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SOLDIERS AND STATE-BUILDING:
THE APPROACH OF THE DANISH ARMED FORCES TO RECONSTRUCTION SUPPORT

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Summary

The Danish armed forces, together with the armed forces of other nations, have come under political pressure to accept a range of state-building tasks, including support for reconstruction. This is the case in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan where few civilian and humanitarian organisations are willing to operate. This report analyses how the Danish armed forces have approached and prioritised reconstruction support and asks how their performance might be improved. It is based on empirical evidence collected over a period of five months of "embedded" research, during which the author took part in the daily activities of deployed Danish units in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. It points out how the Danish units assigned reconstruction support tasks are neglected in a number of ways by their own organisation and show how they nevertheless perform well as measured against basic principles of good development work. It draws on Edgar H. Schein's theory of organisational culture to explain this pattern and shows how civil tasks, while clashing with some aspects of the culture of Danish armed forces – notions about mission and means to fulfil the mission – are compatible with other parts – notions about human beings and human relations. The report closes with a discussion of which political, organisation, and educational initiatives would enhance the current performance of reconstruction support tasks.

Resumé

Det danske forsvar er – i lighed med mange andre vestlige nationers styrker – blevet underlagt et politisk krav om, at det også skal kunne støtte civilt genopbygningsarbejde i konfliktområder, særligt i områder som Irak og Afghanistan, hvor meget få civile organisationer er villige til at operere. Denne rapport ser nærmere på hvordan danske styrker går til arbejdet med at støtte genopbygningen og giver et bud på hvordan effekten af genopbygningsarbejdet kan forbedres. Konklusionerne er baseret på empiri, indsamlet over en periode på 5 måneder, hvor forfatteren deltog i danske enheders træning, uddannelse og arbejde i henholdsvis Danmark, Kosovo, Irak og Afghanistan. Rapporten viser, at de danske enheder, der forestår selve genopbygningsarbejdet i henholdsvis Irak og Afghanistan, bliver underprioriteret på en række områder af deres egen organisation, men at de på trods af dette udfører et godt stykke arbejde set i forhold til blandt andet en række basale principper for godt genopbygningsprojektarbejde. Rapporten forklarer dette mønster ved at trække på Edgar H. Scheins teori om organisationskultur. Den

viser, hvordan civile opgaver, skønt de kolliderer med visse aspekter af kulturen i det danske forsvar – forestillinger om hvad forsvarets kernemission er og hvilke instrumenter der er effektive når den mission forfølges – samtidig understøttes af andre elementer af det danske forsvars kultur – grundlæggende antagelser om menneskets natur og menneskelige relationer. Rapporten slutter af med at diskutere hvilke politiske, organisatoriske og uddannelsesmæssige initiativer, der ville kunne forbedre effekten af det nuværende genopbygningsarbejde.

Acknowledgements

1. Introduction, Purpose, and Delimitation

The engagement of soldiers in civilian tasks has had its ebbs and flows over history. During and in the wake of World War II, the responsibility for administrating conquered territory often fell to military authorities. Moreover, the decolonisation wars saw European armed forces deeply involved in public security, political, and development tasks. Civil affairs and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) was paid limited attention during the Cold War, but the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s brought a renewed emphasis to their importance. The tasks of dealing with failed states, interethnic wars, and complex insurgencies, particularly in areas where civilian actors and agencies have come under fire and in part withdrawn, have increasingly drawn Western soldiers into humanitarian and reconstruction tasks.[1]

The pros and cons of such an engagement have been debated extensively with no conclusive result. The same is true when it comes to the more general question, of *whether* and *how* to do "state-building."[2]

The concern of this report is of a more limited and practical nature. Given the fact that Danish armed forces, with the armed forces of other nations, already are deeply engaged in a number of areas where few civilian and humanitarian organisations are willing to operate, and given that they face a political demand to

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[1] Zaalberg, Thijs W. Brocades. 2006. *Soldiers and Civil Power. Supporting or Substituting Civil Institutions in Modern Peace Operations*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 14.

[2] A major issue for the civilian critics of this trend is the purported risks entailed in blurring the line between civil and military actors – presumably endangering the civilians by making them appear as parties to the conflict. For interventions, summaries, and analyses of this debate see Abiev, Francis Kofi. 2003. From Civil Strife to Civic Society: NGO-Military Cooperation in Peace operations. Occasional Paper no. 39. Ottawa, Ontario: The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs; Byman, Daniel L. 2001. Uncertain partners: NGOs and the Military. *Survival* vol. 43, no. 2: 97-114; Phelan, Jake, Graham Wood. 2005. Bleeding Boundaries. Civil-military relations and the cartography of neutrality. Surrey, UK: Ockenden International; Jenny, Joëlle. 2001. Civil-Military Cooperation in Complex Emergencies: Finding Ways to Make it Work. *European Security* vol. 10, no.2: 23-33; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of DefenseDefence, Danish Refugee Council, Danish Church Relief Agency, Doctors Without Borders. 2004. *Rapport fra den midlertidige arbejdsgruppe vedrørende samarbejdet mellem nødhjælpsorganisationerne og forsvaret*. Copenhagen; Pugh, Michael. 2000. Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo crisis: An Emerging Hegemony? *Security Dialogue* vol. 31, no. 2: 229-242; Slim, Hugo. 1996. The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations. *International Peacekeeping* vol. 3, no. 2: 123-140. On the discussion of state-building, see Breitenbauch. Henrik Ø. 2005. *Transition til statsbygning efter intervention*. DIIS Report 13. Copenhagen: DIIS;. Cordesman. Anthony H. 2006. *Iraq's Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

engage in reconstruction support tasks, how have they approached and prioritised the task? How might their performance be improved?

The report is based on empirical evidence collected over a period of five months of "embedded" research, during which the author took part in the daily activities of deployed Danish units in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. This evidence reveals, at first sight, a puzzling combination: The Danish units assigned reconstruction support tasks are neglected in a number of ways by their own organisation. Still, they bring a high level of engagement and energy to the work and they perform well as measured against basic principles of good development work.[3] Explaining this pattern, the report draws on Edgar H. Schein's Theory of Organisational Culture, and points to the composite nature of the culture of the Danish armed forces. Civilian tasks arguably clash with some aspects of this culture – notions about mission and means to fulfil the mission – yet, are compatible with other parts – notions about human beings and human relations.

Some scholars have suggested that "military culture", that is, the worldview, key values, and self-image of the armed forces, is generally incompatible with civil-support tasks.[4] Assuming that cultural change is normally a slow and complicated process, these scholars are pessimistic about the potential to improve the military performance of reconstruction support, for example. This report leaves room for more optimism. The composite nature of the Danish military culture demands that while some degree of cultural evolution would be required, an effort to document and explain how civilian tasks are indispensable to achieving desired military and mission end-states is also important.

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[3] For an overview of these principles, see Nastsios, Andrew W. 2005. The nine principles of reconstruction and development. *Parameters*, autumn: 10.

[4] Gordon, Stuart. 2006. The changing role of the military in assistance strategies. In *Resetting the rules of engagement. Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations*, eds. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer. HPG Research Report 21.London, p. 52; Nicolas T. Veicherts. 2006. *Samtænkning – modstand og muligheder*. DIIS Report 2006:5. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, p. 12.

2. Structure

This report opens with an account of the "project-embedded researcher" and a discussion of the methodological advantages and drawbacks to embedded research. It then provides a brief introduction to the theoretical perspective guiding the inquiry: The organisational culture theory of Edgar H. Schein. It outlines Schein's concept of culture and explains why culture is important in order to understand organisational behaviour – in this case the behaviour of the Danish armed forces and deployed Danish units.

This report proceeds to explain the strategic backdrop against which Western armed forces have come under political pressure to engage in civilian tasks such as reconstruction support. It shows how the need to pursue security, political progress, and economic development simultaneously has been embraced in official policy documents and doctrines on both sides of the Atlantic, and how specific policy initiatives, like the Danish Concerted Planning and Action (CPA) initiative, involves a direct role for soldiers in reconstruction and civil support.

This report then focuses on the Danish case and outlines how CPA has been implemented in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan (there are no CPA activities in Kosovo). Based on participant observation and semi-structured interviews, the author discusses the challenges encountered by and the performance of designated reconstruction support units. Schein's concept of culture is used to make sense of the observed pattern. Finally, based on an analysis of key concepts of this composite organisational culture, the report discusses how the military execution of CPA might be improved.

3. About "Project Embedded Researcher"

In the public mind, an "embed" is normally a journalist. Under the 2003 invasion of Iraq more than 500 journalists and photographers travelled with deployed units and reported directly from the front line.[5] Embedding researchers with the armed forces, on the contrary, is still an unusual phenomenon.[6] When presented with the research proposal, which eventually led to this report, however, the Danish Defence Command immediately embraced the idea and organised for the necessary training, education, logistics, and security.

A stay in any Danish deployment area as well as the ability to participate in the daily life of a deployed unit requires a certain familiarity with the military lingo, rules, and regulations. In order to acquire this knowledge, the author underwent basic military training at garrisons in Denmark. She also participated in part of the pre-deployment training and education of designated CIMIC and reconstruction support units and attended the week-long final exercise of the Danish Battle Group to be deployed to Iraq in February 2006. This served the dual purpose of introducing the researcher to members of those particular units whose work she would study, prior to deployment, as well as giving an impression of how these units are prepared for their tasks.

In the field the author lived alongside deployed units in Camp Olaf Rye in Mitrovica, Kosovo; Camp Danevang and Basra Palace Base in Basra, Iraq; Kaia International Airport Base in Kabul and the camp of Provincial Reconstruction Team Feyzabad, (PRT Feyzabad), Afghanistan. Here, she took part in the daily activities of the staff (briefings, meetings, planning) and conducted semi-structured interviews with Danish officers, non-commissioned officers, and warrant officers. Interviews were also carried out with members of the armed forces of partner countries, as well as with international civilians and development professionals

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[5] The quality of the reporting has been debated. While some have praised the access granted and the immediacy of the reporting, others have cautioned that travelling alongside the armed forces creates a dependency and a "closeness," which threatens the objectivity. Similar issues arise for the researcher and are discussed below. PBS Newshour Extra. Pros and Cons of Embedded Journalism. March 27, 2003. Available on http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/ (accessed January 24, 2007); Zwirko, Walt. Embedded journalist' reporting questioned. *Dallas Morning News*. April 8, 2003.

[6] Anthropologist, Katrine Nørgaard, employed by the Danish Defence Academy has previously been embedded with the Danish Battalion in Kosovo while conducting Ph.D. research. Nørgaard, Katrine. 2004. *Tillidens teknologi. Den militære ethos og viljen til dannelse.* Ph.D. thesis. Copenhagen University: Institute for Anthropology.

present in Danish deployment areas. The author moreover had the opportunity to talk to a number of local Kosovars, Iraqis, and Afghans during patrols and meetings. These interviews, however, were conducted through an interpreter and mostly in a non-structured way. The author joined the operative units on regular patrols in the deployment area, and participated in a number of the meetings, monitoring visits, and project hand-over ceremonies of CIMIC and reconstruction support units. She also attended training sessions where international police officers carried out training of local security forces. Finally, the author was able to join a number of patrols with French Liaison and Monitoring Teams in Kosovo and the work of German CIMIC units in Afghanistan.[7]

Wearing a uniform throughout the tour, outsiders would not be able to distinguish the author from other members of the Danish armed forces, apart from on those occasions where she was presented as such (meetings with locals and some hand-over ceremonies). The author, having obtained security clearance prior to departure, was placed under no restrictions by the Danish armed forces, except for normal restrictions pertaining to the handling of classified information, and a request not to discuss upcoming operations with outsiders.

[7] A more detailed list of attended courses, patrols, and meetings as well as a list of interviewees is provided at the end of this report.

4. Advantages and Challenges of Embedded Research

The position as an embed provides for both methodological advantages and challenges. Field studies and participant observation, including semi-structured interviews with members of the group of study, most common within the fields of ethnography and anthropology, are generally regarded as methods ensuring a high degree of validity. Insights generated by observation, conversation, and participation over a longer period in the natural setting of the group under study are likely to mirror reality quite accurately. As the researcher becomes accepted as a "natural" part of the environment, he or she is likely to gain confidence and access to activities and attitudes never disclosed to total outsiders. He or she is also likely to develop an intuitive understanding of the surrounding culture, permitting her to formulate better questions, and to interpret the collected data more accurately. However, this demands that the researcher addresses the potential problems of "reactivity", that people might alter their behaviour in response to the researcher, to please, tease, or deceive, and also that the researcher avoids the temptation to "go native", growing to identify so strongly with the "objects of study" that he or she looses her objectivity. Whereas participant observation and field studies have the potential to offer a high-validity tool, the reliability of data collected during field studies and participant observation might be more questionable. It can be difficult for other researchers to replicate the results and generalise to groups other than those originally studied. Data collection is likely to be highly dependant on the evolving relationship between the researcher and the individuals and informers of the surrounding culture. In summary, participant observation can provide access – sometimes the only possibility for access – to in depth insights about the behaviour and thinking of a specific group, but the insights might pertain to a rather limited segment of the reality.[8]

With regard to the relatively narrow and practical research question of this report: how have the Danish armed forces approached reconstruction support, and how might their performance be improved, participant observation arguably provides a good tool. The position as embed provides for unique access and insights into the daily life and challenges in the deployment areas. "The insider" has a privileged vantage point for observing routines, procedures, modes of interaction, planning,

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[8] Bernard, H. Russell. 1995. *Research Methods in Anthropology. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* California: Altamira Press: 140-141; Margaret D. LeCompte & Judith Preissle Goetz. 1982. Problems of Reliability and Validity in Ethnographic Research. *Review of Educational Research.* Vol. 52, no. 1: 31-60.

thinking, and operating in Danish units. Interview questions formulated on the basis of such knowledge are likely to be more refined than questions formulated by an outsider, and the partial insider is likely to be trusted more by the respondents (or, as a minimum, elicit better answers because she in part speaks the language of the insiders). Moreover, observations during meetings and patrols provide first-hand impressions of the approach of locals, civilians, and members of the armed forces of other countries to Danish units and vice versa. Even if a researcher on a relatively short stay in a military camp will never become regarded as "one of the boys," the presence in the field, the willingness to share the daily conditions of soldiers and officers, and the effort to learn and accord with military rules and regulations earned recognition by the personnel on the ground. The mood of "we are in this together," which arises in connection with hardship due to heat, bad infrastructure, or missile attacks on the camp can hardly be recreated in other settings. The frequently hour long sojourns in shelters in Iraq as well as routine patrols in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan proved to be particularly conducive to apparently free and frank talk. All in all, the level of openness and willingness to talk, including the willingness to criticise ones own organisation, was quite impressive.

With the purpose of gaining insights into the attitude towards CPA, but also into the key concept of the broader organisational culture of the Danish armed forces, the author systematically interviewed all the leading officers of the deployed units working with intelligence, plans and operations, civil-military cooperation, press and information activities. She interviewed commanders, chiefs-of-staff, deputy chiefs-of-staff as well as the officers in charge of operative units: CIMIC, reconstruction support units, liaison and monitoring units, military observation teams, scouts and armoured infantry units. The interviewees included both front line and reserve officers. The notion behind this choice of respondents was, that the elite, broadly defined, are believed to be the bearers of organisational culture and thus provide a window into this culture. Interviews with other groups, as outlined in the section above, were used to place these insights into a wider perspective. In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, the author has opted to refer only to the camp or deployment area in which the interview was carried out, and not to give a more specific reference to rank and function. Given the small size of deployed Danish contingents, more elaborate references would make it possible to identify the respondents. Instead the report contains a list of the rank and names of respondents, who have agreed to appear in the list. Those who have preferred not to – very few – obviously do not appear.

The problem of reactivity with regard to both participant observation and interviews is present, but reduced in a five-month long participant observation, permitting the author much better insights and a broader perspective on the topic of study. To help discover potential bias in the interview material, which might nevertheless appear, the author has discussed a number of her findings and considerations with trusted officers of both the line and the reserve – the latter offering the advantage of being both inside and outside the armed forces. In terms of participant observation, the fact that the author was wearing a uniform, and thus was not distinguishable from other Danish officers to an outsider, probably eliminated the reactivity problem with regard to observing the reactions of locals and members of other nations' armed forces to Danish units. To insiders the uniform probably made the author appear as a more "natural" part of the unit. The comparative perspective on the conduct of Danish units in areas with varying security situations also helped ensure a balanced picture. Arguably, the logic and pressures of the situation in the more difficult environments is likely to overrule the potential impact of the presence of one researcher amongst a 500-strong unit. The author could, moreover, guarantee access to a broad slice of reality by comparing her own knowledge and experience, with the impression of the situation conveyed to two VIP delegations, visiting deployed units during her stay.

Finally, the potential pitfall of "going native" is particularly acute when the researcher not only lives among the people she studies, but is aware of being a select and trusted individual, and, not least, depends on the armed forces for personal security. The ethnographic and anthropological literature offers no remedy. It is recommended, however, that the researcher discusses her findings with peers and colleagues as well as takes a break at some point during the participant observation period.[9] The author of this report has discussed her findings with colleagues at DIIS and elsewhere during the process – colleagues who have been very helpful and very insistent in warning against the "going native" danger. Moreover, she took a one week break in her tour between the stay in Iraq and the stay in Afghanistan.

Bias is a perennial challenge to qualitative research within the social sciences. While the precautions outlined above can never provide watertight guarantees, they nevertheless induce some control. The author does not purport to have gen-

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[9] Bernard, H. Russell. 1995. *Research Methods in Anthropology. Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. California: Altamira Press: 162.

erated an exhaustive picture of the reality in the field, but has produced insights into an important segment of this reality – the approach and thinking of Danish officers, non-commissioned officers, and warrant officers towards CPA.

5. Organisational Culture and the Armed Forces

This report is guided by the notion that although policy doctrines, formal structures and relations of power impact on how organisations, including the armed forces, act, organisational culture plays a role as well.[10] To analyse the impact of culture, the report draws on Edgar H. Schein's theory of organisational culture.[11]

Schein defines organisational culture as "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be perceived as valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."[12] Culture is the product of collective learning and thus grows out of historical experience – it is, in Schein's words, the "residue of functionally efficient decisions of the past."[13]

Schein points to the existence of more levels of organisational culture. At the core is a set of stable, frequently unconsciously-held and non-debatable basic assumptions about the nature of truth and reality, of human beings, and of human relations. Referring to Talcott Parsons, and other sources, Schein argues that notions about reality (what is real, how does one determine what is real, what is relevant/irrelevant information?), human nature (at the core, good, bad, mixed, fixed or malleable?), human relations (competitive, communitarian?) exert a strong structuring influence on perceptions and actions. Basic beliefs are understood to shape perceptions and preferences by providing a set of lenses that reduce the complexity of the surrounding world, indicating what is desirable and what is not desirable, thereby guiding priorities and actions.[14] These basic

[10] An existing body of culturally informed security policy research has explored how divergent organisational cultures complicate the interaction between military and civilian, local and international actors in peacekeeping missions. The primary interest of this study lies, not in the clashes between different organisations with different cultures, but instead in tracing how an organisation's culture impacts on organisational behaviour and how it might cause the actual priorities to diverge from the stated priorities. See for example Rubinstein, Robert A. 2003. *Cross-Cultural Considerations in Complex Peace Operations*. Campbell Public Affairs Institute Working Paper No. 10. Syracuse: The Maxwell School of Syracuse University; Rubinstein, Robert A. 1993. Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping. *Millennium* vol. 22, no. 3: 547-562.

[11] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

[12] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San FransicoFrancisco: Jossey-Bass: 17.

[13] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San FransicoFrancisco: Jossey-Bass: 109.

[14] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 141-182.

beliefs are manifested and supported by a set of articulated beliefs, norms, and operational rules of behaviour. These beliefs concern issues such as the mission and *raison d'etre* of the organisation, goals, means to achieve these goals, ways of measuring results, as well as notions about what remedial action to take in cases of perceived failure.[15]

Culture, according to Schein, is not only a medium for external adaptation, but also serves to enhance internal integration. It provides a common language as well as common notions about inclusion and exclusion, distribution of status and power, rewards and punishment. It provides bonds between existing members and acts as a medium for integrating new members of the organisation. A strong culture is thus regarded as an asset. Yet, Schein also points out that a changing and dynamic environment might render once-functional aspects of an organisation's culture dysfunctional. Deeply entrenched cultural beliefs based on an organisation's historical experience and past successes might hamper adjustment and flexibility in the face of changing tasks and demands.[16]

Ultimately, cultural change is likely to result if an organisation faces a severe survival crisis. A severe public scandal, exposing misconduct, gross neglect or double standards (incongruence between the espoused and the real values, in Schein's terminology) might also lead to change. Yet, obviously less destructive and disruptive roads towards changing the dysfunctional elements of a culture are preferable. For a monopoly organisation, like national armed forces, for example, existential survival crises are unlikely, and criticism from the surroundings might lead to defensive reactions rather than cultural change. Although the environmental demands and expectations directed towards the armed forces have changed significantly over the past years, cultural change forced by an existential crisis is unlikely. Culture might thus account for the apparent neglect of new tasks such as reconstruction support.

While acknowledging the difficulty of trying to change culture, Schein points to different mechanisms by which an engineered, gradual cultural adjustment can be attempted: new leaders and employees might infuse new ideas, while cognitive

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[15] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 90-104.

[16] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 313. See also Harvey, Donald F. and Donald R. Brown. 1996. An Experimental Approach to Organizational Development. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.: 417.

change is promoted through teaching and coaching, and can be institutionalised in new reward mechanisms and structures.[17]

One approach to analysing culture would be to start from its articulated or visible manifestations, and seek to decipher the unspoken deeper assumptions from the more superficial levels. However, Schein cautions, the articulated beliefs about mission, goals, and instruments do not always reveal the underlying basic beliefs and assumptions. Instead they might represent aspirations and rationalisations, or be outright deceptive, thus obscuring rather than elucidating the cultural sources of organisational behaviour.[18] Schein provides no final answers as to how to study the real beliefs and deeper levels of culture, but points to the need to supplement interviews with observations, and to focus on puzzlements and inconsistencies in the espoused values or the observed behaviour.

Schein's theory is recognised as one of the more thorough and comprehensive within the organisational theory field and appears particularly appropriate in this context due to its focus on culture as an organisational means for coping with the demands (in this context, political demands) of the surroundings, its focus on possible internal inconsistencies in organisational culture (the composite nature of the culture of the Danish armed forces), as well as its notions about how functional and dysfunctional elements might coexist in time if the environment is dynamic and changing. Finally, Schein's practical focus on the limits and possibilities as regards cultural change are of interest in a discussion of how the performance of CPA might be improved.[19]

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[17] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 314.

[18] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 32.

[19] Scott, W. Richard. 1992. *Organizations. Rational, Natural, and Open Systems*. London: Prentice Hall International Editions: 311.

6. Military Intervention and State-building: Competing for Local Hearts and Minds

Economic reconstruction and institution building have long been recognised as key ingredients in sustainable conflict resolution. Yet, within the broader context of the US-led "war on terrorism", stable and functioning states, which are believed less likely to deliver recruits to the al-Qaeda movement or lend their territories to training activities, are now perceived as a key security interest for Western countries.[20] Despite differences in mandate, participants, international legitimacy, level of ambition and so on, both Iraq and Afghanistan (and Kosovo) are state-building missions aiming at stable, democratic, moderately religious states living in peace with their surroundings.[21]

In state-building missions, success hinges on whether local populations eventually turn their expectations and ultimately their loyalty towards the new democratic political structures, instead of towards sectarian militias, insurgent movements, or local warlords. Thus, the hearts and minds of local populations become the mission's "centre of gravity." There is a scarcity of empirically based knowledge about what it requires to win and hold on to local hearts and minds in today's conflict and post-conflict mission areas.[22] Most analyses refer either to common sense, or rely on historical analogy. British counter-insurgency experience from the 20th century, for example, indicates that winning hearts and minds, where these are fiercely contested, depends on providing security from, but also political and economic alternatives to, sectarian militias, insurgent movements, criminal networks, and local warlords. Moreover, effective military stabilisation, in itself, requires a reconstruction effort. Militias, insurgent movements, and criminal networks will always be able to find new recruits unless political and economic alternatives are provided.[23]

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[20] Chau, Donovan C. 2006. Political Warfare – An Essential Instrument of U.S. Grand Strategy. *Comparative Strategy* vol 25: 109. For a critical appraisal see Menkhaus, Ken. 2003. The Security Paradox of Failed States. *National Strategy Forum Review* vol. 12, 3: p. 3.

[21] As outlined in the following UN Security Council Resolutions: Regarding Iraq: S/RES/1483: 1, S/RES/1546: 3, S/RES/1483: 1. Regarding Kosovo: S/RES/1244: 3. Regarding Afghanistan: A/RES/56/200: 2, S/2001/1154: 2. Available on http://www.un.org/documents/ (accessed on January 23, 2007).

[22] For a discussion of old and new challenges in today's counterinsurgency operations see Mackinlay, John. 2005. *Defeating Complex Insurgency. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan*. Whitehall Paper 64. London: United Royal Services Institute.

[23] Celeski, Joseph D. 2005. *Operationalizing COIN*. JSOU Report 05-2. Hurlburt Field, Florida: Joint Special

One of the few interview-based studies, mapping the expectations and perceptions of local communities in conflict areas, support these notions. The results indicate that local populations frequently meet an intervening force with friendly or neutral attitudes. Perceptions then develop based on two major issues – negative peace in the sense of an absence of direct fighting, and positive peace, comprising reconstruction, jobs, and improvements in daily life.[24] Negative peace is important. However, it seems the attention of local populations shifts towards positive peace very quickly after the end of major fighting operations.

In summary, security is a necessary but insufficient precondition for winning hearts and minds. It has to be combined with a quick and visible effort to improve daily life and political opportunities in the conflict zone to reduce the pull of criminal networks and insurgent groups. In other words, security, democratic governance and economic development are interconnected and must be pursued simultaneously, not sequentially.[25] However, as dramatically highlighted by the bombing in August 2003 of the UN headquarter in Baghdad, civilian organisations and agencies have increasingly become direct targets in conflict areas around the world. In Iraq and parts of Afghanistan, security reasons have forced a withdrawal of civilian agencies from large areas. To fill the resulting gap, western policy-makers have turned to the armed forces.[26]

Operations University; Cordesman, Anthony H. 2006. *The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies; White House. 2005. *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*. Washington D.C.: White House; Eide, Espen Barth, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karin von Hippel. 2005. Report on Integrated Missions. Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group; Metz, Steven, Raymond Millen. 2004. *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptionalizing Threat and Response*. Strategic Studies Institute; Mockatitis, Thomas R. 1995. *British counterinsurgency in the post-imperial era*. Manchester: Manchester University Press: p. 146.

[24] Donini, Antonio, Larry Minear, Ian Millie, Ted van Baarda, Anthony C. Welch. 2005. *Mapping the Security Environment. Understanding the perceptions of local communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies*. Medford MA: Feinstein International Famine Center: 61.

[25] Further emphasising the need to seize the initiative and act quickly is the fact that spoilers such as insurgents and militias are likely to be unorganised in the immediate wake of a military intervention. Dobbins, James. 2006. Preparing for Nation-Building. *Survival* vol 48, no. 3: 38; Mackinlay, John. 2005. *Defeating Complex Insurgency. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan*. Whitehall Paper 64. London: United Royal Services Institute.

[26] For attacks on civilian organisations, see Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina. 2005. *The UN´s Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq*. Santa Monica: RAND: 189 and 199; *Report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of UN Personnel in Iraq*. 2003. 20 October; Donini, Antonio, Larry Minear, Ian Millie, Ted van Baarda, Anthony C. Welch. 2005. *Mapping the Security Environment. Understanding the perceptions of local communities, peace support operations, and assistance agencies*. Medford MA: Feinstein International Famine Center: 15; Implementation of the Afghanistan Compact. Bi-Annual JCMB Report. 2006. Kabul, 12 November: 2; Author's interviews, Basra Palace, April 2006. For political pressure, see Veicherts, Nicolas T. 2005. *Hvorfor*

Currently, US, British, French, and Danish doctrines and directives all acknowledge that under certain circumstances, soldiers might have to provide humanitarian aid, secure law and order, engage in reconstruction, and/or substitute for the civilian administration of a failed state. Military training centres and units focussing on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) have sprung up in a number of Western countries. Reconstruction support units and civil advisers are now part of the force contributions of a number of countries in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the surface, the armed forces seem to have made a substantial effort to integrate various aspects of state-building, in particular reconstruction support, with military efforts.[27]

Some scholars, however, have suggested that this effort is more symbolic than real. Political pressure, they argue, have forced an adjustment in doctrines and directives, but in reality the armed forces continue to give priority to more traditional and directly security related tasks. They point out how the easy victory in the first Gulf War in 1991 confirmed Western militaries in their Cold War focus on major conventional battles , that is, on the operational level of war, reinforcing a disregard of the counter-insurgency lessons of the European de-colonisation wars and the US experience in Vietnam. Moreover, it is claimed, the perceived failure of the UN mission UNOSOM II in Somalia and the drawn-out engagements in ex-Yugoslavia, on the other hand, presumably led particularly the US military to pull back from "nation-building" to focus on more narrowly defined military tasks.[28]

samtænkning af militær og civil indsats er kommet for at blive. DIIS Brief. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; Veicherts, Nicolas T. 2005. *Hvorfor samtænkning af militær og civil indsats er nødvendig i felten*. DIIS Brief. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies; Veicherts, Nicolas T. 2006. *Samtænkninng – modstand og muligheder.* DIIS Report 2006:5.Brief. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. See also Zaalberg, Thijs W. Brocades. 2006. *Soldiers and Civil Power. Supporting or Substituting Civil Institutions in Modern Peace Operations*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

[27] Ministry of Defence. 2006. The Comprehensive Approach. Joint Discussion Note 4/05. UK: Swindon: 1-5 and 3-4; Ministry of Defence. 2006. Joint Doctrine Publication 3-90. Civil-Military Co-Operation. UK: Swindon: 1-2. The German doctrine is more timid and only endorses the occasional need for soldiers to take on humanitarian tasks, not law and order or institution-building tasks. Ministry of Defence. 2003. Defence Policy Guidelines. Germany: Berlin. The French doctrine places particular emphasis on building the capacity of local actors to reassert control. Ministry of Defence. 2005. The French armed forces and Civil-Military Cooperation: 5.

[28] Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2006. *Germany, pacifism and peace-enforcement*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 105-107; Dobbins, James. 2006. Preparing for Nation-Building. *Survival* vol 48, no. 3: 28; Nash, Bill, John Hillen. Debate: Can soldiers be peacekeepers and warriors. 2001. *NATO Review*; Gordon, Stuart. 2006. The changing role of the military in assistance strategies. In *Resetting the rules of engagement. Trends and issues in military-humanitarian relations*, eds. Victoria Wheeler and Adele Harmer. HPG Research Report 21.London, p. 40; Strachan, Hew. 2006. Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq. *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 3: 60.

In summary, within the broader context of the US-led "war on terrorism", military interventions increasingly aim at building stable and functioning states. Civilian tasks like reconstruction and institution building are crucial in progressing towards this end-state and, to some extent, hinge on the armed forces. The need to facilitate or directly engage in these tasks now figure more or less explicitly in military directives and doctrines on both sides of the Atlantic, including in Denmark, as explained below.

7. Denmark: the Coordinated Planning and Action Initiative

The Concerted Planning and Action initiative (CPA) was launched in a common document from the Danish Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004. While the document offers no clear-cut definition of CPA, the key notion is clear: if Danish military and development efforts in a crisis area are coordinated, resources can be mobilised faster, and synergies will result. This will accelerate military stabilisation and the establishment of a functioning state.[29] It is underlined that humanitarian and reconstruction tasks do not belong to the core task and core competencies of the armed forces and should normally be carried out by civilian relief organisations. However, if the security situation precludes civilian actors from operating, the document states, the armed forces should step in to support and facilitate reconstruction work.[30]

According to guidelines issued by the two ministries, CPA projects are intended to meet elementary humanitarian needs, assist vulnerable and excluded groups, produce visible results in terms of material assistance to local populations, assist the (re-)establishment of the local administration, and promote the legal security of individuals and groups.[31]

CPA funds have been funnelled to units in the Basra province, Iraq and in the provinces of Badakshan and Helmand, Afghanistan.[32] In Afghanistan, CIMIC units, in cooperation with a civil adviser employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are responsible for CPA activities. In Iraq a special 12-person unit, Reconstruction Unit Denmark (RUD), has been established and dedicated to CPA

[29] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. *Samtænkning af civil og militær indsats i internationale operationer*, annex to Defence Agreement 2005-2009; Speech by Minister of Defence Søren Gade. 2005. *Concerted Planning and Action of Civil and Military Activities in International Operations.* NATO Seminar on CPA. Copenhagen, June 20.

[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. *Samtænkning af civil og militær indsats i internationale operationer*, annex to Defence Agreement 2005-2009. Copenhagen: Ministry of Defence; Forsvarskommandoen. 2005. *Forsvarets civilt-militære samarbejde (CIMIC) og forsvarets relation til "samtæ nkningsinitiativet"* FKODIR PL.190-1.

[31] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. *Retningslinier for militært-civilt samarbejde ved humanitære og genopbygningsindsatser finansieret af Udenrigsministeriet.* Denmark: Copenhagen.

[32] The Danish force contribution in Basra consists of a battalion size battle group (Danish Battle Group, DBG). 290 soldiers are deployed to the Helmand province and a contingent of 41 soldiers form part of a German Provincial Reconstruction Team in Badakshan.

projects. RUD is supervised and assisted by a civilian adviser and the CIMIC section of DBG headquarters, and consists of a mixture of reserve and line personnel. In both Iraq and Afghanistan regular unit provide security to RUD/CIMIC, which typically operate in teams of two: one officer and one warrant officer.[33]

In terms of the immediate physical results, CPA and traditional CIMIC projects carried out by the armed forces might differ little. Both focus on relatively minor infrastructure improvements, health, water, and education. The two types of projects, however, differ in terms of funding, purpose, and presumably, longer-term results. CIMIC projects are funded via the defence budget, and are undertaken to support the mission, win consent and contribute to force protection. They are typically quick impact projects, not necessarily focussing on long-term sustainability or local involvement. CPA projects, in contrast, are funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are, according to the CPA guidelines, supposed to assist vulnerable groups and contribute towards strengthening the local administration. To put it simply, when the armed forces do CIMIC projects they do it to help themselves. The time perspective is likely to be short. While CIMIC projects might have a positive impact over the longer term, the immediate impact on hearts and minds is the primary aim. CPA projects, in contrast, might have a positive and immediate impact on political and social support, but local needs, not the needs of the deployed soldiers, should guide the selection and implementation of projects.

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[33] The civil adviser has either a technical or a development background, is working from within the deployed headquarters, and liaises closely with the CIMIC section, while advising the operative units. The Danish Battalion in Iraq also supports a group of civil advisers employed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Basra Palace Camp – the so-called Steering Unit – responsible for longer-term reconstruction projects. RUD units support the Steering Unit with some aspects of project identification, data collection, and monitoring while regular units support with transportation and security.

8. The Approach of the Danish Armed Forces to CPA

Since the launch of CPA, RUD/CIMIC units have facilitated a range of health, education, and infrastructure projects. Clean drinking water has been provided to remote villages. Schools have been enlarged and improved. Health clinics have been build or improved, and minor local infrastructure improvements such as bridge constructions or repair have been carried out. Four staff officers, a civil adviser, and the 12-member RUD unit facilitated 33 such projects in the Basra province in less than a year (from mid-2005 to April 2006). Four CIMIC officers, assisted by a civil adviser, facilitated 28 projects in the Badakshan province between May 2005 and June 2006.[34]

It is frequently assumed that RUD/CIMIC does the actual reconstruction work. This is not the case. Whenever possible, local contractors are hired. Moreover, as also frequently assumed, the soldiers do not impose specific projects from the outside based on a well-meaning but possibly misguided conception of locals need. On the contrary, RUD or CIMIC teams liaise with local authorities and community leaders to identify potential projects. In practice, local councils (Iraq) or village elders (Afghanistan) are requested to draw up a prioritised list of their needs. Based on this list, projects are identified. A local entrepreneur is then hired through a tendering process, anchored in the local council, but overseen by RUD/CIMIC, which also monitors the actual construction work, and is in charge of financial management and final approval. The project cycle concludes with a formal hand-over to representatives of the local councils.[35]

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[34] RUD. 2006. RUD projektoversigt uge 15. Iraq: Camp Danevang. Since the launch of the initiative in 2003 Danish units in Iraq have facilitated projects of a value of about 13 mill. DKK. In Afghanistan CPA projects are funded via the overall Danish allocation for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. From May 2005 to June 2006 about 1 mill. DKK were allocated to CPA projects supported by the Danish armed forces. For further details see Danida. 2006. *Desk Review of Civil-Military Activities in Iraq Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Final Report. COWI Consult; Danida. 2006. *Review of Civil-Military Activities in Afghanistan Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Final Report. COWI Consult.

[35] The tendering procedure was not used in Badakshan where CIMIC instead relied mainly on one trusted local entrepreneur. Whereas this practice was clearly less in line with CPA guidelines than the practice followed in Iraq, it might be in part justifiable due to the weakness of local governance structures and the existence of far fewer local entrepreneurs. Also with regard to the hand-over, the practice varied between Iraq and Afghanistan. Hand over was at times less formal in Afghanistan, where many projects were smaller than in Iraq.

Challenges encountered by RUD/CIMIC units

The Concerted Planning and Action initiative enjoys a high level of national political attention. The Danish Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence have gone to great lengths to impress the importance and priority of the initiative upon the armed forces. Attempts have also been made to launch the concept internationally.[36] However, as suggested by some analysts, there are indications that the armed forces have accepted to support civil reconstruction more in name than in reality. Although many Danish officers, at least in words, embraced CPA, RUD/CIMIC units appeared relatively neglected by the planning and support system as well as by some commanders on the ground. RUD/CIMIC work suffered from a lack of strategic planning, specialised training and education, proper systems for capturing and transmitting lessons learned, and problems getting access to resources such as security escorts.

This section discusses the major challenges encountered by RUD/CIMIC units and shows how they nevertheless performed well. It uses Schein's concept of culture and illustrates how the composite nature of the culture of Danish armed forces help make sense of the otherwise puzzling combination of low priority/high performance of RUD/CIMIC units.

Strategic Planning

"Not coordinated and not part of an overall plan." This is how one RUD officer described CPA, looking back at his six-month tour.[37] The perceived absence of strategic guidance emerged again and again as a source of frustration in interviews with RUD/CIMIC officers. Indeed, by mid-2006, this author was unable to locate an overall CPA strategy to give direction to the efforts of individual RUD/CIMIC teams in terms of needs in their specific area, strategic goal, operational goals, and sector focus. The deployed civil advisers were praised on a number of accounts, but contributed mainly technical advice, project management expertise, cultural insights and, in the case of one adviser, political advice. The "higher levels" at

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[36] Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence. 2005. Seminar in Copenhagen 20 and 21 June 2005 on concerted planning and action of civil and military activities in international operations. Program and Chairmen's report; Speech by Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Danish Defence Academy, 1. November 2006.

[37] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006; Danida. 2006. *Desk Review of Civil-Military Activities in Iraq Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Final Report. COWI Consult: 34-35. Arguably, this compromised the efforts in a number of ways. Even when units for example took care to work through local structures, the needs of marginalised groups or groups not favoured by local councils and village elders are, of course, not necessarily accommodated by the projects. Djurhuus, Johanne. 2006. Hjertesuk fra Basra. *Politiken*. 15. March.

home (the military commands) were seen as excessively focussed on monitoring and managing the micro level of CPA – the number of security escorts, the possibility of accommodating civilians in the military camps and so on, instead of providing strategic guidance.[38]

Ideally, CPA, like other aspects of a deployed unit's efforts, should be guided by a strategic plan, spanning more than just one rotation. Such a plan would depart from an assessment of the situation and the needs within the area of responsibility, and be guided by a clear strategic objective, a definition of the overall aim and intended impact of the efforts. Operational goals (short-term and medium-term goals) should be derived from the strategic goal. Indicators for measuring progress should be explained and applied.[39] Such a strategy would provide continuity beyond the six-month tour of each individual rotation, and guide deployed units as to what geographical areas, sectors, and project types to focus on. The main responsibility for forging such a strategy would appear to lie with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has the necessary development expertise. Whether the failure to provide such a strategy should be ascribed to the fact that CPA is still relatively new, to work pressure, or to a lack of willingness to wholeheartedly support CPA, is a discussion which is beyond the scope of this report.

With the absence of an overall strategy, each new commander and RUD/CIMIC team has been largely free to shape the implementation of CPA on the ground. In principle, sector focus, priorities, and operational success criteria may thus change every six months, compromising the coherence and overall impact of the effort.[40]

In this respect, Denmark differs little from allied nations. The British Brigade, responsible for the southern part of Iraq, including the Danish area of responsibility, apparently attempted to provide some coherence to the work of the different national CIMIC contingents by directing projects towards specific sectors: elec-

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[38] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, Basra Palace, and PRT Feyzabad, April, May, and June 2006.

[39] Baylis, John, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen, Colin S. Gray. 2002. Strategy in the Contemporary World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 4; Nastsios, Andrew W. 2005. The nine principles of reconstruction and development. Parameters, autumn: 10.

[40] Whereas some commander for example evaluated success in terms of the number of projects others have measured it in terms of the number of security escorts carried out for RUD or civil actors affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

tricity, health, or water. However, priorities tended to shift as brigades rotated in and out. Obviously, the fact that Danish units always and inevitably form part of larger coalitions demands that an effective contextual CPA strategy has to take the coalition element into account. Effective solutions to the lack of coherence ultimately have to be sought at NATO or coalition level. Meanwhile, however, an applied national CPA strategy would increase the effectiveness of Danish efforts, and as well as making easier the international sale of the CPA idea.

Assignment, training, and specialisation

The vast majority of the RUD/CIMIC personnel interviewed for this study had no prior experience with project work or civil-military liaison. Only half-jokingly, many characterised their assignment as guided by the "halløjsa" principle – roughly translated, the hit-and-miss principle. Rarely did previous experience and expertise point towards a RUD/CIMIC job.[41] Short and intense training is intended to brief the personnel assigned prior to deployment. Staff and officers assigned CPA tasks receive two weeks of specialised CIMIC/CPA training in Denmark and the Netherlands, focussing on context, concepts, and challenges, and how to carry out liaison and project work. Operative units cover many similar aspects, but with a more hands-on focus, using case-studies and practical exercises.

The assessment of whether this training provided proper preparation was mixed. Some officers felt hampered by a lack of local knowledge. Others emphasised how many of the skills conveyed in the general Danish officers' training: communication and contact skills, were useful, and generally felt well-prepared for the job.[42] This author attended part of the pre-deployment training of both staff and operative RUD/CIMIC units. Even if parts were rushed, not permitting in-depth exploration, case studies and scenarios were used effectively and appeared to prepare the assigned units reasonably well to address the challenges of project work in the deployment areas.[43]

However, accentuating the challenge of quickly conveying new skills to personnel with no prior experience, trainers had difficulty getting personnel appointed in time for the start of the training course. Also, getting access to the necessary equip-

[41] Author's interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, Camp Novo Selo, March 2006, Camp Olaf Rye, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[42] Author's interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, Camp Novo Selo and Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006; Camp Danevang, April 2006; PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[43] See list of courses and pre-deployment training attended by the researcher at the end of this report.

ment apparently posed problems.[44] Moreover, although the project management aspects of CPA were covered reasonably well during the training, the personnel assigned were insufficiently prepared for the capacity building aspect of CPA – the requirement that CPA should aid in the (re-)establishment of a local administration. These aspects were not covered in pre-deployment training. Again, the assessment of the officers and soldiers themselves was mixed. Whereas some members of RUD/CIMIC claimed that common sense and even the most basic knowledge of local Danish democratic structures went a long way, others noted that young Danish officers did not have the knowledge and authority to coach Iraqi council members in the procedural and democratic aspects of their work. As was the case for CPA as such, many were critical of what they saw as the absence of a strategy and clear operational goals for capacity building. A common sentiment was that "we have been told to build capacity, but not how to do it." Again, the author is not aware of the existence of strategic CPA guidance on this aspect.[45]

In contrast to the Danish system, countries like France and Germany established specialised and standing CIMIC units as the perceived importance of CIMIC grew over the 1990s. France has a CIMIC Company in Lyon, and Germany has a (battalion-sized) CIMIC unit in Nienburg (CIMIC Centrum Nienburg). These units are partly operational, partly training and education centres, responsible for pre-deployment training of tactical-level CIMIC personnel. Staff assigned to the French or German centre typically serve three to four years in these units. Although not all deployed CIMIC personnel are drawn from these units, some are and these bring a significant experience to the job.[46]

The Danish CIMIC unit does not comprise any standing operative units. With only a few full-time staff, it is fully occupied with education and training. An expansion of this unit has been resisted with arguments such as "Denmark is too small for this kind of specialisation" and "any good officer of the line can do CIMIC." The Danish culture of dialogue, the communicative and interpersonal skills of Danish officers, the argument goes, permits them to engage in CIMIC tasks without additional training.[47] Whereas the latter might well be true, it is also the case that the German CIMIC units joined by the researcher displayed superior

[44] Author's interviews and observations, Oksboel and Garrison of Hoevelte, January and February 2006.

[45] Author's interview, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[46] Author's interviews, Camp Novo Selo, March 2006; Field Camp Prizren, March 2006.

[47] Author's interview, Camp Olaf Rye and KFOR Headquarters, March 2006; PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

communication, negotiation, and psychological skills *vis-à-vis* local leaders and locally hired entrepreneurs. Experience arguably makes a difference.[48]

Capturing and transmitting lessons learned

As a rule, Danish soldiers serve a six-month tour in international missions, and the entire contingent in any given deployment area is thus replaced every six-months. As mentioned, civil advisers span more than one rotation and thus provide for some continuity. Moreover, members of previous RUD/CIMIC teams are in-volved in the pre-deployment training of new teams, which also overlap with their predecessors in the field for two to six days. This transfer period, however, is described as extremely hectic and very short for transferring knowledge, contacts, and concrete projects.[49]

Civilian development professionals with a time perspective of more than one military rotation emphasised how many lessons apparently had to be relearned because they were lost between rotations. At the same time, however, members of RUD/CIMIC described how reporting back to the Army Operational Command in Denmark was extremely time-consuming and detail-oriented. The reporting requirement is one more illustration of how strategic issues are lost sight of amid details and short-term practical issues.[50] Acting on frustration due to a perceived lack of overview of past and present CPA activities, members of an RUD unit deployed to Iraq in autumn 2005 took the initiative to establish a database, record-ing practical and technical information about the sponsored projects.[51]

The problem of loosing too many lessons between rotations is broadly recognised. Some countries, for example Canada, address the problem by operating with stag-

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[48] Author's observations, Kosovo, March 2006 and Afghanistan, May 2006. See list of patrols and meetings attended at the end of this document. Danish CIMIC/RUD units are in other ways better supported than German units – German units typically lack funding for anything beyond very small quick impact projects and need to apply for funds with potential donors at home every time a potential project has been identified.

[49] An inherent challenge is that effective liaison and project work to a large extent build on trust between local actors and the soldiers. Trust takes time to build and is difficult to transfer. Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[50] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[51] The absence of effective systems for collecting and transferring lessons learned was also encountered in connection with other "non-traditional" areas such as psychological operations and press and information activity (P&I). For example, one P&I officer in an established mission where the Danish presence was already year-long found no recorded information from previous P&I officers about their experience with local media and journalists, how to approach them, the level of independence and objectivity of different media etc.

gered rotation of CIMIC units: Only half the team rotate at any one time, ensuring that experienced members always overlap with new ones.[52] Others, like Germany and France, have created institutional anchors for accumulation of expertise with their CIMIC units. Danish CIMIC/RUD personnel, in contrast, typically have no prior experience of project work, and therefore not only need to get acquainted with a new geographic area, but also with a new function.[53]

In Denmark, each deployed team does an end-of-tour-report. This report, however, mainly focuses on practical and technical issues. A system for monitoring and analysing impact, and capturing and transmitting CPA lessons learned over the longer term is lacking, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Who benefits? Are projects sustainable? How does one prevent the projects becoming targets of anti-coalition forces? How does one maximise the transfer of skills to local actors? Is there an impact on security in the medium-term? What is the impact on local perceptions of the local/national administration and of the international forces (and thus presumably on force protection)? These are questions of crucial importance to mission success. Within the current system, however, it is quite likely that many of these questions are never asked, that some answers are lost between rotations, and that others are never found because they emerge only when trends and issues are analysed over the longer-term.[54]

Access to security escorts
RUD/CIMIC typically operates in teams of two soldiers. Regular forces provide security. Thus, in order to move around, attend meetings, monitor project work and so on, RUD/CIMIC depends on access to security escorts. In areas with a relatively benign security environment, getting the necessary (and typically smaller) escorts has not posed any problems. However, in areas with a more hostile environment, with more focus on force protection and the demand for a larger security escort, RUD/CIMIC had, at times, difficulty asserting its need for escorts. In Iraq, for instance, some RUD teams experienced periods where they were largely confined to camp. In reaction to this problem, in early 2006, it was decided to dedicate a platoon from the Danish Battle Group in Iraq to

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[52] Peabody, David. 2005. *The Challenges of Doing Good Work: The Development of Canadian Forces CIMIC*. Paper Submitted for the CDAI Conference: 10.

[53] The same is true for soldiers assigned to other "non-traditional" areas. Unlike in bigger countries, Denmark has no special psychological operations unit or P&I unit. Danish officers are thus not specialising in these tasks and typically have no prior experience with them.

[54] Author's interviews and observations, Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006; Camp Danevang, April 2006.

RUD escorts.[55] Yet, even after the designation of a "RUD protection unit" a number of requested and planned escorts were still cancelled. The problem is probably larger than that which appears at first sight. Interviews indicated that RUD personnel would at times refrain from even requesting escorts in order not to strain the Battle Group further.[56]

A related issue raised in the interviews was the amount of attention paid by commanding officers to the work of RUD/CIMIC units. Many expressed frustration at the perceived lack of interest in their efforts, and complained of difficulties "getting attention and being taken seriously." Some interviewees claimed that commanders hardly ever took time to visit CPA projects, except in connection with VIP visits from home. There were dissenting voices, however, who insisted that when explained properly and pushed energetically, attention and resources, such as security escorts, came forward. Typically, such assertions came from ambitious and articulate officers of the line, assigned to CIMIC functions.[57] The author encountered no instances of a commander joining a RUD/CIMIC team on monitoring visits, meetings, or hand-over of a project, even if commanders were, generally, aiming to show presence on the ground and join operative units in their work.

A cultural aversion?

Adherents of the "cultural aversion" argument would see the challenges described above as evidence that the armed forces have indeed accepted reconstruction support only on paper, but not in reality. One could, however imagine other possible explanations. One possible explanation is that CPA is a new and additional task assigned to an already strained organisation. Both the home organisation and the deployed units, it is argued, are already struggling with limited resources and therefore it is not surprising that planning, assignment processes, evaluation, and access to resources are less than is desirable.

Indeed, some appointments to staff sections responsible for personnel issues and logistics, as well as positions such as press officers, information officers or psychological operations officer were perceived to be as haphazard as RUD/CIMIC

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[55] Author's interviews, Basra Palace and Camp Danevang April 2006.

[56] The difficulties to ensure security escorts also applied to individuals and units engaged in other non-traditional military tasks, such as police training and mentoring. Author's interviews and observations, December 2005, Copenhagen; Camp Danevang and Basra Palace, April 2006.

[57] Author's interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006.

appointments by the affected officers. The highest ranking troop commanding officers, and operations and intelligence staff officers, in contrast, appeared to be selected with care and with an eye for their previous assignments and skills. In summary, the apparently random appointments to RUD/CIMIC might reflect a problem of a broader nature, affecting in particular new and less traditional tasks such as psychological operations, and press and information work.[58]

The absence of effective systems for analysing impact and capturing lessons learned also appeared to reflect a broader problem. Deployed units attempted to gauge the immediate impact of tactical military operations, such as major search or arrest operations, by carrying out "atmospherics" in the affected areas. Patrols and/or special intelligence collecting units engaged local people in discussions to get an impression of their reactions. But, as discussed further under "Conclusions and recommendations" below, there is apparently no system for analysing and comparing the longer-term impact of the various actions a deployed unit might take. Analysis and safeguarding institutional memory are apparently generally neglected within the Danish armed forces.

Finally, cancelled security escorts might simply show that in times of a high per-ceived level of threat, the need for force protection pulls resources away from all other tasks. More units are held on standby in camp, and larger security escorts are required when moving around the area of responsibility. Indeed, both civilian police officers and officers responsible for training local security forces also experi-enced difficulty getting the necessary escorts. Scout units complained that regular patrols were cancelled due to a shortage of personnel. Some interviewees pointed out, that even if training of local security forces on paper had a high priority, very few combined Danish-local patrols and operations were actually carried out. Moreover, even if local forces volunteered their help in connection with handling Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents (for example by cordoning off the area), such help was rarely accepted. Force protection measures and pressure in connection with these life-and-death incidents seemed to get in the way of more long-term thinking. There are no publicly available statistics recording the number of planned but cancelled RUD escorts, as compared to cancelled regular patrols, security operations, or training activities. The evidence is thus anecdotal. Yet, interviews backed up by observations indicated that CPA ranked towards the bot-

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[58] Author's interviews, Camp Novo Selo, March 2006, Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May and June 2006.

tom of the list of priorities at times of stress. Some RUD/CIMIC officers plainly stated that the greatest challenges of their tour were not related to local issues, but to internal issues: arguing for priority to the tasks inside the contingent, and for integrating RUD/CIMIC considerations in the general staff work.[59]

In summary, deployed RUD/CIMIC units struggled with a number of challenges. Some of these challenges point to broader problems within the armed forces. *Ad hoc* assignment, a lack of systems for capturing and transmitting lessons learned, and a tendency for force protection to take resources away from other tasks seemed to compromise not only CPA but other tasks as well. Arguably, the neglect of RUD/CIMIC does not indicate a *specific* cultural aversion to reconstruction support, but instead a broader culturally based disinclination to prioritise new and non-traditional military tasks, including training, communication, and civil liaison. These are tasks falling outside the perceived core mission of the armed forces. Below, the difficulties experienced by RUD/CIMIC are placed in a context by an analysis of the Danish armed forces' beliefs about mission and means.

Cultural Beliefs about Mission and Means

According to Schein, cultural beliefs about organisational mission comprise answers to questions such as "what is the primary task and raison d'etre of the organisation?" "What does it take to survive and thrive?" "Who are our constituents?" "What are our specific goals?" Beliefs about means, in turn, comprise notions about how to organise and behave in order to reach these goals; how to measure success and what action to take in addressing problems.[60]

Reflecting a long and strong tradition of democratic control with the armed forces, Danish officers deployed immediately point to the politically stated goals for Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan respectively: stable, democratic, and peaceful societies, as the overall aim of their efforts. When asked how to reach these goals, most then point to the need to win the hearts, minds, will and trust of local populations. Local populations, it is argued, must become willing to engage and take ownership of the transformation process, taking responsibility instead of blaming higher authorities, the international forces or the international community for failing, starting to direct their expectations and loyalty towards the

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[59] Author's interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[60] Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: 90-103.

new democratic structures instead of towards clans, militias, and warlords. This requires, the argument goes, that locals trust the international coalition and its local allies. Officers and warrant officers were surprisingly consistent about this point, even if sometimes expressing it in more practical forms, for example, arguing that improved education and sanitary conditions are keys to progress. The underlying reasoning was clear: the will, ability, and trust of local populations represent the core of the mission.[61]

How do Danish officers translate this belief into operational goals? When discussing at a more specific level what individual officers hope to accomplish within their six-month tour of duty, the answer obviously depends on the deployment area. Looking at those deployed to the more difficult security environments, the ambition typically is to "recreate a sense of security." A common denominator across Danish deployment areas is the wish to "make both soldiers and locals feel that the contingent made a difference." This, of course, begs the question of how one "re-creates security" and "makes a difference"?

A deployed Danish unit has more different means or "lines of operation" at its disposal: operations (showing presence through regular patrolling, engaging enemy units, arresting criminals and "spoilers", searching for weapons, operating check points etc.); training local security forces; communication and leadership engagement (to win consent and build support for the mission's goals); supporting re-construction through CPA and some aspects of CIMIC work.

Some interviewees offer well-considered arguments about the need to work on more dimensions simultaneously. Arriving at the right mixture of instruments in a dynamic environment, it is argued, calls for willingness to reconsider and adjust along the way. Probing further, it emerges that the majority adheres to the notion that operations are the key to security, and security the key to hearts and minds. Interviewees point to positive feedback from local communities after arrest operations. "The locals also feel intimidated by criminals/terrorists/insurgents," the argument goes. A further operationalisation of "recreating a sense of security" and "making a difference" thus typically is "to remove some of the worst criminals/terrorists/insurgents." When pressured, most officers acknowledge that new spoilers are likely to step forward and fill the ranks, while more weapons are likely

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[61] Author's interview, KFOR Headquarters and Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May and June 2006.

to flow into the area to replace those confiscated. Still, they return to the notion that operations create security, which again is believed to be the key to winning local hearts and minds.[62]

One interviewee also pointed out how an operation releases some of the psychological pressure, which builds in a mission where anti-coalition forces use hit-and-run tactics. Carrying out an operation gives the soldiers a sense of being active instead of reactive. A RUD/CIMIC security escort, the argument went, provides no such outlet, as it maintains the soldiers in a reactive role. Indeed, the level of frustration at being unable to actively counter the threat of improvised explosive devices and indirect fire against units or the camp in Iraq was palpable.[63]

Even if a high-threat environment might thus provide additional incentives to focus on operations, this focus was not context specific. Across the Danish deployment areas, personnel at all levels expressed the wish that they were able and permitted to "do more operations." The frequently immediate and tangible outcome of an operation – an arrested criminal or seized weapon caches – were emphasised. Moreover, testing in practice "what we train and prepare for" is likely to be highly motivating. Given the hypothetical choice between Danish armed forces specialising in short, high-intensity "first-in" operations, or low-intensity and longer stability operations, a number of officers concede that they would personally prefer "first-in."[64] Further reinforcing the image that the perceived core mission of the armed forces is to "do operations", many interviewees also volunteer that working with operations is career-enhancing and carries far more prestige than other functions.[65]

None of the above is surprising from a culturalist perspective. Schein points out how organisational culture is a slow changing product of historical learning.[66] The price placed on operations – the historical "core product" of the armed forces – is evident, not just in beliefs, but also in informal organisational hierarchies (between operations sections and other sections of staff headquarters), processes (staff plan-

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[62] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[63] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[64] Author's interviews, Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006; PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[65] Authors interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[66] Schein also emphasises how culture is a means of both external adaptation - coping with the demands of the environment – and internal integration. Operations are the "product" setting the armed forces apart from all other organisations, arguably serving as a strong internal integrator.

ning procedures), prestige and incitement systems (working with operations is career enhancing). In summary, seen through the cultural lenses of Danish armed forces, the road to local hearts and minds goes through security, and security is created by operations. In light of these beliefs, it is not surprising that CPA slips down the hierarchy of priorities, when domestic support systems or a deployed unit has to prioritise scarce resources. Whereas the notion of the doctrines is that reconstruction is a key to security, the logic guiding action on the ground is that security itself is a precondition for reconstruction activities.

Approach and attitude of RUD/CIMIC units

An external observer might expect that operating inside an organisation which, in terms of structures, processes, prestige and resource distribution places a premium on operations, would impact negatively on the performance and morale of units designated to CPA. Yet, on the contrary, RUD/CIMIC units brought a high level of energy, ingenuity and engagement to their tasks. They also performed reasonably well as measured against the CPA guidelines, specifying that CPA projects should meet elementary humanitarian needs, assist vulnerable and excluded groups, produce visible results in terms of material assistance to local populations, assist the (re-)establishment of the local administration, and promote the legal security of individuals and groups.[67] In addition, when measured against a number of basic principles of good project work – the principles of local engagement, sustainability, and capacity building (a transfer of skills to local actors), Danish units did a reasonable job.[68] Development professionals frequently express concern that these principles are compromised by the armed forces for a lack of time, a lack of local knowledge, a lack of cultural understanding, and a lack of willingness to compromise on other military priorities, for example force protection. The risk is, it is argued, that aid is instrumentalised to reach military goals and that a military fixation on force protection impedes communication and cooperation with local actors. While a number of these concerns are certainly valid, they pertain only in part to the efforts of Danish units, as shown below.

This section looks beneath the Danish armed forces' articulated beliefs about mission and means, to underlying assumptions about human beings and human

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[67] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. *Retningslinier for militært-civilt samarbejde ved humanitære og genopbygningsindsatser finansieret af Udenrigsministeriet*. Denmark: Copenhagen.

[68] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. 2005. *Retningslinier for militært-civilt samarbejde ved humanitære og genopbygningsindsatser finansieret af Udenrigsministeriet*. Denmark: Copenhagen; Nastsios, Andrew W. 2005. The nine principles of reconstruction and development. *Parameters*, autumn: 5-7.

relations. The performance of deployed RUD/CIMIC units is placed in context by showing how these basic beliefs are certainly not adverse to, but actually quite supportive of CPA.

Knowledge of local societies

Clearly, the relatively short mission specific pre-deployment training received by RUD/CIMIC units does not allow time for the development of in-depth understanding of local societies and economies. CPA thus has to be carried out based on a limited understanding of local culture, power structures, and socio-economic structures.[69] A majority of the interviewed soldiers were fully aware of this problem and, while praising the current system of attaching a civil adviser to the deployed units, also pointed to the need for more training or more support in this area. In Iraq, many officers emphasised, that without access to advice from individuals with local knowledge (the second civil adviser in Iraq happened to be of Iraqi background) many issues would have been overlooked and more things gone wrong. One example was the need to incorporate not just local councils but also key individuals in the administrative structure. This secured the incorporation of local technical expertise, but also served to avoid some actors feeling excluded, and boycotting or otherwise sabotaging projects. It was claimed that this need would not have been recognised, without the civil adviser's local knowledge. The issue points to a broader problem, complicating other aspects of deployed units' activities. Lacking insight into local power structures and the role of tribes and clans, made it difficult at times to interpret security incidents correctly and react properly. Whether an attack on a police station was an expression of inter-tribe or intra-tribe conflicts, or anti-coalition sentiments was frequently unclear.[70]

At a general level, however, many officers and soldiers appeared to have a good grasp of the basic characteristics of conflict and post-conflict societies – characteristics such as the absence of long-term thinking; absence of willingness to take responsibility; absence of willingness to take independent initiatives; weak community spirit in a western sense, and instead, an orientation towards family, clan, or tribe. Arguably, if provided with a good operational strategy, informed by a systematic needs assessment, the current performance could be enhanced further. Drawing up such a strategy, as argued above, should not and cannot be

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[69] Djurhuus, Johanne. 2006. Hjertesuk fra Basra. *Politiken*. 15. March.
[70] Author's interview, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

the responsibility of deployed units, but rather of the Ministries with the requisite expertise and a longer time plan.

Local ownership, sustainability, and capacity building
Deployed units to some extent heeded the principles of local ownership, sustainability, and capacity building, by involving local actors in all phases of the project cycle. In Iraq, local elected councils were involved in all aspects of project work, from identification and planning to tendering and implementation. In Afghanistan local governance structures were weaker, and village elders, shuras (village councils), or imams functioned as contact points. Due to the very low level of experience of new governmental structures and a high level of corruption, working through local structures was seen as both time-consuming and frustrating to units working within a six-month time frame. Some gave examples of councils that were so corrupt, slow, and/or incompetent that in order to "get anything done" they had to circumvent them by, for example, not letting the council draw up project cost estimates, but simply have it sign estimates drawn up by somebody else. As a rule, however, the councils were involved. Most RUD/CIMIC personnel interviewed were aware of why they needed to do things the difficult way. Some also described how they experienced that this strategy paid off as they recorded small improvements in the administrative and organisational skills of local councils within their six-month tour. Council members became better at simple things like planning and conducting a meeting, taking minutes, and following up on decisions.[71]

Although the first soldiers in Iraq charged with CPA have been criticised for not thinking broadly enough, for example not analysing whether the necessary staff and budget to ensure continued operation of an enlarged hospital or school were present, later rotations appeared to have a good understanding of the sustainability aspect. This came through both in interviews with the personnel and through participant observation, where the author noticed how sustainability issues were incorporated in RUD/CIMIC discussions with local leaders. The need for locals to "take responsibility" and "contribute actively" to the reconstruction process was also frequently emphasised during these meetings. Sometimes RUD/CIMIC would demand a local contribution as a precondition for initiating a project.[72]

[71] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang and Basra Palace, April 2006.

[72] The focus on local ownership was not specific to RUD/CIMIC, but also expressed by a number of higher ranking officers. It was pointed out as a weakness to overall coalition strategy, particularly in Iraq, that too little had been done to engage local leaders and make them define *their* goals instead of attempting to impose Western goals from the outside. Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

Moreover, although the use of military resources to carry out the actual project work might have been tempting to "get things done" and ensure that the engineering and technical aspects were up to standards, CPA projects were almost without exception carried out by local hired entrepreneurs. The need to rely on relatively simple technical solutions which locals could operate and maintain without external help also figured prominently.[73]

In summary, the principles of local ownership, sustainability, and capacity building could certainly have been applied in better and more effective ways by development professionals, had they been present and able to operate in the area. However, the approach of Danish RUD/CIMIC illustrate, that the traditional allegation – that the armed forces are structurally disinclined to observe these principles for the sake of time or force protection, does not always hold. The three principles of ownership, sustainability and capacity building, although at times named and framed differently, did receive attention in the pre-deployment training of designated units and were observed, at least to some extent, in practice.

Two requirements listed in the CPA guidelines, however, did not appear to receive much attention, neither in the pre-deployment training, nor in the actual procedures and actions on the ground in the deployment areas: the aim to assist vulnerable and excluded groups, and the aim to promote the legal security of individuals and groups. However, many of the school, infrastructure, and water projects carried out were *also* likely to benefit the weak and excluded. Yet, the criteria (with the exception of one project in Iraq specifically aimed at creating employment opportunities for women) did not appear to figure prominently in the deliberations and considerations of personnel. Moreover, although working through and with the Iraqi councils might well indirectly strengthen legal security, by making councils more aware of basic democratic and procedural rules, new skills might also be applied in ways adverse to this goal.[74]

Arguably, however, an inherent military inability to think and behave as necessary is not the reason, as indicated by the good performance of RUD/CIMIC on

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[73] Author's observations and interviews, KFOR Headquarters, Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006; Camp Danevang, April 2006; PRT Feyzabad, June 2006.

[74] Danida. 2006. *Desk Review of Civil-Military Activities in Iraq Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Final Report. COWI Consult; Danida. 2006. *Review of Civil-Military Activities in Afghanistan Financed by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Final Report. COWI Consult; Djurhuus, Johanne. 2006. Hjertesuk fra Basra. *Politiken*. 15. March.

other basic principles of project work. Rather, the fault lies in not providing the deployed units with the necessary needs assessment to help them determine *who* the vulnerable groups are, and training indicating *how* to promote legal security. The ministries and military commands with the necessary expertise and authority to provide an assessment and shape educational curricula could do much to enhance RUD/CIMIC performance if they chose to.

Instrumentalisation of aid

As mentioned, CPA and CIMIC projects might resemble each other superficially, in as much that both concentrate on relatively minor sanitation, education, or infrastructure improvements. Moreover, the same staff officers and, in some deployment areas, the same operative units were responsible for both types of projects, arguably increasing the danger of blurring the distinction between CPA and CIMIC. However, the RUD/CIMIC personnel interviewed displayed a clear understanding of the difference in procedure and purpose. The same was true among a number of high-ranking officers in other functions. At times of a perceived high level of threat against the forces, some commanding officers would admit that they had faced the temptation to use CPA projects for tactical purposes, to buy goodwill and reward cooperative elements of the local power structure. Force protection concerns might thus heighten the temptation to circumvent local councils, for example, in project work, to the advantage of powerful sheiks or warlord, and or to do quick impact projects without considering their long-term sustainability. However, the researcher encountered no instances of giving in to this temptation. On the contrary, in more instances, deployed units even deferred from announcing their support for specific construction projects to openly, in order to prevent it from becoming the targets of anti-coalition forces.[75]

Whether the temptation to use CPA funds for purposes of force protection also will be resisted in the future and even in tough security environments is likely to depend on a number of issues including supervision, political awareness et and so on. Personal qualities of the RUD/CIMIC personnel are also important, for example, whether they are strong and articulate enough to resist this temptation and convince the commanding officer to avoid steer clear of this temptation.

[75] Author's observations during patrols and monitoring visits, April 2006.

Force protection and approach to local societies

Development professionals frequently worry that a military fixation on force protection hampers the ability of military units to assist reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. In the Danish case, however, force protection considerations did not appear to undermine communication and good relations with locals. Indeed, officers, warrant officers, and soldiers from infantry or scout units deployed to areas with a difficult security environment did focus on the potentially threatening aspects of the environment. Questions like "where do they hide the weapons?", "where are the IED factories?", "who and where are the bad guys and how do we get at them?", predominated. In Iraq, moreover, a few interviewees regretted how some soldiers, typically young and assigned to areas with a high level of violence, tended to get excessively focussed on force protection to the detriment of the contact with local communities.[76] This focus, however, is context-dependent and not inherent. In the relatively benign security environment in Kosovo and in the northern part of Afghanistan, other issues supplement the above. Demographical, social, political, and economic issues received far more attention, not just by RUD/CIMIC, but also by regular units.

RUD/CIMIC units conveyed a relatively non-aggressive impression, leaving helmets and at times flak jackets in the cars and long weapons over the shoulder instead of in combat position. Children crowding around parked vehicles and, more remarkably, civilian vehicles breaking up a military convoy were pointed out as "good force protection", not as nuisances or potential threats. Most units took care to slow down while passing through villages, greeting and waving energetically. Generally, the patrols and meetings joined by the author gave the impression that Danish units behave with respect and do a very good job in communicating with locals and creating a friendly atmosphere. Indeed, as a rule, the units were received with very friendly and positive attitudes by the locals. This was the case in settings as diverse as visits to remote villages in the Badakshan province, routine visits to Iraqi army facilities, monitoring visits at construction sites, and meetings with representatives of local governance structures in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The generally friendly attitudes of local people indicated that the behaviour described above is characteristic not only of the teams joined by the researcher, but to their predecessors as well, and thus is probably characteristic of Danish units as a whole. Local leaders, even those critical of Denmark on account of the Mohammed cartoons (published by a Danish paper in autumn

[76] Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

2005), emphasised positive cooperation with the Danish armed forces and their appreciation of the Danish assistance.

Interviews with both current and former civil advisers to deployed units as well as other civilian professionals working in Danish deployment areas corroborated the impression described above. Without exception, these civilians praised RUD/CIMIC for their positive attitude, high level of motivation, and ability to get things done.[77] Moreover, a respectful attitude towards local people, as well as attempts to get the right messages across – messages such as "we can help, but this is your responsibility …" and "… we will look into this, but we cannot promise you anything" – were emphasised. "By the book!" as one civilian with a development background put it.[78] Finally, development professionals in areas with limited freedom of movement due to the security situation also appreciated "the ability to be in touch with local society and local councils through the soldiers."[79]

The designated soldiers themselves displayed an overwhelmingly positive attitude towards their tasks. Although some, in particular individuals who had previously been assigned to combat units, pointed out how the project and liaison work entailed a "very different way of working" almost all claimed that they experienced their new tasks as extremely rewarding. While both staff and operative units, as explained above, displayed some frustration due to what they saw as a lack of planning, background knowledge, and operational strategies for CPA, basically all members also emphasised the positive aspects in terms of palpable and visible results and positive contact with the local population.[80]

Low priority – high performance: CPA and the deeper levels of culture

Even if RUD/CIMIC units in a number of ways were neglected by the planning and support system, they brought a high level of energy and engagement to their tasks. Such performance is puzzling if assuming that RUD/CIMIC

[77] Author's interview, Basra Palace, April 2006.

[78] Author's interview, Copenhagen, January 2006, Basra Palace, April 2006. Another adviser, however, while acknowledging the positive aspects also pointed to what she regarded as a fundamental challenge: Reconstruction requires mutual trust, but the armed forces operate on a basic notion of distrust *vis a vis* the surrounding society. Djurhuus, Johanne. 2006. Hjertesuk fra Basra. *Politiken*. 15. March.

[79] Author's interviews, Basra Palace and Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[80] Author's interviews, PRT Feyzabad, May and June 2006.

units are recruited from and operate within an organisational culture adverse to CPA.

The explanation for this might lie with the existence of a RUD/CIMIC subculture – a subculture more conducive to CPA than the overall culture of the Danish armed forces. However, the vast majority of soldiers serving in RUD/CIMIC units were designated to these functions for a six-month deployment only, after which the personnel melted back into the services and branches from which they were recruited. Culture develops and takes root gradually, according to Schein, as "the residue of functionally efficient decisions of the past". It does not develop overnight. Thus, RUD/CIMIC hardly has the time to develop a subculture differing from the overall culture of the armed forces. Indeed, with regard to the underlying notions of human beings and human relations discussed below, the author encountered no systematic difference between RUD/CIMIC officers and other officers.

Explaining RUD/CIMIC performance as a reflection of perceived reward/punishment structures also does not provide an adequate explanation. Although the designated personnel all emphasised that they personally believed that they learned a lot, they also complained that their efforts received little attention from high-ranking officers. Apparently, serving in RUD/CIMIC is not career enhancing and an officer's performance during such a tour is hence not particularly important as to future opportunities.

Possibly, the quality of Danish personnel is simply very high and the mixture of personnel of the line and of the reserve in RUD/CIMIC units ensures a diversity of skills and perspectives. Moreover, the concept of "professionalism" of Danish armed forces, outlined below, comprises the notion of giving the tasks one's best, no matter whether one is driver or battalion commander. The "can-do" mentality and focus on creating visible results, pointed out by civilians in interviews about RUD/CIMIC, might be a general trait of the culture of Danish armed forces and contribute to the good performance even of relatively neglected units.

Cultural Beliefs about Human Nature and Human Relations

In addition to the possible explanations above, Schein's distinction between basic and articulated cultural beliefs helps make sense of the combination of low priority/high performance of RUD/CIMIC units. According to Schein, the core of an organisation's culture consists of a set of stable, frequently unconsciously held,

and non-debatable basic assumptions about the nature of truth and reality, of human beings, and human relations. These assumptions silently shape the outlook and behaviour of the organisation. This section looks beneath the Danish armed forces' articulated beliefs about mission and means to the underlying assumptions about human beings and human relations. Based on participant observation and interviews focussing on articulated beliefs about motivation, leadership, "good cooperation," and "the good soldier", it seeks to portray the deeper level of the culture of the Danish armed forces.

One of the first adjectives that is offered, when a Danish officer is asked to describe what he or she understands by "a good soldier", is professionalism. "Professionalism" in the sense of taking the assigned task seriously, being constructive and giving it ones best. Flexibility, ability to think independently, and ability to talk and engage with a number of different people are also emphasised. A majority also indicate that a good soldier should have the courage to speak up and question the plans and orders of superiors if he or she believes them to be wrong or ill-advised. Yet, most add, a good soldier also knows when it is time to end the discussion and loyally carry out orders.

When asked to pinpoint what, if anything, sets Danish officers and soldiers apart from the soldiers of partner nations, most interviewees emphasise common sense, initiative, and ability to make decisions without always checking with superiors. Moreover, soldiers of the Danish armed forces are described as less fixated on force protection than the soldiers of other nations, presumably permitting a more open, friendly, and communicative approach to local populations.[81] When asked in a different context to specify what they personally expect from their personnel, attributes like initiative and willingness to take responsibility again figure prominently, as does openness towards locals and the ability to make intelligent observations (for example, notice not just what people say, but also how they live and how they react to and approach a patrol).[82]

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[81] Probing the reality of this self-description, the author joined a number of French and German patrols in respectively Kosovo and Afghanistan, yet not enough to give more than a superficial impression. The patrols together with a number of interviews with officers from allied nations, however, did seem to indicate that at least when it comes to self-conception and ideals, French armed forces place more emphasis on strictly respecting rules and regulations, whereas Danish (and German) officers and soldiers will pinpoint independent initiative more. Author's interviews, Camp Novo Selo, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006 and PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[82] Author's interviews, Camp Olaf Rye, Kosovo, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May and June 2006.

Discussing leadership and motivation, three issues are emphasised: first, giving each person responsibility. Second, sharing information, explaining the purpose of an assigned task, and placing it in context. Third, making results visible. When the information routinely collected by regular patrols were used to inform actual operations or CIMIC projects, this was perceived to be a motivating factor. A number of high-ranking officers also emphasised the importance of being present on the ground, and thus signalling to the operative units that they are not simply handing down orders without knowing their practical implications.[83]

Asked what motivates them personally, a number of different issues are brought up by the respondents. The professional challenge entailed in operating in a difficult mission area and within a multinational coalition is frequently mentioned. Pride in the team and a feeling of responsibility towards subordinates and other members of the contingent is a common denominator. The same notion is given a more general expression when some point to a Danish responsibility towards NATO partners and allies.[84] Making a positive and visible difference in the deployment area also figures prominently ("paperwork" – reporting home or writing up patrol reports, on the contrary, is among the least motivating tasks). This is in Denmark's security interest, the argument goes, as many problems are best solved at their roots. The missions help prevent instability spill-over, streams of refugees, and flows of narcotics as well as the development of new terrorist sanctuaries. More abstract ideals of democracy and a presumed general human aspiration to live in peace and prosperity also come up in this context. Finally, a few simply point to the fact that they are soldiers, and thus, the missions are "part of the job."[85]

On the question of how and with whom Danish forces cooperate and interact - that is, human relations not regulated by a formal hierarchy - it emerges that direct, informal interaction with a tangible result, which stays clear of long, bureaucratic procedures is appreciated. These notions emerge when discussing for example relations between the civil adviser and the Danish military contingent or between the contingent and the ministries and commands at home. RUD/CIMIC personnel, for example, frequently praise the co-location of the contingent and the civil adviser in

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[83] Author's interviews, Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006 and PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[84] Author's interviews, PRT Feyzabad, May and June 2006.

[85] An attitude which, however, appeared to be less prevalent amongst Danish personnel as compared to amongst French officers. Author's interviews Camp Novo Selo and Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006 and PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

camp as well as the immediately useful technical and engineering advice they receive. Commanders appreciate the ability to decide on-site on projects up to a certain amount.[86] Asked directly, most officers point to the importance of "chemistry" as well as of pragmatic attitudes, flexibility, face-to-face interaction, the ability of a partner to follow up on words and promises, and "to get things done."

Discussing relations between a deployed Danish contingent and the larger international unit it belongs to, task force, brigade, or Provincial Reconstruction Team, , it is emphasised that the dialogue should be frank and open, and that mutual flexibility is necessary in order to reach a common understanding of the task. It is stated that orders from higher levels should indicate the goal and purpose and leave it up to the contingent to decide how best to reach the goal. Orders from a higher military level should thus be based on "auftragstaktik"[87] and on trust. These notions seem to reflect the central ideas about human nature and human relations expressed in the discussion about motivation and leadership within the Danish armed forces: the notion that human beings are at core active, rational, and responsible.[88]

Judging the extent to which this view of human nature extends to local populations lies beyond the scope of this report.[89] One existing field study, however, indicates that this is actually the case. To a great extent, Danish personnel project their own values and ideas onto local populations and see the fight against ethnic strife, factionalism, corruption, and crime as a civilising and educational project. The underlying notion is that human beings are at core rational and malleable.[90]

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[86] On the other hand these same individuals had difficulties appreciating the work of the German civilian head of PRT, a person employed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate the civil aspects of the PRT's work. In reality, the German civilian head was engaged in low key coaching of local government structures and an attempt to push the creation of a regional development plan with an Afghan face – thus much less visible tasks. Author's interviews, Garrison of Holstebro, February 2006, PRT Feyzabad, May 2006.

[87] Roughly translated "the delegation principle".

[88] Author's interview, Camp Novo Selo, KFOR Headquarters, and Camp Olaf Rye, March 2006, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

[89] The evidence emerging in discussions of for example realistic end states for the various missions is conflicting. Some officers, pointing to local history, are clearly sceptical as to the prospects of lasting peace. Others, however, pointing to Europe's own history, express the belief that people are able to arrive at peaceful co-existence even after intense conflict. Yet, almost all point out, that this might take at least a generation. This contrasts with a number of the French officers interviewed, typically displaying a slightly more cynical view of human nature as well as less belief in idealistic/humanist reasons for intervening when asked their personal (as opposed to professional) opinion.

[90] Nørgaard, Katrine. 2004. *Tillidens teknologi. Den militære ethos og viljen til dannelse.* Ph.D. thesis. Copenhagen University: Institute for Anthropology.

As cautioned by Schein, an organisation's articulated beliefs about motivation, leadership, and cooperation should not necessarily be taken at face value. Rather than revealing the underlying notions about human nature and human relations they might amount to hopes and aspirations, or be directly deceptive. The interviewed officers might simply repeat truisms inculcated during education and socialisation, or attempt to project a positive image of the armed forces to the outside world. However, the beliefs and values described above were consistent across all interviews. The impression created by the interviews was also corroborated by interviews with external civilians as well as officers from partner countries. Moreover, participant observation tended to confirm the validity of these statements. The interaction between deployed Danish personnel on different levels was characterised by a free and easy tone, as were exchanges between commander and staff officers. Moreover, commanders were visible on the ground (although, as discussed earlier, focussing on infantry and scout units rather than RUD/CIMIC) and took effort to explain decisions and/or restrictions by linking to the overall purpose of the mission.[91]

In summary, looking at the inner core in the organisational culture of Danish armed forces, beliefs about human nature and human relations, a practical, and action-oriented image emerges. Communication, reasoning, and individual initiative and responsibility are valued. Human beings are seen as at core active, rational, and responsible. There is nothing in these assumptions which is adverse to CPA. On the contrary, the core beliefs of Danish armed forces are quite compatible with the practical requirements for carrying out CPA projects: Independent initiative, openness, communicativeness, and the ability to cooperate with local institutions, entrepreneurs, and with the civil adviser around tangible and visible projects. In addition, it could be argued, the core beliefs are also compatible with the argument why CPA is important. Human beings are rational and active, and therefore it matters to give people economic opportunities. Locals, moreover, should be given and take responsibility in the state-building process.

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[91] Author's observations, Kosovo, March 2006, Iraq, April 2006, and Afghanistan, May and June 2006.

9. Conclusion and Recommendations

Recent years have seen increased political pressure on the armed forces to solve a number of civil-support tasks, in particular to support economic reconstruction in conflict areas where civil agencies and organisations are precluded from operating. Some scholars, however, have argued that while these tasks might have been accepted on the surface they are in reality neglected. The military culture, it is argued, is averse to accepting these tasks.

This report, while showing that Danish RUD/CIMIC units actually perform very well as measured against basic principles of good project work, also confirm that these units are indeed neglected in terms of planning, assignment, and access to resources. The report, however, has demonstrated that the reasons are less straightforward than assumed by the cultural aversion argument. It shows that while cultural beliefs about mission and means indeed incline the Danish armed forces to give precedence to traditional military tasks over CPA, deeper notions about human beings and human relations are compatible, even supportive of CPA. This has implications when discussing how the implementation of CPA might be improved. The cultural aversion argument would indicate the need for a general engineered cultural adjustment; a process which, according to most culturalists is extremely difficult, if not impossible. This report leaves room for more optimism. Some degree of cultural adjustment, for example, as suggested by Schein, through changes to education and socialisation, would indeed be required. Yet, the underlying affinity between the core values of the Danish armed forces and CPA should make the challenge of promoting cognitive change less formidable.

In summary, the cultural notions about mission and means of the Danish armed forces, complicating the performance of CPA, could be challenged through changes to current educational curricula combined with an effort to document the importance of CPA to reach military and mission end-states.

Currently, CIMIC, CPA and reconstruction support barely plays a role in the basic schooling of Danish officers at the officers' schools of the different services and at the Danish Defence Academy. Many of the respondents interviewed displayed a clear understanding of the importance of CIMIC and CPA at the conceptual level. Yet, at the same time, the author watched these tasks slip down the list of

priorities in a pressured situation, to the advantage of the directly security-related issues – issues taught, trained, and internalised throughout the officers' training. The fact that Danish RUD/CIMIC units perform very well on the tactical level, ironically, complicates the efforts of those who advocate an adjustment of the training curricula. The counterargument is obvious: "But any good Danish officer of the line can already do CIMIC."

Moreover, although historical analogy and the few existing interview based studies looking at local perceptions in conflict areas strongly suggest the importance of reconstruction when it comes to winning local support, the armed forces lack a system for measuring and monitoring the impact of CPA on this support. In fact, the absence of analysis and evaluation of the impact of RUD/CIMIC work, discussed above, reflects a broader problem within the armed forces. There is a general lack of methodology for measuring how the various lines of operation of a deployed contingent, including tactical military operations, impact on hearts and minds. That is, we know too little about the impact of the different instruments of a deployed Danish contingent on the *core* of current operations. Are arrest/search/destroy operations self-defeating in sense that they upset people to the extent of creating more enemies and problems than they removehan they? Officers might have an impression of the development over their tour of duty, even though the causality might remain murky. However, the evidence is conflicting. Some officers believe that operations actually work, while others contend that they inflame and that new criminals will always fill the ranks. Currently, there are simply no good answers to these questions.[92]

If existing cultural notions about mission and means are to be challenged and adjusted, there is a pressing need to develop a way of demonstrating and comparing the effectiveness of various lines of operation, including CPA, when it comes to reaching military and mission end states. Even if operationalising ways of measuring whether "hearts and minds" have been won is difficult, it should not

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[92] Of course, there is also the possibility that waves of violence against the international forces in Iraq and Afghanistan might be largely independent of the actions of the deployed units. It is possible that they simply reflect that the longer an operation runs, the higher the level of local disillusionment with the international presence. This would call for a rethinking of the 1990s peacekeeping paradigm, which emphasised the importance of a long-term military presence to ensure time for reconciliation and for new local governance structures to take root. If indeed a long-term presence is not just part of the solution, but also of the problem, it is even more critical that training and capacity-building take centre stage.

be impossible. A combination of indicators such as the number of incidents where coalition forces are targeted, the volume of actionable intelligence from locals, the support to militias and so on could be used.[93]

Lastly and most importantly, high level political pressure to keep minds focused is indispensable. Large organisations always involve people of different mindsets and obviously, placing more emphasis on CPA will be resisted from some quarters for different reasons. The lack of strategic planning for CPA, for example, requires action from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the problem of the lack of a system for capturing and transmitting RUD/CIMIC lessons learned requires action from the armed forces.

CPA is no universal panacea. It will not stop hard-core insurgents, foreign terrorists, and local war lords from resisting the international presence in areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, CPA is a way of mobilising and coordinating efforts and resources faster, to ensure that reconstruction and capacity-building get under way, including in areas where civil actors are not able or willing to operate. CPA obviously cannot and should not stand alone; reconstruction support is an important and indispensable element in winning local socio-political support and creating viable local governance structures and is thus a key to mission success.

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[93] A related challenge is the need to de-conflict and coordinate the different lines of operation. There is also, some interviewees indicated, a lack of methodology to measure political impact of tactical military operations. "Even if we plan to de-conflict once on the ground we fall back into old habits" as put by one CIMIC officer. One example might be the political repercussions of the detainment policy of the British Brigade deployed to Basra. As the Iraqi justice system was still perceived as too inefficient, detainees were kept for longer periods to win time. Yet, the detentions were used by local politicians as an excuse for disrupting the cooperation with the international forces over the spring 2006. The consequence, in turn, was that police training and capacity building were grounded during that period. Author's interviews, Camp Danevang, April 2006.

Sources

Civilians/non-military personnel interviewed:
Jan Andersen, UNMIK, Kosovo
Hewi Babakhan, Senior Adviser, Danish Battle Group, Basra
Flemming Bech, CIVPOL, Camp Danevang
Johanne Djurhuus, Senior Adviser, Danish Battalion, Basra
Niels K. Elsnab, Senior Project Manager, Steering Unit, Basra Palace
Per W. Hansen, CIVPOL, Camp Danevang
Stine Heiselberg, Senior Adviser, DANIDA, Feyzabad
Lars Jensen, Senior Adviser and Deputy Head, PRT Basra, Basra Palace
Ole Stockholm Jepsen, Senior Adviser, Steering Unit Basra Palace
Nicholas Ørum Keller, Adviser, Steering Unit, Basra Palace
Christian Oldenburg, Ambassador, Royal Danish Embassy, Baghdad
Flemming K. Pedersen, CIVPOL, Camp Danevang
Ivan Petrovic, Police Adviser, Badakshan.
Toralf Pilz, Civilian Head of Provincial Reconstruction Team Feyzabad
Rujan Sharif, Interpreter, Danish Battle Group, Basra
Otto Erik Sørensen, Humanitarian and Development Adviser, DANIDA, Feyzabad
Kim Vetting, Programme Officer, OSCE Mission in Kosovo

Danish military personnel interviewed:
Colonel H. Berg
Major S. Björcklund
Major C. Corfix
Captain B. V. Christensen
Captain S. K. Danebod
Major M. M. Erichsen
Major C. Glensnov
Captain K. H. Hansen
Major S. R. Hansen
Major P. Hein
Major H. Hvilsom
Major M. Ipsen
Major C. Ishøj
Major J. Jakobsen

Lieutenant Colonel I. E. Jensen
Lieutenant Colonel J. Johansen
First Lieutenant I.-M. M. Jonsson
Captain F. Kjærulff
Lieutenant Commander M. V. Knudsen
Major K.L. Kold
First Lieutenant M. Kvistgaard
First Lieutenant M. Larsen
Major P. Lysholt
Captain L. Mærsk
Captain T. Mørch
Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Nielsen
Major K. K. Nielsen
Major T. V. Nielsen
Sergeant First Class P. Nielsen
Captain H. Parsig
Colonel K. Pedersen
Major N. P. S. Pedersen
Captain F. Ratzow
Major J. Roelsgaard
Lieutenant Colonel K. Simonsen
Civilian-300 H.C. Skaaning
Captain H. Svane
Lieutenant Colonel P. B. Svendsen
Lieutenant Colonel L. Sørensen
Warrant Officer Class II J. Sørensen
First Lieutenant F.G. Thomsen
Captain N. Winther
Captain C. Wülf
Major M.R. Aakjær
Major C. B. Aarhus

Military personnel from partner countries interviewed:
Lieutenant Colonel H. P. Buch, Germany
Major T. Budik, Czech Republic
Major E. Cavalier, France
Lieutenant Colonel J-P Conegero, France
Lieutenant Colonel Holliday, USA

Warrant Officer R. Kristof, Czech Republic
Lieutenant Colonel H. Matschey, Germany
Major J. Moss, United Kingdom
Lieutenant Colonel Perez, USA
Colonel Plateaux, France
Major T. Schuhman, Germany
Colonel B. Schütt, Germany
Lieutenant Colonel S. Sivaro, Finland
Lieutenant Colonel J.-L. Sogny, France
Lieutenant Colonel R. Wendt, Germany

Pre-deployment Training and Courses Attended as Civilian or Embedded Researcher

Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) course for Reconstruction Unit Denmark (RUD), Iraq, team 7, Høvelte Garrison, January 2006

"Reduceret militær grunduddannelse," Vordingborg Garrison, February 2006

"Enkeltmandsforberedende kursus," Vordingborg Garrison, February 2006.

Brigade-led final exercise, Iraq, team 7, Oksbøl, February 2006

Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support, CIMIC course 2006-I, Hærens Logistikskole, Aalborg Garrison, April 2006

Patrols/meetings with Locals Attended as Embedded Researcher

Reconstruction Unit Denmark, Team 3, 12. April 2006
Reconstruction Unit Denmark, Team 2, 14. April 2006
Danish Civil Police, Basra Police Academy, 17. April 2006
Reconstruction Unit Denmark, Team 3, 26. April 2006
Danish CIMIC, Feyzabad, Badakshan, 13. May 2006
German CIMIC, Feyzabad, Badakshan, 14. May 2006
Danish CIMIC, Gor Khusan, Badakshan, 15. May 2006
German CIMIC, Feyzabad, Badakshan, 17. May 2006
Czech Military Police and Croatian Civil Police, Feyzabad, Badakshan, 20. May 2006
German CIMIC, Feyzabad, Badakshan, 20. May 2006
Danish CIMIC, Feyzabad, Badakshan, 22. May 2006
Danish CIMIC, Gor Khusan, Badakshan, 23. May 2006

In addition numerous patrols and meetings in Kosovo, including patrols with Liaison and Monitoring Teams (Danish and French), Infantry units (Danish), meetings, reconnaissance, and monitoring visits with CIMIC units and/or engineering units (American, Danish, French, and German).

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