Development–Military Interfaces

New Challenges in Crises and Post-conflict Situations

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Foreword

The present analysis, "Development-Military Interfaces: New Challenges in Crises and Post-Conflict Situations," was carried out between August and October 2003 by the German Development Institute (GDI) in the framework of a research project for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) which was planned and conducted on short notice.¹

In this connection the GDI commissioned the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) to prepare a background paper with a focus on security policy.² The GDI and the BICC conducted numerous interviews, among others, with representatives of the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg), the Foreign Office (AA), the BMZ, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the relevant implementing agencies, non-governmental organizations, and research and other institutions. We would like to take this opportunity to extend out heartfelt thanks to them for their active cooperation. Furthermore, special mention must be made here of the active and constructive participation in the study conference held at the GDI on September 22, 2003.

Bonn, January 2004  Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehder

¹ The research projected was entitled: "Relationship between Military and Development Components in Reconstruction in Post-conflict Situations."
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief</td>
</tr>
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<td>ACPP</td>
<td>Africa Conflict Prevention Pool</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKNZ</td>
<td>Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz (Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAKS</td>
<td>Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (Federal College for Security Policy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BICC</td>
<td>Bonn International Center for Conversion</td>
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<td>BMI</td>
<td>Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)</td>
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<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defence)</td>
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<td>BMZ</td>
<td>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSR</td>
<td>Federal Security Council</td>
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<td>BW</td>
<td>Bundeswehr</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CHAD</td>
<td>Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (UK)</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Development Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWHH</td>
<td>Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (German Agro Action)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community for West African States</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EF</td>
<td>Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FC</td>
<td>Financial Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FüAk</td>
<td>Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Command and Staff College)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAA</td>
<td>G8 Africa Action Plan</td>
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</table>
GCPP Global Conflict Prevention Pool
GDI German Development Institute
GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HPN Humanitarian Practice Network
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
JUH Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe
KAIPTC Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
KSK Kommando Spezialkräfte (Special Forces Command)
MCDA Military and Civil Defence Assets
MOD Ministry of Defence (UK)
MSF Médecins Sans Frontière
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Nongovernmental organization
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA Official Development Assistance
ODI Overseas Development Institute
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSO Peace Support Operations
PSOF Peace Support and Operations Facility
SCHR Steering Committee on Humanitarian Response
SSR Security Sector/System Reform
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
UNAMSIL United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US United States
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VENRO Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen (Association of German Development Non-governmental Organisations)
WEU Western European Union
Executive Summary

Background

In Germany as well as in other donor countries there was in the past a clearly recognizable distance between development actors and military actors and their tasks. The principle of "No development without security" is, however, increasingly assuming the character of a new development paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in development policy.

In post-conflict situations, which often take on the character of "protracted crises," both military and civil development-related components play an important role. In this context development policy would like to and can gain more constructive influence on the reconstruction phase; indeed, other policy fields even expect this of it. At the same time, the growing number of overseas missions directly involving the Bundeswehr has served to move the overall spectrum of German policies and their joint scopes of action into the focus of attention.

The present study provides an overview of the different relations between development policy and the military in crises and post-conflict situations. The study both examines the views of the actors involved and takes stock of and categorizes development-military interfaces. Examples are used to illustrate some of the positive and negative experiences that have been made with different interfaces and to point out some aspects of special relevance for development policy. Finally the study outlines some initial strategic approaches and policy options open to development policy in its relationship to military actors.

Legitimacy of Military Missions as a Pre-condition for Development Policy in Post-conflict Situations

The mandates for, and thus the legitimacy of, military missions play an important role for the debate on the development-military relationship in post-conflict situations. International peace missions have in large part, and increasingly, been entrusted with civil nation-building tasks in the framework of peace support and governance operations and multidimensional missions. Today the need for mandated military missions for the purpose is widely acknowledged. Preemptive interventions and other military activities without an adequate mandate, and thus without sufficient legitimacy under international law – such as the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 - have attracted considerable controversy and are widely rejected. As far as development policy is concerned, there should, as a matter of principle, be no doubts as to a military mission's legitimacy and mandate when consideration is given to involvement in reconstruction efforts.

Perspective of Different Actors Involved

The development-military relations that emerge from these developments depend not least on national factors. These would include the closeness, or distance, involved in the relationship between development policy and foreign policy, the share that humanitarian aid and emergency aid accounts for in the work done by development cooperation (DC), and national traditions and experiences made with military interventions. Viewed from the perspective of development policy, closer cooperation between the actors involved entails above all the risk that the former may find itself subordinated to short-term military strategies. However, development policy here also has, among other things, chances to bring its influence to bear on overall policy as well as to benefit from an improved security situation, a condition essential for its involvement in civil reconstruction in afflicted countries.

In the framework of the new peace missions the military is itself becoming increasingly involved in carrying out genuinely civil tasks and is seeking cooperation with civil actors, including development policy, for the purpose. Both for the Bundeswehr and for NATO the concept "Civil-Military Cooperation" has involved the development of instruments that cover, from the military perspective, cooperation with civil actors and the
civil sector. In the framework of CIMIC the military routinely conducts projects in the civil sector – including reconstruction – that have impacts on the domain of development policy. The main examples for Bundeswehr measures of this kind can be observed in the Balkans and in Afghanistan.

Development and humanitarian NGOs, proceeding from the debate in the field of humanitarian aid, have engaged in an intensive discussion on the problem complex involved in the military-civil relationship. European NGOs in particular, pointing to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, largely reject cooperation with military actors and voice criticism of any blurring of the boundaries between military and civil aspects.

**Development-Military Interfaces: Four Categories**

The existing interfaces between development policy and the military can be classified under four categories:

1. **Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy**

   In most post-conflict situations the framework conditions needed by development actors for their reconstruction work are often predicated on the stability and security brought about by the military.

2. **Strategic planning and conception**

   – **Interministerial cooperation and mechanisms**: These serve the purpose of information-sharing and development of joint strategies in and among the various policy fields concerned. In the framework of this interministerial cooperation the BMZ is, for instance, able to bring its influence to bear on cross-cutting concepts and the formulation of country strategies. The BMZ has also played a key role in the debate on the structure to be given to the reconstruction team currently deployed in Kunduz as well as on the mandate for the military component involved. The mechanisms of cooperation include, among others, the Federal Security Council, ministerial consultations, and in particular interministerial cooperation, e.g. coordination of the German contribution to the G8 Africa Action Plan (GAA).

   – **Deliberate integration and subordination of development policy in short-term political and military strategies**: This would include the extensive use of instruments of development policy, but also of humanitarian aid, in the framework of military approaches, e.g. in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.

3. **Funding of noncivil measures and missions as well as civil activities conducted by the military**

   – **Development policy funding for noncivil measures and missions**: Here there are a number of different current examples which can, as far as their character is concerned, be assessed as a shift of the boundaries defining the traditional practices of development policy. For instance, €5 million of undisbursed funds were made available from the European Development Fund (EDF) to support the ECOWAS peace mission in Liberia. In November 2003 the decision was taken to set up a Peace Facility for Africa (an initial €250 million) that is to be financed from the EDF and used to fund noncivil peace missions in Africa. Furthermore, Germany has until now reported its assessed contributions to military peace missions, which are funded from the budget of the Federal Foreign Office, as part of the official development assistance (ODA) it provides.

   – **Development-policy funding for civil activities conducted by the military**: The main example here is the BMZ's funding
of CIMIC measures conducted by the Bundeswehr.

- Military competition for DC funds: To conduct CIMIC measures, the military competes e.g. with the GTZ or NGOs for funds in the fields of humanitarian aid and development.

4. Operational approach

- Interministerial projects: The German support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) is seen as a pilot project on the development of a coherent and interministerial funding concept involving AA, BMVg, and BMZ.

- Military conduct of measures typical of DC: This applies above all in the framework of CIMIC.

- Military provision of concrete protection functions for development policy actors and measures; benefits of an improved security situation: Apart from the general conditions required for security and stability, concrete forms of cooperation may develop "on the ground."

- Military contracts for DC actors: In Germany this means e.g. that the Bundeswehr sometimes subcontracts measures to the GTZ.

- Cooperation in training and capacity-building: In various contexts military and development-policy actors are involved, on a reciprocal basis, in training and capacity-building functions as well as in dialogue forums, e.g. in the framework of the Federal College for Security Policy (BAKS), the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College (Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr), or the course on "Civil-Military Cooperation Abroad" (ZMZ A) offered by the Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz (Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defense / AKNZ).

A number of different examples illustrate the ongoing debates and are, furthermore, at the same time of fundamental relevance; for instance:

- Integration of military and development actors in Afghanistan: The strategy of using PRTs to stabilize the security situation and accelerate reconstruction in Afghanistan may be seen as a precedent that will fundamentally alter future relations between the military and civil development actors. The PRTs of the US in particular are an example of integrated civil-military "units" used officially to integrate reconstruction activities in the US military strategy. In the framework of its reconstruction team in Kunduz, Germany is relying on a three-pillar concept consisting of independent but coordinated sectors (development policy, foreign policy, defense) as a means of distinguishing its approach from that pursued by the US.

- Proactive ministerial cooperation in the UK: The UK has been working for some time now with a proactive cooperation model which provides for strategic cooperation between development cooperation and the military – on the one hand, within the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) of the Department for International Development (DFID) and on the other hand by developing an interministerial strategy and funding instrument (so-called Conflict Prevention Pools) for the government's conflict-related work abroad.

- Intensive cooperation between development policy and the military at the European level: The rapid pace of developments at the European level are of particular importance for future development-military interfaces. In the European Union
there are a number of approaches that – building on the "Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts" (Gothenburg 2001) – are aimed at expanding the EU's civil and military capacities and – in particular – their combined use. The task facing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is to systematically interlink the whole of the EU’s external relations, including development policy. One element of great importance to the EU's overall external relations may be seen in the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the Council in December 2003.

Special Aspects of the Development-Military Linkage

Security of DC personnel: The physical security of DC personnel in post-conflict situations has become a significant problem, which may elude solution in the short-term. This has to do only in part with a direct linkage with military structures. In ongoing conflicts Western actors are sometimes perceived collectively as a threat or as unwarranted interference. As members of international missions, DC staff members may in this way become soft targets for local conflict parties. In the present cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, this situation is becoming increasingly critical, one main reason being that the international conflict parties are blurring the lines between military and civil activities.

Validity of the principles of development policy: Any stronger linkage with military components has direct implications for fundamental principles of development policy. We can distinguish two forms of principles: (1) general principles (the civil character of development policy and Do no harm) and (2) development-policy principles with impacts at the operational level (above all sustainability / long-term character and partner orientation / ownership). A stronger interlinkage need not necessarily mean any curtailment of these principles; but in this case three fundamental conditions must be given:

- Acceptance of the military by both the local population and conflict parties.
- Independence of DC activities from military actors.
- Clearly outlined cooperation based on division of functions and limited in time.

The question of a curtailment of these principles is, though, more pressing when it is posed in the light of the fact that development policy is directly involved in emergency or refugee aid and other quick-impact approaches in post-conflict regions where long-term and partner oriented DC is either not yet or only partially possible.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Development policy – mindful of the fundamentally limited options open to external actors – has some important and useful potentials to work in situations that are marked by fragile security as well as by a need to restore effective statehood and to embark on the process of post-conflict economic and social reconstruction. This is all the more the case in view of the fact that peace missions have grown increasingly complex in nature.

Viewed against this background, development policy can be said to have a fundamental and strategic interest in defining and shaping its interfaces with other policy fields. It is therefore essential for development policy to define its position concerning the character that can and should be given to this task.

Interfaces and overlaps between development policy and the military have grown dramatically in recent months and years and are in part highly sensitive in nature. Indeed, in the past some points of contact hardly even entered the minds of the actors involved. We can identify four sensitive areas:

- subordination of development policy to a military logic;
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Implementation by the military of measures with a development character;

development policy as a source of funding for military missions;

development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military.

The following strategic reference models may be recommended here:

1. A distance strategy that would serve to emphasize development policy's independence from the constraints of foreign policy and short-term overall political considerations.

2. A cooperation strategy characterized by closer coordination and joint approaches with actors involved in foreign and security policy.

3. A complementary strategy that would aim for goal conformity and, in strategically selected fields, a complementary and coherent approach involving security- and foreign-policy actors.

The advantages and significance of these policy options depend on the interface in question. They could seek orientation in the following guidelines:


2. Strategic planning and conception: complementary to cooperative strategies.

3. Funding: complementary strategies.


Viewed against this background, German development policy has a number of concrete points of departure for further formulating and shaping the development-military relationship:

the need to foster routine relations and dialogue among the actors concerned, e.g. appointing staff members as liaison persons in the relevant units of other ministries, participation in the courses offered by the AKNZ, or a model involving placement of development advisors with CIMIC units of the Bundeswehr;

the German Federal Government should focus more on developing joint country strategies;

efforts should be made to counter any softening up of the DAC's ODA reporting criteria;

German CIMIC measures should be subjected to systematic evaluation as regards their development-related impacts;

More efforts should be devoted to increasing the visibility of the contributions provided by development policy;

In view of the great relevance of the issue, the BMZ should initiate further in-depth studies.

Above and beyond arrangements geared to individual cases, there is a need to define a set of general strategic cornerstones for the relationship between development policy and military actors.
1 Introduction

In Germany as well as in other donor countries there was in the past a clearly recognizable distance between development actors and military actors and their tasks. This distance has diminished over the past years and months. The principle "No development without security" is increasingly assuming the character of a new development paradigm, one that calls for new approaches in development policy.

Viewed in terms of development policy, there is a marked lack of debate on issues like "The Merging of Development and Security" or possible other forms of cooperation or relations. The consequences involved have therefore not yet been accorded sufficient consideration and discussion. In Germany there has as yet been very little discussion on overarching lines of orientation from a development perspective. A more or less pronounced degree of convergence can already be observed among some other donors.

The Changing Relationship between Development Policy and the Military

The changing relationship between development policy and the military is, for a number of reasons, attracting growing attention:

1. There are a number of "protracted crises" which are characterized de facto by trusteeship rule – and therefore involve functions that extend beyond purely military tasks (e.g. Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq). These situations are often marked by efforts to stabilize fragile security, to restore effective statehood, and to embark on a course of economic and social reconstruction. Nation-building tasks, already a major element of peace missions, are taking on a growing role in this context.

2. Development policy, interested in gaining more constructive influence in post-conflict situations, in some cases even expects contributions from the field of security policy and advocates or calls for military intervention.

To cite some current examples: (i) In early August 2003 the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development called for peacekeeping troops to be sent to Liberia. (ii) In May 2003 the state secretary in the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) called for a strengthening of the UN mission in the northeast of the Republic of Congo, in the region of Ituri. (iii) In an article (co-authored by Helmut Asche) the parliamentary state secretary at the BMZ, Uschi Eid, advanced a proposal for closer cooperation between security policy and development policy, calling, from the perspective of development policy, for a stronger German commitment in the framework of peace missions in Africa. (iv) In an appeal, international nongovernmental organizations active in Afghanistan have called for an expansion of the ISAF mandate there.

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3 In contrast to general international and German parlance, the present study finds it more useful and appropriate to work on the basis of a "closer" definition of security than proceed from an "extended" understanding of security.

4 To quote the subtitle of a book by Duffield (2001).

5 On this issue, see e.g. Ferdowsi / Matthies (eds.) (2003) and Debiel (ed.) (2002).

6 See e.g. King's College (2003), para. 14: "Peace operations in their growing complexity have increasingly included state-building functions."


9 See Eid / Asche (2003).

10 See Annex.
The World Bank analysis "Breaking the Conflict Trap" documents the close mutual relationship between development-policy and military engagement. The report even assumes that development policy is in a position to provide help in lessening risks in post-conflict situations that could be sufficient to permit a reduction of military presence.

3. Other policy fields (above all foreign and security policy) are coming more and more to expect, and call for, an active involvement of development policy in post-conflict situations. As the European Security Strategy paper prepared by the High Representative of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) puts it, "In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos."  

4. The growing number of overseas missions directly involving the Bundeswehr has served to move the overall spectrum of German policies and their potential joint scopes of action into the focus of public attention.

These trends, very different in nature, are becoming increasingly evident as regards some important examples such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Liberia, and – for some donors – Iraq.

As far as the United Nations is concerned, the Brahimi Report, which appeared in 2000, has given rise to debates centering on the difficult relationship between UN military missions and the UN’s simultaneous role concerning important civil tasks. The political sensitivity of civil-military interfaces takes on tangible shape here.

Similar changes – and changes of crucial importance for German policy – are presently underway at the European level. This is clearly indicated by the European Security Strategy adopted by the Council of the European Union in December 2003. Combined civil-military efforts have an important place in the strategy.

Ongoing debates, e.g. on the US's alleged need for a "colonial office" ("Washington needs a colonial office"), show that, in the eyes of a number of political observers and actors, the current combined efforts of security policy, humanitarian aid, and development policy are manifestly inadequate, at least in some major crisis and post-conflict situations.

This is associated with the widespread recognition of the fact that some wars are conducted without plans for – or indeed without even the possibility of – an "exit strategy" and clear goal definitions for post-conflict reconstruction. In this framework it is the military that takes on "nation-building" tasks which are – at least in the short run – not manageable in structural terms.

A discussion on interfaces to the military in relation to humanitarian aid has already been conducted over the past ten years. The issue continues to be the object of numerous analyses as well as of general political interest. Here and there these debates contain some important inferences on the role played by development policy (soft-target discussion; the principle of impartiality, etc.), though, at least in tendency, some other issues are of concern only for humanitarian aid and/or development cooperation (e.g. the question of principles such as ownership, which are central to

13 See Box 1.
14 On this point, see e.g. King's College (2003).
15 See Chapter 4.4.
18 In the narrower sense these are state-building functions. See Hopp / Kloke-Lesch (2004) on the debate on nation-building in the context of post-conflict situations and a comparative discussion of state- and nation-building as viewed from the perspective of development policy.
19 See e.g. Humanitarian Dialogue (2003); Barry/Jefferys (2002); King's College (2003); VENRO (2003); Gor- denker (1999); Weiss (1999).
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In this connection it is important to note the often fluid, often highly irregular transitional areas in which humanitarian aid, emergency aid, and development cooperation (DC) come into play. Here we can look back to earlier discussions on distinctions and overlaps between instruments and the need to link them more effectively (keyword: the LRRD / Linking Aid, Rehabilitation, and Development debate); these will not be recapitulated here.20

In recent years military actors have engaged in an extensive discussion on civil-military cooperation. The concept CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) has turned out to be a military "product" that is capable of attracting substantial public attention. Moreover, the security debate in Germany is increasingly concerned with a broadening of strategic approaches. To cite an example, the new Defence Policy Guidelines issued by the German Minister of Defence state: "German security policy is comprehensive and takes political, economic, ecological, social and cultural conditions and developments into account. It is not possible to guarantee security primarily or solely by military means. Preventive security policy includes political and diplomatic initiatives and action in the fields of economic and development policy as well as constitutional, humanitarian and social measures."21

### The Present Study's Objectives and Terminology

The aim of the present study is to take stock of the following points:

- interfaces between development policy and the military;
- positive and negative experiences made with these interfaces;
- conclusions and recommendations of interest for German development policy.

In view of the dynamic of the current discussion, the present study seeks in particular to give consideration to ongoing developments and tendencies.

The study is not restricted exclusively to interfaces with the Bundeswehr or German defense policy; owing to an array of situations in which

20 See e.g. Commission of the European Communities (2001).

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**Box 1: Overseas Missions Involving the Bundeswehr**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Uzbekistan;</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR (Kosovo Force)</td>
<td>Kosovo;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR (Stabilization Force)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO HQ Skopje</td>
<td>Macedonia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG (United Nations Mission in Georgia)</td>
<td>Georgia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EF (Enduring Freedom)</td>
<td>Horn of Africa, Mediterranean.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, the costs for these missions abroad have risen rapidly. In 1995 they amounted to roughly €131 million; in 1999 the figure was €554 million; and in 2002 they had reached a level of €1.5 billion. For 2003 €1.4 billion was appropriated for the purpose.

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a Data from: www.bundeswehr.de/wir/print/030825_kosten_einsatze.php and www.bundeswehr.de/forces/print/einsatzahlen.php; last accessed on 16 Jan. 2004
the latter are not directly affected or involved, the study also deals with cooperation with other military actors.

On the other hand, the present analysis does not aim to cover the overall spectrum of the debate on civil and development-related crisis prevention and conflict resolution or the debates on the security sector and the options open to development policy in this regard.22

In preparing the study the authors
– worked through available analyses, studies, etc, from the German and the international discussion,
– commissioned the BICC to write a background paper,23
– conducted numerous interviews with BMVg, AA, and BMZ, the Bundeswehr's Führungsakademie (Command and Staff College), the implementing agencies involved in German development policy, nongovernmental organizations and scientific institutions as well as with UK ministry representatives from the fields of defense, foreign, and development policy,
– conducted a study conference (on September 22, 2003).

The analysis calls for a uniform understanding of some central concepts. The present paper is therefore based on the following definitions:

– Development-Military Relationship / Civil-Military Relationship:24

The relationship between civil and military actors includes on the one hand various civil actors such as foreign and development policy and the other hand various instruments such as democratization and equipment aid, dis-

patch of civil peace personnel, humanitarian aid, police aid provided by civilian actors, or support for nongovernmental organizations / NGOs), etc.

Looking at the case of the development-military relationship, we find that interest in the civil component tends to center on development-policy actors and instruments.

"Relationship" refers to all forms of interaction between the two groups of actors. That is, the term may encompass conscious cooperation strategies, a consciously complementary approach, or a unintended sequences of actions by actors marked by a relationship structure. The present text thus sees the terms "interface" and "linkage" as synonymous.25

– Complex Emergencies / Protracted Crises:

Most phenomena that serve as points of departure for cooperation between development and military actors are situations commonly referred to as complex emergencies and/or protracted crises. These are multilevel, commonly persistent crises that emerge from violent conflicts. These situations are often rooted in violent civil conflicts involving hard-to-pin-down constellations and conflict parties. The term protracted crises furthermore points to the unclear beginning and end points of conflicts.26

25 Under this definition the term "civil-military relationship" differs from the widely used term "civil-military relations" commonly used in the political sciences to depict the relations between national security structures and given civilian governments. Particularly relevant in this connection is S. Huntington's classic study "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations," which defines civil-military relations as one aspect of national security policy (Huntington 1957, p.1).

26 See e.g. Boschmann (2003), pp. 3ff.
Reconstruction in Post-conflict Situations:

In the present analysis the term "post-conflict reconstruction" is understood in a "broad" sense. Many situations involving combined efforts of development and military actors are concerned with post-combat and post-peace-accord phases. But there are also situations which, in view of continuing combat operations or unclarified power relations, resist any such classification in a narrower sense. The present study is concerned not with a more focused conceptual interpretation of "post-conflict situations" but with the broadest possible consideration of situations involving interfacing between military and development policy.

Peace Support Operations (PSOs):\(^{27}\)

The present paper regards PSOs as military and civil contributions to preventive peacekeeping or peace-building operations in a conflict region (in general: peace missions). These may, for instance, include traditional peacekeeping missions legitimized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter or peace enforcement operations mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. This would also include the three areas summed up in the Brahimi Report\(^{28}\) under the heading "Peace operations":\(^{29}\)

1. conflict prevention and peacemaking,
2. peacekeeping, and

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27 For further information on the wide-ranging debate on the various terms in use, see e.g. Rossouw (1998); Lilly (2002), pp. 4f.; Matthies (2003), pp. 2f. See also Chapter 2.2 of the present analysis.

28 See Box 2.

3. peace-building.

Presupposing that military missions are legitimized by an appropriate mandate, the following chapter will start out by taking a look at the views held by the various actors involved in stepped-up development-military cooperation. It will then go on to take stock of and categorize the development-military interfaces involved. Examples will be used to illustrate some of the positive and negative experiences that have been made with different interfaces and to point out some aspects of particular relevance for development policy. The chapter will conclude by outlining some initial strategic approaches and policy options for development policy in its relationship to military actors.

2 Starting Conditions: Mandates for and Legitimation of Military Missions

The mandates for, and thus the legitimacy of, military missions play an important role for the debate on the development-military relationship in post-conflict situations. This applies, for example, for the engagement of some donors in Iraq as well as for the debate in Germany on the character to be given the German reconstruction efforts in Kunduz. The type of military engagement is also a highly relevant factor for development-policy decisions. In general practice we can distinguish three categories of military operations:30


2. Military operations covered by a UN Security Council mandate.31

3. UN peace missions with classic monitoring, buffering and, aid mandates geared to restoring deficient state power.

Furthermore, in connection with UN peace operations (categories 2 and 3) we speak of different types of military peace missions which are legitimized under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter:32

- Traditional peacekeeping, which is based on consensus and neutrality and provides only for self-defense measures (e.g. in the Sinai in the 1950s and in Cyprus in the mid-1960s).

Box 2: The Brahimi Report

The findings and recommendations of the so-called Brahimi Commission were published in 2000. The task of the commission, which was appointed by the UN Secretary-General, was to present proposals for political, military, financial, manpower, and organizational improvements that could serve to give a more successful and credible shape to UN peace missions.

The Report calls for reforms geared to strengthening the overall capacities of the UN to conduct more rapid and effective UN operations and modern multidimensional peace missions. The Report stresses that peace missions are complex tasks that go far beyond purely military operations. It proposes, among other things, creating what it calls Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) as an important interdepartmental support mechanism for the planning and implementation of peace missions. The first IMTF was set up to deal with the case of Afghanistan.

A study conducted by King’s College (London) on behalf of various donors (2003) looked, three years following the publication of the Brahimi Report, into the experiences made with peace operations. The study confirms in essence the findings of the Brahimi Report, although it places greater stress on the significance of the civil dimension of peace missions.

30 Based in large part on Bothe (2003), pp. 24 f.
31 These would include Operation Enduring Freedom, which was legitimized by the UN Security Council under Resolution 1368 on combating all forms of international terrorism.
Multidimensional peacekeeping, which is geared to the dynamics of processes and provides for an expansion of nonmilitary functions (e.g. in Namibia in 1989/90 and Cambodia in 1992/93).

Robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement, which also provides for a possible use of military force (e.g. in Somalia).

Peace support and governance operations, in which the assumption of political and administrative functions plays an additional, important role (e.g. in Kosovo and in East Timor).

Accordingly, international military peace missions are increasingly assigned nation-building functions. The concrete shape given to UN peace operations may vary considerably in this context. This applies as well for the profile defined for nonmilitary and civil activities (including reconstruction) and the extent to which a mandate covers protection of the civilian population. Apart from the mandate, though, this also depends on the capacities available to a mission, as we have seen in cases of missions that have proven problematic. The 2000 Report of the Brahimi Commission, which was written on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, goes in detail into the experiences made by UN peace missions and calls on the UN to give greater weight to the civil component of peace missions.

The need for mandated military missions has today found widespread acceptance. Preemptive interventions and other military activities without an adequate mandate, and thus without sufficient legitimacy under international law, have attracted considerable controversy and are widely rejected.

Following Debiel, we can identify five groups of cases that play a role in the debate on international law and in the practice of states and are bound up with the question of what internationally imposed sanctions – down to and including military intervention – can in principle be legitimized:

1. violations of international law;
2. other massive violations of fundamental human rights standards;
3. humanitarian disasters stemming from state failure;
4. transborder refugee movements;
5. restoration of democratic rule.

Against this background it should be noted that military actions like the intervention in Iraq in 2003 may involve contexts of justification based on new arguments that are, for all practical purposes, manifestly untenable under international law. In the framework of its national security strategy the US has accorded to itself the right to take "preemptive action": "The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

33 For more information on UN ongoing peace operations and their mandates, see Annex 2.
34 For more in-depth information, see ICISS (2001).
35 On this point, see e.g. Kühne (2003) and Debiel (2002).
36 See Box 2.
37 For a discussion from the view of development policy, see e.g. Collier et al. (2003), pp. 163ff.
39 The points relevant in this connection include, not least, the discussions on the provisions set out by the UN Charter on the peaceful settlement of international disputes (Art. 2, para. 3), the comprehensive ban on the use or threat of force (Art. 2, para. 4), and the principle of the sovereign equality of all UN members (Art. 2, para. 1); preemptive action threatens to neutralize all of these provisions. See e.g. Tomuschat (2003).
3 Analysis of Development-Military Interfaces

The present chapter will start out by presenting the fundamental views held by the most important actors (development policy, military, nongovernmental organizations) on development-military / civil-military relations. This will be followed by an analysis focusing on the areas in which systematic or case-related interfaces can be identified between development policy and the military.

3.1 Development-Military Cooperation from the Perspective of Different Actors

The relationship between development policy and military actors is a matter that depends not least on national embodiments and traditions of development policy. These would include the closeness, or distance, involved in the relationship between development policy and foreign policy, the share that humanitarian aid and emergency relief – with their more pronounced, situation-related interfaces with the military – account for in the work done by development policy, and national traditions and experiences made with military interventions.

Development Policy

Traditionally the relationship between German development policy and German military actors has been one marked by distance. Development policy views its role as fundamentally civil in character. An additional factor is Germany's long-standing reticence in deploying its troops abroad. In past years the operational development-policy priorities of crisis prevention and conflict resolution have furthermore given rise to a marked orientation toward civil prevention.

In other countries (e.g. the Netherlands or the US) development policy lacks the ministerial autonomy typical of German development policy. In such countries development policy is for the most part an integral function of the foreign ministry, as in the case of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). And it is only since 1997 that the British Department for International Development (DFID), which is also responsible for humanitarian functions, has had an autonomous status of its own.

The boundaries defining development-military cooperation are not always clearly drawn among the group of bilateral development actors. A survey conducted among DAC members found that their "no-go areas" include above all direct support for operational capacities of military actors. Furthermore, areas that are not officially classified as ODA-eligible are often exempted, a circumstance that encourages broad interpretation in view of the lack of clarity on whether or not certain activities, e.g. in the field of security-sector reform, are eligible for classification as ODA.42

Even though various case-specific forms of cooperation and coordination between development policy and the military can be noted for Germany, there has not been any marked convergence of the actors involved.

Development-policy actors see a number of risks and chances in closer convergence and/or cooperation with the military. On the one hand, it may be assumed that improved mutual understanding leads to greater coherence in reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries. Development policy could contribute more of its specific strengths and competences for purposes of decision-making in the fields of military and foreign policy. In exchange it would tap the know-how of military actors for its work, e.g. in the field of security-sector reform. A further aspect is concerned with the possibility that a military presence may provide for a more stable security situation.

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41 DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (2003), pp. 7–8.
42 See Box 5.
43 See Chapter 3.2.
44 See Table 1.
Development-Military Interfaces

on the ground, a state of affairs from which development-policy could stand to benefit.
On the other hand, though, there are also risks involved. These are bound up with possible military dominance and diminished influence of development-related concepts in connection with short-term political or military missions. It is furthermore argued that development policy could be made to share responsibility for a military strategy in cases in which such a strategy lacks sufficient legitimacy or acceptance. And not least, development-policy actors might here run the risk of becoming a target of armed attack (soft-target debate).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Chances and Risks of Development-Military Cooperation from the Perspective of the Different Actors Involved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor</strong></td>
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</table>
| Development policy | – Security and stability as the sine qua non for the development of the country affected  
– Security as a condition required for the engagement of development policy  
– Constructive influence on security strategies  
– Influence on approaches adopted by military actors in areas relevant to development policy  
– Coherence of overall policy, including consideration of aspects relevant to development policy | – Risk that development policy may find itself subordinated to a military strategy as well as to short-term political considerations  
– Security risk in that development policy may find itself in the position of a target of attacks  
– The possibility that involvement of development policy may serve to legitimize and support military interventions  
– Risk of public criticism along the lines: "Development policy providing military assistance"  
– Resources may be diverted from the "core business" of development policy (i.e. long-term tasks)  
– Resources used for noncivil tasks are not eligible for recognition as ODA  
– Regional reorientation of development policy  
– Possible inability to adhere to principles of development policy |
| Military | – Greater acceptance on the part of the local population due to better planning of civil activities  
– Access to additional (DC) resources (financial, advisory, implementation) | – Possibility of mission creep when the military takes on a growing number of civil tasks on the ground  
– Demands for more transparency/disclosure of military strategy vis-à-vis third parties  
– Parallel command structures and, possibly, restriction of powers of discretion on the military side |
| NGOs | – Complementary and effective approach in acute crises based on purely subsidiary aid provided by the military  
– Depending on the concrete case, a more secure setting for the implementation of projects and programs. | – Loss of impartiality and neutrality  
– Security risk (NGOs as a soft target)  
– Diversion of funds to countries in which military missions are underway. |
Military

For military actors, the points of contact with civil activities and actors have grown distinctly in number in connection with peace missions in the recent past. The new peace missions in which the Bundeswehr is becoming increasingly involved call for greater integration of reconstruction strategies in overall strategy. On the one hand, the military is concerned here with classic military tasks in the field of security, a function which is supposed to set the stage for civilian forces to operate on the ground.

On the other hand, the military is itself becoming more and more involved in the carrying out of genuinely civil tasks. These include in part force protection measures in unstable settings, in part far-reaching administrative tasks involved in protectorate scenarios.

Against this background the Bundeswehr is also interested in more pronounced civil-military cooperation, not least as a means of improving its own know-how on the ground, gaining information on the setting in which its troops operate, and tapping new sources of funding for its own civil activities. Military actors often criticize development policy’s alleged reservations concerning the military, a factor, it is asserted, that constitutes an obstacle to improved mutual understanding. Despite their efforts to improve civil-military cooperation, though, military actors also see the risk of an unintended and uncontrolled expansion of the spectrum of military tasks at the expense of military mandates, a phenomenon known as mission creep.

Development and Humanitarian NGOs

In connection with the debate in recent years in the field of humanitarian aid, NGOs have engaged in an intensive discussion on the problem complex involved in the military-civil relationship. Many of the major development NGOs are active at the same time in the fields of humanitarian aid and development policy (e.g. German Agro Action / Deutsche Welthungerhilfe – DWHH, Save the Children, CARE, or OXFAM). Humanitarian organizations see a growing encroachment of military aspects in the traditional field of action of civilian aid organizations. This has become clear in the debate on the legitimacy of “humanitarian interventions” – such as that in Kosovo – or the coherence of humanitarian aid and foreign policy.

Degrees of cooperation with military actors differ from NGO to NGO. Traditionally, most European NGOs share the basic stance that the only way to ensure the effectiveness of their measures is to adhere strictly to the basic humanitarian principles of independence and impartiality. For them this implies the need for a clear distance to the military. At the same time, the euphemism implicit in the designation of the military as a “humanitarian actor” is strictly rejected as an impermissible blurring of the specific mandates involved. The military, it is noted, should generally not operate in civil fields.

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45 See Chapter 4.1 for a discussion of the concept of CIMIC.

46 For a presentation of the broad spectrum of NGO tasks, see Stoddard (2003).

47 See e.g. ICISS (2001).

48 See e.g. Macrae/Leader (2000).

49 Large, purely humanitarian organizations like the ICRC make relatively pragmatic compromises; in Germany, for instance, the Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB) or the Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (JUH) find it less difficult to cooperate with the military; see Müller (2000). Other organizations, e.g. Médecins Sans Frontière (MSF), strictly reject any such cooperation. There are also regional differences: for example the stance of the US NGOs operating under the umbrella of InterAction is cooperative; see Barry/Reddick (2003), p. 32.

50 See Box 8.

51 This view is advanced e.g. in the ODI paper by Barry/Jefferys (2002) as well as by the German umbrella development organization VENRO in its position paper (VENRO 2003). Other position papers have been published by the German Red Cross (DKKV 2003) and the church aid organizations Misereor / Brot für die Welt / EED (2003).
Recent years have seen the publication of a number of codes of conduct that affirm this distance and set out criteria under which, in exceptional situations and in cases of danger to life and limb, cooperation with the military is possible.\footnote{See Box 3.}

In Germany NGOs and representatives of the Ministry of Defence (BMVg) came together in 2000-2001 in the Coordination Committee on Humanitarian Aid with the aim of formulating a code of conduct binding for both sides. However, these efforts at coordination failed, among other things because of unbridgeable divergences in positions calling for restraint on the part of the military in its conduct of civil measures.\footnote{In Germany humanitarian aid projects conducted by independent NGOs are mainly financed from the Foreign Office's humanitarian aid budget, which also provides funds for CIMIC measures of the \textit{Bundeswehr}. The AA division responsible for humanitarian aid is, however, currently seeking to reduce the funding it provides for CIMIC measures.}

However, as conflicts and the actors involved in them grow increasingly complex, with donor nations themselves becoming conflict parties, NGOs indicate that it is increasingly difficult for them to effectively provide aid on the basis of traditional instruments and principles. The following examples will serve to illustrate this state of affairs:

- In certain complex emergencies NGOs have decided in favour of requesting a military intervention to enable them to provide aid for the civilian population. One example is the "Call for security"\footnote{See Annex.} made by some 80 international NGOs requesting a broadening of the mandate of the International Security Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.\footnote{International Rescue Committee (2003).}

- In Iraq, as in other cases, the military administration has been unwilling to fully recognize the neutral role of aid organizations and has hampered their work, a stance which is, in the view of these NGOs, not in keeping with international norms.\footnote{The situation in Iraq has even led US NGOs to reassess their cooperative relationship with the military; see Bishop (2003).}

- In Iraq even explicitly neutral organizations like the Red Cross have become open targets for armed terrorist attack, even though they have, throughout the occupation, demonstrated their independence, or indeed even expressed criticism of the occupying powers\footnote{See Stefan Ulrich: "Die geschickten Helfer," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 Oct. 2003.} (example: the bomb attack on the Red Cross in Baghdad on October 27, 2003).

It is still unclear what this will mean for the future formulation of the civil-military relationship, and the issue is currently under discussion in many NGOs.\footnote{See e.g. Barry (2003).}

### 3.2 Interfaces between Development Policy and the Military

There are a number of direct and indirect points of contact between development policy and the military and/or security policy. This following section will highlight these interfaces and discuss them briefly. In part these are interfaces that have existed for some time and have gained recognition, others have developed only in the recent past. In other cases the discussion process has just begun.

We can distinguish here four categories which differ in their concrete forms:

1. Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy.
2. Strategic planning and conception.
### Category One: Security and Stability as Framework Conditions for Development Policy

Development policy is in need of a certain measure of security and stability before it can start working "on the ground" (country, region, etc.). As far as humanitarian aid actors and various development NGOs are concerned, the security

<table>
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<th>Box 3: International Codes of Conduct</th>
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<tr>
<td>- &quot;Oslo-Guidelines&quot;: UN-OCHA Guidelines on the Use of Military Assets in Disaster Aid, 1994.(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ICRC: Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Aid on civil-military relations in armed conflicts.(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- &quot;MCDA-Guidelines&quot;: UN-OCHA guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies, June 2003.(^e)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The humanitarian codes of conduct, which are voluntary in nature, are as a rule addressed to humanitarian aid actors, though they are also in part meant for the military. In their tenor the codes agree in emphasizing the absolute need to protect humanitarian principles, in particular impartiality and independence, from military action.

This rules out the following overlaps:

- The use of military and civil defense assets (MCDA), e.g. transport capacities or escorts aimed at protecting aid organizations.
- Conduct by the military of humanitarian activities.
- Blurring of separate identities (e.g. military use of the UN emblem or permanent/regular contact on nonneutral territory).

All exceptions are subject to criteria the use of which is decided upon on a case-by-case basis:

- The principle of subsidiarity, i.e. in a given situation no humanitarian organization is in a position to carry out an urgent humanitarian task.
- Cooperation with or aid by the military is accepted only as the last possible option.
- Civil control over the overall operation.
- Clearly defined time limits on joint activities.

On the other hand, information-sharing between the two sides has proven to be an important and security-relevant form of cooperation, although care must be taken that it does not harm or endanger beneficiaries or staff.

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\(a\) UN-OCHA (1994)
\(b\) Relief and Rehabilitation Network (1994); see also Studer (2001).
\(c\) SCHR represents nine of the largest international humanitarian aid organizations: Oxfam, Care, Save the Children, ICRC, IFRC, the World Council of Churches, Caritas, the Lutheran World Federation, MSF
\(d\) SCHR (2001)
\(e\) UN-OCHA (2003a)
\(f\) UN-OCHA (2003b)
needs of development policy have for this reason normally been quite high. However, reassessments have become necessary in view of unstable situations (e.g. in Afghanistan, the Jaffna peninsula in Sri Lanka).

In most post-conflict situations stability and security brought about by the military are decisive framework conditions for development policy actors. Development policy is in this case able to "follow" a situation stabilized by the military, or to work in parallel to military operations in situations that continue to be unstable (e.g. in Kabul).

As a rule the approach is a sequenced one that involves no formal arrangements. In such cases security may be provided by the Bundeswehr (e.g. in Kabul or Kosovo), by other inter- or multinational forces (e.g. in Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), or by local military units (e.g. in parts of Sri Lanka).

3.2.2 Category Two: Strategic Planning and Conception

Interministerial Cooperation and Mechanisms

There are a number of development-military interfaces associated with general concepts and individual country and regional policies. At the government level in Germany these interfaces are concerned with information-sharing and development of joint strategies.

In the framework of interministerial cooperation the BMZ is, for instance, able to bring its influence to bear on cross-cutting concepts (e.g. the German Federal Government’s projected Plan of Action "Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-conflict Peace-building ") or the formulation of country strategies. The BMZ has also played a key role in the debate on the structure to be given to the reconstruction team currently deployed in Kunduz as well as on the mandate for the military component involved.

The following cooperation mechanisms are, for instance, in place at the government level in Germany:

- The Federal Security Council (BSR), in which the BMZ has had a seat since 1998. In the summer of 2000, for instance, the BSR adopted a Comprehensive Concept on "Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution."
- Interministerial consultations and other coordination mechanisms involving the BMZ and the BMVg; these have played a role e.g. as regards concrete missions in individual countries (in Afghanistan, for instance).
- Other forms of interministerial cooperation. Here, in the framework of the G8 Africa Action Plan (GAA), relatively close cooperation has developed, in particular between the AA, the BMVg, and the BMZ, concerning the German contribution to promoting Africa’s capacity to prevent and resolve armed conflicts. The cooperation extends to common conceptual principles and a coordinated approach for individual projects.

59 Exceptions would include e.g. situations in which no unstable conditions emerge in the wake of negotiated and implemented peace accords.

60 See Box 4.
61 See www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv_km/konfliktpraev_html; last accessed on 19 Nov. 2003.
62 See the Comprehensive Concept, which states: "Under the leadership of the Federal Foreign Office but with the involvement of all ministries, the Federal Government devises tailor-made strategies which include the possibility of setting up country focus groups on impending conflicts." In: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv_km/konfliktpraev_ht ml; last accessed on 19 Nov. 11.2003.
63 See Bundesregierung (2003).
64 See the discussion below on the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Box 6.
Box 4: Joint Strategy Development Mechanisms

Germany is in possession of a number of different mechanisms and instruments that constitute workable points of departure for development-military coordination, cooperation, dialogue, and interfacing. Two key actors involved here are the Federal Security Council and the Federal College for Security Policy / Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik.

– The Federal Security Council (BSR) is a committee of the federal cabinet. Its sessions, which are chaired by the chancellor, are conducted behind closed doors. The Council coordinates the German Federal Government’s security and defense policy and is also responsible for matters bearing on Germany’s arms exports. The BSR has nine members: the chancellor, the chief-of-staff of the chancellery, the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, finance, the interior, justice, economics, and economic cooperation and development. The BMZ has had its seat since 1998.

– The German College for Security Policy / Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik (BAKS) is Germany’s central interministerial training institution in the field of security policy. It was founded in 1990 by order of the federal cabinet and entrusted with the task of “organizing events for the joint advanced training of current and future leaders in state and federal government as well as relevant-security-policy actors with a view to fostering a comprehensive, inter-agency understanding of the specific long-term security interests of the Federal Republic of Germany concomitant to Germany’s role within the international democratic community and to enable participants to take adequate account of these interests.”

The BAKS’ most important objective is to convey and to deepen the concept of extended security, to point to cross-cutting policy interdependencies, and in so doing to enhance consensus on issues concerning security policy and to promote dialogue between key government officials and other actors. In this connection the BAKS also offers courses on civil-military cooperation.

The BAKS is an independent agency and reports to federal minister of defense. The BAKS recruits its staff from all of the ministries represented in the BSR – i.e. including the BMZ.

In Iraq aid measures are likewise being conducted under conditions marked by a clear-cut military dominance and orientation dictated by overall strategic considerations. Both prior to and during combat operations aid measures amounted to a component of a strategy. Indeed, the Coalition set up the so-called Humanitarian Operation Center even before the war had got underway.66

Deliberate Integration and Subordination of Development Policy in Short-term Political and Military Strategies

Examples of the extensive integration of instruments of development policy and humanitarian aid would include individual Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and some forms of assistance provided in Iraq. Such subordination to a military approach has been noted for the US’ PRTs. Here, reconstruction work is conducted under the anti-terror mandate of Enduring Freedom; the civil components involved are subordinate to the military leadership; and, in addition, the distinction between military and civil tasks has been blurred.65

65 See Chapter 4.2 for more information.

3.2.3 Category Three: Funding of Noncivil Measures and Missions as well as Civil Activities Conducted by the Military

Development-Policy Funding for Noncivil Measures and Missions

In the recent past there have been several different examples which can, as far as their character is concerned, be assessed as a shift of the boundaries defining the practices of development policy up to roughly 2001/2002. These examples may signal the begin of a fundamentally new orientation of development policy in this area.

– **DC funding for the ECOWAS military mission in Liberia**

Against the background of the ECOWAS peace mission in Liberia, the European Commission advanced a proposal in the summer of 2003 which provided for making available €5 million (of a total of €50 million) of undisbursed funds for Liberia from the 8th European Development Fund (EDF) for support of the ECOWAS mission. The decision to go ahead was taken at the end of August 2003.

The Commission cited Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement ("Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution") as a legal basis for its decision. However, a legal expertise prepared on behalf of the BMZ noted, in October 2003, that Art 11 does not constitute a legal basis for the funding of military peace missions and can be used to legitimize only non-military activities. 67

Similar considerations were brought up in recent months concerning Burundi, where the issue involved is funding from the 9th EDF for the ongoing African Union peace mission.

– **Peace Facility for Africa**

Based on a proposal by EU Commissioner Poul Nielson, a decision was made in November 2003 to set up a Peace Facility for Africa. 68 The initial funding is to consist of €250 million from the 9th European Development Fund. The aim is to support noncivil peace missions in African countries which have been legitimized by the African Union. Although no funds are to be provided for arms, munitions, etc., per diem payments, communications equipment, transportation, and logistics are eligible for funding. In keeping with the currently valid DAC reporting guidelines, most of the EDF contribution would not be eligible for consideration as ODA. 69 Against the background of the EU’s Monterrey commitments, there are plans to examine alternative funding options after one year of experience with the facility.

Taking up Commissioner Nielson’s initiative, the African Union, at its Maputo summit in July 2003, asked the EU "to examine the possibility of setting up a Peace Support Operation Facility, to fund peace support and peace keeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU." 70

– **Transportation costs for Bundeswehr trucks for the ECOWAS peace mission in Liberia**

In 2003 the German government planned to provide material support for the ECOWAS peace mission by making available 25 overhauled Bundeswehr trucks, initially for the mission in Côte d’Ivoire, then, due to the changing conflict situation there, for the mission in Liberia. The division of functions within the German government is as follows: the BMVg makes the trucks available (approximate market value: roughly €325,000),


68 The title originally proposed was Peace Support and Operations Facility (PSOF).

69 See also Box 5 on this point.

70 AU (2003).
Box 5: ODA Eligibility of So-called Peace-related Activities

For some years now there has been a discussion underway in the framework of the DAC on whether and to what extent support for peace-related activities – which is now also understood to include anti-terrorism activities – should be eligible for consideration in ODA statistics (so-called ODA eligibility). The positions of DAC member countries on this issue are highly divergent. In view of the numerous facets involved in the issue, the questions addressed are complex in nature (e.g. eligibility of measures designed to sensitize armed forces to human rights issues, military budget management). There are currently debates underway on this issue in the framework of the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation.

The DAC reporting guidelines stipulate that, among others, the following activities are not ODA-eligible: military aid, military equipment, training of military personnel (including nonmilitary areas); activities dedicated to the protection and security of persons, facilities, etc.

On the other hand, the following activities are among those eligible to be reported as ODA: bilateral participation in UN peace missions (with a development orientation; see below), demobilization efforts, mine clearance activities conducted with a view to development considerations.

As regards bilateral participation in UN peace missions, the guidelines provide for eligibility under the following conditions:

"The cost of a donor's bilateral participation in the activities listed below, when they are part of the post-conflict peace-building phase of a United Nations peace operation, net of any compensation received from the United Nations (the cost of bilateral activities is calculated as the excess over what the personnel and equipment would have cost to maintain had they not been assigned to take part in a peace operation):

- human rights;
- election monitoring;
- rehabilitation assistance to demobilized soldiers;
- rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure;
- monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces;
- training in customs and border control procedures;
- advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilization policy;
- repatriation and demobilization of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; and
- explosive mine removal."

The implementation report of the G8 Africa representative for the GAA contains a call for an expansion of the ODA criteria; the report was prepared for the 2003 Evian summit. The report states:

"Without prejudging decisions to be made in coming months and years by the African Union on the operationalisation of its Protocol on peace and security (notably with respect to standby capacities), early building blocks that have been identified include:

(...) consensus building in the OECD Development Assistance Committee to consider as Official Development Assistance a more inclusive range of assistance provided to enhance capacities to undertake peace support operations and related activities."

a The relevant DAC guidelines contain an overview on this issue: OECD/DAC (2001), p. 40
b See e.g. OECD/DAC (2003)
c Printed in: OECD/DAC (2003), p. 17
d Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, in: www.g8.fr/evian/500.pdf; last accessed on 04 Nov. 2003
the Foreign Office takes over the overhaul costs (some € 200,000), the BMZ assumes the transportation costs (some € 125,000).

ODA eligibility of multilateral contributions to UN peace missions

In the past Germany was the only DAC member country that reported multilateral contributions (so-called assessed contributions) to UN peace missions as Official Development Assistance (ODA). In 2002 these contributions amounted to a total of € 196 million; in 2001 the corresponding figure was € 314 million. These contributions stem from the budget of the Foreign Office.

In the past it was not possible to determine whether these peace missions were geared wholly or in part to development-policy concerns (e.g. in the sense of bilateral contributions to UN peace missions) or whether they were used primarily or in part to pursue non-civil objectives. The German procedure was criticized by the DAC and there are now plans to modify it.

Against this background there are efforts underway within the DAC to apply the reporting procedure for bilateral contributions to UN peace missions to multilateral contributions as well. A procedure of this kind would presumably mean that only a certain percentage of UN peace missions – namely, those devoted to civil tasks – would be eligible for consideration as ODA.

Development-policy funding for civil activities conducted by the military

The BMZ is one source of funding for CIMIC measures conducted by the Bundeswehr. In Kosovo, for instance, such measures were regularly funded from a so-called Study and Expert Fund. The BMZ is provided the relevant documents for project proposals, implementation, and final reporting.

Military competition for DC funds

The military also plays a role as a competitor for DC funds. This goes in particular for the implementation capacities of the GTZ as compared with those of the Bundeswehr. To cite an example: the Bundeswehr applies for funds with the European Union (ECHO, OBNova), which also brings it into de facto competition with nongovernmental organizations in the field of humanitarian aid.

3.2.4 Category Four: Operational Approach

Interministerial Projects

A number of concrete joint approaches have been developed in connection with the German contribution to implementing the GAA. The German support for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPhTC) provided by the AA, the BMVg, and the BMZ is seen as a pilot project for the development of a coherent and interministerial funding concept.

Measures initiated in connection with the fight against terrorism may be cited as a further example of interministerial action. In response to the 9/11/2001 attacks, additional funds (2002: € 1.53 billion) were made available from Section 60 of the federal budget (General Financial Administration). The funds were used in the framework of a comprehensive federal government strategy. The BMZ used the instrument to strengthen the capacities of state and society in partner countries to deal with the impacts of terrorist threats and to address the structural causes of terrorism.

72 See Chapter 4.1.
73 See Chapter 4.1.
74 See Box 6.
Military Conduct of Measures Typical of DC

In the framework of its military strategies and tasks, the military engages in some civil tasks that may be comparable to DC measures. To cite an example: the Bundeswehr is engaged in longer-term vocational-training and microcredit projects in the Balkans.75

Military Provision of Concrete Protection Functions for DC Actors and Measures; Benefits of an Improved Security Situation

Apart from the general conditions required for security and stability, concrete forms of cooperation may develop "on the ground." For example, German DC actors in Kosovo give preference to the "German sector," not least because of the Bundeswehr's presence there. Joint approaches may even be observed in individual cases. An example: a money transport carried out in the framework of a German FC project was managed with the aid of Bundeswehr logistics.

Military Contracts for DC Actors

The GTZ works on behalf of the German Federal Government as well as for third parties as the GTZ International Services (GTZ-IS). In this framework it also carries out activities for military actors. The GTZ has, for instance, constructed barracks facilities for the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan and in the Balkans.

Projects implemented by GTZ-IS are subject to a simplified, global BMZ approval procedure. A special approval procedure is provided for ("Paragraph 3 approval") in cases involving so-called sensitive countries.

Box 6: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra*

The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana was set up in 1998 as a regional training center; the aim was, among other things, to tap Ghana's experience in peace missions and make it available to other African countries. The training program includes e.g. courses on military-police tasks as well as preparatory training for military observers.

Germany is using various instruments to support the development of the KAIPTC in the framework of its G8 Plan for Africa:75

- Development of a course model on the use of civil forces for peacekeeping; the project is being funded by the BMZ and implemented by the Berlin Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze (Center for International Peace Missions / ZIF); the GTZ is responsible for handling and transacting the project.
- AA funds are being used to construct / equip the Centre, the BMVg is responsible for implementing the measures.
- Support for training operations is provided by a German Bundeswehr instructor specialized in the field of civil-military cooperation. In Germany African training personnel is trained by the BMVg and the AA.

In view of its importance, the KAIPTC is also supported by other countries in the framework of the G8 Plan. In particular, CIDA (the Canadian International Development Agency), in cooperation with the Canadian foreign ministry, has provided approx. US$ 3 million for the work of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, which is providing support for curriculum development; the curriculum includes the subject of civil-military relations.5

a See e.g. Hitchcock (2002)
b See Bundesregierung (2003), p. 16

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75 See Chapter 3.3.1.
Cooperation in Training and Capacity-Building

Furthermore, in some contexts military and development-policy actors are involved, on a reciprocal basis, in training and capacity-building functions as well as in dialogue forums.

Examples:

– The courses and events developed and offered by the Federal College for Security Policy (BAKS) place it squarely at the interface between various federal ministries.76

– A course on "Civil-Military Cooperation Abroad" (ZMZ A) offered by the Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz (Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defense / AKNZ) has as its target groups both staff members of aid organizations and Bundeswehr personnel seeking certification of their "CIMIC" capability. The Academy's aim, which it has yet to achieve, is a course ratio of 50 % civilian and 50 % military participation; at present the figure for civilian participation is roughly 30 %.

– The BMZ participates in events conducted by the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (Bundeswehr Command and Staff College) in Hamburg.

– At the international level as well there are some entry points for training and capacity-building situated at interfaces with the military. In the past UNCHR conducted training modules on "Working with the Military";77 the aim of these modules was to improve mutual understanding and to optimize the relations between UNHCR and military actors in peace missions. The curricula included e.g. military logic and organizational culture, the supporting role played by the military for UNHCR's work, and possibilities of coordination.

4 Examples for Civil-Military Linkages

The following section will discuss five examples of immediate relevance, all of which represent closer forms of cooperation between civil and military actors.

4.1 The CIMIC Concept

Implementation of the military's concept of civil-military cooperation involves a number of overlaps with humanitarian and development activities that are in need of discussion.

CIMIC in the Bundeswehr Framework78

In the closer sense of the term, the concept Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) refers to the military doctrine of the same name adopted in the framework of NATO and the WEU;79 in Germany this was given concrete shape in the Bundeswehr "Civil-Military Cooperation subconcept" (TK ZMZ BW) adopted in 2001.80

The core tasks of CIMIC abroad are (i) coordination of civil-military relations, (ii) support for armed forces, and (iii) support for the civil environment. This includes information-gathering, development of / participation in coordination bodies, but also carrying out civil reconstruction projects in cooperation with NGOs, international and bilateral organizations, local authorities, or other civil organizations. Here the Bundeswehr operates with special, in part high-level CIMIC forces.

Bundeswehr CIMIC measures designed to support the civil environment consist of three phases: Pha-

76 See Box 4.

77 See UNHCR (1995).

78 For an overview from the standpoint of the Bundeswehr, see e.g. Braunstein (2001); for a comprehensive presentation and analysis of CIMIC, see Heinemann-Grüder / Pietz / Lipp (2003).

79 See NATO (2001); Council of the European Union (2002).

80 See BMVg (2001) and Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr (2003).
se I includes humanitarian aid and support services, Phase II involves support for the rehabilitation of public infrastructure, and Phase III provides for a contribution to structural, i.e. economic, development.\(^1\) According to the BMVg, the conduct of these measures is based on two principle criteria: force protection and subsidiarity.\(^2\)

- **Force protection**

  CIMIC measures serve as flanking activities designed to raise local acceptance of military forces or to secure the setting in which forces operate (force protection). They are thus dedicated to objectives that differ from those pursued by development policy. Direct, large-scale humanitarian actions in disaster areas, such as the mission in Mozambique, are as a rule special missions that do not fall under the category of CIMIC.

- **Subsidiarity**

  All such measures are based on the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. they are conducted only in cases in which the appropriate civil authorities are either no longer present or unable to discharge their duties. Furthermore, the Bundeswehr claims no right to control civil organizations, and its explicit objective is to transfer projects to civil structures at the earliest possible point of time.\(^3\)

NATO has plans to expand its own capacities in the civil sector: in view of problematic mission experiences in the Balkans, which saw the military taking on government tasks such as justice or police functions, the CIMIC Group North — of which the Bundeswehr is part — is seeking to develop a pool of CIMIC specialists for general and specific functions with an eye to improving the military’s ability to provide support for comprehensive civil functions. This pool of functional specialists encompasses the five following sectors: civil administration, humanitarian aid, civil infrastructure, industry and commerce, and culture. NATO members differ in terms of the efforts they devote to developing these capacities. In Germany only one CIMIC battalion has been set up thus far, and, in addition, for about one year now the Academy for Emergency Planning and Civil Defense (AKNZ, Bad Neuenahr) has offered a compulsory one-week "CIMIC" training course devoted to general mission preparation.\(^4\)

**CIMIC Projects**

*Bundeswehr* CIMIC projects are identified on the ground by troops deployed there. The better part of all CIMIC projects have been conducted in the Balkans: in Bosnia the focus was infrastructure rehabilitation aimed at "creating a returnee-friendly environment," but projects have also been concerned with the construction and management of refugee camps in Macedonia and Kosovo and the assumption of administrative and police functions. Since 1997 there have been some 1900 individual projects in Bosnia; for Kosovo the corresponding figure is roughly 2100 individual measures. In Afghanistan 22 CIMIC projects are currently in progress. The focus here is on building police infrastructure. The Bundeswehr describes as successful the development of CIMIC coordination offices devoted to cooperation with civil organizations.

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82 To quote from the CIMIC subconcept (TK ZMZ BW): "Support for the civil environment encompasses the planning and coordination – including, in given cases, the implementation – of all CIMIC measures that become necessary because the competent civil authorities/organizations/institutions are unable to fulfill their tasks in the home country/mission area. The aim is to contribute, in particular in missions abroad, to improving the environment of mission forces by raising the acceptance of missions (in the sense of force protection)." (BMVg 2001, p.5)

83 See also Braunstein (1999), p. 16.

84 See e.g. Heydecke (2003) and the information available on the NATO website: www.nato.int.
While the absolute number of CIMIC projects in the Balkans is on the decrease, there appears to be a trend involving the assumption of classic development-policy tasks: in the framework of "Structural development aid" – Phase III – additional efforts have been undertaken since 2002 in the Balkan; these include training-sector projects (vocational training, job creation) as well as measures in the microcredit sector.85

**Funding of CIMIC Projects**

The material costs of *Bundeswehr* CIMIC projects are not funded from the BMVg budget, i.e. the *Bundeswehr* is forced to acquire third-party funding for the purpose. It may apply for funds e.g. with the AA, the EU (ECHO, OBNOVA), the BMZ, or nonstate organizations. This means that the *Bundeswehr* is competing for resources mainly with humanitarian and development NGOs, and due to the fact that it has no overhead and personnel costs, the *Bundeswehr* is in a position to offer its services at lower costs than many of its competitors. The BMVg estimates the overall volume of the costs for all of the CIMIC projects it had conducted up to 2003 (Balkans and Afghanistan) at roughly € 35 million.86

The BMZ’s regional division routinely finances CIMIC measures in the Balkans from the Study and Expert Fund, a small-project fund administered by the GTZ. There is no specific funding instrument. Applications for funding are passed on from the BMVg to the BMZ; implementation on the ground is closely coordinated with the GTZ. This support is set to continue after the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe has expired, while, according to the BMVg, no CIMIC measures in Afghanistan have as yet been funded by the BMZ.

**CIMIC from the International Perspective**

In keeping with its doctrine, NATO operates with CIMIC units of its own, as e.g. at present in Afghanistan. Within NATO there are, at the national level, substantive and terminological differences concerning the implementation of the doctrine.87 While the German conception is relatively reserved, and stresses the principles of subsidiarity and confidence-building, the French concept e.g. is more far-reaching and encompasses tasks such as nation-building and functions in the fields of administration and trade and commerce.88 By comparison, the concept subscribed to by the US armed forces must be seen as very extensive. It encompasses e.g. assumption of a country's civil administration as well as aspects of military aid.89

Beyond the official language of the German or European side, the conduct of small/micro-projects as a component of force protection is often subsumed under the term "winning hearts and minds." Among the general public the term is associated mainly with activities conducted by American Civil Affairs Teams (CATs). "Hearts and minds operations" are, however, part of the day-to-day business of UN peace missions and are increasingly referred to as a key factor for a mission's success. India and Pakistan e.g., both of which are important troop-contributing countries, regularly conduct school- and road-building measures, provide medical care, and offer computer training.90

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85 See BMVg (2003a) for an overview.
87 For an overview on different CIMIC approaches, see also Douglas (2002) or Hardegger (2003).
90 E.g. in connection with the UNAMSIL mission and under UNMEE; see www.africaonline.com/site/Articles1,3,52665.jsp; last accessed on 25 Oct. 03.
The Debate on CIMIC from the German Perspective

In many cases neither the Bundeswehr nor civil organizations has encountered any major practical problems in working together on civil projects in the Balkans. As regards the early phase of humanitarian operations, both implementing agencies and a number of NGOs note that the Bundeswehr's activities have been marked by a swift provision of assistance when needed as well as by its high level of commitment, factors which have served to heighten the esteem enjoyed by German troops and constituted an important element of overall German performance.91

On the other hand, though, both NGOs and bilateral implementing agencies express, particularly as far as the longer-term perspective is concerned, vehement criticism on the expansion of gray areas between the military and DC and humanitarian aid. Even though the resources deployed by the Bundeswehr have covered only a small share of overall reconstruction costs, the military is increasingly perceived by civil organizations as a competitor. The debate centers on the following four areas:

1. Unclarified subsidiarity of Bundeswehr measures: since the Bundeswehr itself decides on matters of subsidiarity, often without consulting other actors involved, instead of supporting civil organizations in carrying out their tasks, it comes in for marked criticism on this point. In addition, since one characteristic of armed forces as opposed to civil organizations is the former's need to hold large stocks of material and manpower, the military has head start as well as the material base it needs to mandate its own activities.

2. Inadequate development-policy competence on the part of the military, the short-term nature of military projects, and the in part contradictory goal of force protection give rise to measures that are neither adapted to given conditions nor sustainable and tend, among other things, to encourage the development of parallel structures and to crowd out local businesses.92 Thus far no evaluations have been conducted of CIMIC measures using criteria that are customary e.g. in DC.

3. The charge that the military is reluctant to engage in an eye-level dialogue and tends to patronize its partners: some of the criticism voiced is aimed at the fact that the military's organizational culture is not appropriate for the civil sphere and that military command structures and secrecy-mindedness are not compatible with the principle of accountability vis-à-vis the local population.93

4. "Improper competitive advantages" enjoyed by the Bundeswehr: thanks to its lack of overhead the Bundeswehr is able to submit project applications showing far lower total project costs, even though, examined in overall, real terms, these costs would prove to be far higher than those of private organizations. The Bundeswehr's cost-benefit efficiency is questionable. Furthermore, the media visibility which the Bundeswehr is able to generate through its humanitarian missions is disproportionately high.94

91 See e.g., B. Liebetanz (1999), p. 20, on the positive assessment given by e.g. GTZ, ASB, JUH.

92 While no figures are available for the German context, different international comparisons have been made of military and civil expenditures; for instance, it costs the US $ 215.000 per year to maintain one soldier in Afghanistan, while the equivalent costs for staff members of aid organizations amount to about 1/10th of this figure (see ACBAR 2002, p. 3). In Albania a relatively small refugee camp set up by Austrian troops cost DM 70 million, while a far larger camp set up by MSF cost DM 2 million. (Experiences reported by MSF Netherlands, quoted after Save the Children Fund, UK).

93 See also e.g. Pugh (2000), p. 15.

94 In discussions over these points of criticism, the Bundeswehr has, on some aspects, shown itself willing to learn. According to its own information, the Bundeswehr has, for instance, incorporated the do-no-harm principle or the principle of self-help in its training program.
4.2 Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

While the traditional distance maintained to the military started to soften as early as during the Balkans missions, many development-policy actors are inclined to assume that the civil-military relationship which has become practice in Afghanistan is creating a precedent that will fundamentally alter future relations between the military and civil development actors.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are an example for the development of integrated civil-military "units" whose activities extend, in prospective and strategic terms, far beyond any ad hoc force protection tasks. Civil reconstruction projects are designed to be used as a direct and immediate instrument to create security and stability in selected regions. The aim of the military component is to ensure that civil reconstruction projects will be able to be conducted in a secure environment. Due not least to the disproportionate level of attention that the PRTs have attracted as an instrument in stabilizing Afghanistan, reconstruction activities are being integrated in the official military or higher-level strategy.

Background

The highly controversial concept of PRTs in Afghanistan is based on experiences and ideas of US Civil Affairs Teams (CATs) on the best and most practicable approach to contributing to expanding the influence of the (transitional) Karzai Government outside Kabul and to accelerating the process of national reconstruction. At present international forces in Afghanistan are in an extremely precarious security situation marked by pressing reconstruction needs and only rudimentary state structures. In view of the fact that the higher troop levels aimed for under the ISAF mandate failed, for a number of reasons, to materialize, the PRTs are now expected to make a virtue of necessity and start working with small integrated teams that operate as autonomous units toward the end of stabilizing the region.

Different Models

With reconstruction teams from the US/New Zealand, the UK, and Germany active in Afghanistan, there are now three different models for more or less integrated civil-military units; these models have in part developed on the basis of mutual experience, though they in part also reflect clear-cut conceptual differences.

There is no firm general concept for reconstruction teams because the final shape they are to take on is regarded as the product of an ongoing process. Some of the features shared by the reconstruction teams: their objective of strengthening the reach of the central government in the provinces; robust self-protection, but without any combat mandate; support for civil reconstruction and information-sharing.

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95 See Table 2.
97 The initial US designation was Joint Regional Teams; following consultations with the Afghan government, the teams were given their present name: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In what follows, reconstruction team will be used as a generic term.
98 The New Zealand PRT is largely geared to the US model.
Table 2: Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Structure/ command</th>
<th>Personnel deployed</th>
<th>Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Gardez PRT 02/03| Purely military command under OEF mandate; Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as organizational unit for civil affairs soldiers in PRT; Higher-level coordination unit for CMOCs and CATs is the CJCMOTF (Combined Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force). | Military: 50-100 soldiers, incl. special forces, intelligence, and CATs | – Military observer role, robust self-protection, no combat mandate;  
|                  |                                                                                     |                                         | – escorts for civilians;  
|                  |                                                                                     |                                         | – quick-impact projects conducted by CATs (mainly construction of schools and roads);  
|                  |                                                                                     |                                         | – encouragement of civil aid organizations to work in the region. |
| Parwan PRT 11/03|                                                                                     | Civil: roughly 4 USAID and US officials "embedded" | – Civil-military coordination: USAID staff members identify / negotiate and fund projects for USAID and other organizations. |
| Herat PRT* 12/03(U.S.A.)|                                                                                     |                                         |                                                                                      |
| Bamian PRT (New Zealand) |                                                                                     |                                         |                                                                                      |
| Taken over from US PRT in 09/03 |                                                                                     |                                         |                                                                                      |
| Mazar-I Sharif PRT (UK) |                                                                                     |                                         |                                                                                      |
| Set up in 07/03 |                                                                                     |                                         |                                                                                      |

*US PRTs projected for Kandahar, Jalalabad, and possibly Ghazni by the beginning of 2004.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kunduz reconstruction team (Germany)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken over from US PRT in 10/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate pillars &amp; responsibilities:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- BMVg, BMZ, and AA;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- military component under ISAF mandate;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- weekly mission control via &quot;Kunduz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Koordinierungsgruppe Aufbau Kunduz)&quot;;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- separate accommodations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Up to 450 BW soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning, implementation, support for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reconstruction measures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- liaison with other organizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Sources: for the UK and US PRTs, see e.g. Stapleton (2003); Center for Humanitarian Cooperation (2003); U.S. Department of Defense (2003); Ministry of Defence (2003); and www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5472; on the German reconstruction team: information made available by the BMZ and the BMVg, including www.bundeswehr.de/wir/einsatz/031101_kunduz_vorort.php; for New Zealand’s PRT, see www.army.mil.nz/?CHANNEL=OPERATIONS&PAGE=AFGHANISTAN, (2003), all sites last accessed on 21 Jan. 04

<sup>b</sup> According to Bundeswehr information: www.bundeswehr.de/wir/einsatz/031101_kunduz_vorort.php

<sup>c</sup> According to press information provided by the BMVg; see also Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 Oct. 03: "Dienstleister für die Sicherheit."
The US's PRTs

The US PRTs operate under the flexible mandate provided by Enduring Freedom (EF). Under EF, US-led coalition troops have also been fighting – since late September 2003 without the support of the German Special Forces Command (KSK) – Taliban and Al Qaida forces. The PRTs operate under military command structures; they also include a limited number of embedded representatives of USAID and other US departments, e.g. Justice. The main feature to be observed is that the US military CATs conduct projects on their own, mainly school construction; indeed, some of the soldiers involved even started out working in civilian dress.

Even though great hopes were placed in this new instrument, during the initial phase of their activities the US PRTs attracted considerable criticism, above all from NGOs, which cite the following arguments:99

- PRTs may constitute a security risk for civil organizations operating within their sphere of influence because any blurring of the distinction between military and civilians may render civil aid workers a soft target. And the fact that it is very difficult to draw a clear distinction compromises the impartiality of the organizations involved. The rise in direct attacks on national and international NGOs since the PRTs became operational is seen in this context.100
- There is no clear-cut orientation concerning the role to be played by the military in the security sector. It is difficult to understand why PRTs engage in school construction (hearts-and-minds operations) when they could be disarming armed conflict parties.101
- There are doubts about the qualification of members of the CATs deployed, most of whom, it is claimed, are reservists without any specific experience abroad and therefore not in a position to play a positive role in shaping locally adapted measures.
- PRTs operate on their own and constitute an additional organizational structure not, at first, subject to coordination by the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA). Only in a protracted process has UNAMA been able to establish a coordinative role for itself, at least in some subsectors.
- Aid work is subject to " politicization," i.e. the scope of aid projects is dependent on the degree of cooperation between project environment and central government or contingent on the security situation involved. Furthermore, there is a security risk for cooperating villages in that there exists in Afghanistan a substantial radical potential which could be turned against " collaborators."

The UK's PRT

The conception of the UK's PRT is best understood against the background of these points of criticism and fears. The difference to the US approach must be sought in the general restraint showed by the military in the implementation of civil projects as well as in a heightened focus on security matters. After a brief period of operation, the British Ministry of Defence sees one indication of success in the fact that no quick-impact or humanitarian projects have been conducted by the military component of its PRTs, which have instead concentrated on demobilization and police-training activities.102 The DIFD development advisor's task is to identify meaningful projects and

99 See e.g. ACBAR (2002); Stapleton (2003); Center for Humanitarian Cooperation (2003); Refugees International (2003).
100 VENRO, for instance, reports that international aid organizations were threatened with abduction when, in mid-February 2003, the US military proceeded to arrest a warlord. In Kandahar, it is further reported, military action taken against supposed rebels was answered with rocket and bomb attacks which hit aid organizations as well (VENRO 2003, p. 14). On attacks on NGOs, see also Stapleton (2003), p. 5.
101 On this aspect, see also: Refugees International (2003).
the civil aid organizations, e.g. NGOs or UN organizations, that are in a position to implement them. DFID is in a position to provide funding for the purpose. The PRT does, however, continue to be a purely military enterprise under EF, and it is integrated in the existing military command structure.

**Germany's Expanded Civil and Military Engagement in Kunduz**

Since late October 2003 Germany has maintained, in Kunduz, its own variant of a reconstruction team, one that seeks to set itself off from the existing PRTs. In Germany the dispatch of the reconstruction team to Kunduz was preceded by an intensive and controversial debate – even within the government. The debate was concerned with the following questions:

- Under what mandate is the mission to be conducted, and what is the best way to ensure its security?
- What shape should the leadership structure within the team be given?
- What objectives should the team pursue?
- What role can development policy play here?

Germany was interested in particular in seeing security support for reconstruction extended only within the framework of the UN's ISAF mandate, and, in contrast to the practice of existing PRTs, it was unwilling to subordinate development policy to military leadership. Development-policy actors criticized the – in their view – unnecessary and counterproductive claim that the military's role was to "protect" development workers or to provide security for aid organizations. Furthermore, the choice of Kunduz, a relatively peaceful province, for a military mission also came in for criticism.

The German approach finally agreed on is based on three clearly distinguished pillars consisting of military, foreign-policy, and development-policy elements. The approach is designed to create a secure environment for the work conducted by civil personnel; but it does not provide for any direct protection function. Compared with the US and UK models, the German approach involves a high level of personnel for the civil component. The approach may also prove able to serve as a model for other donor countries that share Germany's critical view of any undue blurring of the lines between military and reconstruction concerns. A number of countries have expressed their interest in participation.

Whether or not the difference between this approach and the US PRT concept is in fact perceived by observers and in particular by the Afghan population is a question that remains to be answered. It is likely that more attention will be paid to the fact that the military component of the German mission is being carried out not under the anti-terror mandate of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom but under the UN (ISAF) mandate, which was broadened for this purpose. The aim of this distance to combat units is to increase the mission's legitimacy and impartiality.

**4.3 Equipment Aid Provided by the Foreign Office (AA)**

The equipment aid provided by the German government is likewise a form of civil-military cooperation, one for which the AA, a civil actor, has established close modes of cooperation with the BMVg. These may include parallel activities involving equipment aid and development policy in a given country, and the new orientation given to this instrument with a view to crisis prevention and conflict resolution could serve to underline this fact.

According to the AA, equipment aid serves to foster relations with "friendly nations of the Third World" as well as to support "their democratic development toward peace and stability." It is used to support civil aspects of the armed forces of partner countries by providing equipment and flanking advisory services. Arms or munitions do

not fall under equipment aid – which is not conceived as military aid.

The AA’s budget has earmarked some €30 million for equipment aid for the period from 2001 to 2004. At present 13 countries are receiving such support, the regional focus of which is Africa; Yemen and, later, Afghanistan have been added to the program as countries outside the region. In addition, there is also a post-equipment-aid fund for former recipient countries. Recipient countries are also selected on the basis of aspects concerned with good governance, in particular respect for human rights, one of the reasons why negotiations with Zimbabwe were broken off and Ghana was taken on board. The program is approved and audited by the Bundestag’s Budget Committee and Committee on Foreign Affairs.

While the political responsibility and the funding for the equipment aid program rests with the AA, the BMVg, Directorate General of Armaments, is responsible for implementation. For this purpose the BMVg concludes agreements with counterpart ministries of partner countries and dispatches, at its own expense, groups of advisors without a military mandate whose job it is to advise and support local armed forces in deploying the equipment aid provided.

According to the AA, the measures have been increasingly aligned to the social and development sectors; they are sometimes presented under the slogan: "The Bundeswehr providing development assistance." Apart from aid in cases of natural disaster or for support of refugees, the measures focus mainly on tasks associated with healthcare, i.e. military field hospitals or medical stations, support for training of young armed forces personnel in technical vocations, and improvement of civil infrastructure (e.g. road construction or access to drinking water). According to the AA, the military advisors involved work on the basis of the principle of "helping people to help themselves," an approach tailored to partner needs.

Since 2001, when it was reconceived, the program has included a political mandate to adapt equipment aid to the demands posed by a policy of crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Equipment aid is designed to help strengthen countries’ capacities to participate in peace missions and to prevent conflicts. In the framework of the G8 Africa Action Plan the aim here is to strengthen these capacities in particular at the level of regional organizations and the AU. Security reform is another important field. One example that can be cited for this new orientation is the support provided for the development of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre for armed forces. In South Africa there are also plans to develop a civil vocational training center to reintegrate ex-combatants, a move explicitly conceived to supplement development-policy measures in this sector. Thus far no evaluation of equipment aid measures has been conducted.

4.4 Developments at the European Level

In the framework of the European Union there are a number of approaches aimed at enlarging civil and military capacities and promoting their combined use. These developments are likely to become increasingly important in coming years when the focus of interest turns to development-military interfaces. These tendencies must be seen against the background of the aim to more strongly and systematically integrate the whole of the EU’s external relations – including development policy.105

In Gothenburg, in June 2001, the European Council adopted a comprehensive "Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts"; development policy plays an important role in this program. Within the framework of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is intergovernmental in nature and is conceived as a "second pillar", the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)106 is being developed at a

104 See Box 6.
105 See e.g. Child (2003).
106 See e.g. the presentations at: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/gasp/akteure_html; last accessed on 24
rapid pace. The central objective is to round off and, in this way to strengthen, the EU's capacities for external action by building civil and military capabilities that can be used to prevent international conflicts and resolve international crises.

As far as the civil sphere is concerned, the member states have decided, among other things, to be able to provide, by 2003, up to 5000 police officers for EU contributions to UN- or OSCE-led missions or purely EU missions. The Gothenburg program contains, inter alia, the following civil targets:

- provision of up to 200 rule-of-law experts (judges etc.);
- formation of a pool of civil administration officials;
- disaster-control teams of up to 200 persons that can be dispatched on short notice.

One factor of major importance is the European Security Strategy which was prepared by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, and adopted in December 2003 by the European Council in Brussels. In view of the new threats analyzed in the document, one of the strategy's main concerns is forms of civil-military cooperation. The Union, it states, "could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities."108

Various passages in the text clearly indicate that development policy is an important part of the civil component. "The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development."109

4.5 The British Model of the Development-Military Relationship

The British Department for International Development (DFID), an independent agency since 1997, represents a new and proactive model for cooperation of development policy with military actors. This is illustrated by the work done by the Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) as well as by the setup of an interministerial funding instrument for conflict strategies ("conflict prevention pools"). These conflict-related strategies include the field of post-conflict reconstruction only to the extent that subsectors bound up with "governance" or "small arms and light weapons" are concerned.

CHAD's Approach to Contracting, Advising, and Funding Military Actors

In its field of activity, CHAD most resembles the BMZ's Emergency Aid and Refugee Aid division, although it has a more central position in matters bearing on this policy field. CHAD is centrally responsible for the conflict-related fields of development policy, including humanitarian aid, security-sector reform, small arms control, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). It embodies the new line of an integrated and political conflict engagement abroad in the sense of a "new humanitarianism," which has attracted criticism from humanitarian organizations and other NGOs, which accuse it of " politicizing aid" and "blurring the lines."111 Some of the department's sectoral programs, e.g. in the field of secu-

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110 For an overview on the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, see DFID / FCO / MOD (2003).
111 See e.g. the brief presentation in Macrae/Leader (2000); see e.g. Duffield (2001), pp. 75–106, on the debate over the "new humanitarianism" with its aim of linking the provision of humanitarian aid with political objectives.
rity-sector reform, are drafted and funded using a new instrument referred to as conflict prevention pools (see below).

CHAD’s tasks include the shaping and articulation of cooperation with military actors in humanitarian emergencies and post-conflict situations.

- **Contracting the military**: CHAD directly approaches the Ministry of Defence (MOD) when, in its view, the military is best equipped to take on a task in a given emergency situation. This leads to tensions with humanitarian organizations, which are willing to accept such missions only as a last resort.

- **Dispatch of liaison persons**: DFID has a director general at the highest level at the MOD who serves as the permanent liaison person with the General Staff. In cases involving military missions with a civil component, CHAD dispatches development-policy advisors to MOD’s command staffs or units deployed on the ground. Their function is to promote adherence to development-policy or humanitarian principles.

- **Conducting training units for MOD’s PSO training modules**.

- **Funding of projects involving civil-military cooperation**: On application, CHAD is in a position to fund projects conducted by military actors. In Kosovo both British troops and all other units of a contingent were authorized to apply for funding. Roughly two years ago, and contrary to the stated interest of the British military, CHAD discontinued its funding for civil projects conducted by military actors in Kosovo because it has come to the opinion that in the present phase reconstruction would best be left in the hands of civilian actors.

### Strategy Development and Funding through Conflict Prevention Pools

In 2001 the government of the UK adopted the instrument of conflict prevention pools with a view to improving interministerial cooperation (“joined-up government initiative”). Two pools are responsible for integrating certain ministerial functions of the departments of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the DFID, and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) that are concerned with the issue of conflict prevention, the aim being to come up with a more coherent, effective policy. Each of them has a control structure made up of representatives of the departments concerned.

DFID chairs the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACCP), while the FCO has assumed responsibility for the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP). In 2002 the GCPP had a budget of roughly €110 million, the corresponding figure for the ACCP was roughly €75 million. There is separate budget for contributions to UN peace missions. The pools are seen as a limited means for intensifying cooperation, but not as a new field of activity. For example, most financially demanding reconstruction programs are also not funded through the pools.

The pools were initially funded by means of agreed-on budget cuts for the three ministries involved which affected the conflict-prevention activities set to be integrated. The government provided an additional "topping-up" as an incentive for cooperation. Since then, however, the pools have been part of the general budgeting process and are not directly linked to ministerial budgets. Within the pools, funds are "distributed," on the basis of jointly planned measures, to the ministries, which use them to conduct the respective projects. Depending on the planning process involved, this allocation process is quite flexible; normally DFID and MOD receive the largest shares, while the FCO does relatively little project work of its own. Subsequently the funds are accounted for by the individual ministries concerned.

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112 “Initially, each department put in funds from their own budget, with the Treasury providing additional resources. Today the Pools bid for money alongside their parent departments in each Government Spending Round.” (DFID / FCO / MOD 2003, p. 7).

113 In Germany the so-called Section 60 procedure likewise constitutes a joint form of funding for measures con-
For their work in the pools, the three ministries have reached a so-called Public Sector Agreement that serves as a guideline for the development of geographic, thematic, and international strategies. Ideally, new projects are jointly developed in the pools, although this approach is limited in scope and practiced only in entirely new situations. Typically, ministries seek to "place" "their" projects in a pool. These projects must be covered by the strategies agreed upon and require the approval of the partners involved. Decisions must be reached on a consensus basis. This means in effect that every ministry has a de facto veto, and DFID, for instance, has in some cases used its veto to turn down projects applied for by another ministry.

The two pools differ in terms of their modes of operation. Various sources report that it is easier to reach agreement on joint strategies in the ACPP in that MOD and DFID are in agreement on the joint objective of conflict reduction, and FCO and MOD at the same time show less foreign-policy interest in Subsaharan Africa than in some GCPP regions. This serves to underline the analysis according to which DFID is increasingly regarded as a "Ministry for International Policy in Non-strategic Countries." DFID's influence in the FCO-led GCPP is seen as relatively low. Generally, tensions emerge over different priorities, especially between security-related military goals and the development-policy focus of poverty reduction.

An evaluation of the pools is currently underway. There are also plans to define criteria on which approval of pool measures is to be based.

An example for a GCPP cooperation model in Sri Lanka: on application, the UK defense attaché there is given a sum of £ 2.2 million for activities conducted in the framework of security-sector reform, and these funds are then coordinated with representatives of FCO and DFID on the ground.

Specific Features of the UK Model

Results of a Trial-and-Error Phase

In the UK Sierra Leone is seen as a prime example for experimenting with instruments with the aim of coming up with coherent and efficient approaches in conflict situations: between 1997 and 1998, when a military junta was in power, the UK suspended its supplies of humanitarian aid to Sierra Leone. Many loudly criticized this step as impermissible conditionality and politicization of humanitarian aid. Beginning in 2000/01, and following the complete failure of the UNAMSIL mission, the UK deployed a strong military contingent to operate in parallel to the UN mission, while DFID, focusing in particular on large-scale programs in the field of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegretion (DDR), stretched the traditional boundaries between development policy and the military by engaging in very close coordination with both military and political actors. In other words, in Sierra Leone the UK jettisoned a number of widely accepted conventions; assessments have been accordingly ambivalent. NGOs have tended to be more critical, while DFID sees the case of Sierra Leone as a success.

Fewer Mutual Reservations among Ministries and Rejection of Distancing Strategies

Compared with the situation in Germany, there are fewer mutual reservations among UK ministries. DFID is highly self-confident as regards its comparative competences and financial strengths in post-crisis reconstruction work. This is due on the one hand to the political weight of former Secretary of State Clare Short, who boosted the influence of development policy in the national political context. On the other hand, and accord-

114 Macrae/Leader (2000), p. 3.
ing to the people directly involved, the proactive cooperation strategies pursued by the pools were also an instrumental factor in achieving this effect. Observers largely agree that the communication required here has served to substantially improve the cooperation between ministries. Strategies of reservation and distance vis-à-vis the military due to difference in principles are generally rejected, and cooperation is based instead on the principle: "If you want to change something, you have to put your hands in."

**Proactive Efforts Aimed at Gaining Influence on Conflict-related Foreign Policy**

DFID goes to great lengths to gain influence on other ministries in conflict-related matters. The Department's goal is to anchor development-policy principles in joint activities as well as in the work of the other ministries abroad. In a constant and effortful process of dialogue, DFID proactively seeks to advocate principles such as long-term and program orientation and a focus on poverty reduction against e.g. any attempts to engage in ad hoc projects aimed at supplying material and equipment.

Opinions differ on the effects of these efforts. While DFID points to a long-term process of policy alignment, other observers criticize the fact that changes are mostly of a rhetorical nature and have very little real impact on existing power relations.

**More Flexible Boundaries in Cooperation with the Military**

While there are boundaries in DFID's cooperation with the military, they are interpreted more flexibly in strategic, financial, and operational terms than they are in many other European countries. One no-go area is, theoretically, direct cooperation with and support for conflict parties. CHAD, for instance, indicates that in Afghanistan it works together only with ISAF units, not with OEF combat units. In Iraq it makes financial support available only to civil partners, providing advisors to support the work of military actors. On the other hand, direct funding for the military (e.g. for equipment or arms) evidently continues to be a controversial issue in the conflict prevention pools, but if a ministerial committee approves such funding, it may be provided. In connection with a security-sector reform project DFID itself has provided funds for an intelligence advisor, which is seen as a gray area. DFID agreed to a rededication of EDF funds to finance the ECO-WAS mission in Liberia. The Department makes use of the possibility it has to report the measures it has conducted, and which have turned out to ineligible as ODA, under the category Other Official Flows.

The ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which the UK is a conflict party with political and military interests of its own, have placed DFID in a dilemma. In the eyes of development actors the limits of civil-military cooperation have in fact been reached here. But the UK's national framework inevitably entails an operational inclusion of development policy in the country's conflict strategy – regardless of differences in position on the legitimacy of the interventions, and despite all of DFID's efforts to avoid having foreign policy dictate, de facto, the lines of its strategy development. The recent change of leadership at DFID that came about when Clare Short, adamantly opposed to the UK's military engagement and the marginalization of the UN in Iraq, resigned her post has cast a glaring light on development policy, showing it to be an explosive domestic issue.

**5 Special Aspects of the Development-Military Relationship**

The cases described here as examples of closer development-military linkages clearly demonstrate that development policy is faced with some special challenges in post-conflict situations with a marked military footprint.\(^{117}\) The following sec-

\(^{117}\) See Box 7.
5.1 Consequences for the Physical Security of DC Personnel

According to a widely held consensus among development actors at home and abroad, the physical security of DC personnel working in post-conflict situations has become a very serious problem. This, however, is due only in part to a direct linkage between development policy and military structures. First and foremost, the security risk is contingent on the intensity and type of the

Aid organizations report that the security situation of aid personnel working in crisis situations has been deteriorating for some ten years now. "From January 1992 to August 1998 153 staff members in the service of the United Nations lost their lives, 43 people were kidnapped. By May 2002 the figure had risen to 214 dead and 258 abducted." (Kreidler/Runge 2003, p.1). The Red Cross publishes similar statistics.
violence (/actors) involved as well as on the acceptance met with by the troops deployed and the international mission concerned.

Special Circumstances Surrounding the Growing Security Risk for DC Personnel

More rapid engagement of development policy

One reason for the increased security risks faced by development actors in post-conflict situations must be seen in the fact that today the set of instruments used by development policy, including emergency aid, are deployed more rapidly than they were even a few years ago. Indeed, the Brahimi report calls emphatically for an early deployment of civil reconstruction components in post-conflict situations. The call of international NGOs working in Afghanistan for an expansion of the ISAF mission underlines this trend toward a parallel deployment of military and development actors.

Low level of acceptance of military presence and international engagement

Wherever international peace troops are readily accepted by the population (in particular in cases of classic peacekeeping missions), the relationship between civil organizations and the military tends to be less complex in nature, and security risks that may stem from a military presence are not the focus of discussion.

There are, however, several phenomena that make military missions more problematic and deprive them of some of their ability to mobilize consensus: (i) the growing importance of domestic, protracted forms of conflict, (ii) an increase in acts of violence with a terrorist background, (iii) a blurring of the lines between combat mission and reconstruction work ("donors go to war").

In many ongoing civil conflicts doubts are cast on the impartiality and neutrality of civil aid projects, a circumstance that diminishes their acceptance. "Aid for the needy population is often [...] seen by conflict parties as preferential treatment of the opposite side. Attacks on staff members of aid organizations cannot fail to attract the attention of the international community and the media." Furthermore, in acute conflicts Western actors are in part perceived collectively as a threat or as unwarranted interference. As members of international missions, DC staff members may in this way become soft targets for local conflict parties.

One of the reasons for the precarious situations today in Afghanistan and Iraq is that the activities of the main external actors are both military and civil in nature. This contradictory blurring of mandates entails an additional security risk for DC personnel. Indeed, even being of the same nationality as the conflict party or parties does not necessarily constitute a shield against attacks, as was demonstrated by the attack on the UN in Iraq; the crucial factor is that international personnel is perceived as part of an extensive hostile "political coalition."

Actor Security Strategies

In addition to in-depth conflict analysis, nongovernmental aid organizations are showing increasing interest in security training for their personnel. As far as development organizations are concerned, this is highly case-dependent. Furthermore, a number of different security strategies are being pursued and discussed by development actors:

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119 See e.g. Kreidler/Runge (2003), p. 2.
121 This state of affairs has also been noted for Afghanistan, where attacks have focused in particular on NGOs that support the Bonn Process. See Stapleton (2003), p. 5.
Implementation by local personnel

If DC seems to be running the risk of becoming a target for attacks, official DC, but also NGOs, seek to counter the security risk for foreign staff members by deploying less visible international personnel and working instead with local manpower.122 Some projects are managed from neighbouring countries. Implementing agencies argue that this also contributes to increasing the security of local staff members in that, on the one hand, the latter are better able than foreign staff to assess both the security situation and the effects of their activities and, on the other hand, this approach serves to counter the "soft-target effect" associated with the presence of foreign staff. Staff members of German development organizations regard this solution as relatively practicable and responsible vis-à-vis their personnel.

Still, placing implementation wholly or in large part in the hands of local staff can be a problematic approach. Studies on humanitarian missions conducted between 1985 and 1998 indicate that more trained local personnel than foreign personnel has been killed in violence-related incidents.123 Even though no comparable figures are available for DC measures, the persons responsible for DC are here at least faced with a dilemma. In unstable conflict situations local staff may, as we have seen in Iraq, soon find themselves perceived as "collaborators."

Distance to the military and confidence-building among the population

Especially NGOs, but also bilateral DC actors, in many cases pursue a strategy of distance to the military in order not to be regarded as partial and thus end up as a target for violence. This goes hand in hand with attempts to build confidence among the local population, an approach of particular importance for all staff members working in local project offices. There are, however, doubts as to the actual effectiveness of this security strategy. Statements by staff members of development organizations strongly indicate that confidence-building has prospects of success only in the immediate project environment, i.e. in "DC enclaves." And even in this case the situation will grow more and more precarious as a military presence grows in length, fueling a sense of occupation among the population.

Moreover, development actors have little influence on whether the military is willing to accept a strategy of distance and adapt its conduct accordingly. As e.g. German Agro Action (DWHH) reports from Afghanistan, the unannounced visit of a military PRT convoy at a DWHH project office led to major tensions with the local population in the project area. Such incidents increase the security risk faced by DC personnel.

The debate surrounding the final shape to be given the expanded German mission in Kunduz likewise serves to illustrate the distance argumentation advanced by development actors. NGOs in particular fear a deterioration of the security situation if they run the risk of being systematically associated with military actors who are not fully accepted by the population.

Protection by the military

Military protection designed to create security spaces for the work of civilian actors has now been widely accepted, and indeed even called for, as a task of the military. Situations in which the overall picture is marked by ongoing regional combat operations in many cases mean that civil organizations are able to operate only if the military provides for the security of reconstruction

122 This applies e.g. for the GTZ in Liberia and, in part, for German Agro Action (DWHH) in Afghanistan.
123 See Kreidler/Runge (2002), p. 1; on attacks on local personnel, see also the article in the NZZ of 25 Sept. 03, p. 3, on Afghanistan: "The Shrinking Humanitarian Space. The ICRC looking for responses to the growing threat."
work conducted by both local and international actors.\textsuperscript{124}

However, development actors are mainly convinced that, beyond the occasional escort or individual case, there is very little point in any direct military protection for personnel or projects; this is also in line with practical experience. The generally shared view is that situations requiring direct and permanent military protection preclude any effective bilateral development cooperation geared to the principles of sustainability and ownership. However, in situations marked by high levels of general crime DC organizations do contract private security services to provide protection.

5.2 Validity of the Principles of Development Policy

The question involved in a more pronounced linkage between military and development components is how and in what form this state of affairs touches on fundamental principles of development policy and the approaches bound up with them. This need not invariably imply any curtailment of development-policy principles; joint training and capacity-building activities or information-sharing e.g. play more a subordinate role in this context. But other interfaces harbour a greater potential for conflict with principles of development policy.

Here we can distinguish two types of principles: (1) general principles of development policy and (2) development-policy principles that apply chiefly for the operational level.

\textbf{General Principles}

\textit{The civil character of development policy as a key principle}

The civil character of development policy is a principle that has until now been held to be self-evident. In the past there were few points of contact and little cooperation between civil and non-civil actors and instruments, and for this reason no explicit lines of demarcation were drawn between them.

A broader integration of development policy in overall political concerns, marked changes in the conditions on which the civil-military relationship was based, as well as other factors have now given a more pronounced and fundamental meaning to the civil character of development policy.

This point can be illustrated e.g. with reference to the need for discussion on development-policy funding for military activities under the EDF: there is no doubt that in this case the boundary defined for the civil approach of development policy would have been overstepped. This even applies when the ultimate objectives of the two different actors are identical, as they have been e.g. in the efforts undertaken to stabilize countries like Liberia. Another crucial factor here is that development policy is in danger of losing its control over the use of DC funds,\textsuperscript{125} although it should be noted here that development budgets for – in relative terms, disproportionately costly – military missions are in any case not sufficient for the purpose. The Instruments specific to each of these policy fields should, instead, be used in a complementary manner.

Broadly speaking, if we look at development policy's influence at the level of overall policy in general and security policy in particular, we find that the actors involved differ significantly in terms of their leverage. In the case of closer coop-

\textsuperscript{124} This goes for earlier conflicts as well; see Weiss/Campbell (1991), p. 62: "As agreements have been ignored and civilians are prevented from access to aid in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, calls have been made for an expanded role for foreign military forces in accompanying convoys and ensuring that access routes are safe for civilian humanitarian workers."

\textsuperscript{125} In Germany an additional factor is that any use of the EDF to fund military missions would contravene the right reserved to the Bundestag to decide on military measures.
eration, one key factor required to safeguard the civil character of development policy is the possibility of eye-level discussions. If development policy lacks the force to assert its interests, the result may be, at least in certain cases, an implicit legitimization of military actions which may shake the credibility of development policy.126

Do No Harm

Since the late 1990s both humanitarian aid and development policy have conducted – and used – analyses on the effects of instruments such as Do No Harm and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessments. In cases in which development-military interfaces are involved, it is especially important to pursue a conflict-sensitive approach. Development policy should therefore seek to identify the implications of a given approach and factor them into the decisions it takes. This is why the do-no-harm principle is an important point of orientation in dealing with development-military interfaces.

Development-Policy Principles with Impacts at the Operational Level

These include in particular the principles of sustainability / long-term orientation and partnership / ownership.

Three fundamental points are of crucial importance to ensure that development-policy principles are adhered to in post-conflict situations involving a military presence:

- Acceptance of the military by both the local population and conflict parties.127
- Independence of DC activities from military actors.
- Clearly outlined cooperation based on division of functions and limited in time.

But since development policy is now in many cases forced to take action before the conditions under which it is to work – i.e. DC criteria – have become fully clear, these principles can, at least in part, not claim any absolute validity.

Sustainability and long-term orientation

The question of sustainability is one that must be addressed above all in unstable situations or immediate post-conflict areas in which long-term development policy is not (yet) an option. Aside from humanitarian aid, the operational instruments used in such cases include e.g. emergency and refugee aid and other quick-impact approaches.

Viewed in terms of current sustainability criteria, it would be stretching matters if these measures were to be assessed as effective. Indeed, in highly fragile settings it may not be possible at all for certain measures (e.g. basic social services) to achieve structural effects. Yet the mere existence and visibility of government-administered basic social services and public structures may very well contribute to improving stability and security and depriving armed groups (warlords etc.) of some of their "legitimacy," setting the stage in important ways for more extensive efforts. The principle of sustainability must for this reason be viewed in a broadened perspective, one that encompasses stability and security.

One important factor in this connection is that the contribution of development policy is – and is perceived as – reliable, plannable, and thus, as a rule, long-term in nature. In many cases the possibility to help improve a region's stability and security will be contingent on this.

126 Theoretically, for instance, the British joined-up government approach places DC in a decision-making role on military activities, or at least makes it very difficult to draw a distinct line between policy fields. See also the analyses on the role of USAID vis-à-vis the US army published by the Center for Democracy and Governance (1998).

127 See Collier et al. (2003), pp. 163ff.
Ownership and partner orientation

Often ownership and partner orientation are as good as impossible to achieve in situations which call for short-term action and are marked by a lack of local governmental structures.

"Post-conflict reconstruction is inherently a top-down affair,"\textsuperscript{128} one often dominated de facto by military and UN organizations. In many cases UN organizations assume a surrogate partner role for DC measures (governmental and nongovernmental alike). Approaches geared to participatory planning and ownership are, for a time, pushed into the background to make way for short-term and flexible stabilization measures.\textsuperscript{129} Development-policy actors are well aware of the transitional nature of these measures, and, with this fact in mind, accordingly adapted principles have been incorporated in certain concepts, e.g. in the field of Development-Oriented Emergency Aid.\textsuperscript{130}

If no local counterpart is available in such scenarios, it is all the more important for development organizations to abide by the principle of impartiality, a sine qua non for their long-term orientation.\textsuperscript{131}

6 Conclusions and Recommendations

Development-Policy Engagement in Post-conflict Situations: Interest in Coherent Approaches

Development policy – mindful of the fundamentally limited options open to external actors – has important and useful potentials to work in situations that are marked by fragile security as well as by a need to restore effective statehood and embark on the process of economic and social reconstruction. This is all the more the case in view of the fact that peace missions, which increasingly include civil tasks, have grown more and complex in nature. In view of its tasks, development policy has an interest in helping to overcome problems that emerge in connection with post-conflict situations or in other contexts in which existing governmental structures are inadequate and/or lack legitimacy. Development policy is for this reason generally interested in creating effective interfaces with other policy fields. This is not to rule out the possibility of tensions and occasional differences in perception, for instance as regards individual regions or countries.

Viewed against this background, one highly important task facing development policy is its need to define its position on the character and shape to be given to its interfaces with other policy fields.

\textsuperscript{128} Schiavo-Campo (2003), p. 45.

\textsuperscript{129} It is often pointed out in this connection that the administrative instruments available to DC have not yet been adequately adapted to this state of affairs. While, with an eye to a flexible and adapted approach, certain principles are not applied in post-conflict situations, the project evaluation standards used are the same as those applied for DC measures in times of peace.

\textsuperscript{130} If, however, the transition to the partner/ownership principle is not effected at the earliest possible point of time, this may have highly problematic consequences, a fact that was clearly illustrated e.g. in "protectorate" cases like Kosovo and East Timor, where post-conflict situations were perpetuated the development of parallel structures and insufficient attempts to involve local counterparts. See e.g. Schiavo-Campo (2003), p. 35.

\textsuperscript{131} See Box 8.
Development policy not only has a fundamental interest of its own in comprehensively shaping its interfaces with foreign and security policy. Outside pressures aimed at inducing development policy to "fall into line" and show more "flexibility" have grown dramatically. This is clearly illustrated by the present, and at the same time crucial, cases of Kunduz / Afghanistan and funding for military peace missions (e.g. in Liberia). It may also be assumed that cases involving Bundeswehr missions abroad automatically entail a manifest interest on the part of foreign and security policy that places development policy under considerable pressure to become involved itself. In pertinent situations "noninvolvement" is an "nonpolitical" option, one tantamount to relinquishment of the possibility to take a hand in shaping policy, and one that could, in the short and medium term, mean a loss of significance for development policy.

On the other hand, there are a number of reasons why development policy should "resist" and instead focus on gaining an active influence keyed to long-term goals and the existing consensus on poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals.

**Box 8: The Principle of Impartiality**

Impartiality is a central principle for humanitarian aid actions and many peace missions. When it comes to defining the term, opinions tend to diverge sharply. While humanitarian aid organizations define the concept in terms of neutral abstinence and equidistance, the term has, e.g. among UN actors, taken on more the sense of a principle of "active impartiality," which, for instance, rules out any toleration of serious human rights violations.

Although, at the strategic level, the principle of impartiality may not be immediately applicable for development policy, e.g. when it is using good governance approaches and conditionality as means to achieve political ends, it does play an important role at the operational level in conflict situations. In dealing with the local target groups involved in most types of project, independence from higher-level political goals is the key instrument for building confidence over the long term. Development actors must remain impartial in the eyes of partners if they are to win acceptance.

a see e.g. Lilly (2002), pp. 9f., 17; VENRO (2003), pp. 3f.
b see Donald (2002); Kühne (2003), pp. 718f.

**Political Pressure to Act Versus Long-term Development Tasks?**

Development policy and the military and/or security policy share a number of indirect and direct points of contact and fields of possible cooperation. In the past some of these points of contact (e.g. "security" brought about by the military and followed up on by development policy) hardly even entered the minds of the actors involved.

These interfaces and overlaps have grown dramatically in recent months and years. We need look no further than the questions involved in the concrete shape to be given to the German Kunduz mission and the use of DC resources to fund non-civil peace missions to see how dynamic the discussion is and how central these issues are.

Development policy is on its way to defining for itself a responsibility for overall policy that goes far beyond its present tasks and competences. This is particularly evident at the level of the European Union, where a number of developments (in 2003, above all the European Security Strategy, the debate on a Peace Facility for Africa, and its "foreshadowing" in the ECOWAS military mission in Liberia) have set some new and important landmarks for it.
Strategic Models

There are, in essence, three strategic models that are conceivable for German development policy: 132

- **Distance strategy:**
  
The aim of a distance strategy is to retain the historically and socially conditioned distance between development policy and security policy and military actors.

  The hoped-for advantage would be a relatively large measure of ministerial autonomy for decisions taken largely on the basis of development-policy considerations, i.e. involving the possibility to reach decisions without having to focus unduly on foreign-policy and short-term political constraints. Development policy would in this case be free to concentrate on longer-term tasks, including the realization of the Millennium Development Goals.

  The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that, given the important political challenges involved in central conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan), any pronounced distance strategy might serve to cast doubt on the relevance of development policy. In this case development policy would be relinquishing its ability to take a constructive hand in shaping elementary framework conditions (security) and would lose some of its influence on security- and foreign-policy strategies concerning such countries.

- **Cooperation strategy:**
  
  Based on far closer coordination and joint approaches with foreign- and security-policy actors, a cooperation strategy would seek to give more weight than it has in the past to the concept of "development through security."

The hoped-for advantage would be a strategy fully coherent in terms of overall policy; this would mean a policy in which development policy would be better able to bring its interest and concerns to bear on security-related and military thinking and approaches.

The potential risks of such a strategy would include the possibility that development policy would be forced to make a good number of compromises and concessions on principles as well as on concrete approaches bound up with short-term and military considerations. Development policy would have to bear greater responsibility for military actions. Finally, development policy would have to come to terms with the risk that other actors might seek its cooperation not least with an eye to existing financial resources and that these resources would in this case no longer be available for the current "core business" of long-term development policy.

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132 These models are highly simplified; they accord, for instance, no attention to the role played by foreign policy.
Complementary strategy:

A complementary strategy would aim for goal conformity and, in strategically selected fields, a complementary approach involving security- and foreign-policy actors. This would, in other words, be an interrelated and thus mutually complementary approach, but one which would not entail any overlaps between the two fields involved. That is, the military would, for its part, define its tasks in such a way as to ensure that they do not include any development-policy measures; and development would be conceived in such a way as to ensure that it does not take on or fund any non-civil tasks.

The hoped-for advantage would be an approach which, compared with a distance strategy, would, on the whole, prove more coherent and effective, but without blurring the lines between tasks and spheres of responsibility.

One potential risk of this strategy would be the possibility that development policy might find itself harnessed to overriding considerations of other policies (e.g. security and/or foreign policy) and see at least some of its interests and concerns sidelined.

With a view to the interface categories outlined above, the following strategic reference models may be recommended here:133

- Complementarity for the interface "Security and stability as framework conditions for development policy": In this area close coordination is appropriate, indeed essential in many cases, although it should focus primarily on information-sharing. One essential principle here is a clear division of tasks. Cooperation, on the other hand, would entail an overlapping approach of the kind involved in direct military protection (e.g. escorts).

- Complementarity to cooperation for the interface "Strategic planning and conception": Many situations call for a complementary or even a joint strategic approach.

- Complementarity for the interface "Funding": A prudent approach to the funding of non-civil measures and missions as well as for the civil activities of military actors is one that involves complementarity, but not overlaps. That is, approaches or individual activities can and should be planned jointly, although funding should be based on the specific tasks and areas of responsibility of the policy fields involved.

- Case dependence for the interface "Operational approach": Here the benefits derived from joint interfaces concerned with operational matters will depend in very large measure on the individual case. Accordingly, action strategies should be chosen on an individual basis.

Sensitive Areas

It cannot be said that all development-military interfaces are fundamentally problematic in nature. But it is possible to identify three areas that must be regarded as sensitive from the perspective of development policy:

133 For a view see Table 3.
1. Development policy subordinate to a military logic: Any subordination of development policy to military contexts or short-term action constraints that deprive development policy of its say on the "whethers" and "hows" of policy should be rejected (examples: the embedded role of development policy in the PTAs conceived and set up by the US; options of development policy following the war in Iraq in 2003).

2. Military implementation of measures with a development-policy character: In this area the principle of subsidiarity should continue to play the central role. As far as the field of humanitarian aid is concerned, the relevant actors have defined clearly outlined exceptions in which the military may be allowed to assume certain tasks.134 As far as the spectrum of functions of development policy is concerned, there appear to be no such reasonable exceptions for the military.

3. Development policy as a source of funding for military missions: Both in principle and in the individual case development policy should continue to refrain from funding military missions (by partner countries and organizations). True, there are legitimate funding needs in the field, and these needs are evidently – one need think here only of the EDF-Liberia debates – not covered by specific and suitable budget lines (above all in the framework of CFSP/ESDP). But development policy should not move in to fill this gap, since this is beyond its scope.

4. Development policy as a source of funding for civil activities conducted by the military: Since civil activities of the military are generally geared to achieving higher-level goals (above all force protection) that have little to do with the goals of DC measures, development policy should not provide funding for them.135

A number of problems faced by development policy in post-conflict reconstruction – e.g. the question of whether or not it is possible to enforce development-policy principles in such situations – are chiefly due not to the presence of military but to difficult starting conditions encountered in the countries affected.

**Legitimacy and Mandate**

As a matter of principle, any engagement of development policy should continue to be predicated on legitimacy and a mandate under international law; only in this case should development policy participate in reconstruction efforts in connection with military missions. There should, in any case,

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134 See Barry (2002), pp. 15ff., who sums up the discussion on this issue.

135 This is not at all to say that civil measures conducted by military actors may not be legitimate or appropriate and useful in view of concrete situations on the ground.
be no doubts regarding legitimacy of such activities under international law.

The use of unilateral force by states – this goes not least for so-called preemptive actions not sanctioned by international law – should not be supported or given a semblance of legitimacy by any engagement of development policy after the fact (example: the war in Iraq in 2003). But in view of the fact that there may be certain constellations in which, despite a military mission’s lack of legitimacy and mandate, it may make sense for development policy to take a hand in reconstruction efforts, it is essential to consider and examine any possible role for development policy on a case-by-case basis.

**Specific Recommendations for German Development Policy**

Against the background of the present analysis, we can formulate a number of different concrete recommendations for German development policy in its dealings with development-military interfaces:

**Intensified development-military exchange**

One key point of departure for any reasonable approach to development-military interfaces is that the mutual dealings of the two actors be based on routine relations and dialogue. Experiences from the field of humanitarian aid indicate that intensified dialogue holds great promise of benefits for both sides.

The following points of departure should be borne in mind here:

- The ministries concerned (BMVg, BMZ, and AA) should consider appointing a staff member as a liaison person (in the headquarters of each of the other ministries) in order to establish permanent communication structures.
- The BMZ should examine the possibility of increasing its participation in the courses offered by the AKNZ (Academy for Emergency Planning and Civil Defense).
- Consideration should be given to a model involving the placement of "development advisors" with German CIMIC units.

**Joint country strategies**

In view of the fact that it is reasonable to expect major benefits from joint planning and strategies, the German government should launch initiatives on joint country strategies (as well as other related matters). One important keystone for an a more pronounced joint approach might be sought in the German Federal Government's Comprehensive Concept on "Crisis Prevention and Conflict Resolution."

**ODA eligibility**

With a view to the issue of the ODA eligibility of measures involving the interface between development and security policy, it would be important to pursue two points:

- In the framework of the ongoing debate in the DAC, Germany should seek to counter any attempts to soften the existing ODA reporting criteria for noncivil activities. However, a broadening of the criteria on multilateral contributions to civil peace missions might – in keeping with the ODA eligibility of bilateral contributions – be justified in substantive terms if it is possible to generate the data required for the purpose.
- The BMZ should, as a precautionary measure, look into whether and in what possible ways it might be reasonable to use Section 23 funds that do not meet the ODA criteria for noncivil tasks.

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136 E.g. patterned on the experiences made with the German government's contribution to the GAA.

137 See the discussion on the UK in Chapter 4.5. The same would apply for the German share of the EDF funds provided for the ECOWAS mission in Liberia.
Evaluation of German CIMIC measures

Civil activities conducted by the military should be subjected to systematic evaluation as regards their development-related impacts. In view of the fact that the BMZ supports CIMIC measures, it would have a legitimate interest in an initiative of this kind. The core categories of an evaluation of this kind should be:

- efficiency analysis;
- short- and long-term impacts (effectiveness);
- adaptedness to the given cultural setting;
- participation in planning, implementation, and monitoring;
- implications for the local economy, political and social structures;
- sustainability.

Visibility of the contribution made by development policy

While the military is as a rule sufficiently visible (perception "on the ground," media presence, etc.) in post-conflict situations as well as in its joint efforts with other actors, the role played by development policy is often less transparent. Development policy should for this reason devote more effort to increasing the visibility of the contributions it provides in these situations.

Questions for Further In-depth Studies

It must be assumed that the discussion on development-military interfaces will continue unabated in coming years. The BMZ should therefore devote further analyses to the issue. To name some of the relevant questions and issues:

- What shape is the development-military relationship taking on among other relevant bi- and multilateral donors (the UK, the US, the World Bank, etc.)?
- Chances and risks of deepened development-military cooperation against the background of the debates underway at the EU level.
- Investigation of relevant examples, based on surveys conducted on the ground (BMZ support for CIMIC in the Balkans, PRTs of other countries, etc.).
- Monitoring of the German Kunduz contribution.
- Nation-building in post-conflict situations: new tasks for development policy and possible contributions of other civil and noncivil actors.
- Is there a need for a permanent availability of development-related nation-building capacities analogous to CIMIC structures?

138 See Barry 2002, p. 15.
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Annex
NUMBER OF MISSIONS ................................................................. 12

PERSONNEL
International civilian personnel .................................................. 413
Military and civilian police advisors and liaison officers ................ 62
Local civilian personnel ............................................................... 996

Prepared by the Peace and Security Section, United Nations Department of Public Information, in consultation with the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
DPI/2166/Rev.9/corr.1
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Mission Code</th>
<th>Since / Date</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNAMA</strong>*</td>
<td>28 March 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength: international civilian 211; local civilian 692; military observer 8; civilian police 3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNPOB</strong></td>
<td>15 June 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Political Office in Bougainville</td>
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<tr>
<td>Head of Office: Noel Sinclair (Guyana)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strength: international civilian 4; local civilian 3; military adviser 1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNOB</strong></td>
<td>25 October 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Office in Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOB:</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BONUCA</strong></td>
<td>15 February 2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BONUCA: General Lamine Cissé (Senegal)</td>
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<td>Strength: international civilian 24; military advisers 5; civilian police 6; UN Volunteers 2; local civilian 36</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region</strong></td>
<td>19 Dec 1997</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General:</td>
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<td><strong>MINUGUA</strong></td>
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<td>United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Tom Koenigs (Germany)</td>
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<td><strong>UNOGIBS</strong></td>
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<td>United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOGIBS: David Stephen (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>Strength: international civilian 10; military adviser 1; civilian police adviser 1; local civilian 11</td>
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<td>1 October 1999</td>
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<td>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East</td>
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<td><strong>UNTOP</strong></td>
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<td>United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building</td>
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<td>Representative of the Secretary-General for Tajikistan: Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria)</td>
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<td><strong>Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa</strong></td>
<td>March 2002</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)</td>
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<td>Current authorization: until 31 December 2003</td>
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<td><strong>MINUCI</strong>*</td>
<td>May 2003</td>
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<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission: Albert Tévoédjré (Benin)</td>
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<td>Strength: military liaison officers 32; international civilian 41; local civilian 52</td>
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* UNAMA and MINUCI, although political missions, are directed and supported by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. For information on political and peace-building missions, visit the United Nations website at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fst_prev_dip.htm)

BACKGROUND NOTE: 15 October 2003

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS since 1948 ............................................................................ 56
Current operations......................................................................................................................... 13

PERSONNEL
Military personnel and civilian police serving in peacekeeping operations........................................ 42,714
Countries contributing military personnel and civilian police............................................................. 91
International civilian personnel ........................................................................................................ 3,241
Local civilian personnel .................................................................................................................. 6,497
Total number of fatalities in peacekeeping operations since 1948 ...................................................... 1,810

FINANCIAL ASPECTS
Approved budgets for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004 .................................................. About $2.17 billion
Estimated total cost of operations from 1948 to 30 June 2003 .......................................................... About $28.73 billion
Outstanding contributions to peacekeeping on 30 September 2003 .................................................. About $1.56 billion

NOTE: Personnel figures are valid as of 30 September 2003 with the sole exception of UNMIL, for which figures are valid as of 15 October. The term “military personnel” refers to military observers and troops, as applicable. Fatality figures include military, civilian police and civilian international and local personnel in United Nations peacekeeping operations only.

Prepared by the United Nations Department of Public Information, Peace and Security Section, in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacekeeping Financing Division, Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts.

### CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

**UNTSO**
Since May 1948
**UNited Nations Truce Supervision Organization**
Strength: military 154; international civilian 99; local civilian 111
Fatalities: 38
Appropriation for year 2003: $25.9 million

**UNMOGIP**
Since January 1949
**United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan**
Strength: military 45; international civilian 24; local civilian 48
Fatalities: 9
Appropriation for year 2003: $9.2 million

**UNFICYP**
Since March 1964
**United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus**
Strength: military 1,351; civilian police 35; int’l civilian 44; local civilian 101
Fatalities: 170
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $45.77 million (gross) including voluntary contributions of $14.57 million from Cyprus and $6.5 million from Greece

**UNDOF**
Since June 1974
**United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**
Strength: military 1,043; international civilian 37; local civilian 91
Fatalities: 40
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $41.81 million (gross)

**UNFIL**
Since March 1978
**United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**
Strength: military 1,983; international civilian 117; local civilian 302
Fatalities: 247
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $94.06 million (gross)

**MINURSO**
Since April 1991
**United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara**
Strength: military 222; civilian police 16; int’l civilian 160; local civilian 112
Fatalities: 10
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $43.40 million (gross)

**UNOMIG**
Since August 1993
**United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia**
Strength: military 122; international civilian 100; local civilian 174
Fatalities: 7
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $32.10 million (gross)

**UNMIK**
Since June 1999
**United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo**
Strength: civilian police 3,657; military 37; int’l civilian 928; local civilian 3,079
Fatalities: 24
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $329.74 million (gross)

**UNAMSIL**
Since October 1999
**United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone**
Strength: military 12,331; civilian police 126; int’l civilian 326; local civilian 577
Fatalities: 111
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $543.49 million (gross)

**MONUC**
Since November 1999
**United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**
Strength: military 8,996; civilian police 102; international civilian 621; local civilian 749
Fatalities: 22
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $608.23 million (gross)

**UNMEE**
Since July 2000
**United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea**
Strength: military 4,068; international civilian 242; local civilian 256
Fatalities: 5
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $196.89 million (gross)

**UNMSET**
Since May 2002
**United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor**
Strength: military 3,455; civilian police 496; international civilian 439; local civilian 897
Fatalities: 12
Approved budget 07/03–06/04: $193.34 million (gross)

**UNMIL**
Since September 2003
**United Nations Mission in Liberia**
Authorized strength: up to 15,000 military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers; and up to 1,115 civilian police officers; and the appropriate civilian component
Current strength (15 October 2003): military 4,459, including military observers 15 and staff officers 28; and international civilian 104
Budget currently in preparation

UNTSO and UNMOGIP are funded from the United Nations regular budget. Costs to the United Nations of the 11 other current operations are financed from their own separate accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all Member States. For these missions, budget figures are for one year unless otherwise specified and include the prorated share of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi (Italy). For details on approved budgets for July 2003 to June 2004, see United Nations press release GA/10139, 18 June 2003.

Afghanistan: A Call for Security
June 17, 2003

We the undersigned humanitarian, human rights, civil society and conflict prevention organizations call on the international community to accord NATO a robust stabilization mandate in Afghanistan. This mandate should include the expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to key locations and major transport routes outside of Kabul and the active support for a comprehensive program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all militia forces outside the control of the central government. Current efforts to train representative, professional Afghan national security forces must be accelerated.

In the past six months, security has deteriorated and violence against civilians has increased. Unless security conditions improve, progress made to date in Afghanistan will be in jeopardy. Reconstruction efforts have already been impeded. Without a shift in the current security paradigm, conditions for free and fair elections are not likely to be in place by June 2004.

Progress in Jeopardy
Much has been accomplished in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban and the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001. After 23 years of war, an Afghan Transitional Administration, headed by President Hamid Karzai, was selected through a nationwide loya jirga. The central government has since adopted a national development budget, completed a currency reform, and begun the important work of drafting a new constitution. Furthermore, more than two million refugees have returned to Afghanistan in the world’s largest voluntary repatriation effort in the last 30 years. After a concerted back-to-school campaign in March 2003, a record four – five million children have returned to school, up from three million last year.

Despite important progress in these and other areas, efforts by the Afghan Government to further implement the Bonn Agreement and rebuild the country economically and politically are now jeopardized by a deteriorating security situation.

Inadequate Security Framework
The international community must continue to build the capacity of the central government to maintain the peace and provide for the rule of law. Sustainable security can only be achieved by a unified Afghan Government with control over internal and external security matters. Efforts to create an Afghan National Army have faltered, with only 4,000 of the 70,000 proposed force trained to date. According to the most optimistic assumptions, the central government will only have 9,000 soldiers – a fraction of the forces currently under various regional commanders – to deploy by mid-2004. Training a new police force has also proven to be daunting. The German-led training program began in March 2003 with a first class of 500-600 people. These programs must be accelerated and undertaken as part of a comprehensive approach to security sector reform that includes the demobilization and reintegration of all combatants currently serving in militias outside of effective government control.

International peacekeepers in Afghanistan have been largely limited to Kabul, where the ISAF contingent of 4,800 soldiers from 29 countries operates pursuant to a UN mandate. U.S. and other Coalition forces are attempting to extend security outside Kabul through “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” which combine military and civilian personnel. These teams, deployed to a few locations, are each comprised of between 50-100 personnel and lack the resources to really address the security threats posed by warlords and other armed spoilers. Some 11,500 U.S.-led Coalition combat troops hunt down armed opposition groups without a corresponding mandate to protect the civilian population. For the majority of the Afghan people, security is precarious and controlled by regional...
warlords, drug traffickers or groups with terrorist associations. The situation is getting worse, and there is no comprehensive plan in place to halt the spiral of violence. Both UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and his Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi have called for an expansion of ISAF to bring security to all of Afghanistan.

Situation Deteriorating
The peace process is jeopardized by daily harassment and intimidation of ordinary Afghans, fighting between ethnic groups and factional leaders, and a recent surge in attacks blamed on Al-Qa’ida and Taliban fugitives and the Hisb-e-Islami forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. There has been a sharp increase of activity by elements hostile to the Afghan Government and the international community, particularly in the southern and eastern border provinces. A water engineer with a humanitarian organization was murdered in March, while in April, assailants threw grenades at a United Nations children’s agency compound. UN offices in Gardez and Kandahar have also incurred grenade attacks. In April, Afghan mine-clearers were ambushed four times in southern Afghanistan. Rivalries between regional and factional leaders are ongoing and numerous. In the west, the forces of Herat’s Governor, Ismael Khan, clash with local commander Amanullah Khan and local governor Gul Mohammad. In the south, forces loyal to the Kandahar Governor, Gul Agha, clash with those under the command of General Akram. In the north, Generals Dostum and Atta continue their rivalry around Mazar-i-Sharif.

In May, the UN required its staff to travel with armed escorts in six volatile southern provinces. NGO travel and activities are routinely suspended for two or three days in specific locations although security conditions have not yet deteriorated to a level that requires complete cessation of local operations. However, the security spiral is downward, and the people of Afghanistan are now speaking of the “days of better security under the Taliban.” The current situation must not be institutionalized.

Unsafe for Elections and Voter Registration
In one short year, elections are scheduled for Afghanistan – June 2004. The conduct of free and fair elections – in which fundamental human rights are respected and the “playing field” is reasonably level and accessible to all electors, parties and candidates – is central to the success of the Bonn process. Free and fair elections require an environment free from violence, intimidation and coercion. Continuing challenges to the authority of the central government by regional warlords and terrorist groups, and the persistent security vacuum in many parts of the country, make it difficult to prepare for elections, including voter registration. Urgent action is required by the international community to support the Afghan government’s efforts to create conditions so that the Afghan people can freely choose their own government next year.

Stability by NATO
NATO has long recognized the need for a robust force to stabilize post-conflict situations (e.g. in the Balkans). Just as a force in Sarajevo alone could not have stabilized Bosnia, a force in Kabul alone cannot stabilize Afghanistan. If Afghanistan is to have any hope for peace and stabilization, now is the time to expand international peacekeepers to key cities and transport routes outside of Kabul. ISAF can accomplish this task, but to do so it requires the mandate and resources. In August 2003, NATO will assume control of ISAF. An expanded ISAF presence requires time for force generation and deployment. The order must be given now for NATO to have impact in August.

We call on the international community to expand the ISAF mandate and provide the resources needed to secure Afghanistan so that democracy can flourish. Doing so will improve the prospect for peace and stability for the Afghan people and the world.
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Center for Victims of Torture
Center for Humanitarian Cooperation
Children in Crisis
Christian Children’s Fund/ Child Fund Afghanistan
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Coalition for International Justice
Coalition of Afghan Associations of Northern California
Committee for an Effective International Criminal Law
Congressional Hunger Center
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Global Action to Prevent War
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Human Rights Watch
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International Catholic Migration Commission
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