political violence in the transitional context may thus be more amenable to comparative analysis with other cases of “post-modern” political violence. However, retrospectively, from the vantage point of the current transitional process, it is also clear that the new political violence is not entirely new and has been anticipated in a number of instances even during the period of
the anti-apartheid struggle. The functions and significance of these peripheral episodes need to be re-examined both at a micro-level and in the larger historical context.

From the above a more specific agenda for further research and analysis would seem to follow. Within the framework of the overall historical trajectory, and with reference to both the thrust and the complications of what has been called the master narrative inherent in the history of South African political violence, this would especially require the micro-analysis of a selected number of key episodes. The case studies of such key episodes would have to be selected both with a view to the inherent richness and significance of the material for analytical purposes in each case, as well as for their relevance in relation to the overall argument and analysis. Understanding political violence in South Africa requires relating the micro-history of local struggles and the discursive meanings generated in these concrete settings to the master-narratives spawned and confounded in the larger historical and political context.
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