

Training to Promote Conflict Management

USIP-Assisted Training Projects

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Introduction

Through its Training Program, the United States Institute of Peace seeks to enhance the skills of professionals who are directly engaged in preventing or responding to conflict, and of third parties who may serve as mediators or contribute to conflict management in some other capacity. In this way, the Institute hopes to have an impact when seminar participants leave the training to resume making decisions about conflict situations. For example, in 1998 Institute staff provided training to Kosovar Albanian leaders, to field personnel of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stationed in various conflict areas around the globe, and to the United Nations (UN) civilian police force in Bosnia.

The goal of the training is to enhance participants' understanding of working in conflict situations, to improve problem-solving skills, to provide a better grasp of the tools available to prevent or mitigate conflict, and to build proficiency in using those tools. Specifically, the training focuses on improving practical skills in conflict analysis, conflict prevention, negotiation, third-party mediation, and coalition building. Training in negotiation examines successful practices in the prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation phases.

The Institute's extensive research and policy work gives the training staff broad access to academic theorists and practitioners, both inside and outside government, and to the most current ideas about conflict, all of which serve to broaden the debate. Training activities also draw on the extensive research carried out under other Institute programs. The Institute's grant, fellowship, and research and studies programs have earned worldwide renown. Researchers associated with Institute initiatives in the rule of law, transitional justice, cross-cultural negotiations, and religion, ethics, and human rights participate regularly in training programs. From these resources—including about a dozen distinguished senior fellows from around the world who perform research at the Institute each year—the training staff pulls together the most appropriate training team for each workshop. One of the main goals is that participants leave the training programs with a heightened capacity to consider the many options for dealing with a conflict. As Institute board chairman Chester A. Crocker likes to say, the Institute wants practitioners to understand that between doing nothing and sending in the troops, a wide range of choices is available to them.

To augment the Training Program, which trains primarily official actors, the Institute also makes grants to other organizations to conduct training. Over the past decade the Institute has made eighty-four such grants, most of them to civil society groups. During 1998, Institute grants supported conflict resolution training programs focused on Bosnia, Cambodia, Central Asia, Cyprus, Eastern Europe, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ukraine.

This publication highlights some of the training programs supported by Institute grants in recent years and shares lessons gleaned from these projects. The training projects described in this report took place in China, countries of the former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia,

Nigeria, Somalia/Somaliland, and southeastern Europe; two other projects had worldwide scope.

These projects had a variety of purposes and used training to achieve several different ends. Two projects used training to build or strengthen institutions devoted to conflict management. A project in the countries of the former Yugoslavia helped form an organization of medical personnel called Health Bridges for Peace devoted to reconstruction and reconciliation. A project in Ethiopia trained staff of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and African diplomats assigned to the OAU to build the organization's conflict management capacity.

Four other projects trained trainers who in turn will train others in a wide range of local institutions in the methods of conflict management. A project in southeastern Europe trained trainers who in turn trained journalists in Macedonia and nongovernmental organization (NGO) leaders in Serbia, offered training in refugee camps in Serbia, and organized conflict resolution awareness seminars for elementary school students and teachers in Macedonia. Leaders of women's NGOs in Somalia and Somaliland trained others who in turn negotiated the release of kidnap victims, mediated between clans at war with each other, and helped bridge the Green Line, which separates rival factions and divides north and south Mogadishu. A training program in Nigeria helped stimulate and disseminate programs for interethnic and Christian/Muslim dialogue in that country. A training program for religious leaders in Bosnia and the other countries of the former Yugoslavia helped promote interfaith dialogue and the dissemination of conflict management skills within the religious communities. This later led to the creation of a Bosnian organization dedicated to interreligious dialogue and training.

Three other projects had broader agendas. A grant to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) launched a program of correspondence instruction to prepare peacekeepers to serve in UN peacekeeping missions. In 1998, 2,000 persons from 62 nations were enrolled in at least one of these UNITAR courses. With Institute financial assistance, the University of Colorado has established the International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict available worldwide through the Internet, with the option of registering for course credit from the University of Colorado. With Institute assistance, Beijing's Foreign Affairs College and the University of Montana jointly developed a curriculum to be used in training Chinese and American diplomats and foreign affairs specialists in negotiation and conflict management, placing particular emphasis on U.S.-China relations.

Lessons gleaned from these projects have wide application. These lessons will inform the future programs of the organizations described here, and by sharing these lessons, the Institute hopes they will have broader utility.

One of the recurrent criticisms of an earlier generation of international training in conflict management is that it depended too heavily on U.S. models and experience, showing little sensitivity to local needs and realities. Some trainers were criticized for parachuting in to new places for brief periods without taking the time to make local adaptations. But it is clear from the projects reported here that the best of the current generation of trainers are very sensitive to these earlier failings.

From her work with health professionals in the former Yugoslavia, Paula Gutlove asserts that only local people can identify the crucial needs of their communities. “Moreover,” she writes, “important resources for understanding and transforming conflict can be found within the culture from which the conflict has emerged.” In writing about a joint Chinese/American training program, Otto Koester and Dennis O’Donnell note that “To a large extent, the goals of the project were accomplished because of the emphasis on a collaborative planning process and open dialogue.” David Steele emphasizes the importance of flexibility.

Similarly, the content of the training needs to be generated from and adapted to the local environment. Writing about Somalia, Hibaaq Osman says, “The CSIW [Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women] workshops succeeded largely because they focused on eliciting women’s skills. In this sense, calling them ‘training’ workshops is something of a misnomer. By default, Somali women had already developed many skills in peacebuilding; the workshops simply helped them to recognize this.” Koester and O’Donnell note that the Americans in their project had to recognize that they had much to learn from the Chinese. Moreover, the Americans had to appreciate that there is not a single Chinese negotiating style and that “identifying the behavior of any particular negotiator as being representative of a ‘national’ or ‘official’ style is risky.” Koester and O’Donnell say that both the American and Chinese participants in the project realized that they had to spend a great deal of time to ensure that “a common definitional basis for keywords exists on both sides.”

An earlier generation of international training programs also often failed to establish explicit goals being pursued and even more often failed to reach consensus with trainees in identifying goals and purposes. These failures led to confusion regarding the measures of a successful outcome. The training programs described here were all sensitive to this and often engaged the participants in setting goals and modifying expectations as the program progressed. As Elizabeth McClintock points out in her discussion of the OAU training, initial skepticism among trainees can often be overcome as a program progresses.

In emphasizing the importance of the organizers, trainers, participants, and donors being in full accord on the purpose of a training, Jean Freymond and Brook Boyer also note the particular importance of having realistic and achievable goals in order to avoid serious disappointment. McClintock points out that a clear statement of purpose should shape the character of the training workshop. Gutlove states that the greater the ownership local groups have of a training program, the greater the likelihood that they will find ways to use it and to sustain it. While initial expectations need to be realistic and well articulated, Harvey Langholtz also points out that “a program must have a plan and a vision that will accommodate managed growth.”

Koester and O’Donnell note that before implementation, it is important to field test new curricular materials with target audiences. Both formative and summative evaluations help ensure corrective steps and ultimate success. Langholtz writes, “Start with a clear vision and mission statement, but be prepared to critically evaluate additional needs and opportunities that may develop.”

Several authors conclude that training must involve much more than introducing a few new techniques. Liz McClintock points to the need for a broad-gauged and broadly expe-

rienced training team. The training team engaged for the OAU project included a specialist on the nature and sources of conflict and another with extensive practical field experience in managing conflict, combined with the Conflict Management Group's experience in building conflict management skills of negotiators worldwide. In developing the Chinese/American curriculum, Koester and O'Donnell found that it "required a more comprehensive, integrated approach that also incorporates needs assessment, evaluation, relationship-building, implementation, and follow-up."

To enhance the quality of the training and ensure that the sessions constitute a laboratory for improved interethnic relations, diverse ethnic representation is essential. Ernest Uwazie writes that interethnic and interfaith facilitated dialogue "allows the parties to vent their anger and communicate their frustrations and prejudices in an open process, which can lead to new understandings through the sharing and mutual validation of each other's feelings and interests." Osman notes that CSIW saw its workshops as tools in building a constituency for peace through diversity, with the participants reflecting the society's diversity. "CSIW workshops were important steps in creating the kind of human interdependency that Somalia has lacked." While Steele accepts the value of religiously diverse training sessions, he has also discovered that some goals can be more effectively achieved in single-confessional sessions.

Another major theme of these presentations is the importance of the institutional setting as a determinant of success for the training. Gutlove writes that for training to have a long-term impact, it must be embedded in a structure that can support and continue the program long after the trainers are gone. Freymond and Boyer say that the training must help local organizations grow. "Although our immediate aim was to train individuals, institution building was also an essential ingredient linked to our overall objective." Moreover, continuity over time needs to be ensured, and both organizers and financial partners need to commit themselves to a long-term program.

Steele is helping to establish a Bosnian organization that can continue to conduct the kind of training he introduced. Gutlove also points out that setting up channels for ongoing communication and information exchange helps preserve the gains made at training sessions. Facilitating linkages to other institutions can help enhance wider impact and sustainability. Langholtz points out that the new distance education program for peacekeepers could be effective only if it was coordinated with organizations such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and linked to other organizations with similar objectives.

Authors also cited these final lessons:

1. Most training should aim to motivate trainees to actively engage in conflict management and to share their newly acquired skills with others. (Boyer/Freymond)
2. Organizations providing training need to recognize the potential and actual role of women as peacemakers and to routinely include them in training programs. (Osman)
3. Training programs need to stress interaction and elicitation, using case studies, exercises, simulations, and discussion. (Koester/O'Donnell)

Part I: Training in Relation to Institutional Development

Chapter 1

Developing Negotiation and Mediation Skills within the Context of the OAU

by
Elizabeth
McClintock

As political, community, and business leaders in Africa work to guide their societies into a rapidly changing world, they are confronted by both age-old and newly emergent political, tribal, ethnic, economic, and social conflicts that threaten the development, and in some cases the very existence, of their nations. While war continues to devastate the continent, the need for more effective means of complex social problem-solving and relationship management has become increasingly urgent. In light of this, the Conflict Management Group, Inc. (CMG) has developed and adapted methods of interest-based joint problem-solving to various African environments with partners and clients from the political, diplomatic, and business sectors. These techniques juxtapose the rich history of relationship-based conflict management practices from many parts of Africa with newer, interest-based negotiation models and technologies from the West.

One client to whom CMG has brought these new methods is the Organization for African Unity (OAU). The OAU has begun to redefine itself as a conflict resolution entity and, in developing a long-term strategic plan for fully elaborating the role of the Special Organ, the Conflict Management Division has emerged as one mechanism through which the OAU might best be able to influence and effect change in Africa.

Workshop

In November 1996, with the support of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Carter Center, CMG was asked to conduct a workshop entitled Developing Negotiation and Mediation Skills within the Context of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution for a group of sixty African diplomatic representatives from various member states of the OAU, as well as the staff of its Conflict Management Division. The goal of the five-day workshop was two-fold: to acquaint participants and the OAU Conflict Management Division with a new set of practical skills and tools for analyzing, preventing, and managing conflict, and to facilitate informal dialogue between the various participants on the shared interests and objectives of the OAU's Conflict Management Division and the African Diplomatic Corps. Given the past emphasis on more abstract, theory-based training initiatives, the program staff and key OAU representatives

agreed that this workshop would focus on nontheoretical, practical skills that individuals and teams could actually use in potential or real conflict situations.

Over the course of the five days, participants examined their assumptions about conflict and negotiation, developed their individual skill sets, and then applied those lessons to a broader inquiry into the role of third parties in joint problem-solving. The workshop concluded with a concrete analysis of the challenges facing African leaders today and the role the OAU's Conflict Management Division might play in addressing them.

CMG emphasized an experiential learning environment for the workshop, combining theory presentations with negotiation simulations, case study examinations, and working group discussions. The structure of the program moved from the micro level to the macro level, from the creation of a productive working environment between participants to a focus on building individual skills, and finally ended with an analysis of the challenges that face African leaders today. At each stage, the group was able to draw upon significant expertise as the training team comprised practitioners from the fields of training, conflict management, and human rights.

The training methodology used during the program seemed to be quite new to the participants. Rather than delving immediately into discussions about current conflicts in Africa, participants were asked to question their own assumptions about the negotiation process and the role they might play in that process. In addition, participants did not begin by addressing real conflicts but instead were asked to negotiate realistic, but fictitious, cases. While the team experienced some initial skepticism from the participants with regard to methodology, the participants were soon persuaded that it permitted them to focus on skill building rather than on problem-solving. As a result, at the end of the week when participants analyzed current conflicts in Africa, they seemed able to generate a far richer list of both causes and possible ways of dealing with the conflicts.

Outcomes

The workshop provided a rich learning environment at many levels. Participants found the Seven Element negotiation framework¹ to be a useful tool for developing and articulating their personal negotiation strategies and, using their experience in the negotiation simulations, they generated guidelines for conducting an effective negotiation in the African context. In the course of that discussion, participants contrasted the deadlock produced by an adversarial and unilateral advocacy approach with the effectiveness of both strategic inquiry and active listening, emphasizing that a successful negotiation process combines substantive problem-solving and effective communication.

In addition to their individual experiences, participants came together in the plenary for a "fishbowl" exercise in which various mediators practiced their mediation skills in front of the large group. Participants seemed to feel that this hands-on opportunity to practice and critique negotiation skills was extremely useful. As mediators and analysts, the participants discussed how a simple and pragmatic model such as the Seven Element Framework could better enable them to analyze, facilitate, and, where necessary, guide a negotiation rather than react to unanticipated events in an ad hoc manner.

During the final two days of the workshop, the lessons generated by the participants were applied to a concrete analysis of the conflict and structural challenges facing African

leaders today. First, facilitators and participants discussed similarities and differences between the OAU and the experiences of other regional organizations. In particular, CMG facilitators shared their experience working with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in designing an intergovernmental organization that could best address ethnic conflict in Europe despite limited resources and a restrictive mandate. This conversation brought to light the fact that, like the OAU, other regional organizations have faced constraints within their charters—such as maintaining requirements of member-state consensus for all actions—which have potentially prevented organizations from engaging in effective preventive diplomacy activities.

The participants analyzed the kinds of structures the OAU might develop to meet the challenges they face. Two examples are the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, who has played an effective role in forestalling and managing conflict in a number of instances in Europe in recent years, and the "missions of long duration," which continue to play a sustained mediatory role in a number of countries in Europe. A number of participants felt that the models developed by other regional organizations could prove promising if modified for the African context.

Following the discussion about other regional organizations, participants were introduced to the "four quadrant tool," a tool that structures strategic planning and effective group problem-solving. Participants were asked to apply the tool to the problem of developing an effective role for the OAU in preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa. Participants broke into small working groups to analyze the barriers for the OAU and to brainstorm some possible means for overcoming those barriers. Among the barriers mentioned were:

- the need for consensus among member states, especially given their reluctance to tolerate involvement in their internal affairs;
- the lack of developed civil society in many African countries; and
- the lack of an efficient means of gathering timely and accurate information about areas of potential conflict.

Working groups then reported back to the plenary session on possible general strategies and suggestions for developing an effective conflict resolution role for the OAU. Measures put forward included:

- establish greater links between the OAU and civil society, perhaps providing conflict resolution training for indigenous NGOs;
- increase coordination with subregional organizations;
- maintain efforts to build an effective communications infrastructure at the OAU;
- encourage greater on-the-ground OAU presence at crisis spots;
- strengthen the Commission on Human and People's Rights; and
- institutionalize in-country conflict resolution missions.

Going Forward

In response to the OAU's interest in a follow-up session, CMG has developed a capacity-building program and partnership with the OAU that addresses the needs of the Mechanism, acknowledges the Mechanism's wide-ranging levels of readiness and preparedness, and provides the Mechanism with usable tools in a timely manner. To take advantage of the latest developments in conflict resolution theories and processes, CMG will partner with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD, Durban, South Africa) to complete the design and implementation of the first phase of this two-phase program. Two important aspects of this program are the focus on real-time conflicts and the involvement of subregional organizations in developing and implementing conflict management strategies.

Lessons Learned

This workshop organized for the OAU offered several take-aways. While they are certainly specific to the organization of this particular workshop, several generalizations can be drawn.

Lesson One

Methodology. As mentioned above, the methodology used by CMG was met with skepticism by the participants, including diplomats. The focus on individual skills seemed to them to be an unrealistic and simplistic way of approaching international conflict. The effectiveness of the framework and the success of the accompanying exercises, however, demonstrated the value of questioning individual assumptions about process, negotiation, and conflict management and the impact that those assumptions can have on the successful outcome of any negotiation process. These lessons would have been lost had the training team not remained true to its purpose—acquainting participants with a new set of practical skills for the prevention and management of conflict at all levels.

Lesson Two

Composition of training team. The training team comprised representatives of three different organizations, each of whom brought a specific skill set or experience to the mix. CMG offered the perspective of conflict resolution practitioners with extensive experience working to build the conflict management skills of negotiators worldwide. Eileen Babbitt of USIP provided a critical understanding of the nature and sources of conflict, in addition to a broader perspective on the role of training in peacebuilding activities. And finally, the Carter Center representatives brought with them extensive practical experience from the field. This broad range of experience and expertise provided an incredibly rich resource to the participants. CMG will seek a similar mix of skills and experience in future work organized with the OAU, although the size of the training team will be limited as the plethora of voices sometimes put the clarity of the message at risk.

Lesson Three

Training as an instrument to promote peace. Training individuals in advanced negotiation and conflict management skills should be considered as a necessary and valuable investment in laying the pathways to peace. When training is provided to a wide range of actors, the lack of evaluative mechanisms sometimes makes it difficult to discern the immediate impact the training will have, either on the participants as individuals or on the conflicts they discussed in the workshops. The value of the training lies in its educative purpose. The larger the number of decision-makers within the OAU who recognize the value of equipping the OAU's Conflict Management Centre and its staff with the skills to analyze and manage conflict, the greater the chances that resources will be allocated for that purpose. The dividend of such an investment in practical skills and tools is the increased capacity of the organizations to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In addition, the purpose of the training and the expectations of participants with regard to that purpose must be clear in order to ensure achievement of training goals. The workshop offered to the OAU in November 1996 was meant to raise the awareness of a wide range of actors within the OAU structure about the negotiation process. Subsequent workshops will be directed differently. In the next two phases of the program, a smaller, more targeted group has been identified to receive training. These actors play a significant role in the design and implementation of OAU conflict management strategies. As a result, the impact that these subsequent trainings have on promoting peace in the region will be more measurable.

Although Western powers and OAU member countries are allocating resources and personnel to develop regional capacity for military peace operations, they also need to ensure the parallel development of indigenous diplomatic capacity at the strategic level to manage such a complex resource. The analytic and diplomatic skills developed through training programs will serve the OAU in numerous ways, contributing to the performance of each of the missions of the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflict. The OAU has made great strides in advancing the freedom and prosperity of the African peoples. As the OAU redefines itself, today's interpretation of the preventive diplomacy mandate and the development of its Mechanism will shape the future of African security for generations. If Africa is to realize this visionary mandate and save her children from the scourge of war, the OAU must continue to increase its investment in capacity-building activities.

Chapter 2

Health Bridges for Peace: Integrating Health Care with Conflict Prevention and Community Reconciliation

On the eve of the nine-day war that began when Slovenia declared independence from the Yugoslav Federation in July 1991, a Slovene physician asked her medical colleague, Paula Gutlove of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies (IRSS), for help. She wanted to introduce concepts of conflict management to people who were in a position to use them to make a difference in the region. Within weeks, similar requests came from individuals and groups in Serbia and Croatia who were concerned about the violent course they saw their countries taking. Thus began IRSS's long-term commitment to the former Yugoslavia.

by
Paula Gutlove

Working with people from Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, IRSS has convened numerous dialogue and training workshops for a range of professional groups, including politicians, educators, religious leaders, refugee workers, and health care providers. Gradually the work came to focus on the unique and crucial role that health care professionals, primarily physicians, can play, not only in mending the physical and psychological wounds of individuals but also in rebuilding structures for public health care and in creating bridges for community reconciliation.

Drawing from its broad experience in the former Yugoslavia and in response to requests from medical professionals in the region, IRSS launched the Health Bridges for Peace project in 1996. The project uses a shared concern, namely the restoration of public health, as a vehicle to convene, engage, and train health care professionals in conflict management and community reconciliation techniques. Also, after training the professionals, the project helps them design and implement intercommunal activities that then integrate community reconciliation and conflict prevention strategies into health care delivery. The first field program in the Health Bridges for Peace project has operated in the former Yugoslavia since 1996.

With the support of a grant from the United States Institute of Peace and other U.S. and European funders, IRSS has been working closely with a group of medical professionals representing all parts of the former Yugoslavia. This Health Bridges program has taken the form of a Medical Network for Social Reconstruction, which connects all parts of the former Yugoslavia. Thus far, IRSS has facilitated five larger meetings and numerous smaller meetings convened by the Network. The first larger meeting took place in Graz, Austria, in April 1997; the second in Bled, Slovenia, in November 1997; the third in Sarajevo in April 1998; the fourth in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in November 1998; and the fifth in Ohrid, Macedonia, in May 1999.

At the first meeting, over 60 health care providers from all parts of the former Yugoslavia convened in Graz. Close to 90 percent of the participants were physicians, includ-

ing clinicians, government health officials, health administrators, and academicians. The rest were clinical psychologists, health care administrators, and social scientists. The meeting focused on the provision of psychosocial support to post-conflict communities.

At the meeting, IRSS facilitated workshops to promote discussion of the role of health care providers in both social reconstruction, which involves building social infrastructure and fulfilling the psychosocial needs of a community, and community reconciliation, which involves restoring human relationships and building trust, hope, and mutuality. Participants were intrigued and excited by the idea that medical professionals have a special role to play in the reconciliation of war-divided communities. The workshops included training in communication skills and basic conflict management techniques, which were important because the majority of the group believed from previous experience that communication across conflict divides was typically unproductive, if not outright contentious. For many participants, the workshops provided a unique opportunity to engage in “safe” dialogue with “the enemy.”

Participants embraced this opportunity for dialogue and readily accepted the idea of a special role for the medical profession. At the close of the meeting, they unanimously established the Medical Network for Social Reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia. They defined the organization as a “loose network of health care providers organized to reconcile existing conflicts and prevent root causes of new conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.” The stated goals of the Network were “to promote dialogue, cooperation, personal contacts, the renewal of relationships, and practical solutions to restore the physical, psychological, and social health of the region.”¹

To expedite its work, the Network formed a Contact Group to implement Network decisions and plan future programs. The Contact Group was designed to include two people from each former Yugoslav Republic, but this was flexibly enforced to reflect the geopolitical realities of the region. The first meeting of the 24-member Contact Group was held in Bled, Slovenia, in November 1997, hosted by the Slovene Foundation of Ljubljana. The gathering provided an opportunity to review the status of health care delivery and social reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia, provide training on the role of health professionals in social reconstruction and community reconciliation, and further the organizational development of the Network.

A meeting of the full Network took place in Sarajevo in April 1998. This meeting focused on the role of health professionals in reconciliation, social reconstruction, and conflict prevention. Word of the Network had spread throughout the region, and more than 100 people from twelve countries attended the meeting. Approximately 90 percent of those present came from the former Yugoslavia, and all parts of this region were represented. The meeting aimed to examine and advance the role of health professionals in reconciliation, reconstruction, and conflict prevention in the former Yugoslavia. It combined a substantive exchange of views on a wide range of public health issues with training in conflict management. Moreover, the meeting provided opportunities for significant organizational development of the Network. The Network created an action strategy to expand its membership and to increase the scope and impact of its programs.

Many participants stated that the training workshops that IRSS facilitated at the meeting provided important skills that proved essential to the Network’s organizational

development. This fact was dramatically borne out when the group was discussing membership in its governing body, the Contact Group. Participants had reached an impasse, some arguing that membership should be apportioned along ethnic lines, others that it should be based on a functional division of responsibilities. Tension in the room became palpable. One participant stood up and announced that if membership were based on ethnic lines, then “we have learned nothing. Those who would rob us of our ability to trust each other have won.” She went on to argue that the Network could succeed in its mission only if each person would try to trust each other as a full and responsible member. Instantly, the tension in the room dissolved, and the group readily agreed to a functional division of responsibilities. The two members who had been the focus of the ethnicity argument stood up and crossed the room to clasp each other around the shoulders and discuss a functional division of responsibilities. Another participant stood and said, “This we have learned to teach to others, but this we must not forget ourselves.”

Outlook for the Medical Network in the Former Yugoslavia

Despite continuing violence in the former Yugoslavia, the outlook for the Medical Network is bright. The small group that came together in spite of enormous difficulties has now grown into an organized Network of more than 100 diverse, influential medical professionals. The Network has developed a communications forum through e-mail and fax that spans all parts of the former Yugoslavia and functions despite the dramatic fluctuations in political climate in the region. Concrete health care delivery programs have been organized across “enemy lines.” For example, Muslim, Croat, and Serb ophthalmologists received training in a specialized surgical technique and now function as a mixed-ethnic team in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A specialized pediatric medical facility in Montenegro has offered long-term care to child war-victims from the Muslim-Croat Federation and from Republika Srpska. When violence erupted in Kosovo in mid-1998, the Network issued a nonpartisan declaration. The declaration urgently asked all the parties to the conflict and the international community to “recognize that the situation must not proceed to war, which would devastate the public health interests of all parties and be a crime against humanity.”² Sadly, this statement of sanity and solidarity went unheeded.

The Network continues its programmatic and organizational development. A meeting of the Contact Group was held in November 1998 in Slovenia, and a meeting of the larger Network was scheduled for Macedonia in spring 1999. This meeting took place in Ohrid, Macedonia, May 26–30, 1999, and was combined with a training program, convened and staffed by the Network, for psychosocial assistance in trauma recovery. Participants in the training program were health care professionals from the Kosovar Albanian refugee and Macedonian communities. IRSS facilitated the part of the training program aimed at the integration of conflict management and trauma recovery. The Network is currently working on a website for organizational and medical information exchange, publishing announcements of the Network’s mission in regional medical professional journals, and developing a coordinated public health survey to evaluate the impact of violence on public health in all parts of the former Yugoslavia.

In addition to expanding and deepening contacts among participants from the former Yugoslavia, the Network is broadening its collaborative and supportive ties with sympa-

thetic international organizations such as the World Health Organization, the European Commission, the European Union, Medecins sans Frontier, and Catholic Relief Services.

The Network also is actively working to reach out to physicians in other war-torn areas to spread the Health Bridges concept. For example, a physician from Chechnya came to the Sarajevo conference as a guest of the Network. After the meeting, she requested assistance in organizing a similar medical network in Chechnya that would bring together Chechen, Ingush, Ossetian, and Russian health professionals. IRSS and members of the Network are actively involved in this project and traveled to the northern Caucasus in October 1998 to facilitate the first meeting of Chechen-area health professionals.

Health Bridges Strategy

Peacekeeping, famine relief, public health, and other humanitarian programs have always involved some degree of conflict management work. However, this work has often been done on an ad hoc basis, without specific planning or training of personnel in conflict management. IRSS's Health Bridges for Peace project deliberately integrates conflict management with other humanitarian efforts in an "integrated action" program. Through integrated action, conflicting parties are brought together to work on a humanitarian or development program that involves superordinate goals, and are provided with significant, concrete incentives for cooperation. At the same time, the humanitarian program receives the benefit of conflict management training expertise.

Medical professionals have a special role to play in healing violence-ravaged communities. Health care providers have an intimate association with the people who have suffered mentally and physically from armed conflicts, are often well educated, and have stature and access to a wide range of community groups. Health care providers can create a bridge of peace between conflicting communities, whereby delivery of health care can become a common objective and a binding commitment for continued cooperation. The involvement of medical professionals from different sides of a conflict in the delivery of health care can be a model for collaborative action and can create the long-term community involvement essential for sustainable peace.

The Health Bridges program in the former Yugoslavia has optimized the assets of the medical profession to promote a systematic integration of public health with social reconstruction and community reconciliation. IRSS helped medical personnel who were locked in polarized, tense situations to engage in effective dialogue about their past, their present, and their potential shared future. Through this dialogue, they were able to identify common health care needs that they could address more effectively through a cooperative approach. Some areas of common endeavor include integrating war-affected people, resettling refugees and displaced persons, reconstructing health care delivery systems, providing civic education for human rights protection, and developing sustainable processes for managing community conflict.

Lessons Learned

Experience in the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated essential principles for integrating health initiatives with community reconciliation in a systematic and sustainable manner.

Lesson One

A broadly representative group of indigenous personnel should guide a Health Bridges program. Only the local people can identify the crucial health needs of their communities. Moreover, important resources for understanding and transforming conflict can be found within the culture from which the conflict has emerged. Wherever possible, participants in our workshops helped to develop their own training programs. As practitioners prepared to use in their community what they had learned in the workshops, they worked together to adapt relevant aspects of the training to improve its usefulness in local communities.

Lesson Two

The more ownership local groups have of a training program, the more likely they are to use and sustain it.

Lesson Three

To have a long-term impact, training must be embedded in a structure that has the potential for long-term sustainability. Thus, the organizational development of the Medical Network was crucial to the success of the project. This development involved helping the Network to plan, convene, and facilitate meetings. It has also entailed identifying personnel and resources that can be committed to the Network for an extended period.

Lesson Four

To preserve the gains made at meetings and training sessions, channels must be set up for ongoing communication and the exchange of information among a range of parties. For example, at times when direct communications were impossible, members of the Medical Network creatively sent messages and medical aid through third parties. These symbolic and substantive acts were crucial to maintaining the gains in trust and human connection that each meeting of the Network had achieved, and ultimately, to the survival of the Network.

Lesson Five

A Health Bridges program is not sustainable or maximally effective unless it relates to other organizations and actors. Thus, the Medical Network was able to grow and gain stability by maintaining communication links with a range of relevant humanitarian and development agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and government and intergovernmental agencies.

Lesson Six

Ongoing program evaluation and the ability to change in response to critical evaluation are essential to the efficiency and sustainability of any training program. Also, the program must be able to adapt to a changing political landscape. For example, violence erupted in Kosovo during the Network's April 1998 meeting in Sarajevo. Participants from Kosovo, concerned that they might not be able to return to their families, decided to leave the meeting one day early. The meeting agenda and the training program were reworked on the spot to highlight discussion of the situation in Kosovo and the appropriate Network response, and to accommodate the Kosovars' changed schedule. More recently, in May 1999 the Network altered its planned annual conference, scheduled to take place in Macedonia, and convened a training program to help health professionals deal with the crisis of the war in Yugoslavia. The training program was staffed by Network health care providers from Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and Macedonia who were eager to share what they had learned from previous war trauma experience with their colleagues.

By working and training together, health professionals are building "health bridges for peace," giving their communities a symbol for hope and a reason to believe that the promise of their shared future can shine brightly enough to start healing the painful memories of their shared past.

Part II: Training of Trainers to Address Specific Conflicts

Chapter 3

Training to Train: Reflections on Southeastern Europe

The violence and warfare associated with the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the general political and ethnic instability of southeastern Europe produced an unprecedented response by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to contribute to peacemaking efforts in the region. While many organizations quickly engaged in humanitarian relief to help alleviate the difficult conditions of war, other NGOs worked to prevent conflict from erupting or escalating in other parts of the region. Many of these latter activities began in the early 1990s and took the form of training workshops designed to build capacity and empower individuals at the community level. Although programs varied in methodology, they generally emphasized the causes and phases of conflict and provided conflict management skills and know-how such as negotiation and mediation.

An evaluation of these early initiatives revealed a strong need to train participants to train others in conflict management. Participants left training programs with much enthusiasm, but they lacked the capacity to design and organize programs and activities of their own. Without such capacity, training would be limited to a small, select group of participants, and future programs would depend on the initiative and involvement of trainers from outside the region. To generate a sustainable and spillover effect, participants needed skills that went beyond standard negotiation and conflict resolution training.

After having run programs in negotiation, conflict management, and community building for participants from most countries in southeast Europe, in early 1994 the Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (CASIN) designed a pilot program in Macedonia to train trainers in conflict management. Emphasis was placed not only on transferring skills and techniques, but also on understanding how to employ them in organizing programs to educate others. In many respects, this program tested a new concept that would have significant and enduring effects.

While the 1994 program led to encouraging results, a post-program assessment indicated a need to go a step further. Not only do participants require training in the organization of such programs, they need continuous support and direction in order to effectively implement conflict management activities. Thus, in early 1995 CASIN developed a second train-the-trainers program, which was organized in close cooperation with the Ethnic Conflict Resolution Project (ECRP) at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Sts. Cyril and

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The primary objective of the project was to train trainers in conflict management so they could develop and implement conflict management activities of their own. The project aimed to strengthen the nongovernmental sector, build networks of individuals, support and encourage the development of local conflict mechanisms, and promote further understanding of conflict and ways it can be managed peacefully.

Approximately 20 participants from Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia took part in the program. They were selected in close cooperation with CASIN's partners, and equal representation of the diverse ethnic backgrounds was maintained. As most of the participants had already been exposed to some degree of conflict management training, organizers could focus more attention on advanced concepts of conflict and conflict management processes.

The project was based on two important premises. First, irrespective of the evolution of the former Yugoslavia, the ethnic communities of southeastern Europe are destined to live together. The people of this region must themselves develop cooperative relations as well as formal and informal mechanisms capable of managing these relations. Furthermore, not only states, but also nonstate actors, including NGOs, schools, universities, and the press and media, must cooperate. Second, cooperative relations in the region cannot be imposed from abroad. The communities themselves must take an active part in reestablishing peace and reflecting on their future. While outside assistance may and should be motivating, it should not be constraining or imposing. In other words, outside assistance—be it governmental or nongovernmental—should serve as an impetus to mobilize and stimulate the local capacity for peace.

Training Program

The 1995 program was structured in two parts. The first consisted of three one-week training modules. Module one reviewed concepts and techniques of conflict management and focused on assessing conflictual situations and identifying their sources through both objective and subjective lenses. The module then examined different ways to manage and eventually resolve an escalating conflict. Trainers gave specific attention to problem-solving and process management skills of negotiation, facilitation, and mediation.

In the second module, participants applied conflict management concepts and skills to community-based situations in southeastern Europe. Analysis of their cases revealed that the perception of conflict varied among people from different areas of the region. Discussion also uncovered that the direct and indirect sources of the conflicts often spread across different levels of society. The participants examined various conflict management mechanisms specific to the region, but several remarked that the legitimacy of these mechanisms had largely broken down with the political upheaval and ethnic tensions in the area.

The third module introduced participants to the concept and mechanics of education programs in conflict management, emphasizing both organizational and logistical elements of programs as well as the pedagogical and teaching aspects. Trainers taught participants how to structure programs and tailor them to meet the specific characteristics and needs of audiences. The participants prepared, conducted, and debriefed role-playing ex-

ercises under the direct supervision of the trainers. The week ended with working group assignments designed to lay the foundations for the follow-up programs, which would be organized and implemented by the participants.

CASIN conceived each of the three modules to include a wide variety of pedagogical tools. Teaching methods such as lectures, assessments, working group assignments, role-playing exercises, and case studies were used to foster interaction and dialogue among the participants. Exercises drew on cases of conflict occurring outside the Balkan region to avoid unnecessary and perhaps volatile political debate among participants from different ethnic backgrounds. In conducting the exercises, however, participants saw a mirror image of many of their own situations, but they concentrated on learning how to manage the process. Trainers thus sought to transfer skills rather than discuss the substantive aspects of conflicts. However, the causes and management processes of local, community conflicts in the region were informally discussed.

Activities Organized and Implemented by the Participants

The second part of the project consisted of a series of follow-up activities. Participants organized and implemented various projects that took place in the months following the three training modules. Follow-up projects included:

- a conflict management workshop for journalists in Macedonia;
- a conflict analysis and NGO empowerment seminar in Serbia;
- two summer camps on environmental conflict management in Serbia;
- visits to refugee camps in Serbia to familiarize refugees with notions of conflict management; and
- a series of one-day conflict resolution awareness seminars for elementary school students and teachers in Macedonia.

At the end of our project, participants were in the process of either continuing their programs or planning new activities. Several participants from Macedonia also began working and developing conflict management projects with ECRP and Search for Common Ground in Macedonia, testifying to their interest, motivation, and enthusiasm to pursue work in the field.

The overall objective of the project was to train a group of individuals to organize and conduct education activities in conflict management. The organization and implementation of the various follow-up projects indicate achievement of the short-term goals of our project. The “trained” trainers used different approaches and new learning techniques in their activities, representing skills they did not possess at the outset of the project. Other objectives included strengthening awareness of conflict management as well as contributing to the creation of a conflict management culture in southeastern Europe. CASIN believes these objectives were met.

The project also enhanced the nongovernmental sector by stimulating new people to become involved in training, education, and community-service activities. The project led

to the development of professional contacts throughout the region, not to mention the many friendships that now cross political and ethnic boundaries.

Lessons Learned

Several important lessons have been learned from this project.

Lesson One

Conflict management training is a necessary condition to transform war-torn societies and rebuild peaceful community relations. The results of train-the-trainers workshops need not necessarily lead to identical or similar programs. The main goal is to motivate trainees to begin engaging in a wide range of conflict management activities, which spill over to other audiences.

Lesson Two

Training and education conducted by “outsiders” must contribute to enabling local organizational growth. Although our immediate aim was to train individuals, institution building was also an essential ingredient linked to our overall objective. For this reason, conflict management activities initiated by NGOs from outside the region must be developed and implemented in close cooperation with local partners. Since CASIN began working in southeastern Europe in the early 1990s, all of its programs have been developed with local partners. Local partners, however, often are weak as they lack human and financial resources as well as some of the needed know-how. They often depend on single individuals who may pursue different goals and have many agendas. Institution building is thus essential if one intends to ensure continuity.

Lesson Three

All crises provoke a multitude of responses by international NGOs who all, in one way or another, would like to contribute to peacemaking. This multiplicity of responses may not always be positive. Local partners lack the capacity to cooperate in so many projects, especially as many of them are different, if not contradictory, in nature and approaches. More troublesome is the fact that some projects are not professional enough and not always well received by the local population.

Lesson Four

Many projects also take place only once or twice, and are then abandoned either for lack of funding or interest by the external or domestic partners. Continuity over a number of years is needed. Similar programs, even train-the-trainers programs, should be repeated several times in order to create a critical mass of available trainers.

Lesson Five

Expectations of both organizers and sponsors must remain realistic. Unfortunately, some conflict management activities organized after the three training modules have proven

difficult to sustain because their financial sponsors often seek immediate gains in terms of positive press coverage and praise. Rebuilding war-torn societies is an evolutionary process and not revolutionary like the destructive forces of war. The seeds of change often take more time to germinate than expected. Project organizers and financial partners thus must work as codevelopers and commit themselves to long-term activities, some of which may not necessarily provide immediate and clear outcomes in the short term.

Lesson Six

Peacebuilding is a stop-and-go process, as demonstrated in many parts of the world. Political and other isolated events will inevitably interrupt peacebuilding activities in southeast Europe, and follow-up programs by NGOs will likely suffer as a result. The decision by the Supreme Court of Serbia to withdraw the Soros Foundation's registration blocked the development and implementation of several conflict education and community-related activities in Serbia. Likewise, the war in Kosovo will hinder cooperation, particularly between Serbs and ethnic Albanians. Although at times the organization of events may prove difficult, if not impossible, civil society should not lose its motivation and determination to continue working to reestablish peaceful relations.

Conclusions

Promoting a culture of conflict management in southeastern Europe necessitates that states, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs from outside the region continue to develop and support various types of activities in the years to come. They must reinforce and strengthen local nongovernmental structures as Catholic Relief Services did, for example, when it created a new local NGO in Macedonia, the Centre for Multicultural Understanding and Cooperation. Search for Common Ground in Macedonia has also made important contributions by including local staff in the design, organization, and implementation of various kinds of conflict-management-related projects. However, the presence of NGOs from outside the region must not overwhelm or inhibit the development of local civil society. Both Catholic Relief Services and Search for Common Ground represent models of the usefulness and commitment of organizations providing links between the local environments and outside partners.

CASIN's project attempted to stimulate the development and implementation of conflict management education activities by a group of individuals native to southeastern Europe. By training prospective trainers, the project resulted in a series of follow-up events designed to promote a conflict management culture in the region. The objectives were met. However, to promote a conflict management culture in any community implies a long-term effort and funding over many years. CASIN was involved in southeast Europe, and particularly in Macedonia, for a number of years, but in the end not long enough. The need for long-term commitment is certainly one of the main lessons learned from what has been a very constructive and innovative endeavor.

Chapter 4

Ecumenical Community Building and Conflict Resolution Training in the Balkans

by
David A. Steele

For the past four years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington has sponsored a project on conflict resolution training for representatives of the various faith communities from the former Yugoslavia. The purpose of the project has been to empower religious communities in Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to take the initiative in pursuing a variety of peacebuilding activities, including but not limited to negotiation and mediation. Developing a critical mass of support for such activities among faith communities is essential to overcoming the stranglehold of ethnic division on both the individual and collective spirit.

To accomplish this goal, the CSIS staff first organized a series of seminars designed primarily for grassroots and middle-level clergy and laity. Each seminar has gathered from fifteen to fifty representatives of the various churches and religious communities in a given local region. As of December 1998, CSIS has held twenty-two seminars involving approximately 300 people. This article examines what may be learned from this training process.

Second, CSIS has made a concerted effort to build indigenous institutional capacity that can adequately empower religious people to be peacemakers. Ongoing support at the local level is critical in order to reinforce some aspects of training, provide access to training that was missed, and encourage the initiation of projects that can influence a broader segment of society. As of October 1998, we successfully transferred responsibility for the Croatian part of our project to the Centre for Peace, Nonviolence, and Human Rights in Osijek, having helped them, over eighteen months, to establish a new program on religion and conflict resolution within their organization. Over the next three years, we plan to assist completely new nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in both Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take responsibility for initiating, planning, and implementing the project within each country. At the beginning of our project, however, we began with a loose network of local consultants and cosponsoring institutions that helped immensely with developing networks, planning seminars, and initiating follow-up. Many of the consultants have now assumed staff positions within the indigenous organizations, and some of the institutions have continued in a supportive role. During the transition process in Croatia, minimal provision was made for staff training and institutional development.

In the next three years, much more training in these areas will be made available for staff and other highly committed people in all three countries. Such attempts at capacity building should always be among the aims of policy-makers and international NGOs providing training in conflict resolution in foreign contexts. We hope our project will help other scholars and practitioners to develop models for such transition periods.

Principal Findings: Theoretical and Practical

This project highlights the value of working with a group that is not traditionally associated with diplomacy. Scholars and policy-makers, even more than practitioners, have tended to either ignore religious people and institutions or see them as contributors to the escalation, rather than prevention or resolution, of ethnic conflict. While not wishing to minimize the potential for unhealthy relationships between religion and nationalism, this project demonstrates that religious communities, even ones that have to some degree compromised themselves on this score, are capable of generating constructive initiatives in reconciliation and peacemaking. In case after case, sincere and honest dialogue on very painful issues has taken place and friendships have developed across ethnic and religious divides. In some cases, concrete initiatives have emerged, such as biweekly ecumenical prayers in Osijek; mediation training at a church in Zagreb; lectures on conflict resolution to political parties in Sarajevo; clergy leadership in a refugee resettlement program in Fojnica, Bosnia; and sponsorship of numerous interreligious seminars by two Serbian Orthodox bishops.

A couple of characteristics make religious communities well suited for conflict resolution training efforts. First, their spiritual/moral character brings with it a long tradition of teachings based on neighborly concern. Even if the predominant expression of a given group's religiosity has been distorted by excessive nationalism, the core of its tradition remains the same. Consequently, one can often find strong dissenting voices that challenge sectarianism from within the tradition. Viewed negatively, the existence of this ambivalence is seen as hypocrisy. Viewed positively, it is an opportunity to utilize the inherent cognitive dissonance to move people within the tradition to a greater degree of self-awareness. For example, one could simply dismiss as manipulative posturing an attempt by a Serbian Orthodox priest to both espouse nationalist ideology and call for humane treatment of Muslims and Croats. Or one could understand the influence of the apostolic tradition of the Orthodox Church on him and, therefore, recognize the priest's struggle with unreconciled parts of himself. Second, local religious leaders frequently hold a place of esteem, and therefore influence, at the grassroots level in a society. There are many examples of priests and imams in the former Yugoslavia who have great credibility with their people based on long-term relationships and a long history of dissidence against communism. Therefore, they can potentially become key players in an attempt to create the alternative structures that can undergird civil society.

Seminar Type and Methodology

Following the first two seminars—held in Osijek, Croatia, and Sarajevo, Bosnia, in early 1995—we concluded that we would not be able, in most instances, to effectively train people in conflict resolution skills during an initial seminar. This proved especially true the closer one got to experiences of war trauma. Most people were simply unable to undertake a task of joint problem-solving with people they could not trust and with whom they had not established some degree of solidarity. At a later point, we became aware of another shortcoming in our training program, namely the need to support local initiatives that can potentially have greater impact on the broad context, including the social structures that feed the conflict.

As a result of both these concerns, we have now developed a three-tiered approach to conflict resolution training. The three levels of seminars in our basic program relate to three dimensions of conflict—people, problems, and systems—each of which presents a challenge to overcome: first, the relational challenge of building trust through intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup reconciliation; second, the issue-oriented challenge of imparting the problem-solving skills necessary to help people resolve particular local disputes; and third, the systemic challenge of identifying and responding to the sources of conflict that lie outside the immediate dispute and within the social structures. Each of these dimensions encompasses a large array of issues, enough to provide ample material for numerous seminars or workshops. Despite the fact that many seminar alumni have attended several seminars of each level, we are well aware that what we have offered has merely provided an introduction to the complex issues inherent within each topic. Therefore, what follows is a model that, hopefully, will further stimulate analysts and broaden the perspective of policy-makers regarding both goals and strategies. Trainers will want to adapt any ideas to the situations in which they work, taking into account the degree of conflict escalation, the primary needs and readiness of the specific target audience, and the capacity for on-the-ground follow-up. All three levels should note the need to expand beyond the traditional problem-solving paradigm. In particular, policy-makers should address the people problems and not dismiss these relational issues as too soft, and trainers need to incorporate the structural level, moving beyond the interpersonal and intergroup levels in which they are more comfortable working.

The first-level seminars serve a local constituency and are focused on interreligious and interethnic community building. The development of trust and solidarity, critical to relationship building in any context, is especially so in situations of war and post-war trauma, where one must first learn some way of coming to terms with the violent past and then find a way to creatively face the challenges of the present and future. Repeatedly we have experienced the value of beginning a seminar by giving participants the opportunity to express and acknowledge grievances. By starting with the common experience of suffering and designing an environment in which each group can discover that others take its hurts seriously, trainers begin to see crosscutting bonds develop. People do not have to agree on diagnoses, aims, or strategies, but simply give compassionate attention. Interspersed with the storytelling, we have also provided interpretive information on the grief process, drawn from both Old Testament lament forms and contemporary theorists such as Elizabeth Kubler-Ross. The Old Testament lament, in fact, could provide much interesting material on this topic for both scholars and trainers. Its method of handling grievance is to ritualize the expression of complaint within a community framework in a way that ensures that the victim has been heard and that limits any vindictive response.¹ The use of the lament motif, coupled with examination of the stages of grief, naturally leads to the second step in addressing the past—examination of the cyclical relationship between victimhood and aggression. As Serbs, Croats, and Muslims recognize that today's aggressors are often yesterday's victims, they also start to reevaluate the role their own people have played in both the near and distant past. This "walk through history," in turn, can lead to astoundingly open discussions about confession of the sins of one's people, the third step in addressing the past. Such discussion needs to be approached carefully, mind-

ful of the sins of all sides (while not assuming equal guilt), conscious of people's need to protect group identity by refusing to accept false guilt, and distinguishing between admission of collective guilt and feelings of personal responsibility. Weaving together the expression of both grief and apology has been reinforced throughout our seminars by theological reflection, as well as examination of psychological and sociological dynamics. For example, participants in one of the Serbian seminars opened up to a profound exchange about Serbian responsibility for the war in Bosnia after discussing how the lament motif in its final stage of development, as found in the Old Testament prophets, specifically incorporates the confession of sin into the grief process. Orthodox priests took the lead in expressing self-critical honesty by acknowledging the evil performed even by some of their own church people. Finally, forgiveness constitutes another crucial step on the way from victimhood to wholeness. Its focus is not to change the aggressor, but to heal the victim. Its purpose is to enable the victim, not to forget but to let go of hatred, the desire for revenge, and the need to change the past. With the act of forgiving, one's life enters the present and future. The justice one seeks takes on a restorative rather than a retributive character. Moving carefully with people from acknowledgement of their grievances through an understanding of the complex victimhood/aggression cycle to awareness of both their accountability and their need to forgive prepares the way for developing a creative approach to present attitudes and future possibilities in the relationship.

Examination of the present and future states of any relationship inevitably involves altering one's perspective. Conflict always involves some degree of misunderstanding and, therefore, the need to clarify perceptions, a factor well-known already in this field. In cases of intense conflict, the experience of victimization usually has contributed to such a threatened sense of identity that bias and stereotyping begin to function as a group-survival mechanism. In light of this, we have found it helpful, following the examination of past dynamics in a relationship, to engage participants in an exercise in which people step into the shoes of another ethnic, religious, or national group. When a Croat is asked to describe the problems or tensions as understood by a Muslim or a Serb, and then is given feedback from a member of the appropriate group, his awareness of the need for attitude change usually increases and sometimes his behavior becomes more inclusive. Admission of unhealthy bias is simply part of confessing sinful attitudes, the dominant type of confession found in the prophetic lament. Furthermore, the lament identifies corporate sin primarily in terms of attitudinal issues. Again, understanding the religious tradition that undergirds each of the Abrahamic faiths can help religious individuals to accept that their own attitudes are contaminated by subtle cultural and subcultural biases.

The second-level seminars have concentrated on developing skills in communication, problem-solving, and mediation. This practical training has led to the development of several local mediation training programs in churches. Some of our participants have helped to negotiate local disputes and, occasionally, offered back-channel communication for formal negotiations, efforts that need much more recognition and support from policy-makers. During the actual training process, we relied primarily on exercises commonly used by practitioners in the field, including paraphrasing and formulating "nonblame" statements (communication skills); mapping parties' needs or fears and brainstorming techniques that reframe the conflict and help create alternative options for

solution (problem-solving); and role-playing the various stages of the mediation process. These skill exercises depend for their success on the level of trust and solidarity established in the level-one seminars, but they also deepen it. The very goal is to transform the dynamics of a conflict situation from an “attack and defend” pattern that at best results in compromise to a partnership paradigm that searches for mutually beneficial solutions, a paradigm which policy-makers would do well to use more frequently in track-one and track-two negotiations. The various religious traditions, again, provide resources that can both motivate and inform seminar participants regarding these skills. For example, a Muslim imam from Sarajevo shared, during an exercise in mapping the conflict, that meditation had helped him to understand and accept that Serbian fears and needs for survival lie beneath their actions. His moving description of the way God opened his eyes, despite the terrible struggle of his own people for survival, was in itself a powerful creator of trust and solidarity. It was also a good illustration of theology’s ability to broaden one’s understanding of needs or interests to the level of common, or at least compatible, ones. Biblical material can also be used to illustrate and support various skills. One can find both brainstorming and mediation processes in St. Paul’s letter to the slave owner, Philemon, on behalf of the run-away slave, Onesimus.

The third-level seminars are designed to help religious communities develop self-generating local programming that can address the structural issues underlying the conflict. They focus on identifying specific creative roles for religious communities in the process of social change, knowing where and how to motivate the right individuals or structures, and building competence in community organizing skills. Thus far, our only level-three seminar was designed to address the present and potential role of the Croatian churches in curriculum development and methodology of peace education. Addressing these questions about the role of religious communities in promoting any kind of structural change, whether focused around education, media, political parties, or other institutions, is important for all who engage in this field. Scholars need to further develop the rationale; trainers and policy-makers need to give more attention to implementation. Our growing awareness of the need to support such initiatives has arisen from an evaluation that our past and present efforts are insufficient to effect major change in the society. Creative entry points into the structures, both ecclesiastical and secular, need to be discovered and approached in ways that can effectively influence their decision-making.

In addition to this three-tiered approach, we have recently realized a need for two additional types of seminars. One of these involves a major focus on group identity and the place of a given religious community within the society. How religious identity interfaces with ethnic identity, how a group forms its values and understands its history, how able it is to balance assertiveness with honest self-criticism, how it views its role in relation to other social institutions and other religious communities, and how it handles internal conflict—all these questions must be faced by each religious community in order to sort out the complex dynamics inherent within a formerly multi-ethnic, but increasingly stratified, society. Many people, and sometimes whole religious communities, are not able to address these issues adequately in the context of interfaith gatherings. Having learned through perceptive seminar participants to be sensitive to this reality, we have held three of these single-confessional seminars to date, as well as one follow-up seminar, bringing

together Serbian Orthodox and Croatian Catholics in Eastern Croatia for joint exploration of identity, perceptions, forgiveness, and acknowledgment of wrongdoing. If identity issues are addressed with an awareness of the twin dangers of assimilation and exclusivity, then the process can actually enhance the feasibility of both cooperative, inter-faith efforts and constructive social influence. The key, in this case, is to help develop an identity formation process that creates self-definition without contributing to the denigration or demonization of another group.

The second additional type of seminar has focused on leadership training. Thus far, we have held only one such event for the training of small group facilitators from all three countries in which we work. Future leadership seminars will include more training in group facilitation, as well as other perception and communication skills, experiential learning techniques, personal assessment processes, and approaches to spiritual reflection, management training/organizational development, and future planning/envisioning.

As can be seen in all of the above seminars, our overall training approach involves collaborative planning, experience-based methodology, and a follow-up designed to empower. These criteria are commonly accepted among many trainers, though our approach, designed for a very specific target audience, may lend some new insights. In closing, it is important to note that, throughout the project, we have learned to be extremely flexible. Approaches that work in one place do not always work in the next, thus producing an ever-evolving *modus operandi*.

Chapter 5

Women's Work Is Peace: Lessons from Training Projects in the Horn of Africa

by
Hibaaq
Osman

Since 1991, when military dictator Siad Barre fled Somalia and the country erupted into a protracted civil war costing hundreds of thousands of lives, neither Somalia nor Somaliland (a northern province that asserted its independence from Somalia in 1991) has had a recognized central government. Amid this political instability, human rights abuses continue in certain areas, with hundreds of civilians killed, raped, and held hostage every year. By the end of 1997, 1.5 million of Somalia's estimated 9 million people were in exile and half a million were internally displaced. And while factional fighting was the lowest in 1998 of any year since the civil war started, armed conflict has not ended. Many in Somalia and Somaliland now realize that peace is the only solution to the region's numerous national and developmental challenges. Getting to peace is the largest challenge of all, but Somali women, at the heart of the region's burgeoning peace movement, are making progress.

The CSIW Women's Project

The mission of the Centre for the Strategic Initiatives of Women (CSIW) is to work in partnership with Horn-based grassroots women's organizations to promote peace, democracy, and human rights. This mission guided CSIW's approach to providing support for the burgeoning women's peace movement in Somalia. The women participating in the three-phase program, which commenced in 1994, defined the training agenda through articulating the skills they needed to be more effective peacebuilders. The first training focused on identifying and addressing the specific institutional and leadership needs of women's organizations in Somalia and Somaliland. From the outset, workshop participants demonstrated unwavering commitment to the process. Many left their children behind to travel long distances on foot, often under armed guard.

This unwavering commitment brought fifteen Somali women leaders to South Africa for the second phase of the program, an intensive conflict management training for trainers in July 1995. Coming out of this program as conflict management trainers, these women worked with CSIW to develop and implement the third phase of the program in 1996, a series of conflict management workshops throughout Somalia and Somaliland. They developed their own conflict management training manual, using it to enhance their own training capabilities while at the same time transferring conflict management skills to other women. Close to forty women participated in each of the five seven-day workshops throughout Somalia and Somaliland. In total, nearly 300 women from diverse communities and backgrounds were introduced to techniques of negotiation, mediation, leadership skills, and, most important, the need and opportunity for their participation in local and

national peacebuilding. This training enables them to build networks and thus to be greater than the sum of their individual efforts.

The trainees, independent of CSIW support, have continued the project, sharing the techniques they learned with other women in their organizations and continuing to offer workshops on their own. And more important, they are coordinating efforts to promote peace, democracy, and human rights in the Horn. Following the CSIW-sponsored conflict resolution workshops in 1994 and 1995, Somali participants joined together to form the Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organizations (COGWO), a major player in consolidating and strengthening peace efforts. Now actively negotiating and mediating among faction leaders, the coalition has produced its own conflict management manual, contributing to the tools available for defusing and resolving crises in the region. Women in Somaliland have also formed an umbrella coalition called NAGAAD, which means peace and stability in Somali. The coalition unites many interests and groups and serves as a focal point of local strategies for cooperation and coordination in peace and reconstruction efforts.

CSIW is contributing to the effort among its partner women's groups to build strategic alliances among the sectors of Somali society—including elders, religious leaders, women, and youth—to mobilize their capabilities and strengthen their voices in building an incipient civil society.

In partnership with CSIW, COGWO, and NAGAAD are continuing the peace initiatives set in motion through the conflict management trainings by establishing peace centers in Somalia and Somaliland. The centers were fully operational by 1999. Providing training in conflict management and peacebuilding, mediation resources, and counseling, they also bring diverse communities together around community development initiatives. Somali women's organizations provide leadership for the centers.

The Results

Participants in the conflict management and peacebuilding workshops have employed their skills in numerous vibrant and powerful ways. Several workshop participants successfully negotiated the release of a woman who had been kidnapped by a clan gang. Participants from Merca placed themselves between clashing clan members and effectively stopped the fighting. Participants from another group held a "peace fast" for women from both sides of Mogadishu's Green Line—the divide between warring clans—after they effectively negotiated an end to fighting between two clans. Women from Mogadishu report that they now cross the Green Line at night to discuss peace initiatives with each other. Another group of trainees has already begun engaging in consultations with the government of Somaliland to advocate for the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The government has agreed to initiate the process of ratification with assistance from CSIW and UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund), a move that will have wide implications for legislation, policy, and practice in the areas of the rights of the girl child and peace education in Somaliland.

Lessons Learned

Lesson One

While it is true that civil war often mutes women's voices and undermines their contribution to community well-being, women are also uniquely situated to work for peace. First, women bear the brunt of the burdens of war, making them more likely than men to oppose war. Since women in the Horn of Africa, like many women around the world, are socialized from birth to protect their families, they see war as destructive of their primary goals. Second, culturally Somali women also have an additional advantage. Since they leave their families and homes to marry strangers (exogamy), they are accustomed to bridging differences. They have already developed concrete skills in advocating for peace in their own families. In a real sense, as one workshop participant put it, "women have no clan": their sons belong to one, their fathers to another, and so their allegiances are multiple. Third, Somali women are protected by traditional warfare practices, giving them a greater ability to cross boundaries to negotiate. Finally, war can be a window of opportunity for women, who are left behind to become heads of families. "War has actually empowered women," said a participant. "We have had to do so much to survive." The conflict in Somalia has also provided a window of opportunity for women who, in the absence of men, have assumed leadership roles in building civil society and building peace.

While many peace initiatives focus on male political leaders, CSIW's work suggests that a more grassroots effort, one that starts with women, will have a longer-term chance for success. As one participant noted, "We are the peace promoters."

Lesson Two

The CSIW workshops succeeded largely because they focused on eliciting women's skills. In this sense, calling them "training" workshops is something of a misnomer. By default, Somali women had already developed many skills in peacebuilding; the workshops simply helped them to recognize this. Bringing women from warring factions into one room was CSIW's biggest contribution. Once together, the women learned from each other that in tragedy they were equal. Having lost family members and livelihoods, they had the room to decide that it would be better to be equal in peace; that is, their natural talent at communication, negotiation, and reaching solutions found a means for expression. CSIW's role was to facilitate the women's meeting (a logistical accomplishment in and of itself) and their careful work to broker peace among themselves and in their communities. This approach suggests that facilitating initiatives, rather than directing them, can lead to much more powerful and sustainable outcomes.

Lesson Three

CSIW saw the workshops as a tool in building a constituency for peace through diversity. To build this constituency, several workshop conditions were essential. The women were brought from their homes to comfortable and safe surroundings, a hotel that for many was quite luxurious. Women from different factions slept in the same room, ate from the same plate, danced to the same music, and wept together at the same terrible stories of war. Such bonding could not have been accomplished in one-day workshops in their

home environments. They needed a peaceful, serene place. Treated with dignity, listened to as equals, they responded to each other in kind. The proliferation of women's groups from the workshops suggests that workshops designed to build relationships among people can have longer-term effects than can workshops with short-term focus on imparting conflict management skills alone. No workshop is an automatic guarantor of peace, but the CSIW workshops were important steps in creating the kind of human interdependency that Somalia has lacked.

Lesson Four

The CSIW workshops brought to light an important principle in women's peace and advocacy work. Instead of making peace and democracy gender issues, the participating women recognized the need to form strategic alliances with religious leaders, local factions, the militia, and other groups, engaging a diverse constituency in transforming society. These alliances have strengthened women's voices and brought these voices into the mainstream. In addition, the women learned that support for gender concerns is best garnered when these concerns are integrated into dialogue on general issues of concern to the community, rather than more narrowly focusing on concerns of primary interest only to women. Strategically, this is the most effective way to focus the attention of all Somalis, not only women, on the effect that community decisions have on women and families.

Lesson Five

The type of power politics used during the reign of Siad Barre cannot contain conflict among clans. Indeed, such coercive measures make conflict fester. Today the legacy of power politics continues even without a strong centralized government. Warring clan leaders continue to blindly believe that opponents will refrain from violence only under threat of retaliation. The recently established peace centers belie that assumption. Their existence is a constant reminder that local institutions must be responsive to the needs of individuals and their identity groups. The peace centers form the nucleus of politically concerned social aggregations. They enable individuals to articulate their needs and to seek satisfaction through peaceful means. This is the very essence of participatory governance.

Conclusions

In six short workshops, CSIW managed to make a contribution that has had a lasting effect in Somalia and Somaliland. By supporting women leaders from all walks of life, CSIW has been an agent for conflict management. While many outsiders continue to concentrate on the atrocities of war, CSIW concentrates on strengthening civil society, furthering democracy, and ending human rights abuses, all by supporting women's activities. Continuing conflict management at the grassroots level is essential to regaining and maintaining peace in Somalia and Somaliland.

Chapter 6

Training for Interethnic/Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria

by
Ernest E.
Uwazie

The need for this project on interethnic and religious conflict resolution in Nigeria grew out of the persistent interethnic and religious conflicts among the country's more than 250 ethnic groups and Moslem and Christian religions. Since 1982, for example, the country has experienced over ten major ethnic/religious clashes in five major cities in northern and southern parts of Nigeria. These riots have caused losses of millions of dollars in property and over ten thousand lives. While much has been written about these conflicts, little or nothing is known about practical ways to manage them and connect theory and practice. The conflicts often occur in urban areas with diverse cultures and religions, and they continue to pose serious problems for the country's socio-economic development programs as well as nation-building efforts.

With funding from the United States Institute of Peace, the California State University at Sacramento's (CSUS) Center for African Peace and Conflict Resolution (CAPCR) collaborated with the Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Lagos, on this project, conducted between June 1996 and November 1997.

The project was designed to develop and promote mechanisms for understanding and managing ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria's multicultural society. The overall objective was to develop internal capacity within Nigerian indigenous urban community groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for preventing, managing, and resolving ethnic and religious conflicts in the country.

Project Goals and Activities

The basic philosophy of the project was the critical need to educate and train urban community (ethnic and religious) leaders in Nigeria in peacebuilding and conflict resolution techniques, so that these trainers would ultimately design their own programs in their respective communities and organizations.

Specifically, the project was designed to:

1. provide training on conflict management for community leaders from the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, and other ethnic groups, plus Christians and Moslems from the northern and southern parts of Nigeria;
2. organize seminars and focus group discussions with diverse audiences in Nigeria;

3. produce a conflict management manual for post-training activities in Nigeria; and
4. assist our Nigerian partners and trainers in establishing a support network—with the aim of creating institutional capacity building for ethnic/religious conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Nigeria.

The focus group discussions involved about sixty participants from five Nigerian ethnic groups as well as Christians and Moslems. The interviews were conducted for four days in January 1997 in Lagos, Nigeria's former national capital and most populous city of nearly 10 million people. During the focus group sessions, participants discussed their knowledge of other groups, their attitudes and stereotypes toward them, and their personal experiences with individuals from the identified ethnic and religious groups. Some of the participants experienced the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–70, and some had experienced or been victims of many ethnic/religious riots and hostility in the northern Nigerian cities of Kano and Kaduna as well as in Lagos. One of the highlights of the discussions occurred when several participants shared their personal experiences of the ethnic/religious riots that occurred at various times in Kano and Lagos between 1982 and 1995. Some were injured; lost their homes, property, and other valuable possessions; or fled during the riots.

The sessions revealed the participants' limited knowledge of other ethnic groups and religions, and how their experiences with members of these groups contradicted their own, long-held ethnic/religious stereotypes of the other (as lazy, cowards, stupid, aggressive, money-conscious, avaricious, bloodthirsty, cunning, greedy, domineering, uncivilized, etc.). Nonetheless, participants said that coexistence among the country's various ethnic/religious groups was inevitable; they also expressed the need for mutual respect, better understanding, and cooperation among the groups to achieve the goal of "One Nigeria."

Soon after the focus group discussions, a two-day seminar on the project theme was held at the University of Ibadan (near Lagos), January 29–30, 1997. Eleven papers were presented at the conference, with three discussants and an additional twenty-five people in attendance. The conference participants, presenters, and discussants were representative of the country's ethnic and religious groups and included scholars, student leaders, traditional rulers, priests, and indigenous organization leaders. The diverse seminar papers and topics reflected both theoretical and historical analyses of interethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria, and offered suggestions for prevention and resolution.

The papers generated much frank discussion and insightful contributions, especially from the nonacademic participants. One of the main conclusions of the seminar was that, despite ethnic/religious differences in Nigeria, the ethnic/religious conflicts are heavily intertwined and result more from political manipulation by certain groups in Nigeria than anything else.

From the focus group and seminar experiences, we gained greater knowledge of the country's ethnic and religious conflicts. The participants' stories about ethnic/religious riots and hostility, as well as the seminar papers, provided us with rich materials that we used to develop and prepare the workshop curriculum.

The training workshops—presented by Ernest Uwazie, project director and conflict resolution trainer and scholar, and Peter Nwosu, CSUS professor of intercultural communications—were held at two sites in Kano and Lagos in March 1997. Each workshop lasted four days. As in the previous programs, the workshop participants were selected to reflect an ethnic, religious, age, and gender balance; they included community/urban and religious leaders, traditional rulers, scholars, student group officials, and criminal justice personnel. Furthermore, with the leadership of our Nigerian partners, for each workshop we selected thirty people who showed the greatest promise for applying the knowledge and skills acquired from the training and who would be likely to share with others and develop post-training programs in their respective organizations and communities.

The workshops included short lectures on basic conflict resolution concepts and practices, video presentations on conflict management techniques, and extensive role-plays and exercises on interpersonal, religious, ethnic, and community disputes. The simulations or cases for the role-plays were adapted to indigenous Nigerian conditions and experiences and designed to acquaint the participants with conflict identification and resolution techniques and communication skills. The training deepened the participants' awareness and knowledge of ethnic/religious conflict, its causes, and various methods for resolving or managing conflict in a multicultural society; it also developed the participants' negotiation, mediation, and peacebuilding skills. The wide media (TV, radio, and newspapers) coverage of the workshops also served to educate the public on the issues and possible remedies. At the end of each workshop, we discussed modalities for post-training activities and network building among the participants. To aid in this network support effort, the participant list was distributed to the participants.

Project Impact

The project had a significant positive impact on ethnic/religious relations in Nigeria. The trainees have formed two organizations (PrimePeace Project in Kano and MOLL Mediators in Lagos) that focus on promoting ethnic/religious conflict resolution and peacemaking in Nigeria. The founders and leaders of these organizations also reflect the country's ethnicities and religions. CSUS-CAPCR is in regular contact with these organizations, assisting them in capacity building and program development efforts and providing more training; they continue to use our conflict management manual in their post-training activities. In May 1998, the project director met for three hours with most of the trainees in Kano and Lagos, and each of them reported positive use/application of their skills and knowledge in their community organizations, churches, professional organizations, and families, and in police-community relations; they also expressed that they now have more positive views and attitudes toward other ethnic groups and religions and that they try to inculcate the same in their members/communities. In addition, the seminar papers have been accepted for publication in 1999 by Lexington Books, which will greatly promote open, constructive discussion and resolution of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Lessons Learned

Lesson One

Facilitated dialogue in a safe environment, by objective and skillful parties, is effective in improving ethnic-religious relations. It allows the parties to vent their anger and communicate their frustrations and prejudices in an open process, which can lead to new understandings through the sharing and mutual validation of each other's feelings and interests.

Lesson Two

Although Africa's culture is rich in plural conflict resolution modes, U.S. experts can contribute curriculum development, training, and pedagogy in promoting the culture's adaptation to (Western) modern conditions. International personnel also need to be sensitive to the limitations of Western training models and attempt to identify amenable indigenous systems of conflict resolution.

Lesson Three

The role of NGOs, people-to-people exchanges, and educational institutions in promoting ethnic/religious relations is very effective in Nigeria. In many respects, this may represent the country's best hope for ensuring peaceful coexistence.

Lesson Four

Although much of the debate about ethnic/religious tension in Nigeria has been cast as mainly motivated by pure politics, its economic dimensions need to be examined. For example, the poor, uneducated youth who are recruited and maintained by wealthy men to instigate some of the riots seem to serve some economic interests in the process of the massive looting and destruction of competing businesses; when such youth are not rioting, they may be used as beggars by their masters who have become "conflict entrepreneurs."

Lesson Five

Conflict resolution skills training and curriculum development are invaluable in the country's search for peace and stability. To be effective, such training requires careful planning, diligence in selecting participants, and flexibility in presenting programs, and it must be ongoing and persistent. Appropriate role-plays and facilitated discussion contribute to the transformative effect of the training because such methods engage the participants in real issues and lead them to fairly consider available options for effective resolution.

Part III: Training in Conflict Management

Chapter 7

The Training and Assessment of UN Peacekeepers with Distance-Education Pedagogy

by
Harvey J.
Langholtz

Recent years have seen an expansion in both the number of peacekeeping missions undertaken by the United Nations (UN), and the challenges faced by individual peacekeepers on the ground. With the help of a grant from The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the United Nations Institute for Training and Research established a program of self-paced training using correspondence-course instruction to prepare peacekeepers to serve on these complex missions. Since 1995, the program has provided almost 2,000 enrollments from 62 nations and continued expansion is anticipated.

Political Background

From the founding of the United Nations in 1945 through the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations were constrained by superpower rivalry. If a prospective peacekeeping mission offered any potential political or strategic advantage to either superpower, the other would veto the proposal in the UN Security Council. Under these constraints, UN peacekeeping remained a relatively small operation and the UN was careful not to attempt overly ambitious missions. Despite more than eighty wars (not including many of the smaller intrastate conflicts) that were fought worldwide during the Cold War with a toll of 30 million deaths,¹ the UN Security Council established only thirteen peacekeeping and observer forces between 1948 and 1988.² A handful of troop-contributing nations including Canada, Fiji, Ghana, India, Ireland, Nigeria, and the Nordic nations loaned the UN fewer than 10,000 people per year, and the entire budget for UN peacekeeping in constant 1990 US\$ was generally less than \$500 million per year.³ Peacekeepers received training through their own national military training programs, and the skills taught were confined to what they would need for missions with limited scope.

Neither the UN nor the international community was expected to intervene in “small-scale” conflicts, and violent ethnopolitical struggles persisted throughout the Cold War.⁴

1992: More Expectations for Peacekeepers

When the political and ideological factors that had constrained UN peacekeeping vanished at the end of the Cold War, the superpowers were ready to see the UN take a more

proactive role in collective security, and in January 1992 the member nations of the UN Security Council called upon the new UN secretary general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to draft a paper proposing his view of the emerging role the UN could play in more proactive peacekeeping. The secretary general outlined his vision in *An Agenda for Peace*.⁵ He called for a widening of the size, scope, and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations, proposing that UN peacekeepers undertake humanitarian relief missions in the face of natural, manmade, and economic disasters. He called for the UN to be prepared to use force to impose peace on behalf of a civilian population in the face of war or anarchy and also to support post-war recovery through refugee operations, demining, disarmament, civilian police, voting assistance, and the restoration of a civil society.

The number of UN peacekeeping or observer forces quickly grew as 20 new forces were created between May 1988 and October 1993. At their largest near the end of 1994, these missions were staffed by 77,783 civilian and military personnel from over 70 different nations at an annual cost of \$3.6 billion.⁶ The UN peacekeeper, trained for years to function within the context of monitoring established cease-fires, found the environment was now being stretched simultaneously in two directions: first, in the humanitarian direction as UN peacekeepers in Mozambique, Cambodia,⁷ and later Haiti⁸ undertook humanitarian operations, voting assistance, and the development of indigenous civilian police; and second, in the opposite, more military direction as UN missions in Somalia⁹ and the former Yugoslavia¹⁰ were deployed when there was, in reality, no peace to keep. Some UN missions undertook humanitarian and military aspects concurrently in an atmosphere of violence and anarchy as in Rwanda, Liberia, and Angola.¹¹

New Demands on UN Peacekeepers and a Need for Access to Training

With the expansion in peacekeeping that came in the first half of this decade came recognition that peacekeepers would need to be trained to serve in a variety of demanding functions. But how would it be possible to train thousands of peacekeeping personnel from so many different nations to perform so many different functions on so many missions worldwide? How could military and civilian personnel from these nations be provided standard, common, universal training that would facilitate unity of function and interoperability? And how could this training be provided to a large population of geographically distributed students on short notice and at a low per-student cost? The solution seemed to lie in the use of distance-education methodology, in conjunction with national training programs.

The need for self-paced training material on UN peacekeeping was first expressed in the Conclusions and Recommendations of the UN Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations at its 1993 session. The view was repeated at the 1994, 1995, and 1996 sessions and was endorsed each year in the General Assembly's Omnibus Peacekeeping Resolution. In addition, the notion was included in the Stimson Center's 1994 report, US Presidential Decision Directive 25, and a variety of other fora.

In response to this need, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction (UNITAR POCI) was established to provide training in a variety of areas. UNITAR POCI's purpose is to coordinate the development

and distribution of correspondence courses on UN peacekeeping. These courses are to support established UN practices and procedures and provide training for personnel of all nations that is standard, common, and low-cost. The development of the first courses for UNITAR POCI was funded through USIP unsolicited grant 134-94F.

UNITAR POCI's initial development was guided by its mission statement as follows.

It is the purpose of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction to coordinate the development and distribution of correspondence courses on United Nations Peacekeeping. These courses are to support established UN practices and procedures, and are to provide training for personnel of all nations that is standard, common, and low in cost.¹²

Distance Education Pedagogy

Distance education pedagogy offers the capability of reaching a geographically distributed target population of military officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), civilian employees, and diplomats who need knowledge-based training. Correspondence courses from UNITAR POCI are not designed for hands-on skills or field exercises. It is recognized that many peacekeeping skills require the development of hands-on technical skills that can be taught only under close, direct supervision. There are also peacekeeping skills that require group coordination and organization, and these can be taught only through field exercises or other real-time group exercises. However, many peacekeeping topics are cognitive or knowledge-based and can be acquired using the self-paced printed courses offered by UNITAR POCI. These courses offer universal training in accepted practices of UN peacekeeping and cover established doctrine, tactics, procedures, administration, organization, theory, history, and other knowledge-based topics that peacekeepers need to understand in order to serve effectively on UN missions.

Courses are delivered to individual students *in situ* with no need to travel or wait for a training quota. The courses range in size from 100 to 500 pages. Each course contains a series of lessons and each lesson includes lesson objectives, readings, and an end-of-lesson quiz. At the end of the course is an end-of-course examination. Each course has an enrollment fee of \$75 to \$95 to cover the costs of printing, shipping, and student administration.

Subjects Covered

UNITAR POCI currently offers eight separate self-paced correspondence courses teaching different aspects of UN peacekeeping. All are available in English; three are also available in Spanish, and two in French. Recognized experts with practical experience in appropriate aspects of peacekeeping wrote the courses, which range in length from four to sixteen lessons with each lesson requiring about two hours of study. Each individual lesson contains three parts: a set of clearly stated lesson objectives so the student may understand what the lesson is designed to provide; the actual reading material, which is generally from ten to twenty pages per lesson; and a ten- to twenty-question quiz with the correct answers available so the student may monitor his or her own progress. At the end of each

course the student completes and submits for scoring a fifty-question comprehensive end-of-course examination. Students who pass with 75 percent correct answers receive a certificate of completion from UNITAR POCL. Those who fail get one opportunity to pass an alternate form of the exam to earn the certificate. The courses are written for the intended student population of military officers. However, other enrollments include diplomats, enlisted personnel, civilian employees of ministries of defense and ministries of foreign affairs, employees of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), scholars, and interested citizens.

The individual courses may be taken in any order but Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support is recommended as an introduction. This course shows students the operational applications and political implications of the full range of Peace Support Operations in today's complex environment: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace support, combat, the promotion of consent, C³ (command, control, and communications), techniques, and planning for peace operations.

Five courses cover various mission-related duties and tasks. Logistical Support of UN Peacekeeping Operations provides the student with an understanding of UN logistics procedures supporting interoperability among forces deployed on UN missions. In the logistics course, students see how to link UN logistics procedures to procedures of their own nations. Serving as a UN Military Observer: Methods and Procedures helps the student understand social customs and deal with culture shock. The course teaches impartiality, duty on patrols and observer posts, code of conduct, liaison, negotiation, communication, and security.

United Nations Civilian Police: Restoring Order Following Hostilities familiarizes the student with the roles and duties of United Nations Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) in restoring civil order following the chaos of war. Topics include the history of UN CIVPOL, privileges and immunities, cultural and social relations, organization, principles, liaison, negotiation, staff duties, communications, and security. Commanding UN Peacekeeping Operations: Methods and Techniques for Peacekeeping on the Ground prepares commissioned officers and NCOs to lead their troops on peacekeeping operations. Students learn the military background to peacekeeping, methods of command, rules of engagement, principles, action, and the use and nonuse of deadly force. Students learn how peacekeepers conduct observation posts, patrols, convoys, escorts, and refugee and humanitarian operations, and protect against mines. The course also covers support of diplomatic initiatives, prisoner exchanges, civilian protection, relations with parties in conflict, humanitarian agencies, and the media. Demining in the Aftermath of War: Preventing Casualties to Peacekeepers and the Civilian Population discusses the global problem, humanitarian clearance, booby traps, detection, precautions, actions, and the treatment of the consequences of mines left behind by war.

Two courses offer historical perspectives on UN peacekeeping. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Former Yugoslavia covers the conflict in Yugoslavia and the UN mission through the Dayton Peace Accord. While the course offers a historical background and will acquaint the student with the genesis of the conflict, it does not cover post-Dayton developments. The History of UN Peacekeeping Operations 1945 to 1987 is available in English and provides the student with an understanding of how peacekeeping evolved during the Cold War.

In April 1999 UNITAR POCI's ninth course, *The History of UN Peacekeeping Following the Cold War: 1988–1997*, was placed in distribution and the first students have already completed the course. The German version of the Demining course was released in May 1999. The course on Yugoslavia has been revised and should be available by late summer 1999. Four courses are being drafted: *Medical and Psychological Aspects of Peacekeeping*, *Humanitarian Relief Operations*, *The Law of War*, and *Anti-Terrorism*. Other courses not actually in draft but under discussion for future development are *Maritime Aspects of Peacekeeping*, *Conflict Resolution*, *Human Rights Monitoring*, and *Election Monitoring*.

Individual Enrollments and National Programs

Currently, enrollments number over 2,000 students from 61 troop-contributing nations: Angola, Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Enrollment in the courses is open, and individual students are accepted with or without national sponsorship. However, many troop-contributing nations have incorporated the self-paced correspondence courses into their national training programs, and these established arrangements provide training for many peacekeepers. In these cases the ministry of defense publicizes the courses to military personnel as part of the regular schedule of national training.

Lessons Learned

Lesson One

Several important lessons have been learned during the development of UNITAR POCI. Some lessons learned may be specific to the development of a program of self-paced training on peacekeeping, but others may be more general. Perhaps the first and most important lesson is the need to develop a clear self-definition before undertaking such a project. Before UNITAR POCI existed, there was no central source for self-paced training on peacekeeping, and it was the goal of the program to fill that need worldwide. This self-definition could be honed only after numerous meetings and discussions, both formal and informal, involving experts in the field from many nations. These discussions included permanent representatives to the United Nations and their staff, personnel within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, military peacekeepers, military trainers, NGOs, and others. UNITAR POCI could not have been initially established without the early self-definition that emerged from these consultations.

Lesson Two

A program must have a plan and a vision that will accommodate managed growth. Programs will not start out as large or self-sufficient. Instead, they will be small and dependent. A training organization crosses a threshold when it enrolls its first student, and for UNITAR POCI, that threshold took over two years of planning and development. The program was first discussed in early 1993, but it was February 1995 before our first student was enrolled. Before the first student can be enrolled, at least one course must be written and printed and the administrative mechanisms must be in place. Once the first-student threshold was crossed, it was a matter of managing growth within available resources. Although the establishment of UNITAR POCI was funded by USIP, the program was expected to become self-sustaining and ongoing through enrollment revenues, and this self-sufficiency required managed growth. The production of the first few courses and the development of the capability to service our first few hundred students consumed the initial USIP funding, but enrollment revenues had to be allocated carefully to take the program to the next level of size. Now that the program has over 2,000 enrollments, it is prepared to expand further. However, it would not have been possible to expand immediately from the first few students to the first few thousand students as early enrollment revenues would not have been sufficient to immediately support this level of student loading. Each level of activity must be developed with revenues from the preceding level, and attempts to expand too quickly will lead to failure. As the organization grows it must be successful at each level, and failure at any level will lead to the termination of the organization.

Lesson Three

As a developing program UNITAR POCI had to coordinate with other organizations and integrate operations with them. A working relationship was developed with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations so that courses on UN peacekeeping were reviewed for consistency with established policy and practices of UN peacekeeping. A memorandum of agreement was signed with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, listing UNITAR POCI correspondence courses in the Army's own catalog of correspondence courses and awarding course credits to U.S. soldiers who completed the UN courses. Similar links have been established with several other nations, including Germany, Italy, and Norway. UNITAR POCI courses were reviewed by the American Council on Education (ACE) and now are listed by ACE as worthy of college credits. A relationship was established with George Mason University's (GMU) Program on Peacekeeping Policy, and GMU students in the program are required to complete UNITAR POCI courses. Corporations in the United States and Germany that provide contract-demining capability require their employees to complete UNITAR POCI's demining course. Our courses have been used to supplement classroom training by organizations in Spain and South Africa. The director of UNITAR POCI has visited other military and civilian peacekeeping training programs in Argentina, Austria, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and additional links are being discussed.

Lesson Four

Keep an emphasis on service, know who you are serving, and have a clear definition of the need the organization is filling. Since UNITAR POCI is now wholly supported through enrollment revenues, we must be responsive to our students. The enrollment process must be simple and easy. Course materials must be delivered promptly. Exams must be scored fairly, and students need to learn results quickly. Students can easily access information through our home page, by fax, or by mail. Our courses are designed to be available to students in both developed and developing nations, so students cannot be required to have computer equipment or capability to take the courses. If students wish, all communication can take place through the mail. However, students who want to use our home page may enroll electronically, correspond through e-mail, and take their end-of-course exam online. Additional steps have been taken to provide a proper level of student services and support.

Lesson Five

Seek a level of financial self-sufficiency. It would not be possible to operate UNITAR POCI while depending on an endless series of grants. Grants are understandably finite both in time and amount. Once UNITAR POCI began enrolling students, it had a commitment to remain in operation and support enrolled students. The program could not be discontinued when the initial grant ended. While demand for enrollments has been consistent, this is difficult to predict. If the number of student enrollments expands or contracts, so will enrollment revenues, making UNITAR POCI solvent at various size levels.

Lesson Six

Publicize the program. UNITAR POCI publishes a concise brochure listing courses available which, along with an enrollment form, is enclosed in all mailings. Free publicity is obtained by having UNITAR POCI courses included in the official list of courses published by ministries of defense, colleges, and other organizations. In addition, UNITAR POCI's home page has been linked to the home pages of other organizations, permitting easy access for potential students.

Lesson Seven

Balance low-risk projects with more risky projects. In 1995 UNITAR POCI was in the process of developing an early offering of correspondence courses. The decision was made to develop a course to prepare peacekeepers to serve on the UN missions in the former Yugoslavia, and after a year of work the course was first offered for enrollment in early November 1995. However, the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina on November 21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, immediately made the course obsolete as the UN Protection Force was replaced by NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Implementation Force. Other topical courses (not mission-specific), such as Commanding Peacekeeping Operations, Demining, and Principles of Peace Support, have retained their currency despite changes in international politics.

Lesson Eight

Finally, start with a clear vision and mission statement, but be prepared to critically evaluate additional needs and opportunities that may develop. To be self-sufficient and lasting, an organization must adapt to environmental and political changes. UNITAR POCI was established as originally envisioned, but recent trends in peacekeeping have led to a slight change in emphasis. Although our original courses focused on topics of peacekeeping that were widely accepted at the time, future courses and courses now under development will focus on emerging topics: Humanitarian Operations, International Humanitarian Law, and World Terrorism.

Conclusions

Today's complex peacekeeping missions require peacekeepers to perform functions as different as peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, demining, and civilian policing. Although the training of peacekeepers remains the responsibility of the troop-contributing nations, UNITAR POCI offers nations and individuals an opportunity to acquire authoritative training directly from one source. The original development of the courses was funded under a generous grant from USIP, but the program is now permanent and financially self-sustaining. Additional courses are being developed, and each month new students from troop-contributing nations enroll in self-paced correspondence courses on UN peacekeeping.

Chapter 8

International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict

by
Guy Burgess,
Heidi Burgess,
and
Paul Wehr

The International Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict provides a variety of distance learning options for people interested in more constructive approaches to difficult and intractable conflicts. Created by the University of Colorado Conflict Research Consortium with support from the United States Institute of Peace and the Hewlett Foundation, this program is available to Internet users worldwide at <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace>.

The training program provides an economical alternative or supplement to travel-based training for disputants and intermediaries. It is not intended to replace traditional face-to-face training, but rather to provide an additional source of training that is primarily intended for people who do not have the time for or cannot afford conventional programs. It can also be used to supplement face-to-face training after that training is completed.

The program provides information on basic conflict management strategies as well as more advanced techniques for dealing with intractable conflicts. Materials can be used independently for self-study or as a supplementary resource that contributes to more conventional face-to-face training and education programs. The program is written in simple language (with an online glossary), so it is appropriate for people with a limited knowledge of English. While it emphasizes intractable conflict problems in the developing democracies and elsewhere in the “two-thirds” world, this program is useful for anyone facing difficult conflict.

Designed for people with limited access to academic or professional literature, the system contains over 1,000 pages of full-text material with analyses of 100 common conflict problems and 200 strategies for limiting those problems. Summaries of 200 articles and books and links to another 200 Web-accessible documents provide a theoretical background for and illustrations of the ideas presented. The program also permits dialogue among users and encourages other conflict research, education, and training organizations to join the project as collaborators.

Program Assumptions

Our approach to resolution-resistant conflicts draws heavily from conflict resolution practice and peace and conflict scholarship. It also incorporates ideas from specialists in advocacy, community organization, and nonviolent direct action. Unlike those who seek resolution for its own sake, we seek justice, fairness, good decisions, and wise solutions. Sometimes this means working to resolve a conflict, while at other times, it means continuing the conflict, but in a more constructive way.

Another important element of our approach is that we use a smaller unit of analysis than is common. Rather than looking at the conflict as a whole, we look at each aspect of the conflict to see what is working well and what is not, and thus, what needs to be changed. The approach suggested is different for each conflict situation—we do not try to apply one standard approach to all situations. Our goal is to help users fix as many of the incremental problems as possible and reduce the magnitude of the remainder, thus allowing users to pursue their goals in more positive ways, even before the conflict is resolved.

Although many of our “treatments” require cooperation between contending parties (often through intermediaries), others can be implemented unilaterally. Similarly, some treatments are relatively easy for the parties to implement, while others require that they develop new dispute-handling skills or secure the assistance of conflict professionals.

Unlike other forms of dispute resolution, this incremental approach can work in situations where resolution-based approaches cannot and where major changes in dispute-handling processes or decision-making institutions are unlikely. In addition to providing support for people in third-party, intermediary roles, the program also highlights steps disputants can take without third-party intervention or assistance.

The Knowledge Base

While there are no proven strategies for resolving intractable conflicts, the field’s growing knowledge base offers a rich array of ideas for handling inevitable confrontations more constructively. While some ideas were developed specifically for this program, many more were drawn from the knowledge, experience, and writing of others.

The problems, solutions, and examples given by no means exhaust the approaches for dealing with intractable conflicts. Rather, we see the program as a starting point that will stimulate users to think of new approaches to their own problems. A principal advantage of this problem/treatment approach is its adaptability to the special circumstances of particular users. No single approach can be expected to work in all conflict situations. Each conflict presents a different combination of problems, requiring a different set of treatments.

How the Material Is Organized

The training program has five major sections: (1) a set of common conflict *problems*; (2) a set of possible *treatments* for those problems; (3) a set of *examples* of problems and treatments; (4) a group of background *theoretical essays*; and (5) a number of *resources and support services*.

The core of the system comprises the two problem lists (one for core conflict problems and one for “complicating factors”) and two matched treatment lists. By clicking on a problem or a treatment, users are taken to an essay describing that topic in more detail. They can then follow links to examples of the problem or treatment, or they can read about related problems or treatments. They can also link to theoretical essays and to articles on other websites. The resources and support services section contains a glossary of specialized terms, a list of references (books and articles), online discussion groups, information on how to reach and download material at low cost, and hints for efficiently using the training program with different kinds of Internet connections.

Using the Program

This training program can be used in several ways. Users who want quick answers to specific questions can scan the problem and treatment lists for items that address their specific needs. They can then follow links to lessons and related topics of interest. All of the information on the web site is available free of charge.

Students who want to gain an in-depth understanding of intractable conflicts and constructive confrontation have two online course options. The work for both options is the same: Students read the theoretical background material, the problem and treatment essays, and many of the examples. They then write a series of papers applying ideas in the materials to their own situations or experiences. They are also encouraged to critically compare their ways of dealing with conflict situations with those presented in the training program. Thus, the program becomes elicitive as well as prescriptive. In addition to providing instructor feedback and interaction, we also encourage online dialogue between students in different parts of the world, thereby enhancing the cross-cultural value of the course. For about \$300, students who complete the course satisfactorily can receive formal university credit for a three-semester-hour course. Those who do not need credit can obtain a Consortium Certificate of Completion for \$100. (We have also established a scholarship program for users who cannot afford these charges.)

Audience

The primary program users will be people with Internet access who are interested in alternative approaches to difficult conflict: government people, university faculty and other teachers, business executives, representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the mass media, and others. While many potential users do not yet have access to computers and the Web, such access is expanding rapidly throughout the world.

There is a much larger secondary audience—people in contact with organizations that have Internet access. For example, conflict research, training, and education organizations can make the program available to their students, dispute resolution practitioners available to their clients, and advocacy groups available to their constituents. Government agencies can use the program for employee training.

At this early stage of audience development, we really do not know how large our user group will be, but we expect it to grow quickly as more people become aware of the program's availability. Unlike conventional, face-to-face training, which is limited by trainer resources and trainee time and money, copies of this program can be distributed instantly and at virtually no cost. Users need not hire trainers, buy new materials, or pay for travel expenses. The cost of online instruction is much less than comparable face-to-face training, since the economies of Internet teaching permit a single instructor to serve more students. Instructors can also be recruited from all over the world, and the online character of the program allows them to fit the work into their normal schedule.

Anticipated Impact

The Online Training Program on Intractable Conflict is a comprehensive and versatile learning resource that provides users with easy access to a great deal of useful information that was previously much more difficult to obtain. We hope that disputants and third par-

ties will turn to this resource when they feel “stuck” in a conflict situation they don’t know how to handle, or in one that seems to be going from good to bad. If each of the thousands of users we anticipate takes away one or two new ideas about addressing conflict problems in more constructive ways, the program is likely to have a significant impact. Beyond such incremental impact, we hope the program will lead users to see intractable conflicts in a new way, allowing them to reframe their problems and develop more constructive approaches to them.

Lessons Learned

We view this project as just one step in a long-term effort to speed the dissemination of information on more constructive approaches to difficult conflicts. We found the following project lessons to be particularly useful since they suggest future project development goals.

Lesson One

Develop better substitutes for face-to-face training interactions. While most conflict learning takes place in situations with a high degree of interpersonal interaction, our training program now relies exclusively on the written interactions—essays users read, papers they write, and online dialogues among instructors and students. To provide some of the depth and richness of face-to-face interactions, we need to incorporate interactive exercises, role-plays, and simulations, as well as audio and video components.

Lesson Two

Work to expand access. Obviously, our training program can assist only those who have access to it. Since access to the Internet is still quite limited, we need to continue to search for clever, low-cost strategies for providing better access to those on the fringes of computer technology.

Lesson Three

Develop better strategies for addressing cultural differences. One of the dangers of a truly global training program is that it has to make sense in a broad range of cultural settings. We need to do a better job of identifying and focusing on truly universal conflict problems. We also need to develop many more modules that adapt general conflict theory to specific (non-U.S.) cultural settings. Also critical are improved strategies for encouraging people who are uncomfortable with our approach to contribute alternative ways of defining problems and seeking solutions.

Lesson Four

Improve our understanding of user motivation and needs. Key to the success of any training program is an ability to provide users with the information they want when they want it. Yet getting online users to evaluate a program is not easy. We are working on ways to increase the amount of feedback we are getting to enable us to better serve user needs.

Lesson Five

Work to make Web-based training a more widely recognized option. When people are interested in training, education, or new ideas, most do not yet think of the Internet as the place to go. Instead they seek advice from friends, books, and education and training programs. Crucial to the long-term success of this and other similar efforts is persuading people to at least give online training a chance. We also need to persuade people to periodically reassess these efforts as the technology and project(s) advance.

Lesson Six

Grow with the technology. The Internet is developing at an enormous rate. The current version of the online training program would have been impossible to construct a few years ago. Continuing development of the system requires an ability to take advantage of emerging Internet capabilities such as audio and video, online translation, and wireless networks capable of reaching remote areas.

Lesson Seven

Build the user/contributor network. Also key to the long-term success of this and similar projects is expanding the network of users and contributors who benefit from the system and encouraging their associates to use it.

Lesson Eight

Adapt to the differing ways in which people use the system. Some users want as much information and as much detail as we can give them. Others want only a quick overview of a few key ideas. Still others want to be able to take a few ideas and develop them on their own. The initial version of this program was designed primarily with the first two user groups in mind. We now need to develop more elicitive materials for the third group.

Lesson Nine

Improve navigation tools. The project's goal of providing quick and easy access to large amounts of information requires continuing efforts to improve the navigation tools that enable users to easily "find their way" through the system.

Lesson Ten

Add additional content. The 1,000 pages of content currently provided by the program is clearly not enough. Too many crucial ideas have had to be either left out or treated superficially.

Lesson Eleven

Sustain a long-term commitment to the project. The most important lesson to emerge from the project was that a long-term, sustained effort is required to develop the potential of these emerging technologies. This project demonstrates the beginning of what is possible, but much more can be (and needs to be) done to reach new users and to make this as good a system as it can possibly be.

Chapter 9

SANCoM: A Joint Sino-American Negotiation and Conflict Management Curriculum Development Project

The SANCoM Project, an acronym for Sino-American Negotiation and Conflict Management, is an interdisciplinary Chinese and American effort aimed at promoting the art and science of negotiation and conflict management. The project is grounded in current debates in both countries about the future of Sino-American relations and mutual anxieties about each other's international aspirations. It does not define the problem as one of how to devise a strategy for coping with a Chinese challenge to American power or vice versa but views the present situation as an opportunity for creating bilateral and multilateral mechanisms that promote peace and cooperation through effective negotiation and conflict management education and training.

In 1997 SANCoM received a grant from the United States Institute of Peace to develop a curriculum and instructional materials for training early- and mid-career diplomats, international affairs professionals, and graduate students of Sino-American relations. This initiative was undertaken in response to a request for assistance by the Foreign Affairs College (FAC) in Beijing, China's central institution for graduate education in international relations and diplomatic training. Affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FAC for the past several years has been taking steps to adopt an academic and research-based negotiation and conflict management curriculum. (SANCoM staff is headquartered at the University of Montana, but works closely with FAC faculty and the Conflict Management Group, Inc.)

The activities funded under this grant consisted of a twelve-month trans-Pacific dialogue between a planning team of fourteen Chinese and American scholars and experts, a consultation visit by SANCoM staff to FAC and other Chinese universities, and an intensive three-day workshop for all planning team members held at the University of Montana. Planning team members represented the fields of negotiation and conflict management training, Sino-American relations, international diplomacy, law, economics, and communications. The product resulting from these activities is a two-volume instructor's manual and instructional materials that can be used to teach semester-long courses and intensive short-term professional training workshops, or as supplemental materials for existing courses in Sino-American relations, international diplomacy, or cross-cultural negotiations and communication. To our knowledge, it is the first such effort of its kind. Plans to pilot-test and implement the manual are under way.

SANCoM Planning Process

From the very outset, SANCoM staff made a conscious effort to stress the importance of adopting a planning process that involved collaborative decision-making and open dia-

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logue among all team members. Members were also told to view the planning process as an exercise in negotiation and conflict management. This resulted in remarkably frank and intellectually rewarding discussions concerning the purpose and focus of materials to be produced.

To focus the team's work, members were invited to respond to a fairly straightforward question: "Suppose you are given the opportunity to teach a course or workshop on Sino-American negotiation and conflict management. What would you teach, what kinds of materials would you need, and how would you organize it?" As all team members were aware, such courses with a focus on Sino-American relations do not exist in the United States, and in China negotiation is an art form with a long tradition, but to date it has not been formalized as a subject for academic instruction or training. Thus, the central challenge was for the team to find a way to teach negotiation and conflict management through a common framework in such a way that would meet the needs of instructors and participants, as well as the institutions responsible for implementing such courses in China.

After extensive discussions about differences in contemporary Chinese and American negotiation practices, Chinese and American views on power, and the role of culture and communication in diplomacy, all team members agreed that the development of an instructor's manual was not only feasible but also an important, timely, and necessary undertaking. In the view of the planning team and SANCoM staff, the conceptual framework for a common training approach can be found in a number of key process elements that occur in almost every kind of negotiation, even if considerable differences with regard to substantive issues or context exist. This pertains not only to political and diplomatic negotiations between Chinese and Americans, but between other nations and cultural groupings as well.

SANCoM Guidelines and Objectives

With this common framework in mind, planning team members adopted the following principles and objectives to guide their work.

1. Develop a common framework that stresses the importance of creating mutual awareness and sensitivity toward differences in Chinese and American negotiation traditions and styles. In preparing negotiation training materials, Americans must recognize that although Chinese negotiation practices are not grounded in social and behavioral concepts and research, much can be learned from them—and not only for purposes of dealing with Chinese. At the same time, Chinese need to learn more about different American behaviors as well. Mutual acknowledgment and sensitivity toward each other's differences does not require full agreement with the other, of course.

Chinese team members reported that contemporary Chinese negotiation practices are not as monolithic as many Westerners have observed, and that in identifying the behavior of any particular negotiator as being representative of a "national" or "official" style is risky. American team members acknowledged that Chinese practices have undergone dramatic changes, especially in the past decade. The ideological, principles-based approach from the 1970s and 1980s is giving way to a variety of styles, and traditional Chinese em-

phasis on “guanxi” or relationship-based negotiation and the rule of the “golden mean” is not as common anymore either. Chinese with extensive experience abroad are stressing the need to follow written agreements, abide by legal processes and procedures, and adhere to international norms.

At the same time, while Chinese are generally receptive to the notion of “win-win” strategies in the business and commercial realms, a number of the Chinese team members also noted that it is conceptually difficult for them to accept the applicability of such strategies in the political and diplomatic spheres. American team members, on the other hand, reported that a variety of negotiation styles exist among Americans as well, ranging from a positional bargaining approach, to interest-based negotiation, to collaborative problem-solving. They also noted that not all American negotiators subscribe to “win-win” solutions. In all cases, it is important to be able to recognize different kinds of negotiation behaviors and learn how to deal with them.

2. Develop common understanding by emphasizing language and the meaning of key concepts and words. From the very beginning, both Chinese and American team members stressed that the effectiveness of a common training approach needs to be based on the ability of participants to gain a clear understanding of Chinese and American negotiation and conflict management concepts and terms. For reasons ranging from differences in culture and politics to language systems that are unusually far apart, a common definitional basis for keywords must exist on both sides. To this end, important Chinese and American words from the fields of negotiation, conflict management, diplomacy, and international law will need explanation. Americans and Chinese generally agreed that the definitions of words such as “negotiation,” “mediation,” and “diplomacy” are relatively similar, but that words like “representation,” “dialogue,” and “contact” are important for Chinese, while not necessarily for Americans. In general, Chinese explanations tend to be more general and indicate an overall condition or state, whereas those of Americans deal more with process and procedural detail. The development of such a lexicon of key terms is a pioneering effort in itself and should also be of interest to Chinese and American policy-makers.

3. Develop practical skills for negotiation, bargaining, and decision-making that will be useful to policy-makers and advisers on both sides. It was agreed that Sino-American relations, like international relations in general, are best understood as the cumulative result of actions taken by individual negotiators, decision-makers, and their advisers. Such persons are required to make choices about a particular course of action under conditions of imperfect knowledge about the different options or the state of policy outcomes.

As a result, materials produced by the SANCoM Project should not promote any particular theory of international or Sino-American relations, but emphasize the importance of everyday analytical skills and practical tools that are neutral in content and applicable from one negotiation context to the next. These skills include those needed to assess perceptions of different choices and options, gather and analyze the relevant information, and identify and evaluate appropriate processes and structures.

Indeed, Chinese team members stressed that practical skill development should be given even greater emphasis than some of the Americans had originally thought. Ameri-

can team members had wanted to develop a curriculum that emphasized a more balanced approach consisting of a mixture of practical skill development integrated with knowledge of international relations and the history of diplomacy. In open discussion, however, the Americans supported the Chinese request.

4. Teach by means of an interactive and elicitive pedagogical approach—cases, exercises, simulations, and discussion. Because of the emphasis on skill development, instructional materials should be designed in such a way that they allow participants to focus on key decision-forcing points in which the outcome is open, carrying the potential for conflict escalation, stalemate, management, or resolution. The best method is to confront students and trainees with simulated or actual situations in which they must deal with everyday factors that influence negotiation. Participation in simulations and exercises and discussion of concrete cases will also help develop other skills such as active listening, empathy with other points of view, the value of historical knowledge and moral assumptions, and the importance of exploring alternative options and potential outcomes.

Although this interactive type of pedagogy is more customary in the United States, Chinese members of the planning team concur that, with appropriate modifications, it can also be used in Chinese classrooms.

Lessons Learned

The SANCoM organizers feel that many of the original objectives of this project have been achieved, although much more needs to be done. The following are concluding observations that may be of interest to others working in the curriculum development field, and in settings other than China and the United States.

Lesson One

On the basis of our experience, it is essential to work with an institutional partner who has a strong interest in making sure that the materials will be adopted and used. The SANCoM Project is fortunate in this regard. Planners on the American side need to have both a clear understanding of underlying motivations for why new curriculum materials should be introduced, and an awareness of strong administrative, faculty, and participant support. If such a partner cannot be found, caution is advised.

Lesson Two

To a large extent, the goals of the project were accomplished because of the emphasis on a collaborative planning process and open dialogue. Individual commitments on the part of planning team members and institutional relationships and ties were thereby strengthened.

Lesson Three

Curriculum development entails much more than giving attention to matters of substance and pedagogy. It requires a more comprehensive, integrated approach that also in-

corporates needs assessment, evaluation, relationship-building, implementation, and follow-up. Above all, adequate preparation of trainers or “training of trainers” needs to be built in. A “parachute approach” will not create a longer-term impact.

Lesson Four

In this project, both the Chinese and American sides found it very helpful to go through the “lexicon” exercise—that is, querying each other for the precise meaning of key concepts and terms. Even if both sides speak English, assuming that everyone means the same thing when using the same words is dangerous, particularly for a field as complex as negotiation and conflict management.

Lesson Five

Before implementation, new curricular materials should be field-tested with target audiences of participants, particularly if an interactive learning approach and extensive case studies are used.

Lesson Six

Despite significant differences in particular practices, it is possible to identify fundamental equivalencies in important negotiation and conflict management concepts and terms in both Chinese and American culture. In the realm of language, specific cultural behaviors, competing interests, cognitive bias, and incompleteness or confusion about factual information, barriers to cross-cultural communication exist.

Notes

1. McClintock, *Developing Negotiation and Mediation Skills*

1. CMG's negotiation theory is based on the Seven Element Framework developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project at Harvard Law School. The framework enables practitioners to identify the interests underlying opposing positions, search for creative options, and develop mutually agreeable standards for evaluation and decision-making.

2. Gutlove, *Health Bridges for Peace*

1. See Sabina Fielder and Gerald Pink, eds., "Psychosocial Support in Post-War Communities, Report of an International Conference, 17–20 April 1997" (OMEGA Gesundheitsstelle, Graz, September 1997).

2. See Paula Gutlove and Gordon Thompson, "A Strategy for Conflict Management: Integrated Action in Theory and Practice" (IRSS Working Paper #7, Institute for Resource and Security Studies, March 1999).

4. Steele, *Ecumenical Community Building*

1. For further development of this theme see David A. Steele, *Role of the Church as an Intermediary in International Conflict: A Theological Assessment of Principled Negotiation* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1991), 365–67, 449–51.

7. Langholtz, *The Training and Assessment of UN Peacekeepers*

1. See A. James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

2. See A. Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

3. See William J. Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

4. See a number of works by Ted Gurr, including *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993); "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System," in *International Studies Quarterly*, 38, no. 3 (1994): 347; "Minorities, Nationalities, and Conflict," in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 53–77. Also see B. Harff and Ted Gurr, "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides, and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995," in *PIOOM Newsletter and Progress Report* (The Netherlands: Leiden University, 1995), and A. James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990).

5. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992).

6. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3rd ed. (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996).

7. See Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); and M. W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate* (Boulder, CO: International Peace Academy and Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

8. See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3d ed. (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996).

9. See J. Chopra, Å. Eknes, and T. Nordbø, *Fighting for Hope in Somalia* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1995).

10. See United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping*, 3d ed. (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996).

11. See several United Nations publications including *United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda*, Progress Report S/1995/457 (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995a); *United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, S/1995/473 (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995b); and *United Nations Angolan Verification Mission*, S/1995/457 (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995c).

12. See the *UNITAR POCI Annual Report, 1997* (United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction, 1997).

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