

Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia

The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy

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Key Points

Introduction: Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia

- ▶ In the period since the end of the Cold War, the security landscape in Eurasia has changed dramatically. Conflict has frequently resulted from the breakup of states along ethnic lines, with elements such as regional, linguistic, or religious affiliation serving as the principal markers of identity. One of the main reasons for the outbreak of conflict in areas such as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia is that ethnicity is linked to territory and claims for self-determination, producing secessionist and irredentist wars. This form of ethnonational conflict has retarded the process of state building, prevented the growth of democratic institutions, given outside parties the ability to intervene and manipulate the outcome, and created massive refugee flows.
- ▶ The nature of the European security *problematique* requires a new and different response from all institutions playing a role in the security arena. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is especially well positioned to respond to the complexity of post-Cold War conflict. Although often undervalued by U.S. policymakers and the media and generally unknown to the public, the OSCE has the potential to assist in preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts that have surfaced in Europe since the late 1980s.

The Evolving Role of the CSCE/OSCE in Eurasian Security

- ▶ Not only did the OSCE (and its predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the CSCE) play a major role in bringing the Cold War to an end, it currently draws upon a wider membership—extending from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”—than do the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the organization has adapted its structures to the security challenges of the 1990s. For instance, it created the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC), which coordinates the work of the OSCE’s “missions of long duration” and verifies the implementation of agreements on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). It likewise created the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which promotes the OSCE’s “human dimension” activities, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who has significant discretion in investigating and defusing potential conflicts involving national minorities. These structures and the wide range of activities the OSCE has taken on make it well suited to respond to conflicts that now include

abuse of minority and human rights, social turmoil brought on by economic transformation, and armed violence between competing factions. Significantly, to achieve this impressive scope of its activities, the OSCE relies on a relatively small budget and a staff of fewer than 250 people.

The Role of OSCE Missions and Other Field Activities in Managing Conflict

- ▶ The OSCE missions of long duration engage in four main activities: (1) democratization, (2) preventive diplomacy, (3) conflict resolution, and (4) postconflict security building. The democratization aspect of the OSCE's mandate was evident in its missions to Estonia and Latvia. Here the organization addressed basic issues, such as citizenship and language laws, as well as school curricula, migration, and dialogue between different ethnic communities in an effort to lower tension between the national majority and both countries' Russian minority.

The preventive diplomacy aspect of the OSCE's work was especially apparent in the early-warning and early-intervention activities of the mission to Ukraine. The HCNM likewise was involved in preventative diplomacy activities when he successfully diminished tensions inflamed by ethnic Russians in Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula.

The OSCE has engaged in conflict resolution by assisting in the negotiation of cease-fires between warring parties. Further, it has monitored peacekeeping forces and other bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as for example between Moldova and the breakaway region of Transnistria.

Postconflict security building entails verifying disarmament agreements, establishing links between domestic organizations and foreign donors, assisting in the return of refugees, and supervising elections, to name but a few activities. These have been among the principal tasks undertaken by the OSCE in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Albania.

- ▶ The OSCE has compiled a record of modest successes in preventing the outbreak or reignition of violent conflicts and contributing to security building in the aftermath of conflicts. The two greatest attributes of the OSCE are its proven ability to strengthen democratic institutions in societies undergoing transition and its capacity to respond rapidly to crises. Unfortunately, there also has been disappointment in its failure thus far to resolve underlying conflicts in those regions that experienced violence in the early post-Cold War years.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the OSCE

- ▶ U.S. officials have criticized the OSCE as being (1) inadequate or potentially harmful to American interests, (2) a constraint on unilateral U.S. action, and (3) a competitor to NATO for primacy in providing for security in post–Cold War Eurasia. Unfortunately, the OSCE’s work is not well known within the general public or even the specialist community. However, the OSCE promotes American values, such as democratization and the rule of law, and has managed to link these “softer” issues to those of security in a unique fashion. The OSCE also has done much to contribute to transparency on such issues as military exercises and budgets. Finally, it is much less costly to promote the organization’s conflict-prevention activities than to fund peacekeeping operations after hostilities have broken out.

Recommendations for U.S. Foreign-Policy Makers

- ▶ U.S. policy could pursue modest measures to enhance the OSCE’s effectiveness in managing conflicts of the kind that have appeared in Eurasia since 1990, and thereby strengthen the organization. These measures include the following:
 1. Assist the OSCE in improving the quality of its professional personnel assigned to missions of long duration. This can be done through longer-term budgeting and staffing, relying more on professional conflict-management specialists than personnel “seconded” by member governments, providing more and better training for mission members before they are sent into the field, and creating a small analytical center in Vienna to support the CPC and the missions under its jurisdiction.
 2. Encourage the OSCE to coordinate its work more effectively with other institutions that have overlapping functions, such as NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
 3. Support the enlargement of the scope of activities of the HCNM and of the human and financial resources available to this office.
 4. Increase the political importance assigned to OSCE activities by high-level U.S. officials. The United States should take the lead in making the OSCE a central pillar of its European security policy. Especially when NATO military force is likely to be irrelevant or ineffective at resolving the problem at hand, the United States should call on OSCE expertise.

Foreword

Before NATO forcefully halted Serbia's violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, another European security organization was operating in the region—the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Doubtless few in the United States and even in Europe knew about the OSCE, let alone its conflict-management functions in Kosovo—and in many other regions of conflict across the Eurasian continent. In the following pages, Terry Hopmann elaborates on the conflict-management work of the organization and explores its possibilities as a complement to the United States' almost sole reliance on NATO as the principal instrument of U.S. foreign policy in trouble spots across Europe (especially in the Balkans) and into the former Soviet political space that constitutes Eurasia.

Foreign-policy makers have witnessed a great deal of institutional evolution in European security organizations ever since the break up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. NATO has probably gone through the most visible transformation, changing from a strictly military alliance guarding against a potential Soviet assault on Western Europe to an enlarged peacekeeping force, as witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The OSCE also has expanded its organizational repertoire in response to the post-Cold War outbreaks of ethnic conflicts. Although it, too, has deployed many missions to the former Yugoslavia, it has ventured into areas where NATO has so far been unable to muster either the will or the mandate to stanch potential mass violence in the Soviet successor states. More than half its missions and “field activities” are located in various former Soviet republics, ranging from the Baltic states to the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Originating from an institutionalized conference in Helsinki in the mid-1970s that sought to secure the territorial status of postwar Europe in exchange for improvements in the Soviet bloc's human rights situation, the OSCE has advanced the Helsinki principles into the post-Cold War era—attempting to bridge the delicate and often violent gap between secessionist regions and central governments' demands for territorial integrity.

To be sure, the OSCE has a shorter history than NATO, but its institutional adaptation has been just as remarkable. It has a larger membership than NATO and the European Union, and it has conducted sixteen missions and field activities so far—all with the consent of its member states. Such an active agenda is notable in light of the fact that the organization operates with a staff of just around 250 people.

In terms of its conflict-management functions, the OSCE is positioned on the spectrum of other European security organizations somewhere between the Council of Europe's normative focus and NATO's military might. This “in-between” existence also reflects the OSCE's typical mode of operation. As Professor Hopmann shows, the OSCE promotes democratization and the rule of law, and is able to link these “softer” issues to security matters in a unique fashion. In this *Peaceworks*, Professor Hopmann analyzes cases of the OSCE's work that correspond to the organization's four principal functions: democratization in Latvia and Estonia; preventive diplomacy on Ukraine's Crimean Pen-

insula; conflict resolution in Georgia's South Ossetia region and Moldova's Transdniestrian region; and postconflict security building in Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. Again, as Hopmann emphasizes in this study, the OSCE's distinctive characteristics of organizational élan and modest size give it the flexibility to respond quickly yet, in most cases, effectively to the prospects of mass violence at critical moments in a conflict's evolution—soon after warning signals indicate an imminent crisis, but before the use of force on behalf of the international community is either warranted or can be effective in separating the parties involved in the conflict.

In a period where the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is so much a function of visible successful outcomes—particularly after the deployment of force to quell an episode of organized mass violence—the OSCE will inevitably exist in the penumbra of NATO's military responses to conflicts. However, the gauge of the OSCE's success should involve a counterfactual argument: How much more conflict would erupt across the Eurasian continent absent the OSCE's missions and field activities? As Hopmann acknowledges, by such a standard, the OSCE does not score many points where it appears that “nothing happened.” If “nothing” means the careful, patient deployment of election monitors, conflict-management specialists, and coordinators of humanitarian organizations' efforts, the OSCE must be lauded for its behind-the-scenes activity in keeping potential conflicts from dramatically erupting into destructive warfare.

There is also a spectrum of U.S. involvement in these European security institutions—from observer status in the Council of Europe to the driving force within NATO. The U.S. participation in the OSCE is similarly positioned between the two extremes. The United States is a full-fledged member of the organization, and many heads of OSCE missions are drawn from the ranks of U.S. ambassadors. Yet, unlike NATO, the organization's senior officials, professional staff, and field workers are usually seconded from European countries (although two of the Institute's staff members served as OSCE monitors in Bosnia's 1998 national elections).

That NATO is the principal vehicle for U.S. involvement in Europe's post-Cold War security architecture says much about the “reactive” nature of U.S. foreign policy when it comes to transatlantic security. This reliance on the military component reflects direct U.S. control of NATO's command structures and military assets. Indeed, much of the reluctance in the U.S. foreign-policy establishment to rely on the OSCE as a vehicle of conflict prevention stems from the distinctly European character of the organization, in addition to a larger membership (which, unlike NATO, includes the Russian Federation) that could complicate consensus decision making on how to respond rapidly to an imminent crisis. However, as this study's author concludes, many of the U.S. foreign-policy establishment's concerns about the organization's presumed lack of effectiveness are exaggerated, pointing to conflicts the OSCE could not *resolve*, when in fact the organization's purpose is to *manage* them.

U.S. foreign-policy officials who are acquainted with the OSCE's history may want to focus their attention on the concluding section of this *Peaceworks*, in which Professor Hopmann addresses these concerns and offers some realistic policy recommendations designed to bring the organization closer to the domain of options foreign-policy officials should consider in preventing conflicts across the Eurasian continent.

Terry Hopmann is more than qualified to write this overview and analysis of the OSCE's functions and its future in U.S. foreign policy. A well-known and respected scholar of international politics and conflict resolution, he is professor of political science at Brown University and research director of the Global Security Program at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. The present study is just one example of the comprehensiveness of his prodigious body of work. The scope and insight expressed in this *Peaceworks* exemplifies not only his intimate knowledge of European and Eurasian politics, but also his keen understanding of the institutions that make up the transatlantic security architecture. Like his other research, this study will speak to the interests of students and scholars alike, as well as to foreign-policy practitioners and conflict-management specialists.

This *Peaceworks* is one in a series of major works on European security organizations published by the United States Institute of Peace. The Institute will soon issue the second of two Special Reports on NATO by senior fellow Andrew Pierre, following former fellow David Yost's *NATO Transformed*, published by the Institute's Press in 1998. The Press also published James Goodby's examination of the role of transatlantic security institutions, including the OSCE, in U.S.-Russian relations in *Europe Undivided* (1998). In another *Peaceworks*, former senior fellow Heinrich Klebes surveyed the work of the Council of Europe in *The Quest for Democratic Security* (1998). The Institute's Research and Studies program also continues to examine transatlantic security issues in its Working Group on the Future of Europe.

In the following pages, Terry Hopmann provides us with a unique and thorough look at this long-neglected security organization. This work and his forthcoming book on the OSCE should be on the reading lists of scholars and foreign-policy officials who continue to examine the architecture of transatlantic security in the attempt to discover ways of strengthening its foundation.

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Preface

This study attempts to inform a broad audience interested in European security issues about one of the most important but least-known institutions that has been working in the European security field since the mid-1970s—namely, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), known before 1995 as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) or simply as the “Helsinki Process.” (In this study, I will refer to the OSCE when treating the organization generically or when dealing specifically with activities that have transpired since January 1, 1995, when the name change became official. When referring to all activities through the end of 1994, I will refer to the organization as the CSCE.)

The OSCE is considered a European regional security organization, although its membership includes two North American states actively engaged in European security: the United States and Canada. It also works in those regions of Asia included within the former Soviet Union (that is, Russia east of the Urals and the Central Asian republics). Thus in this study I will generally refer to the region in which the OSCE operates as “Eurasia,” although official documents occasionally refer to it simply as “Europe.”

Precisely because the CSCE/OSCE has been laboring on some of the less glamorous, infrequently publicized aspects of Eurasian security, its work too often has gone unnoticed in the West and especially in the United States by all but a small group of specialists in government and academia. There is far from a complete understanding of the work of the OSCE in many agencies of the U.S. government, especially at very high levels, as well as in Congress. Among members of the media, and especially in the public at large, including the “attentive public,” knowledge about the OSCE is extremely sparse. The media frequently refer to an anonymous “European security organization” that sent monitors to Kosovo in late 1998 or conducted elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina on several occasions. As such, these are the best-publicized aspects of the OSCE’s work; the vast majority of its activities go almost completely unnoticed in the United States. As I shall argue in the following pages, this lack of attention may partially explain the relative indifference with which U.S. policymakers and members of Congress have frequently treated the OSCE.

In a relatively brief monograph like this one, I am unable to document fully all of the many activities the CSCE/OSCE has undertaken since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 or even since the end of the Cold War in 1989. What I hope to provide is an overview of the most significant kinds of activities in which the OSCE has become involved, especially in the fields of conflict prevention and security building. While no single activity of the OSCE may jump out as being of dramatic importance in the history of post-Cold War international relations in Eurasia, what is perhaps most significant is the cumulative impact the literally hundreds of activities have had on some of the most troubled and explosive regions of the world, especially during the last decade of the twentieth century.

I was fortunate to be able to write the first draft of this manuscript while holding a Jennings Randolph senior fellowship at the United States Institute of Peace in 1998. I am

especially grateful for the support and assistance throughout this project from director Joe Klaitis and program officer Sally Blair in the Jennings Randolph program; Simon Limage, my research assistant at the Institute; Pamela Aall, director of the Institute's Education program; and Peter Pavilionis of the Institute's Publications program. I also was fortunate to receive a Fulbright Fellowship to the OSCE, based in Vienna, in 1997–98. During that time, I conducted much of the field research upon which this study is based. I am especially grateful to Richard Pettit of the Council for International Exchange of Scholars, who coordinates the Fulbright program in Europe; Otmar Höll, director of the Austrian Institute for International Affairs in Vienna, where I was based during this period; Stanley Shraeger and Ilene Jennison of the Public Affairs Office of the U.S. mission to the OSCE in Vienna, who were extremely helpful in all aspects of my research; and to Finn Chemnitz and Kitty Weinberger of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna, who were invaluable in arranging interviews and obtaining necessary contacts at the OSCE offices in Vienna.

This was not my first close-up acquaintance with the OSCE, however. I began research on the initial negotiations of the Helsinki Final Act while based at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's office in Geneva in 1974, where I had the privilege of working with the late Jean Siotis. I observed the work of the CSCE through many shorter visits to Europe in the following years. My next period of extended contact with the organization came in 1992, while on sabbatical from Brown University. I spent five months in Vienna and Helsinki, observing the work of the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Center at a time when missions of long duration were first being created. I also observed negotiations on the Vienna Document 1992 on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); the final negotiations of the Open Skies Treaty; and the preparation, conduct, and follow-up to the July 1992 Helsinki Summit. I interviewed senior officials in the CSCE secretariat and representatives (generally the ambassadors) of most CSCE countries present in Vienna.

As noted above, I had another extended period of close observation of the OSCE from September 1997 through January 1998. During that time I attended most of the Permanent Council's formal and informal meetings, including reports by heads of the missions stationed in zones of potential or actual conflict. These reports were given both in informal settings and in formal presentations to the council. I also interviewed all heads of the OSCE missions of long duration during their regular reporting visits to Vienna. I visited the OSCE mission on-site in Moldova, traveling as well to Transdniestria. I am especially grateful to Ambassador John Evans, who was head of the OSCE mission in Moldova at that time. I also interviewed senior officials of the CPC in Vienna, directed at the time by Ambassador Jan Kubis; the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in the Hague, Ambassador Max van der Stoep; and the Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw, directed by Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann. Finally, I obtained back copies of all field reports (typically issued once or twice a month) from the OSCE missions and other field activities, copies of official correspondence between the HCNM and governments with whom he met (including his recommendations to those governments), and materials from ODIHR (including election evaluation reports).

The analysis that follows, therefore, is primarily based on my personal observations, interviews, and reading of original documents from all of these sources concerning the organization's field activities. Secondary accounts supplement these primary materials when necessary to place them in context. Of course, I cannot use all these materials in a study of this length, and I am currently writing a book that will present a more detailed account as well as a more theoretically grounded analysis of the various OSCE activities in the field of conflict prevention and security building.

In the interim, however, I hope this monograph will introduce a wide audience to the significant role that the OSCE has begun to play in Eurasian security. I have outlined some of the most important challenges that the organization is likely to face in the near future, and I have also included some suggestions for how the United States can help strengthen the OSCE and make it more effective in its efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts throughout the Eurasian region. Students and scholars of European security regimes will benefit most from the first three sections of this study, which examine the history of postwar security initiatives on the Eurasian continent. Officials in the U.S. foreign policy community may want to focus on the concluding section, in which I offer some modest policy recommendations for ways in which the United States can help further integrate the OSCE in the transatlantic security architecture. In any event, I hope that some of my readers will be inspired to do further reading about and analysis of this organization, which has become one of the most significant organs of European security as the twentieth century draws to a close.

This study is dedicated to the memory of my father-in-law, Antony E. Raubitschek, who died as the study neared completion. A native of Vienna, he spent much of his youth during the years between the two world wars in various parts of the Balkans. Subsequently a professor of classics at Yale, Princeton, and Stanford, he read an early draft of this manuscript and never ceased to remind me of the historical dimension of many of the conflicts with which the OSCE is now engaged, some of which he traced back to accounts from classical antiquity. In many conversations, he recalled for me the long and troubled history of the region that borders the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Seas, as well as the hope he witnessed in humanity's continuous, if still unfulfilled, search for freedom, democracy, and peace.

Introduction: Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia

Since the end of the Cold War, conflict in Eurasia (Europe plus the Asian regions of the former Soviet Union) has not disappeared. Rather, it has frequently taken on a different character from the kind of conflict that predominated during the period between 1945 and 1989. The military confrontation between the two Cold War alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been replaced by a political-military fragmentation of the continent, especially on the territory of many former Warsaw Pact states.

Whereas the potential for interstate conflict and especially for nuclear war has decreased, conflicts have sprung up mostly within states throughout eastern and southeastern Europe and in the former Soviet republics of the Caucasuses and Central Asia. Most of these conflicts have been caused by the breakup of states along ethnic lines, with religion, language, or regional or clan affiliation serving in most cases as the markers of identity. In addition, a few conflicts have been caused by the partial collapse of states undergoing difficult processes of transformation. Although these are mostly internal conflicts, they also have been affected by external influences and have significant international consequences.

Similar conflicts have occurred throughout much of the world during the postwar period, but this is a relatively recent occurrence in Eurasia. The disintegration and reshuffling of state structures took on huge proportions with the breakup of the communist system after 1989, especially with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Both federations broke up into their constituent republics, usually named for the largest nationality, but in fact the correspondence between the ethnicity of the population and the new state structures was often imperfect.

Within these new states, therefore, new minorities were created, and in numerous cases these minorities could no longer depend on the protection of the old federal government to preserve their rights in the face of threats from their new governments. These vulnerable minorities also tried to capitalize on the opportunity provided by the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia to assert their own claims for self-determination, threatening to divide these regions into smaller and smaller states. These efforts were frequently accompanied by “ethnic cleansing,” as unwelcome minorities were forced to flee their homelands or face violence and death as the new states sought to create ethnically homogenous populations.

Other new states, such as Tajikistan, or old ones undergoing transformation from especially intense totalitarian rule, such as Albania, experienced a virtual collapse of state structures. Collapsed states are typically accompanied by a breakdown in the social order.

As Lyons and Samatar note, “Without the state, society breaks down, and without social structures, the state cannot survive.”¹

These violent conflicts have created numerous problems for security throughout this region:

- ▮ They have retarded the consolidation of nation and state building in many of the newly independent states by draining resources and depriving these states of their territorial integrity and sense of national unity.
- ▮ They have impeded the growth of democratic institutions because nondemocratic political forces, using the discourse of nationalism, have arisen both in the secessionist regions and in the core of the new states.
- ▮ They have provided numerous opportunities for outside parties to try to manipulate these conflicts to their own advantage, contrary to the interests of the new governments in the region.
- ▮ They have created refugee problems extending well beyond their borders; some conflicts may eventually threaten the security of other European states outside of the immediate region of chaos.

In short, these internal conflicts probably present the most serious security threat to emerge in Eurasia over the past decade.²

Unfortunately, most regional organizations that existed in Europe when the communist regimes collapsed were unprepared to deal with the new security situation. Members of the surviving institutions, such as NATO and the EU, came only from the West. Their counterpart institutions in the East—the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Comecon—collapsed altogether. The only surviving pan-European institution dealing with issues of security was the CSCE, the major focus of this study.³

A debate has since arisen about how best to create a security “architecture” for Eurasia that will be relevant into the twenty-first century. As European institutions have grappled to respond to the new security situation, several alternative approaches have been suggested. Some analysts have argued that no previously existing institution can provide adequate assurances of security in response to the new conflicts and conflict-related issues facing Eurasia. Thus they argue for the creation of a new pan-Eurasian security organization with a mandate drawn up specifically to address the challenges of the post–Cold War security *problematique*.

A second group of security specialists have suggested that existing institutions can be modified and pieced together like a gigantic puzzle, each performing its own special functions as part of some organic, if informal, whole. They argue that each of the surviving institutions has certain specialized functions that it performs best, so the most satisfactory overall arrangement would be one in which these institutions form a patchwork of reinforcing competencies.⁴

Finally, some analysts and policymakers have argued that eventually one of the existing organizations will win out in some kind of Darwinian competition, proving that it has adapted better to the new Eurasian security situation and is thus prepared to deal with the security challenges of the twenty-first century.⁵ The most prominent candidates to fulfill such a role are NATO, the EU, and the OSCE.

However, security specialists and political leaders in different countries have divergent preferences about which of the surviving institutions should emerge on top. Policymakers in the United States and in a few western European countries generally prefer NATO to assume the principal role in Eurasian security. Many analysts and officials in western Europe, especially in France, hope that the EU will achieve a new prominence in the security field. Finally, experts and leaders in many of the former Soviet-bloc countries, especially in Russia, argue that only the OSCE can play the role of a pan-European security institution in the decades ahead.⁶ This debate, and the policies it reflects, have produced a jockeying for primacy among the contending institutions, “institution shopping” among states experiencing conflict, and an attempt by the most powerful states to privilege their preferred institution in the evolving European security institutional structure.

NATO, certainly the preeminent contender for the dominant institution in European security, has adapted in many ways to the new, post–Cold War security environment. Its focus has moved away from defending western Europe against a massive conventional attack and toward participating in peacemaking and peacekeeping missions “out of area” (that is, beyond the territory of its member states). In spite of these changes, however, it thus far has failed to escape completely from its Cold War legacy.

The residue of that past limits its ability to play an exclusive or even a dominant role in Eurasian security into the twenty-first century. First, NATO has an image problem. It is still seen by publics and politicians, especially in the East, as the survivor of the two Cold War military alliances, and it will take a long time before that image changes.

Second, in spite of the alliance’s enlargement when three former Warsaw Pact states entered in 1999, and in spite of the many ways in which nonmembers may participate in NATO activities, the alliance essentially remains a structure dominated by western Europe and the United States. Even though Russia and Ukraine have negotiated special relationships with NATO, the agreements do not give these two countries any say over major alliance decisions. Indeed, for the foreseeable future, NATO’s political decisions will inevitably be made by a limited but important subset of the United States and major European countries. NATO thus falls short of being a truly pan-Eurasian security structure.

Third, at its core, NATO is essentially a military organization that has taken on some important but still secondary political, technological, and economic tasks. For the most part, however, its view of security is one-dimensional, focusing primarily on military security. It has little capacity to deal with some of the most important underlying causes of violence in post–Cold War Eurasia, which are primarily political, social, ethnic, economic, and even environmental in nature.

Perhaps no event illustrates the one-dimensional aspect of NATO’s contribution to Eurasian security better than its role in the Kosovo conflict in the spring of 1999. The failure of diplomatic efforts to bring a solution to the conflict between Serbia’s secessionist province of Kosovo and Serbian leaders in Belgrade led to a NATO aerial bombardment

of much of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commencing on March 24, 1999. In the absence of a supporting diplomatic initiative or a credible threat of ground intervention to protect Kosovar Albanians from attack by the Yugoslav National Army and Serbian paramilitary groups, NATO policy failed in at least two of its objectives: One, it permitted these forces essentially to “cleanse” Kosovo of a large portion of the majority ethnic Albanian population, creating a huge humanitarian crisis of more than eight hundred thousand refugees flowing into surrounding unstable countries, such as Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Two, it at least initially consolidated support for the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, whom it aimed to topple from office.

Even though an agreement eventually brought an end to the war, it is not clear that this agreement was significantly better than one that could have been obtained had more serious negotiations been attempted at Rambouillet in February 1999, where both Serbia and the Kosovar Albanians were presented with a “take-it-or-leave-it” ultimatum. Furthermore, this agreement to end the fighting demonstrated the central role that Russian diplomacy can play in eventually achieving a political settlement in those parts of the world where it is still an influential party. It thus also demonstrated conclusively that many of the security problems of this region cannot be resolved without the participation of most states from the region, including countries that do not belong to NATO, such as Russia.

The second major contender for a central role in Eurasian security is the EU.⁷ The major attraction of the EU is its significant success at promoting economic integration and prosperity in Europe since its founding under the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Most former communist states more eagerly seek membership in the EU than in NATO, in the hope that the western European economic “miracle” will spread eastward. The EU first began to move into the area of foreign and security policy in the early 1990s, with an agreement on a Common Foreign and Security Policy reached as part of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty.

Nonetheless, several major drawbacks hinder the EU’s ability to take a leading role in providing security for Eurasia in the post–Cold War era. First, its membership is limited to states in western Europe. Even if it expands to include members from central, southeastern, or northeastern Europe, two major states are unlikely to become members for the foreseeable future—the United States and the Russian Federation. Their absence essentially precludes the EU from assuming a dominant role in providing for pan-European security.

Second, the EU remains essentially an economic organization. Although the integration process has advanced a great deal since 1958, the EU has not yet fulfilled its mission of promoting full economic integration. Progress in sensitive political-military issues where the claims of national sovereignty still remain strong has been even slower, especially in matters of foreign policy and national defense.

Third, although the EU has adopted a significant program of economic assistance “out of area”—initially to developing countries in Africa and more recently in central Europe and the former Soviet republics—its political-military role outside its geographic borders has remained limited. The diplomatic efforts it undertook to try to prevent and subsequently end fighting in the former Yugoslavia provoked internal dissension within the EU, especially between Germany and other member states, and largely failed to achieve significant results. Some critics even suggest that the results of its intervention were anything

but salutary and may have even exacerbated the very conflict it was trying to prevent.⁸ This perceived failure encouraged many of the larger EU members to want to create a distinctive European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) backed by an effective European military force, perhaps within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). However, the ESDI, like the Common Foreign and Security Policy, remains more a vague dream than an existing reality—and thus does not now provide a sound base on which to construct a pan-European security edifice.

The third principal contender for assuming a major role in post–Cold War Eurasian security is the OSCE. Begun in 1973 as the CSCE, this organization has evolved into a comprehensive, European-wide security organization. Following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which served as its “charter,” the CSCE held a series of conferences (reminiscent of the Concert of Europe during 1815–1822) that negotiated on European security issues in the fluid environment of the last decade and a half of the Cold War. It is unique in that it was founded on the basis of ten normative principles governing security, known as the “Helsinki Decalogue.” The Final Act also included a set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the realm of military security and provisions calling for cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural, and educational fields. The Final Act linked these components with a special focus on shared values, especially human rights, as the foundation for common security in Europe.

The end of the Cold War also brought fundamental changes to the CSCE, which nevertheless maintained greater continuity with its previous activities than did most other European institutions. Indeed, in large part because many of its members—especially those in central and eastern Europe—credited it with playing a significant role in bringing an end to the Cold War, it was easier for the CSCE to cast off its image as a Cold War institution than it was for most other European security organizations to do so.

At the same time, the CSCE’s unique strength endured—namely, the linkage between military-political aspects and the “human dimension” of security. It readily transformed itself from an organization serving as a bridge between eastern and western Europe into one that welcomed all the new states of Eurasia as members and active participants. It is thus the one pan-European security organization with universal membership, including the United States, Canada, and all former Soviet republics, extending from “Vancouver to Vladivostok the long way around.”

The CSCE created new institutions and structures to respond to the specific threats that were arising throughout the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. It also has undertaken the broadest range of security tasks, including military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), third-party intervention into disputes within and between member states, assistance with economic reform and reconstruction, extensive concern for individual human rights, the rights of minority groups, the rule of law, media freedom, and the organization and supervision of democratic elections.

The OSCE thus evolved by responding more directly than other European security institutions to the new security challenges of post–Cold War Eurasia—namely, the rise in intolerance, ethnonational conflict, and violence as states divided along ethnonational lines. These new security threats include the denial of human and minority group rights, major economic dislocations accompanying the transition from communism to market societ-

ies, and armed violence among competing factions in a highly fluid political environment. Only the OSCE has been well positioned to deal with all elements that constitute the Eurasian security *problematique* at once. The success or failure of the OSCE in grappling with this complex environment thus may have a great impact on Eurasian security in the years ahead.

As the security “architecture” of post–Cold War Eurasia has taken shape over the past decade, it has become evident that no single institution is likely to emerge at the top of the pyramid. What is evolving, by contrast, is a “variable geometry” in which different institutions have developed special competencies in particular security activities. The main argument of this study is that the OSCE has greater potential to perform a central role in the emerging Eurasian security regime than is generally recognized, especially in the United States. Its comparative advantages relative to other institutions too often have gone unnoticed by U.S. policymakers, media, and the general public alike. The result has been a self-fulfilling prophecy: Because the OSCE is thought by some to be too weak and undependable, the United States and other key governments have not provided the economic and human resources, and political support necessary to develop its potential fully. Furthermore, even its limited but important successes have largely gone unnoticed in the United States. Hence, the organization seldom has received the credit that it deserves for what it has accomplished.

This study seeks to redress the imbalance by surveying the OSCE’s accomplishments and failings in the area of conflict management and security building. I conclude with some observations about how the United States can help strengthen the OSCE and make it more effective as a central element of U.S. security policy on the Eurasian continent.

Two

The Evolving Role of the CSCE/OSCE in Eurasian Security

The origins of the CSCE may be found in Soviet proposals, beginning in the mid-1950s, to hold an all-European conference that would put a political end to World War II by resolving the “German question” and essentially ratifying the postwar status quo in Europe. The United States and most of its NATO allies were opposed to a conference with such a vague “political” agenda, preferring instead to hold a conference between NATO and Warsaw Pact states dealing with “hard” arms-control issues in Europe.

In April 1969, neutral Finland proposed to host a preparatory conference on European security in Helsinki, and increasingly the Western European members of NATO supported this idea, contrary to the expressed preferences of American leaders.⁹ The idea of convening a European security conference gained momentum in 1970 with West Germany’s *Ostpolitik* and the resulting agreements with both the Soviet Union and Poland over the political status and borders of East Germany and the Four Power agreement on Berlin in 1971.

NATO responded to the Finnish proposal by suggesting that the agenda of a European security conference should include such issues as prior notification of military maneuvers and freer movement of peoples and ideas across the Cold War divide. American concerns were alleviated when, during a trip by Henry Kissinger to Moscow in November 1972, the Soviet Union agreed to link the opening of the Helsinki Conference to the commencement of another negotiation on conventional arms control, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe. In addition, the Western states succeeded in adding to the CSCE agenda issues such as human rights and extended contacts between peoples in Eastern and Western Europe.

From the beginning, however, Kissinger and his American colleagues viewed the MBFR negotiations as the more serious of the two, even though MBFR was accorded far lower status than the strategic nuclear arms negotiations taking place simultaneously in Geneva between the superpowers. The CSCE was still seen in Washington largely as a Warsaw Pact project, supported by a set of “naive” European neutral and nonaligned states, which was bound to produce little of concrete significance.

The CSCE negotiations opened with a foreign ministers meeting in Helsinki on July 3–7, 1973. Thirty-five delegations were present, including two North American countries—the United States and Canada—plus all states of Europe big and small, including the Soviet Union and the Holy See; the sole exception was Albania. The working phase of negotiations began in Geneva on September 18, 1973, and continued until July 25, 1975.

Issues were divided into three substantive “baskets,” which also were reflected in the eventual agreement. Basket I issues concerned security, focusing primarily on a set of principles to govern relations among states. They also included specific CBMs, military provisions intended to provide assurances to potential enemies that a country is not preparing to launch a surprise attack. Basket II issues concerned cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment. Basket III issues concerned cooperation in humanitarian areas, including human contacts, travel and tourism, information and cultural exchanges, and educational exchanges. This basket covered many human rights issues, especially the freer movement of peoples, ideas, and information across national boundaries.

The concluding stage of the original CSCE was a summit conference of heads of state of all thirty-five countries in Helsinki on July 31–August 1, 1975, at which the Final Act was signed. First and foremost, it contains the “Decalogue,” ten principles that the states believed should govern interstate relations: (1) sovereign equality of states, (2) refraining from the threat or use of force, (3) inviolability of frontiers, (4) territorial integrity of states, (5) peaceful settlement of disputes, (6) nonintervention in internal affairs, (7) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, (8) self-determination of peoples, (9) cooperation among states, and (10) fulfillment of obligations under international law.

These ten principles created the normative structure that has undergirded the CSCE and the OSCE ever since, and the elaboration of these principles has fostered the normative core for a Eurasian security regime. Of particular subsequent importance was the provision in the fourth principle, allowing for the peaceful, negotiated change of borders, advocated by the Federal Republic of Germany.

However, at least two pairs of principles tended to collide, causing considerable difficulty in the years ahead. Throughout the Cold War period, there was often an intense dispute between the Western states’ insistence upon the seventh principle, respect for human rights, and most communist countries’ contention that CSCE members’ efforts to promote human rights violated the sixth principle, nonintervention in countries’ internal affairs.

With the disappearance of the East-West confrontation, however, a new consensus has emerged. When member states freely accept certain principles—including those in the Decalogue—this effectively gives other members limited rights of involvement in their internal affairs in order to uphold those norms. Therefore, the OSCE has increasingly insisted on “transparency” and on the right of the “international community,” as represented by a consensus of its members, to intervene in the internal affairs of individual states to enforce those principles to which they have subscribed.¹⁰ This policy has applied to issues such as intrusive inspection to verify compliance with confidence-building and arms control measures, and provisions for human and minority rights. The Helsinki Decalogue has thus evolved in such a way as to weaken the absolute nature of state sovereignty to a far greater degree than was envisaged at the time that the Final Act was signed in 1975.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the most serious contradiction in the Helsinki principles has involved the “self-determination of peoples” versus the “territorial integrity of states.” Although the CSCE acquiesced in the initial breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into their constituent republics, it has since refused to recognize the indepen-

dence of regions within the new states that have also claimed statehood on the basis of the principle of self-determination. In a complex effort to “square the circle” between these competing claims, the CSCE/OSCE has continually tried to balance efforts to secure substantial autonomy for various national minorities and secessionist regions while preserving the formal territorial integrity of its member states. (The one exception was Czechoslovakia, which divided peacefully in 1993.) In this effort, the OSCE has frequently found itself as a defender of state sovereignty against competing claims. This ambivalence between upholding and undermining the principle of state sovereignty has created tensions throughout most of the history of the organization, but the dilemma has become especially sharp in the period since the end of the Cold War.

The Helsinki Final Act called for a series of follow-up conferences to review progress in its implementation and to consider new provisions to strengthen European security. However, the summer of 1975, when the Final Act was signed, also marked the height of East-West détente, upon which the CSCE process had been founded. Unfortunately, Western support for the CSCE as a symbol of détente naturally began to deteriorate as the spirit of détente started to wane. This was most evident in the United States, as John Maresca observes: “Washington attitudes towards the Helsinki Final Act evolved with the overall deterioration of détente. Immediately after the Helsinki Summit, no one was interested in the CSCE. Administration policy officials thought of it as an event that had provoked a hostile domestic reaction and was best forgotten. This attitude infected the entire bureaucracy, though a thorough working-level effort was made to monitor compliance with the Helsinki commitments.”¹¹

Western governments quickly realized that the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act provided them with leverage to criticize the human rights performance of communist regimes. As such, the human rights provisions became popular as détente faded and East-West competition increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus the first CSCE Review Conference in Belgrade in 1977–78 was characterized largely by rhetorical attacks and counterattacks, with Western governments criticizing the human rights performance of the communist bloc countries, and the latter accusing the former of blatant interference in their internal affairs.

The second follow-on meeting began in Madrid in 1980 and lasted for more than three years. At the outset, it also was stalemated by the intensified debate over human rights and intervention in internal affairs. Western governments refused to move forward on proposals to reinforce CBMs and other provisions to increase security unless the situations in Poland and Afghanistan were resolved to their satisfaction and the general human rights picture improved throughout the communist bloc. Under the leadership of Ambassador Max Kampelman, the United States pressed these attacks upon the Soviet Union and its allies for their dismal performance in implementing the Helsinki obligations.

However, Western European governments countered by putting pressure on the United States to try to find some areas of cooperation across the Cold War lines, and eventually the Madrid conference considered proposals for strengthening CBMs and for establishing machinery for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Of particular significance was the adoption of a mandate for negotiations under CSCE auspices in Stockholm—known officially

as the Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe—to enhance CSBMs.¹² In addition, working meetings were set up in a variety of locations to deal with: human rights and fundamental freedoms (Ottawa), human contacts (Bern), the peaceful settlement of disputes (Athens), cultural contacts (Budapest), and Mediterranean security issues (Venice). Although few actual decisions were taken in Madrid, the CSCE process regained some momentum.

This momentum carried through into the third follow-on conference, which began in Vienna on November 4, 1986. A noticeable shift in East-West relations was already beginning to be felt, if only tentatively and barely recognizable at the time. Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power in the Soviet Union only months before, and his influence in European security matters was quickly visible in the Stockholm negotiations on CSBMs, taking place under CSCE auspices. Gorbachev accepted mandatory inspection of Soviet territory west of the Urals for the first time to verify compliance with an arms control agreement. This enabled the Stockholm conference to conclude in September 1996 with a substantial expansion of the CBMs that had been initiated by the Helsinki Final Act. Thus the Vienna conference, which lasted until January 1989, reacted to the rapidly changing political scene in Central and Eastern Europe and began to adapt the European security framework to the new environment even before the definitive end of the Cold War. It strengthened virtually all baskets of the Helsinki Final Act and spawned numerous conferences to deal with the rapidly changing security environment.¹³

With the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the CSCE began a rapid process of transformation to respond to the new post-Cold War security situation. Suddenly the possibility of creating a genuine system of “collective security” on the Eurasian continent appeared to be feasible. The CSCE produced two major documents in the first year after the end of the Cold War that fundamentally changed the normative and institutional structure of Eurasian security. The first of these was a report by an expert meeting in Copenhagen in June 1990 on the human dimension of security. The report endorsed the essential features of Western democratic practices—including free elections open to outside observation, representative governments, equality of persons before the law, freedom to establish political parties, and assurances about the rights of persons accused of crimes—and called for their adoption by all CSCE countries.¹⁴

The second major document was the “Charter of Paris for a New Europe,” signed at a summit meeting held November 19–21, 1990. In its preamble, the Paris Charter announced the opening of a new era for Eurasian security, based on a reaffirmation of the Helsinki Decalogue: “Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe.”¹⁵

In addition to reaffirming the *acquis* of the CSCE from the Helsinki Final Act through the various follow-on conferences and expert meetings, the Charter of Paris began the formal institutionalization of the CSCE. Prior to the Paris summit, the CSCE functioned only as an itinerant series of conferences, moving from site to site without a permanent headquarters or secretariat. The Paris meeting established a secretariat in Prague (later moved to Vienna), a Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna, an Office for Free Elections (subsequently renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, or ODIHR) in Warsaw, and a Parliamentary Assembly made up of parliamentarians from

all member states. Annual meetings were to be held at the level of foreign ministers, summits of heads of state were to be held biannually, and a Committee of Senior Officials would prepare ministerial meetings and call emergency sessions when required. In short, the CSCE assumed most of the features of an established international organization rather than a series of ad hoc meetings about security issues.

At the Paris summit, all NATO and Warsaw Pact states also signed the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which had replaced the long-stalled MBFR negotiations in early 1989. From that time forward, the “hard” arms-control issues favored by the West in the 1960s and 1970s were brought under the aegis of the CSCE, and the two negotiations that had started along separate tracks merged together. A new agreement on CSBMs also was signed, known as the Vienna Document 1990. This document expanded the provisions allowing for transparency of military activities and exchange of information intended to make the inadvertent outbreak of war less likely.

The next major milestone in the post-Cold War expansion of the CSCE came with the follow-on conference and summit in Helsinki in 1992, representing a return to the original site of the CSCE and marking most clearly the changed nature of the organization after almost two decades of evolution. This was the first meeting at which the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics participated as full member states, increasing to fifty-two the total number of member states in the organization.¹⁶ The Helsinki conference was preoccupied with the wave of violence that was sweeping across the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and it sought to engage the organization more actively—both to prevent future outbreaks of such conflicts and to manage and resolve those that had already broken out. Fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina led to the imposition of sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was suspended from active participation in the CSCE in 1992.

Two significant steps were taken in Helsinki to respond to this widespread violent conflict. The first was a decision by heads of state to create the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), to be based in the Hague. Proposed by the government of the Netherlands, the HCNM would engage in early warning, preventive diplomacy, and informal conciliation in an effort to prevent and resolve those conflicts involving primarily the status and treatment of ethnonational minorities. The second decision taken at Helsinki was to adopt a proposal initiated by the United States to establish missions in areas of tension that would provide for “early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peace-keeping) [and] peaceful settlement of disputes.”

The original intent of the heads of state assembled at Helsinki was for the most part to create temporary, more or less ad hoc missions to deal with conflicts as they arose. The U.S. delegation especially wanted to create a CSCE that was “institutionally light,” realizing that U.S. influence on an enlarged secretariat would likely be minimal. Instead, the United States favored mostly ad hoc activities in the form of special purpose missions to respond to threats to peace and security. U.S. officials believed at the time that these missions could be dominated by U.S. personnel when the United States felt that its special interests were at stake. Indeed, subsequent experience, especially with major missions like the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo, suggests that this calculation was largely correct.

However, it became clear very soon afterward that these missions were likely to take on a life of their own. Especially because of the continued worsening of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the Committee of Senior Officials, meeting in Vienna one month after the Helsinki Summit, decided to create so-called “missions of long duration.” The first of these missions was sent to monitor the situation in three regions of the former Republic of Yugoslavia—namely, Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina.¹⁷

These missions were normally mandated for periods of six months, although the mandates have always been renewed, with one notable exception. Since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had been suspended from participation in the CSCE at the Helsinki follow-up meeting, it refused to extend its “invitation” for the CSCE to continue its mission on the territory of the FRY after one year; hence, it was withdrawn in June 1993. However, this case affirmed that the OSCE, like most international organizations, would intervene only by invitation from a member state, and that if the host government objected to a mission’s activities, it could withdraw that invitation. Although NATO side-stepped this principle in its air war against the FRY to try to impose a settlement of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, it did so without a mandate from either the OSCE or the United Nations.


Two other institutions were created at the Helsinki Summit in 1992. A Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, proposed by the governments of France and Germany, was established in Geneva; its membership is voluntary. By late 1998, only thirty-three (not including the United States) of the fifty-five OSCE states had signed the treaty establishing the court, and only twenty-six had ratified it. In the first five years after the treaty’s entry into force in December 1994, the court did not take up any cases. The Forum for Security Cooperation also was created in Helsinki in 1992. Meeting regularly in Vienna, it provides a venue to discuss long-term issues of common security and to negotiate on additional confidence-building and arms control measures.

Alongside the Helsinki meeting, a number of other agreements were signed relating to arms control. These included (1) an expansion of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to include limitations on the personnel of national armies to complement the limits on heavy equipment specified in the original agreement; (2) the Open Skies Treaty, signed by all CFE states and open to signature by other CSCE states, permitting overflights of the territory of all signatory countries to enhance military transparency; and (3) an expansion of the CSBMs in an agreement known as the Vienna Document 1992. Therefore, by the time of the Helsinki meeting, the CSCE had become the principal venue for negotiating, verifying, and discussing the enforcement of the major nonnuclear arms control measures on the Eurasian continent. It also had developed a broad-based set of instruments to engage in conflict management on the territory of its member states.

The next significant stage in the institutional development of the organization took place at the Rome ministerial conference in 1993, which created the Permanent Council, staffed by the permanent delegations based in Vienna. The council meets weekly throughout the year to carry out the continuing work of the organization, especially in the security field. It is headed by a “troika” of three member states serving a three-year, rotating term as chair-elect, chairman-in-office, and past chair.

At the 1994 Budapest Summit, the member states agreed that the CSCE constituted more than a series of conferences and had instead evolved into a fully institutionalized

Figure 1. OSCE Structures and Institutions



Source: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

regional security organization with a permanent secretariat and associated bodies. To reflect this change, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and declared itself to be a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the CSCE had always been a political—not a legal—organization, which enabled it to act more flexibly than if it operated on the basis of formal treaties. In an effort to upgrade its status, several member states favored granting the OSCE a collective standing under international law in conjunction with proclaiming it in 1994 as a regional security organization under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, this move was rejected by most member states, led by the United States, which believed that it would make the organization too formal and inflexible. Therefore, the OSCE remained a political organization despite the enhancement of its institutional status at the Budapest Summit.

The Budapest Summit also adopted a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which created a regional normative framework for all aspects of military activity, including civil-military relations, the conduct of warfare, and the behavior of military personnel in combat. This summit also took up one of the most serious conflicts that the OSCE was trying to manage, in Nagorno-Karabakh. The OSCE decided to strengthen the so-called Minsk Group, which had been established in March 1992 to try to settle the conflict involving the secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh, populated mostly by ethnic Armenians but situated wholly inside of the territorial boundaries of Azerbaijan. The goal was to prepare for an eventual peace conference in Minsk and provide for OSCE monitoring or even for an OSCE peacekeeping force in the region. The Budapest Summit thus set up an OSCE High-Level Planning Group to prepare for implementation of an eventual political settlement, which so far has not materialized.

In summary, by 1998 the OSCE had become fully institutionalized as diagrammed in the figure on the preceding page. The entire budget for 1998 was about 2.2 billion Austrian schillings (U.S. \$180 million), more than 82 percent of which was allocated solely to the largest OSCE missions and projects in Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia. Not included, of course, were the costs of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, which are many times greater than the entire OSCE annual budget. The entire staff amounted to about 250 persons, including interpreters and about 180 persons employed by the Secretariat, making the OSCE an extremely lean international organization relative to its enlarged responsibilities. U.S. contributions amount to 9 percent of the general budget and 12.4 percent of the largest missions and projects, totaling about \$21 million in 1998.¹⁸

As a result of these many developments, the OSCE was transformed in the 1990s from a loosely organized series of conferences into a formal organizational entity. Although it had modest resources, its member countries comprised many of the world's richest and most powerful states, as well as some of the smallest and newest. Clearly, its bureaucracy hardly rivaled that of the United Nations in size or scope of its activities. However, its relative smallness also gave it flexibility not found in many comparable organizations to respond rapidly to developing events. Although the scope of its activities was limited, the CSCE/OSCE was the only regional organization in the world that linked explicitly the military dimension of security with other issues such as human rights; democratization; freedom of the media; economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; and diplomatic efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts.

Three

The Role of OSCE Missions and Other Field Activities in Managing Conflict

Since 1990, the OSCE has emerged as the only truly pan-European organization performing the full spectrum of security functions across the former Soviet region, western and eastern Europe, and North America. My focus in this study is specifically on the OSCE's role in preventing and resolving violent conflicts in that region. I will consider four different categories of conflict management activities: (1) democratization, (2) preventive diplomacy, (3) conflict resolution, and (4) postconflict security building.

Democratization efforts entail long-term conflict prevention through the promotion of democracy and human rights. It involves promoting political conditions conducive to the peaceful resolution of disputes so conflicts are less likely to escalate into violence.

In addition to activities in the human dimension, preventive diplomacy involves early direct intervention in potentially violent situations that threaten to escalate to crisis levels in the relatively near term if preventive action is not taken.

Typically, conflict resolution activities take place in the aftermath of violence and include specific efforts to promote settlement of a conflict's underlying causes, while also engaging in preventive activities to avert the recurrence of violence.

Postconflict security building involves efforts to rebuild war-torn societies by reconstructing the political system and rehabilitating the infrastructure required for normal human activity. Always occurring in the midst of the chaos and physical destruction that typically follow violent conflict, postconflict security building generally includes efforts to build stable, democratic societies capable of resolving differences peacefully.

Although I present these as distinct functional categories, it is important to note that each function typically incorporates some of the activities discussed in other functions as well. Furthermore, while most of the OSCE's missions involve all of these activities to some degree, I have categorized each mission according to the type of function that constitutes its dominant focus. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, I will explain each of these four functions in greater detail and illustrate them with reference to the activities of particular missions where these functions were most clearly performed.

Democratization: Long-Term Conflict Prevention

OSCE member states have broadly accepted the “democratic peace” hypothesis—namely, the belief that democratic states seldom or never engage in violent conflict with other democratic states.¹⁹ Therefore, they assume that the long-term foundations for peace may be constructed by encouraging the widespread development of democratic regimes throughout Eurasia. The basic argument is that liberal democracies promote nonviolent means to resolve conflicts, build coalitions, and achieve consensus about the

basic goals of the state and relations among states. Because liberal-democratic states can expect other democratic states to be similarly inclined, they can count on them to pursue nonviolent means to overcome differences of interest rather than resort to war and violence. Internally, democratic procedures also engender respect for the rule of law and recognize the importance of the decision-making process through which citizens may seek redress for their grievances and overcome their differences. All these factors are assumed to reduce the likelihood of domestic large-scale violence in liberal-democratic states and to make war among them virtually unthinkable.

Therefore, the OSCE has devoted considerable effort to promoting democratization. This effort includes the work of ODIHR, which assists new democracies in establishing fair procedures for holding democratic elections, supervises the conduct of those elections to assure that the procedures are followed, and evaluates their outcome. Numerous OSCE missions and the HCNM have worked to increase the capacity of minorities—often disenfranchised or hindered in other ways from participating fully in the political process—to achieve equal rights not only on paper but in practice. ODIHR's section on the rule of law assists states in developing legal principles to support democratic processes and strengthen the rule of law as a basic norm for democratic societies. The Representative on Freedom of the Media, established at the 1997 Copenhagen ministerial conference, supports the principle of an independent media as a foundation for civil society. Although most of these activities have little direct influence on the occurrence or avoidance of violent conflict, they create the long-term conditions necessary for eliminating violence as a means for resolving conflicts of interest by instituting a democratic process of give-and-take, compromise, and bargaining as a way of overcoming differences.

Numerous OSCE missions, especially those in Latvia, Estonia, and Belarus, have been charged by their mandates to assist the governments of transitional states in the process of complying with democratic norms. In Latvia and Estonia, the primary OSCE focus has been to assure that the new governments do not deprive the large Russian minority communities of their democratic rights out of revenge for the perceived injustices Latvians and Estonians suffered at the hands of the Russian-dominated Soviet regime.

Both Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet Union at the beginning of World War II. This annexation, remembered by older citizens of both countries, created more intense feelings of resentment against Soviet "occupation" than in most of the other non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union. After 1940, large numbers of Russians moved into the Baltic states to take up jobs, and both republics were the site of major military installations of the Soviet armed forces. When the Soviet Union broke apart, both governments refused to recognize as citizens those ethnic Russians who entered Estonia and Latvia after 1940, thereby depriving them of the right to vote in national elections. In 1989, about one-third of the population of Estonia was made up of Russian and other Slavic nationalities (mostly Ukrainians and Belarusians). In Latvia the numbers were even larger, with about 42 percent of the population composed of Slavic ethnic groups.²⁰ In both cases, political leaders in Russia actively supported the rights of the Russian minorities, giving rise to the concern that this issue might provide a pretext for them to intervene in the Baltic states.

In response to these dangers, the OSCE established missions of long duration in Estonia on December 13, 1992, and in Latvia on September 23, 1993. The mandates were essentially similar, calling upon the OSCE to assist the governments in their efforts to deal with such issues as citizenship and language laws, migration across borders, education, social services, and dialogue between the different ethnic communities.

In addition, the HCNM, Ambassador Max van der Stoel, paid frequent visits to both countries, beginning in January 1993. He issued a series of recommendations to their governments concerning national legislation that appeared to be harmful to the ethnic Russian communities. The most sensitive issue in both cases involved the citizenship laws, which effectively deprived large portions of the ethnic Russian communities of civil rights. Both countries established tests through which these individuals could become citizens, but the tests were usually difficult and required knowledge of the official state languages, either Estonian or Latvian.

The OSCE missions quickly realized that there was no point in trying to persuade either government to make major changes in these restrictive citizenship laws. The missions also recognized that many other democratic countries deny political rights, such as the right to vote, to noncitizens. The special problem in this case was that most Russians who had emigrated to the Baltic states did so in a fashion that was perfectly legal under Soviet law. After the disappearance of the USSR, however, most were left essentially in a stateless status. This was an especially severe handicap for the “stateless” children of these immigrants.

The main efforts of the OSCE missions and Ambassador van der Stoel were directed toward getting these countries to modify their citizenship laws by eliminating their most discriminatory features. They also encouraged the governments to implement existing laws more leniently, fairly, and expeditiously, so applicants for citizenship and residence permits would not be harassed or subject to intolerable delays. OSCE representatives also called upon authorities to make it easier for minorities to pass the citizenship tests, especially by expanding opportunities for Russian-speakers to learn the new state languages required to pass those exams. Finally, Ambassador van der Stoel encouraged both governments to grant citizenship directly to “stateless” children born to parents who had lost their Soviet citizenship.

To achieve these goals, both the OSCE mission heads and the HCNM tried to persuade, cajole, and at times even pressure national authorities to modify their procedures for implementing their own legislation. They also offered the “good offices” of the OSCE as a venue for direct dialogue between leaders of the Russian communities and Estonian and Latvian officials. They established Round Tables in which representatives of all ethnic communities were encouraged to participate. They also urged the governments to create an ombudsman to represent the interests of the minority communities.

In general, the OSCE pursued quiet diplomacy and operated outside the glare of publicity. The Yeltsin government in Russia strongly supported both missions, viewing the OSCE as a convenient device for addressing the most serious problems the Russian diaspora faced in the Baltic states, while also keeping nationalist politicians at bay in Russia itself. The desire of Estonia and Latvia to enter the EU also facilitated their cooperation with the OSCE missions. The heads of mission who generally hailed from EU countries

frequently reminded the national governments and parliaments that their full adherence to OSCE norms would enhance their case for rapid integration into Western European institutions.

At the same time, both OSCE missions and Ambassador van der Stoel were frequently criticized for their activities in the Baltic countries. Estonian and Latvian nationalists, both within the countries and among the diasporas in the West, often attacked the OSCE, sometimes in very harsh terms, for what they described as interference in the internal affairs of their states. OSCE officials responded by reminding their hosts that their acceptance of the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent documents in effect gave the OSCE a *droit de regard* over those aspects of their internal affairs covered by the Helsinki principles. Frequently, the High Commissioner urged political leaders in both countries to emulate the principles of Western democratic and pluralistic societies, rather than succumbing to the temptation to seek revenge for perceived injustices perpetrated by putative Russian leaders during almost fifty years of Soviet domination.

By 1997 Estonian and Latvian officials began agitating for an end to the OSCE missions on the grounds that their goals had been accomplished. However, the organization resisted these efforts, at least in the short term, for two main reasons. First, the Russian Federation argued that an end to the missions might be accompanied by a renewed outbreak of anti-Russian activity in both countries. Second, many delegations believed that, although a legal basis had been created for democratic processes, the actual implementation of these legal principles was far too slow in both countries.

Just as the OSCE was debating for the first time in early 1998 the possible voluntary termination of two of its missions, it also began to set up a third mission in Belarus with a primary focus on democratization. Belarus is one of the few Soviet successor states that is relatively homogenous ethnically, with a population overwhelmingly made up of Slavs, including Belarusians, Russians, and Ukrainians. Since the Belarus nationalist movement never gained a large political following, the differences between Russians and Belarusians did not become politically salient.

While there was thus no danger of ethnic conflict in Belarus, a divide did open up between liberal reformers and the supporters of a Soviet-style *ancien regime*, mostly made up of former communist elites. Under the government of President Aleksandr Lukashenko, elected in 1994, there was a substantial reversal of the trend toward democratic reform and economic liberalization. More than any other former Soviet republic, Belarus seemed to be turning back the clock. Indeed, in a November 1996 constitutional referendum, Lukashenko effectively extended his term of office indefinitely and forced all political opposition out of the already weakened parliament. This action was followed by an agreement in 1997 to establish a formal union between Belarus and the Russian Federation. This agreement was supported enthusiastically by President Lukashenko but diluted considerably by President Yeltsin out of concern for its possible negative economic and political impact on Russia.

The Belarusian government appeared to be ambivalent about the potential OSCE role. On September 17, 1997, Foreign Minister Antonovich addressed the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna and accepted in principle an OSCE mission on Belarusian territory. As negotiations unfolded over a Memorandum of Understanding, however, President

Lukashenko tried to water down the mission as much as possible and, indeed, to prevent it from establishing a permanent residence in Belarus. However, during the OSCE annual ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in December 1997, under pressure from Moscow, the government of Belarus acquiesced in the creation of an “OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus” to assist it in “promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments” and to report on the results.²¹

The group took up residence in Minsk in February 1998 and immediately became a point of contact for the political opposition and for the many nongovernmental organizations that had been harassed and threatened by the Lukashenko government. At the time of this writing, it is too soon to assess the effectiveness of this mission, but there appears to be little progress in opening up the democratic process in Belarus since its arrival. A number of Western governments’ embassies and offices of international agencies, most notably the Soros Foundation, were forced out of Belarus, and the country has become progressively isolated from international contacts. As a result, the OSCE group in Belarus remains one of the few surviving symbols of the Helsinki human rights principles and the rule of law in a country where these fundamental freedoms have been strongly attacked since 1994.

In summary, since 1991 the OSCE has embraced the argument that the construction of stable democratic systems contributes in the long run to peace and security by reducing the risks of both intrastate and interstate violence. In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, it has encouraged two regimes with aspirations to join the western European community of nations to democratize in a way that would not discriminate excessively against large ethnic Russian minority communities, whose members are widely perceived in these countries as representatives of the former Soviet “oppressors.” The OSCE helped these countries move along the democratic path and closer toward a more significant relationship with the major western European institutions. It also has diminished any pretext that Russian officials might have seized upon to intervene in the internal affairs of these two states to defend the interests of ethnic Russian “conationals” who were victims of discrimination at the hands of the new majority.

In Belarus, on the other hand, the OSCE undertook the task of preserving the basic rudiments of democratic processes and institutions in a country that has turned its back on democratization and economic liberalization in favor of a more authoritarian route founded on nostalgia for the “good life” of the Soviet era and a pan-Slavic nationalism reflected in the Union Treaty signed between Belarus and the Russian Federation. In this case, the OSCE has returned to a role like the one it played during the Cold War period, serving as an advocate of human rights and the rule of law in a society where the essential principles on which the organization was founded have been under attack. It thus began to provide a normative lifeline that members of the political opposition and nongovernmental organizations can grasp, just as dissidents throughout Central and Eastern Europe rallied around the principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act until the collapse of communism in 1989.

Preventive Diplomacy

The principal focus of OSCE's conflict-prevention activities is to identify and respond to brewing conflicts in order to prevent the outbreak of violence. OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Max van der Stoel has expressed forcefully the belief that conflicts are easier to resolve before they become violent: "It is evident from the experience of Bosnia, of Chechnya, of Nagorno-Karabakh, of Georgia and elsewhere, that once a conflict has erupted, it is extremely difficult to bring it to an end. In the meantime, precious lives have been lost, new waves of hatred have been created and enormous damage has been inflicted. It is my firm belief that money spent on conflict prevention is money well spent, not only because it is cheaper, but especially because it saves so many lives."²²

As van der Stoel suggests, once Humpty Dumpty has fallen off the wall, it is extremely difficult to put him back together again. So it is with states as well. Once conflicts of interest reach the stage of violence, peaceful accommodation may become very difficult to achieve. Then again, conflicts may not be "ripe" for resolution until a "hurting stalemate" has set in, when the situation "has become uncomfortable to both sides and . . . appears likely to become very costly."²³ When a hurting stalemate is eventually reached, by definition both parties have suffered great losses and have become desperate to find a solution to their dilemma. Agreements that might have been unacceptable previously may appear more palatable when compared with the pain the parties are suffering or expect to endure in the future. Typically it takes considerable time—often years—before parties to intense conflicts reach a hurting stalemate. In the interim, they all lose a great deal.

Preventive diplomacy offers the possibility of avoiding much of the pain and suffering associated with violent conflict and the hurting stalemate that so often follows violence. Instead of waiting to intervene until a hurting stalemate is mutually recognized by the disputing parties, potential third parties can be most effective when they recognize that a much earlier point of intervention may be available, before conflicts turn violent in the first place. Furthermore, early intervention is more likely to lead to successful mutual accommodation for the reasons enumerated by Michael Lund: "[T]he issues in the dispute are fewer and less complex; conflicting parties are not highly mobilized, polarized, and armed; significant bloodshed has not occurred, and thus a sense of victimization and a desire for vengeance are not intense; the parties have not begun to demonize and stereotype each other; moderate leaders still maintain control over extremist tendencies; and the parties are not so committed that compromise involves loss of face."²⁴

However, a difficulty practitioners of preventive diplomacy face is that often only a very narrow "window of opportunity" exists during which parties may intervene to prevent the outbreak of violence. At early stages in a conflict, the gravity of the situation may not be recognized so that no stimulus to intervene arises. Furthermore, premature intervention may actually create a "self-fulfilling prophecy" and even stimulate conflict in the minds of disputing parties. Early interventions that are insensitive to local conditions, the needs and interests of the parties, and the nature of their conflict may also widen rather than narrow differences between the parties. If outside parties and international institutions appear to buy into nationalist claims for "self-determination" at the outset of a conflict, they may legitimize extremist propaganda and undermine responsible political authorities. At the same time, if outside parties wait too long before intervening, the threshold of vio-

lence may be crossed before preventive diplomacy can be engaged. Once that threshold is crossed, any opportunity to resolve the conflict may be seriously delayed or lost altogether. Timing the engagement of preventive diplomacy is thus an extremely critical, yet elusive, factor in the etiology of a conflict.

Preventive diplomacy first requires attention to “early warning” to detect situations that might lead to violent conflict. Protests, demonstrations, and riots may provide such early warning signals, as may repressive actions by governments to suppress dissent. Parties to disputes may come directly to OSCE missions and field offices to report threats to the peace that they have witnessed or experienced. These warnings usually appear in the midst of conflicts among nationalities or other ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups, or in situations where socioeconomic classes have been severely disadvantaged. Among the most prominent warnings of an incipient conflict are nationalist claims to establish separatist regimes, irredentist appeals to secede and unify with another state, threats to expand an ongoing conflict into neighboring states, sporadic guerrilla action by radicalized minority group members against state institutions or their representatives, and indications of potential unauthorized external intervention in ongoing internal conflicts.

Early warning is not enough to trigger an appropriate response, however. There must be a capability to distinguish warnings of real conflicts from “false alarms.” As Alexander George and Jane Holl have noted, the problem for preventive diplomacy is often not the inability to identify potential trouble spots but, rather, one of “understanding such situations well enough to forecast which ones are likely to explode and when.”²⁵ However good their intentions, states and multilateral organizations may antagonize important constituencies by too many cries of “wolf” when no violence appears. They also may alienate parties if they try to intervene prematurely in situations that do not seem to warrant early outside intervention. And they may exhaust both their willpower and their limited resources by trying to intervene in more conflicts than they can handle at any one time.

This problem became especially manifest for the OSCE as the crisis in Kosovo escalated in 1998–99. At the October 30, 1997 meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Ambassador Faber-Rod, head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje (Macedonia), presented what he described as “early warning” about the radicalization of the ethnic Albanian community in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and its connection to the deterioration of the situation inside Kosovo. On November 13, 1997, High Commissioner on National Minorities van der Stoep gave a similar worrisome report, commenting on the growing tensions in Kosovo between Serb repression and Kosovar Albanian impatience and radicalization. He also indicated to the Permanent Council that his message constituted “early warning” of an impending crisis, and he urged the council and OSCE member states to give as much attention to Kosovo as they were giving at the time to Bosnia so they could address the situation before it degenerated into a war that might be as serious as the one that had ripped apart Bosnia-Herzegovina just a few years previously. Unfortunately, both of these warnings went largely unheeded. It was almost one full year before the international community gave serious diplomatic attention to the situation in Kosovo, which by that time had degenerated to the point where large-scale violence was exceedingly difficult to prevent.²⁶

Once the incipient crisis has been recognized, the next and often more difficult problem is to get the parties to enter into direct negotiations among themselves or get outsiders

to intervene. As George and Holl have pointed out, “early warning does not necessarily make for easy response. On the contrary, available warning often forces policy-makers to confront decisions of a difficult or unpalatable character.”²⁷ The warning must be rapidly delivered to the OSCE institutions in Vienna, the Hague, or Warsaw, and to key member governments. Once they attend to these warnings, member governments and OSCE authorities must be willing to devote the time and resources necessary to respond. There is little doubt that it is easier to obtain a political solution to a dispute at this stage than after a legacy of violence and death have created images of implacable enemies and motives for retribution in the minds of survivors. Acknowledging this fundamental truism, however, is no guarantee that an organization composed of fifty-five member states that makes decisions on the basis of consensus can act decisively, even in the presence of unambiguous warnings of violent conflict on the horizon.

When a commitment to intervene has been made, the OSCE must then decide upon an appropriate mode of response. This may take the form of verbal protests and denunciations; imposing sanctions; creating a mission of long-term duration or other monitoring, verification, or peacekeeping activities; providing good offices or other third-party assistance; or any other means at the disposal of the OSCE. Each of these actions requires the organization to commit the resources necessary to head off brewing disputes before they turn violent. When many crises occur simultaneously, resources of attention, commitment, time, and capacity to act may all be stretched too thin.

The OSCE has undertaken several conflict-prevention activities in regions where conflict appeared to be escalating and where the risk of large-scale violence was serious. The first OSCE mission of long duration was created in the regions of Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on August 14, 1992, and began its activities on September 8. All three regions were inhabited by significant proportions of ethnic minorities—ethnic Albanians (mostly Muslims) in the case of Kosovo, Muslims in Sandjak, and ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina—who feared for their safety at the hands of the country’s majority Serb population. The OSCE’s mandate included observing the individual and minority rights situations in each of the three Serbian regions to promote peaceful dialogue between representatives of the minority populations and the central government in Belgrade. The mission was to collect information on human rights violations, encourage negotiated settlement of issues of conflict, and provide local authorities with information about OSCE principles and other international standards regarding the protection of the rights of individuals and minorities.

As noted previously, the FRY government was suspended from participation in the OSCE in 1992. In retaliation, the regime in Belgrade refused to renew the Memorandum of Understanding governing the OSCE mission after it expired at the end of six months. The OSCE missions were thus withdrawn in June 1993. Afterward, the OSCE chairman-in-office continued to monitor events in this region. The bilateral diplomatic missions of OSCE member governments in the FRY regularly sent reports to Vienna, and an informal discussion was held almost weekly in Vienna among interested delegations, followed by a formal discussion at most weekly meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council.

In 1997, Danish foreign minister Niels Helveg Petersen, the OSCE chairman-in-office at the time, appointed High Commissioner on National Minorities van der Stoep as his

Special Representative in Kosovo. However, van der Stoel was not permitted to travel there as an OSCE official because the government in Belgrade contended that the OSCE had no legitimate role to play in what it asserted to be the internal affairs of the FRY as long as the republic was not permitted to participate in OSCE decision making. There can be little doubt that the suspension of the FRY from participation significantly limited the OSCE's influence there after 1992, especially in the regions most likely to experience violence.

By late 1997, as tensions began to escalate between an increasingly radicalized Kosovar population and the Belgrade government, many delegations (including those most hostile to the Belgrade regime) were searching for a face-saving way to readmit the FRY into the OSCE. However difficult this was politically, many delegations believed that it was necessary in order to provide a legitimate basis for the OSCE to respond to the crisis in Kosovo at a time when it was becoming unmistakably clear that outside intervention was necessary to head off yet another humanitarian tragedy in the Balkans. The net consequence, however, was that the OSCE, especially its Special Representative for Kosovo, was not permitted to intervene directly in this conflict in late 1997 or early 1998, at a time when diplomacy might have been most effective at finding a solution to the conflict.

The conflict in Kosovo became even more serious throughout 1998. Following the escalation of hostilities between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Yugoslav National Army, along with units of the Serb police and paramilitary forces, and after the threat of NATO air strikes against Serbia, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke brokered an agreement on October 13, 1998, calling for a cease-fire to be monitored by the OSCE. The OSCE committed itself to send in approximately two thousand civilian, unarmed monitors to verify compliance of both sides with the cease-fire agreement and to work with the office of the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to assist in the return of refugees to homes from which many ethnic Albanians had fled during the fighting.

The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was by far the largest operation undertaken by the OSCE in terms of personnel, and it was also one of the most risky. Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek, the OSCE chairman-in-office at the time, described it as "a tremendous challenge and a tremendous opportunity" for the organization.²⁸ The volatile nature of the political situation in Kosovo, and the vulnerability of the unarmed "verifiers" to attacks from militants on either side who wanted to disrupt the cease-fire, placed the OSCE in a very difficult position.

Although the mission reached only fifteen hundred observers prior to its withdrawal immediately preceding the NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia (which began in March 1999), it had achieved some success in brokering numerous small-scale disputes on the ground between Serbs and Albanians. Because the mission was unarmed, however, there was little it could do to stop the escalating cycle of violence that was already well under way prior to its deployment in Kosovo. What became clear afterward was that the withdrawal of the KVM opened the flood gates for Serbian security forces to drive some eight hundred thousand ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo in one of the largest campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" that Europe has witnessed since World War II. However weak the KVM might have been, it had been more effective than the subsequent NATO air campaign in preventing massive violence and the forced expulsion of refugees.

It is at least plausible that a KVM armed with light weapons for self-defense or protected by a modest multinational military force under OSCE auspices might have prevented the humanitarian tragedy that unfolded in Kosovo beginning in March 1999. The failure of conflict prevention in Kosovo, therefore, seems to be due more to the impatience with which NATO and the United States took charge of the crisis on their own, rather than with the inability of the OSCE to act decisively. Indeed, had early warnings generated by the OSCE in late 1997 and early 1998 been heeded, and had the KVM been created in a timely fashion and given the resources needed to do its job, perhaps the entire tragedy that unfolded around Kosovo in the spring of 1999 might have been prevented altogether.

The second OSCE mission, officially known as the “OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje,” was established on September 18, 1992, and began its work shortly thereafter.²⁹ Its primary mandate was to monitor developments on the border with Serbia and other neighboring states that might “spill over” into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and create conflict there. Of special concern was a significant ethnic Albanian minority that would be inevitably influenced by events in contiguous Kosovo, as well as smaller ethnic Greek and Bulgarian minorities that might also be sources of tension. The OSCE mission of eight persons also worked closely with a European Community (EC) Monitor Mission at the outset. The small OSCE and EC missions were eventually complemented by the stationing of UN peacekeeping forces in FYROM, initially a detachment from the UN Protection Force deployed elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

This force was eventually renamed the UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment) and included some 800 UN soldiers, later supplemented by about 360 U.S. troops under UN command.³⁰ Their major function was to deter Serbian intervention in the affairs of Macedonia, although much attention subsequently shifted to the internal scene, where tensions appeared between the ethnic Albanian minority and the Macedonian titular majority. Although scattered violent incidents broke out in 1997, large-scale fighting was averted due in part to the frequent interventions by both the HCNM and the OSCE monitor mission.

At the same time, calls by leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1998 to create a “greater Albania”—unifying Kosovo and the regions of northwest Macedonia heavily populated by ethnic Albanians, with the “mother” country—significantly increased tensions and presented new challenges to the OSCE mission’s preventive work there. These challenges were further amplified by the flood of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo (who entered FYROM following the beginning of the 1999 NATO bombing of the FRY), prompting fears on the part of the titular Macedonian majority of being swamped by a rapidly rising ethnic Albanian population.

The third major mission engaged primarily in conflict prevention was established in Ukraine on June 15, 1994, largely on the recommendation of the HCNM. Following two visits in February and May 1994, van der Stoep was concerned about the seriously deteriorating relations between officials in Ukraine’s Crimean region and the central government in Kiev. Crimea, whose population was about 67 percent ethnic Russians, had been part of the Russian Federation’s administrative jurisdiction until it was given as a “gift” by Nikita Khrushchev to the Soviet republic of Ukraine in 1954.

This change in status made little practical difference until the Soviet Union collapsed, when the Crimean Russians suddenly found themselves to be a vulnerable minority in

the new Ukrainian state. Tensions between the Crimean authorities and Kiev worsened dramatically in January 1994 when Yuri Meshkov, a nationalistic Russian, was elected as the first president of Crimea. He immediately proposed adopting a new constitution for an independent Crimea, setting off a strong reaction among Ukrainians elsewhere, who wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state.

The principal mandate of the OSCE mission was to assist in settling the status of Crimea within OSCE guidelines—namely, that it should be an autonomous region within the state of Ukraine. The OSCE mission and the High Commissioner provided advice to the governments and parliaments of both Crimea and Ukraine in an effort to harmonize the provisions of the two constitutions in such a way as to insure that outcome. Van der Stoel organized several conferences and seminars in Locarno, Switzerland; in Yalta, Ukraine; and in Noordwijk, Holland. He invited political leaders from the region and experts from outside to explore these constitutional issues together.

After listening to the positions expressed by the parties, van der Stoel drafted recommendations for both governments, including detailed language designed to bridge the gaps between the two constitutions. In June 1996, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a new constitution that effectively accepted 116 of the 136 articles of the Crimean constitution, although disagreement remained on 20 troublesome articles. Subsequently, the OSCE mission and the High Commissioner continued to monitor the situation and to provide a mechanism through which the parties could discuss the remaining differences peacefully, if sometimes abrasively.

In December 1998, a new Crimean constitution was adopted that was effectively in harmony with the Ukrainian constitution. Both Jan Kubis, former director of the CPC, and High Commissioner on National Minorities van der Stoel consider the OSCE activities in Ukraine to have been the most successful effort at preventive diplomacy undertaken by the OSCE since these missions were first established in 1992.³¹ As a result of this favorable outcome, the mission was officially terminated in April 1999.

Conflict Resolution

In regions where violent conflict recently has occurred but where fighting mostly has ceased, the OSCE has focused on managing conflicts to avert the reappearance of violence and to resolve the underlying issues and remove the conditions that led to conflict in the first place. Because of the challenging nature of the situations the OSCE has confronted in the former communist countries, resolution has often been extremely difficult to achieve. Most situations do not entail simple conflicts of interest, in which parties may trade off various interests to find an acceptable solution. On the contrary, nationality or ethnic conflicts almost invariably involve issues of identity, which gives people a sense of their place in the universe of social relations. Ethnonational conflicts almost always develop because at least one group feels that its identity is problematic, perhaps even at risk of being extinguished. At moments of social and political upheaval, these identities may be especially vulnerable.

As Zartman has emphasized, resolution of this kind of conflict requires a formula that guarantees the protection of the vulnerable group's identity. In his words, a disintegrating state needs to discover "an identity principle to hold its people together and to give

cognitive content to the institutional aspects of legitimacy and sovereignty. Without such a regime, it will fall apart in continuing and renewed conflict; without an identity principle, it becomes merely a bureaucratic administration with no standard terms for expressing allegiance.”³²

Issues of identity are virtually impossible to settle through negotiations based on a traditional bargaining process. Instead, they require what has become known as a problem-solving approach to negotiations.³³ This negotiation process prescribes a number of negotiating behaviors that are quite different from traditional, confrontational bargaining. The parties should approach the conflict as a problem to be solved jointly rather than as a conflict to be “won.”³⁴ They should treat the dispute essentially as a “non-zero-sum” game, in which both parties stand to lose from escalation while both may gain from mutual accommodation. They should be committed to realizing their own essential goals, while recognizing that this does not necessarily preclude the other side from simultaneously attaining its goals as well. Tactically, they should show sufficient flexibility to achieve progress without appearing to be weak and thus vulnerable to exploitation. They must persuade the other to recognize their legitimate needs and ways of implementing them rather than using hard bargaining tactics to intimidate the other party into concessions.³⁵

It is difficult for the parties to adopt these types of approaches toward negotiations when they are in the midst of a dispute, especially a dispute in which their identity as a “people” or a “nation” is at stake. Unfortunately, the psychological elements of this kind of dispute often produce mutually antagonistic attitudes, beliefs that the other party is a fundamental threat not just to some specific interests but to the very source of one’s identity. Therefore, it is often extremely difficult to develop the empathy required to cooperate with the other party in a negotiation process that seeks to build mutual confidence and discover solutions to common problems that will protect the fundamental interests *and identities* of all parties to the conflict. Third-party intervention may be essential to overcome these obstacles and achieve a fundamental resolution of the underlying conflict.

In general terms, third-party interventions may be categorized along a continuum ranging from passive roles, such as providing “good offices,” to active manipulation of the process by a mediator who uses “carrots” and “sticks” to produce a settlement. But the most effective third-party roles are usually found somewhere along the continuum between these two extremes. Third parties may be especially helpful when they assist the disputants to modify their psychological and attitudinal orientations toward the dispute. The mediator may assist them to reframe the issues so that they no longer appear to be “zero-sum,” to overcome stereotyped images of their “enemies,” to locate possible formulas that merge their joint interests and identities rather than divide them, and to make concessions that will not entail loss of face or opening themselves to exploitation by the other.³⁶ In these various ways, the third party may assist the disputing parties in finding ways to resolve their conflict that they would be unlikely to stumble on by themselves.

Within the OSCE, these third-party roles may be played by key individuals such as the chairman-in-office, the HCNM, or a head of mission, all of whom assume a special role as a representative of a regional international organization whose principles have been accepted by all member states, including those involved in the dispute. What matters in the eventual success of the intervention is usually the OSCE representative’s ability to assist the

disputants to move away from hard bargaining based on competing interests and into a problem-solving mode. Their role is thus primarily one of facilitating the negotiation *process* itself rather than formulating their own solutions to the dispute.

The OSCE's performance of these third-party functions in Eurasia over the past decade has been manifested in numerous different ways. In a few instances, the OSCE has played an active role in the negotiation of cease-fires where conflicts are in progress. However, in the vast majority of cases, fighting has simply ceased because one party achieved its immediate objective and the other was unable to resist by force, the parties became exhausted and turned to other means to pursue their conflict, or an outside party, such as Russia, intervened to help bring an end to the fighting.³⁷ In this region, once a cease-fire is in place, typically some kind of peacekeeping arrangement has been set up, usually under the auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), though occasionally under UN auspices, as in the UN Protection Force in Croatia in March 1992, or under the OSCE, as in the KVM in October 1998. When neither the United Nations nor the OSCE operates peacekeeping forces themselves, as in the largely Russian-led peacekeeping operations carried out by the CIS, the OSCE missions have often been mandated to observe the peacekeepers' performance, assure their neutrality, and verify that they do not themselves instigate incidents that might lead to a renewal of violence. The OSCE has assumed this role in the South Ossetia region of Georgia, the Transdnistria region of Moldova, and in Tajikistan, especially near the frontier with Afghanistan (where CIS border patrols play a major role in preventing the infiltration of illegal arms or narcotics trafficking).

OSCE representatives have used a number of techniques to perform third-party roles in conflict management and resolution. The HCNM, for example, has frequently organized seminars, often in conjunction with the nongovernmental Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations, which works closely with his office in the Hague. He has also undertaken "shuttle diplomacy," traveling between disputing parties, listening to their grievances and suggestions, and then following up with specific recommendations directed to the parties involved.

A second approach, used especially in missions of long duration, has been to provide "good offices" and other fairly passive forms of mediation to assist disputing parties to reach agreement. The OSCE mission head often serves as a go-between or mediates between disputing parties during formal meetings. For example, OSCE mission heads have served as mediators both between the government of Moldova and the breakaway region of Transdnistria and between the government of Georgia and the separatist regime in South Ossetia. The mission in Dushanbe has mediated between the government of Tajikistan and the United National Opposition, composed of rival clans and political opponents of the ruling regime, who have sometimes resorted to violence to bring down the central government. Finally, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya played a critical role in mediating the agreement reached at Khasavyurt in 1996 between Chechen leaders and the Russian government that eventually ended that bloody conflict.

A third approach to mediation has been to establish formal groups of states operating under OSCE auspices to try to assist disputing parties to resolve their differences peacefully. These may take the form of "contact groups," representatives of the UN secretary general from particular countries, or a formal entity such as the Minsk Group, which was

established in 1992 to prepare for an eventual peace conference to resolve the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. Currently co-chaired by the United States, France, and the Russian Federation, the Minsk Group consists of senior diplomats and, from time to time, their countries' foreign ministers. It seeks to hammer out a political solution to what has been one of the most deadly conflicts in post-Cold War Eurasia.

Finally, where agreements have been reached, the OSCE may play a role in overseeing their implementation. For example, the OSCE has set up special missions to assist in the implementation of bilateral agreements between Russia and Latvia concerning the decommissioning of a Russian radar station at Skrunda and agreements between Russia and both Latvia and Estonia on the operation of joint commissions on military pensioners. Similarly, the OSCE mission in Moldova is charged with monitoring the 1994 treaty between Russia and Moldova (not yet ratified by the Russian legislature) on the withdrawal of the Russian Fourteenth Army and associated equipment and supplies stored on the left bank of the Dniester River.

In principle, but thus far not in reality, the OSCE may undertake a peacekeeping operation, perhaps with assistance from NATO, other military alliances, or individual member states, to oversee political agreements between disputing parties. The OSCE has anticipated establishing a peacekeeping operation as part of a political settlement between Azerbaijan and the Armenian community in Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1992 Helsinki Summit. At the 1994 Budapest Summit, the organization created a High-Level Planning Group to prepare for such an operation. However, a political settlement has remained elusive to date, so there is no agreed mandate under which an OSCE peacekeeping force might function there.

Altogether, there have been five OSCE missions whose primary tasks have involved managing conflicts following agreement on a cease-fire. The first mission created in the aftermath of violent conflict was established in Georgia on November 6, 1992, with a mandate to "promote negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia which are aimed at reaching a peaceful political settlement."

After the Soviet Union broke up, Georgia was wracked by a civil war over control of the central government and by two wars of secession, one in Abkhazia and another in South Ossetia. The United Nations took primary responsibility for dealing with the former secessionist conflict, while the OSCE mission became the principal intermediary in the latter. During the Soviet period, South Ossetia was an autonomous oblast (province) within Georgia and had close ties with its neighbor across the Caucasus, North Ossetia, itself an autonomous oblast within the Russian Federation.

Georgia's first post-Soviet president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, insisted upon creating a unitary Georgian state by abolishing the autonomous regions, including both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He sent Georgian troops to the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali to establish Georgian authority throughout the region. This met with violent resistance from the Ossetian population, and most of the substantial Georgian minority residing within the oblast were evicted from their homes. Leaders in Tskhinvali meanwhile began talking openly about the possibility of the unification of the Ossetian nation by bringing South and North Ossetia together as an independent state. A June 24, 1992 agreement reached in

Sochi, on Russia's Black Sea coast, declared a cease-fire and created a peacekeeping force in South Ossetia consisting of Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian troops.

The OSCE mission thus entered Georgia after this cease-fire was signed. It was specifically charged with preparing an international conference, in cooperation with the United Nations, aimed at resolving the conflict and settling the status of South Ossetia within the Georgian state. As a result of the Helsinki Final Act's principle providing for the sanctity of the territorial integrity of states, all mandates for OSCE missions stress their opposition to complete independence for secessionist regions, although any form of autonomy that might be agreed to by the parties is likely to be consistent with the OSCE principles.³⁸

The mission was encouraged to organize round table discussions involving all parties to try to overcome their major differences. It was also charged with overseeing the peacekeeping force to assure that its mission was being carried out in conformity with OSCE principles. Although the conflict had not been completely resolved by early 1999, substantial progress had been made, and both parties to the conflict generally credit the OSCE with having, at a minimum, prevented a resumption of the fighting. More significantly, the mission has contributed to a gradual improvement in confidence between the parties that appeared to enhance prospects for a political settlement about the status of South Ossetia.

The second OSCE mission of this type is the mission to Moldova, created on February 4, 1993. Its mandate called for the mission "to facilitate the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects," including "the reinforcement of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova along with an understanding about a special status for the Trans-Dniester region." The region on the east bank of the Dniester River was historically distinct from the rest of Moldova because it had been part of the Russian Empire as long ago as the eighteenth century, whereas the rest of Moldova had been part of the Russian province of Bessarabia and later part of Romania. About two-thirds of the population of this region is made up of Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking peoples. A good deal of industry was located there during Soviet times, so that even ethnic Moldovans tended to adopt a more "Soviet" outlook than was the case for Moldovans living west of the Dniester. Finally, the Russian Fourteenth Army was (and still is) stationed in this region.

During the Gorbachev period, Moldovan nationalists called for independence from the Soviet Union, and some even advocated unification with Romania. The residents east of the Dniester resisted these moves and responded to Moldovan calls for independence by declaring themselves to be the Transdniester Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union. Their leadership continued to proclaim its loyalty to the USSR even after the Soviet collapse.

In the spring of 1992, the authorities in Chisinau, Moldova's capital, proclaimed the primacy of Moldovan law throughout the entire country. When they tried to impose their proclamation on the east bank of the Dniester by force, fighting broke out between the Moldovan army and the Transdniestrian Republican Guard, supported by elements of the Russian Fourteenth Army. A cease-fire was reached in Moscow on July 6–7, 1992, after approximately eight hundred people had lost their lives. A peacekeeping force of Russian, Moldovan, and Transdniestrian units was established to police the cease-fire.

The CSCE mission in Moldova was created in the aftermath of the Moscow agreement. As in Georgia, the mission was to oversee the performance of the peacekeeping forces, report on the human rights and security situations, and assist the parties to achieve a permanent political settlement recognizing some form of autonomy for the Transdnistria region within the Moldovan state. The OSCE head of mission, along with representatives from Russia and Ukraine, meets with the parties regularly to mediate the conflict. Tensions in the region have been reduced considerably, and at the grassroots level a great deal of contact has been restored across the banks of the Dniester.

By 1998 a number of CBMs had been negotiated along the security zone separating the two parties, including reductions in the number of control posts and security forces deployed by all three parties—Russians, Moldovans, and Transdnistrians—in the security zone. Agreement on the eventual political status of Transdnistria, however, has remained elusive. The principle that Transdnistria should have broad autonomy within the formal structures of the Republic of Moldova appears to be under intense discussion, though significant differences remain on the specifics of an autonomy arrangement. Despite the serious deterioration of the economic situation throughout the country, especially in Transdnistria, the stalemate appears not to hurt either party enough to push it toward some final resolution of the most difficult political questions. Furthermore, the danger remains that extremists on either side might try to break the stalemate by resorting to violence in the hope that a crisis in Moldova would be noticed abroad and perhaps provoke the West or the OSCE to intervene in order to impose a settlement from outside along the lines achieved in Bosnia and Kosovo.³⁹

The final task of the OSCE mission in Moldova is to verify a treaty signed in 1994 between the governments of Moldova and the Russian Federation calling for the complete withdrawal within three years of Russian troops, other than the peacekeepers, and the large stocks of equipment and ammunition stored in Transdnistria. Although the Russian legislature did not ratify this agreement, President Yeltsin committed his government to implement it anyway. In fact, when the November 1997 deadline passed, only token withdrawals had taken place. The OSCE mission was powerless to enforce the treaty, though it did publicize the slow rate at which Russia was carrying out its treaty obligations.

The mission to Tajikistan, the third of this type, was created on December 1, 1993. Unlike the situations in Georgia and Moldova, the case of Tajikistan involves an internal power struggle among competing clientelistic groups rather than a secessionist movement involving a particular national or religious minority or a distinct region. In addition, the United Nations was involved in Tajikistan prior to the arrival of the CSCE mission.

Several important issues arose in the situation along the southern border with Afghanistan, where the Tajikistan government, with the support of Russia and other Central Asian leaders, feared that Islamicist political forces could easily gain entry into the region. The border also proved to be a porous barrier against trafficking in drugs and other contraband. Therefore, Russian border guards remained stationed along the frontier even after the Soviet Union collapsed. The CIS also took on a peacekeeping role, again fulfilled primarily by Russian soldiers with the assistance of a few units from other Central Asian

countries. In this instance, the Russian forces have generally played a one-sided role in helping to defend the central government against its opponents.⁴⁰

The mission focused on issues such as protecting human rights, improving the democratic character of the regime in Dushanbe, and promoting confidence building and negotiation between the government and its opponents. Although the lines of division within Tajik society are complex, the civil conflict mainly involved forces from outside the capital, often though not always with an Islamicist bent, opposing a secular government composed mostly of clan leaders and former Communist Party officials from the Soviet period. The OSCE thus sought to protect the human rights of those individuals who were part of a peaceful opposition, and to promote integration of dissident groups into the government.

With the encouragement of the CSCE mission, talks took place between the government and opposition leaders in Moscow in April 1994. Subsequently, the CSCE put pressure on the government to allow for free elections to take place in the fall, and some resulting changes in the electoral law apparently encouraged the opposition to agree to a cease-fire during negotiations in Tehran in September 1994. The CSCE consistently encouraged the government to create an independent ombudsman to promote dialogue between the government and the opposition.

After many sporadic violations and repeated extensions of the cease-fire, a major breakthrough came on June 27, 1997, when all parties accepted the terms of an agreement on peace and national accord at negotiations in Moscow. A Commission of National Reconciliation was created, and the OSCE assumed substantial responsibility for aiding and advising this commission as it set about creating conditions in which the civil conflict could be brought to a halt. Although the OSCE did not really play a major mediating role in bringing about the Moscow agreements, it helped to create the conditions under which an agreement could be achieved and assisted in its subsequent implementation.

A fourth OSCE activity of this type was the Assistance Group to Chechnya, established on April 11, 1995, the first mission of long duration to operate inside the Russian Federation. Chechnya is a predominantly Sunni Muslim region in the northern Caucasus, with a population consisting largely of mountain-dwellers who resisted Russian occupation for centuries. Its population in 1989 comprised about 65 percent Chechens and 25 percent Russians, most of whom lived in the capital of Grozny. Following the Moscow coup attempt in August 1991, Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev, an ethnic Chechen, seized power in Chechnya and shortly thereafter declared independence from Russia. Dudayev subsequently refused to sign Yeltsin's proposed Federation Treaty. After lengthy political skirmishing, on December 11, 1994, approximately forty thousand Russian troops entered Chechnya and initiated by far the bloodiest of the post-Cold War conflicts in Eurasia, lasting off and on for some two years.

The OSCE Assistance Group was created during a period of intense combat with a mandate to "promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles. . . ." In addition, the OSCE group was assigned to monitor compliance with the usual "human dimension" norms, including human rights and the unimpeded return of refugees to their homes. It

also sought to guarantee the right of international humanitarian organizations to work safely in Chechnya. Little space was available to open productive negotiations between the parties, however, until after an attack by Chechen guerrillas on a hospital in Budennyovsk in southern Russia, in which they took numerous hostages. This daring escapade by the Chechens well inside Russia mobilized Russian public opinion against the fighting and opened up political space for the Russian government to enter into serious, albeit initially secret, negotiations.

The head of the OSCE Assistance Group at that time, Ambassador Tim Guldemann of Switzerland, assumed an activist role in promoting talks between Russian and Chechen leaders. He began engaging in shuttle diplomacy involving some thirty trips between the Russian leadership in Moscow and the Chechen leadership, including Dudayev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, and Aslan Maskhadov, who were based in the Chechen mountains south of Grozny. He arranged a secret meeting in the Kremlin at which a military accord calling for a cease-fire was negotiated and signed on July 31, 1995—even though it was frequently violated. Following the death of Dudayev during a rocket attack by Russian forces, Guldemann was able to arrange another meeting between Yandarbiev, the new Chechen president, and Yeltsin in Moscow on May 27, 1996.

This was followed by a series of meetings between Russian and Chechen officials arranged by the OSCE in neighboring Ingushetia, culminating in an agreement between the Chechen chief of staff Maskhadov and Yeltsin's newly appointed security adviser, General Aleksandr Lebed. A cease-fire was to take effect on August 13, 1996, and parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled to be held in Chechnya on January 27, 1997. Guldemann then arranged a meeting at Khasavyurt, in neighboring Dagestan, between "President" Yandarbiev and General Lebed, who signed an agreement on August 31, 1996, calling for the eventual withdrawal of Russian troops while postponing final resolution of Chechnya's status for five years. This agreement left considerable ambiguity surrounding the most important political issue dividing the parties.⁴¹

This case thus illustrates the most successful effort of the OSCE to broker a peace agreement and terms of a postwar settlement between parties engaged in combat. Tragically, however, while the peace agreement brought an end to fighting between Russians and Chechens and the election under OSCE observation of a new president (Aslan Maskhadov) and parliament, it did not bring lasting security to Chechnya. By the end of 1997, the security situation within Chechnya had deteriorated to the point where the OSCE Assistance Group remained as the only international organization—governmental or nongovernmental—operating in Chechnya with foreign personnel. The OSCE mission continued to report from Chechnya and tried to assist in securing the release of a number of international aid workers who had been kidnapped.⁴² Unfortunately, both the governments of Russia (which essentially withdrew altogether) and Chechnya were incapable of establishing law and order within the republic. By 1998, in short, the situation in Chechnya had sunk almost completely into anarchy, as economic conditions became hopeless, human rights abuses became abundant, and guns became available for all. The fighting between Russians and Chechens had so thoroughly destroyed the economic and social fabric of society that chaos took over after the Russian troop withdrawal.

The fifth and final OSCE mission whose primary function is to promote conflict resolution is the involvement of the personal representative of the OSCE chairman-in-office to the Minsk Group. Appointed initially on August 10, 1995, this mission formally linked the OSCE Secretariat, especially the CPC, to the Minsk Group, which was established by the CSCE in 1992. The mission is not based directly in the area of conflict but instead shares facilities with the OSCE mission in Tbilisi, Georgia. Its goals are among the most ambitious to be mandated by the OSCE Permanent Council: The personal representative will “represent the OSCE Chairman-in-Office in issues related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, assist the [chairman] in achieving an agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict and in creating conditions for the deployment of an OSCE peace-keeping operation, in order to facilitate a lasting comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects. . . .” The OSCE’s involvement with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, however, dates back to the spring of 1992 when the Minsk Group was first created prior to the Helsinki Summit. It was here that the concept of missions of long duration was enunciated for the first time.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh began even before the breakup of the Soviet Union. On February 1, 1988, the Regional Council of Nagorno-Karabakh petitioned the Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan and Armenia to transfer sovereignty over the region from the former to the latter. When violence broke out between the two sides, Azerbaijan embargoed both the Karabakh region and all of Armenia as well, an embargo later joined by Turkey. Armenia retaliated by placing an embargo on the Azeri region of Nakhichevan, which is separated physically from the rest of Azerbaijan by a strip of Armenian territory—just as Nagorno-Karabakh is separated from Armenia by a portion of Azeri territory (later captured and occupied by Karabakh forces during the fighting). When the Soviet Union collapsed and both republics became independent, the fighting became more intense as the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh drove virtually all ethnic Azeris out of the territory and began fighting in earnest to separate from Azerbaijan and to unite with the newly independent Armenian state.

In March 1992, the CSCE created a group of eleven member states to prepare a peace conference in Minsk.⁴³ The group was initially chaired by Ambassador Mario Raffaelli of Italy, then by a co-chairmanship of Russia and Finland, and since 1996 it has been led by France, Russia, and the United States. During the July 1992 Helsinki Summit, the CSCE was optimistic that it might broker a peace agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh, so it considered undertaking the organization’s first peacekeeping operation to enforce whatever agreement might emerge. The communiqué issued at the Helsinki Summit envisioned such an operation, noting that it might call on regional military arrangements such as NATO, the WEU, and the CIS for support.

Unfortunately, the situation on the battlefield largely prevented serious negotiations from getting under way. By May 1994, when a cease-fire was agreed upon, the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh had not only gained complete control over the territory to which they lay claim but also over about one-fifth of Azerbaijan outside the Karabakh region. This one-sided military outcome encouraged intransigence among Karabakh and Armenian leaders, who hold the upper hand militarily. The Azeris also have been reluctant to

negotiate from a position of military weakness and have relied instead on the joint Azeri-Turkish embargo of Armenia to put pressure on them. The primary issues involve (1) the formal, legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and its relationship to Azerbaijan and Armenia; (2) security guarantees demanded by the regime in Stepanakert, capital of Karabakh, as a condition for their withdrawal from the occupied territories in Azerbaijan outside of the Karabakh region, especially control over the Lachin corridor that connects Karabakh with Armenia through what would once again become Azeri territory; (3) provisions for the safe return of refugees, especially of Azeris displaced from their homes in the regions occupied by the Karabakh army; and (4) the extent and role of OSCE peace-keeping forces.

The position of the Minsk Group, and indeed of the OSCE, has also been somewhat inconsistent, perhaps reflecting the changing priorities of the co-chairs. Following the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the OSCE supported the principle of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, while calling for “self-rule” for Nagorno-Karabakh within its original frontiers and security guarantees to protect Armenians against retribution and assure safe passage along the main land route between Karabakh and Armenia. The Minsk Group also advocated a “step-by-step” process to bridge the differences between the parties, with the issue of the political status of the enclave postponed until the resolution of other outstanding issues—that is, the withdrawal of the Armenian Karabakh forces from the occupied regions of Azerbaijan, the return of refugees, the lifting of the economic blockade of Armenia and of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the establishment of CBMs to ensure the security of all parties. This approach was accepted by both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but it was rejected by the leaders of Karabakh primarily because it postponed their most essential issue to the final stages of negotiation, when they would no longer hold any “bargaining chips” to reinforce their negotiating position on the status question.⁴⁴ Armenia, however, shifted its position in 1998 when President Levon Ter-Petrosian was ousted and Robert Kocharian, formerly “president” of Nagorno-Karabakh, was elected Armenian president.

In late 1998, therefore, the Minsk Group reversed itself, apparently against the wishes of the U.S. representative, Donald Kaiser, and introduced a new proposal calling for an Azerbaijan-Karabakh “common state.” Strongly advocated by the Russian co-chair and supported by his French colleague, this proposal calls for two co-equal parties to form a common state, similar in structure of the status of Bosnia, which is divided into the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (primarily Croat and Bosnian Muslim). Furthermore, the Minsk Group advocated a return to a “package” approach for negotiations, abandoning the step-by-step strategy.

Not surprisingly, Armenia embraced the new proposals because they would enable Karabakh to retain its territorial “bargaining chips” throughout the negotiations on political status. They were strongly opposed by Azerbaijan’s president Haidar Aliiev for essentially the same reasons when he met the Minsk Group mediators in Baku on November 9, 1998.⁴⁵ Azerbaijan denounced the Minsk Group for abandoning the basic OSCE principles in favor of a vague, alternative formulation. At a minimum, this sudden shift in position by the “mediators” has harmed the credibility of the Minsk Group and created the impression that the shifting interests of its most powerful member states, who serve as its

co-chairs, may take precedence over maintaining the appearance of neutrality with regard to the outcome of the disputes.

In summary, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has probably been the most frustrating one addressed by the OSCE thus far. Perhaps because the organization began with such high expectations in early 1992, the lack of progress remains a source of great disappointment. The process undertaken by the Minsk Group has been manipulated by some of the most powerful member states, which have pursued their own interests, however divergent, rather than seeking a resolution that serves the needs of the conflicting parties. It is probably fortunate that the OSCE has not tried to replicate the Minsk Group concept in its subsequent efforts at conflict resolution but has focused instead on lower-profile, more neutral missions that are less subject to being buffeted about by changing political winds.

Postconflict Security Building

The OSCE also has engaged in promoting long-term peace and security in regions after violent conflicts have occurred and a political settlement has been formally achieved—but where the bitterness and destruction of war have left a legacy of hatred and animosity that must be overcome. This has often involved efforts to promote reconciliation between the parties to the conflict that go beyond a formal settlement of the dispute and move toward a deeper resolution of their differences. It may also include assistance with building democracy, in this case not so much as a prophylactic measure against the initiation of violence, but to create nonviolent, institutional means to resolve differences that were previously settled violently. Constructing civil society, holding elections, assisting in the creation of new constitutions, and promoting the rule of law and all other aspects of the OSCE “human dimension” activities are emphasized in these situations.

In addition, the OSCE may assist in verifying disarmament agreements between disputing parties. It may arrange and provide training for civilian police and other law enforcement institutions. Because economic and social distress is frequently a major obstacle to postconflict rehabilitation, the OSCE may assist states in identifying potential donors of economic assistance or help humanitarian organizations become established in zones where violence has created severe social needs. In short, it provides assistance to help relieve the conditions that breed conflict and make reconciliation difficult to realize.

Finally, the OSCE has sometimes assisted with the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their pre-war homes by advising governments on the legal provisions regarding property rights, for example, that may be necessary for such a process to work effectively. In some cases, such as the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia, the OSCE has cooperated with the UNHCR to facilitate the return of refugees to their homes.

The most dramatic illustration of this OSCE role is in the implementation of the Dayton Accords on Bosnia-Herzegovina. When fighting broke out in the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center was just being created and no adequate mechanism existed to engage in direct conflict-prevention activities. Therefore, the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1991, chaired by German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, passed a resolution condemning Yugoslav government activities in Slovenia and Croatia. The CSCE, however, was unable to take any direct action. Hence, responsibility for future involvement with this conflict was passed on to the European

Union, which sought to demonstrate its *bona fides* in dealing with conflicts on the European continent under the Common Foreign and Security Policy formalized in the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. For the next several years, the EU, sometimes in tandem with the United Nations, sought to broker an end to the fighting in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The CSCE played only a minor role at this stage, providing ombudsmen to assist individuals under its human dimension role. On June 2, 1994, the OSCE created a mission in Sarajevo largely to assist and advise the ombudsmen.

The OSCE role was substantially upgraded following the signing of the Dayton Accords on November 21, 1995. The mission to Sarajevo was replaced by a much larger mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina on December 8, 1995, to carry out all tasks assigned to the OSCE by the Dayton Accords. The OSCE was charged specifically with preparing and supervising all national, republic-level, and municipal elections, and with implementing the results of those elections, including the return of elected officials to those communities from which they had been forcibly evicted during the fighting. The organization was assigned responsibility for implementing the regional stabilization and arms control measures under Articles II and IV of the Dayton Accords, including supervising the disarmament of combatant forces, the surrender of weapons by individuals, and aerial surveillance to verify compliance with the arms control provisions and to enhance confidence among the parties. Finally, the OSCE played a leading role in promoting the development of pluralistic and independent media and the fair use of the media by candidates and political parties during elections.

In short, with the exception of the direct military enforcement role under the leadership of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR), the OSCE has played the leading role in the implementation of the Dayton Accords, especially involving political dimensions of the security-building process. This became the first large mission launched by the OSCE, which was authorized to have as many as 246 internationally seconded members. Through December 1997, the mission was headed by Ambassador Robert Frowick of the United States, who was replaced in 1998 by Ambassador Robert Barry, also a senior U.S. diplomat. The mission's budget in 1997 amounted to approximately U.S. \$20 million, totaling about 44 percent of the entire annual OSCE operating budget that year.

The OSCE's prominent involvement in implementing the Dayton Accords has gone almost unnoticed in mass media accounts of the peacebuilding process in Bosnia, especially in the United States. Yet the OSCE's fulfillment of the elections mandate and of the arms control and stabilization provisions of the Dayton Accords has perhaps demonstrated most clearly the value of its unique role—namely, linking security issues to the human dimension, especially democratic processes and human rights. Just as the OSCE could not have implemented these provisions without the physical security provided by IFOR and SFOR troops, so the eventual withdrawal of these troops would be impossible without the role that ODIHR and other OSCE personnel have played in creating the political prerequisites for a sufficiently secure environment in Bosnia so that foreign military troops may eventually be withdrawn. No long-term security building can take place until warring parties are disarmed, refugees are returned to their homes, and democratic politics can take place in the absence of fear and intimidation. It is precisely these aspects of the Dayton Ac-

ords that the OSCE is charged with implementing. At the same time, the effectiveness of the OSCE's mission has been hampered by the divided authority and absence of clear lines of coordination in the Dayton Accords among the Office of the High Representative, the head of the OSCE mission, and the NATO commander of IFOR/SFOR.

Similarly, the OSCE mission in Croatia has played a key role in the postconflict process in that country. This mission was created on April 18, 1996, largely to assist the government of Croatia with the settlement of the many issues left over after an end to the violence that took place in 1995 in the Eastern Slavonia (Danube) and Krajina regions of Croatia, areas that previously had been heavily populated by Serbs. The mission's mandate focused on implementation of democratic processes and the rule of law. Primary responsibility for peacekeeping and other security functions at that time was lodged with the United Nations, especially with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). When the mandate for this force expired on January 15, 1998, full responsibility for administration in this region reverted to the government in Zagreb. However, most Serb residents and refugees had little confidence in the Croatian authorities' commitment to implement these agreements fairly, so the OSCE mission agreed to step into the breach.

In January 1998, a force of approximately 250 OSCE officials took over tasks formerly undertaken by the much larger UNTAES. A principal responsibility for OSCE officials has been to assist and oversee the Croatian government's implementation of agreements concerning the two-way return of refugees in an effort to undo at least partly the ethnic cleansing that took place in the course of the fighting in this region of Croatia. A UN police training unit stayed on to assist Croatian civilian police in protecting all parties involved in the return of refugees, but all other responsibilities for advising the government on how to implement its commitments reside with the OSCE. The position of head of mission was assumed by Ambassador Tim Guldemann of Switzerland, the former head of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya. Although it is too soon to evaluate fairly the OSCE's contributions to postconflict security building in Croatia, this represents an ambitious undertaking that provides a real test of the OSCE's capacity to deal with a very difficult situation in the aftermath of bitter interethnic fighting and ethnic cleansing.

Finally, the OSCE played a major role in resolving the conflict that broke out in Albania in early 1997, and in the subsequent process of rebuilding political and social order after the fighting was brought to an end. This mission was created on March 27, 1997, in the aftermath of the collapse of civil order in Albania. The major precipitating event was the collapse of a nationwide financial "pyramid scheme" supported by the government of President Berisha, which led to widespread chaos and violence throughout the country. The conflict also represented a long-term conflict between the Gheg clans based in the north (where Berisha came from) and the Tosk clans of the south, from which the Albanian Socialist Party drew most of its support.⁴⁶ In response to this outbreak of violence and a flood of refugees that crossed the Adriatic Sea into Italy, the Italian government led a "coalition of the willing" to create a Multinational Protection Force (MNF) consisting of about sixty-five hundred troops from ten countries to enter Albania and restore order. Dubbed "Operation Alba," this intervention was sanctioned by both the United Nations and the OSCE.⁴⁷

Following the restoration of some semblance of order, a tentative agreement was reached on March 9 among the Albanian political parties to hold new elections. Shortly thereafter the OSCE decided to establish its “presence” (as opposed to a “mission”) in Albania, which immediately set about the task of assisting in preparing, monitoring, and implementing elections. The mandate adopted by the Permanent Council on March 27, 1997, however, assigned to the OSCE presence in Albania responsibility for providing “the coordinating framework within which other international organizations can play their part in their respective areas of competence, in support of a coherent international strategy, and in facilitating improvements in the protection of human rights and basic elements of civil society.” Specific areas of OSCE specialization included, as in many other missions, responsibility for preparing and monitoring elections; oversight of democratization, media, and human rights; and monitoring the collection of weapons.

The OSCE chairman-in-office at the time, Danish foreign minister Helveg Petersen, appointed former Austrian chancellor Franz Vranitzky to head the OSCE presence. Vranitzky’s personal role was essential in the effectiveness of this OSCE operation, as his senior status in European political circles gave him access to the highest-level officials of all major European governments to ensure that the OSCE presence had the support it needed. The organization’s presence also worked closely with the Italian-led Multinational Protection Force, relying on it to provide the security necessary to undertake its tasks. For a brief but critical period between the fall of President Berisha and the election of a new president, the OSCE presence provided the sole source of nationwide governance, with the support of the troops from the MNF.

The entire operation was conducted with little advance preparation, demonstrating the flexibility of the OSCE to react rapidly and creatively to a fast-developing crisis to which other organizations, more tightly bound by bureaucratic procedures, were unable to respond so quickly. The ODIHR was able to prepare and conduct presidential elections by the scheduled date of June 29, and the elections proceeded peacefully with the selection of the opposition leader, Fatos Nano of the Socialist Party, as prime minister. As a tenuous political stability returned to Albania following the election, the OSCE mission was reduced in size and the Multinational Protection Force was withdrawn. The OSCE continued to make progress in overseeing the return of more than one million weapons, mostly AK-47s, looted from storehouses during the violence, and to restore the foundations for civil society in Albania. Although many aspects of the situation in Albania remain precarious, there can be little doubt that the OSCE played a major role in coordinating the international response to a severe crisis in that Balkan country, located in a volatile region of southeastern Europe. It provided what Hugh Miall has characterized as “light conflict prevention,” which aims to prevent escalation or to “bring about de-escalation without necessarily addressing the deep roots of the conflict.”⁴⁸ Albania seemed well on its way to becoming a collapsed state, in which all central authority might have given way to anarchy, with implications stretching far beyond its borders. The OSCE assistance was critical in preventing that outcome, and Albanian authorities credit the OSCE with playing the key role in preventing a major tragedy in their country.⁴⁹ Of course, after the 1999 war in Kosovo, when hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians (mostly related to the northern Gheg clans) took refuge in Albania, the fragile economic conditions and the ethnopolitical

balance were once again in danger of being tipped, possibly setting off yet another round of anarchy and instability.

The OSCE was successful in Albania, at least in the short run, primarily because of its ability as a small, nonbureaucratic organization to react flexibly. Under the firm leadership of a prominent individual and concerned and willing states, the OSCE was capable of responding quickly to a rapidly evolving crisis where an international consensus to act existed, but where no other international organization was able to react promptly. The chairman-in-office's personal representative, Franz Vranitzky, and his deputy, former Austrian ambassador Herbert Grubmayr, were given virtual *carte blanche* by the OSCE to take charge of the mission, and they acted promptly and decisively. Their personal leadership of the OSCE presence, free of unnecessary constraints imposed by the Permanent Council in Vienna, was a major factor enabling the OSCE to play a significant role in putting "Humpty Dumpty back together again" in Albania. This case thus offers many useful insights into the role that a regional security organization can play in managing crises in collapsing states that may endanger international security well beyond their borders.

Evaluating OSCE Missions and Field Activities

The preceding overview of OSCE missions and other field activities indicates that the organization has been actively engaged during the last decade of the twentieth century in a large number of conflict areas in the former communist countries of Eurasia to a far greater extent than is generally recognized. Obviously, it is too soon to present a definitive evaluation of the effectiveness of these activities in reducing violent conflict, but some preliminary observations may be ventured nonetheless.

First, the OSCE is most effective, especially in comparison with other security institutions operating in Eurasia, when it links issues of security and conflict prevention with broader humanitarian issues and especially with the process of democratization. Although long-term conflict prevention through democratization has been the central task of only a few OSCE field activities, it has figured in virtually all of them. By definition, the success of this form of conflict prevention can be evaluated best over a period of several decades, but there can be little doubt that the OSCE has already made a major contribution in the Baltic states, Central Asia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, among others, to strengthening democratic processes in countries that are at very different stages of democratization.

Similarly, the OSCE has already compiled a significant record in conflict prevention, despite the sad failure to prevent violence in Kosovo. Nonetheless, Crimea provides one of the best examples of successful conflict prevention, and the fact that vulnerable Macedonia has not yet exploded in violence may be attributable in no small part to the extensive work of the OSCE mission there. Preventive diplomacy also figures prominently in many missions that have been established after cease-fires have taken effect, but where the major function of the mission is to prevent the renewal of violence. In this respect, the OSCE has played an important role in Moldova, Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Georgia, Tajikistan, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Conflict prevention successes are frequently overlooked in large part because, from the point of view of the media and most political figures, when conflicts are prevented it appears that "nothing happened." Definitive evidence of preventive diplomacy's success de-

depends on creating a plausible, but counterfactual, argument—namely, that violent conflict was possible or even likely in the absence of an outside intervention. In the cases examined here, that argument certainly is plausible. Indeed, there may be many other cases that are hard to identify but where the presence of international observers in the form of OSCE missions stationed on the territory of conflict-prone countries has prevented tensions from escalating into overt violence.

Perhaps the area of greatest disappointment for the OSCE in its first decade after the adoption of the Charter of Paris has been the obstacles it has encountered in facilitating long-term resolution of many conflicts that erupted into mass violence as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia fell apart. As noted previously, although the OSCE has helped prevent the reignition of violence where cease-fires have taken hold, it has thus far played a very limited role in actually brokering settlements of the fundamental issues in conflict or encouraging the warring parties to reconcile their differences. This is due in part to the intensity of these conflicts, but it is also a consequence of the rather passive role that OSCE conflict-prevention mechanisms have assumed in these conflicts. To date, more active mediation has been left to individual states and other organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the United Nations—bodies that can bring carrots and sticks to bear in promoting the settlement of conflicts.

There is little doubt that the OSCE will have to develop greater capacity and skills at active mediation to be more effective in its conflict resolution functions. Such a strengthening of the OSCE inevitably will be controversial because it will necessarily entail more active OSCE intervention into what many member states will perceive to be strictly their internal affairs. Thus one of the major challenges that the organization faces is how to increase its capacity to promote conflict resolution within the constraints placed on it by its member states.

Finally, the OSCE has played an important, if often overlooked, role in security building in the aftermath of violent conflict. In places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania, the OSCE has assumed an essential role in the nonmilitary aspects of building security in “collapsed” states, where the local security structures are essentially incapable of functioning effectively. Military forces from NATO and other Partnership for Peace countries have taken the lead in providing physical security in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the Multinational Protection Force of Operation Alba assumed a similar role in Albania. However, the key components for building long-term security depend first and foremost on the provision of those services at which the OSCE is most effective—namely, building democratic institutions and practices, strengthening the rule of law, promoting freedom of the media, and emphasizing preventive diplomacy to avert new crises that might lead to renewed outbreaks of violence. When the OSCE acts in partnership with other complementary security institutions, and when it emphasizes its historical role in promoting the political and human dimensions of security, it is capable of making its most important contributions to long-term security building in the volatile Eurasian region.

Four

U.S. Foreign Policy and the OSCE

U.S. Attitudes toward the OSCE

The brief overview of OSCE activities since 1990 in the previous section summarizes the wide range of contributions the organization has made to security building on the Eurasian continent since the end of the Cold War. To be sure, there is no dramatic breakthrough in conflict prevention or settlement for which the OSCE can claim credit. Furthermore, most of its accomplishments have been modest and could not have been successful without substantial contributions from other European and global security organizations, individual governments, and nongovernmental organizations. Nonetheless, the cumulative record of OSCE accomplishments is impressive. Certainly Eurasia is still wracked by numerous tensions and violent conflicts, which are appalling by any standard. Yet the overwhelming conclusion suggested by the preceding survey of the activities of OSCE missions, the Conflict Prevention Center, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities is that the level of insecurity likely would be even greater in post–Cold War Eurasia were it not for the quiet but persistent work of the OSCE to maintain and enhance the security and the quality of life for the citizens of that region.

In spite of these accomplishments, the OSCE is generally not well regarded by high-level officials in the United States and it is virtually unknown by the American public, even by many well-educated and informed members of the “attentive public” and by those in the media responsible for informing the public. Even among those who are familiar with the OSCE, it is frequently dismissed out of hand as irrelevant to U.S. national security interests. Indeed, from the very beginning, U.S. officials were skeptical. As John Maresca notes: “The United States, deeply involved in bilateral negotiations with the USSR, relegated the CSCE to the second rank.”⁵⁰

Throughout the Cold War period, the United States government regarded the CSCE primarily as a forum in which it could readily attack the dismal human rights record of the Soviet Union and other communist governments. Between 1975 and 1985, during the CSCE review conferences in Belgrade and Madrid, the United States opposed strengthening the CSCE’s security regime, especially the confidence-building provisions of Basket I, predating negotiations about security issues upon an improvement of the Soviet Union’s human rights performance. Even in the post–Cold War period, the attitude of the United States toward the CSCE/OSCE has remained relatively cool, especially at higher levels in the foreign policy and national security bureaucracies.⁵¹ Diplomats who have served in the U.S. Mission to the OSCE or in missions of long duration have frequently expressed dismay at the low level of support given to their activities by senior officials in Washington.

There are some indications that Washington’s reluctance to rely on the OSCE to perform sensitive security tasks may have changed by 1998. In particular, the U.S. government supported empowering the OSCE to verify compliance with the agreement on Kosovo negotiated by Richard Holbrooke in October 1998. However, this decision came in the face

of strong Serbian opposition, supported by the threat of Russian vetoes in the UN and OSCE, to the introduction of any armed force in Kosovo comparable to SFOR in Bosnia. Even if these barriers would not have prevented the deployment of an armed peacekeeping force, it was unlikely in late 1998 that public and congressional support could have been mustered in the United States to send American ground forces once more to the Balkans. Furthermore, the United States insisted that the Kosovo Verification Mission be headed by an American, namely Ambassador William Walker, and the OSCE had little choice but to accede to this demand. As in Bosnia, therefore, the United States has found the OSCE most useful when it can feel confident that it can control the OSCE mission to ensure that it serves U.S. interests first. It still remains to be seen whether this apparent shift in U.S. policy toward the OSCE will apply to other issues where U.S. interests are not so clearly at stake and where the OSCE missions are not led by an American. In addition, western European political leaders' resentment of U.S. domination of OSCE missions appears to have contributed to their desire to give the OSCE only a modest role in Kosovo after the end of the military campaign in June 1999, with many responsibilities for non-military roles being assigned to the United Nations and the European Union instead of the OSCE.

There are a number of plausible explanations for the reluctance of senior U.S. officials to support the OSCE's role in the security field with any enthusiasm. Many in Washington view the OSCE as a distinct competitor to NATO for primacy in providing for European security. Some U.S. officials assume that whatever strengthens one organization weakens at least the relative influence of the other. In this competition, NATO is usually preferred for several reasons.

First, U.S. policymakers generally believe that in times of crisis, it will be easier for NATO to make a decision than the OSCE. Although both organizations require consensus to make decisions, the more politically diverse membership of the OSCE is perceived in Washington to make consensus harder to achieve in Vienna than in Brussels. Americans especially fear that the OSCE may be paralyzed by a Russian veto, and Russian opposition to decisive OSCE action against Serbia is often cited as evidence. In spite of the Cold War's end, official Washington has still found it difficult to change its view of the CSCE as a Soviet project put forward in the early 1970s in opposition to NATO's proposal to negotiate conventional arms reductions in MBFR.

Second, U.S. policymakers generally perceive that the OSCE lacks the means to implement its decisions. Although the organization has played an important role in political and humanitarian operations in Bosnia, for example, it depended on the NATO Stabilization Force to provide security for its personnel, especially ODIHR's election monitors. Since the OSCE has never raised peacekeeping forces, the unarmed KVM notwithstanding, these policymakers believe that the organization's dependence on other institutions to provide the muscle needed to carry out its decisions detracts from its effectiveness.

Many of the OSCE's critics also point to its alleged history of "failures" to prevent or to resolve conflicts as evidence of its unreliability. Most often cited is the alleged failure of the OSCE to prevent war and genocide in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991–92. Similarly, critics often point to the failure of the OSCE to resolve the conflicts in countries where cease-fires have been in place but where negotiations have failed so far to yield significant

results, including the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and South Ossetia. Finally, they note that anarchy and sporadic violence have prevented a return to normal life in both Chechnya and Tajikistan, where the OSCE has allegedly failed to bring about a significant improvement in the political situation for most of the inhabitants of these troubled regions.

Some critics assert that Russia is primarily responsible for the continuation of tensions in these regions and has successfully blocked all serious efforts by the OSCE to bring about a settlement. Others simply point out that these many “failures” in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War so undermined the OSCE’s credibility in the field of conflict management that disputing parties tend to resist efforts by the OSCE to intervene as a third party in their conflict. In particular, they argue that only an actor capable of wielding real “carrots” and “sticks,” such as the United States or NATO, can successfully push intransigent parties to settle their differences when they are based on deeply felt hostility. This further reinforces the argument that the United States needs a capacity to be able to act unilaterally or through more reliable institutions like NATO, without being constrained by more “political” multilateral institutions such as the OSCE or even the United Nations.

In short, many policymakers see the OSCE as playing a useful role only on the margins of European security. When it comes to an ability to respond decisively to crises that may present real threats to U.S. or western European interests, U.S. political leaders have generally preferred to act through NATO or unilaterally. This point was most dramatically illustrated by NATO’s decision to order the withdrawal of the OSCE Verification Mission from Kosovo as a prelude to NATO’s air campaign in the FRY. Because a strengthened OSCE might reduce U.S. freedom to employ tools such as coercive diplomacy, American leaders have often been unwilling to support measures to strengthen the organization.

I would contend, however, that these criticisms of the OSCE’s record, though sometimes well founded, are nonetheless frequently exaggerated. They tend to overlook the many positive accomplishments of the OSCE since 1992 and fail to appreciate the many reasons for its apparent inability to *resolve* the many complex conflicts that it has been called upon to *manage*. These criticisms especially disregard the large number of multidimensional security issues confronting Eurasia, which cannot be addressed unilaterally or by multilateral institutions that rely primarily upon military power because these problems are generally not amenable to solution through the threat or use of force. Finally, they do not sufficiently acknowledge the important role of multilateral institutions like the OSCE in creating norms of international behavior.

Certainly one of the major strengths of the CSCE/OSCE is the extent to which it has linked issues of security directly to the “human dimension,” and indeed to a normative structure that very much reflects American values. Virtually all former communist states are groping their way through an uncertain and insecure environment in search of norms to guide their domestic and international behavior. Multilateral institutions like the OSCE serve an essential function by socializing new states in these universal principles, such as those embodied in the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent documents that make up the collective *acquis* of OSCE norms. Over the long run, the OSCE may thus play its most important role by aiding the former communist states to bring their behavior into closer conformity with international standards.

By promoting democratization, the rule of law, economic liberalization, expanded trade, and human rights throughout Eurasia, the OSCE acts as a major proponent of fundamental American values, albeit values shared widely with other European countries. The OSCE has more clearly linked these values to issues of national, regional, and global security than any other multilateral organization in which the United States participates, including NATO and the United Nations. It legitimizes a *droit de regard* for the United States and other Western democracies over the transition process in countries that are trying to throw off decades—even centuries—of authoritarian rule and centrally planned economies. After the United States devoted vast resources to defend these rights and values during more than forty years of the Cold War, it would seem foolhardy not to take advantage of the opportunities afforded to it after the fall of communism to promote rapid and thoroughgoing change throughout this region. The OSCE offers a vehicle for doing just that without requiring the United States to expend vast resources or to shoulder the burden single-handedly.

Second, the OSCE offers to the United States an unparalleled forum for dialogue about security issues affecting the U.S., its western European allies, and its former adversaries in central Europe and the former Soviet republics. One of the major strengths of the OSCE has been the degree to which it has promoted “transparency” about military exercises, force deployments, military budgets, new weapons technologies, and a wide range of other information about developments in the region, which aid the United States to assess accurately the military capabilities and intentions of other member states. The OSCE missions provide a continuous source of information about events taking place in the most volatile regions of Eurasia. This information can provide early warning of possible threats to U.S. interests. It also can provide reassurance regarding events that may not prove to be as threatening as they appear at first; in this way transparency may allay concerns rather than heighten tensions. Although some of these functions may also be performed by NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, the institutionalized information exchange and opportunities for on-site observation provided by the OSCE are unparalleled in the history of statecraft and diplomacy.

Third, the OSCE has a significant track record in preventing new conflicts from breaking out and, more important, in preventing the recurrence of violence in those regions that experienced severe conflict as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were falling apart. It has done this in large part by strengthening democratic institutions and procedures in countries undergoing a difficult transition process. It has helped new states cope with the challenges inherent in constructing state institutions for the first time and the frustrations associated with changing from authoritarian to democratic rule and from centrally planned to market economies.

Of course, it is true that the OSCE was not able to prevent many conflicts that broke out in the early 1990s from turning violent, but it is also misleading to attribute this to a failure on the part of the OSCE. This criticism is often based on a misunderstanding of the OSCE’s limited capabilities for conflict prevention when violence broke out following the dramatic events in Eastern Europe beginning in 1989. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of fighting initially in Slovenia, then Croatia, and finally in Bosnia-Herzegovina all occurred as the CSCE was only beginning to construct its conflict prevention institu-

tions. Although these conflicts were brought before the CSCE in 1991 and early 1992, the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna was still being formed, and it had no capacity to respond to any crisis, much less many simultaneous crises of this magnitude. Therefore, the CSCE's Committee of Senior Officials met, condemned the violence in ex-Yugoslavia, and decided to turn over the management of these crises to the United Nations and the European Union. It was only at the July 1992 Helsinki Summit that the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities was created, and the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center was in a position to send its first missions into the field only in August 1992. Furthermore, no other European security institution can claim credit for preventing the violence that spread throughout southeastern Europe and the Caucasus as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union collapsed. Thus the OSCE's performance must be evaluated primarily in terms of its record since mid-1992, after most of the severe conflicts in the region had already broken out.

As suggested in this study's review of the OSCE's conflict-prevention and security-building work since the July 1992 Helsinki Summit, the newly created missions of long duration coordinated by the CPC, the office of the HCNM, and ODIHR have all achieved some success in the four tasks they have undertaken in the area of conflict management. These successes have been most notable in (1) long-term conflict prevention through building democratic processes, as in the Baltic states; (2) short-term conflict prevention in crisis situations, such as the role played by the HCNM in Crimea; and (3) postconflict security building, exemplified by the activities undertaken by the OSCE presence in Albania to restore stability and security to a Balkan state that teetered on the brink of collapse in early 1997. On the other hand, there is still reason to be disappointed that the OSCE has not been able to do more in the area of conflict resolution; it has not yet been able to promote the resolution of the underlying conflicts in regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Moldova. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the OSCE missions have made important contributions by keeping negotiations open and by preserving the cease-fires that so far have prevented large-scale violence from reappearing.

Simply put, the OSCE experience highlights the value of multilateral preventive diplomacy in many areas of conflict. There can be no doubt that conflict prevention is cheaper than fighting war or peacekeeping in the aftermath of war. Illustratively, the incremental costs in the U.S. budget for the Bosnia peace operation (mostly SFOR and its civilian support) amounted to \$2.5 billion in 1998, more than one hundred times greater than the U.S. contribution of \$21 million for *all* OSCE operations.⁵² Certainly by this standard, the old aphorism that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" holds true. This cost comparison also has to be added to the less quantifiable, but even more important consideration of the lives that can be saved and the destruction of property and of the human spirit that can be avoided when preventive diplomacy successfully averts the outbreak of a violent conflict. If the OSCE can prevent even one war the size of the Bosnia conflagration, the financial and humanitarian benefits would be well worth the effort.

Recommendations for U.S. Foreign-Policy Makers:

How the United States Can Strengthen the OSCE

In summary, the OSCE serves many important U.S. interests. Of course, it alone is not a panacea for all of Eurasia's ills. It is a multilateral, intergovernmental organization whose decisions are very much affected by the interests of its member states. Furthermore, it is most effective when it cooperates closely with other European and global security institutions such as NATO, the WEU, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations. Ironically, its success is often partly a result of its relatively small size, limited resources, and minimal bureaucracy. The OSCE has proven to be remarkably flexible in reacting to potential crises, responding more rapidly, and adapting its responses more appropriately to the specific issues arising in each case than most other institutions. This may be illustrated by the rapid intervention by the HCNM in Ukraine's Crimean situation. The fact that the High Commissioner may enter on his own initiative and make use of many varied conflict prevention tools enables him to respond rapidly and flexibly to the requirements of particular situations. Increasingly, the CPC has also demonstrated a capacity for rapid and flexible response to crises, as it did in putting together the OSCE presence in Albania. This enabled the OSCE to become the lead institution in the successful effort to prevent the collapse of Albania in 1997, which would have further destabilized the fragile Balkan region.

The logical conclusion that would seem to follow is that the answer to the OSCE's limited capacity to manage conflicts in Eurasia is neither to treat it as a small and only marginally useful institution on the one hand, nor to build the organization into a large and bureaucratic entity like the United Nations on the other hand. Rather, the United States should advocate and support modest but concrete measures to increase the OSCE's capacity to undertake its conflict prevention activities more effectively, retaining its flexibility for rapid response. Specific measures that would enhance the OSCE's conflict-management capacity at very modest cost might include the following:⁵³

(1) *Professionalization of OSCE Missions of Long Duration.* The OSCE needs to improve the professional quality of its field missions, and the U.S. government should encourage and assist it by contributing a portion of the modest resources that would be needed to upgrade the professionalism of its staff. OSCE missions depend almost entirely on personnel "seconded" by governments. This was precisely the way U.S. policymakers, such as John Kornblum, U.S. ambassador to the CSCE at the time of the Helsinki Summit, wanted it. As the wealthiest member that is the most capable of seconding mission members, the United States could dominate an OSCE with a light secretariat that relied mostly on ad hoc missions staffed by seconded personnel. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the heads of the largest, most important missions such as Bosnia, Ukraine, and the KVM, have all come from the United States, enabling the U.S. government effectively to dominate these missions. However, this process has not necessarily proven to be in the best interest of strengthening the OSCE's capability in conflict prevention.

Furthermore, since the missions' mandates are normally extended only six months at a time, commitments cannot be made to personnel for longer assignments, creating frequent personnel turnover. Mission members often go into the field with little or no knowledge about the region where they are being sent or about the extensive literature on negotiation and conflict resolution, too often believing that they can learn on the job

or get by with a little “common sense.” Together these policies produce unevenness in the quality, preparedness, training, and regional knowledge of mission members. Personnel often complete their short-term assignments just as they are beginning to understand the issues and problems which they are responsible for managing. Staff members sometimes feel less loyalty to the OSCE than to the governments that pay their salaries. Some of these problems may be overcome by taking the following actions:

- ▶ *Missions should be budgeted for longer periods.* Mandates and budgetary allocations for OSCE missions should be made in advance for at least one and preferably two years. Personnel should then be recruited to serve through the duration of the mandate. Complex conflicts seldom can be settled in a few months. Because no missions have actually been closed down so far, except for the first mission to Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina, this recommendation is unlikely to prove very costly.
- ▶ *OSCE missions should depend less on “seconded” personnel.* The OSCE should recruit a core staff of professional conflict-management specialists to serve under the supervision of the CPC in Vienna, who can be sent into the field where and when they are needed. Mission heads and some support staff may still need to be seconded by member governments, but the core conflict-management specialists on each mission should be recruited on the basis of their professional qualifications rather than solely on their availability because their governments do not need them elsewhere. However OSCE missions are staffed, personnel should be assigned for longer tours, normally for two years, and past mission members should be encouraged to sign up for repeat tours of duty.
- ▶ *OSCE mission members, whether professional staff or seconded officials, need to receive more and better training before going into the field.* This should include information about the situation, the culture, and other specifics about the countries where they will be stationed. Even more significantly, training should be given on the techniques of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. Training in negotiation and conflict resolution should be designed for individuals who will represent a multilateral institution and thus will be expected to intercede as a “third party” in disputes. This training should thus be fundamentally different from the knowledge and experience individuals may have acquired previously while representing their governments in bilateral relations.
- ▶ *An analytical center should be created at the CPC to support the work of the field missions.* This should consist of a small staff of professional conflict management specialists who can advise mission members about specific issues that arise in the course of their assignment, can assist in training mission members before they take up their duties or on site, and who can make recommendations to the senior staff of the OSCE secretariat about how to respond to developing conflict situations. This center should contain a good, specialized library of materials on conflict management as well as on the Eurasian region and its history, cultures, and peoples.

It should also have sophisticated computer facilities capable of tapping the many sources of information about conflict management around the globe. A data bank should be established and maintained containing information on armaments, demographics, incidence of violence, and other data that might prove useful to missions or to the CPC.

(2) *Coordination of OSCE conflict-prevention activities with other multilateral institutions.* The United States should encourage the OSCE to clarify its relationship to other multilateral institutions dealing with European security, and to build relationships that are increasingly complementary rather than competing. Particularly destructive to the development of the OSCE capacity to deal with conflict prevention and security building has been the perceived competition between the OSCE and NATO. In particular, U.S. officials must cease their policy of privileging NATO as the primary pillar of their European security policy at the expense of the OSCE. In fact, NATO and OSCE have different “comparative advantages” that should be mutually reinforcing. The OSCE is a broad-based security organization with inclusive membership, explicit links between military and nonmilitary dimensions of security, and a political role to play in conflict prevention and resolution that cannot possibly be played by a military alliance like NATO, no matter how it is transformed.

At the same time, in the few instances where the OSCE’s activities require military force for their implementation, including making and keeping peace, close links should be forged between the two, building especially on NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Such links were envisioned in the Final Communiqués of NATO’s June 1992 Copenhagen Ministerial and the OSCE’s July 1992 Helsinki Summit. In marked contrast to NATO’s actions over Kosovo in 1999, the North Atlantic alliance should not engage in “out of area” military activities, except where the security of its members is directly threatened, without a mandate from either the UN or the OSCE. On the other hand, the OSCE should be willing to work with NATO and other national and multinational military forces to provide peacekeeping and protection for civilian security-building activities in the aftermath of violence. Therefore, far from being inherently in competition with each other, OSCE and NATO in fact need each other to be able to fulfill the roles envisioned for both in providing security for Eurasia in the twenty-first century.

The OSCE should seek the help of the EU to provide additional economic resources to carry out its missions and to provide the economic foundation for security in those regions of Eurasia where scarcity, poverty, and unemployment breed social instability and insecurity. In spite of its ambitions to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy as specified in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the EU has thus far not shown itself to be an effective organization for preventing and resolving conflicts, even within its geographical area of interest, as was demonstrated quite dramatically in the former Yugoslavia and during the crisis in Albania. However, the EU does serve as a center of economic attraction and dynamism that should be channeled more often in support of the conflict-prevention goals and activities of OSCE missions, especially in regions where the EU has special leverage, such as the Baltic states, and in regions where economic problems are among the root causes of violence and insecurity, as in Crimea and Albania.

Similarly, the OSCE should enhance its cooperation with other institutions that have overlapping functions, such as the Council of Europe and the UNHCR. In the recent past, problems have occasionally arisen from the similar roles of the OSCE and the Council of Europe in human dimensions activities, especially regarding responsibility for setting and implementing norms in areas such as human rights, the rule of law, and the promotion of democratization through free elections. Cooperation between the two organizations has increased considerably since the mid-1990s; this is a positive development that needs to be supported and replicated elsewhere.

The OSCE also has operated alongside the UNHCR in the effort to protect refugees returning to their homes in regions that had been ethnically “cleansed” during fighting. A Memorandum of Understanding between the two organizations was signed by OSCE Secretary-General Giancarlo Aragona and UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata in Vienna on October 15, 1998. This agreement will hopefully improve cooperation in humanitarian crises, such as the one that developed in Kosovo and its bordering regions in 1999, and reduce or eliminate tensions that have arisen in other areas, such as Georgia, where the two organizations have operated side-by-side to provide for internally displaced persons as a consequence of the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.⁵⁴

(3) *Strengthening the role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.* The United States should support the strengthening of both the mandate and resources of the office of the HCNM without making it overly bureaucratized. The creation of the office of High Commissioner has been perhaps the most innovative and unique contribution made by the OSCE to enhance security in Eurasia since the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the HCNM is currently constrained by the limited resources and relatively small staff it has to draw upon to fulfill its mandate.⁵⁵ The High Commissioner’s work is also restricted by the mandate adopted at Helsinki in 1992, which limited its interventions to issues where *national* minorities are involved, where there is no terrorist element, and where a conflict threatens to spill over international borders. In fact, these limitations have permitted the HCNM to intervene only in conflicts in the former communist countries, giving credence to the unfortunate perception that the OSCE is an organization through which western European and North American governments can manage conflicts only in eastern Europe and Central Asia, and nowhere else in the region.⁵⁶

Furthermore, the High Commissioner may intervene in conflicts where parties have resorted to full-scale war, but ironically not where individual acts of terrorism have occurred. Thus van der Stoep has entered the conflict between Abkhazians and the Georgian government, who fought a bloody war in 1992–93, but may not do so in the conflict between Kurds and the government of Turkey because of the allegations of terrorist activity by Kurdish factions. In fact, if the HCNM could turn its attention to such conflicts, this might remove some of the stigma attached to its work by governments in eastern and southeastern Europe, while also allowing it to assist in the resolution of conflicts that also threaten vital U.S. interests.

The success of the office of the HCNM since its creation in 1992 has largely been the result of the dedicated work of its first incumbent, former Dutch foreign minister van der Stoep, and a small, professional staff that supports him. It is by no means certain that future High Commissioners will interpret their mandate as broadly, engage themselves as actively, and perform to the high professional standards set by the first incumbent in The

Hague. This office needs to be strengthened in terms of both its mandate and human and financial resources to assure that its role is institutionalized. Unfortunately, some governments in the OSCE oppose the independence and integrity with which Ambassador van der Stoel has acted, and this may lead to efforts to weaken rather than to strengthen this office. These efforts should be resisted by the United States, in cooperation with the Russian Federation and the EU, which have also strongly supported the work of the High Commissioner.

(4) *Increasing the political effectiveness of the OSCE.* To be more effective in its conflict prevention mission, the OSCE should enhance its ability to respond rapidly and effectively to emerging conflicts wherever possible before they turn violent. Of course, the OSCE's ability to act in response to threats to peace and security is constrained by its dependence on consensus decision making. The United States should thus support the recommendations made by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to replace consensus with "approximate consensus" as the decision rule on all but the most critical decisions taken by the organization. Naturally, it will be necessary to define more precisely what constitutes an "essential" decision, as well as the threshold of agreement that constitutes "approximate" consensus. Nonetheless, these recommendations should enhance the OSCE's capacity in general to act rapidly and decisively even in the absence of unanimity among its members.

Furthermore, consensus should not necessarily be equated with formal unanimity. In actual practice of late, consensus has effectively meant that no state objects with sufficient vigor to block a decision. Therefore, as in any large multilateral organization, consensus needs to be constructed through a process of coalition building. The United States thus can use the OSCE most effectively when it integrates it more closely with other components of its foreign policy, giving members of the U.S. delegation greater capacity to link their actions within the OSCE to other dimensions of U.S. bilateral and multilateral relationships with OSCE member states. U.S. diplomats in Vienna have usually been effective in building coalitions to support their preferred policies in the Permanent Council. However, greater support from Washington and greater use of other bilateral contacts with member governments would increase the ability of the U.S. to create consensus in support of early, effective action to prevent and resolve conflict in the OSCE region.

This argument applies especially to U.S. bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. Russia has played multiple roles in most of the conflicts taken up by the OSCE: (1) It is often a party to the conflict or backs one of the disputants. (2) It has sometimes insisted on its own primacy as a peacekeeper, usually under a CIS umbrella within the so-called "near abroad," thereby largely preventing the OSCE from taking on more than an observer role in places such as Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. (3) It sometimes plays the role of co-mediator, as it does along with Ukraine and the OSCE in the Moldova/Transdnistria conflict. At the same time, Russia has long advocated granting a central place in the European security architecture to the OSCE rather than to NATO. Without giving up its support for NATO, the United States can make more effective use of this Russian rhetorical position by showing that the United States values the OSCE and takes it seriously, thereby encouraging Russia to match its own rhetoric with deeds.

After all, the OSCE is the only major European security institution to which both the United States and Russia belong as equal parties. More often than not, Russian behavior within the OSCE since 1990 has been constructive, but on several occasions Russia has ef-

fectively obstructed OSCE action. By making the OSCE a central element of the bilateral Russian-U.S. relationship and by showing its willingness to cooperate with the Russian government in strengthening the OSCE, the United States can effectively neutralize some of the least constructive Russian behaviors and encourage Russian cooperation in making the OSCE a truly effective alternative to NATO for dealing with conflicts such as the one in Kosovo. The U.S. government has recently placed most of its hopes for cooperation with Russia on the NATO-Russia Founding Act, but as a result of serious disagreements over NATO's role in Kosovo, this may be even more difficult to implement than it had been previously. There is no better way for the United States to influence constructive change in Russian foreign policy than by coopting it within multilateral structures such as the OSCE.⁵⁷ This cooperation may be most effectively achieved by making the OSCE the venue of choice for cooperation on many issues where the interests of Russia and the United States largely coincide.

In addition, the United States can use its influence in some countries where OSCE missions have been stationed to encourage them to demonstrate greater flexibility in negotiating solutions to their internal conflicts. U.S. aid to those countries can be made partly contingent on the degree to which recipient governments cooperate with the OSCE missions to resolve their conflicts. For example, the United States should take advantage of its influence on the government of Croatia to encourage it to stop undermining the OSCE mission's efforts to assist in the return of Serbian refugees to Eastern Slavonia and the Krajina, from which they were evicted in the summer of 1995.

Finally, the United States can strengthen the capacity of the OSCE to prevent and resolve conflicts in Eurasia by demonstrating consistently that it takes the OSCE seriously as an important partner in strengthening Eurasian security. The fact that Secretary of State Albright twice canceled her travel to the OSCE's annual ministerial conferences in 1997 and 1998, attended by her counterparts from all of the other member states, indicated to the other OSCE members the low regard in which the OSCE is held by senior Washington officials. Though perhaps only symbolic, this attitude by leading U.S. foreign-policy makers has been criticized privately even by U.S. working-level representatives in Vienna because it frustrates their efforts to make more effective use of the OSCE to serve U.S. policy interests.

When U.S. policymakers treat the OSCE as if it were an ineffective institution and consequently underestimate its role in European security, they create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The OSCE will not be able to do an adequate job of preventing and resolving conflicts if the most powerful and wealthiest member refuses to give it the support or resources it needs to be able to work effectively. The same individuals who refuse to give the OSCE the prominence it deserves often justify their indifference by proclaiming that the OSCE is fatally flawed. The inevitable consequences of their actions thus serve as "evidence" to "prove" the correctness of their assessment. As long as this attitude prevails at the highest levels in Washington, the OSCE will prove incapable of preventing, managing, and resolving conflict and building security, not because it is inherently incapable of doing so, but because it will not receive the modest increments of attention, resources, and political support that it needs to do its job effectively.

What is most needed to enhance the role of the OSCE in security affairs is an increase in the commitment by member governments, especially by the United States, to work

through the OSCE to promote democratization in countries in transition, to engage in preventive diplomacy, to intervene after violence to prevent its recurrence, to play a third-party role to assist conflicting parties to overcome their differences, and to assist in post-conflict reconstruction and security building. With the half-hearted support many governments have given to the OSCE since 1991, it is amazing that it has been able to compile the record it has thus far, as documented in the previous section. As the most powerful and largest member of the OSCE, there is little doubt that the United States can exert a significant influence on other OSCE member states by its leadership and example.

History has thrust upon the United States a tremendous responsibility because of its preeminent position in post-Cold War global politics. The current situation provides an opportunity for the United States to lead the global system in the development and strengthening of new security institutions, based on norms and values that include respect for diverse individual and collective identities, human rights, mutual tolerance, and cooperative rather than competitive security. The OSCE offers to the U.S. government a unique opportunity to institutionalize those values long advocated by official rhetoric. Furthermore, it includes among its membership some of America's oldest allies and new, significant "strategic partners." Finally, the OSCE is trying to create stability and security in a region of vital U.S. interests that has been threatened by instability and mass violence ever since the end of the Cold War. Because of its large membership, the OSCE enables the United States to share with other states holding common values and interests the burdens and responsibilities for providing security. Above all, by placing its emphasis on diagnosis and prevention rather than on military shows of force to avert war, the OSCE offers the potential to save human lives and vital resources that might be lost as a result of widespread violence anywhere on the Eurasian continent.

Therefore, the United States would seem to have every reason to support and strengthen the OSCE in its efforts to create a stable, peaceful security regime in a region that has been the site of costly, deadly wars throughout the twentieth century. If the United States takes the lead in strengthening a Eurasian multilateral security regime, in which the OSCE is linked in a tightly knit web with NATO, the CIS, the EU, the Council of Europe, and a myriad of other institutions that combine to make up the new pan-European security regime, then it can expect to get the support of other important states that also play a central role in these institutions. When the burdens and responsibilities for providing security become shared through a network of security institutions, including a central role for the OSCE as the only genuine pan-European, multilateral security organization, it may be possible to create a new Eurasian security regime. This should greatly reduce the chance that Americans will have to spill blood and spend vast resources to keep Europe free and secure in the twenty-first century, as it has tragically had to do so often in the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995), 1. See also I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).
2. See P. Terrence Hopmann, Stephen D. Shenfield, and Dominique Arel, *Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Regional and Global Security*. Occasional Paper no. 30 (Providence, R.I.: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, 1997). The only serious competition as a major, new regional threat might be the potential for runaway proliferation of armaments of all kinds and loosening control in Russia over weapons of mass destruction. At the time of this writing, however, this threat remains largely hypothetical, whereas ethnonational violence has already appeared frequently and thus constitutes a major and immediate threat to security in many parts of Eurasia.
3. At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), effective January 1, 1995; I shall therefore refer to it as the OSCE when discussing its activities in general or after that date.
4. Both of these arguments are treated in James E. Goodby, *Europe Undivided: The New Logic of Peace in U.S.-Russian Relations* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), especially 203.
5. See, for example, Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).
6. See Hopmann et al., *Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union*, 59–61.
7. An argument on behalf of centering post–Cold War European security around an EU core is made by Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer, and Ole Waever, *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post–Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990), ch. 10.
8. See, for example, Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996), ch. 6 (especially pp. 157–62 and 183–89).
9. Jonathan Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1994), 207.
10. In recent years, this practice has been modified to mean “consensus minus one,” in which a state accused of violating the Helsinki principles may not veto action by the organization as a whole to uphold those principles.
11. John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–75* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), 207. The author was deputy chief of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE negotiations during the period covered in this book.
12. Beginning with the Stockholm conference, the term CSBMs was often employed to incorporate CBMs and broader security measures.

13. For an excellent and detailed analysis of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, see the book written by Stefan Lehne, a member of the Austrian delegation: *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986–1989: A Turning Point in East-West Relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).
14. Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars*, 210.
15. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* (Paris: CSCE, 1990), 13.
16. The number of member states increased to fifty-three when the Czech and Slovak Republic split voluntarily into two states on January 1, 1993; to fifty-four when the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia joined on October 12, 1995; and to fifty-five when Andorra joined on April 25, 1996. This number includes the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which was suspended from participation in 1992 but officially remained a member.
17. Allan Rosas and Timo Lahelma, "OSCE Long-Term Missions," in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti, and Allan Rosas, eds., *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 169.
18. See *OSCE Handbook*, 3d ed. (Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, 1999), 33–34 and 177–78. This figure excludes the many individuals seconded to the OSCE by member governments, including the bulk of the staff of its missions and field activities. It also excludes the large number of people recruited on a short-term basis by ODIHR, for example, to supervise and monitor elections. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, in 1998 the United States alone spent \$1.85 billion for its military operations in Bosnia. In addition, it spent about \$450 million for its civilian activities, of which about \$26 million was channeled through the OSCE. See U.S. General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, *Bosnia Peace Operations*. GAO/NSIAD-98-138 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1998), 21 and 153.
19. See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205–35; Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for the Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), ch. 8.
20. Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Baltic Identities in the 1990s," in Roman Szporluk, ed., *National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 196–200.
21. OSCE, "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Belarus and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus," SEC.GAL/37/97, December 18, 1997.
22. Max van der Stoep, "Minorities in Transition," *War Report*, no. 48 (January/February 1997), 16.
23. Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, "Introduction: Mediation in Theory," in Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 16.

24. Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 15.
25. Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, May 1997), 10–11.
26. In a personal interview in The Hague on November 18, 1997, Ambassador Max van der Stoel expressed his most serious concern that the international community had become habituated to the crisis in Kosovo and might not respond until it was too late to his warnings—and those of other OSCE observers watching the situation closely—that this crisis was on the verge of exploding. Tragically, this prognostication came true. It is likely that the war fought over Kosovo in 1999 might have been prevented if these “early warnings” had been heeded and high-level diplomatic efforts had been engaged to halt the escalating tensions much sooner.
27. George and Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem*, 5.
28. “OSCE Deploys Kosovo Verification Mission,” *OSCE Newsletter* 5, no. 10 (October 1998), 1.
29. The convoluted title for this mission is a consequence of Greek objections to the country’s name of Macedonia, by which this region was known when it was one of the six republics in the Yugoslav Federation. According to the claims of the Greek government, “Macedonia” refers to a much larger region, including significant segments of modern Greece. Although a compromise decision subsequently called this state the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), this name has not been accepted by the government of the country. Therefore, the OSCE mission has been referred to under the name of the republic’s capital city, Skopje, even though it operates throughout the entire country.
30. Rosas and Lahelma, “OSCE Long-Term Missions,” 184.
31. Interviews with Ambassador Max van der Stoel, November 18, 1997, The Hague, and with Ambassador Jan Kubis, December 5, 1997, Vienna.
32. I. William Zartman, “Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 318.
33. P. Terrence Hopmann, “New Approaches for Resolving Europe’s Post-Cold War Conflicts,” *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 4, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 1997): 155–67.
34. For a discussion of the differences between these two styles of negotiation, see P. Terrence Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 542 (November 1995): 24–47.
35. This constitutes only a brief introduction to the processes of “problem-solving” negotiations. For further elaboration on the kinds of approaches and tactics associated with this form of negotiation, see P. Terrence Hopmann, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), ch. 6.
36. For a review of the literature on third-party roles, see *ibid.*, ch. 12.

37. Some analysts, especially those from some of the former Soviet states, tend to argue that both the onset and cessation of fighting in the “near abroad” is generally determined in Moscow, though not necessarily by the Yeltsin government. They thus contend that fighting usually ceases when forces in Russia terminate their support to one or more of the belligerent parties. See Hopmann et al., *Integration and Disintegration in the Former Soviet Union*, 26–30.

38. The one exception was that the Minsk Group dealing with the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh did not specify its presumption in favor of maintaining the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan when it was set up in 1992. This was partly rectified at the 1996 Lisbon Summit, when the statement of Swiss foreign minister Flavio Cotti, OSCE chairman-in-office at the time, referred to this as one of three principles that should govern a settlement of that conflict; only the Armenian delegation objected to this summary statement. See *OSCE Decisions, 1996*. DOC.SEC/1/97 (Prague: OSCE, May 1997), 6–7.

39. Interview with Ambassador John Evans, head of the OSCE mission in Moldova, January 6, 1999, Washington, D.C.

40. Ettore Greco, “Third-Party Peacekeeping and the Interaction Between Russia and the OSCE in the CIS Area,” in Bothe et al., *The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security*, 281.

41. Tim Guldemann, “The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya—Experience Report,” paper presented at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1997, 4–6.

42. Because of the deteriorating security conditions in Chechnya, the “assistance group” was temporarily relocated to the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow in early 1999, although its members continued to make occasional visits to Grozny to monitor the situation there.

43. Although technically the dispute is between Azerbaijan and the secessionist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, their extensive support from Armenia has in effect made the government in Yerevan a party to the conflict, whose participation is required for its resolution. The original eleven members of the Minsk Group are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States, with the Karabakh leaders participating as an “interested party.”

44. Terhi Hakala, “The OSCE Minsk Process: A Balance after Five Years,” *Helsinki Monitor* 9, no. 1 (1998), 10–11.

45. *Prism*, November 27, 1998, 4–7.

46. Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, *Albania: From Anarchy to Balkan Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 4–5 and 152.

47. Arie Bloed, “OSCE Presence in Albania Successful,” *Helsinki Monitor* 8, no. 3 (1997), 82.

48. Hugh Miall, “The OSCE Role in Albania: A Success for Conflict Prevention?” *Helsinki Monitor* 8, no. 4 (1997), 74–75.

49. Interview with Roland Bimo, Albanian ambassador to the OSCE, January 21, 1998, Vienna.

50. Maresca, *To Helsinki*, 64.

51. This skepticism has not necessarily extended to the working levels, where there is often active engagement with the OSCE and support for its activities, especially by the large U.S. delegation assigned to the OSCE in Vienna.

52. U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operations*, 21. Incremental cost refers only to “additional costs to the Department of Defense that are directly related to the Bosnia operation and would not have otherwise been incurred.” (p. 20).

53. Many of these recommendations are elaborated on in the concluding section of another of my papers: P. Terrence Hopmann, “An Evaluation of the OSCE’s Role in Conflict Management,” in Heinz Gärtner, ed., *European Security: Options at the Beginning of the 21st Century* (Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, forthcoming).

54. See S. Neil MacFarlane, Larry Minear, and Stephen Shenfield, *Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping*. Occasional Paper no. 21 (Providence, R.I.: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1995).

55. The 1998 budget for the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities came to about U.S. \$1.2 million (15 million Austrian schillings), or less than 1 percent of the total OSCE budget. See *OSCE Handbook*, 34.

56. Martin Alexanderson, “The Need for a Generalized Application of the Minorities Regime in Europe,” *Helsinki Monitor* 8, no. 4 (1997), 50–53 and 57

57. A similar argument has been made by Goodby, *Europe Undivided*, especially 170–79 and 190–92.

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P. Terrence Hopmann is professor of political science at Brown University and research director of the Program on Global Security at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. During 1991–92, he was vice president of the International Studies Association. Until 1985, Hopmann was professor of political science at the University of Minnesota and director of the Harold Scott Quigley Center for International Studies. He is also a former director of the Harold Stassen Program for World Peace at the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Hopmann has twice been a Fulbright fellow to Belgium and most recently was a Fulbright fellow to the OSCE based in Vienna. In 1992, he received a Pew Faculty fellowship from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He held a McKnight Fellowship at the Salzburg Seminar in 1982–83 and a NATO research fellowship in 1975. In addition to serving as editor of *International Studies Quarterly* from 1980 to 1985, Hopmann is the author of many books and articles, including *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts* and *Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe*, which he coedited with Frank Barnaby. He is currently writing a major work on the OSCE.

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