A world map with a color gradient from light green to dark red, highlighting regions of genocide in the 20th century. The map shows various countries and regions, with some areas shaded in darker red, indicating the locations of major 20th-century genocides. The text is overlaid on the map.

IMAGES OF TWENTIETH CENTURY

GENOCIDE

DECODING SYMBOLS AND HEEDING WARNINGS

*DIANE E. CHIDO*

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IMAGES OF TWENTIETH CENTURY GENOCIDE  
Decoding Images and Heeding Warnings

By

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## **Preface**

In the Twentieth Century genocide increased in frequency and ferocity due mainly to technological advances and environmental degradation. It is highly likely that the economic dislocations caused by globalization will continue to exacerbate the problem of genocide in the Twenty-first Century. The United States is still the most powerful and influential country in the world and is in the best position to halt this frightening trend. The best way to save genocide victims is to stop it before the killing begins.

This study intends to prove that genocide is not the frenzied act of madmen it appears to be. A successful genocide campaign requires years of planning, the coalescence of a particular set of environmental conditions, and careful psychological preparation of both the target and the aggressor populations. Predicting the next onset and preventing violence are attainable goals. This study proposes to illustrate how an effective Indicators and Warning (I&W) system can stop this century from outpacing the last in brutality.



## Chapter I Introduction

The purpose of this study is to introduce the underlying elements of ethnic conflict and the environmental conditions that can bring simmering tensions to erupt in violence. A thorough review of the processes that lead to genocide must include following the continuum of violence that prepares both victims and perpetrators for the “final solution” within their society. It also requires understanding the cultural traditions and attitudes that contribute to the evolution of ethnic division, and finally exploring the particular kinds of imagery that organizers of genocide use to incite the aggressor population to participate or observe passively while their neighbors are massacred.

### *I &W Practical Application*

There are typical warning signs that herald genocide which, observed in the early phases and correctly identified, can provide policymakers with ample time to halt violence before it reaches the stage of violence. Monitoring foreign press and noting use of certain images to rally people around a demagogue or a political movement that sows seeds of ethnic divisiveness and watching the rise of such a person or entity can help analysts to identify genocide well in advance.

### *Environmental Factors*

To identify the internal and external conditions that, coupled with a destabilizing event (power vacuum, external shock, economic crisis, political instability) are likely to enable the rise of such a demagogue to engender genocide.

### *Definition*

In order to address this topic in full, the term “genocide” must be clearly defined. This study is directed toward US policymakers, therefore the definition of genocide used here will be that of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 December 1948 to which the United States is a signatory. The US government also typically relies on the UN definition when one is needed as in the case of Darfur in 2004.<sup>1</sup> Article II of this Convention states that, “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”<sup>2</sup>

However, Article III states that genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; and complicity in genocide are all punishable acts.<sup>3</sup> This indicates to the policymaker that merely determining that a genocide has been attempted, incited, or that a conspiracy exists is enough to permit preventive measures.

### *Why We Need To Think About Genocide At All*

Many governments suspend human rights or use excessively harsh treatment on a particular group within their society. When the government's treatment of noncombatants is deemed inhumane by the International Community, that government, in essence, forfeits its right to sovereignty and invites intervention. The difficulty is in determining where the line is and what kind of intervention is most appropriate and politically expedient. This has not always been the case; the concept of "humane war" has been evolving in the west for a millennium.

Until the widespread institution of professional armies in the last 200 years, it was often difficult to determine who the noncombatants were during war. Previously uninvolved peasants rose to the occasion when their villages were sacked and even monks and priests often violently defended their congregations and strongholds when necessary.

Saint Augustine first wrote about "just war" and discussed humane treatment of civilians in war.<sup>4</sup> The Greeks and Romans often spared poets, philosophers, artists, and intellectuals out of respect when destroying towns.<sup>5</sup> Alexander the Great restrained his troops, telling them, "Do not destroy what will soon be ours."<sup>6</sup>

Historians generally agree that the work of Grotius, writing after the Thirty Years War from 1648, is the basis of our modern, Western concept of "Humane War." His observations include: "One should not destroy that whose loss does not strengthen him or

weaken the enemy...Persons taking no part in the hostilities...shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.”<sup>7</sup>

In modern times, debate continues on how much a code of conduct ought to differ from interstate to internal warfare. In the United States, the Civil War Code states that, “men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.”<sup>8</sup> For specific aspects of treatment of civilians in internal conflicts, the Geneva Civilian Convention, commenting on the relocation of citizens, notes that the difference between “ethnic cleansing” and relocation of civilians with the aim of protecting them or moving them to where they cannot abet guerrillas – must ensure that the citizens are better off in the new locale.<sup>9</sup> This does not include sending them on forced marches without adequate supplies, interring them in death camps, or summarily executing them and dumping them in mass graves.

As the historical record of war continues to evolve with each new conflict, the legacy is clear that our civilization expects humane treatment of noncombatants in any conflict, internal or external, anywhere in the world. As the primary supporter of the United Nations and as the nation with most powerful military as well as other economic and political leverage points, the United States is in a unique position to intervene to halt genocide when it appears. The most effective strategy and expedient options can be explored when given more warning of a looming crisis, rather than less.

### *Limitations*

This study is limited to determining the early warning indicators that identify impending genocide and for estimates derived through the use of these indicators to provide US policymakers time and evidence to then decide whether to take action or not. This study is confined to cases of mass murder based on ethnicity, not political persuasion. This excludes the Khmer Rouge treatment of Cambodians; however, it does include treatment of Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims in the early 1990s. Although the Muslims are ethnic Slavs, their Islamic orientation caused them to develop in a divergent manner for over 600 years, arguably resulting in a group culturally different from neighboring Serbs and Croats by the Twentieth Century.

The study is not about prosecution of war criminals, which the International Criminal Court in The Hague already addresses. The study is also not concerned with the moral implications of action or inaction except as they are expressed in terms of US national self-interest and political expediency. This study uses only open-source information and is conducted from Erie, Pennsylvania with no financial assistance.

### *Other Works*

Samantha Power's 2002 *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* was the inspiration for this project. Her thoughtful treatment of cases of genocide throughout the "enlightened" Twentieth Century caused this analyst to consider the plight of the intelligence analyst reading the initial reports of atrocities beginning in Bosnia or Rwanda and wonder how to improve the system for dealing with such information. As Power makes clear, it often takes time for observers to assimilate the reality of the crimes

associated with these kinds of extreme conflicts, as the acts tend to be so widespread and barbaric that the mind initially refuses to accept the reports as fact. In addition, the intelligence community rightly expects corroboration of evidence, but this can be very difficult when everyone who might have witnessed the violence has already been killed.

This author used Power's book as a starting point to determine similarities among these conflicts to find shared conditions and precursors and suggests the Intelligence Community develop a watch team to determine where, how, and when these conditions begin to coalesce. Such a team would use a set of warning indicators that might point analysts already observing the initial conditions toward the development of this magnitude of ethnic violence before it can occur. This would then give policymakers more time to decide whether, how, and when to intervene politically or militarily.<sup>10</sup>

In his book, *The Roots of Evil*, the esteemed psychologist Erwin Staub brilliantly illustrates the internal motivations of individuals and societies to engage in genocide. Staub describes the conditions under which societies erupt into ethnic violence as "difficult life conditions," which can be due to extreme economic problems, political violence or upheaval, war, or rapid changes in society that are difficult for individuals or groups to cope with. Although this work deals extensively and clearly with the causes of genocide and the inciting factors, as well as offering strategies to avoid future ethnic violent events, it does not provide clear indicators for predicting genocide that can be effectively used by analysts to inform policymakers.

Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan have provided an excellent edited volume, *The Specter of Genocide*, which offers a historical perspective and comparative analysis of mass murders in articles from a number of authors from all the branches of social science, including military viewpoints. This volume is an excellent resource for exploring the commonalities and underlying causes of genocide, but does not presume to predict.

Armenian historian, Vahakn N. Dadrian, provides a starting place for comparative analysis in his 2004 *Journal of Genocide Research* article, "Patterns of Twentieth Century Genocides: The Armenian, Jewish, and Rwandan Cases." He offers a useful theoretical framework with interesting descriptions and caveats for the researcher, but provides little prescriptive information.



## Chapter II Methodology

This is an analytic study of the conditions in which existing ethnic tensions are exploited by political leader(s) to create an atmosphere of fear that permits the perpetration of genocide within a society. The primary focus of this research is to determine how particular images are manipulated in line with specific cultural traditions of the aggressor group to ensure compliance of the entire population along the continuum of violence to the point of persuading the population to participate or passively permit the atrocities to be perpetrated. The intent of the study is to assist intelligence professionals in determining which precursor conditions and preparatory propaganda indicate impending violence, in order to provide policymakers with warning in time to make sound, informed policy decisions on preventing or halting the violence, whether through direct intervention or other means.

This study relies mainly on four case studies including the Ottoman Turkish genocide of Armenians in 1915; the Nazi extermination of European, mainly German, Jews, excluding other nationalities and euthanasia of the imperfect; Serb aggression primarily limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but events in Croatia and Kosovo are difficult to compartmentalize in some areas as the means are identical; and the Hutu Power coup in Rwanda in 1994. The intent is to compare the development of conditions leading only to Twentieth Century genocides and to discover what we can learn for use in future conflicts.

The last part of the “Findings” chapter deals with a number of environmental conditions taken from the *Failed States Index*, constructed by the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and published by *Foreign Policy*. These conditions are present in each of the four cases and are likely determinants of the next hotspot. Such conditions combined with long-simmering ethnic divisions and amoral elites that fear usurpation of power are the clearest ingredients of future ethnic massacres. Finally, the author attempts to use this modified Index and relevant cultural images and media statements to predict where the next genocide is most likely to occur.

### Chapter III Literature Review

Although it does not provide information on Twentieth Century ethnic conflict, *Guns, Germs, and Steel* by Jared Diamond thoroughly outlines the historical and even prehistoric development of the concept of “us versus them.” This volume offers the anthropological perspective that resources, initially food, later produced goods and even land itself became the basis for competition, which stimulated advances in warfare and concepts of primitive nationality and ideology.

Diamond clearly describes how humans spread across the landscape into the five habitable continents, and how their groups developed in different ways due to local environmental conditions. Those land areas able to sustain agriculture were farmed, creating societies in which people worked together to achieve collective cultivation. This left more time for individual pursuits than did poor agricultural areas in which societies developed hunter-gatherer economies. Agricultural societies were then able to develop irrigation and food storage systems, leaving even more time available for other pursuits. These projects required labor organization, which led to early hierarchical development. These land areas were able to develop due to higher population density and in turn, were also able to support greater population density and as populations grew, so did labor specialization.

Assured food sources also led to healthier populations with increased diversity of nutritional sources, life became less hazardous, and infant mortality decreased, allowing

populations to grow more rapidly. Originally, the entire population was engaged in farming, which required little specialized skill, so farmers were not accorded high rank. Tool-makers became artisans and very skilled at their crafts, leading to hereditary guilds with a special place in society. With specialization, hierarchies developed due to the value placed on certain activities by the society. Above these were the organizers of labor for large projects.

From such collective project organization developed primitive bureaucracies, and the concept of chiefs, which were placed above the rest of society. Artisans and other skilled laborers were commissioned to provide special products for chiefs and their status grew, as did that of the chiefs who were permitted increasing trappings of prestige. As the population grew, increasingly specialized skilled laborers evolved: spear makers, boat makers, navigators, explorers. Through them, societies expanded their reach and with more advanced weapons and more organized hierarchies, were able to travel and discover new resources and space for growing populations.

Once new resources were discovered, other populations were often in the way of obtaining these resources or provided competition for them. As travel and communication improved and agrarian societies become more centralized, civilizations were able to expand influence and conquered territory. As diversity of products increased from subsistence levels, some goods became more valuable than others, and trade began among and within societies. Therefore, the established societies were better

able to organize themselves militarily and as they served a chief, developed an “us” and “them” mentality which led to a concept of righteous usurpation of desired lands occupied by “others.”

Building an institutionalized religion in which the chief is divine or has special access to the divine world improves the chief’s ability to rule because his followers are often willing to follow him unquestioningly and his warriors to die for him and his cause. Development of a state religion also can lead to building public worship centers, the grandiosity of which also increases the impression of the chief’s power. This shared ideology or religion gives people without kinship ties a sense of belonging to a group distinct from others. Tribes and clans united only on the basis of kinship ties did not go to war without a direct threat to their people or land or grazing area. They did not make war for the sake of an idea. This shared ideology is the root of nationalism, patriotism, and religious zealotry and for which societies willingly go to war.

Economists, those “dismal scientists,” would say it all comes down to the scarcity of resources; that we differentiate so that we can determine who is worthy of sharing with and who is not. This interpretation persists; however, the more basic imperative for inter-group conflict is likely to be survival of the species. Philosophers can just give up – the meaning of life is *creating life*. Reproduction requires a healthy, well-fed, well-protected host. In order to propagate the species, its members replicate themselves with mates who are like themselves. The impotent mule is the result when the horse mates with the

donkey and the species goes no further. In the same way, the pejorative term “*mulatto*” is applied to the offspring of two mates the surrounding society sees as unsuitable.

The reason for competition over scarce resources is population growth, current or projected. This is what requires groups to see themselves as separate from each other, and to create a culture of “them” to increase the cohesive bond among “us;” a common enemy is the best societal glue. Humans need a “them” to create a stronger “us.”<sup>11</sup>

Much of the theoretical discussion in this study that certain cultural values or tendencies contribute to genocide and the idea of the continuum of destruction comes from Ervin Staub’s fascinating book, *The Roots of Evil*. Staub’s thorough treatment of such concepts and his descriptions of their manifestations in Nazi Germany and during the Armenian Genocide of 1915 added greatly to the exploration of how populations can be persuaded to permit or even participate in genocide. Understanding of the role of propaganda would be incomplete without a discussion of how it is received by its audience. Staub’s work also traces the preparation of a population for genocide decades, or even centuries before the main event. He explains that such conditions can lead to crises of self-identity that particular types of societies and individuals may try to resolve through scapegoating.

According to Staub, such a reaction can seem to offer a number of ameliorative effects: faulting another group relieves the burden of self-blame and removes a sense of responsibility for the crisis; it provides understanding of the current circumstances in

order to dispel confusion; it appears to offer a solution to the problem; targeting another group can improve self-esteem and connects people with a shared enemy, thus creating a new social identity; and development of an ideology, even one based on hate, can provide a new plan for a supposed better future.<sup>12</sup>

Gustave LeBon's book *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* was originally published in 1895 but still has much to tell us about the behavior and characteristics of crowds. Such an understanding assists greatly in exploring the method of appealing to masses of people and moving them as a single unit to enact change, be it positive or negative.

James E. Bond treats the issues of humane war and the development of such laws and codes with great depth and cogency in *The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War*. He notes interestingly, however, that in some cases, "Guerilla forces often dispense summary justice because they control no territory and lack the facilities in which to house prisoners."<sup>13</sup> Although this would qualify as inhumane treatment, it provides practical expediency and does not offer the intent required for a claim of genocide, but certainly gives one pause to consider the position of the guerilla, which sometimes evolves from genocide, such as the remnants of Hutu Power still residing in Zaire and Uganda.

This study relies very heavily on Susan Woodward's 1995 book, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, for historical details and some analysis of the Balkan Wars. The author feels very confident doing so, as she was a member of the research verification team at the Brookings Institution that sought out confirmation of every fact and detail in Woodward's book prior to publication. Already intimately familiar with the primary source materials that went into making this book, the author decided that citing them in this case would be reinvention of the wheel. In addition, this book has become one of the definitive works on the subject and it treats all the aspects of the conflict necessary for this study.

Using the case of Rwanda as one illustration, Jared Diamond's latest book, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, provides an excellent survey of the combination of ecological factors that increase demographic pressure on a society or region and can often lead to conflict. The simple lack of arable land, further subdivided into plots too small to provide even for a nuclear family leads to discord within extended families. This seems to have been the basis for killing of Hutus by Hutus during the Rwandan genocide primarily directed against Tutsis in 1994, and helps to explain one aspect of the process that turns neighbors and family members against one another.

As shown by such volumes as "The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict" by Marjan Malešič<sup>14</sup> and Peter Fritzsche's *Germans Into Nazis*,<sup>15</sup> political rhetoric and imagery are recognized as playing large and important roles in inciting

genocide. It does not appear, however, that such propaganda has been studied in depth as an indicator or warning sign of impending violence.

According to “The Failed States Index,” a summer 2005 article in Foreign Policy, “about 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict.”<sup>16</sup> The Index uses 12 indicators of failed states to assess the likelihood of conflict in the near-term and to calculate the threat each state poses to the security of the United States. This article fully explains the results of this first 2005 Index and briefly describes the methodology and data used to create the Index. This is likely to be an invaluable tool for policymakers needing to determine future hotspots and has been used as the basis for assigning the necessary precursor conditions shared by each of the genocide cases in this study.

Two reports by Human Rights Watch were particularly useful in handling the case of the Rwanda genocide and this author recommends them to anyone looking for the details of the planning, execution, and aftermath of the conflict. *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* is a comprehensive account of the entire genocide from the history of the ethnic conflict through 1999.<sup>17</sup> The premise of the report is that ethnic tensions were purposely incited through a fully planned campaign by the Hutu Power elements in the government, rather than a wild frenzied manifestation of ancient bloodlust. The new foreword, written in April 2004 to mark the ten-year anniversary is a useful addition providing a more recent perspective and showing that the world continues to watch such

atrocities in horror, recoiling, but still standing by and pledging after the fact that this will “never” happen again and then going back to business as usual. This section makes comparisons with the situation in Darfur, which, two years later, has finally been officially declared genocide, but the world still looks on with indifference.

*The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared* is an excellent companion to *Leave None to Tell the Story*, as it details the actual planning process, where the other volume focuses on the political and economic motivations and historical background of the conflict. This report provides specific details about propaganda and how it was used, as well as other obvious signs that something terrible was in store for the Tutsis as early as 1990 to any observer who cared to look. This author does not attempt to replicate their work here.

Philip Gourevitch’s award-winning guide to the Rwandan conflict, *We Regret To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*, on which the film *Hotel Rwanda*, is somewhat based, is a life-altering experience, intimately introducing the reader to the people that were there, from victims to survivors and foreign observers. Gourevitch’s detailed accounts of the conditions and the personalities involved greatly contributed to this author’s understanding of the generic process toward genocide and of the economic and ethnic divisions common in Africa. The letter from which Gourevitch took the title is reproduced in its entirety in Annex III.

## Chapter IV Findings

### Development of Ethnic Conflict

In addition to identifying the conditions for and indicators of an impending genocide, it is important for the analyst to have a firm grasp of the roots of ethnic conflict from an anthropological perspective, as well as some familiarity with the groups in question and with the history of their feud. Before launching into ethnic conflict, however, there must first be an understanding of ethnicity as a concept: its origins, its expressions, and its effects on others. We must also define the concept of nationalism and explore how it differs from ethnicity and from politicized nationalism.

### *Ethnic Identity*

The roots of ethnic identity are as simple as the concepts of “them” and “us” that all individuals learn as infants when they begin to differentiate their own bodies from the floor on which they lie or their unique “self” from their parent or caretaker. Eventually all children learn by example who is most like them and who is not like them. Depending on the stimulus, differences might be a matter of skin color, accent or diction, some concept of “class,” or even kinship.

Just as infants begin to attach to a caretaker, they develop “stranger anxiety.” This fear of unfamiliar people may be the beginnings of the determination of who belongs to “us” and to “them” categories for individuals. Even young school-age children begin to have a sense that their own nation or society exists on a higher plane than others do or that there are certain characteristics of their ethnic group or society that deserve elevation over

others. As these early sensibilities harden into attitudes of “right” and “wrong,” so does categorization into “us” and “them,” enhancing ethnocentrism.<sup>18</sup>

### *Ethnicity Versus Citizenship*

Lawrence Cahoon asks, “What does belonging to a cultural tradition mean if it does not entail the judgment that one’s culture is superior in some respects to others?”<sup>19</sup> As long as it does not lead to violence or even arrogance, most Americans would feel that this is a fair point to some degree. However, would a German agree after 60 years of conditioning to believe that concepts of “cultural superiority” are dangerous? Would a Frenchman say that such a judgment is enough without expressing it often and loudly?

Cahoon presents the ideas of “thinness” and “thickness” of identity.<sup>20</sup> The more “thick” is the ethnic identification, the more exclusive it appears on a conceptual continuum. For example, American identification as citizens is thin, it is valued above all else, but does not preclude identification of its loyal citizens with a particular ethnic group. This is clear from the prevalence of such self-identifying labels as “African- or Italian-American, which by no means calls the individual’s adherence to the tenets of citizenship into question (as long as they pay their taxes, Cahoon quips). However, the French concept of citizenship is very thick, requiring “true” citizens to renounce other claims to ethnic identity, as seen in the current debacle on the wearing of scarves by Muslim girls in French schools and culminating in the November 2005 riots in Paris.

In the US case, this is likely because immigrants (with the exception of African slaves) all came to America out of personal choice and the belief that by doing so they could escape oppression, be it economic, religious, or political. It is likely, therefore, that in a very general sense Americans are composed primarily of a particular *type* of person that, among other qualities, is individualistic, idealistic, and risk-prone. This does not easily describe the crowd mentality discussed in the next section, nor does it place the citizen's central focus on ethnicity, but on the value of some vague concept of "Americanness" that supersedes the original ethnic identity precisely because it does not seek to do so. A recent Hoover Institute study observes that, "[t]he influx of newcomers produced a greater tolerance of intergroup differences, making the society more absorptive. Thus Poles, for instance, became more willing to shed their Polishness in favor of "the American way." Had the society been less tolerant, groups would have held fast to their ethnic traditions in residential enclaves. As it was, groups underwent a gradual but steady course of cultural transformation... The inescapable forces of social change made ethnic identity only one part of personal identity. Increasingly, over the generations, individuals were shaped by the jobs they held, the churches they attended, their places of residence, and by their schooling, peer culture, and consumer tastes... Immigrants have furthered the evolution of a society based on achieved status, voluntary identity, and free association. And what ethnic groups developed in common through mutual activity became more important than what made them different."<sup>21</sup>

If this is the case, then, assimilation into American culture provides the economic and political opportunities that nationalist politicians in our genocide cases claimed were usurped from their own ethnic groups by the target group. As most ethnic groups interacting in other countries have ended up neighbors through historical accident or conquest, not by choice, conflict is far more likely. This situation is exacerbated by resource and territory shortages, which have not historically been an issue in the United States (for more information on this subject, see the section *Environmental Conditions*). Therefore, with no common overriding ethnic identification, national pride of US citizens is not a historical flashpoint for ethnic conflict, as it does not tend to divide groups along nationalist lines.

In the Yugoslav case, as in other “nations” of diverse ethnic groups cobbled together under colonial administration, the identification of “Yugoslav” citizen was created to be a thick, binding concept, intended to supersede prior claims of ethnic groupings on citizens. However, the reality was that Yugoslav identification was so thin as to be easily snapped as the various Slavic ethnic groups began to assert their individual identities following the death of Tito and the fall of the Soviet Union, both of which exacerbated political and economic divisions among them, thus resulting in an ethnic exclusivism powerful enough to draw them into war and genocide.

### *Ethnicity Versus Nationalism*

Elias Canetti tells us that “One approach to defining ‘nations’ consists of being interested in one nation only – one’s own – and indifferent to all the rest. Its components are an

unshakeable belief in the superiority of this one nation; prophetic visions of unique greatness, and a peculiar mixture of moral and feral pretensions... They want the same thing, but in themselves they are different. They want aggrandizement [sic], and to substantiate their claim with the fact of their increase. There is no nation, it seems, that has not been promised the whole earth, and none which is not bound to inherit it in the course of nature. All the other nations who hear this feel threatened, and their fear blinds them to everything except the threat.”<sup>22</sup> This is typically the basis of exclusivist ideology associated with nationalism as it influences politics.

Ethnic identity evokes all the shared historical and linguistic tradition discussed above, but nationalism has the added dimension of territory. This relates to the basic nature of conflict, which begins with toddlers who both want the same toy. As economists tell us, resources are finite and must be divided in some way. Harmony can be achieved when this is done in such a way that the society at large believes that resources are divided equitably. When they are divided in a manner that appears arbitrary, or along divisive lines, cleavages can appear within the social fabric in myriad ways.

A very important part of this symbolic sense of identity is the group’s connection to a particular piece of land. In this vein, Woodward asserts, “[i]n contrast to ethnic conflict or civil war, national conflict is over rights to land. ‘Nationalism always involves a struggle for land, or an assertion about rights to land; and the nation, almost by definition, requires a territorial base in which to take root.’”<sup>23</sup> Further stating that, “[o]nce a contest

takes on territorial dimensions, moreover, memories of previous conflicts and wars can be revived to fuel fears and mobilize support for nationalist leaders who claim to protect them.”<sup>24</sup>

Erwin Staub describes nationalism as arising “partly from [a] combination of superiority and self-doubt. One form of nationalism is the desire to enlarge the nation’s territory or to extend the influence of its values and belief system. Another form is the desire for purity or “cleansing.” Nationalism is often strengthened under the influence of difficult life conditions. Strong nationalism sometimes originates in the experiences of shared trauma, suffering, and humiliation, which are sources of self-doubt.”<sup>25</sup> This was very clearly illustrated immediately after 9/11 in the United States, when despite historical “thinness,” nearly every car, home, and business suddenly displayed an America flag.

In the case of ethnic conflict, the source of division is most typically economic resources, such as arable or livable land area, typically tied historically to more than one group. These groups may live in peace sharing the land to which they both lay an historic claim until something causes a rupture. In her volume on the post Cold War dissolution of Yugoslavia, Susan Woodward contends that there is a “difference between inter-ethnic conflict and intra-ethnic competition.” The latter occurs when historically similar cultural groups redefine their identity as different enough from one another that they cannot share resources or territory, leading to the economic motive in “ethnic conflicts.”

Such ruptures are typically the result of environmental economic conditions, which vastly inflate the value of the land. Such conditions can be caused by a natural disaster or pollution that renders a significant proportion of the land unusable or inaccessible, demographic pressures that cause one group to feel the need for more land, or sudden economic collapse that threatens other means of support or an adverse change of circumstances for one of the groups. (For a detailed look at these and other precursors for ethnic conflict, as well as their application to cases, see *Environmental Conditions*).

### *Nationalist Politics*

As nationalism is based on an ethnic ideology coupled with a shared territory or homeland, nationalist politics add the element of a shared enemy as an element of cohesion for defending, regaining, or enlarging that territory. In order to create a unified concept of “us” worth fighting for, the effective nationalist politician must show the populace that there is a “them” threatening the integrity of that unity.

Woodward speaks to this process thusly, “[a]s a political force, nationalism is an empty vessel to be filled by those who see their interests in political independence and states’ rights. Its key characteristic is its definition of a political community – its principles and membership, its cultural and territorial boundaries, and also, therefore, its enemies...nationalism has no intrinsic substantive goals beyond affirmation of a particular collective bond among people and the creation of an independent state around that identity. Exclusion is as important as inclusion. Nationalist expression may be a positive assertion of commonality in culture, political history, and obligations of social

reciprocity. But it is at the same time necessarily a negative assertion of who does not belong, of mistrust, fear, even hatred of persons seen as “other,” as “foreigner,” and of the characteristics of persons who should be excluded.”<sup>26</sup>

The element of nationalism that focuses on the connection to either a specific piece of territory or to the need for the perpetrators’ right to expansion can endanger even members of the preferred ethnic group. Members of the intelligentsia or other liberals who disagree with or somehow threaten the success of the removal of the target group are often the first to be eliminated. In Armenia, there were few Turks to whom this applied, but in Germany on the day after *Kristallnacht*, Hitler observed that he “might one day exterminate the intellectual classes in Germany if they no longer proved of use.” Serbs who protested the killing of Muslims were not spared. Moderate Hutu politicians in Rwanda who did not support Hutu Power were among the first victims in 1994. Rather than discounting the ethnic component of genocide, such efforts underscore the need to “protect” the territory from those who might threaten its “purity.”<sup>27</sup>

### **Crowd Power And Mass Incitement**

Emergence of a powerful political party that can usurp the authority of the state and control the military is a major trigger that genocide may ensue; such a party is typically loyal to a charismatic figure or to an ideal, not to the state. Such parties often require members to sign or utter oaths of allegiance and vows of secrecy to the leader or ideal. Once the nationalist party leader amasses enough support to rival the existing political

order, he is ready to challenge that order. Gaining control of national media, police, military forces, supply lines, and the support of the elites, as well as the masses, provides the tools necessary to launch an overt attack on the “other.” In comparing the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide, Vahakn N. Dadrian notes that “[The party] gained optimal control of organizations, including the key governmental agencies, such as cabinet ministries and legislative bodies.”<sup>28</sup>

In order to achieve the power sought by nationalist politicians, they must use propaganda and the national media to provide a set of images linked to events that can clearly illustrate for the masses that the territory, way of life, and even their very identities are in peril from the target population. This incites the masses to join the struggle intellectually, although at a very low consciousness level and later, to join it financially or physically. The success of this politician depends on his ability to discover and display the key images that will appeal directly to the most basic sense of self and most elemental fears. Once this is achieved, the politician can gain official access to the state tools necessary to carry out the planned consolidation of resources on behalf of the masses and at the expense of the target population.

Perceptions of oneself as a member of one society or another, be it a family, a village, or a nation, are essential components of an individual’s sense of identity, his most precious asset. In the framework of ethnic conflict, these perceptions are often manipulated for a particular political outcome. Now, in hindsight, one often wonders how the average

German citizen allowed the horrors of the Holocaust to take place. As enlightened individuals, we all like to think that we would have gone to great lengths to stop the atrocities, or at least not participate. In the case of genocide, the role of propaganda cannot be underestimated. In every case of genocide, and even in lower-level conflicts, propaganda and the use of the media are the primary instruments of turning an aggrieved population into a wall of indifference or an angry mob.

As far back as 1936, propaganda was recognized as a powerful tool for the purpose of inciting war. At that time the League of Nations developed a convention required signatories to ensure that radio broadcasts “shall not constitute an incitement either to war” or “to acts likely to lead thereto.” In August 1945, the Nuremberg Tribunal noted that crimes against peace include “preparation, planning, initiating, or waging” war crimes. “Instigators” were deemed as criminally responsible a “leaders, organizers, and accomplices.” This Tribunal also sentenced German anti-Semitic propagandist Julius Streicher to death for crimes against humanity on that basis alone, finding no evidence that he participated in the Holocaust any other way.<sup>29</sup> Since then, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights struggled in 1961 to include Article 20 which states:

1. Any propaganda of war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

Studies have identified three types of war propaganda: war-mongering is that used to incite armed conflict; subversive is that used to inflame conflicts within an existing political order or across borders; defamatory is recognized as that which is “widely used to excite fears, hatred and passions.”<sup>30</sup> It is difficult to separate these types of propaganda in the case of genocide and typically all three are used together, with the first emphasized to initiate violence and the third to support continuation of violence.

### *The Role Of Crowds*

Understanding the dynamics of crowds and their effect on the individual may help to explain the phenomenon in which bystanders become perpetrators. No matter how unlike its members, a conscious crowd will transform into a homogeneous group and it will act as no individual would in isolation. This is because the human desire for group identity is so ingrained, that the stress and fear of going against the group can overpower the anxiety caused by contemplating wrongful action.

The behavior and movement of crowds is contagious, once joined, it is difficult to break from it and sometimes impossible not to move when and where it does. Within the individual member, it is even more difficult to break emotionally or psychologically from the crowd, as its “rightness” seems above reconsideration by a mere single individual.

Canetti claims that the modern concept of crowds originated with the older and smaller unit of “The Pack.” “Among the small hordes which roam about as bands of ten or twenty men it is the universal expression of communal excitement...Men may press

closely together and enact a 'multitude' in traditional rhythms and movements, but they are not a multitude; they are a few and have to make up in intensity what they lack in actual numbers."<sup>31</sup>

It is highly likely that bands of modern killers move as a pack when perpetrating acts of genocide; with the pack characteristics giving them strength, purpose, and righteousness.<sup>32</sup> This helps to understand how seemingly "normal" average citizens can be incited to become willing participants in heinous acts, fully justified that their perceived offense is justified defense in the face of planned annihilation of THEM by the enemy.

Even in 1895, Gustave LeBon noted that homogeneous crowds are likely to operate like juries and justify criminal acts without sympathy.<sup>33</sup> In 1978, Sam Wright commented on the innate fear of being outcast from the peer group, the village, even the family by noting that, "[t]he very crossing of a space to join a group can become an initiation rite of immense proportion... The cry of "Where do you stand?" can lead to a commitment crisis... Movement out of the group becomes a visible act by reason of having to cross an open space. The resulting cost of being exposed to labeling as a defector and the derision in the situation itself become a consciously manipulated factor."<sup>34</sup> Research has shown that people stand much closer together while waiting in line for an X-rated movie than for a Disney-type film. This has been explained as likely due to a concept of social-binding, seeking the anonymity of a crowd, and "we feelings," among other reasons.<sup>35</sup> Those at

the X-rated film are aware that their action is not above reproach, as in the case of the two political ends of the spectrum on some level realizing that their position is not nuanced enough to be “right,” and so prefer the company of those who reinforce their position, rather than question it. So it is with crowds swayed toward ethnic violence, albeit to a far greater degree.

### **Crowd Power**

According to LeBon, a crowd imparts certain powers to an individual he does not experience on his own. As Staub points out, belonging to a group allows people to give up a “burdensome self” and reject inhibitions. As part of a group, people can more readily open up to emotions of love and acceptance, as well as anger and hate toward outsiders. Groups also offer anonymity and reduce personal responsibility.

LeBon’s initial list includes:

- Sentiment of invincible power
- Anonymity
- Contagion
- “Magnetic influence paralyzes the brain, enslaving the conscious personality so that all feelings and thoughts are bent in the direction determined by the hypnotizer...the individual is no longer conscious of his acts...Those who might resist are too few to struggle against the current.”<sup>36</sup>

### **Crowd Characteristics**

The deficient level of individual consciousness within groups can reduce them to lowest-common denominator emotions and reactions. Crowds and group environments draw in those less accustomed to developed social interaction and drive the whole toward a heightened emotional response and receptivity, sometimes out of all proportion to “normal” reaction to stimuli. This provides the impression of mobs driven into frenzy by a leader’s exhortations. Here LeBon describes this crowd dynamic, “By the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization...An individual in a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will.”<sup>37</sup> The typical crowd characteristics defined by LeBon include:

- Impulsivity, mobility, and irritability
- Suggestibility and credulity
- Exaggeration and ingenuousness of sentiments
- Intolerance, dictatorialness, and conservatism
- Morality: constant respect for certain social conventions and permanent repression of selfish impulses/transitory display of...abnegation, self-sacrifice, disinterestedness, devotion, and the need of equity = the lofty morality of crowds.”

### **Crowd Imagination**

Very simple and direct images are needed for a leader or speaker to connect with a crowd. This is not the forum for the detailed, cogent argument of a courtroom, but for

powerful imagery that connects the speaker as the protector of the crowd's most basic needs and interests. Again LeBon on the imagination of crowds: The figurative imagination of crowds is very powerful, very active, and very susceptible of being keenly impressed...[crowds are] incapable both of reflection and of reasoning, are devoid of the notion of improbability; and it is to be noted that in a general way it is the most improbable things that are the most striking [to a crowd]...it is always the most marvelous and legendary side of events that more specially strike crowds...It is only images that terrify or attract them and become motives of action...A hundred petty crimes or petty accidents will not strike the imagination of crowds in the least, whereas a single crime or a single great accident will profoundly impress them...It is not, then, the facts in themselves that strike the popular imagination, but the way in which they take place and are brought under notice."<sup>38</sup>

LeBon further asserts that "...ideas suggested to crowds...can only exercise influence on condition that they assume a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape...[presented] in the guise of images...not connected by any logical bond of analogy or succession and may [shift over time]...This explains how it is that the most contradictory ideas may be seen to be simultaneously current in crowds."<sup>39</sup>

On the reasoning power of crowds, he observes that "[a]ssociation of dissimilar things possessing a merely apparent connection between each other, and the immediate generalization of particular cases...a chain of logical argumentation is totally

incomprehensible to crowds...An orator in intimate communication with a crowd can evoke images by which it [the crowd] will be seduced.”<sup>40</sup>

Summarizing the effectiveness of the Serb and Croat propaganda machines in 1991-92 in successfully inciting and sustaining genocide, Sweden’s *Psykologiskt Försvar* (Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence, or SPF) notes that “communications in abnormal and extreme situations are characterized by generalizations combined with the use of categories, stereotypes, labeling and value-weighted, emotionally charged attributes...such a categorical mode of expression and labeling makes for a fast, simple and very condensed communication, but one that lacks precision. Deliberations and communications based on categories eradicate possible differences, which result in simplifications and error. Such simplifications can be productive in the short term, especially in abnormal situations, since they ensure the required speed and simple identification. At the same time the effect of categorical patterns of thinking and labeling is still further enhanced by the use of value-weighted and emotional negatively charged characterizations, which possess a powerful mobilizing power.” This is fully in line with Canetti’s characterization of effective communication with crowds.

### *Effects Of Culture On Genocide Participation*

Ervin Staub notes that the goal of any society is the maintenance of its “way of life.”

This requires the creation of institutions that educate young members to successfully preserve and promote it. However, research shows that the existence of such institutions does little to resolve longstanding differences among subgroups. These differences,

therefore, easily intensify when life conditions worsen for the society as a whole or for one subgroup relative to another.

Although morality tends to focus on a belief in justice and the sanctity of human life, this does not have to extend to subgroups in all cases. Staub proposes the example of Athens, which “elevated individual freedom, dignity, human reason, and creativity.” At the same time, such values did not apply to the concept of slavery or to those that were outside the boundary of “Athenian.” This is also true of many of the founders of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, in particular. In addition, the preservation of the group can be seen as overriding the rights of the individual, especially in times of crisis, thus permitting exclusion of certain individuals or types of individuals easier to justify.<sup>41</sup>

Staub convincingly proposes that there are societies more culturally disposed toward genocide than others are. He points out that some societies are more prone to devaluation of outgroups. This can manifest itself in perpetuation of stereotypes in various forms of art and in the media and can be found in discriminatory practices built into social institutions. In the pluralistic United States such devaluation can be found in the widespread notion that it is dangerous to be found “DWB” or “driving while Black,” and that therefore, African Americans are more likely to be stopped by police. In some cases, the ingroup discriminates against an outgroup that is so similar that it is difficult for outsiders to even notice the differences. This occurs in Russia when housing preferences

are given to “true Muscovites,” those who can prove that their family has lived within the environs of Moscow for more than a certain number of generations.

In other instances, outgroups can be created in order to assign blame to them, or to galvanize coherence within the ingroup. Recent US government practices of targeting Muslim Americans for special attention from authorities in the wake of 9/11 might be seen in this light. Changes in societal values due to an internal or external shock may increase the likelihood of outgroup selection. The recent discourse on legislating illegal immigrants to the US, is one such case that, though a dormant issue for decades, has come to the forefront of national attention with increased xenophobia caused by the 9/11 attacks and questions about the success of the war in Iraq. In all cases, selection of an outgroup makes mistreatment more likely. (For a detailed look at the characteristics, conditions, and processes Staub outlines, see *Annex 1: The Origins and Motivational Sources of Mistreatment*)

Ottoman Turkey based its treatment of non-Muslims on certain tracts of the Koran and on its own traditional culture which had always restricted the legal rights of non-Muslims, which included a prohibition against Christians owning guns or riding horses. The 1922 Encyclopedia Britannica noted that as far back as 1571 a foreign observer characterized the Armenians as little more than a tax base for the Empire,<sup>42</sup> creating a long-ingrained devaluation of Armenians in the Ottoman mind. There was in Ottoman culture a deep respect for authority that was combined in the inseparable religious and political

tradition. The abdication of the sultan left the population with a desperate need for an authority figure, as well as someone to blame for their painful new confusing circumstances.

German culture is predisposed toward strong leadership, and a general appreciation for orderliness and organization. After its crushing defeat in World War I, German people tended to feel humiliated as a result of the war losses, the resulting economic collapse resulting from punishing war reparations, combined with heavy effects of the worldwide depression of the early 1930s. Unemployment was at an all-time high, forcing proud laborers to live off government handouts and French occupation of the industrial Ruhr region stung German pride and hindered the ability to recover economically, causing dishonor to those who were unable to uphold long held traditions of order and family security.

All this led to a lack of respect for the Weimar Republic, which was seen as having caved in to the enemy and misled the population about the progress of the war. National pride did not allow Germans to blame Prussian military leaders, or the abdicating Kaiser. This all led to the collective need for a scapegoat. Even those who might not outright care to do harm to Jews appreciated having someone other than themselves or their own history to blame for current circumstances. Removal of Jews from society, therefore, also provided an inspirational ideological hope for the future and an active opportunity to improve the current situation in Germany.

The central theme of Serb victimhood was at the heart of its drive for self-preservation in the

“Serbs win wars, but lose the peace.”

-Interwar Serb saying underscoring the collective myth of victimhood revived by Milošević

early 1990s. Fears that the “Turks” in the form of the Kosovo Albanians or the Bosnian Muslims would displace and destroy them were the moving force of Serb mobilization and destructiveness. In another paranoid message, Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić assured journalist Misha Glenny in January 1992 that Croatian independence was tantamount to Nazi German resurgence in the region, reviving a “German compulsion to rule Europe.” “Munich,” Mladić claimed, “is being repeated all over and this time at the expense of the Serbs. But we will not roll over.” As Glenny reports, many Serbs shared his “phobia,” and this is what made Serb propaganda that hearkened back to Nazi atrocities perpetrated via Croatian (*Ustaši*) agents in World War II an effective tool for whipping up Serb anti-Croat sentiment at the end of the Twentieth Century.<sup>43</sup> These images were used to define and warrant Milošević’s vision of a “Greater Serbia” in which all the disparate enclaves of Serbs currently spread throughout Yugoslavia would come together within a single (much larger) Serbian state that would encompass much of the territory that also included a number of other nationalities, such as the Croatian *Krajina* and much of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is commonly stated that Rwanda poses a “culture of obedience.” This is often cited as a reason for the ease with which the genocide appeared to be executed. In *The Graves Are Not Yet Full*, journalist Bill Berkeley focuses on the perpetrators of Africa’s greatest

crimes, in order to understand the culture and history of such events. In each case under scrutiny, Berkeley compares the leading actors whose political maneuverings, corruption, and ineptitude appear to be the causes of violence. “It is a phenomenon that runs like poison through all of Africa’s seemingly senseless wars: Big Men using little men, cynically maneuvering for power and booty while thousands perish.” In terms of the Rwandan genocide Berkeley writes, “This was the culture of obedience, chillingly illuminated, at the very heart of Rwanda’s darkness. . . It goes a long way toward explaining the velocity of a mass slaughter that was orchestrated on high but implemented by tens of thousands of ordinary civilians at the grass roots”<sup>44</sup> Further he blames the leaders for misusing power, rather than the masses for their inherent weaknesses, “All of Africa’s ethnic conflicts start at the top and spread downward,” he states. “People hungry for power use violence as a means of achieving it. They use ethnicity to mobilize constituencies—above all, the militias they need to vanquish their foes and protect themselves.”<sup>45</sup>

It has been widely observed that the average Rwandan tends to look toward elites for cues on how to formulate opinions and determine courses of action. Leaders in the Church, for instance, were instrumental in both inciting Hutus toward violence and luring Tutsis to churches for safe haven, which often became sites of massacres, rather than sanctuary.<sup>46</sup> A primary illustration of the absolute faith Christian rural pastors placed in their superiors is the title of Phillip Gourevitch’s book, “We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families.” This title comes from a letter signed

by seven rural pastors requesting assistance from their senior pastor, who was actually in league with Hutu Power and assisted in the massacre of these Tutsi pastors and their congregations. (For the full text of this letter, see *Annex III: Additional Information/Documents.*)

If we accept Staub's premise that some "cultural-societal characteristics" predispose a people toward genocide, a number of factors inherent within that society increase the likelihood of success of this process. One of these is a local inclination to conspiracy theories.<sup>47</sup> In such societies, the key to attracting adherents through nationalist propaganda is to "persuade people that the security of their identity, way of living, and perhaps even person lay within their national identity. As terrorists reason, elemental fears were to force people to take sides." This can then feed the need to convince the majority of the population and the outside world of the impossibility of living together.<sup>48</sup>

A 25 March 1915 telegram from the Committee of Young Turks who orchestrated the Armenian genocide encouraged regional governor, Jemal Bey, that "It is the duty of all of us to effect on the broadest lines the realization of the noble project of wiping out of existence the well-known elements who have for centuries been constituting a barrier to the empire's progress in civilization."<sup>49</sup> Such powerful imagery was easy to digest after centuries of preparation and scapegoating that permitted Ottomans to avoid looking within to discover the failings of their own nation.

Anti-Semitism had a long tradition in Europe as far back as the Middle Ages, when religious and hygiene practices enabled a larger proportion of Jews to escape the plague, they were accused of causing it. The psychological and economic depression rampant in post-war Germany was ripe for the resurrection of conspiracy theories about Jews. That they had killed Christ was an indisputable fact, along with the belief that they used the blood of non-Jewish children in their Passover feasts (*à la* lamb's blood smeared on lintels to spare Jews from the wrath of God visited upon the Egyptians), after all, it was clearly written in the Bible. Therefore, blaming those who were not economically disadvantaged and those who tended to keep themselves apart, with the added bonus of being "Christ-killers" in a society that saw itself as the inheritor of the Holy Roman Empire, was no difficult task.

Napoleon's preferential treatment of Jews had led to certain "privileges" considered traitorous by Germans. The longstanding prohibition of Jews from landowning and other professions, as well as their heavy emphasis on education, had led the majority of Jews into the law, banking, or medicine. Successful practitioners were scorned as "parasites" that took all the good jobs and seemed less affected by the economic deprivations throughout Germany. Bankers were considered thieves who stole from their debtors, lawyers were distrusted as the law was complex and difficult for the uneducated German to understand, and doctors were seen as detrimental to patients' health in some cases.

Philip Gourevitch reports meeting many Rwandans who tell him that he cannot understand Rwanda and the genocide without understanding the culture of the people. In order to do this, he is told, he must recognize that theirs is a culture of dishonesty, with one man claiming, “We have a habit of secrecy and suspicion.” Many there say it is typical for the average Rwandan to cheat and obscure the truth even with his closest associates and family. Other Rwandans suggest that dishonesty is not a cultural trait but rather a common political tactic in the country.<sup>50</sup> Whether or not this is truly the culture of Rwandans, if enough of them believe that it is, such suspicion is likely to engender a culture tending toward violent conflict resolution, rather than constructive dialogue, if no side in any dispute can ever trust the other.

In the case of Yugoslavia, polls in 1990-91 showed the majority of the population unlikely to vote for dissolution of the nation along ethnic republican lines. Therefore, nationalist politicians had to convince their populations that they were under threat from another ethnic group, in order to shore up their own personal power within their republic. To do this they drew upon various historical examples and even local disputes to show that there was reason to fear the other. According to Woodward, such threats and warnings of plots easily “played upon a local inclination to conspiracy theories and on growing economic insecurity and rapidly shifting, uncertain political conditions...[that created a] collective paranoia that was self-perpetuating.”

Woodward defines a lack of “tolerance or institutionalized pluralism” in a society as another societal characteristic likely to engender a culture of genocide: “Political nationalism defines the rights of membership itself: black and white, in or out; on this one defining trait it cannot compromise...the goal of nationalist politicians is to use the coercive instruments of the state to enforce that principle.”<sup>51</sup>

The Ottoman Empire was an absolute theocracy, with Islamic law requiring the masses to obey the sultan and all his dictates and emissaries. The society was rigidly hierarchical and leaders of the genocide and of previous massacres repeatedly told their subordinates that they would take full responsibility for the actions of all, thus absolving any recalcitrant participants of fear of reprisal.<sup>52</sup>

The rise of the communist movement in the 1920s and 30s was disconcerting to Germans who had no wish to see “the state” whither away and who saw Jews leading the Bolshevik charge with growing alarm. The advent of democracy also conflicted with German preference for a strong centralized authority and further weakened the Republic’s ability to maintain popular power. The Nazi movement combined German national pride with social programs intended to assist those who had been harmed economically in the war. This appealed to the average German without requiring the undertones of anti-Semitism. For some, the addition of a scapegoat and a plan of what to do with it were also comforting. For these, racial purity was an acceptable battle cry that eventually, coupled with the other appealing aspects of Nazism, found resonance with the

majority. Promotion of an outgroup concept also strengthened the bonds of the ingroup, enabling Germans to regain the cohesive sense of the *Volk*, an unconquerable master race.

Gourevitch notes that Rwandans needed to overcome the “‘old mentalities’ of colonialism and dictatorship and the perfect pecking order of intimidation and obedience that had served as the engine of genocide.” He further notes that these mentalities had been “internalized in the reflexive habits of a lifetime’s experiences and expectations of brutality: us or them; kill or be killed.”<sup>53</sup>

In Yugoslavia, national political leaders seeking to carve out new independent republics had to draw on the desire for political loyalty to a nation, rather than to a village or to kinship, found the best method was to play on the ethnic component of identity and nationalize it, gaining support from those who were uncertain. Slobodan Milošević did this with great success by focusing on the idea that Serbs had been victims of other nations since Ottoman times, and as Serb victimhood became more virulent, threatening other ethnic groups in the abstract, those groups in turn, took measures to restrict Serb access to authority, thus justifying Milošević’s claims.<sup>54</sup>

It is not the intention of this study to dwell on the aspects of the victim’s culture that attract genocidal tendencies but Vahakn Dadrian notes poignantly that the Armenian and Jewish cultures share an “inner toughness” that belies their apparent passivity to

oppression that enables them to retain their distinct cultural characteristics and resists assimilation. The same can be said of Slavic Muslims, as they have not converted to Christianity in the 600 years they have coexisted as a religious minority in Southern Europe. In Rwanda, a common cultural myth among both groups is that Tutsis descended from Ethiopian aristocracy and are thus more reserved and dignified. It is true that they consume milk as hereditary herdsmen, unlike Hutus, and despite centuries of intermingling, their very physical appearance (taller, paler, more slender, and finer featured) marks Tutsis as “different” from Hutus. Retaining these cultural and physical differences in the face of oppression is deemed “cultural assertiveness” and if the majority group is lashing out from insecurity, it is only more likely to target those who resist.<sup>55</sup>

### **Imagery And Demagoguery: Beating The Drum**

Complete control of the media is essential for the process of co-opting and corrupting nationalist sentiment and turning it from a positive expression of cultural or religious identity, into a war cry. As Canetti put it, “An investigation of customs, traditions, politics, and literature, could be thorough and still not touch the distinctive character of a nation, that which, when it goes to war, becomes its *faith*. Thus, nations are regarded here as though they were religions; and they do in fact tend to turn into something resembling religions from time to time. The germ is always latent in them, becoming active in times of war.”<sup>56</sup>

A nationalist political strategy, as opposed to benign ethnic pride, is an inherently exclusivist ideology. As Susan Woodward observes, “In a world of competing symbols and personalities at a point of political transition, nationalism has a particular advantage. The message is simple and can be largely emotional. It relies on the familiar, using little time or money to develop a new political language appropriate to the new times of democratic governance or to communicate and explain the complexities of policy for an entire social and economic transformation. Nationalist appeals thus provide the easiest route to political visibility for politicians without established constituencies and party organizations and makes no demands on first developing party platforms...As an alternative to the immediate regime, nationalism reaches into the nonpolitical aspects of contemporary life – cultural identities, historical memories, alternative social networks, and organizations that are already present in society...gathering into its fold all forms of reaction – from those in genuine opposition, those politically excluded from the previous regime, to opportunists – regardless of their substantive policy positions.”<sup>57</sup>

Elias Canetti saw nationalism emerging as a form a faith, endowed with all the potentially positive characteristics one imagines in the context of religious faith. He also intends the sense of the fanatic’s faith that can drive an individual or a group to violence: “Every member of a nation always sees himself, or his picture of himself, in a fixed relationship to the particular symbol which has become the most important for his nation. In its periodic reappearance when the moment demands it lies the continuity of national feeling.”<sup>58</sup>

Genocide is typically presaged by the emergence of a demagogue or political cadre that effectively employs rhetoric filled with imagery related to the group's idealization of its own destiny. This kind of leader or cadre can also tap into a collective sense of the current or historical limits placed on its ability to increase in greatness by the targeted group. The effective political movement must be able to gather support through use of this image-filled rhetoric that engages receptive crowds. Close observation of such emergent leaders or parties, focused on the kind of images and rhetoric used to rally support is likely to provide a reliable indicator of an impending genocide.

LeBon wrote of this phenomenon in 1895, "As soon as a certain number of living beings are gathered together, whether they be animals or men, they place themselves instinctively under the authority of a chief...A crowd is a servile flock that is incapable of ever doing without a master...The leader has most often started as one of the led. He has himself been hypnotized by the idea, whose apostle he has since become. It has possession of him to such a degree that everything outside it vanishes, and that every contrary opinion appears to him an error or a superstition...The leaders we speak of are more frequently men of action than thinkers. They are not gifted with keen foresight, nor could they be, as this quality conduces to doubt and inactivity...The intensity of their faith gives great power of suggestion to their words...Men gathered in a crowd lose all force of will, and turn instinctively to the person who possesses the quality they lack...These leaders are often subtle rhetoricians, seeking only their own personal interest and endeavoring to persuade by flattering base instincts...of all the forces at the disposal

of humanity, faith has always been one of the most tremendous...The great events of history have been brought about by obscure believers, who have had little beyond their faith in their favor.”<sup>59</sup>

The demagogue embellishes on the “national” need to believe in the inherent greatness of one’s own country and its natural ability to increase (in landmass, population, wealth, etc.). He uses imagery that invokes the nation’s dearest symbols and vaguely defines the enemy that is hindering the nation’s ability to increase. Once this enemy begins to be identified in rallying speeches, the target of potential genocide is clear. Only annihilation of this limiting group can lead to the national destiny of increase and greatness. Beyond this, the target group can be maligned in myriad ways, as territorial usurpers, or traitors collaborating with other enemies, or some mythical cult waiting for the preordained moment to rise up and swallow the population whole. Therefore, detention of the target group’s leaders, destruction of its cultural symbols and other property, and eventually its annihilation are perceived as justifiable self-defensive acts. Vahakn N. Dadrian notes that, “[c]entral to these preparatory instigations is the common decrial of the targeted victim groups as “internal enemies” seen as being in league with foreign enemies. In all of these cases the victims had to be vilified, degraded, and disenfranchised.”<sup>60</sup>

### *Peasant Cultivator Image*

A shared element of genocide cases is the universal idealization of the peasant cultivator. Although often considered evidence of neo-communist views of the shared right of the primary ethnic group to possession of the homeland, this is more likely tied to reverence

of the land as a central conceptual element of nationalism. Cultivating peasants are clearly the stewards of the national territory.

Susan Woodward bolsters this theory with more practical assertions that nationalist rhetoric is more easily accepted by those in rural areas because they are dependent upon internal production of resources and not as well integrated into the trade and external ties that exist in more urban and frontier regions. These areas are also more closely tied to the village through kinship, a more homogenous ethnicity, and to more traditional values and historical precedents. Those that instigate nationalist divisions tend to have a larger agrarian sector with the economic importance of land and natural resources higher. These areas also tend to have higher unemployment and lack the “multiple allegiances and moderating attachments” more common to urban dwellers, thus greater insecurities allow political polarization to grow more quickly, more easily marginalizing moderate elements.<sup>61</sup>

Yusuf Akçura, the Young Turk movement’s chief propagandist, considered Turkish peasants the basis of the Turkish nation, with the movement’s leadership proposing changes that would improve the lives of peasants first and foremost. At the time it was considered “vital to save the peasant from the feudal lords.”<sup>62</sup>

A major concept of Nazi ideology was *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) emphasizing the importance of race and territory as the sacred tenets of Germanness. In addition to



Typical German Nazi  
pastoral icon (1942)  
<http://www.thirdreichruins.com/kunsthaus1.htm>

denigrating other races to prove the supremacy of the Aryans, German soil (never mind who currently happened to be occupying any part of it) was considered sacred. Peasant values were idealized with Hitler declaring the farmer “the most important participant” in the Nazi movement. Himmler promoted the ideal of the “primeval German peasant warrior and farmer” and the “yeoman of his own acre is the backbone of the German people’s strength and character.” Martin Bormann, Nazi Party chancellor agreed, romanticizing the “superior virtue of rural life.” To further drive home the point, the German agricultural minister proclaimed that “the German man emerged from the German peasantry...with an unparalleled tenacity, knew how to preserve its unique character and its customs against every attempt to wipe them out...One can say that the blood of a people digs its roots deep into the homeland earth.”<sup>63</sup>

In Rwanda, the Tutsis had been singled out by German and later Belgian colonial rulers for elite status, due to their more European-looking appearance and reserved nature, gaining coveted political appointments and civil service positions in far greater numbers than Hutus. They were also traditionally herdsman, with the Hutus the land cultivators. Traditionally there had been three types of chiefs in Rwandan society, with the “land chief” usually Hutu. Belgian colonists however changed this system, centralizing provincial chieftainship into a single personage, most often a Tutsi. By 1959 only two

of 45 chiefs were Hutu.<sup>64</sup> Reversal of Tutsi dominance justified the periodic pre-genocidal massacres from 1973 with President Habyarimana claiming, “We want to fight this form of intellectual bourgeoisie and give all kinds of physical labor its value back...our food strategy gives absolute priority to our peasants...the government always takes care of the peasant families...the essential productive forces of our country.”

This focus on the idealization of peasant life further enabled vilification of the target group. Armenians and Jews were traditionally restricted from the right to own agricultural property and were primarily stereotyped as merchants living in set locations within cities where trade took place. This dichotomy allowed Hitler to pointedly proclaim that, “a nation can exist without cities, but... a nation cannot exist without farmers.”

Serb nationalists also favored an idyllic vision of the Serb peasant farmer and demonized Muslim city-dwellers: “The solid peasant from rural areas, especially from the “Serbian heartland” of Sumadija, came to define the ideal of national identity. In contrast, a view of urban life and culture as unnatural and dishonest came to be promoted.”<sup>65</sup>

The Rwandan king, or Mwami, historically Tutsi and supported by a Tutsi court, was the simplest administrative link for the colonial Germans and Belgians, who then tended to favor the Tutsis for civil service positions as well as educational patronage which led to a larger proportion of them in professional occupations and therefore, to live in more urban

areas. This kind of cultivation imagery also simplified the message for the less educated, rural dwelling members of society who may not have often come into contact with members of the target group, with Hutu Power for example, referring to the slaughter of Tutsi women and children as “pulling out the roots of the bad weeds,” a metaphor easily understood by all.

### *Threat to Nationalist Central Self-Image*

The self-image of the nationalist power is typically at a low point at the start of planning for genocide. Such events are typically presaged by an extreme loss of territory or prestige: loss of Empire in the case of the Ottoman Turks, a great military defeat, as in the case of post-World War I Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union suddenly and drastically reduced the value of Yugoslavia as an East-West bridge, and the impending implementation of the Arusha Accords threatened a loss of power for the dominant Hutu faction in Rwanda.

### **Ottoman Turks, 1915**

The Turks saw themselves as Mohammad’s descendants who had succeeded in bringing Islam all the way to Europe. Faith in the righteousness of this religious philosophy and the administrative power of the sultanate, in addition to the mass of territory controlled by the Turks created a sense of infallibility and great warrior mystique that was precious to the Turkish national self-image. The dissolution of this Empire was caused by rot from within and by the rise of western power without. However, this reality required Turks to look inside themselves to discover the source of their loss. The cognitive

dissonance this causes a nation is often too difficult to bear and finding an enemy to blame is a more palatable alternative. The losses incurred during World War I, as European powers scrapped like hungry dogs over the dregs of the Empire were too horrific to bear and resulted in powerful internal factions straining to hang on to any of the shreds of Empire that they could. This also drove proud military and political factions to destroy that which seemed to be the cause of all the trouble before it was too late.

Dr. Mehmed Nazim and Dr. Behaeddin Şakir, both members of the Central Committee, are considered the chief architects of the 1915 Armenian genocide. Details of the planning of the genocide have been pieced together from a series of letters from 1906-07 signed by the two, declaring the Armenians to be the arch-enemies of Turkish Muslims and that they were to be “dealt with accordingly.” At the 1910 Saloniki Congress (from this meeting issued the blueprint for the genocide, see *Declarations and Manifestos* for more information) Dr. Nazim was seen as the most influential of provincial delegates and to be the most vocal in calling for “Turkifying” Ottoman territory. Both doctors were sentenced to death by a 1919 Turkish Court Martial.<sup>66</sup>

### **Nazi Germany**

The Germans also viewed their nation as a strong, orderly, warrior people; the disastrous results of World War I and the depression led to a reduced national self-image of a desperate and down-trodden people that was unacceptable. Nazi propaganda pointed

toward a 2,000-year long history of strength and military culture and even in the last days the end was near, the propaganda machine puffed along, with schemes such as sending propagandists into public spaces and transportation to have a loud dialogue that always ended in the doubter being reaffirmed in the rightness of the cause and the assurance of victory.<sup>67</sup>

In his memoir, *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle), Adolf Hitler reports having the same sense of “Germanness” and the feeling of being part of a great national undertaking, recalling, “those hours [at the demonstration] appeared like a redemption from the annoying moods of my youth.” He further reports that he



Hitler at August 1914 demonstrations – a clearly impassioned young man imbued, like other Germans, with the righteousness of a “Greater Germany”  
<http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/riseofhitler/odeon.htm>


“thanked Heaven out of my overflowing heart that it had granted me the good fortune of being allowed to live in these times.” Harkening back to the “August Days” of 1914 when Germans gathered in Munich to hear the decision to support Austria-Hungary and declare war on Serbia and Russia after the assassination of the Archduke, Germans recall feeling truly part of one nation. These images became a large part of the appeal of the National Socialist Party to the German nation. The images of 1914 represented German strength, unity, and self-sacrifice that Germans felt lacking from their national landscape in the 1920s and early 1930s. The actual moment in history and the photograph of

Hitler's euphoria in the crowd (above right) helped to transform the follower into the leader of a new national movement.<sup>68</sup>

Hitler's appeal had three components: racial purity, nationalism, which united ethnic pride with the need for and inherent right to increased *Lebensraum* (living space), plus the leadership principle, in which Germans and the German state would unquestioningly obey the Führer. This combination of ideals appealed directly to the Germans' sense of self as a strong nation with a large and prosperous land area united under strong leadership. With his intentions for "lesser peoples" thinly masked while gaining power, Hitler was a perfect storm of charisma and guiding principle needed by downtrodden Germans in post-World War I Europe. Despite official Nazi press announcements that Hitler had "fallen at his command post in the Reich Chancery fighting to the last breath against Bolshevism and for Germany,"<sup>69</sup> he had seen the tide was turning against the Nazis with the Allied invasion and swift march across Europe and took his own life with a cyanide capsule in his secured bunker on 30 April 1945.

### **Greater Serbia, 1990s**

The Serb national image, sadly, is one of victimhood. The Serb loss to Ottoman Turks in 1389 on the Field of Blackbirds (or *Kosovo Polje*) is considered the single most celebrated day in Serb history. As the Soviet Union collapsed, and with it ended the Yugoslav "special relationship" to the West and needed subsidies from the USSR, Serb morale plummeted as the Yugoslav republic dissolved into competing states that all saw



Milošević as Hitler

<http://members.surfeu.at/ist.krieg/ist.krieg/HiMi.jpg>

the Serbs as an unworthy dominating force. The symbolic transfer of national animosity toward the Ottoman Turks to Bosnian Muslims was not difficult to achieve. In Serbia, Slobodan Milošević began consolidating his control over the media as he came to power in 1988. By 1991 Serbia's parliamentary Assembly passed a law giving the state a monopoly over RTV Serbia, later called "the lie factory."<sup>70</sup> Beginning in 1989, Milošević began to incite crowds with the need for Serb unity to "save" them from "enemies" and later provided true (and other) instances in which Serbs were being let go from civil service positions and political appointments all over Yugoslavia. He positioned himself as the only one who cared about their plight and as the leader who could preserve the Serb "nation" from extinction by those who sought her demise.

By 1991 as his nationalist rhetoric reached a fever pitch and the Serbs in Croatia appeared threatened with separation from Serbia proper, the necessary elements of war were already mobilized. The Serb leadership also appealed to European countries not to allow an independent Bosnian state, claiming that just as the Serbs had protected western civilization from Ottoman encroachment, they would now save Europe from rising Islamic fundamentalism. Serbs also emphasized the statistically higher birthrates of Muslim Kosovars and Bosnians that "threatened" the European complexion of Yugoslavia. Milošević dusted off the old Serb symbol of a cross with four "Cs" in each corner that stands for "Only Unity Can Save the Serbs (*Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava*)."

This soon came to have an ominous meaning for Serb enemies similar to the Nazi swastika. Milošević's other battle cry was that "No one will be permitted to beat you," and "No one will ever humiliate the Serbian people again;" yet another allusion to the painful losses in the Serb collective past, placing Milošević as the obvious protector of Serb interests and the nation's very identity.<sup>71</sup> Milošević was brought



**Serb nationalist symbol: Only Unity Can Save the Serbs (Srpski Štoper Štoper Štoper)**  
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/serb/241414>

before the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague in 2001 and was on trial at the time of his death on 11 March 2006. He died in his cell and speculations abound that he was poisoned or denied medical treatment despite official autopsies that confirm death by natural causes.

### **Rwanda 1994**

Although massacres of Tutsis had taken place every few years since independence in 1960, they occurred with more frequency and ferocity from the installation of Juvenal Habyarimana as president in 1973. Despite the fact that his administration was decidedly anti-Tutsi, his pro-Hutu credentials came into question by radical elements by spring 1993 when, after successful insurrections by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a paramilitary group composed primarily of exiled Tutsis, resulted in a peace process brokered by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the US, France, and Belgium assisting. These Arusha Accords, as the peace plan was called, provided a mechanism for power-sharing among the government, the RPF, and a bloc of other political parties

intended to ensure checks on each other's power. Habyarimana resisted finalizing and implementing the agreements until France threatened to cut funding for Rwanda. Once forced to implement the Accords, Habyarimana became the enemy of the radical Hutu elements that feared loss of power.<sup>72</sup> These elements coalesced into a political-paramilitary movement called Hutu Power led by military officers who would be downsized by the agreement, in particular a retired Colonel Bagosora, and those close to the president's wife, Agathe, a princess from a northern Hutu tribe, purported to compose an inner circle called the *akazu*, that held the true power behind Habyarimana's throne.

Hutu Power believed that Hutus had only just achieved their rightful dominant place in Rwanda in 1960, once colonial powers had left, thus depriving Tutsis of their historical patrons. They had no intention of forfeiting that dominance so quickly. Once Habyarimana began to appear as a traitor to these radicals, he became part of the problem and Hutu Power propagandists caricatured him as an "Uncle Tom" and sounded death threats against him.

The primary propagandist of the Hutu Power movement was Hassan Ngeze who first



Hassan Ngeze on trial for war crimes in 1997  
<http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p107.html>

served as editor of the newspaper *Kangura* from 1990 and then from 1993 as the leading talk show host on *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills, RTLM).

Both ventures were funded by the Rwandan Interior Ministry and privately by the *akazu* in

order to exacerbate divisions between Hutus and Tutsis and incite hate. He was prosecuted after the genocide and has been condemned by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to life in prison.<sup>73</sup>

### *Naming the Enemy*

A traditional military culture caused Turks to devalue professions in trade, finance, and other professional occupations, providing well-educated Armenians with opportunities in the civil service and to create a merchant class. Other foreigners appreciated their work ethic and good reputation and preferred them over Turks in trade, causing many Armenian families to become quite wealthy. This allowed the Turks to portray Armenians as “cunning and treacherous, and as parasites, exploiters who plotted against Turks.”<sup>74</sup>

The Armenians resisted Turkish oppression and often appealed to their trading partners and outside powers for help. This led to characterizations of treachery and that they were foreign agents working to undermine the Ottoman regime, which, by the time of the 1915 genocide, was an easy case as the Empire had basically dissolved and the Turks needed some one to blame. By the



Characterization of foreign powers' interest in helping Armenians

<http://www.straightdope.com/art/2005/050520.gif>

end of World War I, Turkish writing described Armenians as “instruments of foreign agitation, tools of European powers, an avenue for their mingling in the internal affairs of Turkey, and for pursuing their designs on the empire.”<sup>75</sup>

The official Nazi view of Jews is strikingly similar to the Turkish view of Armenians. Jews were also called “parasites” or “pests” as they were not land cultivators and were primarily better educated members of the professional, scientific, and civil service class. The emphasis on money lending made Jewish bankers appear as thieves when they charged interest for loans and in the depression era of post-war Germany, many Germans were deeply in debt to Jewish financiers, thus removing Jews from this type of occupation allowed Germans to renege on their debts and so many looked on the increasing hostility with which Jews were treated as justifiable and in their own interest. As Jews typically held better jobs, societal stereotyping that they were stealing opportunities from Germans economically was also an easy sell.

Harkening back to the 1389 defeat of Serbia by the Ottoman Empire, which caused Serbia to fall under eastern, rather than western influence, and thus lag in progress behind eastern European Slavic states, Milošević easily superimposed World War II images of Turkish soldiers kicking dogs and shooting civilians onto contemporary figurative Bosnian Muslims. This created a sense of fear among the Serb population that the Muslim “Turks” as they referred to the Bosnians, were capable of and intent upon enslaving Serbia once again and keeping it from its reunion with Christian Europe.<sup>76</sup> One

tract that made the rounds of the Serb army in 1992 and was clearly intended to inspire soldiers to avenge past wounds read: “Under the warm sun of the Balkans, they have spit-roasted people, they have run bayonets through the bodies of children, to add to the folklore of the enemies of Serbian people.”<sup>77</sup>

Like the Armenians and the Jews, Hutu Power characterized Tutsis as “parasites,” as they too held the preponderance of civil service and professional positions due to their elite status under the colonial powers and therefore, their greater access to and emphasis on education. More typically they were called “cockroaches,” ironically a name that exiled Tutsi fighters in the 1960s gave themselves, for their stealth and the belief that they were “uncrushable.” This referred to cross-border attacks by Tutsi insurgents defending against sporadic massacres of Tutsis under dictatorial President Kayibanda who periodically encouraged Hutus to kill Tutsis, by many accounts merely to distract from his own ineffectuality, which would then incite retaliatory Tutsi violence and provide a pretext for the next purge.<sup>78</sup>

“Colonel Déogratias Nsabimana, chief of staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces warned the men under his command that the enemy was still intent on taking power and would do so at any price. Emphasizing that they were not to put their faith in negotiations and that they must really “understand what kind of enemy” they were fighting, he circulated a report from a military commission on 21 September 1992 that had examined ways to defeat the enemy. He said the soldiers were to pay particular attention to the parts of the

document that defined and identified the enemy and the milieu from which he was recruited. The report divided the enemy into two categories, the principal enemy and partisans of the enemy. The principal enemy was: “the Tutsi inside or outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have NEVER recognized and will NEVER recognize the realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to reconquer power by all means necessary, including arms.”<sup>79</sup>

The massacres of the early 1990s were also typically preceded by political “consciousness raising” meetings in the villages where local authorities would describe Tutsis as “‘devils – horns, hoofs, tails and all’ and gave the order to kill them.”<sup>80</sup>

### *First Death Image*

Poet Dylan Thomas noted in 1946 “After the first death, there is no other.”<sup>81</sup> Even Josef Stalin, often himself considered an architect of genocide stated, “The death of one man is a tragedy. The death of millions is a statistic.”<sup>82</sup> “First death” imagery is one of the most powerful catalysts to violence, lending righteousness to the offensive attack and killing spree, turning it into a necessary act of self-defense in the face of the enemy’s undeniable planned annihilation of the nation.

Elias Canetti treated this concept substantially, observing that “It is the *first* death which infects everyone with the feeling of being threatened. It is impossible to overrate the part played by the first dead man in the kindling of wars. Rulers who want to unleash war know very well that they must procure or invent a first victim. It need not be anyone of

particular importance, and can even be someone quite unknown. Nothing matters except his death; and it must be believed that the enemy is responsible for this. Every possible cause of his death is suppressed except one: his membership of the group to which one belongs oneself.”<sup>83</sup> Canetti further notes that “War is kindled by the death of one man, or at most, a few; but it leads to the death of tremendous numbers. The lament for these, when victory has been won, is very subdued in comparison with the original lament. Victory is felt to be a decisive decrease of the enemy, if not his annihilation, and it reduces the impetus of the lament for one’s own dead. They have been sent as a vanguard into the land of the dead and have drawn many more of the enemy after them. Thus they have disburdened their people of that fear without which they would not have gone to war.”<sup>84</sup>

The insurrection at Van on 20 April 1915 is the first instance from the period in which the Turks sustained casualties as they attacked the Armenians. Eighteen Turkish soldiers were killed when locals resisted Turkish efforts to deport Armenians and destroy the town, thus providing the impetus for rounding up Armenian intellectuals and opposition figures later that night. This event was a blow to the pride and confidence of the Turkish military and gave the Turkish propaganda machine fuel for its attack on the “traitorous” Armenians, as well as encouraged the Turks to resume deportations and massacres with renewed fury.<sup>85</sup>

It is difficult to determine the first death image for Nazi Germany, but perhaps in the pervasive use of imagery from August 1914, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand is the most profound first death image for this case. If the August 1914 declaration of war on Serbia and Russia, with Slavs being “lesser nations” in the German nationalist mindset, this is surely a galvanizing moment for the Nazi movement.

The first Serbian fatality occurred on 9 March 1991 during a demonstration in Belgrade when an 18-year old student, Branivoje Milinović, was accidentally killed by a Serb policeman. His parents say he was only going to buy cassette tapes.<sup>86</sup> However, later street demonstrations culminated in the laying of flowers on Milinović’s grave.



Wreckage of Habyarimana’s Plane

<http://www.cmo.nl/conflictenbank/index.php?Afrika:Grote-Merengebied:Rwanda>

The first death in the 1994 Rwandan genocide around which militant Hutus could rally is the assassination of Hutu President Habyarimana. His plane was shot down on the evening of 6 April 1994 and the Hutu massacres of Tutsis began in the capital within hours.

Although the perpetrators of Habyarimana’s death are still in dispute, Hutu Power could easily claim at

the time (and did) that Tutsis were responsible and that the massacre of Tutsis that ensued was a justifiable act of self-defense in the face of an obvious coup by Tutsis in league with the RPF.

### Public Blueprints Of Genocide: Declarations And Manifestos

Despite the fact that the outside world seems to constantly be surprised by outbreaks of genocide, they are typically preceded by sporadic lower-level violent episodes as well as by a blueprint or manifesto made public far in advance by the perpetrators. Often these documents clearly outline what is intended and to whom. Often there is a party conference, which may be public or secret, in which the leading members make the decision to perpetrate the genocide and may even design the process. Even if the proceedings of this conference are not revealed *in toto*, the outcome of the discussion is generally made public with a declaration of who is “with” and who “against” and what one is required to be or to do in order to become or remain part of the ingroup. (All but the Ottoman plan, (which was never written clearly in one place, but alluded to in telegrams, letters, and speeches) are reproduced in their entirety in *Annex II: Declarations and Manifestos*.)

The blueprint for the Armenian genocide appears to have been drafted at the 1-12 November 1910 Saloniki Congress, with the principles reiterated at the 1911 Congress. A cleverly concealed plan of “Turkification” was sealed at these congresses within a public program of “Ottomanizing,” meaning upholding the constitutional rights of non-Muslim minorities while plotting massive deportations of Armenians from six provinces under Dr. Nazim’s jurisdiction; this even included allocating a budget for the process under the cover of a Muslim resettlement program. The Central Committee was a clique of eight, the inner circle of the radical wing of the *Ittihad* party, and the primary organizer of the Armenian genocide. Such secretive and oligarchic groups and agendas were not

uncommon in the Ottoman court, so they were easily able to operate without widespread detection. The *Ittihad* leader, Mehmed Talât, even stated outright that the “goals of the party, especially with respect to the provinces, could not be attained unless the provincial officials of the government were kept “in ignorance.” The entire process was initiated by a speech made by Talât to the *Ittihad* several weeks before the 1910 Congress in which he is quoted as saying, “You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution equality of Mussulman and Ghiaur [infidel, a derogatory label applied to non-Muslims] was affirmed, but you one and all know and feel that this is an unrealizable ideal. The Sheriat [the religious laws of Islam], our whole past history and the sentiment of hundreds of thousands of Mussulmans and even the sentiments of the Giaurs themselves...present an impenetrable barrier to the establishment of real equality... There can therefore be no question of equality until we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the Empire.”<sup>87</sup>

Hitler’s 1924 memoir, *Mein Kampf*, provided a very clear blueprint of his plans for the Jews and other “lesser” peoples in the name of purification of the German homeland.<sup>88</sup> In volume one Hitler notes that “He [the Jew] is and remains the typical parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a favorable medium invites him. And the effect of his existence is also like that of spongers: wherever he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer period... Anyone who examines the historical development of the last hundred years from the standpoint of this book will at once understand the screaming of the Jewish press. For once this book has become the common property of a people, the Jewish menace may be considered as broken.”<sup>89</sup>

In volume two Hitler provides a precise plan for extermination: “As the leadership of our destinies has, since the end of the War, been quite openly furnished by Jews, we really cannot assume that faulty knowledge alone is the cause of our misfortune; we must, on the contrary, hold the conviction that conscious purpose is destroying our nation. And once we examine the apparent madness of our nation's leadership in the field of foreign affairs from this standpoint, it is revealed as the subtlest, ice-cold logic, in the service of the Jewish idea and struggle for world conquest... If at the beginning of the War and during the War twelve or fifteen thousand of these Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas, as happened to hundreds of thousands of our very best German workers in the field, the sacrifice of millions at the front would not have been in vain. On the contrary: twelve thousand scoundrels eliminated in time might have saved the lives of a million real Germans, valuable for the future.”<sup>90</sup>

The September 1935 Nuremberg Laws codified and “legitimized” the unofficial policies increasingly enacted against Jews in Nazi Germany. These articles stated that only Germans could be citizens thus excluding Jews and others. They defined Jewishness, based on ancestry, as the basis for exclusion from citizenship, the right to vote, and from holding public office. They also provide options for future exclusions.

The document most widely viewed as the architectural framework of the aggressive Greater Serbia campaign under Milošević is the 1986 Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (*SANU*) Memorandum.<sup>91</sup> This document was written by a committee at *SANU*

which claims that it was never “edited for public consumption.” This is clear from the text. The most striking passages include: “A nation that has regained statehood after a long and bloody struggle, that has achieved civil democracy, and that lost two and half million kinsmen in two world wars underwent the experience of having a bureaucratically constructed party commission determine that after four decades in the new Yugoslavia it alone was condemned to be without its own state. A more bitter historic defeat in peacetime cannot be imagined.”

Rather than a cold scientific work that one might expect from such an institution, this memo is steeped in historical melodrama and beseeches the reader to be convinced of the rightness of the Serb cause: “Having borne for over half a century the stigma and handicap of being the jailer of the other Yugoslav nations, the Serbian nation was incapable of deriving support from its own history. Many aspects of this history itself were even brought into question. The brave and honorable efforts at liberation exerted by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and by all Yugoslav youth, which included Young Bosnia, experienced a similar fate and were pushed into the historical background by the contributions of a class ideology whose proponents and creators were Austrian Marxists, confirmed opponents of movements of national liberation.”

The fear mongering and sense of victimhood that has become the trademark of the Serb cause under Milošević is clearly in evidence here: “Influenced by the ruling ideology, the cultural achievements of the Serbian people are undergoing alienation, being usurped by

others or denigrated, or they are ignored and retrogress; the language is being displaced and the Cyrillic script is gradually being lost. In this connection, the realm of literature is serving as the main arena for caprice and anarchy. The cultural and spiritual integrity of no other Yugoslav nation is so roughly challenged as that of the Serbian nation. No other literary and artistic heritage is so disordered, ravaged, and confused as the Serbian heritage. The political criteria of the ruling ideology are imposed on Serbian culture as being more valuable and stronger than scientific or historical criteria.”

Here it makes very clear that the integrity of Serb territory is the method by which the “nation” can be saved: “Complete national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people is their historic and democratic right, no matter in which republic or province they might find themselves living...The present depressing condition of the Serbian nation, with chauvinism and Serbophobia being ever more violently expressed in certain circles, favor of a revival of Serbian nationalism, an increasingly drastic expression of Serbian national sensitivity, and reactions that can be volatile and even dangerous...The 1974 constitution turned Yugoslavia into a very unstable state community, prone to consider alternatives other than the Yugoslav alternative, as has been made clear in recent statements by public figures in Slovenia and the earlier positions taken by Macedonian politicians. Such considerations and fragmentation lead to the notion that Yugoslavia is in danger of further corrosion. The Serbian nation cannot meekly await the future in such a state of uncertainty. Therefore, all of the nations within Yugoslavia must be given the opportunity to express their wants and intentions...Naturally, Serbia must not take a passive stand in

all this, waiting to hear what others will say, as she has done so often in the past.”

And finally the threat to other republics, if Serb nationalists do not get their way: “Unless the Serbian nation within Serbia participate on an equal footing in the entire process of decision making and implementation, Yugoslavia cannot be strong--and Yugoslavia's very existence as a democratic, socialist community will be called into question.”

In Rwanda, Hutu Power was the political movement at the forefront of orchestrating and executing the genocide. Over three years before the main events of the genocide began, such a declaration took the form of the “Hutu Ten Commandments.” The title was effective in this largely Christian country in which the majority of the population looked to religious leaders for correct action. A Hutu Power newspaper, *Kangura* (Awaken), published these Commandments, which instructed every Hutu to recognize the general unworthiness of every Tutsi, exclusion of Tutsis from all jobs, business dealings, and family roles. This manifesto ominously included Commandment number 8: The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi. (See *Annex 2: Declarations of Intent* for the full document.)

Closer to the actual start of the genocide, the basic plan of attack, including clandestine distribution of weapons was discussed at a meeting in October 1993. In early 1994, another planning meeting produced the document, “Organization of Civilian Self-Defense” (*Organisation de l'Auto-Défense Civile*). According to Human Rights Watch,

“The program was to defend against actual RPF combatants in uniform but also against “disguised RPF” and their “accomplices”: language so broad as to be easily interpreted as encompassing Tutsi civilians.”<sup>92</sup>

### **Continuum Of Destruction**

Grievances may fester and be fueled over a period of decades or months, but are brought to a head through a process, not in a single moment. To understand how citizens can degenerate into a riotous mob or develop into a more serious genocidal regime that ensures participation of the population from nearly every stratum of society, it is necessary to explore this process of combining nationalism, crowd formation, and propaganda. The effects of these elements are not felt overnight, the culture of the population must be made ready to participate in genocide.

According to Ervin Staub, “There is a progression along a continuum of destruction. People learn and change by doing, by participation, as a consequence of their own actions. Small, seemingly insignificant acts can involve a person with a destructive system: for example, accepting benefits provided by the system or even using a required greeting, such as “Heil Hitler.” Initial acts that cause limited harm result in psychological changes that make further destructive acts possible.”<sup>93</sup>

Canetti observed that “When the enemy has been beaten the threat which united people vanishes and it is each for himself again...the danger of an army disintegrating

completely through pillage is so great that leaders have always been concerned with finding some means of re-establishing a fighting spirit. The most effective means to this end are *victory feasts*...In societies which pride themselves on being civilized the exhibition of captured enemies suffices. Others, which to us appear barbarous, want more. They want to *experience* an actual decrease of the enemy, and to experience it together, relieved from the pressure of an immediate threat. This leads to the public executions of prisoners familiar in the victory feasts of many war-like peoples.”<sup>94</sup>

Staub further notes that through this process we devalue the victims, “justify their suffering by their evil nature or by higher ideals. A changed view of the victims, changed attitude toward that suffering, and changed self-concept result.”<sup>95</sup> Although never hiding his views, Hitler was wise enough in the 1932 campaign to tone down his plans for the Jews until his hold on power was assured.

Responsibility for one’s individual actions can be assumed by the leaders of the genocide. In the case of the SS, Himmler announced that he and Hitler would accept all responsibility for individual actions. This greatly helps to assuage any last vestiges of guilt that may be harbored by perpetrators. Along these lines, most people are prepared to accept the version of reality presented to them by “experts.” This, coupled with a lack of alternative viewpoints, creates a society well prepared for an orchestrated violent campaign on “them.”<sup>96</sup>

Governments that are more authoritarian are more likely to succeed in silencing opposition to the point where there is no protest at any point along the destructive continuum. Such authorities can also create pretexts for their actions that make them more acceptable to those that might otherwise have opposed them. The Turks overtaxed the Armenians to the point that they refused to pay; and early pregenocidal massacres caused Armenians to begin to fight back, thus encouraging the view that the Armenians were trying to undo the Ottoman Empire.<sup>97</sup> SS members and concentration camp inmates dressed in Polish uniforms attacked a radio station on the German border in August 1939 to provide justification for a counter attack on Poland.<sup>98</sup> With its equation of the current situation with the Ottoman annexation 600 years before, the Serbian authorities used its controlled media to create a “critical mass of war in the political-ideological field.”<sup>99</sup> In Rwanda, President Habyarimana used an RPF attack on the border as a pretext for a purge of Tutsis, claiming that they had that they had been assisted by disloyal Tutsis within Rwanda, and had invaded the capital overnight and when in fact, they had only come within 60 miles of Kigali.<sup>100</sup>

Support of the “just world” hypothesis has been proven experimentally to substantially increase an individual’s tendency that victims deserve to suffer due to some deficiency of character or effort. Acceptance of this hypothesis permits bystanders and perpetrators alike to expect to escape the same fate and perhaps encourage its infliction on others to ensure the truth of this world-view. Such a belief is often coupled with an inflexible view of social norms and conformity, rather than a focus on empathy and the welfare of others.

Expectation of victims' continued or increased suffering further drives others to observe passively or to participate in violence.<sup>101</sup>

Once the Armenians began fighting back, with such skirmishes causing some Turkish military losses, coupled with Armenians appealing to the Russians for help, it was no difficult task for Turks to believe that the Armenians were colluding with Turkey's greatest enemy (Christian Russia) and causing trouble internally to engineer the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Under such conditions, any Armenian suffering caused by Turks in self-defense was fully justified.

One Rwandan noted that "Rwandan culture is a culture of fear...when you're that resigned and oppressed [to pay for a bullet to be killed more quickly and mercifully], you're already dead...These victims of genocide had been psychologically prepared to expect death just for being Tutsi. They were being killed for so long that they were already dead."<sup>102</sup>

Another aspect along this continuum is the "foot in the door" phenomenon, in which people begin by permitting insulting language to be used about the target group, then agree to minor discrimination such as limiting freedom to work or live in a particular place. Then, property seizure that might benefit the ingroup at the expense of the outgroup begins. By this time, the outgroup has been so devalued that small-scale

violence becomes more acceptable, leading to acquiescence of a broadening of the conflict.

In the case of Rwanda, there were many places in which the authorities seemed deliberately to bring hesitant Hutus into more and more violent behavior. They would first encourage them to steal from Tutsis, then to destroy Tutsi homes, then finally to kill the owners of the homes. Sometimes soldiers and police threatened Hutus who were only willing to steal and not to commit violence against Tutsis. Officials initiated attacks on obvious targets, such as men who had or might seem to have a connection with the RPF. Once Hutus participated in this level of violence, the graduation to killing women, the elderly, children, and others not so clearly implicated became less difficult.<sup>103</sup>

Often the “foot in the door” phenomenon is part of the course given to perpetrators in which they “learn by doing.” Here, Staub offers the example of Greek torturers-in-training. First, they were made to stand guard by the door of the interrogation cells; then, they were brought in to watch torture and help rough up the prisoners. The merit system required them to pass an aptitude test of sorts before “graduating” on to the next level of torture application.<sup>104</sup>

All three of these aspects of the destructive continuum were in play in the Ottoman Empire and in Nazi Germany, as Turks and Germans respectively were already accustomed to devaluing Armenians and Jews through centuries of “education.”

Increasing restrictions on Armenian rights tended to coincide with instances of Armenian civil disobedience or violent resistance and as the oppression increased, Turks correspondingly devalued Armenians along with their government's acts. Germans watched passively as Jews became increasingly restricted from higher education and certain professions in Nazi Germany. As this continued and laws against property and business ownership increased in severity, German businessmen began cutting ties and firing employees on their own initiative before the government even demanded it. In addition, the gradual movement of Jews into ghettos reduced contact between them and Germans, thus removing the opportunity for empathy for the plight of Jews to develop. Once they were rounded up for further "relocation" the process of alienation was complete and German indifference, if not wholesale participation, was assured.

It is often reported that the smaller scale killing of dissidents in Rwanda from 1990 on were "practice massacres," intended to soften the populace to the idea of killing Tutsis in the neighborhood and to give the *interhamwe*, (militia of the ruling party) an opportunity to become skilled that their "work," as systematic killing was called. As Gourevitch describes it, "few refused, and assertive resistance was extremely rare. Killing Tutsis was a political tradition in postcolonial Rwanda; it brought people together."<sup>105</sup> Unfortunately, Staub notes, "the further the destruction has progressed, the more difficult it is to halt it. Human beings have a tendency to complete what they start."<sup>106</sup> The same is true of genocide. Even

"The further you have progressed toward a goal, the more difficult it is to give it up."

-Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil*

when it is clear that the effort is failing, as in the case of the last days of World War II, perpetrators attempt to salvage some sense of power and accomplishment by ratcheting up the “work” and striving to complete the task. This is the great argument against intervention in genocide by those who prefer not to become embroiled in long-term peacekeeping or state reconstruction efforts. The counter argument is to more effectively predict impending genocide and intervene before it turns violent.

### Internal and External Environmental Conditions

Whether experts predict them accurately or not, conflicts do not emerge without

precursors and formative

events. An excellent

starting point for

considering the sources

of political/

economic/social

instability within a state

#### *Twelve Indicators Of Failed States:*

- 1 - Mounting Demographic Pressures
- 2 - Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs
- 3 - Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance
- 4 - Chronic and Sustained Human Flight
- 5 - Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
- 6 - Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline
- 7 - Criminalization or Delegitimization of the State
- 8 - Progressive Deterioration of Public Services
- 9 - Widespread Violation of Human Rights
- 10 - Security Apparatus as "State within a State"
- 11 - Rise of Factionalized Elites
- 12 - Intervention of Other States or External Actors

or its environment that can lead to genocide is the Failed States Index.<sup>107</sup> The Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the nonprofit Fund for Peace, and the journal, Foreign Policy, have conducted extensive research to create a global ranking of destabilized or failing states. Using these 12 indicators, spanning the social, economic, political, and military spheres, the Fund ranked 60 states in order of vulnerability to violent internal conflict.<sup>108</sup>

The author of this genocide study initially began the project with a list of destabilizing factors and precursor conditions that intuitively indicate that a state is likely to spiral toward genocide. These clearly correlated with the “Twelve Indicators of Failed States” as defined by the Index. Due to the effective exploitation of massive amounts of data, which this author would have had no way to collect or analyze, and rather than attempt to improve on this excellent methodology, the Index will serve as the basis for the discussion on events and conditions most likely to breed genocide.

Of the twelve indicators listed by the Failed States Project, six are most relevant to the cases of genocide cited here. These primary conditions are likely to lead to genocide by varying degrees; they are presented here in rank order depending upon their impact on the four cases under discussion:

- Mounting Demographic Pressures
- Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline
- Criminalization or Delegitimization of the State
- Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines
- Rise of Factionalized Elites
- Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance

All of these eventually led, of course to a “widespread violation of human rights” at least for the target groups.

### *A Note On Presentation*

*The Failed States Project has provided brief, well crafted, and explicit points in elaboration of each indicator. These are included verbatim in sea green typeface and in*

*bullet form to indicate that they are the words of the Project authors. The illustration of how each case fits each indicator follows. Each of the genocide cases has been discussed in previous sections. Events or circumstances that have been thoroughly treated elsewhere will only be mentioned briefly to illustrate their relevance to the case and to the indicator. Other events or conditions that have not yet been explored will be presented in more detail.*

### *Mounting Demographic Pressures*

Demographic factors, especially population pressures stemming from refugees, internally displaced populations, and environmental degradation, are also found in most at-risk countries, as are consistent human rights violations.

- Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship
- Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards
- Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a "youth or age bulge," or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups

Ottoman Turks feared that the massive numbers of Armenians settled in Russian Armenia, Turkish Anatolia, and throughout the eastern part of modern-day Turkey would cut Turks off from Muslim lands in the Middle East as the Ottoman Empire shrank from its largest dimensions due to Balkan secession and Western and Russian encroachment.

Although Germany does not have the population density of a Rwanda, its national sense of security was threatened from territorial losses since its apex in Holy Roman times.

French occupation of the Ruhr and the sense that they were surrounded by enemies gave Germans a sense of vastly reduced living space (*Lebensraum*), which became a central tenet of National Socialist philosophy.

Kosovar Albanians' attempts at autonomy in the late 1980s increased Serb nationalist concerns of inaccessibility to the city of Pec, birthplace of Serb Orthodoxy. In addition, Serbs feared that substantially higher birthrates among Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo would drive them from Serb settlements there.

East Africa has the highest population growth in the world, but considering that Rwanda's average population density is three times that of Nigeria and ten times greater than Tanzania, it is not surprising that the ethnic complication of the political landscape caused an eruption there, rather than in other poor, African countries.<sup>109</sup>

Jared Diamond's illustration of Hutu-on-Hutu violence following the Tutsi massacre in 1994 clearly demonstrates the lack of arable land available to poor Hutus due to traditional restrictive familial land redistribution patterns and lack of opportunity for poor farmers to increase sustainability with non-agricultural income supplementation as was possible for large landholders who could afford to engage in other occupational pursuits.<sup>110</sup>

### *Sharp And/Or Severe Economic Decline*

Typically, an economic crisis or major economic shift (redistribution of resources or transition to capitalism from communism) is a contributing factor. In addition, the fear of

worsening economic conditions, i.e. unemployment, decreased trade, inflation, to affect the nation as a result of enemy favoritism or increase.

- A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures
- Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments
- Collapse or devaluation of the national currency
- Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs
- Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight
- Increase in levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the general populace
- Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments

As the Foreign Policy article on failed states notes, “When a large state falls, everyone hears about it—and some unlucky neighbors may even be brought down with it.”<sup>111</sup> This was clearly the case with both the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Although both states declined over time, these are the watershed years for the cases under discussion.

The Ottoman Empire saw its treasure and its territory shrinking precipitously and felt in need of a scapegoat. The wealthy, successful, foreign-connected, infidel Armenians were the perfect target. Overtaxed and oppressed, the Armenians began to refuse to bow to Ottoman economic demands. This further depreciated the Ottoman self-image as the dominant power. Russian and Western encroachment and economic decay culminated in the 1910-11 decision to make way for Muslim settlers and remove the Armenian “problem” in vain hopes of restoring order.

German shame at military defeat in World War I was exacerbated by economic collapse as a result of the financial toll of the war, coupled with heavy reparations and was made even worse with the spread of the depression in the early 1930s. Unemployment, reduced market share, and loss of control of the industrial Ruhr region to French occupation brought Germany to its lowest point post-unification.

The fall of the Soviet Union suddenly removed Yugoslavia's trading status with the West and reduced it to the status of poor relative of Eastern Europe. The military suffered most when subsidies from the USSR were halted. Declarations of independence by Catholic and West-leaning Croatia and Slovenia threatened Serb market share and led those republics to remove qualified Serbs from their traditional civil service and political positions.

Such pressures were clearly at play in Rwanda since the 1980s as world prices for its primary exports dropped and ecological degradation led to near-famine conditions in the south. The government only survived due to cash infusions in the form of aid from the international community, primarily France.

Foreign sources of economic hardship exacerbated the social problems in each of the four cases. In the 1970s the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a massive attempt to salvage the international financial system with massive injections of recycled

petrodollars. This came to a screeching halt in 1979, leading to bank closings, and an increase in US interest rates that exponentially raised the burden of foreign debt on other countries, leading to other financial disasters throughout the world. Hardest hit were developing countries whose monetary systems were already fragile and who had tried to revive their own economies with huge foreign loans. The results were felt everywhere and the IMF and World Bank tried to ameliorate the situation with austerity programs launched in many countries. Two of these were Yugoslavia and Rwanda. These measures resulted in disruptions of financial flows and governmental intervention in many facets of domestic economies where they had not been felt as harshly in previous periods. These were meant to be temporary measures, but with the dissolution of the Soviet Union so greatly altering the Yugoslav economy and with dropping prices for Rwanda's products, they had severely negative effects.<sup>112</sup> Reparations had a similar effect on the German economy, already in shambles after the war. As noted, the loss of the Balkans and the conduct of World War I correspondingly affected Turkey.

### *Criminalization Or Delegitimization Of The State*

Criminalization or delegitimization of the state, which occurs when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal, or ineffective, also figured prominently. Facing this condition, people often shift their allegiances to other leaders—opposition parties, warlords, ethnic nationalists, clergy, or rebel forces.

- Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites
- Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation
- Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or contested elections, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies
- Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites

Genocide usually takes place, not only in conditions of war, but in times of revolution. Revolutions are more likely to be violent overthrows than peaceful transitions so there is a commonality of purging of likely dissenters that typically takes place. This is the case with the Young Turks attempting to consolidate power over the remains of the Ottoman Empire, the National Socialist revolution in Germany, the reassertion of power structures in the dissolving Yugoslavia, with Serbs attempting to seize as much power and territory as possible, and with Hutu Power likely assassinating the president and attempting to assert their agenda over Rwanda. This implicitly means that the official authority is no longer maintaining control and providing services or other requirements of a stable government.

By 1913 the Balkan peoples had all seceded from the Ottoman Empire and only the Arabs, Turks, and Armenians remained. Despite the fact that the previous sultan had considered the Armenians loyal subjects, due to their lack of resistance to discriminatory measures imposed upon them, Abdul Hamit, the last sultan, perpetrated his own Armenian massacre in 1894-96. Once he was deposed by the Young Turks (*Ittihadists*), the tattered Empire faced further secessions and the external pressures of World War I. This turbulence required them to enact greater repression than had even the previous administrations in order to demonstrate their ability to hang on to the remaining territory and consolidate power.

After the abdication of the Kaiser, Germans looked to the National Socialist agenda for economic relief and for strong authority. Initial social successes provided Germans with a reason to hope for the future and with imagery that hearkened back to the days of German optimism in 1914.

As Mate Babić notes below, the southern Balkans suffered from the legacy of Ottoman influence with corruption at all levels one of the sustaining bequests. The Serb economy and political establishment were corrupt, even by Balkan standards.

In the Rwandan case, the government of President Habyarimana had enriched itself since 1973 on funding from international donors with very little aid money trickling down to the majority of the society. This situation was tolerable as Rwanda's fortunes appeared to be on the upswing through the 1970s and early 1980s. In order to counteract any opposition brought about by the worsening economic conditions of the late 1980s, the *akazu*, or inner circle of the government, began to place blame on the Tutsis who had dominated Rwanda through colonial patronage until independence in 1960.

### *Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines*

Uneven development is high in almost all the states in the index, suggesting that inequality within states—and not merely poverty—increases instability.

- Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status
- Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels
- Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities

Susan Woodward notes the commonality of frustration inspired by the perception of an economic threat to an ethnic group or nation asking, “What society does not seek to defend privilege or wealth as a national right or to organize social roles and patterns of discrimination (positive and negative) in part along cultural lines?”<sup>113</sup> As Quattrone and Tversky point out, “each party may view its own concessions as losses that loom larger than the gains achieved by the concessions of the adversary.”<sup>114</sup>

As noted previously, Armenians, Jews, and Tutsis tended to have more professional or mercantile positions within their larger societies that survived the economic shocks, primarily through their trading relations, higher education, work ethic, and skill sets.

Misha Glenny reports Mate Babić’s “elegant” portrayal of Yugoslavia’s post-communist political/economic situation: “In the post-war communist federation, the imbalance between Slovene sophistication and the developing-world conditions prevailing in Kosovo, southern Serbia and Montenegro could only be rectified by massive state control of the economy. This created resentment in the prosperous north, the fruits of whose productivity were transferred to the dusty climates of the south where they rotted in the sun. Above all, a taut mistrust grew up between Slovenia and Croatia, where a more industrious work ethic was the tradition, and Serbia, the borderland of the Ottoman empire’s corrupt economic values. Being inextricably involved with the Serbian economy, which appears to be fuelled by lotus leaves, had a damaging long-term effect on the Croat and Slovene economies. When the political decay in Yugoslavia

accelerated, following the multi-party elections in the republics, the economic tensions ensured that this mistrust would deepen.”<sup>115</sup>

### *Rise Of Factionalized Elites*

- Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines
- Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism, (e.g., a "greater Serbia") or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith")

Woodward further notes that power vacuums leave some segments of society feeling more vulnerable than others: “Nationalist parties most often attract individuals when political organizations representing their specific interests are absent or have not sought their support, when individuals – out of a growing rootlessness or anomie – seek a restored sense of community. Because it is a principle of exclusion, however, it tends to surface in conditions that are not conducive to its more benign expression alone. Its potential for violence is ever more manifest as it moves from intellectual expression and economic discrimination to criteria for citizenship and claims for territorial sovereignty...it must destroy while it builds.”<sup>116</sup> Nationalist elements in the Turkish, German, Serb, and Hutu communities found communality in attacking those they could characterize as elites or infidels.

### *Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance*

- History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries
- Patterns of atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups
- Specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression
- Institutionalized political exclusion
- Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric

Ottoman Turks equated Armenian wealth and patronage from Russia, France, and Great Britain with these nations' designs on their territory in the last days of the Empire, making the Turks determined to remove this "foreign threat."

The post-war German reversal of fortune drove nationalists to seek a foreign enemy within, in order to remove the perceived source of its decline. Jews were overrepresented in the professional and civil service professions, so it was easy to find them at fault for economic and political disaster.

Kosovar Albanians' drive for autonomy in the late 1980s reignited Serb collective memory of Muslim domination since its greatest military defeat in Kosovo in 1389. This was further exacerbated when Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was nearly equal parts Serb, Muslim, and Croatian, contemplated independence in 1991.

Independence in 1960 reversed centuries of Tutsi dominance in Rwanda, sparking frequent reprisal pogroms intended to draw attention from ineffectual governance. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a militia group of exiled Tutsis, began sporadic raids on Rwandan border lands in the late 1980s to counteract the increasing frequency of these attacks on Tutsis. This gave rise to the impression that Rwandan Tutsis, allied with the RPF to widely varying degrees, were attempting to regain their dominant position. In addition, French pressure forced Habyarimana to implement the Arusha power-sharing

agreements, which gave Hutu radicals cause to fear loss of their own power to Tutsis once again.

### *Catalytic Events*

Catalytic events are those moments in time that trigger violence when the environmental conditions have coalesced to the right (or wrong) degree. Such events are often likened to a match striking a tinderbox or a powder keg. In a 2005 report on its Fragile States Strategy, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) lists the following as the most common types of catalytic events:

- democratic collapse (e.g., Nigeria in 1983)
- succession or reform crisis in authoritarian states (e.g., Soviet Union in 1991)
- high levels of state-sponsored corruption (e.g., Philippines in 1996)
- regional or guerilla rebellion (e.g., Colombia in 2000)
- violent ethnic conflict or genocide (e.g., Rwanda in 1994)
- economic collapse (e.g., Zaire in the early 1990s) or hyperinflation (e.g., Argentina in the early 1980s).<sup>117</sup>

Because we are actually studying the phenomenon that is genocide, we will focus on the others, especially as there is typically some inter-ethnic violence that precedes the massacres, making that item a given. In the genocide cases addressed, the catalytic events of each are different, nevertheless, such conflicts require some precipitating event that either galvanizes support to be mobilized when the planners are ready, or that directly sparks mass action.



event, though engineered by the authorities, spelled disaster for Jews who had been vilified for centuries as “foreign elements.”<sup>119</sup>

In Bosnia, despite the fact that widespread violence did not begin for more than two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it began the swift slide into national dissolution and genocide. This event caused “Yugoslavia’s special relationship with Europe [sic] to become obsolete overnight” observes Susan Woodward. Yugoslavia lost its special status among the Eastern European countries as a bridge from East to West. Now that Yugoslavia was no longer needed as a broker between the Moscow and Washington, a huge loss of prestige resulted, suddenly giving Yugoslavia “second-class status” when it had been the West’s favorite for decades. At the same time Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary began to receive all the development aid and kudos for progress. Western comments that central European (Hapsburg) traditions made these states more suited for democracy, as opposed to “Ottoman-influenced” Yugoslavia increased the loss of prestige and identity. This widened cleavages within Yugoslavia as Croatia and Slovenia strove to differentiate themselves from such “South Slav” culture.

Economically, Yugoslavia lost subsidies from the Soviet Union, impoverishing its large, integrated armed forces, and at the same time, the US removed its special trading status that had made it the freest market in COMECON. The dissolution of this trading bloc also removed Yugoslavia’s ready trade partners and the Iran-Iraq war disrupted trade and oil subsidies from the Middle East. These events, combined with International Monetary

Fund (IMF) austerity measures since 1982 created a near total economic collapse for Yugoslav citizens. As a result, Serbs, who had traditionally held a large proportion of civil service and political leadership positions especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro, found themselves objects of scorn as unemployment rose throughout Yugoslavia. This paved Milošević's path to power, riding on his slogans of Serb victimhood, further permitting him to use his hard line to pose as the protector of Serb rights.<sup>120</sup>

Through the 1980s, Rwanda saw improved economic conditions due to increasing foreign aid. However, drought and a drop in world prices for Rwanda's main exports, coffee and tea, in 1989 brought progress to a grinding halt. Near-famine conditions developed in the south due to over cultivation and deforestation. In addition, when land disputes occur in countries with established institutions for conflict resolution, such as fair and mature courts, such disputes are handled relatively fairly and swiftly; 1994 Rwanda had no such mechanisms.

These severe economic conditions were exacerbated by a Tutsi invasion from Uganda that provided the Hutu government in Rwanda a pretext for an assault on Tutsi dissidents throughout Rwanda, resulting in a civil war. This conflict ended with the infamous Arusha Accords signed in 1993, which provided a power-sharing mechanism for Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. However, President Habyarimana was killed in April 1994, when his plane was shot down by two missiles as he returned from a round of negotiations on

Arusha that would have severely curtailed Hutu dominance, thus sparking the violence hours later that ended in genocide. Therefore, a severe economic collapse due to external prices and internal environmental deficiencies, coupled with an impending political shock for the ruling elite, coalesced to create conditions ripe for devastating ethnic violence.

The assassination of Habyarimana is universally regarded as the initiating event, but by no means the cause, of the mass killing of Tutsis by Hutus. Only hours after the plane crashed on 6 April at the Kigali airport, Hutu militias began a well-planned, systematic killing spree. It is still unclear why or by whom the missiles were fired. Hutu Power claimed that it was Tutsis opposed to Habyarimana. However, the regime's oppression of Tutsis appeared to be abating with the signing of the Arusha Accords. Considering the swiftness with which the violence began in the crash's aftermath, it is more likely that a cadre of Hutu Power extremists created a catalytic event to galvanize Hutu fear of Tutsis bent on taking over the government, in order to prevent power-sharing from ever occurring.<sup>121</sup> This also served as the "first death" image around which Hutus could rally, even if they had not previously supported Habyarimana.



## Chapter V Conclusions

### Indicators and Warning (I&W)

As Kristan Wheaton notes in *The Warning Solution*, “most problems have histories.

These histories, if studied carefully can determine the realm of the possible for that particular problem. Once the realm of the possible is understood, the task of determining the most probable outcome is easier.”<sup>122</sup> (Genocide Watch discusses two other models in use on its website, but provides a critique of their shortcomings; the report is reproduced in its entirety in *Annex IV: Other Early Warning Models*)

### Dedicated Analytic Team

The value of an analytic team tasked to anticipate a particular kind of event is in its ability to scan the horizon and use particular information and methodologies to create a framework within which to determine far in advance, where are the likeliest places for genocide to occur in the near-term (usually 3-5 years out). This requires targeting specific regions for their likelihood of spawning genocidal regimes or conditions. Then it requires assembling qualified experts in languages, politics, histories, cultural conditions, ethnic relations, and conflict studies in order to provide the best estimate of the next violent outbreak.

The best way to do this in the case of genocide is to assemble a watch team assigned initially to determine where such a conflict is most likely to occur and then literally to “watch” this region or country for signs of trouble. When conditions begin to coalesce in which ethnic tensions are likely to turn violent (see next section), particular clues are

readily available for the astute analyst to collect and evaluate. Such conflicts seem to the untrained observer to arise virtually over night. This is far from reality. Such conflicts simmer for decades, even centuries, typically with lower-level violent periods. They also take planning and equipage.

In order to effectively predict the future, in this case, predicting genocide, there must be a base of knowledge available to the team of analysts responsible for evaluating the problem to tap into before the problem heats up. This means that institutional memory in the form of databases, historical records, and linguistic expertise must be developed long before a region or issue comes to the fore. By end-2005, the US intelligence community still did not have enough qualified Arabic translators available to work on documents and communications intercepts relating to al-Qaeda, a full four years after the 2001 attacks, but is still expected to have to ability to predict future attacks.

In Rwanda, for example, the Hutu government started importing massive numbers of machetes, far above the number needed for agriculture, a full year before the violence began in earnest.<sup>123</sup> On 29 March 1994 (one week before the killing began) military leaders “suggested that the burgomasters should instruct people in the use of traditional weapons, including swords, spears, bows and arrows, and machetes, according to Human Rights Watch.<sup>124</sup> In retrospect, such events seem easy to spot, but only in retrospect.

The most important of clues lie in the propaganda used to prepare the aggressor population for genocide. As illustrated, each past case of genocide has its code language and once the watch team has determined that a particular spot is likely to turn hot, it should have enough specialized knowledge of the culture and histories of the two groups to realize that the rhetoric is changing from political bombast into a battle cry.

An analyst team should keep a close watch on the news reports, especially those provided by government-sponsored media outlets, or by rising opposition groups, depending on the source of the aggression. As discussed in the section *Demagoguery and Images*, each aggressor group has a particular kind of catch phrase or word coding that most effectively evokes the crowd symbol for the aggressor group and clearly reminds the “crowd” or population of the past sins and intended infringements of the target group, thus whipping up aggressive sentiments. These calls to arms are typically couched in such a way as to appear as necessary self-defense maneuvers by law-abiding citizens, rather than preemptive aggression. As noted above, genocide takes time to plan and organize, so it is highly likely, based upon the experience of past cases, that a good watch team can alert policymakers to a likely impending genocide far in advance of actual widespread violence.

### **Coalescence Of Environmental Conditions Plus War**


Robert Melman points out that genocide is typically carried out in conjunction with, or perhaps, under cover of war. In the case of Armenia, World War I; the Holocaust took place during World War II; Serb aggression with the confusion of the end of the Cold

War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a whole; and the Rwandan regime was already engaged in a low-level war against the RPF.<sup>125</sup>

This conditional precursor or co-incidental event of war with genocide provides three aspects of scapegoating that are especially useful for perpetrators. One is the impression that the internal enemy group is somehow linked to external enemies: the Armenians with the Russians, the Jews with the communists, the Bosnian Muslims with Islamic fundamentalists, and the Tutsis with the RPF. A state of war increases the capability of the regime to restrict opposition and freedom of the press and individual expression. Finally, the prospect of assimilating domestic “enemies” seems too lengthy or complex within the confines of the immediacy of a wartime crisis.<sup>126</sup> This suggests that genocide is more likely to occur during a time of war or revolution (or an invented case of either).

### Next Case?

In the previous section, six indicators from the Failed States Index were rank-ordered as the most likely determinants of genocide. These indicators, coupled with particular images used in propaganda are likely



Failed States Index Interactive Map  
<http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php>

to provide warning of impending genocide. The 2006 Failed States Index was just published in April 2006; using these data this study will list the countries that the FSI

ranks as the five most affected by each indicator. Then, using that list, the most likely two will be compared in terms of issuance of propaganda as described in depth above to determine the most likely candidate for the next genocide.

### *Recalling The Indicators*

- *Mounting Demographic Pressures*

Zimbabwe, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Niger

- *Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline*

Zimbabwe, North Korea, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger

- *Criminalization or Delegitimization of the State*

Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, North Korea, Sudan, Chad

- *Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines*

Guinea-Bissau, Sudan, China, Zimbabwe, Nepal

- *Rise of Factionalized Elites*

Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, Iraq, Haiti, DRC

- *Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance*

Cote d'Ivoire, Iraq, Sudan, Bangladesh, Nepal

### *Top Contenders*

It is clear that there are a number repeat performers leading the top five. One of these is Sudan, which appears in the top five under four indicators. Sudan has been declared a state in the process of committing genocide by the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations for the past two years. Therefore, it must be excluded from states that can be predicted to begin genocide, but its presence tends to validate the process.

North Korea also appears twice, and in the past ten years, it has been said that nearly two million people were permitted to perish through famines engineered by the North Korean government, thus a case for political genocide can easily be made, however, North Korea is a mainly homogenous society and in this study, genocide is defined on ethnic grounds.

Cote d'Ivoire appears four times, the most numerous of any state in this list, three times as the number one entry. Cote d'Ivoire led the list in overall ranking in the 2005 FSI and in 2006 moved down only two places to number three. If readers found the 1992-95 Bosnia war confusing, it would take a complex social network link chart to unravel the discord in Cote d'Ivoire. In Cote d'Ivoire, there are five major ethnic groups with various subgroups that all consider themselves to be Ivorian. In the northern region, there are recent immigrants from Burkina Faso and Liberia, along with French citizens and Belarussian mercenaries. The ethnic divisions in Cote d'Ivoire do not tend to follow clear-cut geographic, religious, or even cultural lines. The Ivorians who are fighting, tend to be in favor of disallowing voting rights for people without two parents born in Cote d'Ivoire before 1972. Despite the fact that the UN and other humanitarian groups have successfully called a halt to xenophobic hate speech that often spews forth from government-controlled radio and television, this case is not typically called a genocide, because there is no clear majority targeting a particular minority. This is more like a civil war in which geographic and economic groups are vying for power in a post-colonial setting with a short, but turbulent history, and no model for peaceful coexistence to adopt. Therefore, Cote d'Ivoire is likely to flare up in violence again in the near future, but is not likely to engage in genocide as defined by the UN Human Rights Committee.

### *Selection: Zimbabwe*

Zimbabwe appears three times in the list above, twice as the number one entry; thus making it the clear number two. Due to extremely repressive government policies intensifying in April 2005, Zimbabwe moved up in the overall FSI ranking from 15<sup>th</sup>

place in 2005 to number five for 2006. This leaves Zimbabwe as the most likely genocide case in the near future.

Authoritarian President Robert Mugabe exercises repression ostensibly along political, not ethnic lines, as, in April 2005 he engineered Operation Restore Order (also called “Operation Drive Out Filth”), a crackdown on opposition elements as a result of the March 2005 parliamentary elections to which British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw commented, "I cannot say how long President Mugabe will stay... What I know for certain is that he lacks any effective consent of the people, that beneath this apparently strong veneer this is a weak and fragile government which will collapse sooner rather than later."<sup>127</sup> Billed as an attempt to reduce poverty and crime in the “makeshift” and “illegal” settlements in the suburbs of the capitol, Harare, the homes and livelihoods of over 700,000 supporters of the opposition political party were destroyed, causing near economic collapse, with 80% unemployment, thousands fleeing across the border to South Africa, and massive population displacements within Zimbabwe. Estimates suggest 2.4 million people were affected.<sup>128</sup>

### **Ethnic Division**

The current problems in Zimbabwe stem from Prime Minister Ian Smith’s 1964 endeavors to gain independence for Zimbabwe under white minority rule, against British directives to increase African inclusion in the political process. Former dissident exiles of white rule, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, joined forces to win independence in

1980, when the country was renamed Zimbabwe. Their cooperation was always contentious, each heading a different political party and each from one of the rival indigenous ethnic groups. They did combine their efforts and unite their parties to combat white dominance until 1982 when Mugabe, as president, dismissed Nkomo and



Map of Zimbabwe's Regions  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1829845.stm>

his supporters from the government, which resulted in an uprising in Matabeleland (see map above), Nkomo's base of support (*rise of factionalized elites*). Mugabe is Shona, with his base in the eastern Matashonaland. The current composition of Zimbabwe is 82 percent Shona, 16 percent Ndebele.<sup>129</sup> Although it can be argued that the source of the ethnic strife is Mugabe's personal rivalry with Nkomo, the fact that the Ndebele ethnic group suffered most under this government initiative cannot be ignored (*legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance*).

As in Rwanda before the 1994 genocide, Mugabe has perpetrated sporadic Ndebele massacres in the past, including 1982-83, with 2,000-8,000 Ndebele killed. According to Genocide Watch, "The crimes included mass murder of whole villages, mass rape, and widespread torture. The victims were often forced to sing Shona songs before being beaten and killed. Although these massacres were not an attempt to destroy a whole group, they did intentionally destroy part of an ethnic group and were therefore genocidal massacres, because victims were chosen by their ethnic Ndebele identity. No one has ever been prosecuted for these massacres, and commanders who perpetrated them are now at

high levels of the Zimbabwe armed forces.”<sup>130</sup> Genocide Watch issued a “Politicide Watch” in February 2002 for Zimbabwe, this is the first stage of a three-phase warning scale, with “Warning” being the second stage when genocide or politicide becomes imminent and “Emergency” when the killing intended to destroy an entire group is underway, as in Sudan.

### Criteria Genocide Watch Uses to Determine Warning Level

**Classification:** The population is ethnically classified and ZANU-PF has become an ethnic party [of Shona].

**Symbolization:** Possession of ZANU-PF party membership cards is mandatory to avoid beatings by the Shona militias.

**Dehumanization:** President Mugabe refers to his opposition as “weeds,” and has called on ZANU-PF to “go and uproot the weeds from your garden.” [Cultivation imagery]

**Organization:** The ZANU-PF Youth Brigades are militias being systematically trained and armed, taught Shona songs, and organized like the militias that participated in the 1982-1983 genocidal massacres.

**Polarization:** President Mugabe regularly appeals to race and ethnicity, and refers to his opponents as “traitors” and “terrorists.” Police have begun to arrest moderate leaders, including church leaders.

**Preparation:** President Mugabe’s latest moves to shut off Zimbabwe from monitoring by human rights groups, election monitors, and the press, and his new laws to criminalize anyone who criticizes him, are ominous signs that he is planning at least massive election fraud. Enemy lists have been compiled by the state and party intelligence services, a sign that political and possibly ethnic violence and terror are being planned that President Mugabe wants to hide from outside scrutiny. Movement of a largely Shona Zimbabwe Army brigade into Matabeleland, and mob attacks on opposition party offices are ominous harbingers of potential mass violence.<sup>1</sup>

The notations given in the *Dehumanization* section are consistent with the examples cited in the *Findings* chapter of this document in which devaluation of the target group is an important step along the continuum of destruction. The kinds of images are also consistent, with the universal use of “cultivation” phrasing. Since this report by Genocide Watch, the implementation of Operation Restore Order, begun in April 2005, focused on property destruction, rather than mass killing, it has led to massive economic disadvantage for the poor in the capital’s suburbs, as well as those who relied on their open markets and labor (*rise of factionalized elites*). In this case, Zimbabwean whites are also targeted as sources of political opposition, although so many of them have fled since Mugabe’s rise to power, it is appropriate to focus on attacks on Ndebele and exclude whites, as we excluded concentration on Hitler’s attacks on Gypsies, Slavs, and other non-Aryans.

On 27 March 2006, Mugabe published a new “Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Bill” that would impose heavy fines and imprisonment of 5-10 years on anyone who engages in or neglects to disclose information about “foreign terrorist” groups operating in Zimbabwe. This bill came after the discovery of an arms cache in Mutare linked to an opposition group called the Zimbabwe Freedom Movement allegedly intending to assassinate the president and leading government officials at the 26 February 2006 national celebration of Mugabe’s 82<sup>nd</sup> birthday.<sup>131</sup> Following the “discovery” of the arms cache, government militias raided arms dealers across the region to prove that there is indeed an “external” threat to the regime, with editorials claiming that Mugabe is

intending to use this “threat” to strengthen further crackdowns on opposition groups. This choreographed assassination attempt thwarting has been widely mocked, as most of those arrested have been released as the case collapsed in court. The unveiling of such a threat to national security is expected to be followed soon with a new bill permitting security services to begin widespread phone taps and monitoring of email. In a country as poor as Zimbabwe, such actions are clearly aimed at the local intelligentsia and at finding cause for expulsion of foreigners who might report on domestic events (*delegitimization of the government*).<sup>132</sup>

### **Economic Pressure**

Mugabe consistently blames the country’s economic problems on sanctions by the international community and on drought in order to draw ire from his own policies. There have been diplomatic sanctions placed on Zimbabwe, but only restricting the right of travel by top government officials and freezing of their private accounts overseas. These elites within the Shona-dominated government have enriched themselves through taxes and foreign aid that does not begin to reach the people that need the aid (*criminalization of the government*). These sanctions, therefore, have no direct effect on the common citizen. There has been ongoing drought in the southwestern portion of the country, which is the region most heavily populated by the Matabele. A Roman Catholic Archbishop accused Mugabe of withholding food supplies to the Matabele region during the 2005 elections, where the majority of Ndebele live and which is the source of the strongest government opposition in the country.<sup>133</sup>

The Matabele region is very important to Zimbabwe's economic recovery as it is rich in methane gas, and as the location of Victoria Falls and a major National Park, with its power station and as a singular source of tourist dollars for the country. This helps explain why Mugabe would want to destroy the Ndbele people, as they currently are in the way of national exploitation of these resources and which points toward the *demographic pressure* indicator.<sup>134</sup>

As is common in cases of genocide, the regimes perpetrating the violence often do so irrationally, with the effect of worsening the country's position, usually economically. In the case of Hitler and the Ottoman Turks, genocide wiped out the vast majority of the professional class, with the Jews having been in a position likely to make the greatest scientific strides on behalf of Germany. In Rwanda, the civil servants, now needed to rebuild the government and the doctors and teachers needed for a new generation are largely gone.

In Zimbabwe, even the drought has been engineered by the regime, wittingly or not: the withholding of seeds, irrigation equipment, and other requirements for successful cultivation have caused longstanding widespread drought in the area around Lake Victoria, with the lake now receding drastically due to over-draughting on its water for irrigation and hydroelectric projects to benefit other regions or countries. Mugabe's government is propped up through intimidation and reward schemes for Shona militias who make up the majority of the police and the military. Operation Restore Order

displaced hundreds of thousands of workers that the government hoped would move to the countryside and help man the understaffed farms. However, these urban laborers do not have the necessary skills for the rural environment, and due to the shortsighted program of redistribution of landholdings away from capable white farmers to loyal Shona military personnel with no farming experience, agriculture has declined precipitously. In addition, due to these repressive measures and to nationalization of 50% of mining interests, foreign investment has halted, as has international sympathy for the country under Mugabe's administration, causing foreign aid to dry up. Even South Africa has begun to rethink its "special relationship." Therefore, Zimbabwe has created its own *sharp and severe economic decline*.

### **Propaganda**

In terms of propaganda, Genocide Watch reports above that Zimbabwe's media is rife with hate speech usually directed against white farmers. As their numbers have been reduced to 2% of the population and their landholdings have dwindled to almost nothing, Mugabe is likely to turn toward the Ndbele as his next "opposition" target. The International Press Review consistently designates Zimbabwe a "watch country" as it routinely closes down independent media outlets, even censoring state-controlled media and personnel for any infractions, including reports that might "insult" the president. Journalists have had their credential revoked and have been arrested with increasing frequency in proportion to Mugabe's "paranoia."<sup>135</sup>



Professor Johnathan Moyo,  
Mugabe's chief propagandist  
turned tribal rights and  
government reform activist  
<http://zimdaily.com/news2/article.php/20060413153402477>

Former Minister of State for Information and Publicity, Johnathan Moyo, (often compared to Josef Goebbels) is said to have “single-handedly destroyed the media as Zimbabweans had known it and demanded sycophancy, bias, outright fabrication and other unprofessional practices of journalists.” Moyo typically labeled any journalists, domestic or foreign, as “terrorists” when they reported anything that is not wholly flattering to the president, his administration, or his policies.

Private and foreign press broadcasts are also routinely jammed, reportedly with “sophisticated Chinese equipment.”<sup>136</sup> Even former US Secretary of State Colin Powell was labeled a “sell-out” by the government-controlled press when he wrote an editorial in the *New York Times* about Mugabe’s repressive regime. Once the chief propagandist and propagator of hate speech, Moyo was removed from his post and from the ruling party in the summer of 2005. This is the same course that appeared to befall Hassan Ngeze of Rwanda before he began to promote genocide full-time as editor of the “independent” newspaper *Kangura* in Rwanda. It is now well-known that Ngeze’s apparent fall from grace was a planned attempt to bring moderates under the sway of Hutu Power in his position of anti-government provider of “truth.” Perhaps this is true in Moyo’s case as well.<sup>137</sup>

In fact, now that Moyo is out of power, he is the driving force behind public awareness of President Mugabe's rejection of the Tsholotsho Declaration, an unwritten "document," discussed and approved by an unauthorized committee of provincial and national authorities in November 2004. The importance of Tsholotsho is its alleged attempt to underscore the true government structure that is supposed to share power among the four primary Zimbabwean indigenous African tribal groups as written in the 1974 Constitution. According to Moyo, the agreement contained "radical recommendations for reforming Zanu PF by transforming it from a party of the past based on patronage and arbitrary rule by the old guard led by President Mugabe, dominated by one ethnic grouping, to a modern party based on democracy, merit and the rule of law." He outlines the following four principles contained in the Declaration, which Mugabe claims to have a copy of, but Moyo denies it was ever written down, yet insists it was not created in secret:

- "that the top four leadership positions in the ruling Zanu PF - president and first secretary, two vice-presidents and second secretaries and national chairman - which make up the party's presidency, should reflect Zimbabwe's regional diversity and ethnic balance between and among the country's four major ethnic groupings, namely Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndebele in order to promote and maintain representative national cohesion, development, peace and stability while fostering a broad-based sense of national belonging and identity;
- that the top position of president and first secretary of the party should not be monopolised by one sub-tribe (or clan) but should reasonably rotate among the four major ethnic groupings;
- that the filling of these top four positions should not be by imposition by the party hierarchy but through democratic elections done by secret balloting;
- that the filling of the top four leadership positions and the democratic elections should be defined and be guided by and done in accordance with the constitution

of the party to promote the rule of law within the party as a foundation for maintaining the rule of law in the country.”

Moyo claims that he was ousted from the ruling party for his part in approving the Declaration and now, in opposition, he states that, “The current political and economic problems facing Zimbabwe are due to the fact that the country is being ruled by a hopelessly clueless, tired and terrified undemocratic clique which desperately wants to cling to power by fair means or foul at the clear expense of national interest.” In a regime that treats critics harshly, Moyo well knows as the former hatchet man himself, such statements are not particularly healthy, especially when they concern a succession plan for political intrigue to follow the death of the 82-year old Mugabe. Moyo clearly has some as yet unrevealed plot. Rwanda’s own chief propagandist, Hassan Ngeze, often referred to his own imprisonment by the Habyarimana government while promoting the ruling clique’s Hutu Power agenda.<sup>138</sup> The fact that this Declaration was discussed and approved in Matabeleland is not likely to be lost on the ruling party.

### **Further Considerations**

Beyond the scope of this study, but brought to mind as a result of it, are a number of other avenues for research on genocide warnings and indicators. Or in the case of the US parallels below, impressions from the indicators that can serve as warnings of potential rifts in societies that are highly unlikely to descend as far as genocide, but that could still suffer detrimental national effects.

### *Current American Parallels*


Until 9/11, it was unthinkable that Twenty-first Century America could ever become so polarized or could vilify an ethnic group in the way that has occurred with Muslims, since we are founded on assimilative democracy. However, in the name of protecting ourselves from terrorists, new laws were swiftly enacted severely curtailing the rights of all private citizens and restricting immigration, travel, and the rights of immigrants within the country, all with majority public support. Even the information that the president authorized wire taps on US citizens' communications without following legal procedures has only caused a flurry of debate with little action

An additional result of 9/11 is the United States' Twenty-first Century doctrine of preemption on potential enemies.<sup>139</sup> We have traditionally conceived of the US military's purpose as the defender of our already impenetrable borders and even when we projected power abroad, it was in order to "liberate" as in Kuwait in 1991 or in proactive self-defense, as in Korea and Vietnam and the other proxy wars during the Cold War designed to "contain" or "roll back" communism. Once the current US borders were established, we did not express territorial expansion in our foreign policy, but attempted to "make the world safe for democracy." Since 9/11 however, the preemption doctrine seeks to protect American interests by engaging offensively in conflict, as in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003. The relation to this thesis however, is the clear targeting of a particular group: Muslim "extremists," which although not an ethnic group, US focus is primarily on Arab Muslims. Because 9/11 was such a shocking experience for so many Americans who had been under the impression that we had done nothing to deserve the

attacks and for whom the lack of security was unthinkable, fear was a great motivator in permitting the centralization of control and the vilification of a particular group.

It has been observed that rumor plays a large role in crowds as they “are seen as constantly ongoing and emerging definitions of the situation.”<sup>140</sup> This was the case even on 9/11 when erroneous reports of bombs and plane crashes filled the offices and airwaves. Those who had never come in contact with an Arab or a Muslim, particularly those from rural areas of the country, were easily swayed by broad pronouncements of terrorists hiding around every corner, fueling the ability of isolationists to recommend closing the borders and halting all dealings with Muslims on every level. This reinforced the observation that “[w]hen people do not have deep convictions about an issue, they often respond to “catch phrases” that point them in a socially desirable direction.”<sup>141</sup>

US liberals decry the current curtailment of personal freedom, best exemplified by the presidential authorization of “eavesdropping” on Americans. Defenders of the policy invoke the “us or them” mentality and I have heard my own father say that he doesn’t care “if they are spying on me, it is worth it if they catch even one of those terrorists.” The 2004 presidential election galvanized the polarization that began in September 2001, dividing the electorate into those who wanted to engage on humanitarian terms with the



“I guess it was easier than putting the terrorists behind bars.”  
<http://cagle.msnbc.com/news/WarOnTerror/main.asp>

Middle East and those who preferred a military approach. These two groups closed ranks and often refused to see any middle ground between the two sides, with hawks branding those who disagreed with the current policies as “traitors” and doves calling the administration “fear-mongers.

### *Timeline*

Demagogues are not hard to come by. Such individuals or cadres must also be able to create a political party or movement that rivals the power of the official government. A more thorough case study comparison based on the theoretical discussions here is likely to show that a timeline can be projected between the moment when such a leadership begins to use particular code words or images and the outbreak of violence. This would have to be adjusted, of course, for changes over time in the speed of communications and media dissemination from the early Twentieth Century through today.

Other milestones on the road to conflict in an ethnically divided, relatively unstable state, like the Failed State Index provides, might also be tracked to follow the progress of this leader and his agenda. Creating and monitoring such a timeline is likely to provide ample warning for timely and targeted intervention to arrest the total control of this leader over the society in question and to halt genocide before bloodshed begins. However, a thorough job would require full access to and the linguistic and cultural expertise to understand domestic media reports.

### *Thick Versus Thin Citizenship*

Only briefly discussed in the section on *Ethnicity Versus Citizenship*, the model of “thick” versus “thin” is also used to determine the scale of the effect of religion and other sociological factors in a society. The subject is somewhat outside the scope of this study, but it is likely, that the development of a set of markers for the identification of thick versus thin citizenship requirements within a society are also valuable indicators for the likelihood of genocide.

### *Propaganda As Distinct Indicator*

There is also the possibility that propaganda itself may serve as a distinct warning indicator. Once the primary indicators are ranked accordingly for a country, one might consider how propaganda correlates with these main conditions. One could determine whether there is imagery more effective in mobilizing the population based on the primary condition or conjunction of conditions. The key to determining this is in linking the current predominant indicators of failure to specific nationalist imagery for optimum incitement.





## Annex I: Origins And Motivational Sources Of Mistreatment

Enviromental and Cultural Origins	Motivational Consequences	Psychological and Behavioral Means of Fulfilling Motives
<p><i>A. Difficult Life Conditions</i></p> <p>Economic problems (inflation, depression, etc.); political, criminal, or other widespread violence, including war; rapid changes in technology; social institutions, values, ways of life; social disorganization.</p> 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Retaliation and harm-doing (hostile aggression)</li> <li>2. Defense of the physical self</li> <li>3. Motivation to overcome obstacles, to fulfill expectations and goals</li> <li>4. Defense or elevation of psychological self (self-concept, values, ways of life); desire to relinquish burdensome identity</li> <li>5. Desire for a feeling of efficacy, control, power</li> </ol>	<p>Mistreatment, aggression</p> <p>Escape; nonaggressive self-defense; aggression; submission or giving up</p> <p>Instrumental aggression, constructive (individual/communal) actions</p> <p>Devaluating, scapegoating; diminishing others by mistreatment or aggression; giving up self to new group or leader; adopting an ideology; acting constructively for change</p>
<p><i>B. Cultural and Personal Preconditions</i></p> <p>Self-concept, goals and aims, value orientations; ingroup-outgroup differentiation, devaluation; orientation to authority; monolithic (vs. pluralistic) culture; emerging ideology; cultural aggressiveness and others</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Motivation to protect and elevate social identity (societal self-concept)</li> <li>7. Motivation to gain renewed comprehension of the world and of the self in the world</li> </ol>	<p>Protecting and elevating one's group, partly by diminishing other groups; adopting new group; also those means listed above</p> <p>Adopting ideology; joining new group; acting to elevate and protect old group</p>
<p><i>C. Societal-political Orientation</i></p> <p>Authoritarian or totalitarian system; social institutions discriminating (vs. promoting harmony, cooperation, and altruism); institutions capable of carrying out mistreatment</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Motivation to regain hope</li> <li>9. Need for feeling connected to other human beings</li> <li>Obedience to authority</li> </ol>	<p>Giving up self to new group or leader; adopting an ideology; acting constructively for change</p> <p>Joining group; promoting joint cause; creating strong ingroup by scapegoating; creating an experience of threat to the group</p> <p>Submission to authority, an agentic state</p>





## Annex II: Declarations Of Intent To Commit Genocide

### Nuremberg Laws

**The Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race:  
September 15, 1935<sup>142</sup>**

The Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935

THE REICHSTAG HAS ADOPTED by unanimous vote the following law which is herewith promulgated.

ARTICLE 1. (1) A subject of the state is one who belongs to the protective union of the German Reich, and who, therefore, has specific obligations to the Reich.

(2) The status of subject is to be acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Reich and the state Citizenship Law.

ARTICLE 2. (1) A citizen of the Reich may be only one who is of German or kindred blood, and who, through his behavior, shows that he is both desirous and personally fit to serve loyally the German people and the Reich.

(2) The right to citizenship is obtained by the grant of Reich citizenship papers.

(3) Only the citizen of the Reich may enjoy full political rights in consonance with the provisions of the laws.

ARTICLE 3. The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy to the *Fuehrer*, will issue the required

legal and administrative decrees for the implementation and amplification of this law.

*Promulgated:* September 16, 1935. *In force:*  
September 30, 1935.

**First Supplementary Decree of November 14, 1935**

On the basis of Article III of the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935, the following is hereby decreed:

ARTICLE 1. (1) Until further provisions concerning citizenship papers, all subjects of German or kindred blood who possessed the right to vote in the *Reichstag* elections when the Citizenship Law came into effect, shall, for the present, possess the rights of Reich citizens. The same shall be true of those upon whom the Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy to the *Fuehrer* shall confer citizenship.

(2) The Reich Minister of the Interior, in conjunction with the Deputy to the *Fuehrer*, may revoke citizenship.

ARTICLE 2. (1) The provisions of Article I shall apply also to subjects who are of mixed Jewish blood.

(2) An individual of mixed Jewish blood is one who is

descended from one or two grandparents who, racially, were full Jews, insofar that he is not a Jew according to Section 2 of Article 5. Full-blooded Jewish grandparents are those who belonged to the Jewish religious community.

ARTICLE 3. Only citizens of the Reich, as bearers of full political rights, can exercise the right of voting in political matters, and have the right to hold public office. The Reich Minister of the Interior, or any agency he empowers, can make exceptions during the transition period on the matter of holding public office. The measures do not apply to matters concerning religious organizations.

ARTICLE 4. (1) A Jew cannot be a citizen of the Reich. He cannot exercise the right to vote; he cannot hold public office.

(2) Jewish officials will be retired as of December 31, 1935. In the event that such officials served at the front in the World War either for Germany or her allies, they shall receive as pension, until they reach the age limit, the full salary last received, on the basis of which their pension would have been computed. They shall not, however, be promoted according to their seniority in rank. When they reach the age limit, their pension will be computed again, according to the salary last received on which their pension was to be calculated.

(3) These provisions do not concern the affairs of religious organizations.

(4) The conditions regarding service of teachers in public Jewish schools remains unchanged until the promulgation of new laws on the Jewish school system.

ARTICLE 5 (1) A Jew is an individual who is descended from at least three grandparents who were, racially, full Jews...

(2) A Jew is also an individual who is descended from two full-Jewish grandparents if:

- (a) he was a member of the Jewish religious community when this law was issued, or joined the community later;
- (b) when the law was issued, he was married to a person who was a Jew, or was subsequently married to a Jew;
- (c) he is the issue from a marriage with a Jew, in the sense of Section I, which was contracted after the coming into effect of the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor of September 15, 1935;
- (d) he is the issue of an extramarital relationship with a Jew, in the sense of Section I, and was born out of wedlock after July 31, 1936.

ARTICLE 6. (1) Insofar as there are, in the laws of the Reich or in the decrees of the National Socialist German Workers' Party

and its affiliates, certain requirements for the purity of German blood which extend beyond Article 5, the same remain untouched....

ARTICLE 7. The *Fuehrer* and Chancellor of the Reich is empowered to release anyone from the provisions of these administrative decrees.

## Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) Memorandum 1986

There is deep concern in Yugoslavia because of stagnating social development, economic difficulties, growing social tensions, and open inter-ethnic clashes. A serious crisis has engulfed not only the political and economic arenas, but Yugoslavia's entire system of law and order as well. Idleness and irresponsibility at work, corruption and nepotism, a lack of confidence in and disregard for the law, bureaucratic obstinacy, growing mistrust among individuals, and increasingly arrogant individual and group egoism have become daily phenomena. The resulting blow to moral values and to the reputation of leading public institutions and a lack of faith in the competence of decision-makers have spread apathy and bitterness among the public and produced alienation from all the mainstays and symbols of law and order. An objective examination of Yugoslav reality suggests that the present crisis may end in social shocks with unforeseeable consequences, including such a catastrophic eventuality as the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state. No one can close his eyes to what is happening and to what may happen. Certainly, our nation's oldest institute of scientific and cultural creativity cannot do so.

In these fateful times, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences feels obliged to express its views on society's condition in the conviction that this will help us find a way out of our present troubles. The nature of this document, however, obliges us to limit ourselves to the key issues of Yugoslav reality. Regretfully, these issues include the undefined and difficult position of the Serbian nation, a position brought to the fore by recent events.

In order to understand the primacy of ethnicity in the present practice of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia it is necessary to consider the influence of the Comintern on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between the two world wars. The Comintern's strategy during that period derived from the conclusion that following the failure of the proletarian revolution in Western Europe, the Communist parties of Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe had to depend on national movements, even though they were expressly anti-socialist and based on the idea of national rather than class unity. Stalin engaged in crushing all opposition to such a strategy (as, for example, in the case of Sima Markovic, one of the founders of the Yugoslav Communist Party). In this spirit, the solution to the national question was formulated and developed theoretically by Sperans (Kardelj) in his book "Razvoj slovenskoga narodnoga vprsanja" (The Development of the Slovene National Question), which generally served as the ideological model for Yugoslav development in the direction of a confederation of sovereign republics and autonomous regions, which was finally achieved by the Constitution of 1974.

The two most developed republics, which achieved their national programs with this Constitution, are now the most ardent defenders of the existing system. Thanks to the political position of their leaders at the centers of political power, they have held (both

before and after the decisive years of the 1960s) the initiative in all matters affecting the political and economic system. They modelled the social and economic structure of Yugoslavia to suit their own desires and needs. Nothing would seem more normal that they now defend the structure that they stubbornly took so long to build, a structure that represents the attainment of most of their national programs.

No one needs convincing that separatism and nationalism are active on the social scene, but there is insufficient understanding of the fact that such trends have been made ideologically possible by the Constitution of 1974. The constant reinforcement of and the competition engendered by separatism and nationalism have driven the (ethnic) nations further from one another to a critical degree. The manipulation of language and the confinement of scientific and cultural professionals within the ranks of the republics and regions are sorry signs of the growing power of particularism. All new ethnogeneses are unfortunate products of locally closed, regional ideologies and shackled logic, and they are also symptomatic of a retreat from a common past, a common present, and a common future. It is as if everyone wished to flee as fast and as far as possible from a collapsing house. Mental attitudes warn us that the political crisis has reached the critical point, threatening the complete destabilization of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is the clearest expression of this.

No form of political oppression and discrimination on the basis of nationality is properly acceptable in modern society. The Yugoslav solution to the nationalities question could be considered at its inception an exemplary model of a multinational federation in which the principle of the unity of the state and state policy was successfully joined with the principle of the political and cultural autonomy of nationalities and national minorities. During the past two decades the principle of unity has become progressively weaker and the principle of national autonomy is stressed, which has in practice changed into a sovereignty of the parts (republics, which are not ethnically homogenous as a rule). The weaknesses that were present in the model from the beginning became more and more visible. All nations are not equal: the Serbian nation, for example, did not obtain the right to its own state. Unlike national minorities, portions of the Serbian people, who live in other republics in large numbers, do not have the right to use their own language and alphabet, to organize politically and culturally, and to develop the unique culture of their nation. The unstoppable persecution of Serbs in Kosovo in a drastic manner shows that those principles that protect the autonomy of a minority (Albanians) and not applied when it comes to a minority within a minority (Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks and Gypsies in Kosovo). Considering the existing forms of national discrimination, present-day Yugoslavia cannot be considered a democratic state.

Yugoslavia is seen less as a community of citizens, nations and nationalities all equal before the law, and more as a community of eight equal territories. But even this variety of equality does not apply to Serbia because of its special legal and political position which reflects the tendency to keep the Serbian nation under constant supervision. The guiding principle behind this policy has been "a weak Serbia, a strong

Yugoslavia" and this has evolved into an influential mind-set: if rapid economic growth were permitted the Serbs, who are the largest nation, it would pose a danger to the other nations of Yugoslavia. And so all possibilities are grasped to place increasing obstacles in the way of their economic development and political consolidation. One of the most serious of such obstacles is Serbia's present undefined constitutional position, so full of internal conflicts.

The Constitution of 1974, in fact, divided Serbia into three parts. The autonomous provinces within Serbia were made equal to the republics, save that they were not defined as such and that they do not have the same number of representatives in the various bodies of the federation. They make up for this shortcoming by being able to interfere in the internal relations of Serbia proper through the republic's common assembly (while their assemblies remain completely autonomous). The political and legal position of Serbia proper is quite vague-Serbia proper is neither a republic nor a province. Relationships in the republic of Serbia are quite confused. The Executive Council, which is a body of the republic's assembly, is in fact the Executive Council for Serbia proper. This is not the only absurdity in the limitation of authority. The excessively broad and institutionally well established autonomy of the provinces has created two new fissures within the Serbian nation. The truth is that the proautonomy and separatist forces insisted on increasing autonomy, but this would have been difficult to achieve had they not received moral and political support from those republics in which separatist tendencies have never died out.

Relations between Serbia and the provinces cannot be reduced solely or even primarily to a formal legal interpretation of two constitutions. It is primarily a matter of the Serbian nation and their state. A nation that has regained statehood after a long and bloody struggle, that has achieved civil democracy, and that lost two and half million kinsmen in two world wars underwent the experience of having a bureaucratically constructed party commission determine that after four decades in the new Yugoslavia it alone was condemned to be without its own state. A more bitter historic defeat in peacetime cannot be imagined.

The expulsion of the Serbian nation from Kosovo bears spectacular witness to its historic defeat. In the spring of 1981 a very special, but nevertheless open and total war, prepared by administrative, political, and legal changes made at various periods, was declared against the Serbian people. Waged through the skilful application of various methods and tactics, with a division of functions, and with the active, not merely passive, and little concealed support of certain political centers within Yugoslavia (more pernicious than the support coming from outside), this open war, which has yet to be looked in the face and called by its proper name, has been continuing for almost five years. It has thus lasted longer than the entire Yugoslav war of liberation (from April 6, 1941 to May 9, 1945). The Balli (anti-communist nationalist) uprising in Kosovo and Metohija that broke out just before the end of the war with the participation of fascist units was broken militarily in 1944-45, but it appears not to have been broken politically.

Its present form, disguised with a new content, is proceeding more successfully and is moving towards a victorious outcome. A final showdown with neo-fascism did not materialize; all of the measures so far taken have only removed the expression of this aggression from the streets and in fact, its racially motivated and unretracted goals, which are being sought after by all means and at all costs, have only been reinforced. Deliberately drastic sentences are even pronounced on young offenders in order to incite and inflame inter-ethnic hatreds.

The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide perpetrated against the Serbian population of Kosovo and Metohija is the greatest defeat suffered by Serbia in the wars of liberation she waged between Orasac in 1804 and the uprising of 1941. Responsibility for this defeat falls primarily on the still living Comintern heritage in the nationalities policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and on the acquiescence of Serbian communists in this policy and on the exorbitant ideological and political delusion, ignorance, immaturity, and chronic opportunism of an entire generation of post-war Serbian politicians, always on the defensive and always more concerned with the opinions others have of them and of their hesitant explanations of Serbia's position than with the true facts affecting the future of the nation that they lead.

Kosovo is not the only region in which the Serbian nation is being pressured by discrimination. The absolute (and not merely relative) fall in the number of Serbs in Croatia is sufficient proof of this assertion. According to the 1948 census there were 543,795 Serbs in Croatia (14.48% of the total). According to the 1981 census their number has been reduced to 531,502 or only 11.5% of the total number of inhabitants in Croatia. Over 33 peacetime years the number of Serbs in Croatia has declined, even in relation to the immediate post-war period when the first census was taken and when the effects of the war on the number of Serbian inhabitants in Croatia was well known. Lika, Kordun, and Banija have remained the most underdeveloped regions of Croatia and this has greatly encouraged the emigration of Serbs to Serbia and migrations to other parts of Croatia where the Serbs, being newcomers, are a minority and socially inferior group, greatly exposed to assimilation. In any case, the Serbs in Croatia are otherwise exposed to a sophisticated and quite effective policy of assimilation. One component of this policy is the prohibition of all Serbian associations and cultural institutions in Croatia, which had had a rich tradition dating from the Austro-Hungarian and pre-war Yugoslav periods, and the imposition of an official language that bears the name of another nation (Croatia), thus giving concrete shape to national inequality. A constitutional provision has made this language obligatory for the Serbs in Croatia, and nationalistically inclined Croatian linguists are distancing it systematically and by well-organized actions from the language used in the other republics of the Serbo-Croatian language area, and this is helping to weaken the ties binding the Serbs in Croatia to other Serbs. Such action is gladly undertaken at the cost of interrupting language continuity among the Croats themselves and of eliminating international terms that are invaluable for communicating with other cultures, particularly in the field of science and technology. But the Serbian community in

Croatia is not just cut off from their homeland culturally; that homeland cannot keep itself informed of their circumstances or of their economic or cultural situation anywhere near the extent to which it is possible for some nations in Yugoslavia to maintain contact with their compatriots in other countries. The integrity of the Serbian nation and its culture in Yugoslavia as a whole is an issue vital to its survival and progress.

With the exception of the Independent State of Croatia from 1941- 45, Serbs in Croatia have never been as persecuted in the past as they are now. The solution to their national position must be considered an urgent political question. In so much as a solution cannot be found, the results could be disastrous, not just in relation to Croatia, but to all of Yugoslavia.

The question of the Serbian people's position is given considerable weight by the fact that a large number of Serbs live outside of Serbia, especially Serbia proper, and that their number is larger than the total number of people of some other nations. According to the census of 1981, 24% of the Serbian people (1,958,000) live outside of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, which is considerably more than the number of Slovenians, Albanians, Macedonians and taken individually, almost the same as the Muslims. Outside of Serbia proper there are 3,285,000 Serbs or 40.3% of their total population. In the general disintegration process which has taken over Yugoslavia, the Serbs are hit with the most intense disintegration. The present course which our society in Yugoslavia has taken is totally opposite from the one that has moved for decades and centuries until the formation of a unified state. This process is aimed at the total destruction of the national unity of the Serbian people.

Having borne for over half a century the stigma and handicap of being the jailer of the other Yugoslav nations, the Serbian nation was incapable of deriving support from its own history. Many aspects of this history itself were even brought into question. The democratic bourgeoisie tradition for which Serbia had struggled successfully in the 19th century has remained in the shadow cast by the Serbian socialist and labor movement until quite recently because of narrow-mindedness and lack of objectivity on the part of official historiography. This so impoverished and restricted the true picture of the contribution made by Serbian bourgeoisie society to law, culture, and statesmanship that, deformed in this manner, it could not provide mental or moral support to anyone nor could it serve as a foothold for preserving or reviving historical self-confidence. The brave and honorable efforts at liberation exerted by the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina and by all Yugoslav youth, which included Young Bosnia, experienced a similar fate and were pushed into the historical background by the contributions of a class ideology whose proponents and creators were Austrian Marxists, confirmed opponents of movements of national liberation.

Influenced by the ruling ideology, the cultural achievements of the Serbian people are undergoing alienation, being usurped by others or denigrated, or they are ignored and retrogress; the language is being displaced and the Cyrillic script is gradually being

lost. In this connection, the realm of literature is serving as the main arena for caprice and anarchy. The cultural and spiritual integrity of no other Yugoslav nation is so roughly challenged as that of the Serbian nation. No other literary and artistic heritage is so disordered, ravaged, and confused as the Serbian heritage. The political criteria of the ruling ideology are imposed on Serbian culture as being more valuable and stronger than scientific or historical criteria.

After the dramatic interethnic conflicts of the world war, it had appeared that chauvinism has lost momentum was even on the road to oblivion. This appearance has proven deceptive. It was not long before nationalism began rising up once more, and every change in the constitution served to promote its growth. Nationalism has been promoted from above; its chief proponents have been politicians. The fundamental cause of this multi-dimensional crisis is to be found in the ideological defeat of socialism at the hands of nationalism, which has produced the centrifugal processes that have brought the Yugoslav community to the brink of ruin and which has destroyed the old system of values.

Its roots lie in the ideology of the Comintern and in the nationalities policy of the pre-war CPY. The revanchism directed at the Serbian nation as an "exploiting" nation that was built into this policy has had far-reaching consequences for inter-ethnic relations, the social organization, the economic system, and the fate of moral and cultural values since the Second World War. The Serbian nation has been encumbered with a feeling of historical guilt and has remained the only nation not to solve its national problem and not to receive its own state like the other nations. Therefore, the first and foremost action must be to remove this burden of historical guilt from the Serbian nation, to categorically deny the contention that it enjoyed a privileged economic position between the two world wars, and to refrain from denigrating Serbia's liberation-oriented history and contribution in creating Yugoslavia.

Complete national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people is their historic and democratic right, no matter in which republic or province they might find themselves living. The attainment of equality and an independent development have profound historical meaning for the Serbian people. In less than fifty years, over two successive generations, the Serbian nation has been exposed to such severe trials—twice exposed to physical extermination, to forced assimilation, to religious conversion, to cultural genocide, to ideological indoctrination, and to the denigration and renunciation of their own traditions beneath an imposed guilt complex, and thereby disarmed intellectually and politically, that they could not but leave deep spiritual wounds that cannot be ignored as this century of the great technological takeoff draws to a close. In order to have a future in the international family of cultured and civilized nations, the Serbian nation must have an opportunity to find itself again and become a historical agent, must re-acquire an awareness of its historical and spiritual being, must look its economic and cultural interests square in the eyes, and must find a modern social and national program that will inspire this generation and generations to come.

The present depressing condition of the Serbian nation, with chauvinism and Serbophobia being ever more violently expressed in certain circles, favor of a revival of Serbian nationalism, an increasingly drastic expression of Serbian national sensitivity, and reactions that can be volatile and even dangerous. We must not overlook or underestimate these dangers for a moment under any circumstances. But a principled struggle against Serbian chauvinism cannot be based on the reigning ideological and political symmetry in historical guilt. The rejection of this symmetry, fatal to the spirit and morale, with its trite falsehoods and injustices, is a precondition for mobility and effectiveness on the part of democratic, Yugoslav, humanistic awareness in contemporary Serbian culture.

The fact that ordinary citizens and the working class are not represented in the appropriate councils in the Federal Assembly cannot simply be ascribed to favoritism for ethnic nationalisms; it is also the result of an attempt to place Serbia in a position of inequality and thereby weaken her political influence. But the greatest calamity is the fact that the Serbian nation does not possess a state like all of the other nations. True, the first article of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia contains a provision to the effect that Serbia is a state, but the question immediately arises: What kind of a state is one that lacks authority within its own territory and lacks the means to protect the personal property of its citizens, to prevent genocide in Kosovo, and to prevent the emigration of Serbs from their ancient homeland? This position underlines the political discrimination against Serbia, especially when one remembers that the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has imposed internal federalism on Serbia, creating a permanent source of conflicts between Serbia Proper and the provinces. The aggressive Albanian chauvinism in Kosovo cannot be contained until Serbia ceases to be the sole republic whose internal relations are ordered by others.

The Federal Constitution has formally established the equality of all the republics but this has been rendered worthless in practice by forcing the Republic of Serbia to renounce many of its rights and powers in favor of the autonomous provinces, the status of which is regulated by the Federal Constitution to a considerable extent. Serbia must openly state that this is an imposed arrangement. This is especially true in regard to the position of the provinces, which in reality have been promoted to republics and which regard themselves far more as constituent elements of the Federation rather than as parts of the republic of Serbia. Besides failing to consider a state for the Serbian nation, the Yugoslav Constitution also created insurmountable difficulties to the establishment of such a state. In order to satisfy Serbia's legitimate interests, a revision of that constitution is unavoidable. The autonomous provinces must become true integral parts of the Republic of Serbia by granting them a degree of autonomy that would not destroy the integrity of the Republic and would make it possible to act in the common interests of the wider community.

The unhappy matter of Serbian statehood is not the only deficiency that must be corrected by constitutional amendments. The 1974 constitution turned Yugoslavia into a very unstable state community, prone to consider alternatives other than the Yugoslav alternative, as has been made clear in recent statements by public figures in Slovenia and the earlier positions taken by Macedonian politicians. Such considerations and fragmentation lead to the notion that Yugoslavia is in danger of further corrosion. The Serbian nation cannot meekly await the future in such a state of uncertainty. Therefore, all of the nations within Yugoslavia must be given the opportunity to express their wants and intentions. Serbia would then be able to declare and define her own national interests. Discussions and agreements in this vein must precede an examination to the Constitution. Naturally, Serbia must not take a passive stand in all this, waiting to hear what others will say, as she has done so often in the past.

The position of equality that Serbia must strive for presupposes the same initiative in deciding on key political and economic issues as enjoyed by others. Four decades of Serbian passivity have been bad for Yugoslavia as a whole by failing to contribute ideas and critical appraisals based on her longer state tradition, enhanced feeling for national independence, and rich experience in struggling against home-grown usurpers of political freedom. Unless the Serbian nation within Serbia participate on an equal footing in the entire process of decision making and implementation, Yugoslavia cannot be strong--and Yugoslavia's very existence as a democratic, socialist community will be called into question.

An entire period in the development of the Yugoslav community and of Serbia has clearly ended in a historically worn-out ideology, overall stagnation, and ever more obvious regression in the economic, political, moral, and cultural spheres. Such a situation imperatively requires a profound and well-thought out, rationally grounded, and decisively implemented reform of the entire governmental structure and social organization of the Yugoslav community of nations, and speedy and beneficial integration into the modern world through social democracy. The human resources of the entire country must be involved to the utmost extent in social reform in order that we may become a productive, enlightened, and democratic society capable of existing on the fruits of our own labor and creativity and able to make our fair contribution to the human race.

The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences is taking this occasion to express once again its willingness to promote this portentous undertaking and the historical aspirations of our generation with all the resources at its disposal.

### Hutu Manifesto or Hutu Ten Commandments<sup>143</sup>

*Written by Hassan Ngeze, first published in Hutu Power newspaper Kangura (Awaken) in December 1990.*

1. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group as a result we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman, makes a Tutsi woman his concubine, plays a Tutsi woman as secretary or makes her his dependant.
2. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role of women, spouses and family mothers. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
3. Hutu women be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
4. Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is to enhance the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu forms an alliance with Tutsi in business, invests his money or government's money in a Tutsi's enterprise, lends or borrows money from a Tutsi, gives favours to Tutsi in business like obtaining of import licences, bank loans, construction plots, public markets etc.
5. All the strategic posts, be they political, administrative, economic, military and security must be entrusted to Hutu.
6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.
7. The Rwandese armed forces must be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October war has taught us a lesson. No military person should marry a Tutsi woman.
8. The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi.
9. The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity, solidarity and be pre-occupied by the fate of their Hutu brothers the Hutu both inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with our Hutu brothers; they must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy who are Tutsi.
10. The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must be taught to every Hutu and at all levels. Every Hutu must spread widely this ideology. We shall consider a traitor any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother for having read, spread and taught this ideology.

## Annex III: Additional Information/Documents

### **“We wish to inform you...” Letter<sup>144</sup>**

*Letter exemplifying control church leaders had over Rwandan masses, a line of which serves as the title of Philip Gourevitch’s book on Rwanda:*

Our dear leader, Pastor Elizaphan Ntakirutimana,

How are you! We wish you to be strong in all these problems we are facing. We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families. We therefore request you to intervene on our behalf and talk with the Mayor. We believe that, with the help of God who entrusted you the leadership of this flock, which is going to be destroyed, your intervention will be highly appreciated, the same way the Jews were saved by Esther.

We give honor to you.

Signed by Pastors Ezekiel Semugeshi, Isaka Rucondo, Seth Rwanyabuto, Eliezer Seromba, Seth Sebihe, Jerome Gakwaya, and Ezekias Zigirinshuti

*Pastor Ntakirutimana was sentenced to 10 years in prison by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.*

## Annex IV: Other Early Warning Models Of Genocide

*This article has been reproduced in its entirety from the Genocide Watch website:  
<http://www.genocidewatch.org/BuildingAnAnti-GenocideRegimebyGregoryStanton.htm>*

Early warning models matter. They must be comprehensible to policy makers, and provide specific guidance. The U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have each had contracts with social scientists who use multi-variate, statistical models to predict the likelihood of genocide and other forms of violence. The models assign country scores to a large number of abstract risk factors ("level of democracy, trade openness, history of armed conflict, ethnic diversity") and then assess the risk of genocide from their sum (Harff, 2003; Krain, 1997). The models are useful to the extent that they demonstrate the benefit of promotion of democracy and other general policies. But statistical models do not describe the intentional process by which political leaders push a society toward genocide. They therefore are not sufficient to formulate specific counter-measures at each stage of the genocidal process.

To provide immediate early warning signs, Harff (1998) has identified accelerators and triggers that may lead to genocide. They include refugee and internally displaced persons flows, compulsory visible identification of targeted groups, arming of ethnic militias, hate speech, killing of opposition leaders, and massacres. However, Harff's accelerators are not ordered within the predictable process of genocide, the stages that all genocides follow, and therefore fail to predict how close a genocide may be. So that policy-makers can recognize early warning signs and plan specific counter-measures at each stage to stop the process, Stanton has proposed a structural theory of the genocidal process, "The Eight Stages of Genocide." (Stanton 1998) Genocide's eight stages are:

1. **Classification:** Underlying most social scientists' theories of genocide is an image of "ethno-centric man." Because all people grow up and live in particular cultures, speaking particular languages, they identify some people as "us" and others as "them." This fundamental first stage in the process does not necessarily lead to genocide. Genocide only becomes possible with another common human tendency - - considering only "our group" as human, and "de-humanizing" certain others. Thus, we not only develop cultural centers, we also create cultural boundaries that shut other groups out -- and the latter may become the boundaries where solidarity ends and hatred begins. "Us versus them" can be converted by political elites desiring to gain or retain power into ideologies of purity, exclusion, and destruction. (Valentino, 2004) Regimes bent on genocide take great pains to classify their populations. The main preventive measure at this early stage is to develop universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial divisions, that actively promote tolerance and understanding, and that promote classifications that transcend the divisions.

2. **Symbolization:** Names or other symbols are assigned to the classifications. People are named "Jews" or "Gypsies", or distinguished by colors or dress. When combined with hatred, symbols may be forced upon unwilling members of pariah groups: e.g. yellow stars for Jews. To combat symbolization, hate symbols can be legally forbidden (swastikas) as can hate speech. If widely supported, denial of symbolization can be powerful, as it was in Bulgaria, when many Jews refused to wear the yellow star and were not turned in by their Christian neighbors, depriving the yellow star of its significance as a Nazi symbol for Jews.
  
3. **Dehumanization:** One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder.  
At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. In combating dehumanization, incitement to commit genocide should not be confused with protected speech. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech, and should be treated differently than democracies. Hate radio stations should be shut down, and hate propaganda banned.
  
4. **Organization:** Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, though sometimes informally (Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants) or by terrorist groups. Special army units or militias are often trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings. To combat this stage, membership in such militias should be outlawed. Their leaders should be arrested and denied visas for foreign travel. The U.N. should impose arms embargoes on governments and citizens of countries involved in genocidal massacres, and international commissions should investigate crimes against humanity.
  
5. **Polarization:** Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating and silencing the center.  
Prevention may mean security protection for moderate leaders or assistance to human rights groups. Assets of extremists may be seized, and visas for international travel denied to them. Coups d'état by extremists should be opposed by international sanctions.
  
6. **Preparation:** Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. They are often segregated into ghettos, forced into concentration camps, or confined to a famine-struck region and starved. At this stage, a Genocide Emergency should be declared. If the political will of the U.N. Security Council or NATO can be mobilized, armed international intervention should be prepared, or heavy assistance given to the victim group to prepare for its self-defense. Otherwise, at least humanitarian assistance should be organized by the U.N. and private relief groups for the inevitable tide of refugees.

7. **Extermination:** Extermination quickly becomes the mass killing legally called "genocide." It is "extermination" to the killers because they do not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with militias to do the killing. Sometimes the genocide results in revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the downward whirlpool-like cycle of bilateral genocide, as in Burundi.

At this stage, only rapid and overwhelming armed intervention can stop genocide. Real safe areas or refugee escape corridors should be established with heavily armed international protection. (False "safe areas" are worse than none, because they only concentrate the victims.) A multilateral force authorized by the U.N., led by NATO or a regional military power, should intervene. Militarily powerful nations should provide the airlift, equipment, and financial means necessary for the intervention.

8. **Denial:** is the eighth stage that always follows a genocide. It is among the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres. The perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and often blame what happened on the victims. They block investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until driven from power by force, when they flee into exile. There they remain with impunity unless they are captured and a tribunal is established to try them. The best response to denial is punishment by an international tribunal or national courts. There the evidence can be heard, and the perpetrators punished. (Stanton, 2005.)

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<sup>65</sup> Gordy, Eric (1997). The Destruction of Alternatives: Everyday Life in Nationalist Authoritarianism. Berkeley: University of California, Ph.D. Thesis. 51. Accessed 26 April 2006 at: <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW5/volcic.pdf>

<sup>66</sup> Dadrian, Vahakn N. (2003). Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ. 94-8

<sup>67</sup> Baird, Jay W. (1974). The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945. University of Minnesota: Ann Arbor, MI. 244

<sup>68</sup> Fritsche, Peter. (1998). Germans Into Nazis. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. 1-6

<sup>69</sup> BBC UK "On This Day: Germany Announces that Hitler Is Dead." accessed 26 April 2006 at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/1/newsid\\_3571000/3571497.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/1/newsid_3571000/3571497.stm)

<sup>70</sup> Malešič, Marjan. (May 1993). "The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict: August 1<sup>st</sup> 1991 to January 31<sup>st</sup> 1992". Psykologiskt Försvar, Rapport nr 164. Försvarsmedia: Stockholm. 40

<sup>71</sup> Woodward, Susan (1995). Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 229

<sup>72</sup> According to the Human Rights Watch 1999 Report Leave None To tell The Story (accessed 2 April 2006 at: [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-11.htm#P824\\_314441](http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-11.htm#P824_314441)), details of the Arusha Accords were as follows: "The Accords appeared to have dealt with all the major issues in a detailed series of agreements that covered the establishment of the rule of law, the transitional institutions to govern until elections could be held, the repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of displaced persons, and the integration of the two opposing armies. They laid out a clear schedule for implementation of the Accords. In the broad-based transitional government, power was to be shared among three forces: Habyarimana and his group, the RPF, and the block of MDR, PSD, and PL, with the addition of the Democratic Christian Party (PDC). Habyarimana would remain as president, but would lose most of his power to a Council of Ministers, and in that body the MRND was to have only five of nineteen places, instead of the nine held previously. The RPF also was to hold five seats, but received in addition the newly-created post of vice prime minister. The MDR, PL, PSD, and PDC were to have nine ministries plus the post of prime minister, which remained in the hands of the MDR. The parties that composed the broad-based transitional government were also to dominate the transitional legislative assembly with a small number of additional seats allocated, one each for less important parties.

In the integrated army, the Rwandan government was to provide 60 percent of the troops, but would have to share command posts fifty-fifty down to the level of battalion with the RPF. The new army was to count no more than 19,000 soldiers and 6,000 national police, so both forces, the Rwandan army with more than 30,000 soldiers and national police and the RPF with some 20,000 troops, would have to demobilize at least half their military personnel.

The carefully calibrated three-part division of power in the government made it unlikely that any one group could dominate and thus be able to disrupt the movement toward elections and real peace. But the hope of progress depended on each of the groups remaining coherent and able to act as a counterweight to the others."

<sup>73</sup> Details of Hassan Ngeze's involvement as the chief propagandist for the Rwandan genocide are provide here from TrialWatch.org, accessed 26 April 2006 at: <http://www.trial-ch.org/trialwatch/profiles/en/facts/p107.html>

"In 1990, he [Ngeze] founded the newspaper Kangura, with [other well known personalities of the "Akazu" (which means "the little house" – being a reference to the entourage of President Habyarimana). The first publication was entirely financed by the Information Bureau of the Presidency. The creation of this publication, for which Ngeze was made the chief editor, was part of a much wider strategy on the part of the State. By setting up such "hate media", the authorities hoped to broadcast as widely as possible the official ethnic message. These media had a great influence on the Rwandan population and played a major role in the genocide. On occasion they were used as a direct means to communicate lists of people to be executed, and also to bring about, in a subtle way, a climate of perpetual tension and an intensification of

inter-ethnic hatred.

Kangura, for example, published the “Ten Commandments of the Bahutus” (December 1990) which was an unequivocal call to contemptibility for and hatred towards the Tutsi minority in addition to constituting slander and persecution against Tutsi women

In 1991, Hassan Ngeze (in close collaboration with Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza) planned the killings of the Bagogwe (Northern Tutsis) in the Mutura Commune, in the Gisenyi Prefecture. He distributed arms and money to the soldiers of the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi who then committed the massacres. At that same time he was a participant in meetings presided over by Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and others, during which they encouraged the militia and the civilian population to kill Tutsis. As a result of these meetings Tutsis were attacked and murdered.

In 1993, when the “Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines” (Free Radio and Television of the Thousand Hills, RTLM) first went on the air Ngeze became a shareholder of the station as well as its correspondent in Gisenyi. Between January and July, 1994, peoples names were called out over the air by RTLM and designated as enemies. In his role as informant in Gisenyi, Ngeze sent to the RTLM the name of an individual from Gisenyi, which was broadcast by this radio station in April 1994.

From 1990 to 1994, due to the influence he wielded, Ngeze was considered to be a de facto organ of the regime of President Habyarimana. He always attempted to deny this by invoking the fact that he was imprisoned several times by the regime during this same time period: and indeed it has been authenticated that he was imprisoned for high treason from July to October 1990.

At the time of the actual events (the ICTR, by virtue of Article 1 of its Statute, only has jurisdiction over crimes committed between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994), Ngeze was the chief editor of Kangura. As founder of the Movement for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), he was also an influential member of this party, and one of the commanders of the soldiers in the Gisenyi Prefecture. Previously, Hassan Ngeze had been a member of the National Republican Movement for Development (MRND), the party of the President

As chief editor of the Kangura, Ngeze exercised his authority and control over the employees responsible for publication, including the journalists. Furthermore as an important member of the CDR, ex-member of the MRND and one of the army commanders in Gisenyi, he wielded his authority over the troops of the Interahamwe (MRND) and the Impuzamugambi (CDR).

In April, May and June 1994, Ngeze was interviewed by RTLM and Radio Rwanda. During the interview, he called for the extermination of the Tutsis and those Hutus in opposition. He also took sides with the extremist Hutu ideology of the CDR.”

<sup>74</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge University Press: New York. 175-7

<sup>75</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. Cambridge University Press: New York. 179

<sup>76</sup> Woodward, Susan (1995). Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 234

<sup>77</sup> Gellately, Robert and Ben Kiernan, eds. (2003). The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press: New York. 366

<sup>78</sup> Gourevitch, Philip. (1999) We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. Picador: New York. 64

<sup>79</sup> “Definition et Identification de l’ENI [Enemi]” from “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared.” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, April 2006, Number 1. Human Rights Watch. Accessed 8 April 2006 at: <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/>

<sup>80</sup> Gourevitch, Philip. (1999) We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. Picador: New York. 95

<sup>81</sup> Thomas, Dylan. (1946) “A Refusal To Mourn The Death, By Fire, Of A Child In London.” Accessed 16 April 2006 at: [http://www.poetryconnection.net/poets/Dylan\\_Thomas/1093](http://www.poetryconnection.net/poets/Dylan_Thomas/1093)

<sup>82</sup> This may have been a response to Churchill at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. Accessed 16 April 2006 at: [http://www.dkosopedia.com/wiki/Joseph\\_Stalin#Stalin\\_as\\_a\\_theorist](http://www.dkosopedia.com/wiki/Joseph_Stalin#Stalin_as_a_theorist)

<sup>83</sup> Canetti, Elias. Crowds and Power. The Continuum Publishing Corp. New York, NY. 1978. p.138.

- <sup>84</sup> Canetti, Elias. *Crowds and Power*. The Continuum Publishing Corp. New York, NY. 1978. p.138.
- <sup>85</sup> Dadrian, Vahakn N. (2003). *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ. 116-7
- <sup>86</sup> Malešič, Marjan. (May 1993). "The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict: August 1<sup>st</sup> 1991 to January 31<sup>st</sup> 1992". *Psykologiskt Försvar*, Rapport nr 164. *Försvarsmedia*: Stockholm. 64
- <sup>87</sup> Dadrian, Vahakn N. (2003). *Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of the Turko-Armenian Conflict*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, NJ. 96, 101
- <sup>88</sup> [http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein\\_Kampf/](http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/)
- <sup>89</sup> Hitler, Adolf. (1924). *Mein Kampf*. Volume I Chapter XI accessed 25 April 2006 at: [http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein\\_Kampf/mkv1ch11.html](http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv1ch11.html)
- <sup>90</sup> Hitler, Adolf. (1924). *Mein Kampf*. Volume II Chapter XV accessed 25 April 2006 at: [http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein\\_Kampf/mkv2ch15.html](http://www.hitler.org/writings/Mein_Kampf/mkv2ch15.html)
- <sup>91</sup> Accessed 24 April 2006 at: <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-Background17.htm>
- <sup>92</sup> "The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared". A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper. April 2006 Number 1. Accessed 18 April 2006 at: [http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm#\\_Toc132173457](http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm#_Toc132173457)
- <sup>93</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 17
- <sup>94</sup> Canetti, Elias. *Crowds and Power*. The Continuum Publishing Corp. New York, NY. 1978. p.138-39.
- <sup>95</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 82
- <sup>96</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 84-8
- <sup>97</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 177-9
- <sup>98</sup> "Prelude to World War II Timeline" from World War 2.Net. Accessed 19 April 2006 at: <http://www.worldwar-2.net/prelude-to-war/prelude-to-war-index.htm>
- <sup>99</sup> Malešič, Marjan. (May 1993). "The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict: August 1<sup>st</sup> 1991 to January 31<sup>st</sup> 1992". *Psykologiskt Försvar*, Rapport nr 164. *Försvarsmedia*: Stockholm. 125
- <sup>100</sup> "The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared." *A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper*, April 2006, Number 1. Human Rights Watch. Accessed 19 April 2006 at: [http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm#\\_Toc132173454](http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm#_Toc132173454)
- <sup>101</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 79-80
- <sup>102</sup> Gourevitch, Philip. (1999) *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. Picador: New York. 23
- <sup>103</sup> "Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda." (March 1999) *Human Rights Watch*. Accessed 16 April 2006 at: [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-02.htm#P29\\_10436](http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-02.htm#P29_10436)
- <sup>104</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 82
- <sup>105</sup> Gourevitch, Philip. (1999) *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda*. Picador: New York. 95
- <sup>106</sup> Staub, Ervin. (2002). *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge University Press: New York. 85
- <sup>107</sup> A more complete description of this index and its underlying methodology can be found in the Literature Review Chapter. Accessed April 6, 2006 at: <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php?column=9&>
- <sup>108</sup> "For each indicator, the Fund for Peace computed scores using software that analyzed data from tens of thousands of international and local media sources from the last half of 2004." For more information on methodology, see <http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindicators.php>. Accessed 6 April 2006.
- <sup>109</sup> Diamond, Jared. (2005). *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*. Penguin Books: New York. 313

- <sup>110</sup> Diamond, Jared. (2005). Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Penguin Books: New York. 312-28
- <sup>111</sup> “The Failed States Index”. Foreign Policy. July/August 2005. Accessed 20 April 2006 at: [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3098](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098)
- <sup>112</sup> “The Failed States Index”. Foreign Policy. July/August 2005. Accessed 20 April 2006 at: [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\\_id=3098](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098)
- <sup>113</sup> Woodward, Susan (1995). Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 223
- <sup>114</sup> Quattrone, G.A. and Tversky, A. (1988). “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Choice”. American Political Science Review. 82, 726
- <sup>115</sup> Mate Babić was a former Croatian Prime Minister responsible for the economy by the time of this writing. Glenny, Misha. (1993). The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. Penguin Books: New York. 63-4
- <sup>116</sup> Woodward, Susan (1995). Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 224-25
- <sup>117</sup> USAID 2005 Fragile States Strategy accessed 6 April 2006 at: [http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005\\_fragile\\_states\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/policy/2005_fragile_states_strategy.pdf)
- <sup>118</sup> Gellately, Robert and Ben Kiernan. (2003). The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press: New York 208
- <sup>119</sup> The History Place Holocaust Timeline, accessed 24 April 2006 at: <http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/timeline.html#burnThe>
- <sup>120</sup> Woodward, Susan (1995). Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 50, 104-110
- <sup>121</sup> Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. (March 1999). Human Rights Watch. Accessed 6 April 2006 at: [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-02.htm#P409\\_91365](http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno4-7-02.htm#P409_91365)
- <sup>122</sup> Wheaton, Kristan J. (2001). The Warning Solution: Intelligent Analysis in the Age of Information Overload. Fairfax, VA: Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) International Press. 19
- <sup>123</sup> “Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda.” (March 1999) Human Rights Watch. Accessed 8 April 2006 at: [http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-02.htm#P29\\_10436](http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno1-3-02.htm#P29_10436)
- <sup>124</sup> “The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared.” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, April 2006, Number 1. Human Rights Watch. Accessed 8 April 2006 at: <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/>
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- <sup>126</sup> Gellately, Robert and Ben Kiernan. (2003). The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. Cambridge University Press: New York 337
- <sup>127</sup> “Straw Condemns Zimbabwe Elections,” BBCNews, 5 April 2005. Accessed 1 May 2006 at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/4412763.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4412763.stm)
- <sup>128</sup> Fund for Peace Zimbabwe Country Profile, 2006; accessed 1 May 2006 at: [http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/profiles/cp\\_zimbabwe.pdf](http://www.fundforpeace.org/publications/profiles/cp_zimbabwe.pdf)
- <sup>129</sup> The Ndebele are a Zulu people, also called Matubele in Zimbabwe. They arrived in Zimbabwe in 1837, driven out of the Transvaal by the Boers and other Zulu groups. Their militant culture enabled them to conquer the Rhodesian territory (as Zimbabwe was called until independence in 1980) and became the dominant political group, with the western part of the country called Matabeleland. The Shona are traditionally agricultural, growing maize, they settled in eastern Zimbabwe (Mashonaland) in the thirteenth century Background information from The Shona People; accessed 1 May 2006 at: <http://www.uiowa.edu/~africart/toc/people/Shona.html> and Peace Pledge Union Online, accessed 1 May 2006 at: <http://www.ppu.org.uk/war/countries/africa/zimbabwe.html>
- <sup>130</sup> Genocide Watch’s Politicide Watch: Zimbabwe, 20 February, 2002. Accessed 1 May 2006 at: <http://www.genocidewatch.org/zimbabwepoliticidewatch.htm>

<sup>131</sup> “Zimbabwe; Bill to Deal With Terrorism Gazetted,” Africa News: The Herald, Harare, 27 March 2006 Accessed via Lexis Nexis Academic on 1 May 2006: “A NEW Bill to deal with terrorism and mercenary activity -- which are currently not adequately addressed by the existing laws in Zimbabwe -- has been gazetted.

The Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Bill (2006) will provide for the curtailment of foreign and international terrorism, including mercenary activity. Under the proposed legislation, it would be an offence to undergo training for foreign or international terrorism, to recruit persons to undergo such training, or to possess weaponry that would be used for the purposes of foreign or international **terrorist** activity.

The maximum penalty under the proposed law for such offences would be life imprisonment. It would also be an offence to knowingly harbour or conceal a foreign or international **terrorist** or to fail to report such **terrorist** within 72 hours of becoming aware of his or her presence in Zimbabwe. The maximum penalties for such offences would be a hefty fine or 10 years' imprisonment or both in the case of harbouring or concealing a foreign or international **terrorist**; and a fine or five years' imprisonment or both for failing to report or disclose such **terrorist's** presence upon being questioned by an official.

The proposed legislation comes in the wake of the recent discovery of a large arms cache with an assortment of weapons and ammunition in Mutare that was linked to a self-proclaimed, little-known **terrorist** group -- Zimbabwe Freedom Movement. Several MDC activists who were picked up in connection with the case have since been released after the High Court ruled that they had been wrongfully arrested. However, ex-Rhodesian soldier Michael Peter Hitschmann is still facing charges of conspiracy to possess weaponry for insurgency.

He has been denied bail at the High Court and has been remanded in custody. The arms were allegedly to be used in an assassination bid on President **Mugabe**, Mutare businessman and Zanu-PF official Cde Esau Mupfumi and ruling party MP for Chipinge South Cde Enock Porusingazi, among others, during the 21st February Movement celebrations in Mutare. Under the proposed law, the Minister of Home Affairs, after consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, would designate by notice in a statutory instrument any organisation to be a foreign or an international **terrorist** organisation.

After an organisation has been categorised as a **terrorist** organisation, it would be declared to be unlawful and that could only be revoked after the said organisation makes a fresh application to the Minister of Home Affairs. Any person who collects or supplies information for purposes of foreign or international **terrorist** activity shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a hefty fine or imprisonment not exceeding five years or both. Materially assisting foreign or international **terrorists** knowingly or after realising that there is a real risk or possibility that the property or money would be used by the foreign or international **terrorist** organisation, shall be an offence liable to a heavy fine or five years' imprisonment or both.”

<sup>132</sup> “BBC Monitoring Africa Watch Zimbabwe press review for 17 March,” Accessed via Lexis Nexis Academic on 1 May 2006: “The spectacular collapse of the Mutare arms-cache case has exposed the latest Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) bid to link the opposition MDC and white farmers to an imagined plot to assassinate President Robert **Mugabe**. Intelligence source! s said yesterday following the "discovery" of arms at the home of one of the suspects, Peter Hitschmann, government dispatched teams of CIO agents across the country to raid licensed arms dealers with the aim of publicizing the findings as "evidence" of a nationwide **terrorist** plot. The sources said the case was designed to make it appear as if the country was under attack.”

<sup>133</sup> “Mugabe heads for disputed victory,” UPI, Washington, 1 April 2005, Accessed via Lexis Nexis Academic on 1 May 2006: “Pius Ncube, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, **Zimbabwe's** second-largest city, infuriated the government Sunday by accusing it in a series of interviews with British and South African news organizations of withholding food from political strongholds of the MDC in drought-ravaged Matabeleland in the southwest of the country. The allegations were angrily denied. But they were especially potent because the **Matabele** people were never supporters of Mugabe, and he mercilessly crushed them after taking power in the early 1980s.”

<sup>134</sup> “Zimbabwe; Federation Calls Merely a Search for Identity,” Financial Gazette – Africa News, 1 December 2005, accessed via Lexis Nexis Academic on 1 May 2006: “Asked why the government has always been against the idea of a federal system yet the Ndebele are not calling for a secession, the

observer said Matabeleland was too rich to be left alone because there was a real danger it could fight for secession.

"It has vast tourism resources through the Victoria Falls and Hwange National Park. It has the power stations at Hwange and is therefore vital for the supply of power to the country. It has vast resources of methane gas. These are vital resources that the nation cannot afford to tamper with."

<sup>135</sup> International Press Institute World Press Freedom Review. Accessed 1 May 2006 at:

<http://www.freemedia.at/wpfr/Africa/zimbabwe.htm>

<sup>136</sup> "Mugabe government jams private radio station," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Cape Town, 20 March 2005. Accessed via Lexis Nexis Academic on 1 May 2006: "Zimbabwean President Robert **Mugabe's** government is jamming broadcasts to Zimbabwe from a London-based pro-democracy radio station, an independent media monitoring agency said Sunday.

The Zimbabwe Media Monitoring Project (MMPZ) said the government was using sophisticated Chinese equipment to block out broadcasts from Short Wave Radio Africa, run by a group of exiled Zimbabwean press freedom activists.

The watchdog quoted a report by the Washington-based federal International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), which said the jamming appeared to emanate from Thornhill, a military airbase and state communications centre in the central city of Gweru.

Three jammers were being used to scramble the SWRA's three shortwave frequencies, according to the IBB.

The British Broadcasting Corporations Monitoring Services also confirmed the jamming operation. "The interfering signals were present only for the period of the SWRA programming," said a spokesman."

<sup>137</sup> "Why Moyo Should Not Be Blacked Out," Financial Gazette, Africa News, 12 August 2005. Accessed via Lexis Nexis Academic on 1 May 2006: "It is an understatement to say that before 2000, Zimbabwe had never seen a government minister like Moyo both with respect to the over-zealousness, shamelessness and ruthlessness with which he went about making sure the full weight of his ministerial power was felt.

Spearheading a crude and amateurish propaganda offensive comparable to that waged by Red China's chairman Mao during his disastrous Cultural Revolution, Moyo single-handedly destroyed the media as Zimbabweans had known it and demanded sycophancy, bias, outright fabrication and other unprofessional practices of journalists. Those who were unwilling to sell their professional souls became targets of Moyo's savage tirades and harangues. As a result, thousands were forced out of their jobs from state media organisations. Correspondents of foreign media organisations were harassed or deported and news giants such as the BBC were banned from reporting from Zimbabwe.

Despite his belated protestations, Moyo was the chief architect of the draconian media laws introduced under the umbrella of the deceptively named Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). Even if AIPPA was not Moyo's brainchild, he outdid the rest of cabinet and the ruling party hierarchy in his over-zealous promotion and defence of the statute. As the responsible minister, he never missed a chance to brandish the provisions of AIPPA to justify his endless clashes with the media and civil society, promote **hate speech** and to victimise journalists who disagreed with him or the government.

Under Moyo's leadership, journalists were harassed and arrested on flimsy and trumped up charges and newspapers were closed down on tenuous grounds. To cut a long story short, Moyo, who used his position as minister to pick quarrels with stakeholders from all sectors of Zimbabwean society, was simply bad news during the five years he wielded power. But after his intoxication with power and an inflated sense of his own importance led to self political strangulation and an unceremonious ejection from ZANU PF, Moyo is now, without a hint of irony or a pang of shame, once again in anti-establishment mode."

<sup>138</sup> Full text of Moyo's disclosure was published in three weekly installments from 7 April through 21 April 2006 on NewZimbabwe. Accessed 1 May 2006 at:

<http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/sky96.14063.html>

<sup>139</sup> DIA Workforce Of The Future: Creating The Future Of The Defense Intelligence Agency, 15 May 2003 White Paper accessed on 2 March 2006 at:

[http://www.dia.mil/thisisdia/DIA\\_Workforce\\_of\\_the\\_Future.pdf](http://www.dia.mil/thisisdia/DIA_Workforce_of_the_Future.pdf)

<sup>140</sup> Wright, Sam. (1978). *Crowds and Riots: A Study in Social Organization*. Sage Publications, 133

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<sup>141</sup> Plous, Scott. The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. (1993) McGraw-Hill, Inc. New York, NY, 68

<sup>142</sup> "The Nuremberg Laws on Citizenship and Race: September 15, 1935". Accessed 25 April 2006 at: <http://www.mtsu.edu/~baustin/nurmlaw2.html>

<sup>143</sup> Power, Samantha. (2002). A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York, NY: Basic Books. 338-39

<sup>144</sup> Gourevitch, Philip. (1999) We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. Picador: New York. 42