

Passing the Baton

Challenges of Statecraft
for the New Administration

With Remarks by Samuel R. Berger
and Condoleezza Rice



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Summary

The United States Institute of Peace hosted a conference of leading officials and specialists on January 17, 2001, entitled “Passing the Baton: The Challenges of Statecraft for a New Administration.” Keynote speeches by both the outgoing and the incoming assistants to the president for national security affairs—Samuel R. “Sandy” Berger and Condoleezza Rice, respectively—highlighted the range of insights presented regarding the external and internal challenges of promoting U.S. interests and values around the globe in the twenty-first century. The conference program was organized around five panel discussions covering two functional topics (organizing for national security and international conflict management) and three geographic regions of special concern to the United States (Russia, the Balkans, and Northeast Asia).

by
Patrick M.
Cronin

U.S. Foreign Policy in an Era of Globalization

Five major points emerged regarding U.S. foreign policy in an era of globalization. First, despite the conventional wisdom of a decade ago that the United States was in a period of decline, there was little doubt among conference participants that the United States is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the preeminent world power. But with this power comes a responsibility, Sandy Berger averred: to serve as a “catalyst of coalitions, a broker of peace, a guarantor of global financial stability.”

Second, processes of globalization are having a profound effect on America’s dealings with the world. Receptivity to democracy and open markets has seldom been greater than at present. At the same time, however, there is an unmistakable backlash against globalization, which is sometimes equated with American hegemony. Seizing the opportunities of economic, political, and social globalization while averting the pitfalls of sowing anti-U.S. sentiment is an ineluctable challenge for the new administration.

Third, crafting U.S. foreign policy should begin with allies and friends. In building coalitions, our alliances with Europe and Asia are still the cornerstones of our national security, even while these must adapt to meet emerging challenges. But the United States cannot expect to preserve both its interests and peace unless it also forges constructive relations with former adversaries, especially Russia and China.

Fourth, although the Cold War is over, and with it the threat of proxy wars erupting into a global nuclear context, local conflicts can still have global consequences. Conflicts or potential conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East, Colombia, South Asia, and the Taiwan Strait reverberate well beyond the regions in which they are centered.

Finally, expanded national security priorities are required to deal with the panoply of old threats mixed with new dangers such as proliferating weapons technologies and porous national borders. Most of the new threats are generic, such as state failure, warlordism, mass atrocities, weapons proliferation, and transnational crime and terrorism.

Organizing the National Security Decision-Making Process in the Twenty-First Century

Three fundamental national security management questions emerged during the conference: (1) how to organize and use presidential authority, through the vehicle of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Executive Office of the President, in the service of new national security strategies; (2) how to better coordinate our diplomacy and our defenses; and (3) how to manage our dealings with the major powers.

The U.S. national security bureaucracy is large and diverse. The question is, who can sift through excess information and competing bureaucratic interests to determine priorities and options? The answer begins with presidential leadership, but the president's power, prestige, and time must be protected and used judiciously. That means presidential leadership in national security and international affairs should be built around the assistant to the president for national security affairs, who must be the administration's chief policy integrator, as well as a leader, agenda setter, and honest broker and adjudicator of the interagency process. The national security advisor can also be critical as a liaison to Congress. While he or she may occasionally have to assume some operational assignments, the national security advisor must not fall prey to the trap of trying to execute policy from the White House. The secretary of state, in contrast, should be the dominant voice of an administration's foreign policy.

In an era of globalization, there is no avoiding the need to integrate economic and security policy decision making. Economic and national security advisors must work with one another to integrate the issues. For instance, they must decide how to create a more effective mechanism for responding to future international financial crises. Charles Boyd, who was executive director of the U.S. Commission on National Security for the Twenty-First Century, contended that the United States can change the existing National Security Act of 1947 without creating an entirely new legal structure. He recommended in particular establishing the secretary of the treasury as a statutory member of the NSC, eliminating the National Economic Council (NEC), and integrating the NEC international staff with the NSC staff—the latter two steps of which have since been taken by the new Bush administration.

Making Peace and Making Peace Stick

The search for peace in the disorderly world of the post-Cold War era is especially challenging because our times are wracked with two-to-three dozen intrastate conflicts often involving sources of deep-rooted and enduring hostility such as ethnicity, religion, and identity.

What have we learned about the context, timing, strategies, appropriate actors, consequences, and leadership of peacemaking efforts in today's world? When should the United States engage, and when should it leave peacemaking to others? What can the United States and other outside parties do to make peace take hold after a negotiated settlement? How can the United States do a better job at preventing and managing international conflict?

One lesson that has been learned involves the evolving concept of sovereignty.

Governments no longer have the exclusive powers they once held. Now, there are many new actors and factors challenging traditional government domination of information, economic power, and political legitimacy. As a consequence, governmental dominance of the peacemaking process has declined.

Furthermore, states differ in their ability to solve their own problems. Leadership, both domestic and international, is of paramount importance in peacemaking. Chester Crocker, chairman of the board of directors of the United States Institute of Peace and James R. Schlesinger professor of strategic studies at Georgetown University, advised that Washington should take the lead for peace only when U.S. interests are affected by the conflict, when our relevance is clear and strong, when our role is welcome and irresistible, and when it is likely that we can develop serious political traction in getting a peace process going.

The United States can lead through strategic concepts that frame a problem and solution, as well as through its unrivaled intelligence assets, diplomatic reach, prestige, and hard and soft power assets.

Allen Weinstein, president of the Center for Democracy and former Institute board member, argued that not all conflicts that end quietly end with a negotiated peace. Some, like the Cold War, simply end. Moreover, complex threats (e.g., terrorism) often have no clear beginning, middle, and end. Not all peace negotiations involve the American government nor should they, whether or not we want them to. Sometimes, others are better placed to be third-party mediators. All peace negotiations with U.S. involvement are not equal in importance to U.S. national security interests. Regional involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as in the Middle East, can erupt into larger regional conflicts, whereas other regions such as Haiti are inherently more self-contained. "Getting to yes" on terms acceptable to the United States may not always be possible. Peace negotiations rarely respect electoral or any other presidential timetable. And the United States must always beware of unintended consequences of its actions that might sow the seeds of subsequent conflict (such as withdrawal from the Balkans or working with some allies to the exclusion of other powers).

Both new actors and new forces are emerging in the sphere of conflict transformation. Sometimes, peace can come from the bottom up rather than the top down. Peter Ackerman, coauthor of *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (1994), discussed how to bring change to authoritarian governments through nonofficial, strategic nonviolent means. From Poland to South Africa to Serbia, nonviolent mass political action has played a key role in ending repressive regimes. Strategic nonviolent resistance involves well-planned, orchestrated deployment of such strategies as protests, refusals to cooperate, and direct action aimed specifically against repressive leaders or institutions. In order for these strategies to work, other elements have to be in place, including a unified command committed to a nonviolent strategy; objectives that will engage all elements of society; a strategy for striking at the vulnerable spots of the adversary; the capacity to deal with the effects of new repression and terror; and the cooperation of institutions such as the military and police that the adversary needs to stay in power. The foreign policy community has remained ignorant or skeptical about the concept of strategic nonviolent political action, despite many successes.

Russia: Why Is Partnership with Russia So Elusive?

A coherent and successful strategy for assisting Russia to take its place in the transatlantic community remains elusive. U.S. policies should try to avoid a Russia working to counter Western institutions and accept a Russia that is largely outside that community, while working to bring it into a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.

Stephen J. Hadley, a member of the Institute's board of directors before becoming deputy national security adviser in the Bush administration, said the "problem with Russia is our politics." Americans like simplicity and clarity, but Russia has both important common yet sharply divergent interests. Devising policies to address the conflicting realities of the bilateral relationship requires a sophisticated approach.

The integration of Russia into the international community should be a policy priority for the United States. The current dialogue to date has lacked seriousness.

Paula Dobriansky, vice president and director of the Washington office of the Council on Foreign Relations prior to being tapped for the post of undersecretary of state for global affairs, argued that Russia is too important to global stability and U.S. security to be allowed to succumb to anarchy. The United States should seek security cooperation on both nonproliferation issues and the promotion of defense transparency, encourage cooperation on common interests from terrorism to regional instability, and promote positive democratic political trends in Russia while maintaining realistic expectations. While relations need to be institutionalized, that will have to occur through many contacts and on a variety of levels, including state-to-region relationships.

Nurturing the bilateral Russia-U.S. relationship will be a key foreign policy challenge for the new administration. The relationship is beset with difficulties because Russia remains in transition. Although Boris Yeltsin laid the groundwork for Russia's evolution into a democratic country and free-market economy, that evolution at best appears stalled. Yeltsin, for all his problems, dismantled the command economy, defanged the Communist Party, established a pattern of elections in Russia, promoted a free press and civil society, and established a voluntary association with the loose-knit Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the other former republics of the USSR.

The fundamental question facing the new administration is whether Russia will evolve into a genuinely pluralistic society.

If anyone "lost Russia," it was Boris Yeltsin, demurred Sergey Rogov, director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in Moscow. A "new world order" cannot be constructed without Russia; yet, he asked, how can the West build this order based on institutions to which Russia does not belong or is only a marginal participant? There must be an institutionalized mechanism for making joint decisions.

Rogov said both countries can move beyond the strategic posture of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but only if there are reductions in strategic nuclear arms that go deeper than those envisioned in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) III treaty and by traditional arms control concepts.

Building a Stable Balkans

During the presidential transition, much of the foreign policy debate centered on whether the Bush administration would continue President Clinton's policy course of ever-deeper

United States involvement in the Balkans. The answer appears to be an unequivocal “yes.” As key officials from both parties made clear, the United States has important interests at stake in Southeastern Europe, and U.S. engagement is inextricably linked to the health of the transatlantic alliance. Indeed, despite contrary public perceptions, Europe is supplying 87 percent of the troops and paying 80 percent of the costs of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Speakers focused on three topics regarding the Balkans: (1) the duration and role of the U.S. troop presence; (2) the importance of processes of justice and reconciliation to peace and stability in the region; and (3) the lessons learned regarding conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding during the past decade.

Notwithstanding concerns that President Bush might move precipitously to draw down the U.S. troop presence in the Balkans, Condoleezza Rice made it clear that any change to the disposition of U.S. forces would be worked out in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance—a context favoring a continued U.S. presence on the ground. But Richard Perle, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, suggested a recalibration of presence based on the comparative advantages of U.S. and European forces, with the recalibration favoring a U.S. role in combat support such as logistics, transportation, and intelligence. Significant differences of opinion surfaced, however, with respect to the mid- to long-term duration of the American troop presence in the Balkans. Whereas top-level Clinton administration officials and advisors foresaw a prolonged need for a troop presence, Morton Abramowitz, senior fellow at the Century Foundation, felt a troop presence was necessary only as long as the status of Montenegro and Kosovo remained in question. Perle cautioned against deferring measures to make the situation self-sustaining.

There was little difference between the two administrations regarding the importance of bringing indicted war criminals to justice. Walter Slocombe, former undersecretary of defense, Perle, and the other speakers agreed that the establishment of stability and democracy is hampered by the fact that major war crime indictees—including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic—remain fugitives, and Slobodan Milosevic has not been extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

The consensus that processes of transitional justice accelerate development and peace is also one of the larger lessons learned from the crucible of the Balkan experience, with respect to post-conflict recovery. A second generalization about conflict management drawn from the Balkans is that the sometimes significant contributions are made by grass-roots organizations: bottom-up rather than simply top-down peacebuilding. Third, the past several years have also shown the value of facilitated dialogues aimed at helping former adversaries find common ground across the conference table rather than on the battlefield. Finally, in the realm of conflict prevention, measures that are sometimes coercive need to be considered relatively early and not as a last resort.

Securing Peace in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia labors under the weight of both two divided countries, Korea and China, and an abundance of distrust. The challenge facing U.S. officials is to adapt our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to changing circumstances while managing

difficult yet cooperative relations with an evolving China. Closely related to this challenge are the ancillary problems of deciding how to deal with an emerging North Korea and how to protect democratic Taiwan from intimidation by Beijing.

Perhaps nowhere more than on the Korean peninsula have the prospects of war and peace—from the dangerous nuclear crisis of 1994 to last year's unprecedented inter-Korean summit—been so intermingled during the past eight years. The Bush administration inherits a situation in which change appears inevitable in North Korea, and yet where tangible threat reduction is still elusive.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, recounting the nuclear crisis and its sometimes-maligned diplomatic product, the 1994 Agreed Framework, explained that the Clinton administration faced three unpalatable choices in dealing with North Korea: (1) issue an ultimatum that might lead to war, (2) ignore North Korea's burgeoning nuclear capability, or (3) negotiate with one of the last totalitarian regimes on earth.

The twin nuclear and missile crises in August 1998 thrust Perry back into the center of Korean affairs again, this time as a special envoy. The resulting "Perry process" solidified the tripartite ROK-Japan-U.S. bargaining position and presaged a possible missile deal at the end of the Clinton era.

Perry's recommendations to the new administration were threefold: (1) sustain tripartite alliance cooperation vis-à-vis North Korea; (2) support South Korean attempts to engage the North; and (3) hew to clear priorities in threat reduction, beginning with weapons of mass destruction.

According to Michael Armacost, former ambassador to Japan and president of the Brookings Institution, the Bush administration will find relations with Japan in good shape so long as the United States remains strong. There are doubts about how China will use its growing power and whether Japan will follow through with economic reform and deregulation.

Armacost recommended restructuring the alliance—not toward collective self-defense and constitutional revision, but through sustained strategic dialogue and tight economic and diplomatic coordination. The two allies should review military forces based in Japan to ensure that these mesh with regional requirements.

If the new administration is adroit, Armacost believed it will be possible both to have strong alliances with Japan and South Korea and to convince China and Russia to collaborate with the United States in consolidating a favorable status quo.

Stapleton Roy, former ambassador to China and Indonesia, former assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research, and former member of the Institute's board, advised the new administration to work with China to promote a stable and predictable environment. Avoiding a repolarization with China is an important goal, considering China's likely international prominence in 10 or 15 years.

The United States needs to see China in all its complexity, rather than focusing on a single issue over which it may have limited influence, such as fostering China's social transformation. China will change at its own pace. This goal needs to be pursued along with promoting ties with China that are consonant with U.S. interests, ensuring Taiwan's security, and providing a counterweight to China. The effective integration of these

objectives will be tested as the new administration formulates policies for issues such as arms sales to Taiwan, missile defense, and World Trade Order accession.

Relations across the Taiwan Strait are imbued with contradictions: China wants unification but lacks the means to achieve it; Taiwan wants independence and yet pours investment into the mainland. The United States must manage these issues without denying their inherent contradictions.

National Security and the New Administration

In her capstone address, Condoleezza Rice praised Sandy Berger for his professionalism and bipartisan spirit in ensuring a smooth transition in U.S. national security leadership. “We may compete against each other when we’re in races at home,” Rice said, “but I can tell you that when the United States tries to pull together a foreign policy that’s good for American interests—and I hope good for the world—we both have had the pleasure of representing ‘Team USA.’”

Rice underscored the importance of statesmanship and statecraft. During the Cold War, she said, “it was statesmanship that saved the world from what could have been a conflagration.” Now America confronts a different world, Rice added, noting, “you don’t have to hear a band playing to signal that one era has ended and another has begun.”

According to Rice, the United States needs an NSC system “that unites the government to prepare not for total war, but for the total spectrum of policy instruments we can use when military power is not appropriate.” She added, “we at the National Security Council are going to try to work the seams, stitching the connections together tightly.”

American values, Rice opined, are of pivotal importance in the post-Cold War world. “Unless you understand the specialness of the American experiment, it is hard to understand what America can mean in the world,” Rice said. America’s “creativity and openness and . . . the willingness to let a free people and their labor be rewarded is really the engine of economic growth.” She added that, “it’s an academic debate as to whether or not our values ought to govern foreign policy. Our interests and our values have to go hand in hand.”

U.S. leadership in the contemporary world requires both “hard” and “soft” power, she said. Strong military and cohesive alliances can buttress America’s hard power. But utilizing America’s soft power means tapping “the strength of nongovernmental institutions in promoting American values,” conveying knowledge through educational exchange and scholarship, and establishing public-private partnerships. By combining both kinds of power, Rice concluded, “we can develop a foreign policy that uses all of the incredible strength of this country . . . to project American influence in support of its principles.”

Preface

The United States Institute of Peace convened a day-long conference on January 17, 2001, on national security challenges facing the country. The conference leitmotif—passing the “baton” of leadership on foreign policy issues—was made tangible in a ceremonial handoff between the outgoing Clinton administration and incoming Bush administration national security advisers. The substantive aspect of the conference was the outstanding ideas, and, at times, wisdom, of the speakers, the essence of which is captured in this publication.

Max Kampelman, vice chairman of the Institute’s board of directors, suggested the concept for a national security transition program at an Institute board meeting last June. Board Chairman Chester A. Crocker seconded the notion of encouraging the Institute to serve as an intellectual bridge between administrations during the upcoming presidential transition, especially on issues central to its programmatic work on conflict prevention and management and reconciliation. Given the Institute’s standing as an independent national organization created by Congress, we were in a good position to highlight some of the best practices of political statecraft and to foster a bipartisan exchange on national security issues, while upholding the finest tradition of professionalism and expertise.

In response to the board’s urging, Patrick Cronin, director of the Institute’s Research and Studies Program, initiated planning for this event by drafting a transition publication that would distill the policy-relevant work of the Institute and would highlight several critical issues likely to be the focus of national debate. Collaborating closely with other members of the Institute’s senior staff, we published a succinct booklet entitled *Policy Support in International Conflict Prevention and Management: A Policy Brief for the New Administration*.

In November, following the then-inconclusive outcome of the 2000 presidential election, Tara Sonenshine, an Institute consultant, suggested the value of a public event to mark the end of the Clinton administration in general and the four-year term of Sandy Berger as assistant to the president for national security affairs in particular. In addition, then-board member Stephen J. Hadley was able to interest Condoleezza Rice in the project after the election was decided and her future position announced.

Subsequently, Patrick Cronin and I began drafting a substantive program that would provide a bipartisan discussion of some of the leading national security issues facing the new administration. After discussions with Institute personnel, we settled on a one-day agenda. Although time prevented us from highlighting some of the critical areas of the Institute’s work, or from including a second day of panels on a broader range of foreign policy topics, we were pleased with the positive response to the program from an extraordinary number of senior officials, former officials, soon-to-be officials, and congressional leaders on international issues.

Thus, while others celebrated the holiday season, the Institute organized a team to prepare for what became a unique “transition” event. A steering group led by Harriet Hentges, the Institute’s executive vice president, included Sheryl Brown, director of the Office of Communications, and her colleagues Suzanne Wopperer and Burton Edwards; Dan Snodderly, director of the Office of Publications, and his colleagues Marie Marr and Cynthia Roderick; Cris de Paola in the Office of Administration; my executive assistant, Maureen Sullivan; and Patrick Cronin, director of Research and Studies, and his two program assistants, Donna Ramsey Marshall and Christina Zechman Brown. Donna and Christina bore the biggest brunt of planning and conducting this activity. The program’s success was a testament to both their toil and the exceptional teamwork of the Institute.

Finally, with the help of Nancy Hargrave, our director of development, the Institute was able to offer its more than 400 guests luncheon and reception hospitality, thanks to support from the following corporate sponsors:

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It’s worth noting that American business, through its support of this event, expressed its concern for a stable international environment in which to pursue its commercial activities abroad, which have become ever more important to our country’s domestic economic vitality in a world of growing economic interdependence.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

Managing International Conflict in the Twenty-First Century

Throughout the 1990s, the United States has been struggling to deal with a world very different from that of the Cold War era. It has been not a world at peace so much as a world in search of peace. It has been not a world of interstate war, but a world increasingly burdened with intrastate conflict and turmoil, pervasive ethnic and religious conflict and humanitarian crises, failed states torn apart by civil warfare, threats from “rogue” regimes, terrorism, and the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Today on five continents, some three dozen such conflicts fester and raise difficult security problems for us and for the international community.

As we enter the new millennium, what is to guide us in dealing with this chaos? Should we be dealing with it at all? Most of the threats that we see today don't put at risk our very survival as did the Cold War-era nuclear standoff between the major powers. But these conflicts do challenge our security in a variety of ways, they challenge our interests, and they challenge our values.

There is a natural tendency to look back into history for some guidance on how to deal with today's challenges. That means, most immediately, looking back on the most violent and destructive century in human history. As we all know, in the twentieth century warfare became industrialized and high-tech. It came to target civilians more than soldiers. And humankind created the capacity to destroy itself. More than 150 million people died in the twentieth century through warfare, revolution, and civil violence. This past century, as a Japanese colleague of mine put it, has been one in which “man experimented on man” in the great political disasters of fascism and communism.

The danger of looking to the past for guidance, of course, is that we'll draw lessons inappropriate to dealing with the future. If there is one central message that we hope to convey through the discussions of this conference, it is that we have to adapt our approaches to managing international conflict to the challenges of the twenty-first century. We have to create political institutions and policies responsive to changed international circumstances—institutions and policies that can keep up with rapid advances in technologies while dealing with humankind's enduring capacity for self-destructive violence. We can't isolate ourselves from this challenge; we have to develop effective approaches to preventing, limiting, or resolving international conflicts. We have to strive to be peace brokers as much as policemen.

This challenge gets us to the charter and the work of the United States Institute of Peace, which is to advance our nation's understanding of the dynamics of international conflict; to develop more effective policies for conflict prevention, management, and resolution; and to educate new generations and the general public about the challenges of conflict management. The Institute's work today focuses on an activity that I think our

by
Richard H.
Solomon

founders never really anticipated: training professionals in the skills of negotiation, mediation, organizational coalition building, and in the processes of postconflict reconciliation.

We believe that the new administration has before it a unique opportunity—indeed a heavy responsibility—to recast the ways we deal with international conflict. To have an effective national security policy, we must adapt our institutions to the world of the twenty-first century. As well, we have to exercise global leadership—as this country did after World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War—in creating international institutions and policies appropriate to dealing with the changed character of international conflict.

This new national security agenda requires special emphasis on the use of political skills and stratagems. It can be effective only if we are able to coordinate our remarkable economic resources and our unique military strength. It requires a new view of diplomacy and new investments in the training and use of our Foreign Service officers. It requires efforts to create new international coalitions in support of our foreign policy goals, and to refurbish and sustain our existing alliances. These are not just coalitions of nation-states and Cold War-era alliances, but groupings of international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the business community. And it requires a new level of intelligence—with both a capital and small “i”—one that makes use of the dramatic possibilities of the information revolution.

We’re now coming to see that the Internet, the cell phone, the fax machine, and satellite television networks are turning George Orwell’s world of *1984* upside down. “Big Brother” is finding it ever more difficult to control his people. In fact, the transparency created by these new communication vehicles—their capacity to mobilize populations and to coordinate mass action in short periods of time—have given new meaning to the phrase “people power”—as Mr. Milosevic discovered not long ago, as did Suharto, Marcos, and quite a few other dictators and corrupt leaders before them.

Making effective use of new opportunities for innovation and leadership in managing international conflict requires presidential commitment. That’s why we’ve built this conference around presentations by the president’s national security adviser, Sandy Berger, and his successor, Condoleezza Rice. Through their presentations, we will look back at the experience of our country in dealing with the world of the 1990s, and then look forward, to the challenges of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In the various sections of this report, you will find important ideas expressed by some of our country’s most outstanding and experienced foreign affairs practitioners. They explore the major national security challenges and opportunities that will confront the incoming administration. Among those challenges are how to organize and use presidential authority—through the vehicle of the National Security Council and the Executive Office of the President—in the service of developing new national security strategies and to better coordinate our diplomacy and our defenses.

We face difficult issues in managing our dealings with the major powers. We still don’t have relations with China or Russia on the right track, and we’re in danger of drifting back into confrontations with these key powers—confrontations that hold many of the dangers that we successfully navigated during the Cold War years. Indeed, we may be seeing the emergence of new great power coalitions arrayed against us.

We have to explore how to stabilize volatile regions like the Balkans, where local ethnic hatreds are putting at risk our dealings with both allies and former adversaries. And we have to examine how to use our country's formidable political, economic, and military resources more effectively in the service of peacemaking, coalition building, and the empowerment of peoples around the world who seek democratic governments.

In these and other challenges of contemporary statecraft, the United States Institute of Peace will continue to work to expand our body of knowledge and practical expertise in support of more effective approaches to preventing and managing international conflict.

Two

Foreign Policy in an Era of Globalization

by
Samuel R.
"Sandy"
Berger

In three days, I will end my tenure as national security adviser, grateful for the opportunity President Clinton and the American people have given me to serve at this extraordinary moment in our history. I appreciate this forum to look back on these past eight years and, just as important, to look forward to the challenges ahead.

Let me begin with the extraordinary year just ended. There was China's agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), the victory of an opposition party in Mexico, the downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, the peace we helped broker between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the president's historic visits to India and Vietnam, our success in funding debt relief and reforming the United Nations dues structure so we could finally repair our relationship with that institution.

Of course, the year past had its share of tragedies and disappointments. Sitting at the Norfolk Naval Base with survivors from the USS *Cole* only reinforced the reality that America is in a deadly struggle with a new breed of anti-Western jihadists. And despite all the progress we have made in the Middle East, it will be sad if the promise of this moment in history slips into the abyss of violence. But I know this: sooner or later—hopefully before too much more bloodshed and tears—Israelis and Palestinians will return to the same questions they confront today and the same inescapable choices. They can postpone the moment of truth, but they cannot escape the reality that they must find a way to live side by side.

The scope of events over this past year reflects the range of challenges and opportunities for America that sometimes appears overwhelming. It is tempting to step back from robust engagement, to simplify our presence in a complex world, to limit our definition of what is important to America to what seems most easily achievable. That would be a profound mistake. For the threats to America's interests only will grow more dangerous if neglected. More important, this is a time of unprecedented opportunity for us, as we stand at the height of our power and prosperity.

Any honest assessment of how we've used that strength must begin with an acknowledgment of what has changed since Bill Clinton was first elected. Consider the conventional wisdom about America in the fall of 1992: *Time* magazine—reflecting the widespread view—asked: Is the United States in an irreversible decline as the world's premier power?

Today, as President Clinton leaves office, America is by any measure the world's unchallenged military, economic, and political power. The world counts on us to be a catalyst of coalitions, a broker of peace, a guarantor of global financial stability. We are widely seen as the country best placed to benefit from globalization.

President Clinton understood before most the challenge globalization posed to how we think about the world. Let me describe just two. First, for a half-century of Cold War

struggle, we viewed the world largely through a zero-sum prism. We advance, they retreat. We retreat, they advance. Today, zero-sum increasingly must give way to win-win. A stronger Europe does not necessarily mean a weaker United States. Indeed, a stronger Russia and stronger China—if they develop in the right way—could be a lesser threat than if they unravel from internal strains.

Second, while globalization is an inexorable fact, it is not an elixir for all the world's problems. What is important is that we can harness the desire of most nations to benefit from globalization in a way that advances our objectives of democracy, shared prosperity, and peace.

Some of the most hopeful recent developments in the world have come about because of how we sought to do that, not because globalization preordained them. For example, if China has begun to dismantle its command-and-control economy despite the huge risk, is it simply meeting the demands of global markets? In part, yes. But it also has decided to fulfill the terms we negotiated for its entry into the WTO. If people from Croatia to Macedonia are rejecting hard-line nationalists and embracing democracy, is it because they've reached the end of history? No—but they have concluded that this is the best way to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)—an opportunity made possible by our expansion of NATO and more attractive by NATO's victory in Kosovo.

If the dividing line of the Cold War was the Berlin Wall, the dividing line of the global age is between those who seek to live within the international community of nations—respecting its rules and norms—and those who live outside of it, either by choice or circumstance. We must ensure that the international system is open to all who adhere to its accepted standards. We must defend those standards when they are threatened. And we must isolate those who choose to live outside the system and disrupt it.

Guiding Principles

The foundations of a foreign policy for the global age are reflected in the principles that have guided us there and hopefully will serve as a touchstone as our next president takes office.

The first principle is that our alliances with Europe and Asia are still the cornerstone of our national security, but they must be constantly adapted to meet emerging challenges.

Eight years ago in Asia, it was far from certain that we would maintain our military presence at the end of the Cold War, or that our allies there would continue to see its legitimacy. In Europe, NATO's continued relevance was seriously questioned, ironically at the very same time that the security and the values it defends were threatened by an out-of-control war in Bosnia.

So in Asia, we formally updated our strategic alliance with Japan. We stood with South Korea to meet nuclear and missile threats while we moved together to test new opportunities with North Korea. We dispatched naval forces to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait, and helped our allies deploy an unprecedented coalition to East Timor.

In Europe, we revitalized NATO with new partners, new members and new missions. After agonizing differences with our allies over Bosnia, we came together to end a ghastly

war and later acted decisively to end the carnage in Kosovo. Today, we are closer than ever to building a Europe that is peaceful, democratic, and undivided for the first time in history.

Southeast Europe, which has been a flash point for European conflict throughout the twentieth century, now has the potential to become a full partner in a peaceful Europe—if we don't snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Our European allies already are carrying the overwhelming share of this burden: 85 percent of the peacekeeping troops and 80 percent of the funds. But we can't cut and run, or we will forfeit our leadership of NATO.

NATO's future, and that of Europe's new democracies, also depends on the answer to another question: Will more of Europe's new democracies be invited to walk through NATO's open door at its next summit in 2002? To stop at Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would defeat the very purpose of NATO enlargement—which is to erase arbitrary dividing lines and to use the magnet of NATO membership to strengthen the forces of democracy in Europe.

A second principle is that peace and security for America depends on building principled, constructive relations with our former great power adversaries, Russia and China.

With Russia, it is tempting to focus on what this troubled country has failed to do in the last decade. It has not developed a full-feathered democracy or demonstrated consistent respect for the rule of law. It has not rooted out corruption or learned that brute force cannot hold an ethnically diverse country together. But we should not forget what it has done. The Russian people have rejected a return to communism or a turn toward fascism; in five straight elections they have voted for a democratic society that is part of the life of the modern world. And it is in large part for that reason that we have been able to work with Russia to safeguard its nuclear arsenal, to secure the exit of its troops from the Baltic States, and to cooperate in the Balkans.

What do we do now? I believe that President Vladimir Putin wants to build a modern Russia plugged into the global economy, and that he realizes the only outlet lies to the West. What we don't know yet is whether he will do that while tolerating opposition, respecting the independence of his neighbors, and conducting a foreign policy that does not revert to the Soviet-era mentality.

What can we do? If Russia seeks to exert coercive pressure against neighboring states like Georgia or Ukraine, we must do all we can to strengthen their independence. If it continues to provide military technology to nations like Iran, we must use our leverage to change its behavior. But at the same time, when Russia seeks partnership with the international community and membership in international institutions, we should welcome it, insisting that Russia accept the rules as well as the benefits that go with integration. And when the Russian people work at home to build a free media, to start their own businesses, to protect human rights and their environment, we must continue to support that with dollars and deeds. For little else will be possible in our relationship with Russia unless it builds a pluralistic, prosperous society inexorably linked to the West.

With China, our challenge has been and will remain to steer between the extremes of uncritical engagement and untenable confrontation. That balance has helped maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait and secured China's help in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The passage of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) represents the most constructive breakthrough in U.S.-China relations since normalization in 1979. For China, it is a declaration of interdependence, and a commitment to start dismantling the command-and-control economy through which the Communist Party exercises much of its power.

Can China manage this economic transition at a time of uncertain political transition? For a country seized by a history of intermittent disintegration, will China seek stability in greater control over its people, or in giving its people greater control? Only China can decide. But we can help it make the right choice—by holding it to the commitments it made to join the WTO, and by continuing to make clear that we believe China is more likely to succeed in this information age by unleashing the creative potential of its 1.2 billion people than by trying to suppress it.

A third principle that must guide American foreign policy is that local conflicts can have global consequences. I don't believe any previous president has devoted more of his presidency to peacemaking—whether in the Middle East, the Balkans, or Northern Ireland or between Turkey and Greece, Peru and Ecuador, India and Pakistan, or Ethiopia and Eritrea.

It is more important than ever that America remain an energetic peacemaker—not a meddler, but a force for reconciliation even, at times, where our interests are not directly involved. Why? Because the challenge of foreign policy in any age is to defuse conflicts before, not after, they escalate and harm our vital interests. Because in this global age, when we witness distant atrocities, we can choose not to act, but we can no longer choose not to know.

While we should never send troops into conflict where our national interests are not at stake, when our interests and values are challenged, the American people increasingly expect their government to do what we reasonably can. Those who ignore America's idealism are lacking in realism. What's more, the disproportionate power America enjoys today is more likely to be accepted by other nations if we use it for something more than self-protection. When our president goes the extra mile for peace—as he has been doing in the Middle East, as he did in Belfast last December, or in Africa last August when he joined a fractious conference seeking peace in Burundi—it defies preconceptions that an all-powerful America is a self-absorbed America. It earns us influence that raw power alone cannot purchase.

A fourth principle is that, while old threats have not all disappeared, new dangers, accentuated by technological advances and the permeability of borders, require expanded national security priorities. Indeed, I believe one of the biggest changes we have brought about in the way America relates to the world has been to expand what we consider important.

We intensified the battle against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from the complete denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, to the Agreed Framework with North Korea, which has frozen the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons there, to the effort that to this day is diverting billions of dollars in Iraqi oil revenues from the purchase of weaponry to the provision of food and medicine. We persuaded the Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. I hope President George W. Bush will work with the Senate to address the concerns raised in the debate over the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as General John Shalikashvili, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has suggested.

One of the most important decisions America must make is how to meet the future ballistic missile threat from hostile nations. The emerging threat is real. But National Missile Defense (NMD) is a complex issue—technically, internationally, and strategically. I hope the new administration will not be driven by artificial deadlines. And it is inconceivable to me that we would make a decision on NMD without fully exploring the initiative with North Korea and the potential of curbing the missile program at the leading edge of the threat driving the NMD timetable today.

A fifth principle that should continue to drive our foreign policy is that economic integration advances both our interests and our values, but also increases the need to alleviate economic disparity. During the last eight years, America has led the greatest expansion in world trade in history, with the completion of the Uruguay Round, the creation of the WTO, and the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and of the PNTR with China. Our conscious decision to keep our markets open during the Asian financial crisis in no small measure is responsible for Asia's recovery.

In the last two decades, more people than ever before have been lifted from poverty around the world. And yet, three billion people still struggle to survive on less than two dollars a day. Globalization did not create the gap between the rich and poor nations. But there is a gap in globalization.

To dismiss global poverty and disease as “soft” issues is to ignore hard realities. Few nations can survive the onslaught of AIDS that already has hit southern Africa, where half of all 15 year olds are expected to die of the disease. And this epidemic has no natural boundaries; its fastest rate of growth is now in Russia.

Working to bridge the global divide is not merely a matter of national empathy; it is a matter of national interest. That is why we have lowered barriers to African and Caribbean imports, tripled funding for global AIDS prevention and care, and launched international initiatives to stimulate vaccine research and get children into school. That is why we have led the global effort to relieve the debts of poor countries that invest the savings in their people. Keeping these issues at the top of the global agenda can only be done with presidential leadership.

“Five Easy Pieces” for the Next Administration

These are basic principles (listed above) that I believe must define the contours of America's role in a global age, and some of the specific challenges we will continue to face. Many are daunting. But the new administration takes the reins of a country at the zenith of its power, with the wind at its back, and clear objectives to steer toward. And there are several steps it could immediately take, both to seize the opportunities so plainly ahead, and to signal the world that there will be no fundamental shift in America's purpose as it reviews our global role.

Let me respectfully mention just a few. You might call them “five easy pieces” for the next administration:

1. Give our European allies a clear sign that there will be no change in our commitment to NATO, to its missions, and to its next round of expansion.

2. Make clear to our allies in Asia that we will explore the opportunity presented by North Korea's emergence from isolation.
3. Tell our partners in the Hemisphere that we want to finish negotiations on a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2003, so it can enter into force by 2005.
4. In preparing your first budget, signal the world that our contributions to win the fight against global poverty will continue to rise.
5. Finally, seize the chance to work with Russia to reduce nuclear arsenals without abandoning negotiated agreements. One good way would be to move with the Congress to repeal legislation that prevents us from going below the START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) level of 6,000 warheads while we bring START II into force and negotiate much lower levels in START III.

The overriding reality for the new team will remain that American leadership, in cooperation with our friends and allies, is essential to a more secure, peaceful, and prosperous world.

Our extraordinary strength is a blessing. But it comes with a responsibility to carry our weight, instead of merely throwing it around. That means meeting our responsibilities to alliances like NATO and institutions like the United Nations. It means shaping treaties from the inside, as President Clinton recently did with the International Criminal Court, instead of packing up our marbles and going home. Otherwise, we will find the world resisting our power instead of respecting it.

There is a difference between power and authority. Power is the ability to compel by force and sanctions, and there are times we must use it, for there will always be interests and values worth fighting for. Authority is the ability to lead, and we depend on it for almost everything we try to achieve. Our authority is built on qualities very different from our power: on the attractiveness of our values, on the force of our example, on the credibility of our commitments, and on our willingness to listen to and stand by others.

In the last eight years, I believe President Clinton's most fundamental achievement is that he steered America into a new era of globalization in a way that enhanced not only our power but also our authority in the world. I have been proud to be part of this journey. I can promise you this: as the new administration builds on that achievement, nobody will work harder than its predecessors to turn common goals to reality.

Three

Challenges of Statecraft:

Organizing for National Security Policy

Summarized by
Patrick M.
Cronin

The Bush administration inherits a world marked by both low-level violence and ethnic hatred, as Richard Solomon made clear, but also a world increasingly influenced by globalization, as Sandy Berger emphasized. Although a seminal challenge in this brave new world is simply to determine America's objectives, its role in the world, and its policy priorities, a vital ancillary question centers on the process and modalities of organizing the national security architecture for the contemporary era. Moderating the conference's opening panel, David Abshire, head of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, declared that the "overriding question" for the new administration is "how best to pursue national security in the twenty-first century." Panelists included Charles G. Boyd, executive director of the National Security Study Group, Anthony Lake, former national security adviser to President Clinton, Robert E. Rubin, former secretary of the treasury, and Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush.

A half-century has transpired since the last time the U.S. government experienced a fundamental overhaul in its national security architecture. According to Abshire, the Eisenhower administration's approach to national security decision making remains the touchstone for how to focus the American governmental behemoth on strategic priorities and on the execution of successful national security policy. But it is questionable whether it is possible to return to that model in the present era in which security strategy is as much financial as it is political and military in nature, and during which our discipline of statecraft has arguably atrophied even while our military forces have remained preeminent.

This panel addressed several related questions concerning organizing for national security. Among them: What is the fundamental role of the assistant to the president for national security affairs? What are some of the major challenges confronting the national security adviser in guiding the interagency process? How are economic and security objectives and policies most effectively integrated? Does the United States need a new national security act? Finally, how should the new administration adapt the structure of national security to the new era, and can it create a culture of strategic planning that permeates all U.S. national security institutions?

The Role of the National Security Adviser—*Brent Scowcroft*

Brent Scowcroft, the only person to serve as the assistant to the president for national security affairs for two different presidents, offered a series of maxims regarding the role of the national security adviser. Although General Scowcroft did not proffer his advice in this fashion, it is easily conveyed in the form of ten axioms directed toward his protégé, Condoleezza Rice.

First, the assistant to the president for national security affairs must remember that her principal responsibility is to be the administration's chief policy integrator, overcoming the "stovepipe" structure of the Executive Branch and when considering diplomatic, military, financial, informational and other instruments of power, to be prepared to bring the vital issues to the president's attention at the appropriate time.

Second, the national security adviser should be the leader and honest broker of the interagency process, which otherwise would lapse into the parochialism of the lead or largest agency. But she must work the process even-handedly, or else the cabinet secretaries and their subordinates will eventually circumvent a process they deem unfair.

Third, the assistant to the president for national security affairs should concentrate on advising the president, not the press and the American people. She should be seen occasionally, heard less.

Fourth, the national security adviser should let the Secretary of State be the chief explicator of foreign and security policy.

Fifth, the national security adviser should not attempt to run foreign policy from the White House. President Nixon attempted to do this, and it is an aberration that should not be repeated.

Sixth, the assistant to the president for national security affairs must always remember how precious the president's time is. She should husband the time of the president wisely and sparingly, limiting and determining what he needs to read and who he meets and under what conditions, and also deciding the scope and duration of decision meetings.

Seventh, the national security adviser should limit the operational role of the National Security Council staff, letting the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch conduct the studies and execute policy on a daily basis.

Eighth, when the assistant to the president for national security affairs does assume an operational role, it should be limited to exceptional special envoy missions in which a greater degree of privacy and a direct link to the White House enhances diplomacy. At times the adviser may need to play host to foreign officials at the White House in order to underscore the administration's commitment to a particular position. However, in all these cases, it is imperative that the adviser works in tandem with the secretary of state and other appropriate officials to avoid undermining the vital departmental structure.

Ninth, the national security adviser should organize the National Security Council staff to fit the president's habits, needs, and proclivities, and not the other way around. If the president does not find the adviser's style and approach fitting his particular needs, he will eventually seek his national security advice from others.

Tenth, the assistant to the president for national security affairs must work in a close partnership with the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), instead of allowing OMB to make policy by default by dint of its control over money.

The Role of the National Security Adviser—*Anthony Lake*

Anthony Lake, the assistant to the president for national security affairs during President Clinton's first term, seconded much of Scowcroft's advice, but he focused on changing elements in the international arena and some of the new challenges facing the national security adviser. His points can also be distilled into ten topics.

One of the elementary changes in the world's national security environment is that wrought by the twin revolutions of democratization and communications. While these trends are undeniably empowering a bottom-up approach to policy, in which civil society and nongovernmental actors find themselves increasingly able to affect the policy agenda, they are simultaneously strengthening the power of the official at the very top of government. Hence, prime ministers and presidents are more and more apt to want to conduct foreign and national security affairs at the expense of their foreign ministers and other senior officials. This means that the assistant to the president for national security affairs must realize this growing pressure from abroad to conduct business directly with the White House, while warily seeking not to undermine the secretary of state or other senior U.S. officials in the process.

A second challenge facing the national security adviser is to adjudicate conflicting recommendations emerging from the various departments and agencies of the government. Unless the assistant to the president for national security affairs steers the unwieldy and often ad hoc interagency process, then the "structure of government will be at war with the substance," Lake admonished. That means the national security adviser must be delegated the formal authority from the President to serve as the referee of internal bureaucratic scrimmages.

A third challenge facing the assistant to the president for national security affairs is the never-ending demand from the media for information, background, and explanation. Even though Scowcroft warned against becoming the "explicator" of American policy, Lake opined that no other official could help provide vital background explanation like the national security adviser. "Feeding the press," he said, is an essential aspect of the job.

A fourth major challenge confronting the national security adviser is to work assiduously to forge cooperation with members of Congress. This is as difficult as it is essential, especially given the high degree of partisan rancor during the past few years. One specific task of the assistant to the president for national security affairs is to build trust with congressional leaders. The trust will go a long way to facilitating salutary executive-legislative relations during a crisis. Moreover, it should be on the agenda of the national security adviser to persuade Congress that the current demand for documents and explanation from the Executive Branch is stifling the policymaking process. There are simply too many requests for information, and the resulting workload is overwhelming decision making and diplomacy. According to Lake, it is important that Congress find a way to streamline its requests for myriad details so that serious executive-legislative communications can endure without overburdening the national security apparatus.

A fifth challenge for the national security adviser is to remember that there is and should be a firewall between domestic and national security policy. In particular, the assistant to the president for national security affairs should give a wide berth to the president's domestic political advisers, in order to avoid creating a "wag the dog" perception that national security policy is determined by a desire to increase popular support at home.

A sixth challenge for the assistant to the president for national security affairs concerns early warning intelligence. The national security adviser and her staff are in a vital

position to help the intelligence community keep apprised of emerging threats or potential threats, which is essential if the government is to successfully prevent conflict. Because the NSC staff members serve as policy integrators, they should be able to forecast potential trouble spots so that preventive action can be pursued.

The demands on the president and his staff can make it easy to forget strategic objectives, and thus a seventh challenge for the national security adviser is to periodically step away from the “Augean inbox” and reassess the strategic game plan. For Anthony Lake, this would be on Sunday morning, when he found time to consider the larger flow of events in which the administration found itself.

An eighth challenge for the national security adviser, according to Lake, is to try to make strategic sense out of America’s policies, even though no single concept like “containment” can any longer encapsulate the thrust of post–Cold War ends and means. Lake said he was especially partial to the phrase “democracy and open markets,” but even that does not fully capture the strategy of the United States in an era in which threats are so diffuse.

It follows that a ninth challenge for the assistant to the president for national security affairs is to help define national security priorities. After all, Lake said, with so many issues and policies in play simultaneously, it is important to determine which issue and which approach needs presidential attention and urgency within the interagency process. Bringing all vital issues to the president’s attention is a fundamental task of the national security adviser.

Finally, Lake said, the national security adviser must work with the president’s top economic adviser. According to Lake, he and Clinton administration Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin decided to assign some staff members to report to both the national security adviser and the head of the National Economic Council. Not only has Condoleezza Rice announced that she wants to follow this practice, but she has taken the additional step of integrating an economist into each of the regional directorates under her purview in order to create “a seamless web” across economic and security issues. Lake called this imperative: to break down existing barriers, which inhibit the effective integration of policy.

Summarizing the Roles of the National Security Adviser

The distilled advice of the two former assistants to the president for national security affairs could be outlined as follows:

The Scowcroft Definition:

- w**chief policy integrator
- w**honest broker, leading the interagency process
- w**confidante, advising the president, not the public
- w**supporting team player, upstaging neither the secretary of state as main explicator of policy nor the Executive Branch bureaucratic machinery
- w**special envoy, occasionally taking on exceptional missions
- w**gatekeeper, using the president’s time wisely and sparingly
- w**special assistant, tailoring NSC staff and rhythms to suit the president’s habits and needs

The Lake Definition:

- w agenda setter, defining priorities
- w arbiter, adjudicating conflicting interagency recommendations
- w diplomat, selectively using the White House venue to engage foreign officials
- w intelligence officer, helping to identify emergent threats and provide early warning
- w media source, feeding media demand for explanation with background interviews
- w congressional liaison, building trust with leaders on Capitol Hill
- w national security professional, preserving a firewall between national security and U.S. domestic politics

Integrating Economic and Security Issues

Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin underscored the need to integrate economic and security policy, saying that economic goals are increasingly shaping national security policy. Economic issues cannot afford to be subordinated to other national security issues, and the national security adviser, who has great access to the president, must strive to balance these issues and policies in a fair manner.

Rubin outlined the following salient challenges facing the new administration:

- w To continue to promote trade liberalization and open markets, which includes getting fast track legislation or some effective alternative to it
- w To counter the exceedingly dangerous backlash against globalization occurring not only in this country but also around the world
- w To increase foreign aid to developing nations, which now account for 35 to 40 percent of our exports, and to support the World Bank and other international development banks such as the International Monetary Fund
- w To help Russia and other nations in their transition from communism
- w To create a more effective mechanism for responding to future international financial crises, such as those Clinton faced in Mexico and Asia
- w To promote a strong U.S. dollar
- w To reform the international financial structure

Future international financial crises are virtually inevitable, Rubin added. To the extent possible, we should develop prevention measures. We should also promote a strong dollar and continue to reform the financial structure.

Do We Need a New National Security Act?

Globalization has increased the impact of international economics on foreign policy and national security issues. The Hart-Rudman Commission, charged by Congress to reassess how the United States should provide for its national security in the twenty-first century,

has concluded that economics have become a component of national security “at least equal to the diplomatic or military components,” said Charles Boyd, who was executive director of the U.S. Commission on National Security for the Twenty-First Century. “We’re not structured in such a way as to either give recognition to that fact or to integrate all the processes that that kind of decision implies.” Therefore, the Hart-Rudman Commission has called for a modification of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the current structure (the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Agency). The recommended change would establish the secretary of the treasury as a statutory member of the National Security Council, would eliminate the National Economic Council (NEC), and would then integrate the NEC international staff with the NSC staff and the NEC domestic staff with the Domestic Policy Council. “There is no need for a new National Security Act,” Boyd, a retired Air Force general and former prisoner of war, said. “We need to change the one we have.”

Four

Making Peace; Making It Stick

Summarized by
Pamela Aall

The end of the Cold War brought unexpected changes to the international system. Instead of leading to a widely anticipated peace, the end of the superpower rivalry and the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with an increase in violent conflict. Unlike during the Cold War period, however, these conflicts were not over ideology, nor were they generally between states. Instead, they were intrastate conflicts caused by many factors, but often involving complicated issues long ignored as triggers of hostility—ethnicity, religion, identity, the desire for self-determination. In response to these conflicts, the international community engaged in a vastly increased number of peacemaking missions—in, among others, Angola, Bosnia, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Kosovo, Mozambique, and Somalia—and it continues to play a mediating role in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, and between the Koreans.

What lessons about peacemaking have these experiences taught us? What have we learned about the context, timing, strategies, appropriate actors, consequences, and leadership of a peacemaking effort? When should the United States engage, and when should it leave the heavy lifting to others? What can the United States and other outside parties do to make peace take hold after a negotiated settlement? When the causes of conflict abide in the official structures of a society, how can positive change come about? And what does this mean for the new administration and the individuals who will manage the American response to conflict? To provide answers to these questions, Chester Crocker, Allen Weinstein, and Peter Ackerman discussed “Making Peace—Making It Stick,” in a panel moderated by Marc Leland.

Challenges of Modern Peacemaking

Crocker, a former assistant secretary of state for African affairs and the chairman of the Institute’s board of directors, set the stage for the panel discussion by assessing the challenging environment of modern peacemaking and identifying a number of its significant characteristics.

wOld threats still abound, but new ones have joined them. “While geopolitics is not dead, most of the major challenges are generic—state collapse, warlordism, antihumanitarian barbarism, weapons technology profusion, international criminal networks. It is worth noting that these old and new threats can intermingle, thereby increasing their potential impact and making an effective response much more difficult.”

wNew actors—some good and some bad—are active on the world stage, challenging the traditional government domination of information, its legitimacy, and its

capacity to govern. “Many of these new actors were never elected, but they know how to use a microphone and how to influence public opinion,” a characteristic that can work both for the good and the bad.

- wAs a result, “there has been a decline in governmental dominance of the peacemaking process. With so many actors involved, there is a kind of natural incoherence which can be uplifting and amazing to behold, but it can make it very difficult to maintain the kind of discipline that is sometimes called for in peacemaking.”
- wIt is also important to recognize that there is a divergence among states and societies in their ability to solve their own problems. The resilience of political structures, the vitality of the civil sector, the social willingness to reconcile—all affect the peacemaker’s environment. In this regard, Kosovo differs from South Africa not only in the causes and dynamics of the respective conflicts, but in the two societies’ abilities to contain violence and build on a viable political structure.
- wThe domestic environment of his or her own country also affects the peacemaker. In this country, perspectives of the executive branch and the legislature diverge sharply, differences that are magnified or blown out of proportion by the media, while the general public shows little interest in foreign affairs. These attitudes can lead to official indifference or paralysis, and the result in a number of crises—Bosnia, Indonesia, and Rwanda among them—has been a reluctance to act. The cost of inaction has been one of the hard lessons of the decade as the international community first created vacuums and then watched as they were filled by the best armed, not the most democratic, players.
- wFinally, this changing environment makes it yet more apparent that leadership—both domestic and international—is the most important element of peacemaking. Leadership is necessary to provide discipline and coherence in the international system and within the leading global players. “Global and regional security continues to depend on the actions and leadership of a very few nations and institutions, which I call the ‘security exporters.’ There are many ‘security importers’ and therefore the few suppliers of this rare commodity—and the United States is a principal one—will be called on to help in providing global and regional security, whether in the Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, West Africa, on the Korean peninsula, or among the Andean nations.”

This point raises the question of when the United States should engage in peacemaking. In Crocker’s view, Washington should take the lead for peace only when “(a) our interests are affected by the conflict; (b) our relevance is clear and strong; (c) our role is welcomed or irresistible; and (d) it is likely that we can develop serious political traction to get peace going.” Crocker noted that these conditions do not exist or easily arise everywhere in every conflict. “When these conditions do not exist, we should let others lead and not give U.S. leadership a bad name by pretending to engage, as we did recently in Sierra Leone.”

Turning to the instruments and tools available to peacemakers, Crocker asserted that leadership on a global scale today requires a better understanding than the United States

has shown in the past of those factors that give us influence and leverage. He noted that too often in recent years, the United States has acted and spoken as if its influence as the world's leading nation derived only from its ability to sermonize or to coerce: "We wag our finger or stamp our feet or launch airstrikes or wage economic warfare on whole societies." These capabilities, although central to our peacemaking capacity, are both blunt and imperfect. The circumstances that permit coercive diplomacy to bring peace are limited and hard to control, as the United States learned in Kosovo.

Its predominance in coercive power is, of course, a central element of the U.S. capacity in peacemaking, but only when it is embedded in a well-thought-out political and strategic framework. And there are other important instruments of leadership that the United States should exploit in support of peacemaking. "The United States should lead through our unique intelligence assets, through our matchless diplomatic reach, through our military prestige and capacity-building potential, through our "soft" power assets such as the new communications technologies, through our special repute and expertise as peacemakers, and through our unmatched capacity to organize and sustain coalitions." Here, however, the new Bush administration has some work ahead of it to strengthen the civilian peacemaking agencies so that they learn the kind of leadership that produces coherence, coalitions, and coordination.

Chester Crocker ended his remarks with these suggestions to the new administration when acting as peacemaker: to listen more and preach less; to share the credit as well as the burden; to let others lead but back them to the hilt; and to build up, prepare, reward, hold accountable, and support the people and institutions engaged in peacemaking. He noted that the challenge of making peace stick—of ensuring that the negotiated settlement does not end in renewed fighting or in a shadow world between peace and war—demands an amount of leadership equal to that during the active peacemaking process. It also requires discipline and self-awareness. Peacemakers need to understand their strategic impact on the conflict and then use that impact to help in the implementation of peace. "Ending civil wars is complex business, and it takes the same kind of relentless intensity as war-fighting. The peacemaker needs to remain a parent through the implementation phase. Those who are best placed to lead are those who have enough interest and commitment to care about the result, to make resources available, to be prepared to take risks."

Negotiating Peace

Allen Weinstein, founder and president of the Center for Democracy, echoed some of these themes in his remarks on negotiating peace. As an historian, Weinstein extracted lessons that stretched back over the twentieth century, and in doing so emphasized that the United States should act carefully and selectively in its role as peacemaker. Weinstein drew the following lessons from his review.

- W Not all conflicts that conclude peacefully end with a *negotiated* peace. Some simply *end*. The Cold War, for instance, simply concluded rather than yielding to a series of negotiations, although this state of affairs was encouraged by American statesmanship. The United States did not "win" this war in a traditional sense and as Weinstein noted, "the triumphal 'we won, they lost' Western rhetoric that its conclusion

inspired, especially in this country, did not encourage clear, long-term, post-Cold War strategic thinking.”

- W**Most Americans believe that foreign entanglements should have a clear beginning, middle, and end. But, as Weinstein pointed out, “what confronts the United States—without a designated, single enemy state as in the past—is a complex of threats, challenges, and mini-adversaries, none offering the clear prospect of a victorious ending.” It is up to the United States to adapt to an environment in which conflict may be diffuse, associated with terrorism, economic instability, or humanitarian crises, and not likely to have clear causes or victory.
- W**Not all peace negotiations involve the American government—or should, whether or not we want them to. Weinstein noted that there is a distinction between “presidential involvement in national security negotiations of vital interest to the United States—Soviet-U.S. arms control talks during the Cold War for example—and *third-party mediation* by the American President in peace negotiations not related to direct, priority U.S. national security interests”: as, perhaps, the central role played by Presidents Carter and Clinton in the Middle East peace talks. This consuming involvement raises the issues of when and under what circumstances should an American president take a direct part in mediation, and when should the United States stay out of the third-party role altogether.
- W**All peace negotiations with which the United States becomes involved are not necessarily equal in importance to American national security. Keeping one’s eyes fixed on national security, however, is difficult at a time when there is divided political and popular sentiment about how the United States should respond to humanitarian crises and internal conflicts. The complexity of this issue found expression in the case of Haiti. “When the full story of the U.S. effort to return President Aristide to power is written, there will be a rather large chapter or two on the important, frustrating, and often-conflicting roles of various NGOs and notable figures in a process whose urgency to American national security remains debatable.” U.S. engagement in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Middle East is justified, as all have the potential to erupt into greater regional conflicts, but here again are questions of what kind of engagement and what degree of involvement are appropriate.
- W**“Getting to yes” on terms acceptable to the United States may not always be possible in the short term, in which case getting no agreement at all may be far preferable to getting a flawed one. It is difficult to walk away from an agreement, but at times it is necessary in order to arrive at a better agreement down the road. Max Kampelman demonstrated the importance of this maxim during his five-year leadership of the Helsinki negotiations in the 1980s, and “taught all of us lessons in the effectiveness of careful preparation, unending patience, and devotion to principle in negotiation, whether for human rights in his case or for peace.”
- W**Peace negotiations rarely respect an electoral or any other presidential timetable. Negotiations can last for decades, as they have in the Middle East, North and South Korea, and Northern Ireland. The proof is in the legacies of unsettled conflicts and

unfinished negotiations that U.S. presidents have left to their successors: Franklin D. Roosevelt died before the peace negotiations began, leaving to Harry S. Truman key decisions on ending the World War II and shaping post-conflict relations with Europe, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Truman, in turn, left Korea to Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Eisenhower left Cuba and Indochina to John F. Kennedy. Jimmy Carter bequeathed Iran to his successors, and George Bush bequeathed Iraq. Along with these last three, Clinton is leaving Kosovo, the Middle East, and Northern Ireland to the new Bush administration.

WBeware of the law of unintended consequences. Remarking that “historians of civilizations older than our own are well aware of the inexorable manner in which the resolution of one major conflict often sows the seeds of subsequent ones,” Weinstein pointed to the example of the Soviet-Afghan war. During this period, the United States supported the Muslim opposition—both Afghan and other—and thereby provided training and equipment for the current Taliban regime and for the “Osama Bin Ladens who terrorize Western interests worldwide.” An unintended consequence of American withdrawal from the Balkans and the implementation of the National Missile Defense system may be heightened discord in NATO, leading perhaps to the first peace negotiations the Bush administration will have to undertake.

Weinstein also examined the role of NGOs in peacemaking, noting their increased activity in recent years. “I remain doubtful, however, that at least in its early years, the new Bush administration will find such initiatives by NGOs and distinguished global figures much to its liking, especially given the idiosyncratic independence with which such private efforts—my own Center for Democracy’s included—proceed. Nonetheless, such initiatives will continue to play an increasingly important role in prenegotiations and peace mediations themselves, whatever the views of a particular U.S. administration, in part because of the close ties such groups and individuals often have with the media, influential members of Congress from both parties, and prominent foreign leaders.”

People Power and Democratization

Turning to another topic, Peter Ackerman, the coauthor of *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* (1994), spoke about an approach that brings both new actors and new forces into the sphere of conflict transformation. Rather than concentrating on peacemaking efforts in ongoing conflicts, he focused on bringing change to governments and authorities that are themselves sources of conflict—not through violent uprisings or international intervention, but through nonofficial, nonviolent means of opening up repressive societies and creating democratic institutions. Citing the words of Lech Walesa, leader of the Polish Solidarity Movement, and Mkhusele Jack, a boycott leader in apartheid South Africa, Ackerman pointed out that each leader reflected a deep conviction that their nonviolent actions would eventually bring down the repressive states they opposed. “What did Lech Walesa and Mkhusele Jack see that made them so confident? At the very least, their statements tell us that they had a vision that the nonviolent weapons they were using were punishing their opponents, and they were plotting new engagements that they believed would lead to victory.”

What constitutes strategic nonviolent conflict? It is a well-planned, orchestrated deployment of such tools as protests, refusals to cooperate, and direct actions aimed specifically against repressive leaders or institutions. Protests might include petitions, parades, walkouts, and mass demonstrations that strengthen popular support. Methods of noncooperation encompass strikes, boycotts, resignations, and civil disobedience. Nonviolent actions or interventions include sit-ins, nonviolent sabotage, and blockades. But in order for these tools to work, Ackerman asserted, other elements need to be in place, including

- w A unified command committed to a nonviolent strategy
- w Objectives that will engage all elements of society
- w A strategy for striking at the vulnerable spots of the adversary
- w The capacity to deal with the effects of new repression and terror
- w The cooperation of institutions such as the military and the police that the adversary needs to stay in power

These elements can greatly increase the possibilities that strategic nonviolent action will be effective. “To the question of whether a strategy of nonviolent conflict can succeed against political tyranny, the answer is a resounding ‘yes’! However, we should not confuse the possibility of a successful nonviolent resistance movement with the excessive claim that every nonviolent resistance movement must inevitably prevail because its methods are just.” In exploring why individuals become involved in strategic nonviolence, Ackerman found that almost all examples showed one of the following characteristics: they had experienced a failed violent uprising; they had no option to use the military (although they were not opposed to doing so); or they had learned from examples of successful strategic nonviolent campaigns elsewhere. “Way down on the list was the notion of a moral imperative to remain nonviolent or a belief that they could convince their opponent to stand down. Lacking no illusions about the tyrant’s superior armed power, they conceived of nonviolent conflict as the way to fight and win.”

Ackerman turned to the recent case of the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic through a strategic nonviolent campaign in Serbia. This campaign showed several characteristics of other successful campaigns: the organizers learned lessons from other conflicts, they mobilized support from all elements of society, and they co-opted the police—the security forces that Milosevic needed to stay in power. “Most interesting was how private NGOs had a tremendous impact on the outcome. With the provision of only tens of millions of dollars (as opposed to billions for the bombing) the opposition was able to both sustain an independent organizational base and create a communications infrastructure, so that the resistance seemed ubiquitous and unstoppable. This was a significant factor in neutralizing the terror and involving a much wider slice of the Serb population.”

Perhaps because the driving forces behind this and other strategic nonviolent campaigns are individuals and NGOs rather than official structures, the foreign policy community has remained ignorant or skeptical about the idea of strategic nonviolent conflict. Supporting Crocker’s point about understanding the variety of tools available for affecting peace and democratic change, Ackerman noted that “traditionally, the phenomenon

has been lumped into peace studies and wrongly seen as a form of conflict prevention or resolution. Nonviolent tactics have not been considered relevant when the fight begins, for by then only the correlation of armed forces matter. But despite the skepticism, the appetite to learn more about nonviolent conflict is growing dramatically,” as evidenced by inquiries he has received from the Falun Gong, and from opposition groups in Belarus, Ivory Coast, Iran, and Zimbabwe. Official peacemakers and policymakers should understand the power of this tool, both in bringing constructive change to repressive regimes and in establishing stronger democracies, thereby reducing the chances of conflict in the future.

Five

Why Is Partnership with Russia So Elusive?

In the years since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Europe have struggled to fashion a clear strategy to assist Russia to take its place in the transatlantic community. As a result, three potential end states for Russia's relationship with the West are now foreseeable:

■ A Russia that belongs to a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe and that sees its identity as part of that community

■ A Russia that is outside that community but nonetheless believes its fundamental interests lie in cooperating with it

■ A Russia that sees an international system embodied in Western institutions as threatening to its fundamental interests, and therefore works actively to counter it with the assistance of outlier states

The goal of future U.S. policies toward Russia, most American experts believe, must be to strive for the first scenario, to be accepting of the second, and to employ policies to avoid the third. Although there is disagreement about the success of the Clinton administration's Russia policy, there is consensus that the United States can learn from past policies without assigning blame. The vision of Russia as a cooperative member of the broader transatlantic community is an easily agreed upon long-term goal in American policy circles. But Russia must conclude for itself that accepting the norms and principles of the transatlantic community and appropriately participating in its institutions is the best way to secure Russia's own long-term security and broader national interests.

Conference speakers participating in the panel discussion "Why is Partnership with Russia So Elusive?" addressed many such aspects of Russia's difficult relationship with the West over the last decade. Strobe Talbott, deputy secretary of state and the leading force of Russia policy during the Clinton administration, suggested the Russians deserve more credit for the efforts they have made since the end of the Cold War. He warned, however, that reform efforts could be reversed and that leadership matters. Sergey Rogov, director of Moscow's influential Institute of USA and Canada Studies, emphasized the frustrations of Russian leadership as it struggles to combat internal problems over which it has authority and international problems over which it has little control. Pointing to Russia's tremendous foreign debt, potentially crippling prospects for improved economic growth, Rogov noted that restructuring that debt is an issue out of Russian control. Paula Dobriansky, vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations articulated the reasons why it is important to have stable and cooperative relations with Russia and presented options for improving those relations. Stephen J. Hadley, the deputy national security adviser in the new Bush administration, moderated and participated in the discussion.

Summarized by
Emily Metzgar

Nurturing the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia is one of the key foreign policy challenges facing the new administration. The discussion among three experts on the subject of Russia and its relations with the United States indicated how difficult and complicated the subject of relations with Russia is to American foreign policy.

Dealing with Russia in Transition

Strobe Talbott argued that when it comes to continuity of government in both domestic and international policies, there is less certainty in Russia than in the United States. In Russia, one leader's short-term accomplishments should not be mistaken for a legacy. A legacy is properly seen as the implementation of lasting, institutionalized change; no such thing was accomplished under former president Boris Yeltsin, however.

Talbott noted that, nevertheless, Yeltsin deserves credit for starting Russia down the path toward reform. Yeltsin's actions did not succeed in establishing a legacy, and they caused many lingering problems; nevertheless, he did lay the fundamental groundwork for Russia's evolution into a democratic country with a free-market system. The question today remains to what extent current president Vladimir Putin will build on the fundamentals Yeltsin tried to establish and whether Putin will then take the additional steps to complete Russia's evolution.

Looking at the historical record, Talbott identified several ways in which Yeltsin helped Russia take the first critical steps away from communism and the policies of the former Soviet Union and toward a democratic system with a market-oriented economy.

- w First, as Russia's president, Boris Yeltsin worked to dismantle the command economy. It is clear now, however, that this was accomplished at extraordinary cost to the Russian people. This initiative is also the origin of many of the critical issues now facing the Russian economy. Fallout from "loans for shares" and the resulting endemic corruption continue to characterize Russia's flawed transition even today.
- w Detesting the Communist Party, Yeltsin worked aggressively to "defang" it, Talbott said. Yeltsin succeeded in loosening the party's stranglehold on the politics of the former Soviet Union and paved the way for the explosion of small, special-interest political parties that now vie for a voice in the Russian political system.
- w Yeltsin also worked to establish the habit of "electoralism" in Russia. Talbott was careful to distinguish between "electoralism" and "democracy," but he argued that Yeltsin's efforts to send people to the polls regularly to vote for their leaders were fundamental in developing tendencies without which true democracy for Russia will remain an unattainable goal.
- w Talbott also stressed both Yeltsin's promotion of a free press and his development of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which together have begun to change the landscape of society and public policy in Russia.
- w Finally, Yeltsin established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a loose organization of states referred to as the Newly Independent States (NIS) by the U.S. Government in recognition of the voluntary nature of membership in the loose confederation of nations under the Russia umbrella. Talbott called Yeltsin's policy

toward these countries one of “benign and constructive passivity.” He suggested, however, that Putin’s intentions toward these nations remain unclear; the legacy of their loose affiliation-by-choice with Russia is not yet solidified.

Although many steps taken by Yeltsin yielded positive—albeit impermanent—results, Talbott observed that many of Yeltsin’s actions created more problems than they solved. His incomplete economic reforms destroyed the base of public support necessary for making future difficult, corrective, economic-policy decisions. The failure to institutionalize economic reforms led to the creation of a new class of political powerbrokers opposed to the policy changes threatening their oligarchic interests. The failure to fully deconstruct Soviet-era security institutions means that an invigorated FSB (the successor to the Soviet KGB) and strong government hand still pose the greatest challenges to today’s nascent free press and civil society. Finally, the war in Chechnya continues to pose the greatest threat to the viability of Russia as a democratic, multiethnic state with a government dependent on legitimacy as the source of its authority. The long-term viability of Yeltsin’s efforts at reform has yet to be demonstrated.

Talbott spoke of a package of issues known in the Clinton administration as “norms and neighbors.” The fundamental question facing the new administration, Talbott said, is whether Russia will evolve into a genuinely pluralistic society. Today there is little doubt of Russia’s diversity. Encouraging Russia to see this as an asset rather than a liability is the challenge for U.S. policymakers. Talbott recommended that the new administration simply support Russia in its domestic reforms and encourage in Russia a “live and let live” foreign-policy attitude toward its neighbors.

Who “Lost” Russia?

Sergey Rogov began by accusing Talbott of calling the Yeltsin years “the golden age of democracy and market reform” for Russia. Rogov contested this view. He insisted that with its great diversity, Russia needs to establish a new identity separate from what he called “Czarist communism.” Russia must also complete the transition from a command to a market economy. Democracy has not taken root in Russia. Russia’s international status is “second rate,” he noted, lacking “the veto power of Luxembourg.” Finally, Russia’s defense structure must be reformed to represent more accurately the intentions of the Russian Federation.

Rogov argued that Yeltsin failed, and now Putin faces the same tasks as his predecessor. Putin is not responsible for the problems he inherited, and his term in office is the opportunity for a new start. Neither the United States nor Russia “lost” Russia. The fact is, the “new world order” cannot be constructed without Russia. The problem is that the West decided to build this new order based on Western institutions to which Russia does not belong. Russia has been marginalized.

Russia ended the Cold War, Rogov noted. Should it not be rewarded for having done so? Russia should not be treated as a defeated country, and yet, in the international arena, since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia has been presented with international deals as *faits accomplis*.

Concerning a “real strategic partnership,” the United States and Russia do indeed have common interests, but there must be a “mechanism for making common decisions” and

this mechanism must be institutionalized, he advised. Issues in the bilateral relationship must not be presented to Russia as take-it-or-leave-it propositions. “We all failed to develop that mechanism,” he argued. “The result was extreme fragmentation of policy.”

There was no Marshall Plan for Russia. The United States instead “believed in personality and supported private corruption.” Policies supported accumulation of domestic debt and a situation resulting in enormous capital flight. The Russian government spent “35 percent of all its revenue to pay its foreign debt, [not unlike] German reparations after the War.”

In the meantime, Rogov continued, in the first decade after the Cold War, the United States lost its enthusiasm for arms control. It threatened to withdraw from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty and not to pursue START III. Russia is unable to respond in reciprocal fashion to these unilateral U.S. steps. He went on to question why both countries still operate within the construct of mutually assured destruction (MAD). If both countries are serious about moving beyond MAD, Rogov claimed, then reductions in strategic offensive weapons are necessary.

The top priority for policy toward Russia should be the economy, Rogov insisted. Without the restructuring of Russia’s foreign debt, no rosy future scenario will be possible. Russia cannot do this unilaterally, nor can it join the World Trade Organization (WTO) until this issue is settled.

“Integration of Russia into the international community” should be a U.S. policy priority. Assume that in the year 2010 Russia has been successfully integrated, Rogov posited: how would that happen? Work backwards and devise the policies necessary to get there from here, he advised. Many countries belong to the West without membership in NATO, Rogov noted: Consider Japan and Israel. The current dialogue with Russia simply “lacks seriousness.”

Institutionalizing Bilateral Relations

While not questioning the importance of institutionalizing relations between Russia and the United States, Paula Dobriansky acknowledged that recognizing the need for institutionalization raises fundamental questions: Why is Russia considered important enough to spend time and resources on improving the relationship? What should be the fundamental policy priorities? What issues have the greatest potential for bilateral cooperation? What issues have greatest potential for bilateral friction? What are the best means of institutionalizing the relationship?

Dobriansky argued that Russia is important because it is a major Eurasian power and, despite significant economic problems, it still wields influence. In possession of weapons of mass destruction, Russia cannot be allowed to succumb to anarchic forces. The United States has a “vital stake,” she said, in seeing Russia stabilized.

Dobriansky identified three fundamental policy priorities for the new administration concerning Russia.

- wFirst, the United States should seek security cooperation on both nonproliferation issues and the promotion of higher degrees of transparency in Russia’s domestic defense environment.

wSecond, the United States should encourage cooperation on common interest issues while protecting American interests where there is disagreement. Engagement on problems such as terrorism and focusing on regional hotspots are good possibilities for cooperation on common interests.

wFinally, the United States should promote positive democratic trends in Russia in politics while maintaining realistic expectations about likely results. This would include a shift from large-scale assistance for Russia to smaller, more targeted aid.

With “appropriate statecraft” the defense issues with the greatest potential for conflict in the bilateral relationship can be addressed, Dobriansky said. Addressing Islamic fundamentalism together, Russia and the United States can build their cooperative relations. National missile defense (NMD) can be a source of “either conflict or cooperation,” she said, but the United States must convey that it is serious about the subject. If Moscow thinks Washington is wavering on NMD, that becomes part of the problem.

Dobriansky warned that on other issues, while Russian support cannot be expected, the Russian reaction can be tempered. These issues include NATO enlargement, the Balkans, certain Russian economic trends, and Chechnya.

On the subject of institutionalizing the relationship, Dobriansky cautioned against relying on a “single official talk structure.” Instead, she urged that the United States “deploy a multitude of contacts on a variety of levels,” including development of state-to-region relationships. Ongoing parliamentary exchanges should be continued and contacts between defense organizations should be nurtured. The challenge facing the new administration is to recognize that while differences are inevitable, they cannot be allowed to poison the overall bilateral relationship.

Conclusion

As suggested by Steve Hadley in his commentary, “the problem with Russia is our politics.” Americans like clarity in their international relations, where the distinction between friend and foe or ally and adversary is clear-cut and provides a framework within which it is easy to operate. The United States does less well when dealing with a country like Russia, which has important interests that are both shared and sharply divergent.

Devising policies to address the realities of the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship requires a sophisticated approach. Policymakers should recognize the many potential areas for cooperation and should think beyond official bilateral contacts. A variety of forums can be used to identify potential areas for collaboration. The United States must now work to maximize them.

Six

Building a Stable Balkans

Summarized by
Kurt Bassuener

A great deal of the discussion and speculation about the new Bush administration's foreign policy has revolved around the extent to which it will continue policies in the Balkans initiated under the Clinton administration. Specifically, the debate has been on the maintenance of troop deployments in Kosovo and Bosnia, which total roughly 11,000. This overarching question, as well as how the United States should best address a rapidly changing situation in the Balkans, was discussed during the panel entitled "Building a Stable Balkans." Institute Executive Vice President Harriet Hentges moderated the panel, which included Morton Abramowitz of the Century Foundation, Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe, and Richard Perle of the American Enterprise Institute. In addition to this panel, the topic of America's policy in the Balkans and its relevance to the U.S. relationship with Europe and Russia was presented in other panels and addressed by Senator Joseph Biden and outgoing National Security Adviser Sandy Berger.

The Current Situation

The situation in Southeastern Europe has significantly changed during the past year, which began with landmark parliamentary and presidential elections in Croatia. Those elections a year ago, which followed the death of President Franjo Tudjman, forced the ruling nationalist party, the Croatian Democratic Union, from power for the first time since independence. Zagreb's policies toward Bosnia and Herzegovina, minorities in Croatia (most importantly Serbs), and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have become considerably more progressive. Problems remain, especially regarding accountability for war crimes during Operations Flash and Storm in 1995, which crushed ethnic-Serb-dominated secessionist regions and led to an exodus of ethnic Serbs from Croatia into Bosnia and Serbia. But Croatia's government has definitively ceased to be a conflict generator in the region.

More recently, the fall of the Slobodan Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia in October 2000 heralds the hopeful beginnings of democratic development there. Milosevic's rump Yugoslavia had long been a source of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Serbian Republic elections at the end of last year consolidated the victory of democratic forces, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), which had won in the September elections and had secured its victory in the streets of Belgrade in October. Yugoslavia was then quickly admitted to the United Nations and to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and has garnered promises of Western political and financial support. But the transition to European norms of democracy continues. Slobodan Milosevic's Socialists are marginalized, but some who have been indicted for war crimes have yet to be either arrested or even removed from public life. This issue is fast becoming a barometer of Yugoslavia's conception of its obligations.

Serbia's relationship with its smaller federal partner, the Republic of Montenegro, has not improved since October. Since 1998, Montenegro has developed its democratic structures and relations with the outside world at a distance from Belgrade, a distance that increased during the war in Kosovo and NATO's military intervention. Montenegro under President Milo Djukanovic and his Coalition for a Better Life has developed separate relationships with the West, has insulated Montenegro from the Milosevic regime's disastrous economic policies by adopting the German mark, and has substantially improved interethnic relations within the Republic. Changes to the federal constitution by the Milosevic government in the summer of 2000 led Montenegro to boycott the September federal parliamentary and presidential elections that were won by the DOS. The consequent pairing of the DOS and the Socialist People's Party, an erstwhile Montenegrin ally of the Milosevic regime, helped further sour relations between Montenegro and the new democratic coalition in Belgrade. At present, a proposed new relationship between the republics appears to be a dead letter, and Montenegrin parliamentary elections have been scheduled for April. If the ruling coalition wins, a referendum on independence is expected. While Yugoslav President Kostunica has ruled out (federal) military intervention, intra-Montenegrin violence could possibly erupt. Montenegro has not received any international support for independence.

One major reason for international reluctance toward an independent Montenegro is the fear of what might result in Kosovo, the Serbian province into which NATO forces were introduced in mid-1999. Violence by the ethnic Albanian majority and by minority Serbs, as well as by other minorities such as Roma, has been a major problem since then. The proportion of Serbs in Kosovo's population has dramatically decreased. In addition, intra-Albanian violence, both criminal and political, continues to plague Kosovo. In addition, in recent months activity by ethnic Albanian insurgents in the southern Serbian districts of Medvedja, Bujanovac, and Presevo has heightened tensions across the five-kilometer "Ground Security Zone" in Kosovo separating NATO from Yugoslav forces. The status of Kosovo, which is defined as part of Yugoslavia (not Serbia) by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSC 1244), remains, in actuality, undefined. Kosovo Albanians overwhelmingly favor independence, while the federal Yugoslav and Serbian governments insist that Kosovo remains part of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. There are no vocal supporters of Kosovo's independence in the international community, which has based its continuing approach in Kosovo on building local institutions and deferring the final status question. Independence for Kosovo, according to some analysts, would destabilize Macedonia, with its large ethnic Albanian minority. Others are of the opinion that Kosovo's continued limbo promotes violence and instability.

While Bosnia remains at peace five years after the Dayton Accords, there has been only slow progress toward building a self-sustaining, functioning state. To a great extent, this process has been encumbered by the structures created at Dayton to end the war. The Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, the two entities created at Dayton, hold a majority of powers, and ethnic nationalist parties who were signatories of the agreement maintain a strong grip on political and economic levers despite electoral setbacks in successive elections. A number of major indicted war criminals, most notably

former Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic who has been repeatedly sighted in Bosnia, remain at large. Refugee return has accelerated in 2000, but a lack of both security from local nationalist officials and economic assistance continues to put a brake on those returns. A reduced NATO military presence, including American forces, remains on the ground.

The “Building a Stable Balkans” panel was assembled to address the policy challenges this complex environment presents to the United States and the incoming Bush administration.

Proposals on Policy

No one at the conference put forward the idea that the Balkans are not important to U.S. foreign policy. Morton Abramowitz saw nothing less than the stability of Southeastern Europe and the cohesion of NATO at stake in determining American policy toward the Balkans. Outgoing National Security Adviser Sandy Berger connected the American engagement in the Balkans directly to not only maintaining stability but also keeping the promise of NATO alive for the countries in the region. The United States “can’t cut and run, or we will forfeit the future of NATO,” he said in his luncheon address.

It is worth noting that none of the three panelists, or indeed any other speakers at the conference, made much mention of Croatia as a problem for American policies. The apparent perception is that great strides have been made in the past year since President Stipe Mesic and Prime Minister Ivica Racan have come to power, and that the country has ceased to be a problem. While there remain unresolved the issues of war crimes and the return of ethnic Serb refugees from Yugoslavia and Bosnia, cooperation with the ICTY has markedly improved, and Bosnian Croats who increasingly call for ethnic separation can no longer look to Zagreb for support from Croatia’s leadership.

What remains of Yugoslavia—Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo—presents a number of policy questions to the incoming Bush administration. The relationship among these component parts remains as yet undefined under the new democratic federal government in Belgrade, which *de facto* has no writ outside the borders of Serbia. In addition, noted Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocombe, there is the issue of the unrest in the Presevo Valley. In his presentation, Morton Abramowitz laid out what he saw as the current American policy approach, underscoring the need for a systematic approach to the region in order to recognize interrelationships while avoiding unintended policy consequences. He noted that Kosovo has been effectively a hostage of the Dayton framework, from which it had been excluded; promises of cooperation from President Milosevic on Bosnia have led to a soft-pedaling of the problems in Kosovo. With both Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman no longer occupying their posts, new questions have emerged regarding the status of territories. The role and actions of Serbia are central. Abramowitz saw no likelihood that NATO forces could be withdrawn until these status questions in Montenegro and Kosovo are resolved.

Abramowitz saw current Western policies, including those of the United States, as giving priority to developments in Serbia, and therefore toward supporting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) remaining intact. This approach is manifested in the active discouragement of Montenegro’s moves toward independence and in the disregard of the

possibility of Kosovo's independence. The overarching aim, in his view, is to promote the integration of these components into the region as a whole. This school of thought holds that economic development in all three parts will either preclude Kosovo's departure from the FRY altogether, or make such a departure less difficult. A competing viewpoint identified by Abramowitz is that the current policy of supporting the status quo merely prolongs the agony and postpones what is, essentially, the inevitable separation of Kosovo and Montenegro from Serbia. This school of thought would not act to disallow Montenegro's departure from the FRY, and would call for UNSC 1244 to be superseded, which would leave Serbia to face the limits of the Republic's borders. UN Security Council members Russia and China certainly are not in favor of this approach. It is integral to this view that the approach to the new democratic government in Belgrade should be predicated on the presumed obligation that it comply with ICTY demands that Slobodan Milosevic and others be extradited for trial at The Hague, and that there should be enforcement of conditionalities to encourage this result.

Abramowitz then posited his personal view that the United States and its allies were in no position to "do anything radical," noting that this approach in itself had consequences. Allowing Montenegro to leave, should it decide to do so, would help put Serbia's focus back on itself. As for Kosovo, he advocated a functional approach of establishing a constitution and electing a Kosovo-wide governance body, and he saw no need to force the status issue at present.

Undersecretary Slocombe concurred in this view: that the "stark choice" of Kosovo's status could be deferred in favor of building institutions and making other progress on the ground. Even this approach is seen by some as a predetermination of an outcome in favor of eventual independence, and it would be opposed not only in Belgrade, but also in Europe and the United Nations.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle opened his talk by stating that the question of justice is central to the stabilization and democratization of the Balkans. He noted that "big fish" war crimes indictees (persons indicted for war crimes, or "PIFWCs," as defined by Slocombe) such as Radovan Karadzic and former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic remain at large. Perle stated that apprehension and trial of these men is important, and that Milosevic's remaining at liberty at that time presented a barrier to a needed catharsis in the region as well as to democracy in Serbia where he continued to wield influence. Undersecretary Slocombe agreed that the most senior indictees would remain an issue, though he noted that roughly two-thirds of those publicly indicted have been arrested, have surrendered, have died, or have had their indictments dropped. Later in the day, National Security Adviser-designate Condoleezza Rice, in response to a question from the audience, stated that she expected U.S. policy to remain focused on seeing those indicted brought to justice, but she did not postulate on how this would be achieved.

U.S. Forces in the Balkans

A central issue of discussion at the conference was the role of American forces in the region. As Sandy Berger noted in his luncheon address, the proportion of American forces serving in Bosnia (the Stabilization Force or SFOR) and Kosovo (the Kosovo Force

or KFOR) is small; Europe provides 87 percent of the troops and about 80 percent of the funds devoted to these regions. The question whether a U.S. presence is essential there was a topic not only at the conference, but also during the presidential campaign, during which the Bush campaign was reported to have advocated an American withdrawal in consultation with our NATO allies. In his introduction of Berger, Senator Biden, coming from the confirmation hearings of now-Secretary of State Colin Powell, noted that he was pleased to hear what he considered a softening of this campaign stance by the incoming Bush team. His view, bolstered by a recent trip to the Balkans, was that continued American participation in SFOR and KFOR is essential to maintaining both these missions and America's "single most important alliance": NATO. He noted that were the United States to withdraw its forces from these missions, the alliance would be put under a heavy strain. In her address, Condoleezza Rice noted that maintaining this alliance, among others, is important to the maintenance of America's "hard" power. When questioned after her speech, Rice said that the Bush administration believes it is important to review U.S. deployments abroad, in the context of consulting with our allies and in keeping with standing commitments.

Panelists had a variety of views on the necessity of American forces remaining on the ground in the Balkans. Both Abramowitz and Slocombe said that American forces were essential to keeping the allied missions together and would have to be stationed in the Balkans for the foreseeable future. Abramowitz closed his speech by saying that the "only successful exit strategy . . . is Alliance success. That's a long way off." Undersecretary Slocombe said that while some reduction of American troop levels over time would be "inevitable and just," the United States should be resigned to some military presence on the ground for a long time. He also said that it would be a mistake to establish withdrawal as an objective, as opposed to departing when the time was right. Richard Perle took direct issue with this viewpoint, saying that accepting a long-duration deployment is bad strategy that would become self-fulfilling and delay the impetus to take the necessary measures to make the situation self-sustaining. Among the security measures he thought useful to bring this about is making sure Bosnia is capable of self-defense, and he referred positively to the Train and Equip Program the United States has pursued with the Bosnian Federation armed forces.

Perle also said that he thought the Bush team has been misinterpreted as advocating precipitous withdrawal or disengagement, and he further opined that the United States "will remain deeply involved" in the Balkans under a Bush presidency. His view was that the United States should devote assets and capabilities—logistics, transport, and intelligence—in which it has a comparative advantage vis-à-vis its NATO partners. His view was that such a "recalibration" would be a more rational division of responsibility. He added that the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have moved beyond the need for massive military presence, and that now more "administrative" structures geared to law and order are needed. In this context, he believed that it is appropriate to have a "rational substitution" of European infantry troops for the Americans currently involved in this role. Slocombe stated that the lack of gendarmerie capacity is the "black hole" in international security, but that the U.S. role in these forces as "the meanest dogs on the block" is intimidating to those who might want to disrupt the fragile peace and is therefore

important to maintain. Abramowitz concurred that the absence of the instrumentalities of justice is a major failure, but in an environment with painful problems that could spark violence, these forces' deterrent value is crucial: that the ability to wield overwhelming force is without substitute. He also added that maintaining U.S. military presence is an "important bit" in dealing with Europe, and that the value of "boots on the ground" could not simply be reduced to burden sharing. In his speech, Berger noted that NATO's relevance has been called into question with the division between Europe and the United States over the war in Bosnia, but that the commonality of purpose since the Dayton Accords has been a major stabilizing factor in Southeastern Europe: one that gives hope to the ideal of a "peaceful and undivided Europe."

The effect of U.S. policy toward conflicts in the Balkans also received attention on a separate panel devoted to U.S.-Russian relations. Outgoing Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott noted that the United States has repeatedly encountered difficulties with Russia over the use of force, not only in the Balkans regarding interventions in Bosnia and later Kosovo, but even more so in regard to Iraq. He added that this would likely be the case in the future, and that the issue before the United States and Russia is how to maintain a good relationship in spite of these differences. He noted that Russia had an important role in ending the Kosovo war. Paula Dobriansky, head of the Council on Foreign Relations Washington office, noted that both America's Balkan policies and NATO enlargement are persistent "friction areas" with Moscow. She added that the relationship is complicated, and that it should be built upon multiple structures and layers on different issues and should find common ground where possible. Sergey Rogov of Moscow's Institute of USA and Canada Studies cited the example of the NATO intervention over Kosovo, which Moscow vehemently opposed, as an example of Russia's exclusion from the international state system. Dobriansky replied that Russia has indeed been included both in the process of both the first round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement and in the attempts to end violence in Kosovo.

Lessons Learned

A number of speakers commented on what they viewed as lessons to be drawn from American involvement in the Balkans over the past decade. Balkans panel chair Harriet Hentges opened the discussion with some of the lessons of the Institute's Balkans Initiative, many of which were echoed on the panel or at other events of the day.

- w**The first of these was the important link between justice and conflict resolution, including the need to address the needs of victims of violence. To this end, the Institute, primarily through its pioneering work on transitional justice, as well as through its Balkans Initiative and Grant Program, has devoted a great deal of effort to promote and shepherd the creation of a Truth Commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- w**A second lesson was the importance of tapping into a bottom-up and not simply top-down approach, because grass-roots movements can play a pivotal role in peacebuilding. Thus, Hentges noted, key players in addressing and trying to resolve conflict will not necessarily be senior officials.

wThird, in the right circumstances with the right expertise, a facilitated dialogue can have a salutary effect on healing wounds and preventing conflict. The Institute has found that dialogues can begin—even when wounds are fresh—in the appropriate environment and with the necessary sensitivity. Just as the Institute has in other regions, it played such a role in July 2000 during an Airlie House meeting between Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb leaders. This effort, the first of its kind since the Kosovo war and perhaps ever, is being followed by an effort to maintain and expand connections made at Airlie through a cyber-dialogue among the participants in Kosovo, made possible by a donation of laptop computers by the Waitt Family Foundation.

wRichard Perle noted a fourth lesson during his panel presentation. He said that the experience of the Balkans over the past decade has illustrated that diplomacy is occasionally not the appropriate tool for addressing some problems. He noted that the insistence that force be used only as a last resort reduces options, thereby making the use of force more costly. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, sanctions merely delayed the eventual application of force, and had little chance of succeeding from the outset in altering Belgrade's behavior. In fact, the arms embargo penalized the Bosnian government, which as a result was unable to effectively exercise its internationally recognized right to self-defense by the United Nations, which also refused to defend it. In that case, force was eventually applied, but at a far greater cost than would have been the case had it been used earlier. Walter Slocombe noted that while options should not be ruled out when force is to be employed, such a stance can strain relationships with allies. In addition, he added, the use of force is war by any name, and it involves inherent risks. Risk-free and cost-free wars do not exist.

Conclusion

The discussion of America's continued role in promoting peace, stability, and democratic development in the Balkans permeated a number of the panels, speeches, and discussions at the conference, illustrating the level of both public and policymaker interest in the subject. The United States Institute of Peace, through its various programs—the Balkans, Rule of Law, Fellowships, Training, Education, and Grants—will remain engaged in efforts to promote innovations in peaceful conflict resolution in the Balkans.

It is as yet unclear what policies the Bush administration will adopt, or continue, toward the Balkans, though initial indications point toward greater continuity than some had expected. However, "Passing the Baton" offered policy experts and others concerned with national security policy a unique opportunity to hear the views of the exiting national security adviser and the incoming one on a region that no doubt will remain a focal point for America's interaction with Europe, especially within NATO.

Securing Peace in Northeast Asia

The challenge for American leaders of securing peace in Northeast Asia at the dawn of the twenty-first century is to formulate policies that sustain our existing alliances while pursuing political approaches to forge cooperation with China. To address these challenges, Patrick Cronin, the Institute's director of research and studies, moderated a panel of three senior American statesmen with long experience in the region: William Perry, former secretary of defense, Michael Armacost, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, and J. Stapleton Roy, former U.S. ambassador to China, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Summarized by
William
Drennan

The Korean Peninsula

Like every administration since Truman's, the Bush administration must grapple with the issue of Korea. The good news for the incoming administration is that, after fifty years of conflict and confrontation on the peninsula, there may now be an unprecedented opportunity for peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region. Among other things, the warming of relations between South and North Korea, epitomized by the first-ever summit meeting between the two antagonists last June, suggests the possibility that the Armistice Agreement could at last be replaced by a permanent peace mechanism. The bad news is that achieving peace and stability is by no means assured. To date, there has been little progress on concrete issues in the aftermath of the highly symbolic summit; indeed, there has been no movement whatsoever on tension-reduction and confidence-building measures. The demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas remains the most heavily defended border in the world. Other than the overarching goal of ensuring the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime, North Korea's intentions are not clear, and no one can be sure how much room among the elite, especially the military, Kim Jong Il has to maneuver.

One need look back no further than June 1994 to appreciate how dangerous the Korean confrontation remains and how profoundly difficult the problems associated with Korea are. By the spring of that year, it became increasingly clear that North Korea was determined to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, a development unacceptable to the United States and its allies. Pyongyang's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, followed by moves to refuel its graphite-moderated reactors at Yongbyon (which would have produced enough plutonium for about half a dozen nuclear weapons), convinced Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo that this would severely weaken deterrence on the peninsula. At a minimum, the allies agreed that enhanced sanctions would soon be necessary, a step that Pyongyang declared would be an act of war. In the event of war, North Korea threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of

fire.” The spring of 1994 was, according to then-Secretary of Defense William Perry, the most dangerous crisis of his time in office, and the closest the United States came to war.

As the crisis built, Secretary Perry and the uniformed leadership of the military conducted a comprehensive review of war plans for Korea. At the conclusion of the review, U.S. defense officials were convinced that United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces would win a decisive victory, but at the cost of very high casualties. In the words of the former secretary of defense, “This would not have been another Desert Storm.”

The review also suggested that reinforcing the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command prior to the start of combat operations could reduce allied casualties. Secretary of Defense Perry therefore recommended that the president approve the dispatching of tens of thousands of reinforcements to Korea. For his part, the U.S. ambassador in Seoul was prepared to order the evacuation of nonessential U.S. civilians from the ROK. The president was, according to Secretary Perry, within hours of authorizing the reinforcement of South Korea when word came that, following the eleventh-hour intervention of former President Jimmy Carter, the leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, was willing to freeze activities at Yongbyon and enter into negotiations to end the crisis.

Less than a month later, Kim Il Sung was dead, but the negotiations proceeded under his son and successor, Kim Jong Il, and on October 21, 1994, the two sides signed the Agreed Framework wherein North Korea agreed to freeze, and eventually dismantle, its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon in exchange for proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWR). The United States agreed to create an international consortium to fund and construct the LWRs and to provide heavy fuel oil to compensate for the loss in electrical generation capability resulting from the shutdown of the graphite reactors.

The Agreed Framework has been subjected to severe criticism and second guessing, and it will likely be reviewed by the new administration. But the Clinton administration concluded it had only a few choices regarding the North’s push to acquire nuclear weapons. Those choices were to

- w issue an ultimatum, backed by reinforcements (which could have led to war);
- w ignore North Korea’s nuclear processing facilities (running the risk of having to confront a much more dangerous North Korea in any future crisis); or
- w engage the North Korean regime diplomatically.

The administration, Bill Perry said, chose to engage Pyongyang diplomatically. The resulting Agreed Framework has kept the North’s nuclear program frozen and under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring while construction of the LWRs has proceeded. Were this not the case, Pyongyang by now could have extracted enough plutonium for approximately 50 weapons, with no end in sight. However, the dismantling of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors is still a few years away, as is a full accounting of the amount and disposition of plutonium extracted from a pre-Agreed Framework refueling of the Yongbyon reactors. Additionally, North Korea could conceivably restart the reactors (and hence the production of plutonium) in a matter of months if the Agreed Framework were terminated.

In the absence of hard evidence of North Korea’s cheating on its obligations under the Agreed Framework, the period 1994–98 was marked by an uneasy truce between the

administration and its critics. That truce was shattered in August 1998 with published allegations of a suspected underground nuclear weapons facility at Kumchang-ri, followed by the North's surprise launch of a three-stage ballistic missile in a test flight over Japan. Amid calls for an immediate cutoff of funding for the Agreed Framework in both Tokyo and Washington, Congress passed legislation requiring the appointment of a North Korea Policy Coordinator. The coordinator was charged with conducting a thorough review of U.S. policy toward North Korea and reporting the findings and recommendations to the administration and the Congress. At the President's request, Perry returned to government service to conduct the review.

Perry's first task was to resist calls within both Japan and the United States to terminate the Agreed Framework, impose new sanctions, and reinforce U.S. forces in Korea. Perry reasoned that such an approach was a prescription for failure, for two reasons:

- w Manifesting our concerns with the missile threat by abandoning the Agreed Framework would have compounded the danger by inducing North Korea to reopen its graphite reactors and begin again to produce plutonium.
- w Abandoning the Agreed Framework would have split the United States from its ROK ally, whose president, Kim Dae Jung, was committed to his "sunshine policy" of opening up to and peacefully coexisting with the North.

Perry recognized the need for concerted, coordinated action by Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. He was able to achieve consensus among the allies for a comprehensive and integrated policy founded on the precepts of Seoul's policy of engagement, while hedging against North Korean recalcitrance. The Perry review resulted in a new U.S. policy, one that emphasized moving beyond engagement toward normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang and the establishment of a permanent peace, in exchange for a halt to North Korea's missile programs and the strengthening of the Agreed Framework. Should the North prove unwilling or unable to accept the offer of normalization and peace in exchange for renouncing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, however, the allies were prepared to implement a policy of enhanced containment of the North. The "Perry Process" had the additional benefit of presenting North Korea with a united front, neutralizing Pyongyang's divide-and-conquer strategy toward the allies. Additionally, the highly effective trilateral coordination and oversight process continues to serve as the principal communication and policy coordination mechanism.

Pyongyang, initially fearful of the consequences of opening up, finally signaled its willingness to explore the ramifications of the Perry proposals by agreeing in September 1999 to suspend further missile tests while continuing negotiations on improving relations with the United States, beginning with the partial lifting of sanctions. By the spring of 2000, and with the apparent blessings of Beijing, Kim Jong Il felt sufficiently secure to host ROK President Kim Dae Jung for the first ever intra-Korea summit. The second half of 2000 saw unprecedented diplomatic activity between Washington and Pyongyang as well, including the visit of the second-highest official in North Korea's military to Washington, a reciprocal visit to Pyongyang by the secretary of state, and efforts to craft an agreement halting the testing, deployment, and export of North Korean missiles: an agreement comprehensive enough to justify a visit by President Clinton to Pyongyang.

Time ran out on those efforts, however, and a new U.S. administration must now grasp the baton of managing the “Korea Problem.”

Perry offered the following suggestions to the incoming administration:

- w**Sustain robust consultation with Seoul and Tokyo. Ideally, responsibility for this should be vested in a senior envoy charged by the president with the difficult mission of reconciling the divergent interests of the three allies. The ROK government is tied, for emotional as well as pragmatic reasons, to the “sunshine policy” of rapprochement with Pyongyang; Japan’s government must resolve the issue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korea; and the United States, as the guarantor of South Korea’s security, must remain focused on North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles as the principal objective.
- w**Work closely with the ROK government as it attempts to build trust, especially economic cooperation, with North Korea. North Korea must be convinced to eliminate regulations that effectively bar businesses from assisting in rebuilding the North’s dilapidated infrastructure.
- w**Establish priorities for dealing with the North Korean threat. Nuclear weapons and missiles must come first, followed by other weapons of mass destruction programs, and finally conventional forces. The Agreed Framework must be sustained if the nuclear weapons portion of this approach is to succeed. Work to finish the efforts of the Clinton administration on Pyongyang’s missile programs to include bringing North Korea into compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime. Only then should the effort shift to conventional threat reduction measures. Achieving these objectives would create conditions for a permanent peace on the peninsula. Only then should consideration be given to reducing the U.S. force presence in the ROK.

Japan

The U.S.-Japan alliance is the pivot of our geopolitical position in Northeast Asia. Ten years after the Cold War, Japan remains critical to U.S. interests. Prospects for the continued peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region are greatly enhanced when the two giants—the United States and Japan—cooperate. In addition, the allies gain added security at lower cost through defense cooperation. In that regard, Japanese self-defense forces that complement the American military are a source of reassurance to the Japanese and to others who fear a “normal” Japan. Finally, the U.S.-Japan security alliance is a key element in nonproliferation efforts. Indeed, Japan is our most important nonproliferation success story.

In the view of former ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost, the new administration will find relations with Japan in good overall shape for three reasons.

First, the dawn of the twenty-first century finds the United States experiencing a renaissance of power. This is important, given Japan’s tradition in the last hundred years of aligning itself with the dominant Western power. Second, the rise of China has reminded Americans and Japanese alike of the value of the alliance as an insurance policy for which the premiums are modest. Third, Japan is beginning to embrace the administrative reforms and economic deregulation necessary to the dismantling of trade barriers, a movement

which, if continued, will reduce the economic friction between Tokyo and Washington, making management of the relationship easier.

U.S.-Japan security ties have stabilized since the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, and both sides have reaffirmed the value of the alliance. We are operating under new defense guidelines, and enabling legislation has been passed. Japan is cooperating with the United States on anti-ballistic missile technology, and closely coordinating its policies toward North Korea. And the allies have made some progress in defusing the issue of U.S. bases in Okinawa. In addition, there is a new mood of realism, especially among younger Japanese politicians, on how to address security issues. The formerly taboo subject of constitutional revision is now open for debate. Progress is being made on defense acquisition matters. And Japan is beginning to recognize that foreign aid can be a powerful tool in managing relations with China and North Korea.

The security environment in East Asia is currently benign, and there is little likelihood of major power clashes. Tokyo is working steadily to improve relations with its neighbors. While there are doubts about how China will ultimately use the military power that it is steadily accumulating, at present China poses no immediate military threat to Japan, and there is noticeably less saber-rattling across the Taiwan Strait.

Not all the news in the East Asia-Pacific region is good, however. The U.S.-Japan high-level security dialogue, so effective in the mid-1990s in updating the relationship, has atrophied on all fronts save that of the North Korean issue. During the Asian financial crisis and the uproar caused by the 1998 North Korean missile test over Japan, the United States did not respond with as collaborative a spirit as it might have. Japanese officials complain about U.S. inattentiveness ("Japan passing") as Washington focuses on China. Americans continue to complain about Japan's indecisiveness regarding the continued stagnation of its economy. Overall, the Bush administration is faced with an alliance that, in Japanese eyes, is drifting.

The new administration, therefore, needs to restructure the alliance to make it steadier. That is not to say that a fundamental alteration along the lines of a NATO-like structure, or through a push toward collective self-defense, is necessary. Movement toward peace in Korea is too tentative, prospects for cross-Strait dialogue too speculative, and relations between the great powers are too unsettled for such measures. Rather, the administration should start more modestly by getting economic and diplomatic relations back on the right trend line and by reinvigorating a serious security dialogue. The coordination of policies regarding North Korea is an example of effective alliance management, but the United States should not expect immediate or quick responses from the Japanese system.

Despite controversies over U.S. forces in Japan, the Japanese public will continue to support an American military presence if the two governments present a compelling case, one buttressed by the return of unneeded facilities, especially on Okinawa, which host the bulk of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The early months of the Bush administration are not the time to make dramatic changes to our forward deployments in the region. But the administration should reinstate, in very close consultation with our allies, the periodic review of overall troop levels that was begun in 1989 (and later interrupted by the North Korean nuclear crisis), and tailor our force structure to the region's changing security requirements.

The Japanese bureaucracy, which for decades has run the government and managed the economy in the absence of strong political institutions and leadership, is demoralized after a decade of economic stagnation and recurrent scandal. These problems tend to obscure the fact that Japan is experiencing momentous changes. Indeed, the current trend toward globalization represents the third major turning point for Japan since it was “opened” to the outside world a century and a half ago (the other two were the Meiji Restoration and the United States occupation following World War II).

Reform, however, is proceeding in fits and starts. The political class has not yet achieved the strength to fill the void created by the demoralization of the bureaucracy, so it seems likely that drift will continue. But while consensus is slow to form in Japan, once it has formed, Japan moves quickly. And there has been progress in some areas, most notably in defense, where Japan has begun to take a more assertive stand despite weak political leadership. The United States, therefore, needs to be attentive for signs of change and to have realistic expectations.

Armstrong pointed out that during the Cold War, the United States had the (relatively) simple task of alliance management in the face of a fixed adversary. Today, with its preponderance of power, the United States faces new opportunities as well as problems, including the potential for the creation of a balance of power against an overarching United States if we mismanage relations with other key states. Effective management of the region includes solidifying our most critical alliances in Europe and Northeast Asia, and enticing Russia and China to band with us in consolidating what is generally seen as a favorable status quo. The new administration can do that best if it conducts itself with clarity of purpose, attentiveness to close friends, a certain humility in providing advice to former foes, and a readiness to continue shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden of common goods which are required to augment any security or political community in East Asia. If we can do these things, we will reap benefits to U.S. security.

China

Both the new U.S. administration and the Chinese government face the same challenges, in the view of former American ambassador to China Stapleton Roy: how to promote a stable and predictable environment that can permit the very positive aspects of development that have occurred over the last quarter century to continue, and how to avoid getting off on the wrong foot with each other.

And we always seem to get off on the wrong foot, causing us to waste enormous resources in trying to regain our balance. Roy points out that “It is almost a truism that, while new administrations all start with differing positions on China, they all end up with similar China policies. If there is merit to this observation, the new administration might want to consider beginning where it is going to end up.”

China is changing very rapidly, and there is an expectation widely shared in East Asia that China is likely to dominate the region in the next ten to fifteen years. None of the regional states wants to “contain” China because no one benefits from the repolarization of Asia. The miracle of the last 25 years is that we did away with the polarization of the earlier period. It has been the total engagement of East Asia that has opened up the opportunities for regional economic growth and for the easing of political tensions.

There are four core elements to the China policy of the United States, in no particular order: (1) ensuring Taiwan's security; (2) promoting ties with China that enhance U.S. interests; (3) providing a counterweight to China; and (4) fostering positive change in China.

The last area is where the United States has the least influence; yet that element tends to be the one that we use rhetorically to justify China policy domestically, and that is the one that creates problems. Missing the totality of China policy plagues effective policy implementation. The new administration should avoid falling into that rut.

The next four years will be momentous for the Bush administration in dealing with China. The administration faces immediate challenges regarding a decision on national missile defense, on the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act that is being considered by Congress, and on arms sales to Taiwan. The new administration will have to come to grips with these quickly, but hopefully not so quickly that it will not understand the full implications of its decisions.

Longer term, the issue of World Trade Organization entry for both China and Taiwan will have an enormous impact on cross-strait relations, and should be factored into U.S. policy. In addition, the Sixteenth Party Congress, coming up in less than two years, will mark a very important leadership transition in China, one that will influence the future of Asia and the future of U.S. relations with China.

Cross-strait relations are marked by contradictions, and the American mind does not like to deal with contradictions. They exist nonetheless. China wants reunification, but it lacks the military means to accomplish it, while also lacking the domestic situation and a political system that would lend credibility to a more persuasive approach. For its part, Taiwan finds offers to reunify from the mainland easy to refuse. Taiwan wants independence, but its geographic circumstances make this too costly, and it also lacks the required international support. Taiwan also does not want to abandon its economic interests in dealing with a rapidly growing Chinese economy. So, Taiwan pursues the contradictory objectives of maximizing Beijing's distrust of its motives while pouring investment into the mainland. Taiwan must also try to keep the common interests that are rapidly developing from exceeding a level that would compromise its freedom of political maneuver. The key to U.S. policy in managing China, therefore, is to understand these contradictions and find the right way to deal with them, not to deny their existence.

Effective U.S. policy formulation and implementation is complicated by a tendency to see the issue in moral terms, to see democracy and freedom in Taiwan and repression and authoritarian government in the mainland. This is not the right framework for the adoption of a subtle approach to the management of contradictions, and it makes the United States vulnerable to manipulation by the other players.

For a while, U.S. policy was rooted in a relatively stable framework. The "One China" policy put restraints on arms sales to Taiwan. The policy was endorsed by both Taiwan and the mainland, and it created an environment in which both the mainland and Taiwan had incentives to open a political dialogue.

And it worked, until Tiananmen. The violence in June 1989 destroyed China's image in the United States. Furthermore, the F-16 sale in 1992 negated the credibility of the August 17th Communiqué of 1982, which was supposed to govern arms sales to Taiwan.

Losing confidence in Taiwan's intentions and in the U.S. ability to restrain Taiwan, China reintroduced the overt threat of force as a means of trying to constrain Taiwan from breaking away. Beijing is now developing more credible military capabilities that can be used against Taiwan.

The cross-Strait relationship has become much more complicated, and could result in a dangerous arms race driven by a cycle of action then response that would divert resources away from economic development, and have enormous repercussions for the other states of the region.

Old approaches clearly will not work. However, neither will a penchant for U.S. intrusions to "fix" the situation in an atmosphere of heightened risks; indeed, U.S. intervention often makes things worse, in Roy's view. For the new administration's policy toward China to be effective, it must talk sensibly to both Congress and the American public. In doing so, it should avoid labels like "partnership" and "enemies." To be effective, the United States should avoid making relations contingent upon certain particular changes within China. China *will* change, but at its own pace. On the big issues, the United States will lose the ability to control its own policy if it makes the ability to do things that must be done dependent on the other side doing things first. (For example, to tie good relations with China to democratization may be self-defeating. Democracy may well come *sooner* if the United States has good relations with Beijing.)

China is torn between, on the one hand, impulses that its nationalism impels it toward on issues like territorial integrity and, on the other hand, an enormous desire for good relations with the United States and the West (which in turn is driven by its desire for modernization). If the United States understands this dynamic, it can encourage the positive aspect that works to our benefit. And if we handle China appropriately, we will not have to worry about Russia-China relations. We must try to avoid squeezing China in the east and Russia in the west, and thereby jeopardizing the entire Eurasian landmass.

The challenges regarding China are manageable, but require the United States to be subtle, and whether the United States has the capability of being subtle is an open question.

Eight

National Security Challenges for the New Administration

I am very much looking forward to joining the fraternity of national security advisers. I don't know if they're going to have to change the rules of admission or not, but it is delightful to follow in the footsteps of a great group of people who have served the country selflessly. I just want to add that no one has served more selflessly than my former boss, Brent Scowcroft, who I expect will still be on the other end of the phone to tell me how to really do the job. I'm also very glad to be here with all of you. I see a lot of friends in the audience, a lot of people whose wise counsel I've had over the years and whose wise counsel I hope I will have over the coming years. And I am especially glad to participate in a conference that is organized by the United States Institute of Peace. This is clearly one of our country's most successful new public-private partnerships. I'm grateful to the Institute for its work. I am grateful to its visionary director, Richard Solomon, with whom I've had many, many interesting and important discussions about foreign policy and about Asia in particular.

I am very grateful to you for giving me the opportunity to speak about "Passing the Baton." Now that's an image I particularly like, because passing the baton evokes an image of a relay race run by a team. And indeed I like that image because Sandy Berger and I are teammates in important ways. We may compete against each other when we're in races at home, but I can tell you that when the United States tries to pull together a foreign policy that is good for American interests, and I hope good for the world, that we have both had the pleasure of representing "Team USA." This has been, as most of you know, a very hurried transition for reasons that we all know. But Sandy has done everything possible to make this transition a smooth one, and I want to take this opportunity to publicly thank him because when we get off to a start on Saturday—if we get off to a good start—it will be in large part because Sandy has performed that task so well, and I would like you all to know that.

I think that dialogue is a part of the tradition here at the United States Institute of Peace. But I want to offer some thoughts about the challenges that we face and a little bit about how I think the National Security Council staff and its adviser need to think about those challenges as we face them over the next several years. Now, as you all know, I had the honor of serving in government for the United States at the end of the Cold War, and in 1990 I saw events that I never thought I would behold. I, like most specialists in international politics, went into government expecting to return to Stanford University with a Europe divided, with a Soviet Union intact, with a Germany divided, and with a world that had been pretty static; since 1945 largely unchanged. Well, to my great surprise—and indeed my great honor—I had a chance instead to participate in the unraveling of the Cold War. A largely peaceful unraveling of the Cold War that came about because of

by
Condoleezza
Rice

great statesmanship on all sides—and I really do want to say on all sides, on the side of the United States and the Europeans, but also on the side of the Soviet Union. It was statesmanship that saved the world from what could have been a conflagration. It was also a time when values mattered, when values of individual liberty and freedom that had been suppressed in one part of Europe for almost 50 years emerged unscathed because it turns out that they are incredibly powerful values that can, regardless of the circumstances, endure. I remember particularly one moment when I stood in Moscow at the Oktyabrskaya Hotel and witnessed the signing of the document that reunified Germany. And it struck me that it was remarkable that it was done really with very little ceremony, quite unlike the scores of arms control agreements that had been attended by major summits and great fanfare. This moment took place in a hotel in Moscow, the only head of state who was there was Soviet president Gorbachev. In some ways it was as if the world, tired of the Cold War, had finally decided that it should end with a whimper, not a bang. To that we should be very grateful, but in thinking about that moment we should not underestimate how remarkable it was. You don't have to hear a band playing to signal that one era has ended and another has begun.

For the first years of the new era, after leaving the government, I had the privilege of helping to manage one of the world's great educational institutions, Stanford University, parked right in the heart of the Silicon Valley. In fact, Stanford University and the Silicon Valley are symbiotic. This last week one of the last remaining fathers of the Silicon Valley, Bill Hewlett, died. Bill Hewlett and David Packard built a little company called Hewlett-Packard with a \$500 loan from the dean of engineering at Stanford University, Fred Terman. Fred somehow believed that these two young graduate students of his had a good idea, that creativity ought to be rewarded, and that they ought to go out and give it a try. Well, I'm going to tell you, that's still the story of not just the Silicon Valley but the story of Route 128 and of Austin, Texas, and of many, many places where knowledge and smart people that come out of the great American universities go on to create whole new realms of knowledge that become whole new areas of the economy. I can tell you that during that time the subjects that were familiar and of great love to me, Kremlin debates and nuclear throw weights to name two, were displaced by some new topics. Believe me, when you talk about the rivalry of the great powers in the Silicon Valley they don't mean East and West; they look toward Redmond, Washington. Now, no foreign visitor to my office ever wanted to talk about nuclear throw weights or Kremlin debates during my time as provost. They wanted instead to talk about how to become the Silicon Valley, how to use the creativity and innovativeness of their people to create whole new areas of knowledge, and to spur the kind of economic miracle we have seen in this country.

I am grateful for the opportunity of having had that experience because it taught me something very special about the United States of America. Unless you understand the specialness of the American experiment it is hard to understand what America can mean in the world. First of all, it taught me that creativity and openness and risk taking—the willingness to let a free people and their labor be rewarded—is really the engine of economic growth. It taught me, too, that we are one America out of many backgrounds and ethnic heritages because California, and the Silicon Valley in particular, is as ethnically diverse a place as you will ever find. In fact, one of America's great strengths has been that

it has been open to wave after wave of immigration constantly rejuvenating, constantly strengthening, the pool of people already here, and that is something that if we ever lose, we lose something that is very vital to the United States. It taught me, too, in America it does not matter where you come from; it matters where you are going. It matters tremendously that our educational system supports upward mobility, that it supports the belief that you can be the child of an itinerant farm worker or the child of a fourth-generation legatee and you can still sit in the same classroom at Stanford or Harvard University. It can matter not where you came from but where you are going. Those values and the belief that merit and hard work can help you get ahead, that class and background should not be impediments to the good life, are part of the promise that people have come to America seeking for the two-and-a-half centuries of our existence. So, in some ways it is a different world from the world that we confronted in the Cold War. But we need to remember always that these core values have not changed and that they are indeed the core values that sustain us at home and make us a different kind of power abroad.

President-elect Bush and I had the opportunity many, many times to talk about these values. As governor of Texas he practiced them, and I think it is one of the reasons that he has been so fundamentally devoted to education as the most important priority as president. But they are values that he understands and it is for that reason that he will be able to lead Americans as we play our important role in the world.

Now it is absolutely true that America's national interests require a kind of consistency and a kind of constancy about certain elements of what my friend Joe Nye would call "hard" power. That constancy entails a devotion to keeping the military strong, so that we can keep the peace. It means a devotion to friends and allies, making certain that our alliances are strong, that our coordination and consultation with our allies is complete, so that we have friends and partners in the world when we need them. And it is absolutely the case that you cannot simply call your friends when you need them; you have to call them before. And so I think that you will see a strong emphasis on the role of allies. It is also true that America's interests are served by devotion to open economies and to free trade, and that the president of the United States has to pay attention to the great powers. Powers like Russia and China and increasingly powers like India are, as my kids at Stanford would put it, so large and so consequential that they can "ruin your whole day." The desire is that those great powers can develop relations with the United States that will not ruin our whole day but that will instead be cooperative. We will have our disagreements. There are disagreements that are quite serious. But there is no reason to believe that fruitful relationships with other great powers with important interests cannot be nurtured and sustained in a way that is good for all concerned. Now, that's the kind of "hard" power (and since most of you may know from reading about me that I am a realist, or so people say) to which I apparently pay a lot of attention.

I want to assure you of one thing: it's an academic debate as to whether or not our interests or our values ought to govern foreign policy. Our interests and our values have to go hand in hand. In fact, our interests are reinforced by our values and vice versa. There is no doubt that American interests are better advanced today in a world in which more countries share our values of individual liberty, of freedom, of the belief that the

ruled ought to be able to choose those who will rule them, of freedom of the press, of human rights, and of human dignity. There is no doubt that those interests and those values go hand in hand. In that regard there are two instruments of American power that I think are sometimes undervalued in understanding our best road toward a coherent foreign policy, and I want to talk just briefly about those two.

One instrument of America power is to better understand and to better use the strength of nongovernmental institutions in promoting American values and interests abroad. In fact, I would call these “universal values,” because these are not simply American values. It turns out that when you ask people, “Do you want to speak freely? Do you wish to be able to enjoy the fruits of your labor? Do you wish to be able to be free from arbitrary power?” all people say, yes, they do. These are universal values. Now, nongovernmental institutions of many types play important roles. We can think about the tremendous role of institutions that are doing the hard humanitarian work abroad, or we might think about a set of institutions that I’m extremely interested in—our great educational institutions.

At Stanford I watched as more and more students, particularly at the graduate level, from around the world sought their higher education here. And those people go back not just with a better education, but I think with a better sense of who we are. Now there’s been a lot of talk about how to build nations and there’s often reference to the Marshall Plan in doing so. But I would offer to you that as important as the Marshall Plan was to the rebuilding of Europe—and it was—one of the most lasting effects of that period was actually through Fulbright Scholarships and Marshall Scholarships. They brought scores of Europeans here and scores of Americans there. Scores of Asians here and scores of Americans there. To understand each other better and to come to a common vision of human dignity. At Stanford I was fortunate to engage with some of my colleagues in the creation of something called “New Democracy Fellows.” These fellowships brought outstanding scholars from Eastern Europe to Stanford. We helped them to study traditional academic disciplines where top-flight scholarship in the former communist states had really been stifled. Disciplines like history and sociology and anthropology and political science. When these fellows went back home I’m sure that they were not preaching the virtues of the Republican Party—the Stanford faculty made certain of that. But I can assure you that they were experiencing free scholarly exchange and free scholarly ideas. You know at the toughest, most difficult times countries that were cut off from one another could sometimes find a way to break down barriers through scholarly exchange. Knowledge truly knows no borders. And if we ever forget that knowledge knows no borders, we again will take one of the most important arrows out of the quiver of the forward march of democracy.

Another instrument of power is of course this public partnership with the United States Institute of Peace. The Institute has pioneered a new Virtual Diplomacy program that applies information and communications technologies to prevent, manage, and resolve international conflicts. The program’s sponsors write about a revolution in diplomatic affairs that can parallel the revolution in military affairs. And I think the Institute is on to something because, where power lies in knowledge and ideas, surely the new information technology has become an astonishing force multiplier.

Now, as I give these examples of public-private and private institutions, let me assure you that I think that there are many things that the U.S. government can also do to further values, to further the promotion of ideas, and to create a world in which there is a common, shared experience and thereby a common understanding of human dignity. Now it's a real challenge for the way in which our government does its work, particularly in national security affairs, and that leads me to the subject of the National Security Council system.

The National Security Council system was, of course, created by the National Security Act of 1947. It was created to help unite the great departments and agencies of the government to prepare for the dangers of total war. One of the statutory members of the council under the act was the director of defense mobilization. Now, since he doesn't come to the meetings any more, I think we may ask the question, "How relevant is this particular institution to the world that we face now?" What we need today is an NSC system that unites the government to prepare not for total war, but for the total spectrum of policy instruments we can use when military power is not appropriate. We've gotten ourselves into a quite bipolar discussion: we either intervene militarily, or we're isolationist and we don't intervene at all. In fact, there are a whole host of instruments in between that need to be fine-tuned for the times when military power is clearly not appropriate. In 1947 the challenge was to tame the clashing interests of the State, War, and Navy Departments. In 2001 the challenge is to unite the far-flung concerns of all the agencies that are working across our real and virtual borders, from the Department of Defense to the Public Health Service, from the administrator of NASA to the Federal Communications Commission.

Let me comment, then, on how I see my own role as assistant to the president for national security affairs in this complex world. These many agencies have to perform in concert, striving toward a common purpose. Precisely because our policies now involve so many players, we have to have a clearly written sheet of music (you may know I'm a musician, so pardon the reference), so that everyone knows what tune to play. The National Security Council system, with the president at its top, is the instrument we use. Now, it's not my job to make people "toe the line"; instead, the challenge and the great opportunity is to sense the possibilities of this new era and to make connections, to work as a team toward an American foreign policy that is coherent and successful. We can no longer afford "stovepipes."

When we talk about America's commitments with our European allies, we should think about how our common ideals help us to see ways to work together on issues of the new economy without being mired in problems of the past. When we talk about free enterprise with our Latin American trading partners, we should make the connections to our political institutions. When we think about the new dangers of transnational terrorism, we must make the connections between law enforcement and national security. When we think about transforming defense, we must make the connection between defense agencies and the way business and society are already adapting to the new information technology.

So my conception and my hope for this job is overwhelmingly positive. We at the National Security Council are going to try to work the seams, stitching the connections together tightly. If we can do that, if we can provide glue for the many, many agencies

and the many, many instruments the United States is now deploying around the world, I think we will have done our job on behalf of the president of the United States. Then we can develop a foreign policy that uses all of the incredible strength of this country and is able then to project American influence in support of its principles.

Conference Participants

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Joseph R. Biden, Jr. has served as U.S. senator from Delaware since 1973 and is the senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee and a member of the Judiciary Committee. He is cochairman of the Senate NATO Observer Group and cochairman of the Senate National Security Working Group.

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