STATE AND SOLDIER IN LATIN AMERICA
Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

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Given the history of military intervention in Latin America, it is striking that today we can point to no country in the region that is under military rule. Yet the success of popularly elected governments should not blind us to the continuing political importance of the military in many Latin American countries. Although apparently on the sidelines at present, the possibility that the military will again seek to take over the reins of government when it hears “the knock on the barracks door” needs continuous review.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and its support of leftist insurgencies around the world, the strength of most of the insurgent movements in Latin America has waned, thereby removing one of the main threats for the region’s militaries. Moreover, the impetus for economic reform across the region puts pressure on civilian governments to reduce the size of their armed forces and free up budget funds that are desperately needed elsewhere.

In such a milieu, what new missions can these civilian governments assign to their armed forces in order to keep them satisfied with fewer resources, constrain their domestic role, and reinforce their submission to civilian authority? Former Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow Wendy Hunter examines this question in this latest edition in the Institute’s Peaceworks series.

Professor Hunter is an expert on Latin American militaries, and the following pages attest to her keen insights into an institution that has distinguished itself by serving as the guardian of order during turbulent periods in the region’s history. Her extensive research on the armed forces in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile provides an excellent comparative perspective on the different historical patterns of civil-military relations in these countries. More importantly, though, she suggests what kinds of new missions these and other civilian governments in similar circumstances can assign to their armed forces in order to integrate them into a democratic political culture under civilian control.

What does this have to do with conflict and its resolution? In an era when interstate wars are giving way to more internal conflicts, many of Latin America’s national security threats are falling within the “gray area” between jurisdictions of the military and law enforcement. Indeed, as Professor Hunter argues, the threats Latin America’s militaries see these days stem less from external attacks and leftist guerrilla movements than from drug trafficking, conflict with indigenous groups, immigration, and environmental assaults. In addition, as Professor Hunter reports, the military is increasingly being deployed in nation-building duties, ranging from distributing food and other public services in a country’s more remote areas to repairing or constructing a national infrastructure.

Professor Hunter’s report includes practical suggestions for U.S. government policy in support of reducing civil-military conflict in the countries of Latin America. The lessons of her research may have some salient applications to other regions, where popularly elected governments are replacing communist or other authoritarian regimes. One of the challenges of the early twenty-first century will be to consolidate and strengthen the democratic forces that have made such dramatic advances throughout the world in recent years. Forging a constructive alliance between civilian governments and the military constitutes a critical part of that challenge. This report provides useful insights into the state-building dynamics policymakers will be addressing in the years to come.

Richard H. Solomon
President
Recent years have given rise to an intense debate about appropriate roles for Latin America’s armed forces: Should they remain the guardians of political stability, or should they restrict themselves mainly to external defense? The two major challenges for the region’s civilian leaders are to carve out missions for their militaries appropriate to both the security environment of the post–Cold War era and to civil-military relations in a democracy, and to provide ways militaries will effectively adopt these missions.

This essay examines efforts to identify such missions and assign them to Latin America’s armed forces. It also analyzes the implications for democracy and civilian control of specific roles for the armed forces that are either under consideration or already under way in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. These countries’ militaries are the most powerful in the Americas outside of the United States and have also ruled their countries for a lengthy period during the Cold War era.

If the region’s civilian governments do little to shape roles for the military that are compatible with democracy and civilian control, the result will be continued military meddling in civilian decision making and inflated defense budgets. This will increase the difficulty of the region’s governments to restructure their economies and free up resources that could be devoted to long-neglected social concerns. If left unattended, poverty and other social problems could well pose long-term risks to political stability as restive segments of these societies lose patience with new democratic institutions.

The status of the armed forces also has consequences for regional peace. Whether historical nationalist conflicts will remain at bay depends on how the armed forces in these countries react to efforts to redefine their role vis-à-vis the state and their place in society. Latin America currently has the chance to reshape its political landscape, making it more compatible with sustaining democracy at home and securing peace and security in the region and abroad. The serious implications of civil-military relations merit investigation of where Latin American militaries are headed and what determines the specific paths they take.

The two central issues at stake with civil-military relations in the current era are the degree of subordination of the armed forces to civilian control and the substantive orientation of the region’s defense forces (namely, whether their primary focus is internal or external security). Theoretically, a military can be highly subordinated to civilian authority and have either a primarily internal or external orientation. In practice, however, strong civilian control is difficult to sustain when the armed forces are oriented mainly toward internal conflict. This is especially true in countries where the armed forces have sought to expand their role in times of domestic political and economic crisis.

A variety of factors support Latin America’s civilian governments in their efforts to reform civil-military relations: the relatively recent wave of democratization that has swept over the region; the end of the Cold War and the widespread disappearance of leftist guerrilla insurgencies; and the spread of neoliberal economic reforms that have reduced the military’s ability to command the direction of these countries’ strategic economic sectors.

However, other factors may thwart reform. Many of these countries’ national security threats are falling in the “gray area” between strictly defined military functions and law enforcement. Drug trafficking, immigration, environmental protection, and the like are becoming more
significant national security issues in a region where many traditional military concerns (for example, border conflicts) have either been resolved or have diminished in importance.

Similarly, Latin American governments’ renewed attention to social problems and the armed forces’ need for organizational justification have led to the enlargement of civic action and social development roles for military personnel across the continent. The most recent Conference of American Armies recognized economic inequality, terrorism, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflict as the primary threats to security in the region.

The major options for Latin American militaries at this time involve some combination of (1) conventional defense of territorial integrity; (2) international peacekeeping; (3) internal security, which includes counterinsurgency and drug interdiction; and (4) civic action and development functions.

Latin America’s civilian governments have a choice of two strategies to keep their militaries in check. **Subjective control** reins in military ambitions in the domestic sphere by actively subordinating the armed forces to the control of the government and other civilian groups. The more effective method of **objective control** attempts to keep the military out of politics by “buying it off” through increased defense spending and an emphasis on modernization and professionalization. While objective control seeks to enhance the military’s traditional focus on external defense, such a strategy is hard to justify in an era when governments are trying to pare down and reorient budgets and when there are few external enemies.

What strategies have Argentina, Brazil, and Chile adopted, and how effective are they?

Following a stormy period of exerting subjective control over the military during the Alfonsín administration, Argentina has managed to assert a high degree of authority over its armed forces and diminish their domestic jurisdiction. President Carlos Saul Menem’s policies have included some elements of objective control by making external defense and participation in multinational peacekeeping missions central functions of Argentina’s military. While such objective control has not demanded sophisticated training and weaponry, the country’s defense expenditures—going mainly toward salaries—still consume a large part of the Argentine budget. The Menem administration’s objective control of the military also allows military leaders more autonomy in strictly professional matters.

Civil-military relations in Brazil suffer from an overly broad and inclusive definition of the armed forces’ role. Pressure to scale down the budget, low external threats, and numerous social and internal security problems militate against an exclusive expansion of the army’s energies in the direction of conventional defense and toward involvement in its traditional functions of internal security and social action. Such involvement does not bode well for Brazil’s nascent democracy in a country where profound social problems remain and civilian political institutions are traditionally weak and inefficient.

Of the three militaries examined in this study, Chile’s has had the fewest civilian-imposed constraints. Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s privileged position during the transition to democratic rule has maintained the Chilean military’s political and economic strength in the postauthoritarian period despite civilian attempts to prosecute officers for human rights violations committed during the 1973–90 dictatorship. The military’s position has allowed it a high degree of freedom in choosing its missions, which are focused primarily on modernization and external defense. Domestic missions are largely confined to national development projects.

If one risk in redefining military missions is overinclusion, while another is excessive exclusion, the appropriate governmental policy should incorporate elements of objective control, respecting the military’s special role in providing for defense and adequately funding appropriate military missions. In return, the military must recognize that it is accountable to the rule of law and must remain nonpartisan in its respect for civilian authority.

In Argentina, civilian leaders should stay the course. In Brazil, they should define military roles more clearly, more narrowly, and outside the realm of internal functions. In Chile, they should try to attenuate the military’s political prerogatives, while taking caution to preserve some of the objective control mechanisms already in place. In general, Latin America’s governments should continue to downsize their militaries while simultaneously encouraging military preparedness and
professionalism with fewer resources. In addition, government officials should build up police and other nonmilitary security forces and rely on only them to handle what police typically handle: stopping crime and maintaining social order.

While taking measures to enhance professional development and encourage the reduction of force levels among Latin America’s militaries, the United States should be wary of pushing noncombat tasks on them. Enlisting these armed forces to perform counternarcotics operations, for example, could draw them into other internal tasks, such as intelligence operations, and threaten the region’s nascent democratic institutions.
Civil-military relations in Latin America are at a crucial juncture. Recent years have given rise to an intense debate about the boundaries and appropriate missions of Latin America’s armed forces. At stake in this debate is whether the armed forces should remain the guardians of political stability when civilian governments falter—a role that puts them at the center of broader social and political conflicts historically—or whether they should shed this and related functions and restrict themselves to tasks confined mainly to external defense. The two major challenges for the region’s civilian leaders are to carve out missions for their militaries appropriate to both the security environment of the post–Cold War era and to civil-military relations in a democracy, and to provide inducements and sanctions so that military organizations effectively adopt these missions.

Latin America’s civilian governments can seize the opportunities presented at this current juncture to reorient the armed forces away from political activism and toward strictly military functions. They can also fail to exploit the trends favoring reform and leave the military without a clear, legitimate mission, thereby contributing to the perpetuation of the military’s tradition of domestic activism and interventionism. While the capacity of civilians to shape military missions presupposes some degree of leverage vis-à-vis the officer corps, the precise missions that civilians assign to the armed forces in turn affects the sovereignty of civilian decision making in the future.

This paper examines efforts to identify and assign missions to the armed forces and analyzes the implications for democracy and civilian control of specific roles for the armed forces that are either under consideration or already under way. For the purposes of this study, I define the term role as the principal orientation of the armed forces. Roles are usually expressed in functional terms (internal or external) but, as I demonstrate in the course of this study, the term has an even greater political dimension, namely, the relationship of the military vis-à-vis the state. Missions are the specific tasks assigned to the armed forces. While the military may be responsible for a wide range of tasks, certain missions—individually and collectively—tend to define the military’s fundamental role in the nation.

The service branch I examine for comparative purposes in this study is the army, the most politically relevant branch of the military. The countries I have selected for comparison are Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which have the most powerful armed forces in the Americas outside of the United States. These armed forces have also distinguished themselves by having ruled their countries for a lengthy period during the Cold War, which contributed to military dominance in several ways.

Needless to say, I do not claim that these case studies should serve as exact models for how other countries in the region redefine their civil-military relations. Quite simply, the structures and histories of the region’s governments and armed forces present as many crucial differences as they do similarities. Haiti’s military is an obvious example of just how tenuous generalizations can be. Yet my purpose in linking these case studies to the region seeks to highlight the common pressures most of these countries will face to a greater or lesser extent and to focus the universe of policy options on those that seem more appropriate, given the history of the continent’s armed forces’ serving as autonomous actors and nation-builders, the relatively recent wave of economic and political reform that has swept over the continent, the decline of leftist insurrections in practically all of these countries, and the lack of external threats. Put another way, I selected these three case studies to offer a look at
quite different histories of civil-military relations and the corresponding policies that seemed appropriate in balancing military interests against the demands of demobilization, economic reform, and democratization. The vast majority of the region’s countries will have to confront such trade-offs to varying degrees in the near future. As such, my use of the case studies is not to suggest a particular model for how to redefine civil-military relations across the continent, but to isolate similarities and ask simply, How should we expect other civilian governments to approach the issue of redefining civil-military relations, given roughly similar conditions in the case-study countries?

Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are useful cases for such a comparative analysis. Despite the presence of several common influencing factors (the end of the Cold War, the reemergence of democracy, and few significant external enemies), a distinctive set of military role definitions has begun to emerge in each country. In Argentina, the armed forces have come to assume an almost exclusive (albeit modest) focus on externally oriented roles, of which international peacekeeping is a large component. In Brazil, they are trying to maintain activities on both the domestic and external fronts. In Chile, the armed forces are vigorously strengthening external defense capabilities and moving away from political activities, despite the significant autonomy they enjoy and their persistent saber-rattling over civilian attempts to prosecute officers for human rights violations committed during the 1973–90 dictatorship.

What precisely are the imminent and potential threats posed by Latin America’s militaries during this crucial period? What could result from the failure of civilian leaders to manage correctly the demobilization and definition of new roles for the armed forces? In the realm of domestic politics, worst case scenarios include recurring military rebellion, as witnessed in Argentina under President Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89), or a full-blown (albeit less probable) authoritarian backlash mounted by the military leadership to recover institutional prerogatives eliminated or imperiled by civilian governments.

On a less dramatic and more probable note, if civilian governments do little to shape roles for the military that are compatible with democracy and civilian control, the result will be continued military meddling in civilian decision making and inflated defense budgets. This will increase the difficulty of the region’s governments to restructure their economies and free up resources that could be devoted to long-neglected social concerns. If left unattended, poverty and other social problems could well pose long-term risks to political stability as restive segments of these societies lose patience with Latin America’s new democratic institutions.

In the regional and international sphere, backsliding by Latin American states on previous commitments to nuclear nonproliferation is arguably the most serious potential outcome of civilian governments’ failure to retain control over the armed forces in the process of trying to redefine them. Only in 1991, when Argentina and Brazil had presidents capable of containing the military, did these two countries reach a nuclear rapprochement and subject themselves to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Similarly, only with the “military question” at least partially resolved did Argentina’s second postauthoritarian president, Carlos Saúl Menem, act vigorously to arrest the development of the air force’s ballistic missile program. The development and export of such missiles have clear adverse implications for international security. Brazil has yet to commit itself as clearly as other countries in the region to curbing the production and sale of highly sensitive military technology.

What could result from the failure of civilian leaders to manage correctly the demobilization and definition of new roles for the armed forces?
resolution of many regional disputes as well, such as the clash between Argentina and Chile in 1977 over territory at the southern tip of South America and the competition in nuclear development programs between Argentina and Brazil. Democratization and the activation of trade in the Southern Cone have also resulted in a reduction of border disputes and other sources of regional tension. Whether historical nationalist conflicts will remain at bay depends in no small part on how the armed forces in these countries react to efforts to redefine their role vis-à-vis the state and their place in society.

In short, the current juncture provides a rare chance for Latin America to reshape its political landscape, making it more compatible with sustaining democracy at home and securing peace and security in the region and abroad. The serious implications of civil-military relations merit investigation of where Latin American militaries are headed and what determines the specific paths they take.

The two central issues currently at stake in civil-military relations are the degree of subordination of the armed forces to civilian control (independent of the specific substantive roles they perform) and the substantive orientation of the region’s defense forces (namely, whether their primary focus is internal or external security). The autonomy of the military from civilian control and the substantive roles the armed forces play are analytically distinct issues. Theoretically, a military can be highly subordinated to civilian authority and have either a primarily internal or external orientation. In practice, however, strong civilian control is difficult to sustain when the armed forces are oriented mainly toward internal conflict. This is especially true in countries where the armed forces have sought to expand their internal role in times of domestic political and economic crisis.

Factors Affecting Military Missions in the Current Era

What are the forces that militate in favor of a redefinition of civil-military relations and a contraction of the armed forces’ jurisdiction in Latin America? The first is the wave of democratization that has spread across the region in the last decade and a half. As recently as 1978, the armed forces governed in half of all Latin American countries. Since then, military governments have vanished from the region. Only in Peru, which witnessed an extreme economic crisis and a serious threat of guerrilla insurgency, did a civilian president temporarily suspend constitutional democracy (in April 1992) and invite the armed forces to play a larger role in the government. Democratization has emboldened citizens to contest the military’s control over issues of broad national importance, question the institution’s raison d’etre, and demand justification for its consumption of scarce economic resources.

The nature of threats facing the region is important in justifying which roles and missions the military plays. The end of the Cold War and the widespread disappearance of guerrilla insurgencies and their external sponsors have largely invalidated internal security missions for Latin America’s armed forces. Latin America’s militaries and socio-economic elites viewed leftist organizations in their countries as a threat to capitalism, to the extant social order, and to the military hierarchy itself. As recipients of funding from various Soviet-bloc countries, including Cuba, some Latin American leftist groups endorsed the notion of armed struggle, directly challenging the military’s institutional interest in monopolizing coercive power. The U.S. government provided high levels of support in the form of direct military aid and favorable financial and trade arrangements to Latin American governments and militaries intent on combating and defeating these insurgency movements.

The spread of neoliberal economic reforms, particularly privatization, has reduced the military’s ability to command or influence the direction of these countries’ strategic economic sectors, such as mining, telecommunications, and energy. Market reforms have exposed once-protected military industries and the weapons systems they produce to the dictates of competition. Moreover, countries that are undergoing economic restructuring need to be on good terms with the United States and Western financial institutions, which place severe constraints on the development and purchase of sophisticated military technology they deem unacceptable.

However, there are other factors in the region that may thwart reform. At a time when Latin America’s governments are eager to distance their militaries from the domestic realm, many of the
immediate threats to national security are falling within the “gray area” between strictly defined military functions and law enforcement. Drug trafficking, immigration, environmental protection, and the like are becoming more significant national security issues in a region where many traditional military concerns (for example, border conflicts) have either been resolved or have diminished in importance.

Similarly, Latin American governments’ renewed attention to social problems, coupled with the armed forces’ need for organizational justification in an era when diminished external as well as internal threats exert heavy pressures to downsize, has led to the enlargement of civic action and social development roles for military personnel across the continent. The most recent Conference of American Armies recognized economic inequality, terrorism, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflict as the primary threats to security in the region.¹ One analyst has summarized the dilemma this poses: “How [Latin American] military institutions retain a legitimate institutional function in modern democracies while at the same time defining security missions that assign meaningful but politically unintrusive roles to those institutions is a tough act.”²

Nevertheless, civilian governments must manage to surmount these problems and to define respectable, credible, and stable nonpolitical missions for the armed forces if they seek to break the region’s legacy of military tutelage and end its recurring authoritarian-democratic cycle of political rule. In the words of one author, “The military’s mission is the most critical determinant of civil-military relations. . . . Mission is critical because it determines doctrine; doctrine, in turn, is like software—it runs the military’s hardware.”³

**Mission Options**

The major options for Latin American militaries at this time involve some combination of (1) conventional defense of territorial integrity; (2) international peacekeeping; (3) internal security, which includes counterinsurgency and drug interdiction; and (4) civic action and development functions.

**Conventional Defense.** Virtually all militaries in the region insist on retaining the defense of territorial integrity as their predominant mission. At the very least, conventional external defense remains the primary official function of the armed forces in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Their insistence on the continued need to combat conventional threats was made amply clear when the hemisphere’s military leaders met in Williamsburg, Virginia on July 24–25, 1995, for the first-ever inter-American defense summit. While the United States displayed an ongoing tendency to underscore “gray-area” threats and the need for Latin American militaries to perform “operations other than war,” including drug interdiction, many Latin American leaders showed resistance to the suggestion that the military play a more active role in these struggles. Instead, they tried to emphasize territorial disputes and conventional combat roles.⁴

Concrete external threats in the region are difficult to identify, but Latin American military officers are quick to point out that, just as the Soviet Union’s dissolution led to the outbreak of subnational ethnic conflicts on the Eurasian continent, the waning of left-wing terrorism and subversion in Latin America—which had created a united front among Latin American militaries in the past—may now give way to interstate disputes that were previously kept in check. The outbreak of war between Peru and Ecuador in early 1995 signals, in their view, the greater potential for border disputes between countries in the region. Despite the overall trend toward economic integration on the continent, South America’s armed forces continue to take seriously extant territorial disputes and threats, and perhaps even exaggerate them. They persist in regarding combat power as the ultimate arbiter of sovereignty and exhibit across-the-board support for enhancing their country’s capacity to defend itself against these threats.⁵ At a time when civilian leaders are actively pursuing economic integration and cross-border ties in other nongovernmental sectors, the military remains one of the last bastions of nationalism in Latin America. On the whole, civilian policymakers appear less concerned than senior officers about conventional defense and are less willing to allocate the resources necessary to ensure that the region’s militaries are viable combat organizations.

**International Peacekeeping.** International peacekeeping provides military personnel with credible
participation in international missions and highly valued professional experience at a time when budgetary constraints at home make it difficult for many Latin American militaries to train at a level they consider appropriate. It also constitutes a way of increasing officers’ and enlisted men’s salaries, which have witnessed a steady decline in recent years. By sending troops to far-off corners of the globe, various Latin American governments have demonstrated their solidarity with the United Nations as well as with the United States and other Western nations. As such, peacekeeping operations also serve as a way for these governments to integrate their otherwise marginalized armed forces into their foreign policy objectives. Notwithstanding the various benefits of peacekeeping, many officers remain wary of giving it too high a priority. Arguing that peacekeeping detracts from the resources and attention devoted to the defense of their own countries, they insist that it not become the armed forces’ primary mission.

**Internal Security.** Traditionally, Latin America’s armed forces have had a variety of internal security functions: counterinsurgency, drug interdiction, fighting organized crime, and quelling social protest, among them. Guerrilla insurgency remains a problem in some countries, such as Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Subversion and counterinsurgency continue to be subjects of intense discussion at recent conferences among Latin America’s armies. Moreover, civilian governments persist in looking to the armed forces for protection when guerrilla groups resume their activities.

Counterinsurgency is by definition “geared to military, political, economic, and civic action” and thus invites the military to expand its reach. Counterinsurgency also politicizes the institution and inevitably leads its members to commit human rights violations. The armed forces’ insistence on immunity for these violations typically unleashes mass social recrimination, causing top commanders to guard the institution’s autonomy with even greater vigor. This lock-step sequence of military abuses, amnesty, social protest, and the military’s efforts to redouble its autonomy has unfolded recently in Peru. Such a cycle does not bode well for making the military more amenable to civilian oversight and control in the long term.

Drug interdiction is among the most credible roles for the armed forces in the 1990s and one that the United States has urged many Latin American militaries to assume. As recently as spring 1995, U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated, “The only way to deal effectively with the narco-trafficking problem is to treat it as a regional problem. . . . Military forces can provide needed support to our civilian law enforcement agencies in fighting the drug trade. We hope to see this cooperation between the police and the military and between nations wherever narco-trafficking crosses borders.” Narco-trafficking is indeed a scourge, undermining democratic political institutions, seriously challenging governmental authority, wreaking violence on society, and colluding with insurgent groups and criminal gangs. Since the late 1980s, the U.S. Army’s Southern Command has been deeply engaged in supporting and coordinating U.S. efforts with host-country organizations devoted to fighting narcotics trafficking.

President Clinton’s selection of General Barry McCaffrey in January 1996 to head the White House Office of Drug Control Policy is a telling sign of the United States’ insistence on involving the military in narcotics interdiction. In the two years prior to his appointment as the nation’s “Drug Czar,” Gen. McCaffrey was the commanding officer of the Army’s Southern Command.

Fighting the drug war is imperative, but assigning such a mission to the armed forces promises to be counterproductive from the standpoint of scaling back the military’s influence in Latin American society. A military charged with drug interdiction could very well demand the right to conduct surveillance, to apprehend suspects, and even to administer justice. Militaries engaged in such activities typically begin to assume intelligence functions, and there is a fine line between monitoring the movement of drugs and keeping a watchful eye on other internal social and political developments. As is the case with counterinsurgency efforts, violations of citizens’ constitutional rights and due process are almost inevitable in a war against drugs. Besides preferring to avoid such entanglements, many militaries eschew the assumption of counternarcotics functions because of their numerous opportunities for corruption. U.S. efforts to encourage Latin American militaries to become involved in the war against drugs, which often sparks nationalist resentment over pushing “police roles” on Latin American military officers, provides yet another disincentive for the military
to carve out a counternarcotics mission. In short, although drug trafficking is a serious problem, both civilian governments and the military recognize that the militarization of the drug war leaves much to be desired.10

**Civic Action.** Civic action and development roles, such as the provision of food and health services in poor and remote areas, infrastructure building, and environmental protection, would provide a useful contribution by the military in a region marked by poverty and inequality. All countries could benefit from the human resources and logistical support the military could lend to such efforts, especially in the absence of private sector initiatives or state-funded civilian agencies to take on these tasks. Civic action also compensates the armed forces somewhat for the demise of the military-development model resulting from the abandonment of Latin America’s state-led development policies. Civilian and military policymakers have given this mission more consideration in the 1990s, threatening the return to a tradition among Latin American militaries that goes back to the 1950s and 1960s, when modernization theorists advocated civic action roles for militaries of developing countries. The U.S. government also advocated such roles and funded this type of activity as a means of bringing Latin American militaries in line with the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.11

Domestic missions such as civic action have also been subjects of debate regarding new missions for the U.S. armed services. Senior public officials and members of Congress knowledgeable about national security matters, such as Senator Sam Nunn, have called for the U.S. military’s involvement in refurbishing the country’s infrastructure and addressing social problems in communities. One of the driving forces behind the renewed attention to civic action for militaries in many countries is the need for the military to make itself useful domestically in order to compete successfully for budgetary allocations.

However, Latin America is a region where development missions have encouraged the military to view itself as more effective than civilians and to expand its role in development beyond that of a mere instrument of the civilian leadership to policymaker. As such, the military’s adoption of a central social development mission has potential drawbacks. Expanded civic action programs, coupled with the political inclinations of many Latin American militaries, have the potential to draw the institution into social conflicts. This situation has unfolded in Ecuador, where civic action provided an opening for the army to ally itself with right-wing evangelical groups against progressive sectors of the Catholic church and grass-roots organizations representing the country’s increasingly mobilized indigenous population.12 There, civic action on the part of the military has become intertwined with the state’s desire to exercise social control over the country’s indigenous peoples.

Expanded social roles for the army also help create a positive public image for the institution, often in contrast to that of political parties and other civilian institutions. Survey data suggest that such an image may contribute to bolstering public support for broader, more interventionist political roles as well.13 Moreover, the fact that the army takes on civic action often means that civilian institutions capable of fulfilling social functions do not develop.

Reservations about extensive military involvement in civic action are summed up well by one analyst: “Whereas a larger role for the military in development will result in a more encompassing concept of security, such an expanded conception, including development-related issues, will, in turn, tolerate larger military roles.”14

**How to Redefine Military Missions**

In the process of recasting civil-military relations and defining future roles for the armed forces, politicians and policymakers run the risk of adopting two mistaken approaches, either one of which could well provoke tension and conflict in the short or long term. These risks loom especially large if drastic downsizing is not a viable option. Drastic downsizing is not feasible in most Latin American countries, where the military has been a very powerful actor throughout the continent’s history and where civilian governments lack sufficient power or the will to confront the institution directly.

The first risk is that civil-military relations are insufficiently transformed when the search to find useful missions keeps the military involved
in activities that immerse it in broad social problems. Fighting crime, drugs, and insurgencies perpetuates the notion of the military as the guardian of internal order, and civic action or public works activities keep the armed forces in the role of “nation-builder.” Even if they are not coup-mongering or actively trying to usurp power, the armed forces will remain a politicized institution at the center of domestic strife. Expanding military jurisdiction (“mission creep”) is a definite danger, with injurious long-term effects on reorienting civil-military relations in line with democratic standards and principles.

The second risk is that civilian efforts to control the military and minimize its role in society end up isolating the institution. Such an outcome may stem from the economic and political imperatives of the late twentieth century or from the mistaken notion that all forms of military strength are necessarily dangerous for democracy. In any event, marginalizing what remains in many countries the most organized institution with the greatest coercive power is obviously not a wise policy option. Such a tendency could well ignite civil-military conflict in the short term and create the basis for fostering military resentment with adverse longer-term consequences for stable civil-military relations.

Because civilian elites in Latin America have historically viewed the military as part of an alien culture, despite the comprehensive role of the institution, it is particularly imperative that contemporary civilian leaders not be perceived as downgrading the profession of arms or the social status of officers. The partially correct view among military officers that civilians have looked down on them socially and have always held the military profession in low esteem (but have willingly turned to the institution for a strong hand to resolve political crises) has bred in the officer corps a resentment that militates against accepting civilian dictates.

In this respect, there is a threshold above which civilian leaders probably cannot go without provoking a backlash. Even if active military rebellion in response to real or perceived isolation is not an immediate threat, the perceived contempt of civilians toward men in uniform will not facilitate greater military openness to the idea of subordination to civilian authority. Such an exclusionary approach may even work against the armed forces’ own impulses toward a higher level of integration with the civilian world. In this connection, one analyst of military affairs notes a lesson to be drawn from recent experiences in Latin America:

Many Latin American armies are organizing from a defensive posture, in the sense that they face shrinking public resources, diminished social esteem, or military defeat. In this context, it would be expected for any institution to withdraw, re-group, and find ways to build walls between itself and the outside world. It is precisely at these moments that civil society must remain open to civil-military rapprochement, and make explicit overtures to this effect. The uncomfortable legacies of military domination may make continued segregation between civilians and soldiers seem the path of least resistance, but it is precisely at this juncture that civilian leaders need to take the initiative to assure the continued vitality and need for senior officers to be part of the state’s future.

An overly inclusive approach to military missions may make use of the military’s human resources and logistical capacity but at the risk of further role expansion. An approach that carries the risk of excessive exclusion reduces defense spending in the immediate term but may plant the seeds of future civil-military conflict. In light of these perilous choices, the question for civilian governments becomes, Are there alternatives that both sides can accept?

One alternative is to keep military budgets and salaries at Cold War levels (or thereabouts) and allow the military to develop greater and more sophisticated capabilities against intangible and remote enemies in exchange for the institution’s acceptance of political subordination and a shrinking degree of influence in the domestic sphere. Put simply, why not “buy them off,” or placate them financially at least as a temporary strategy? In this connection, one retired U.S. military officer and analyst of Latin American militaries points out, “The idea that the military will be provided for is one of the successes of the civil-military contract in the United States.” This contract includes “providing an adequate standard of living—health care, retirement, housing, etc.—to ensure professional integrity and to discourage the armed forces from seeking financial resources from other sources.” Similarly, in his guidelines for democratization,
Samuel P. Huntington highly recommends boosting military salaries, pensions, and benefits, using the funds saved by reducing the size of the armed forces.18

Indeed, allocating relatively high levels of financial resources to the armed forces would seem to go a long way toward placating officers at a time when they fear the virtual elimination of their institution. Core concerns of officers at the present time include the ability to earn salaries high enough to afford them a middle-class lifestyle and budgetary resources sufficient to maintain reasonable levels of training, education, and equipment.

**Objective vs. Subjective Civilian Control: Pros and Cons**

The strategy of funding the armed forces well enough for them to carry out their professional roles is an important aspect of the notion of objective civilian control, originally elaborated by Samuel P. Huntington. This concept rests on the assumption that the vocation of most men in uniform is that of arms, not politics. Civilian control is said to be “objective” when civilian politicians provide the armed forces with the conditions to organize, plan, equip, and train for combat roles (external defense) that reflect their special status as experts in the management of violence. The armed forces, in turn, jealously guard this sphere of competence and autonomy in return for political subordination.19 At the risk of oversimplification, adherents of objective control recommend giving the military “new and fancy toys” in order to occupy its attention and keep it satisfied.20

Modernization and professionalization help create the conditions for objective control by enhancing the military’s professional status.21 Both modernization and professionalization rest on material or technological improvements as well as the ability to maintain reasonable levels of training, leadership, strategy, organization, and coordination. Professionalization alone has not and most likely will not prevent the military from engaging in political meddling, as Alfred Stepan suggests in his concept of “the new professionalism,” referring to the fact that the most technologically advanced militaries of Latin America came to power in the 1960s and 1970s.22 Nevertheless, enhancing professionalism can help tame the military by conferring prestige on the institution and giving it direction.

Objective civilian control is thought to be superior, or at least a necessary complement, to subjective civilian control, which seeks to minimize military power by maximizing the relative power of civilian groups and institutions. Instead of recognizing an independent professional military sphere, subjective control means that civilian groups define, oversee, and monitor military activities. However, subjective control suffers from at least two related problems. First, “the maximizing of civilian power always means the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups.”23 Since some civilian groups in Latin America—particularly on the right—have historically supported military activism to protect the status quo, their “control” over the institution might not keep officers out of politics. For example, Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori appears to have an impressive level of command and influence over the country’s armed forces. But at the same time, he has also used them as a domestic political instrument. Subjective control also does not allow the military to develop its own independent commitment to political noninterference. By inducing the military to be less interested in politics, objective control mechanisms would eventually provide an additional source of military restraint should civilian governance falter and lead groups to “knock on the doors of the barracks.”

Hence a strategy of control based on objective mechanisms or professionalization might seem superior and highly useful politically, but current conditions do not provide a propitious context for the development of objective civilian control in Latin America. While there is no necessary correspondence between levels of spending and the professional status of the armed forces—that is, militaries can learn to do “more with less” and can become “leaner and meaner”—higher levels of funding certainly facilitate modernization and professionalization. Objective control is more likely to exist in the presence of formidable external threats and ample defense expenditures. A strategy of civilian control based on co-optation lacks feasibility in an era when external enemies are few and when governments are seeking to stabilize their economies and reduce public deficits. Such a strategy is also untenable when the first goal of
many politicians is to fund programs that will win them votes with the public rather than points with the high brass and when international powers make loans and other benefits conditional upon diminished defense expenditures. Indeed, neoliberal economic reform imposes crucial limits to “buying off the military.”

In any event, although the current juncture presents an opportunity for civilians to provide the military with a clear guide to its proper conduct, the cross-cutting pressures of the 1990s render difficult a definition of military roles compatible with narrowing the military’s jurisdiction while simultaneously achieving and sustaining the primacy of the civilian sector. Pressures of this type include the desire among many civilian governments to confine military functions to defending national borders in an era that sees few tangible external threats; budgetary constraints that tempt civilians to neglect the expensive modernization necessary to turn Latin American militaries into more viable combat organizations and to sanction domestic operations instead; and U.S. pressures on Latin American governments and militaries to engage in operations other than war, such as drug interdiction. Despite these and other problems, the failure of Latin America’s fledgling civilian governments to provide their armed forces with clearly defined missions may well invite traditional patterns of behavior to reemerge and exacerbate the current crisis of identity among many of the region’s militaries, a condition that is not salutary for democracy or political stability.

Let us now turn to three cases—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—where the armed forces have assumed somewhat different profiles in reaction to recent domestic and international developments.
Of the three militaries under study, Argentina’s is without question the most subject to civilian control. It is also the institution with the most modest and circumscribed role; conventional defense is defined as its main mission. International peacekeeping, logistical support in antinarcotics operations, and community aid in the event of national disasters are secondary missions.

In practice, the Argentine armed forces’ sphere of activity is confined almost exclusively to the external arena, namely to international peacekeeping and conventional defense roles. Only under very exceptional circumstances—when civilian security forces are overwhelmed—do the armed forces have the authority to participate in functions that come under the rubric of “internal security.” Their contribution to drug interdiction is merely logistical. Aside from occasional stints in disaster relief, their participation in civic action/public works is practically nonexistent. Compared to past eras, when Argentine caudillos and generals issued sweeping pronunciamientos with far-reaching consequences for the political and economic order, today’s armed forces, while still an actor to be reckoned with, have assumed a much narrower scope and exercise less authority in the economic, social, and political order of the country.

To explain the recent constriction of the military’s domain, it is necessary to return to the past, specifically to the period of military dictatorship during 1976–83, the self-styled Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (Process of National Reorganization). The armed forces’ abuse of power in this period (also known as the “Dirty War”), combined with their devastating defeat in the Malvinas/Falklands War with Great Britain in 1982, turned Argentine society against the institution. This forced the military to subordinate itself to a new civilian regime and to assume a more circumscribed role in society, politics, and the economy, causing considerable conflict between the military and the civilian leadership. If Argentina’s first postauthoritarian president, Raúl Alfonsín, ended up marginalizing and isolating the armed forces in his vigorous efforts to subordinate them, his successor, Carlos Saúl Menem, has sought to reintegrate the armed forces in Argentine society and give them direction. Alfonsín’s measures were crucial in ultimately bringing the military under control, but their immediate result was to provoke a military backlash. Menem’s more accommodationist strategy has lowered the level of conflict between the civilian leadership and the military.

The following discussion of Argentina is divided into three parts. The first section describes the expansive role definition for the military in Argentine history. The dictatorship of 1976–83, which ultimately turned society against the armed forces and unleashed efforts to contract their sphere of influence, represented an extension of this pattern. The second section traces the process by which Argentina’s postauthoritarian governments have managed to assert their authority over the often unwieldy military institution, shrink its jurisdiction, and ultimately channel its members’ energies in directions judged fitting for sustained civilian rule. The third section evaluates the country’s current civil-military relationship and discusses remaining and potential problems.

The Military: From Nation-Builder to Powerful Political Player

In the century between the 1870s and 1970s, the Argentine military evolved from playing a central role in the final demarcation of the country’s borders to seizing power from elected civilian leaders
and sitting at the head of government. In the late nineteenth century, Argentina’s hierarchical and unified army occupied Patagonia and defeated warring Indian populations in what became known as the “conquest of the desert.” This period was critical in establishing the army’s self-image of national unifier and defender against not only divisive internal forces but external attack as well.

The Argentine military made its first direct political intervention in a 1930 coup, arrogating to itself the role of “guardian of the nation” and “supervisor of the political system.” From then on, Argentina oscillated between military and civilian governments. As one specialist on the Argentine military writes, “After early appearances as the ‘watchdog’ against corruption and guardian of the constitution, military leaders increasingly began to impose their own rules and standards on the political system, until, eventually, the armed forces became that system’s most powerful player.”

Over time, the armed forces also established for themselves a huge military-industrial complex in arms, metals, petrochemicals, shipping, and other strategic industries.

The most recent instance of the military’s chronic political interventionism took place in the 1976–83 dictatorship. This period was an unmitigated disaster for all institutions of Argentine society. The junta advanced economic policies that led to the demise of important industries and produced record-high levels of unemployment. Systematic state repression caused the “disappearances” of at least nine thousand Argentine citizens—suspected subversives and countless innocents. A desperate eleventh-hour attempt to salvage the regime’s support led Argentina into a reckless war with Great Britain over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. The failures, errors, and crimes of military rule—a damaged economy; extensive, heinous human rights violations; and an ignominious defeat in war—all served as the basis for efforts by Argentina’s subsequent civilian governments to diminish military power and influence and reorient military missions away from the domestic arena and toward external defense. By 1983, the armed forces were badly divided and in too weak of a position to defend themselves against these efforts.

Since the return to civilian rule in 1983, elected politicians in Argentina have gone much further than their counterparts in either Brazil or Chile in diminishing the armed forces’ political, economic, and social standing and asserting authority over them, even if the country’s two postauthoritarian governments went about this task in radically different ways. Raúl Alfonsín waged a direct confrontation against the military and set in motion a redefinition of institutional roles—at the risk of causing leading officers to feel attacked and excluded. Conversely, Carlos Saúl Menem has gone a long way toward reintegrating the military and developing an accommodation with its members without relinquishing control over them.

The Alfonsín Government: Contesting the Military without Redirecting It

The failings of the Proceso and the widespread public support for reducing military influence motivated President Raúl Alfonsín to assume office determined to break the institution’s political clout. From the time he took office in December 1983, he proceeded to challenge the military on its political prerogatives, budgetary expenditures, and human rights record. Such a confrontation on so many fronts was unprecedented in a country where men in uniform had literally gotten away with murder for so long.

With respect to institutional prerogatives, the Alfonsín administration secured the passage of numerous reforms reducing the armed forces’ autonomy and influence. Laws passed during this period transferred decision making over important policy areas—from the heads of the three service branches (downgraded from commanders to “chiefs of staff”) to a civilian-led Ministry of Defense. Additional reforms stripped the armed forces of management over public-sector defense firms and charged the Ministry of Defense with supervising them.

The Alfonsín government also succeeded in passing legislation limiting military participation in matters of internal security, a constitutionally authorized attribute the military had relied on in the past to legitimate its political activism. The 1988 National Defense Law (No. 23.554) formed the centerpiece of efforts to remove the military from the realm of internal security, providing a
legislative separation between external defense and internal security by putting the military in charge of the former and making police forces and border patrols responsible for the latter. This legislative change would not preclude a military bent on intervention from overstepping legal boundaries, but it would increase the costs of undertaking such action. In addition to overseeing the passage of the National Defense Law, the president removed over two hundred active duty and retired military personnel from the country’s chief intelligence agency, the Secretaría de Inteligencia y Defensa del Estado (SIDE), which is now directly subordinate to the presidency.

The Alfonsín government also proceeded with a drastic reduction in defense expenditures as well. The political motive to weaken the military in every way possible reinforced the economic incentives to cut the military budget and thus reduce the country’s pernicious inflation and public debt. As a share of public sector expenditures, the armed forces occupied 32.3 percent in 1982, compared to 18.4 percent in 1990. Stated in absolute terms, military expenditures (in constant 1993 dollars) stood at $9.2 billion in 1982 and fell to $4.9 billion by 1989. Demobilization contributed to a large part of these savings; between 1983 and 1989, the government reduced military personnel from 175,000 to 95,000.

The budgetary cuts the government imposed on the armed forces weakened their operational capacity severely. The physical condition of buildings and equipment deteriorated. By the late 1980s, finances were so tight that the work week was shortened and the capacity for training was severely undermined by insufficient resources such as fuel and munitions. On any given day during this period, the barracks and army ministry were empty by 2:00 p.m. Officers of all ranks were reported to be “moonlighting.” Military service became a part-time job rather than a profession of singular dedication. While all of the services suffered from budget cuts, the army—historically the most politically meddlesome branch—took the biggest hit. In short, under the Alfonsín administration, the military became a shadow of its former self. The days of splendor for the institution were most certainly over.

Civilian moves to reduce the political and economic standing of the military frequently fueled tension in civil-military relations, most notably in the efforts to prosecute officers responsible for the deaths and “disappearances” during the Proceso or “Dirty War.” The initial intention was to prosecute only the top leadership and stop there; this was largely accomplished by the end of 1985. Military acquiescence to the trials was put to the test after members of the Argentine legislature and some human rights groups sought to extend the proceedings further down into the ranks, specifically to the level of unit commanders, implicating scores of junior officers. This would erode the distinction that the president initially had made between top officials who had issued commands, individuals who had followed orders, and those who had exceeded orders.

In sum, the crux of government policy toward the military under President Alfonsín was oriented more toward restriction and exclusion than redirecting the institution into activities and missions aimed at keeping its members out of politics. Demilitarization, not redirection through professionalization and modernization, formed the core of government efforts during this period. This orientation is understandable in light of both the extensive misdeeds the military had committed in the previous period and the public sentiment for punishing and weakening the armed forces on all fronts. Such a tack may even have been a necessary precondition for later reintegrating the military on terms favorable to civilian rule. Efforts to cut state resources for the institution also made economic sense, given the crisis-ridden state of the Argentine economy and the competing demands for public funds.

At the same time, major sectors within the military perceived the policies of the Alfonsín era as a multifront assault that stripped the institution of all prestige and deprived it of any role to perform,
including strictly military and professional functions. One student of the Argentine military observed that, “Government policies were aimed at eliminating any danger posed by the armed forces to either government or society. However, their result was to combine steps toward political debilitation of the military with their institutional debilitation, which, in many ways, had the opposite effect of that intended.”36 Rather than depoliticizing the institution and encouraging its reprofessionalization, goals that enjoyed widespread support among officers, the strategy backfired and led to renewed politicization and defiance of civilian authority.

Junior and mid-level army officers struck back in three rebellions that took place between April 1987 and December 1988. These officers became known as the carapintadas (“painted faces”), named after the camouflage paint they applied to their faces. The primary and initial cause of military rebellion was the move to prosecute junior officers for human rights offenses. But the army’s perceived isolation, professional degradation, and lack of mission further fueled the rebels’ campaign and expanded their following.37 As is the case with junior officers nearly everywhere, those in Argentina tended to be more radical than their superiors and were more insistent on wresting the conditions for a strong professional role from the relevant political authorities.

The army leadership initially did little to oppose the rebels since it, too, resented these developments and considered them detrimental to the institution’s future. Its members were not willing to initiate a confrontation with the government, fearing that such a move would risk further opprobrium for the institution, but they were not above quietly resisting civilian orders to subdue rebellion. The fact that army leaders discontinued their support of the carapintadas by the third and fourth rebellions, in which political and ideological issues figured more prominently than institutional or professional ones, suggests that they did not have an explicitly political agenda but, rather, were interested in defending institutional integrity first and foremost.38

The perceived linkage of political and institutional strength is something David Pion-Berlin points to as a phenomenon that is consistently misunderstood among civilian policymakers. In his view, the blurring of the distinction results in confusion about the military’s ultimate objectives. Where military power takes on political connotations, it is indeed unhealthy for democracy. But where military power assumes institutional characteristics—that is, when it bolsters institutional autonomy in ways that enhance modernization and professionalization—it may in fact facilitate the military’s withdrawal from politics.39 Such a view is predicated on Huntington’s notion of objective civilian control, described above.

Leaving the military with an ill-defined mission and insufficient resources to reprofessionalize contributed to the instability of civil-military relations under the Alfonsín government. Government policy in this critical period erred on the side of isolating and excluding the unwieldy institution in an effort to subordinate it. Nevertheless, the president ended up negotiating with the military in the aftermath of each rebellion, setting an inauspicious precedent for asserting the primacy of civilian power. Miscellaneous concessions were granted to the rebels, the most noteworthy of which absolved all officers below the rank of colonel for human rights abuses, but little was done to try to design a role definition for the army in accordance with what Argentine citizens would find acceptable and what public resources they were willing to spend. The Alfonsín government’s battle with the country’s armed forces wound down on a fragile truce.

The Menem Administration’s Military Policy: Seeking Accommodation and Integration

The Menem administration’s policies have been instrumental in depoliticizing the armed forces, providing them with renewed prestige and professional roles, and stabilizing civil-military relations. While civil-military relations under the Menem government should not be held up as an ideal model of civilian control, its policies may offer some lessons on how to induce military compliance and channel the energies of officers in apolitical directions in countries where military elites have resisted subordination to civilian authority.

The key features of the Menem administration’s strategy toward the military consist of conceding issues where implacable military hostility was bound to persist, namely, human rights; upholding
the previous government’s efforts to weaken the autonomy and standing of the institution (by curtailing its political prerogatives and cutting defense spending); and offering inducements to enhance military compliance by encouraging peacekeeping and other professionalizing roles.

President Menem’s relations with the military began on a dramatic note. Shortly after assuming power in July 1989, Menem granted a blanket pardon to officers imprisoned for repression in the Dirty War (including all junta members) and those who led uprisings under the Alfonsín government. Having witnessed what three military rebellions did to disrupt the preceding administration, Menem’s first priority was to purchase peace with the military and then turn to other pressing issues, namely, the deep economic crisis he had inherited.

If the military interpreted Menem’s gesture as a sign of weakness and an invitation to test the new president further, it was mistaken. Hoping to extract more concessions, extremist elements in the Argentine armed forces pushed their luck and revolted for the fourth time since 1983. Menem rose to the challenge by ordering army leaders to crush the rebellion; they complied, firing on rebel forces. By handling the uprising in this way, the president bolstered his reputation for brooking no dissent and strengthened his credibility with the military, dissuading would-be dissenters. Notably, no military revolt has erupted since.

By the end of 1990, the fourth rebellion had been thoroughly quashed and the leaders of the Argentine junta had been pardoned. Only after the dust settled on these events did civil-military relations enter a period of accommodation. The government now focused its attention squarely on the question of defining new military missions. By January 1991, the Menem administration had planted the seeds of reconciliation between itself and the military.

The subsequent stabilization of civil-military relations helped President Menem uphold his predecessor’s reforms to curb the political autonomy of the armed forces and continue the trend of smaller defense budgets. Strengthening Menem’s capacity to hold his ground against the armed forces was the broader success of his economic policies, namely, curbing inflation and restoring economic growth after mid-1991.

The Menem government has done little to reverse the demise of many of the military’s political prerogatives effected under the Alfonsín administration. Institutional prerogatives transferred from the military to the civilian-led Ministry of Defense under Alfonsín’s presidency have stayed within the ministry’s purview. The general prohibition of military participation in internal security roles remains in place, save when relevant civilian authorities judge the situation to exceed the capability of the police. While not wanting the army’s organizational justification to shrink any further, many officers have grave reservations about reimmersing the institution in internal conflicts and linking soldiers once again with the repression of Argentine citizens, an inevitable consequence of such operations. Analyst J. Samuel Fitch, who has conducted an extensive survey of attitudes among Argentine officers, documents a rather marked change of sentiment toward internal security roles between 1985 and 1992: While 70 percent of officers interviewed in 1985 listed internal security as a mission for the armed forces, by 1992 only 30 percent of respondents on active duty regarded internal security as a military mission. Fitch writes, “[p]articularly among active-duty officers, there appears to be a widespread acceptance of the official position that regular military forces are the last resort in cases of insurgency or internal disorder.”

The military does have two other “subsidiary” or “secondary” missions that are internally oriented, but these are highly circumscribed. The first is logistical support in drug interdiction. The central responsibility for counternarcotics operations goes to civilian security forces, the Gendarmería Nacional (border guards), the Prefectura Naval (coast guard), and the Federal Police. Even though Argentina is only a transit country and not...
a drug producer, the military has been adamant about not wanting to assume a larger drug interdiction role. Representatives of the U.S. military have made overtures to the Argentine government and armed forces to solicit their help in taking joint action against narco-trafficking. The Menem government, despite its strong interest in remaining on good terms with the United States, has consistently resisted drawing Argentina’s military further into drug interdiction.

Disaster relief is the only other internal role the armed forces perform. Recent examples of this activity include efforts by the army and air force to treat people already infected and prevent further contamination in the cholera epidemic that swept across Argentina’s northern provinces during 1992–93. Both service branches helped transport the sick, brought thousands of liters of potable water to the northern region, and set up water purification equipment. Departing from a long history of civic action dating back to the beginning of the republic—which included literacy education, medical services, and infrastructure development—the military now performs no civic action roles on a routine basis. Survey data gathered by Fitch in 1992 show that whereas half of the retired officers listed civic action as a legitimate military mission, only a quarter of the active-duty officers did so.

The recent elimination of compulsory military service has further diminished the armed forces’ broader impact on society. Instituted in 1901, obligatory military service not only provided adequate troop levels in the event of war, but also integrated and imparted a sense of patriotism to Argentine citizens, who comprised high numbers of immigrants in the first half of the twentieth century. President Menem eliminated Argentina’s tradition of conscription after barely consulting with the military leadership. The lack of public protest by the armed forces in the wake of this historic decision was testimony to how much authority Menem had come to develop over men in uniform. As of January 1995, Argentina left behind the era of the citizen-soldier and adopted voluntary military service, a further step toward confining the military to a narrow professional sphere.

In the realm of economics and trade policy, the strict neoliberal orientation of the Menem government has also posed various other challenges for the armed forces. Regarding Argentina’s previous embrace of nationalism and nonalignment as unfitting for a country seeking to bring itself out of a decades-long economic decline, President Menem has advocated instead open markets, cooperative security, and diplomacy. Menem’s close relationship with the United States has eliminated obstacles to advantageous commercial and financial relations, but his new internationalism has put further pressure on the armed forces financially, restricting the types of weapons they can buy and develop on their own.

The austerity programs prescribed for Argentina by international lending institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have exerted downward pressure on the country’s military budget. Continuing the trend toward lower military budgets, defense expenditures under Menem reached only 1.7 percent of gross national product (GNP) in 1993, falling from 2.6 percent in 1989. This represents a dramatic drop compared to the late 1970s, when defense expenditures stood at roughly 8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The relative decline from 1989 to 1993 corresponds to a small drop in absolute expenditures. Whereas military expenditures totaled $4.9 billion (in constant 1993 dollars), they fell to $4.2 billion in 1993. In line with cutting defense expenditures, the government reduced force levels from 95,000 in 1989 to 65,000 in 1993.

As part of a comprehensive dismantling of public sector industries, the government privatized key military firms, including the arms producer Fabricaciones Militares. Other assets in the military’s vast real estate holdings were sold off as well. Privatization has not only subjected the military’s weapons acquisition programs to the demands and uncertainties of a market economy, it has also eliminated many managerial jobs for officers and has greatly diminished the armed forces’ impact on the economy.

The Menem government’s drive to align its foreign policy unequivocally with powerful Western nations was undoubtedly the chief reason behind its downgrading or elimination of high-technology projects, such as the CONDOR II ballistic missile, which the United States and other Western governments deemed objectionable. The dismantling of the CONDOR II program involved a struggle with
the air force, for which the project represented organizational pride and a symbol of national sovereignty, but Menem ultimately prevailed. This act signaled an important shift in Argentina’s foreign policy and brought the Menem government closer to the United States.59 Another subsequent move in this direction was Argentina’s decision to adhere to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.60

Some countervailing measures have been enacted to conciliate the military, such as pay raises and the diversion of revenues from defense industry privatization to the purchase of new military equipment. Also, President Menem’s emphasis on cooperative security—especially on confidence-building and other preventive measures—as a means to reduce international tensions (and, by implication, to reduce the need for a large standing military) has put him in a better position to persuade the officer corps to accept smaller budgets and personnel levels. All in all, the Menem government has continued to limit military spending as part of its program to restore economic growth and stability and to restrict the construction of sensitive military high-technology projects.61

Changes in objective threats facing Argentina provide no real impetus to counteract the economic pressures to downgrade the military’s arsenal and capacity for modernization. Chile remains Argentina’s biggest rival, though diminished tensions with this country as well as with Brazil (another historical adversary) have rendered rather remote the possibility of a conventional war. Argentina and Chile—while at the brink of war in 1978 over three islands in the Beagle Channel—signed a series of agreements in 1991 that put an end to most of their outstanding border conflicts. In December 1991, Argentina and Brazil, the two Latin American countries with relatively advanced nuclear programs, mutually consented to opening their nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The prospect of greater economic integration between Brazil and Chile enhances the probability of continued peace in the region.62 In addition to diminished tensions with bordering countries, Argentina has reestablished diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom and has committed itself to bilateral negotiations aimed at resolving the historical dispute over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Oil exploration in the area around the islands has recently heightened Argentina’s interest in their economic and strategic potential. While still determined to gain control over the archipelago, Argentina has virtually abandoned the idea of doing so by military means, even though some of the country’s extreme nationalist groups—including some in the armed forces—still hope for a military takeover of the islands. Recently, Argentina’s foreign ministry admitted that it would even consider paying inhabitants of the islands (who prefer to remain under British domination) to transfer the islands to Argentine sovereignty.63 In short, the foregoing developments contribute to making military spending an obvious target for a government seeking to economize resources.

Hence, the Menem government has continued the trend toward downsizing that began under Alfonsín. In the decade between 1983 and 1993, military personnel fell from 175,000 to 65,000.64 Efforts to shape the army chain of command into a more pyramidal structure have heightened competition for places at the top. The seventy slots reserved for generals between 1983 and 1989 fell to forty-two in the period 1990–91, to thirty-four in 1992–93, and to thirty-two in 1995.65

If the Argentine armed forces are in such dire straits, what inhibits them from expressing their displeasure and strong-arming the government to redress the situation? On the one hand, leading officers regard as insurmountable the political and economic pressures to confine the goals and economic means of the institution, short of forcing an undesirable confrontation that President Menem—shielded by the support of large sectors the Argentine elite and middle class—would be almost sure to win. Acutely aware of the armed forces’ image, they have noted that periods in which low military budgets and salaries (accompanied by military complaints) have been major news items are typically followed by dips in the public’s approval rating of the institution.66 Beyond institutional considerations, individual officers need to be concerned about their own careers when speaking out against the government. Being passed up for promotion or led into retirement in more direct ways constitute genuine professional threats, especially in an era of such streamlining.67

Beyond the disincentives for resisting civilian directives, the armed forces are relatively quiescent because the Menem government has also offered
them at least the minimal amount of resources to satisfy their core institutional and professional interests. In the interest of conciliation, President Menem has tried to bolster military prestige and find external professionalizing roles for the institution to play. Sending Argentina’s armed forces on United Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the world since 1990 is the centerpiece of this aspect of Menem’s military policy. Peacekeeping has provided the Argentine armed forces with professional experience, higher salaries, and a boost in morale, serving as a counterweight to the restrictions that domestic financial burdens impose. It also constitutes a way of integrating the military, marginalized in many other ways, into broader government objectives.

The idea to engage the Argentine armed forces in international peacekeeping operations and elevate this activity to a central mission came directly from President Menem, and the Gulf War provided the first opportunity to lead them in this direction. In September 1990, a little over a year into his presidency, Menem and his minister of foreign affairs decided to join the UN-sanctioned blockade against Iraq, sending two ships, air force transport planes, and approximately six hundred commissioned and noncommissioned officers to the Gulf. Thereafter, Argentina became one of the UN’s most reliable participants in peacekeeping operations. In March 1992, Argentina sent an army battalion to Croatia, including close to nine hundred commissioned and noncommissioned officers, with new personnel rotating in and out of the region every six months. Since then, the government has sent troops to places as far ranging as Somalia, Cyprus, Kuwait, Haiti, Angola, and other trouble spots. One analyst writes, “If 1992 and 1993 rates of Argentine involvement continue, by the middle of the decade, over half of the military’s permanent personnel will have participated in international missions.” In 1994, three thousand men from the Argentine armed services went abroad and took part in such missions. The government has even sponsored the creation of a peacekeeping operations training center in Argentina for troops from around the world. President Menem inaugurated this center, the Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ), on June 27, 1995.

For the Argentine government, UN peacekeeping bolsters the pursuit of an international economic and foreign policy closely aligned with the United States. It has also given the government a way to offer the country’s historically problematic military a credible, positive, medium-expense mission. For the military, peacekeeping addresses important institutional and professional concerns, the first of which is morale. For an institution that was an international pariah less than a decade ago, becoming a leader in UN peacekeeping boosts self-image and morale, of critical importance for keeping down restiveness in the barracks. Marching alongside U.S. troops in a Gulf War welcome-home parade—a much reported event back home in Argentina—was a dramatic change of profile for Argentine troops. Most members of Argentina’s service branches welcome the ability to travel and gain foreign experience, and this is especially true among the army’s soldiers, few of whom have traditionally gone abroad. Higher wages that accrue to those engaged in foreign operations also provide relief from the dismal financial situation plaguing most military personnel in Argentina. Furthermore, the opportunity to train and work with some of the world’s most highly trained militaries provides solid professional experience for soldiers eager to exercise and enhance their skills. In Fitch’s 1992 survey of Argentine officers, 81 percent of respondents supported the international peacekeeping mission, as opposed to only 3 percent in 1985.

Officers of more advanced militaries, which face higher prospects of carrying out traditional combat roles, tend not to view peacekeeping in the same way. Among such armed forces, peacekeeping is often considered a “second best” activity, perhaps even one that threatens the institution’s
ability to carry out more exciting and sophisticated operations.\textsuperscript{76} Along these lines, Robert Potash, a veteran student of the Argentine military, notes that the military’s embrace of peacekeeping is a concession to the fact that its standing in Argentine society has dropped.\textsuperscript{77} However, the scope of what encompasses peacekeeping has greatly expanded in the post–Cold War era. Peacekeeping not only often brings military troops into a variety of politically complicated situations, but it also now can include such elements as ‘civil functions, disarming militias, providing security to the population, rescuing ‘failed’ countries, organizing elections, launching preventive deployment, encouraging peace settlement, providing humanitarian assistance, or security for delivery of humanitarian assistance.’\textsuperscript{78}

Some Argentine officers share some of the more fundamental doubts of their counterparts from more advanced militaries regarding peacekeeping operations, insisting that collective security efforts should not replace the defense of sovereign territory as the number one goal of the Argentine armed forces. At the same time, however, many of them recognize the need for noncombat activities to occupy Argentine troops, at least until resources improve and the armed forces find a more credible and acceptable set of roles to perform. In the meantime, much of the military leadership, as well as the rank and file, remain enthusiastic about donning the UN’s blue helmets.

In short, Argentina’s experience with peacekeeping missions provides an important example for new democracies seeking to reorient their militaries away from internal security to roles that are more appropriate for democratic regimes in the post–Cold War era. This is not to suggest that peacekeeping is a panacea for diverting the armed forces from domestic political temptations, or that it will replace the need for a careful redefinition of national military missions. But at the very least, the merits of peacekeeping operations as an interim role in a transitional period should be seriously considered.

**Assessment of the Current Situation**

Civil-military relations in postauthoritarian Argentina have undergone a dramatic shift. The civilian leadership has managed to assert a high level of authority over the military institution and to diminish its jurisdiction. The military’s principal mission is external defense; international peacekeeping plays an important secondary role. Only under exceptional circumstances does the army engage in internal functions.

President Alfonsín’s positive contributions as well as his failings lay in measures to enhance subjective civilian control. By transferring military prerogatives to civilian institutions, Alfonsín aimed to “demilitarize” the military. However, such a strategy caused the armed forces to feel professionally and politically marginalized and provoked their members into attempting to regain institutional strength through extraconstitutional means.

President Menem, while keeping the military’s role definition narrow and modest, has adopted a strategy that includes some of the defining features of objective control. In contrast with the predecessor government, the Menem administration allows uniformed leaders more autonomy in professional matters. For example, while setting down general guidelines for restructuring, it has left the details of demobilization to the military. Similarly, it has not directly tried to influence the attitudes and conduct of junior officers. Instead, it has made senior leaders acutely aware that their own professional survival and ascent rests on promoting the notions of subordination and adherence to civilian authority among the ranks. In these and other ways, noninterference in each other’s sphere of influence characterizes the relationship between the Menem government and the armed forces.

Beyond this “live and let live” theme in current government policy toward the military, Menem has gone further than Alfonsín in trying to integrate the armed forces into the government. Peacekeeping forms a central part of the integrative aspect of Menem’s military policy. By sending the armed forces on peacekeeping missions, the government signals that they have a respectable, explicitly military contribution to make in the sphere of foreign relations. Hence, the Menem government has introduced into its military policy some basic elements of a model of objective control. Even though the application of such a strategy in Argentina does not involve highly sophisticated training and weaponry, the elements that are in
place have helped to stabilize civil-military relations and keep the armed forces’ jurisdiction confined.

Indeed, the Argentine military has assumed a much lower political profile since 1990; for the most part, it is subordinate to civilian authority and oriented toward the external realm. Needless to say, what the armed forces perceived as “hostility” on the part of Alfonsín strengthens their willingness to accept Menem’s “friendly” efforts at subordination. There is much to be said for these developments, especially in light of the institution’s history of political unwieldiness and the tense state of civil-military relations as recently as during the Alfonsín government. In this respect, the experience of the Menem government may offer some lessons in how to tame the armed forces and keep them quiescent.

Critics of Menem’s military policy are quick to note that much “de facto” military autonomy in everyday decision making within the Defense Ministry is one result of the president’s “hands off” posture toward explicitly military matters. This autonomy stems in no small part from the fact that civilians abdicate their responsibilities from the lack of either interest or knowledge, or a combination of the two. To be sure, men in uniform, on active duty and retired, continue to set the agenda and the parameters of discussion over such questions as which defense programs should be developed or phased out.79

In this connection it should be underscored that defense expenditures, despite reductions in recent years, still consume a large part of the country’s budget. Even with demobilization, the defense budget is on par with that of education, culture, and health combined.80 The purpose of allocating financial resources on this order is questionable in light of the country’s diminished external threats and poverty concerns that still need to be addressed. From the standpoint of social needs and efficient resource allocation, there is a reasonable argument to be made for even more drastic budget cuts. But doing so could very well disrupt the underpinnings of objective control and destabilize civil-military relations.

Menem’s critics also note that senior officers have not used their decision-making influence over the allocation of defense expenditures to the institution’s advantage. The critics contend that rather than accepting current realities and making their forces smaller yet more efficient, there is little rhyme or reason to the current process of restructuring. Reform has not been undertaken with an eye toward creating an integrated defense system. Given that 80 percent of all defense expenditures go toward salaries, the remaining percentage needs to be used efficiently.81 However, rather than coordinating their efforts, the three service branches are undertaking separate restructuring projects. Many of the weapons being salvaged or acquired do not comprise a logical system; they are not only costly but are useless from the standpoint of providing the country with a true measure of defense. Expensive weapons that have been purchased often lack the requisite human and material resources to maintain them.82 “The Argentine military,” one analyst has commented, “is like a trunkless elephant.”83 These outcomes—de facto military autonomy in the area of defense and still rather ample defense expenditures—may be the necessary price exacted for the strategy of objective control the Menem government has followed. Pursuing a more comprehensive process of reform would have to address these problems, but doing so could well antagonize the military and disrupt the accommodation that President Menem has forged.

If civilians and the military in Argentina have succeeded in defining the military’s main mission as external defense and greatly limiting the institution’s reach in other areas, their counterparts in neighboring Brazil have not made such a commitment. While they have circumscribed the armed forces’ influence over distinctly political questions, military roles remain relatively diversified.
Military and civilian leaders in post-authoritarian Brazil have openly tackled the question of what role the armed forces should serve for the remainder of this century and into the next. As in Argentina, the political and economic standing of the Brazilian military, as well as the nature of threats facing the country, constitute critical determinants of what missions the armed forces will carry out. In terms of their political and economic strength, as well as their standing in society, the Brazilian armed forces stand midway between the Argentine and the Chilean. Brazil’s armed forces have greater clout than the Argentine military in lobbying for their preferred roles, but unlike their Chilean counterparts, they are not sufficiently influential to be able to pick and choose what missions they are willing to perform.

Of the three militaries in question, the Brazilian has the largest sphere of operations at the present time, including conventional external defense, international peacekeeping, internal security (including drug interdiction), and civic action. If the Argentine military has little choice but to accept a role definition limited to modest external defense, and the Chilean armed forces can focus on making conventional defense a primary and robust mission, the Brazilian military is neither as restricted as its Argentine counterpart, nor as privileged as the Chilean. In order to understand why the attention and resources of the Brazilian armed forces are spread over such far-reaching activities, it is necessary to examine the history of the institution, including its most recent experience in power. Such an examination should also include current political and economic factors, especially the country’s persistent weakness of civilian authority and problems of governance.

The Military as Nation-Builder, *Poder Moderador*, and Champion of Brazil’s World-Power Status

Since the birth of the republic in 1889, the Brazilian armed forces have spent the lion’s share of their resources and organizational energy in roles related to internal security as well as the overall development of the country. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the army spearheaded explorations in outlying regions of Brazil; planned and oversaw the construction of infrastructure, principally roads and telecommunications systems, to integrate the vast country; and established and managed state-owned firms in strategic areas of the economy, such as energy and minerals. These roles helped to create and sustain the military’s self-image as an indispensable agent of national development and progress. Moreover, such roles positioned the armed forces to champion the idea that Brazil, a huge and resource-rich country, was destined to greatness and world-power status. The aspiration to transform Brazil into a world player accounts in part for the military’s developmental orientation and mania for large-scale projects, leading it to promote ventures ranging from the development and occupation of the Amazon region to the construction of a nuclear submarine.

From the last century until now, the Brazilian military has also played a central role in quelling internal conflicts. In the last century, army troops quashed local rebellions, including state secessionist movements in the 1930s. In the 1960s and early 1970s, they assumed a counterinsurgency role against suspected subversives. As recently as 1995, soldiers invaded the slums of Rio de Janeiro to root out criminal gangs and drug traffickers. Since the inception of the republic, all Brazilian constitutions have recognized and legitimated a
role for the armed forces in providing domestic law and order.

As an extension of this internal security focus, the Brazilian armed forces have historically arrogated to themselves the role of *poder moderador* (“moderating power”). Their leaders would justify repeated military interventions as efforts to “moderate” politics or stop governments (even elected ones) from becoming too radical, generally meaning “left-leaning.” Beginning with the removal of the monarchy in 1889, the army became the ultimate arbiter of Brazilian politics. After helping to overthrow the oligarchic regime in 1930, the armed forces threw their support to Getúlio Vargas, responsible for instituting important state- and nation-building reforms in the Estado Novo (1937–45). In the years between 1945 and 1964, Brazil’s previous period of democracy, military actions were decisive in influencing the course of several national political crises.85

After mounting a coup d’etat in 1964, the military headed the government for twenty-one years. The guiding doctrine of the period, encapsulated in the slogan “security and development,” saw a close connection between ensuring social stability (by stemming political mobilization) and safeguarding capitalist economic development. In the first decade of the dictatorship, the military regime demobilized the radical left and greatly expanded Brazil’s industrial plant. The modernization of agriculture and large-scale (often ecologically destructive) development projects in the Amazon were among the hallmarks of the economic expansion that took place in these years. Despite the legacy of repression (comparatively mild in relation to what occurred in Argentina and Chile) and financial debt, Brazil’s military governments managed to garner an impressive degree of public support for themselves.86 The country’s bureaucratic-authoritarian regime was neither as brutal as the Argentine dictatorship, nor as economically successful as the Chilean.

The military as an institution emerged from the authoritarian governments of 1964–85 in a fairly favorable position. Notwithstanding the legacy of financial debt, the economic successes the public associated with Brazil’s military governments, the comparatively low incidence of human rights violations they committed, and the public support they managed to command allowed the last two military presidents, Generals Ernesto Geisel (1974–79) and João Figueiredo (1979–85), to keep a firm grip on the transition back to democracy and to preserve important institutional prerogatives for the military in the process.87

Compared with the thoroughly discredited Argentine armed forces, the Brazilian military entered the new democratic period with considerable influence over both its own institutional affairs and extramilitary matters as well. However, it did not retain legal guarantees of the degree and kind the Chilean armed forces have used to bolster their political as well as their professional standing.

**The Political and Economic Context for Redefining Military Missions**

The armed forces enjoyed considerable political influence under Brazil’s first postauthoritarian government (1985–90), led by José Sarney. During this time, they successfully insisted on maintaining internal security as a central role and also made strides to enhance their external defense capabilities. Since then, beginning with the government of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92), the military has become more vulnerable to civilian influences that impinge on its role definition. The diminution of threats from Brazil’s traditional external enemies and the virtual disappearance of communist insurgencies coincided with the political weakening of the military and its subsequent struggle to maintain increasingly tenuous claims on the budget. Together, these factors forced the military and the civilian leadership to confront the need to redefine military missions. Dependent on resources allocated by civilian politicians, the military could no longer dictate its own role and found it necessary to justify its purpose. The following discussion seeks to illustrate where the process of redefining military missions has led and to explain what political and economic factors have influenced the specific roles assigned to and assumed by Brazil’s armed forces.

**Conventional External Defense.** Unified support exists among all branches of Brazil’s armed forces for expanding conventional external defense missions. The raison d’etre of most militaries—even ones that meddle in domestic politics—is to protect or advance national sovereignty. Moreover, by
1985, being in power for over two decades had taken its toll on the institution. After experiencing the typical strains of military rule—politicization, factionalism, corruption, and an erosion of strictly military capabilities—many officers anticipated with relief and eagerness the renewed attention being given to preparing for combat roles.

In principle, virtually no civilian politicians take issue with this goal. In debates over military provisions in Brazil’s 1988 constitution, many progressive politicians argued that the defense of territorial integrity should be the sole purpose of Brazil’s armed forces. Yet even proponents of an exclusively external orientation for the country’s military could not then, and still cannot now, provide many concrete and compelling war scenarios that directly involve Brazil. The external threats facing Brazil that demand a large and vastly equipped military are indeed few and remote, especially given the resolution of previous disputes with Argentina. Even leading officers themselves are hard pressed to point to tangible external enemies, arguing instead that defense is like insurance: something one cannot pay for only when the need arises. But in a setting where economic resources are tight and hotly contested, politicians find themselves reluctant to allocate funds for such vague potential contingencies. Electoral competition has motivated Brazil’s patronage-oriented politicians to search ever more energetically for economic assets to distribute as political pork barrel, thereby improving their electoral chances. Defense expenditures in Brazil yield little electoral capital; the arms industry employs few people and is concentrated in one state. Moreover, the Brazilian legislature has limited influence over military bases. Hence, civilian ministries that lend themselves more readily to pork barrel politics, such as transportation, education, and health, have more appeal among politicians. The amount Brazil’s politicians are willing to allocate for defense appears insufficient for making external combat roles the sole or even primary mission of the armed forces, especially the army. Without a more extensive organizational justification, the military seems unable to ward off a loss of resources and downsizing.

During the Sarney presidency, especially in its first half, all three branches of the armed forces managed to make headway in technological modernization programs they had announced in 1985. Land Force 1990 (Força Terrestre 1990), the army’s plan for reorganization and reequipment, called for new and improved weaponry (especially in the area of advanced electronics), new garrisons (particularly in the northern Amazon region), and a major increase in troops (from 183,000 to roughly 296,000) over several years. The air force sought to develop new air-to-air missiles, telecommunications satellites, and a subsonic jet fighter, the AMX. Sustaining these programs would naturally require high levels of funding.

Since 1985, however, and especially after 1988, when the new constitution bolstered the budgetary powers of Congress, the pressure on defense spending has complicated and rendered difficult the realization of these ambitious plans. Unlike the Argentine case, this pressure stems primarily from domestic political and economic imperatives, not from foreign governments and lending agencies. For example, up until it was forced to abandon the program in February 1996 due to financial constraints, the navy’s main goal was to advance its nuclear-powered submarine program. Relative to Argentina, economic restructuring in Brazil has proceeded slowly and has not entailed such strict acquiescence to foreign authorities, although the Brazilian government has come under some foreign pressure to abandon its strategic projects.

As a share of the nation’s budget, Brazil’s military spending has declined from 20.65 percent in 1985 to 14.27 percent in 1993. Absolute military expenditures, according to U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency figures, fell from $7.5 billion in 1988 to $5.8 in 1993 (in constant 1993 dollars). Between these same years, military expenditures went from occupying 1.4 percent to 1.1 percent of GNP. Force levels for the three branches, rather than taking the upward turn the services had hoped for, decreased from 319,000 in 1988 to 296,000 in 1993. Military officials have lamented their financial constraints, complaining that their equipment is outdated and that troops are unable to perform routine exercises. According to one informed source, “The country’s military can scarcely deploy highly trained infantry units, with limited air cover, for antiguerrilla operations, and does not have a force structure capable of engaging in an international confrontation.”

Defense of Brazil’s Amazon border is the one “external” project that has commanded attention
and resources in the decade following the return to civilian rule and remains the primary security concern of Brazil’s armed forces at the present time. The part of the Amazon within Brazil occupies a little more than five million square kilometers and represents 59 percent of all of Brazil’s territory. From a strictly military perspective, the Amazon region is vulnerable; it is sparsely populated, and the nine-thousand-kilometer border itself is poorly defined and defended. Traditional geopolitical views of the river basin’s susceptibility to foreign penetration inform and reinforce current military views toward Amazonia. The armed forces may exaggerate some recent threats, which include drug trafficking; foreign guerrilla insurgents who regularly cross the border; prospectors from neighboring countries pilling gold and other contraband; foreign environmental movements devoted to saving the Amazon rainforest from further destruction; and even the U.S. Army, which recently conducted exercises along the border in Guyana. Nevertheless, the defense of the Amazon borders is probably the most credible external role the Brazilian military could perform in the late twentieth century. The military institution’s marginalization in the sphere of Brazil’s political life renders its Amazon claims especially vital. The armed forces do not appear to have any expansionist designs in the region, but they do make much ado of anything that can be construed as a threat. There is virtual consensus within the armed forces for fortifying security in the region.

Civilians across the political spectrum also support strengthened security in the Amazon, at least in principle. Political groups of practically every stripe can identify with the nationalist implications of guarding the resource-rich region from foreign interests. Progressive forces see an added benefit in relocating army units and their internal security functions away from Brazil’s large urban centers to the remote Amazon region. In the 1989 presidential campaign, virtually all candidates endorsed a central role for the military in the Amazon.

As part of the military’s intensified assertion of control over Amazonia, the armed forces initiated the Calha Norte (“Northern Headwaters”) project in 1985. Calha Norte involves strengthening security along the northern border through a system of military posts, airstrips and garrisons, roads, and “colonization” projects. Encompassing 14 percent of the nation’s territory, the Calha Norte project essentially put roughly four thousand miles of Brazil’s border under military jurisdiction, pleasing the Sarney administration’s (1985–90) support of military efforts to strengthen border defense.

Since the early 1990s, military units have relocated to the northern border from the states of the center-south, such as Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul. In 1992, the army created a new military command headquartered in the northern state of Pará. President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92) supported in principle advances in Amazonian defense that the military tried to make under his tenure.

Under Collor’s successor, Itamar Franco (1992–94), the military made progress toward another major defense project, Sistema de Vigilância da Amazonia, or SIVAM (System for the Vigilance of the Amazon). SIVAM is an expensive surveillance system consisting of satellites, ground-based and airborne sensors, and environmental data-collection platforms. SIVAM’s radars will be able to monitor invasions of the country’s airspace by planes and missiles and track the movement of ships and ground troops. The program has the potential for use in environmental protection, but it appears to be essentially a military project aimed principally at post–Cold War, nonstate (“gray-area”) threats, such as drug trafficking and the movement of other contraband, guerrilla insurgencies, and recent challenges posed by indigenous peoples’ movements in the region.

Most signs suggest that military efforts to enhance its mission in Amazonia will continue, but
even this mission is subject to political and economic constraints. The political weakness of President Sarney, which reinforced military influence, contributed to the institution’s ability to stake out its claims in the Amazon. It succeeded, despite the heavy pressure exerted on the Brazilian government by foreign environmental groups, governments, and lending institutions to rein in the occupation and development of the rainforest. Under President Collor, whose neoliberal economic program made him more susceptible to international opinion and whose political strength (at least initially) made him willing to challenge the military, the advancement of Project Calha Norte practically came to a halt. The project was subject to scrutiny on environmental grounds and was deprived of funds by civilian ministers and politicians for whom it was not a priority.

Collor’s successor, Itamar Franco, allowed military influence to expand in response to his own beleaguered presidency and conceded to military lobbying for SIVAM. The go-ahead for the surveillance system, approved in August 1993, came in the wake of extensive saber-rattling over the dwindling funds devoted to the military’s budget. However, the program has been suspended over charges of corruption in the contracting process. Despite the scandal in the SIVAM program, Brazil’s president since 1995, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, has done little so far to restrict military activities vis-à-vis Amazonia, which will most likely remain the principal focus of the Brazilian armed forces’ activities. If past patterns serve as any indication, though, a weakening of the military politically will mean less maneuvering room for the institution even with respect to one of its most legitimate and widely supported missions.

**Peacekeeping.** Brazil’s military has participated in a few international peacekeeping efforts, but such operations are far from a central mission for the country’s armed services. Between 1965 and 1966—when Brazil was the principal Latin American contributor to the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic—and the end of 1993, Brazil had little involvement in international military missions. At the present time, Brazil has small contingents of troops in Mozambique (at one point, up to 850 soldiers), El Salvador, and the former Yugoslavia. In 1995, after much deliberation, eleven hundred Brazilian troops embarked on a peacekeeping operation in Angola, constituting the largest Brazilian military operation overseas since World War II. Prior to that, a Brazilian general supervised the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

Brazil’s involvement in Mozambique and Angola stems from the country’s long-standing ties to the two former Portuguese colonies. Both countries, especially Angola, have been the site of Brazilian investment, particularly in developing Angola’s petroleum industry. The army ministry saw the Angolan mission as a good opportunity for training, and the army’s mission there is also undoubtedly linked to Brazil’s positive assessment of the country’s investment climate. The United Nations sought Brazilian participation in its Angola and Mozambique missions because of the common language. Recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry expressed interest in seeing greater Brazilian participation in UN peacekeeping efforts.

We should not expect to see Brazil assume a peacekeeping role on the scale of the Argentine armed forces. Brazil’s foreign ministry does not regard such operations as key to the country’s broader foreign policy goals. Even though important segments of Brazil’s civilian and military leadership have ceased to embrace anti-American strains of Third World nationalism, Brazil still resists coming under the influence of the United States and international organizations subject to heavy U.S. influence. Much more than Argentina, Brazil has tried to remain independent in its economic and foreign-policy making even as it undergoes economic restructuring and the shift to a more open market economy.

Moreover, peacekeeping remains tangential to the establishment of an institutional purpose capable of preserving a major military organization. In contemporary Latin America, only a very weakened and discredited military, like the Argentine, would embrace peacekeeping as a central mission. Even in such cases, the military regards it as “second best” to combat roles. As such, the Brazilian military is concerned that allocating money and resources to peace operations will detract from other, more central, missions. Such reasoning is consistent with the military’s resistance to abandon sensitive military technology programs.
is also consistent with the traditional aspiration of the officer corps to see Brazil develop into an important and relatively independent power.

**Internal security.** The Brazilian military’s role definition goes beyond the conventional defense and peacekeeping activities discussed above to include internal security and civic action. Many political leaders and citizens alike regard the problems surrounding these internal missions as more immediate than those supporting the military’s external defense roles. Internal missions bolster the army’s organizational justification in particular and thereby help this service branch resist budget cuts and reductions in force levels. In contrast to the situation in Argentina, comparatively solid public support for the Brazilian military regime has allowed the military as an institution to keep traditional internal activities and even acquire some new ones. In light of these and other factors, the army in Brazil has maintained a highly diversified role definition.

Internal security missions enlist military troops in what are essentially police or national guard functions, including combating crime in urban areas and drug interdiction. Civilian and military support for military involvement in such activities is mixed, but army troops have nonetheless carried out these functions in recent years, at least on a temporary or emergency basis. Internal security roles rest squarely within the tradition of the Brazilian armed forces, as all Brazilian constitutions have sanctioned military involvement in guaranteeing “law and order.” The constitution in place since 1988 allows the military to continue to play this traditional central role but goes further than previous basic laws in making sure that civilian authorities decide the terms of the military’s involvement.

What constitutes Brazil’s current internal security problems? The threat to stability posed by the country’s radical left in the 1960s has all but disappeared. Brazil’s most important leftist party, the Workers’ Party, is firmly committed to electoral politics. The demise of communism certainly lowers the probability that threats to internal security of the kind that prompted the military to intervene in the 1960s will return. Nevertheless, other internal conflicts remain and are even on the rise, including crime in Brazil’s major cities and drug trafficking. Many regard the army as the most obvious institution to combat them.

No one disputes that crime in Brazil’s urban centers is a grave problem, especially in Rio de Janeiro. Gambling, racketeering, gang violence, the trafficking of arms and drugs, and general disorder create a tremendous sense of public insecurity. For the last several years, the hills surrounding Rio de Janeiro have witnessed nightly shootouts. From time to time, gangs descend onto the beaches of the city and rob people en masse. The police tend to be corrupt, lack credibility, and are outgunned by criminal gangs. The military maintains that fighting crime is a job for the police. At the same time, the military is well aware that the crime problem will not be resolved short of an all-out reform and reequipping of the police, something that Brazil’s civilian leadership has yet to tackle in a comprehensive way. Military leaders also note that it is not their prerogative to set policy but, rather, to respond to civilian orders. Recent years have given rise to numerous civilian-initiated proposals to deploy army troops to combat urban violence. Two particular instances of military participation in crime control deserve mention since they reveal the sources of civilian and military support for the army’s participation in internal security as well as the bases of its reservations regarding such activities.

Military troops were deployed to guard Rio de Janeiro during the 1992 United Nations environmental conference. The army’s massive presence in the city reduced the incidence of crime sharply and led to an outpouring of public praise and suggestions that the army assume regular police functions. Charged with safeguarding the city during the Earth Summit, military intelligence mapped out areas particularly prone to problems stemming from drugs, arms trafficking, and criminal gangs. The army drew up a plan of action should conflict spiral out of control during the conference.

The army became more deeply involved in internal security in the fall of 1994. By August of that year, organized crime and related gang violence, gambling racketeers (*bicheiros*), and general disorder in the slums of Rio de Janeiro (much of it related to the trafficking of arms and drugs) had reached such alarming proportions that civilian authorities were forced to consider taking aggressive action to combat it. They looked to the army.
The great majority of the city’s residents supported the idea of the institution’s intervention: 82 percent favored such a prospect, 13 percent rejected it, and 5 percent expressed uncertainty. In an offensive called “Operation Rio,” the army commanded its own soldiers, the military police, the federal police, and the state’s civil police in a massive sweep of the favelas (slums) of Rio de Janeiro. The operation, described as a “sweeping out” of the favelas, lasted from November 1 to December 30, 1994. The purpose was to overwhelm traffickers and gangs, remove the large caches of arms that had accumulated in the hillsides, and put in place public works for the impoverished residents of the city’s favelas. Operation Rio was not an independent military initiative. Rather, it was launched as a joint initiative of the state governor and the president after undertaking careful planning and legal precautions. President Cardoso approved another military sweep of the favelas in March 1995, calling for participation from all three service branches. Before assuming the presidency, Cardoso maintained that it was not appropriate for the military to be involved in police duties due to their lack of proper training. Yet given the gravity of the situation, which he likened to an “undeclared civil war,” he eventually sent them back in.

Support for army intervention rose from 82 percent to 86 percent in a poll conducted after soldiers first occupied the streets of the city. Overall support for the military as an institution ran high in the aftermath of the fall 1994 operation, despite the occurrence of human rights violations. As the weeks passed, especially after human rights violations were exposed, the army reiterated its position that public security not be part of a permanent mission but, rather, only an episodic role during emergencies. Military leaders appeared increasingly concerned about staying in the favelas too long and having public sentiment turn against the army troops. They stressed that military involvement in such roles should go only as far as providing logistical support and not extend to direct operations.

The army has demonstrated on several occasions that it does not want to abdicate its guardian role, enshrined in the constitutional prerogative to maintain “law and order.” But at the same time, the unfolding of Operation Rio indicated that most officers reject the development of a regular and central mission in internal security. A frequently stated objection is that public security puts the institution at the center of society’s conflicts without granting its leaders broader policymaking authority. Another objection is that police duties do not require distinctive military skills, diminishing the army’s unique professional standing and dragging it into situations for which its soldiers are not prepared. The potential for corruption in fighting organized crime is a further concern. Asking poorly paid military personnel to interdict drugs and intervene in other forms of crime that involve large amounts of money is to tempt fate.

Civic Action. Civic action roles are part of a long-standing tradition in the Brazilian armed forces. They are rooted in notions of the military as an agent of development and a state- and nation-builder. Many Brazilian officers continue to think of their institution as a force for national integration and the sole representative of the state in remote regions of a vast and underdeveloped country. Concrete examples of enlisting military troops in civic action include the construction of roads, bridges, dams, and other infrastructure projects, and the provision of education, food, and field health services in impoverished and remote areas.

As the institution with the most penetration into the country’s interior, the Brazilian military began its social action mission at the end of the last century. The 1950s and 1960s witnessed renewed attention to military involvement in such activities when U.S. policymakers tried to mobilize Latin American citizens to support their governments.

Unlike the Argentine military, which is necessarily confined to modest external activities, Brazil’s army retains the popular support to operate on the domestic front.
American militaries to assume development roles in order to diminish the attraction of leftist movements among the continent’s poor.\textsuperscript{127} The Brazilian military has revisited civic action in recent years, beginning with the Franco administration (1992–94). Since then, the army has stepped up efforts in poverty-stricken areas to distribute donated food; construct roads, public housing, and sanitation systems; and provide field health and educational services. In the first four months of one program’s existence, the army distributed basic foodstuffs to over eleven hundred municipalities. Eight battalions of army engineers—over two thousand men—are currently engaged in an effort to repair over eighteen hundred kilometers of roads in several remote states.\textsuperscript{128}

The armed forces have regarded the assumption of greater development and civic action roles as a mixed blessing. They cannot deny that abject poverty and underdevelopment are problematic and could even constitute a threat to security insofar as frustrations stemming from misery and inequality could eventually lead to mass social unrest. In reaction to a wave of supermarket lootings across the country, a top officer recently proclaimed, “Today, misery, not communism, threatens to subvert the social order.”\textsuperscript{129}

Civic action also expands the organizational justification of the army at a time when downsizing and budget cuts are a real danger to the military’s vitality. The army has been rather open about agreeing to take on social functions conditional upon gaining budgetary resources for doing so.\textsuperscript{130} Another motivating factor is the improvement in the army’s public image that comes with civic action. Army leaders perceive (probably correctly) that social development roles help the institution appear as “a friend of the people.” Another perception is that carrying out tasks that have concrete and immediate social utility helps boost the morale of soldiers at a time when the identity and direction of the institution are unclear.

On the other hand, military leaders have reservations about enlisting soldiers to combat poverty and underdevelopment. Their first reservation is shared by all relatively advanced professional militaries: Should military troops regularly engage in noncombat roles; that is, roles that do not call on distinctly military training? Will doing so diminish their status as professionals and eventually jeopardize their ability to perform and acquire resources for more sophisticated combat roles?

Another objection is that domestic assignments in general immerse the military in social and economic problems, which could eventually pose a threat to institutional boundaries. Many officers seek to lift the institution out of the kinds of conflicts in which it was mired for over two decades. Yet another source of resistance stems from the at least partially correct perception that the U.S. defense establishment is trying to mobilize support for noncombat roles on the part of Latin American militaries, while denigrating their conventional defense missions.

Nevertheless, ample civilian support exists for military involvement in civic action. Proposals to enlist the energies of soldiers and the logistical capacity of the military in antipoverty efforts have received more substantial and unequivocal support from civilians than efforts to deepen military involvement in sophisticated external defense roles. As a whole, Brazil’s legislature is amenable to the idea, even though it keeps the institution involved in the domestic sphere. Legislators from the Workers’ Party favor this activity for the military, despite their general exhortations to turn the military’s attention outward.\textsuperscript{131} Most civilian leaders regard poverty as a more pressing problem than the external threats facing the country. Moreover, they view social action as a better use of the country’s limited resources.

Assessing the Direction of Military Missions

In sum, Brazil’s armed forces have a very diversified role definition, with a foothold in functions involving conventional external defense as well as internal security. Brazilian politicians have demonstrated a reluctance to continue funding expensive military programs against unlikely, intangible enemies. Military missions that make a social contribution in some concrete and immediate way are on the rise. Pressure to scale down the military budget and the combination of low external threats and the numerous social and internal security problems that beset the country militate against an exclusive expansion of the army’s energies in the direction of conventional defense and toward involvement in internal security and social
action. This has begun to occur despite high military interest in building up missions related to the former and reservations about deeper involvement in the latter.

Unlike the Argentine military, which is necessarily confined to modest external activities, Brazil’s army retains the popular support to operate on the domestic front. But in contrast to its Chilean counterpart, it lacks sufficient clout to pick and choose its activities. Hence, no activity enjoys the status of a primary mission. The lack of a concrete definition of the military’s place and function is therefore greatest in Brazil, compared with Argentina or Chile.

Brazil’s army is torn between professional impulses to turn outward and pragmatic political considerations to continue its traditional internal security and nation-building focus. Absent the occurrence of a major political movement to discredit the military (along the lines of the Proceso in Argentina), traditional missions continue to reemerge and reinforce current developments shaping military role definitions.

Does the situation that has begun to develop in Brazil present cause for concern? Put simply, in terms of the two broad risks for democracy and civilian supremacy noted at the outset, if civilian governments in some countries undergoing a reassessment of civil-military relations and military roles err by going too far in isolating or excluding the institution (for example, Argentina under Alfonsin), Brazil’s civilian leadership can be faulted for keeping the domain of military roles overly broad and inclusive, thus failing to transform historical patterns of military activism in wide-ranging national issues. Since 1985, civilian politicians have indeed curbed the military’s tendency to venture autonomously into extramilitary activities. Yet “mission creep” and the subsequent unraveling of civilian control nevertheless remain a danger when the military takes on internal functions. Moreover, it does not bode well for democracy that the army, upon expanding into internal operations, comes to be regarded as more effective than the civilian police. Nor is it salutary for civilian supremacy that military units are virtually the sole representatives of public authority in many rural areas.

Creeping jurisdiction would not present such a high risk if Brazil’s civilian governments tended to be more effective. With the partial exception of the current administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, which has successfully brought down inflation and promoted economic growth, all of Brazil’s post-1985 governments have been marked by political and economic instability, a context that renders more difficult the maintenance of stable and confined military roles. While Brazil’s current democracy has so far been able to survive despite corruption, hyperinflation, and stagnant growth, in past years the country was not able to sustain democratic rule in the midst of poor political, social, and economic performance. Hence, in a country where social problems remain profound, civilian political institutions are weak and often ineffective, and economic stability is far from assured, the failure to delimit the boundaries of military jurisdiction and provide the institution’s members with a clear sense of identity and direction is indeed cause for concern.
Civilians-imposed constraints on the military have been the lowest in Chile. The political and economic autonomy and strength of the Chilean armed forces in the postauthoritarian period have allowed them to act on their renewed interest in enhancing military professionalism. Chile’s armed services are heavily engaged in national defense, strictly defined. Unlike its counterpart in Brazil, which faces greater budgetary constraints, the Chilean military is not making noncombat tasks a major part of its regular role definition, although it is involved in national development to some degree, and the constitution does charge it with a tutelary political role (to “guarantee the institutional order of the Republic”). In contrast to the Argentine armed forces, the Chilean military’s participation in international peacekeeping missions has been minimal. Instead, the armed forces in Chile are engaged primarily in preparing for conventional defense.

The current direction of the Chilean military corresponds with the generally apolitical nature of the institution roughly from 1938 to 1970. However, given the military’s sharp break with this apolitical stance beginning with the coup of 1973 and continuing throughout the seventeen-year-long dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, something more than tradition is necessary to explain the current profile of the institution. The political and economic strength of the Chilean armed forces is what allows them a high degree of freedom in choosing the roles they wish to perform. Officers regard as desirable and prestigious missions relating to national defense in a strict sense, and these have prevailed over noncombat functions. Stated more dramatically by one U.S. army officer who participated in joint exercises with the Chilean army in 1992, “Chilean officers are obsessed with war-fighting.”

There is evidence of the military’s desire for an expanded role in Chilean development, particularly in the sphere of science, technology, territorial occupation and border consolidation, and the exploitation and protection of the country’s natural resources. Yet to the extent that this orientation exists, it stems much more from the armed forces’ confidence and conviction of their own broader importance, which grew under the Pinochet dictatorship, than from a defensive need to enhance organizational purpose. Supremely confident in their institution, senior officers view the armed forces as uniquely qualified to guide the country into the future. According to one analyst, “Chileans who wear the army uniform still see themselves as symbolizing the finest attributes of the Fatherland, as having a historical vocation, and as playing social and developmental roles—and doing so successfully.”

What factors have enabled the Chilean military to elude some of the constraints faced by their counterparts in Argentina and Brazil? Many of these factors go back to the dictatorship of 1973–90 and to the negotiated transition back to democratic rule. The armed forces presided over what eventually became a showcase model of an open economy. Many Chileans—while critical of the human rights offenses that occurred under military rule—credit the regime with saving the country from chaos and putting it on a path to success. While insufficient for victory, the 43 percent of the vote that General Augusto Pinochet garnered in the 1988 plebiscite to determine whether he would remain in power for eight more years reflects the considerable support that still existed for the regime. Public opinion polls suggest that the military continues to enjoy a fair degree of public support. Such support was critical to General Pinochet’s ability to wrest and sustain the
institutional prerogatives that insulate the military from forces that might otherwise seek to reduce its institutional and professional strength.

What do these prerogatives consist of? The 1980 constitution and the Leyes Orgánicas Constitucionales for the armed forces conferred guarantees of autonomy on the military and police, while limiting executive, judicial, and legislative authority. Concessions to the military included a provision for General Pinochet to remain at the helm of the army until 1997 and immunity for all military officers—from the commander-in-chief down (including the chief of the police, or carabineros)—from dismissal by the president. The prerogatives also included a powerful, military-dominated National Security Council, whose authority extends beyond advising the president to exercising veto power over policies affecting national security. The National Security Council gives the military a stronghold in the executive branch. Notwithstanding the passage of reforms in 1989 that have weakened the council’s formal authority and deprived the armed forces of a majority presence on it, the council remains a central locus of military influence.

General Pinochet’s blueprint of a “protected democracy” consisted not only of a military with considerable autonomy but also a strong political right wing. Both actors had been allies since the rise of leftist radicalism in the early 1970s and were expected to support each other against the inevitable reemergence of the center-left in a new democracy. Thus beyond measures to expand specifically military prerogatives, the outgoing authoritarian regime made provisions to overrepresent the right in the Senate. The designation of nine senators, coupled with the introduction of a “binominal majoritarian system,” was designed for this purpose. Conservative politicians were expected to defend the military prerogatives put in place by the Pinochet regime. The overrepresentation of conservative parties and the formidable obstacles to amending the constitution and the Leyes Orgánicas (requiring a two-thirds vote in both houses of the legislature) would make it difficult for any reformist government to pass measures weakening military influence.

In addition to expressly political prerogatives, the military enjoys important economic privileges that underpin the combat role definition it is assuming. The first of these privileges, enshrined in the Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas of 1989, ensures that the armed forces receive budgetary allocations equivalent to at least those of 1989 levels in real terms. To ensure that its fortunes would not be tied to the whims of civilian politicians and to the electoral imperatives to which democracy would give rise, the military sought to guarantee its own fiscal autonomy before it departed from power.

The second noteworthy economic prerogative of the Chilean military provides it with 10 percent of all profits from copper exports of the state monopoly, Codelco. This prerogative represents an advance on what the armed forces claimed previously. In 1973, the armed forces enjoyed the right to 10 percent of all copper profits, but with a floor on returns set at U.S.$90 million. In 1986, a new law (No. 18.445) retained the 10 percent provision, but raised the floor to U.S.$180 million. In recent years, the armed forces have extracted upwards of U.S.$400 million annually from this extrabudgetary source.

The funds channeled to the military through the copper surtax are divided equally among the three branches and designated expressly for the purchase of equipment. Because it pays for new weaponry, the money from the copper surtax has indirectly expanded the military’s ability to increase the numbers and salaries of its personnel. The payroll for the armed forces has doubled since the 1970s (in contrast to most other Latin American militaries), and this level of expenditure is guaranteed to continue due to the constitutional arrangements the military secured before leaving power.

From time to time, civilian politicians have proposed reallocating money from the copper fund for education, health, or other social programs. Because the military jealously guards this prerogative,
it would surely resist losing its control over the fund. If such reforms advanced before General Pinochet’s departure in 1997, the general himself could be expected to lead the struggle against their passage and implementation. Moreover, given the overrepresentation of the political right in the Congress, it is far from clear whether advocates of reforms to eliminate these military prerogatives could even garner enough support among civilians.

In short, the Chilean military enjoys an unusual degree of independence from civilian authority. In neither Argentina nor Brazil does the military possess such standing. This has allowed Chile to keep up defense expenditures, advance in the modernization of weaponry, and elevate the training and skills of its troops. Chile’s per capita defense spending is roughly twice that of Argentina, four times that of Peru, and ten times that of Brazil. Historically, Chile was not a country with large military budgets. If one examines defense spending as a percentage of fiscal expenditures (a valid way to see where defense stands in relation to other government priorities), the Chilean military did not fare particularly well compared to its counterparts in neighboring Argentina, Brazil, or Peru in the decades between 1940 and 1970. On this basis, Chile ranked fourth in the postwar years in relation to these comparable Latin American powers.

Chile’s military leaders state clearly that conventional external defense is the institution’s overriding mission, and they are taking active steps to promote this activity. They have participated only minimally in international peacekeeping efforts, despite UN requests and prodding by the U.S. Army’s Southern Command, and play a small role in internal security. Military-initiated proposals are under consideration that would provide the institution with a higher level of involvement in national development.

At the present time, all three services are pursuing programs to modernize their weapons systems and enhance training. Their considerable insulation from civilian decision making and their steady source of income give them a more solid and predictable basis on which to chart future programs. The military’s objective is to maintain readiness to fight against real and perceived threats from the country’s three principal regional rivals: Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia. Although none of these countries poses an immediate threat of war, the Chilean officer corps continues to view these traditional rivals with distrust. Chile’s disputes with Argentina over parts of Patagonia date back to the
last century. Chile fought the most important postindependence war in nineteenth-century South America with Bolivia and Peru (the War of the Pacific) between 1879 and 1883, which shaped the Chilean military’s view about the need for preparedness for over a century. Although neither Argentina, Peru, or Bolivia is presently at its peak militarily, Chile’s armed services want to be prepared for the possible strengthening of these militaries.\textsuperscript{148} For this and other reasons, the Chilean armed forces seek to enhance the training and skills of soldiers and purchase or develop sophisticated technology that will afford them greater independence from the United States and other major powers.

The army has been busy pursuing a modernization program since the early 1990s. This service branch lags behind the others because part of its organizational energies were devoted to the government during military rule. Following the trend among contemporary armies, Chilean army leaders are trying to work toward developing a more mobile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and efficient force. The army’s modernization program emphasizes informatics and advanced electronic warfare; in particular, it seeks to strengthen anti-air and anti-armor defense. Military training is being reoriented along these lines at a recently constructed training center, the Centro de Entrenamiento Operativo y Táctico. Beyond reequipping and training the army in an effort to make it a viable, modern war-fighting organization, its leadership has also developed a new center for strategic thought, the Centro de Estudios Estratégicos, with this aim in mind. The country’s navy and air force have followed suit, pursuing their own modernization programs to project Chile’s presence in the sea and to enhance its air power.\textsuperscript{149}

As for international peacekeeping, Chile has been reluctant to assign large numbers of servicemen to such missions. It has sent modest numbers to Cambodia, El Salvador, India and Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf to take part more as observers than as members of missions with a more distinctive military character. In general, however, Chile’s reactions to UN requests for greater participation, and a progressive increase in the degree of involvement with each request—from observers, to technical-assistance specialists, and then to combat troops—reveal considerable reservations about becoming more deeply engaged in peace missions. Chile rejected the idea of maintaining a prepared contingent that would be available whenever necessary for UN peacekeeping missions. On several occasions, it also rejected UN requests for troop assistance.\textsuperscript{150} The reasons for these refusals have varied somewhat according to the specific instance; but overall, the military’s resolute stance against deeper involvement and that its overriding mission is to deter, fight, and defeat Chile’s enemies reflect a relatively privileged position to decline such tasks and still maintain itself as a viable organization.

With respect to internal security, the Chilean military plays a negligible role even though a broad provision for such a mission exists in the constitution.\textsuperscript{151} After the coup of 1973, the military conducted counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with the carabineros, Chile’s heavily armed and disciplined police force. Chile’s first postauthoritarian government returned the carabineros to the Interior Ministry after a seventeen-year period under the Ministry of Defense, underscoring internal security as the preserve of the police and not the military.\textsuperscript{152} It also excluded the army from working with the newly created Oficina Coordinadora de Seguridad Pública (Coordinating Agency of Public Security), the civilian-led agency responsible for coordinating the carabineros’ antiterrorist program.\textsuperscript{153} Evidently, the military did little to resist these moves, suggesting that it does not desire regular participation in counterinsurgency or internal security conflicts as a central role.\textsuperscript{154}

Notwithstanding the renewed attention the Chilean military has paid to the strictly military aspects of national defense, the armed forces are moving increasingly into development roles as well.\textsuperscript{155} The institution’s tradition includes civic action, but not nearly on the order carried out by militaries in the less-developed, less-integrated nations of Latin America, including Brazil.\textsuperscript{156} The specific type of development projects the armed forces are currently pursuing focus on the occupation and exploitation of land and sea in order to enhance Chile’s economic modernization and sovereignty.

Territorial occupation and national integration essentially are the goals of the army’s Fronteras Interiores (“Interior Borders”) project, whose
extramilitary activities nevertheless correspond well with Chile’s ongoing efforts to modernize its economy further. The rationale behind Fronteras Interiores is that the country’s border regions (especially in the extreme north, south, and eastern strip of the country adjacent to Argentina) need more vibrant regional economies. The military’s hope is that boosting these regions’ economic value will have a “pull effect” and help to distribute Chile’s very unevenly concentrated population over more of the nation’s territory. Ninety percent of Chile’s population inhabits the area between the cities of La Serena and Puerto Montt. In the army’s view, occupying virtually deserted territory not only establishes a base for development efforts but guards against potential encroachments on sovereign territory from across the border. The army leadership has repeatedly asserted that the conquest of the nation’s underdeveloped hinterland has always been a military mission, but in fact it appears to represent the reinvigoration of an older policy: the army’s drive under the dictatorship to modernize Chile.157 General Pinochet is fond of repeating that the country should take advantage of the resources and capacity the army can contribute to the Fronteras Interiores project, which would begin with the extensive construction of infrastructure. So far, the army has conducted studies of the border regions and drawn up proposals about how to develop them, but civilian authorities have yet to approve the project.158

Similarly, Chile’s navy recently formulated a twenty-year plan to project its presence into the Pacific Ocean, fortify Chile’s rights in its territorial sea, and expand scientific and oceanographic programs. This project draws on the navy’s perception of the ocean as the natural space for Chile’s development and growth. The idea for Mar Presencial (“Sea Presence”) was formulated in 1989 and envisions staking out Chile’s claims beyond the country’s two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone to include a huge area eastward to Easter Island and southward to Antarctica. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes this area as part of the “high seas” and, as such, open to all nations. The navy’s ultimate goal in the Mar Presencial program is to stake an eventual claim of Chilean sovereignty over this area, thereby closing off this portion of the high seas and its resources to commercial exploitation by other nations. The Chilean navy views these ocean resources as rightfully belonging to Chile.

The three principal projects in the Mar Presencial program are the development of ocean fishing; conducting marine and other scientific investigations; and the construction of a port on Easter Island, which would allow the navy to exercise a greater sovereign presence in protecting and advancing Chilean interests without violating international law.159

While staking out claims for scientific exploration and economic exploitation of deep sea resources is undoubtedly part of the reason for Mar Presencial, the goal of projecting Chilean power and sovereignty onto the high seas undoubtedly also motivates this program. Recalling a central tenet of Chilean nationalism—that Chile’s destiny hinges on predominance in the South Pacific—the project’s goals are both economic and geopolitical. Mar Presencial would expand Chile’s maritime jurisdiction from 1.3 to 9.1 million square miles. Based on a unique Chilean interpretation of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Mar Presencial contradicts United States policy on the UN treaty. Mar Presencial is still only an idea, but its implementation would surely require Chilean naval power to establish and defend the nation’s presence on the high seas.160

Assessing the Current Direction of Military Missions in Chile

The Chilean military remains a strong political and professional institution. Its professional strength and its demonstrated capacity to continue making professional advancements stem in no small measure from its solid political and economic standing. A comparison with Argentina and Brazil, where the military has been less able to defend strictly military aspects of national defense, lends support to this thesis. The Chilean armed forces are progressing more rapidly than their neighbors in building up their arsenal, although they do not rival their Brazilian and Argentine counterparts in sophisticated missile and nuclear-related technology. It is reasonable to expect that unless and until the political and economic autonomy of the Chilean military declines markedly, the institution’s ability to enhance its external defense capabilities will surpass that of the armed forces in
neighboring countries, including especially Argentina.

What concerns does the Chilean situation raise? First of all, it should be noted that an examination of the political and professional standing of the Chilean armed forces, compared to the Argentine and Brazilian, suggests an obvious correlation that is not lost on the institutions themselves: The greater the political strength (and, by implication, economic strength) of the military institution in question, the better off it is in strictly military or professional terms. Stated differently, the more the military is forced to accept subordination to civilian authority, the more it exposes itself to contemporary domestic and international pressures that militate in favor of limiting the military’s external defense capabilities. If notions about objective civilian control have any validity (namely, that granting the military maneuvering room in the sphere of national defense will create disincentives for domestic political involvement), the reward system for military subordination to civilian authority in the major countries of Latin America is misguided. If civil-military relations are based on a political compact that exchanges civilian funding for the military’s obedience, what happens to the compact when the money starts to dwindle?

Another potential problem the Chilean case raises for the region stems from the fact that it is simply out of step with the trend in neighboring countries. While the Argentine military is busy keeping global peace, Chile is buying arms and training soldiers for a conventional war. Both Argentina and Brazil have cut back on the training of troops, but Chile proceeds with full force, creating the general impression that it would be better prepared than its neighbors to fight an actual war should the eventuality arise. Although the Argentine armed forces have grudgingly accepted their civilian-imposed boundaries, at least provisionally, the officer corps is well aware that Argentina is losing ground to Chile, which not only has a strong and prepared reserve but also possesses air superiority over Argentina.161

Similarly, while other countries have shown some interest in collective security arrangements in the region, Chile has signaled its refusal to take part. There are as yet no signs that the growing military imbalance (more in terms of the rate of Chile’s advance than its absolute capability) poses a direct and concrete threat to peace in the region. However, concern among neighboring militaries impedes them from letting down their guard and accepting with much confidence the trend toward smaller and less heavily equipped armed services.

As for the Chilean military’s recent proposals to expand into development roles, while signifying that the long period of military rule may have led to a more permanent entrenchment of the institution in the political, social, and economic fabric of the country, programs such as Fronteras Interiores and Mar Presencial do not portend the kind of mission creep that could be injurious to democracy in countries with weak civil societies and ineffective civilian governments. In countries such as Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, nation-states that are less integrated and where political and economic stability is more elusive, military role expansion—especially in internal security but also in civic action—carries the risk that men in uniform will come to believe that they have more competence than civilians to manage governmental affairs and may well be perceived as such by society. However, the impressive performance of Chile’s elected center-left governments since 1990 in maintaining Pinochet’s economic growth policies and in advancing equity-enhancing social reforms and keeping social order leaves little room for the military to present itself, or be seen as, a superior governing alternative.
The current political and economic climate in Latin America presents at once opportunities for military reform and difficulties in reorienting the military away from the internal arena and toward robust and professional external roles. The demise of communism and the decline of insurgency groups within Latin America, and the broad support for democratic rule from practically every segment of Latin American society—including the military—bodes well for shrinking the military’s jurisdiction. However, the diminution of regional disputes and the rise of drug trafficking and other “gray-area” threats, combined with pressure on military budgets, constrain the development of strictly professional military missions.

Objective control, which rests on defining clear and nonpolitical military missions, is indeed a worthwhile goal for Latin America’s civilian governments to pursue. If one risk in redefining military missions is overinclusion, while another is excessive exclusion, the proper response should follow the contours of objective control, or what Joseph Nye calls the “liberal bargain,” in which civilians respect the military’s special role in providing for defense and support adequate funding for appropriate military missions. In return, the military recognizes that it is accountable to the rule of law and must remain nonpartisan in its respect for civilian authority. If missions matter insofar as they serve as the basis for the military’s independent commitment to political neutrality, then civilians must work to define honorable and credible roles that draw the military out of functions that can lead them into politics.

Subjective control suffers from several drawbacks. When implemented by civilian elites who are willing to use the military for their own domestic purposes, subjective control can politicize the institution and keep its members politically involved. Or, in order to prevent a slide into military activism and interventionism, a strategy of subjective control can pressure civilians to improve their management of the government’s affairs. For the time being, the ability of civilians to keep their own house in order is not a major cause for concern in either Argentina, Brazil, or Chile, but this leaves the important issue of civilian control vulnerable to a myriad of factors beyond the control of elected officials. Nevertheless, civilian leaders should work hard to resolve pressing problems, such as terrorism, rampant crime, and economic and political chaos, that have historically led the military to intervene in the affairs of government.

The political strength of the armed forces and their ability to command economic resources goes a long way in determining whether the military can overcome traditional role definitions, stepping out of internal security and civic action functions and adopting an exclusive focus on external defense. The greater the political clout of the armed forces and the more resources they can command, the more confidence and ability they have to focus (almost exclusively) on developing robust conventional defense roles. This describes the case of Chile.

At the other end of the spectrum, where the armed forces have extremely low political standing and face serious economic obstacles, they will be more or less forced into accepting a modest role definition based on external functions in light of social objections to their involvement in the domestic sphere. This characterizes the situation of the Argentine military during roughly the last decade.

Where the military finds itself in an intermediate position—with enough social support to continue operating in the domestic realm and sufficient budgetary allocations to aspire to strength-
ening conventional defense but insufficient to maintain the organizational justification for this mission—it is usually subject to role expansion and diversification. This describes the Brazilian military.

While the Chilean case suggests a strong positive association between political and professional strength, the Argentine case reflects the difficulty of reconciling political weakness with strong professional status. If political strength is required for exercising institutional and professional strength (as the Chilean case suggests), and if such institutional or professional strength is the basis of objective control, then the incentives for military subordination to civilian authority would seem to be misguided. Argentina’s Menem has managed to at least partially overcome this apparent “contradiction of civilian control” by creating a basis for objective control without dedicating massive amounts of financial resources to the armed forces. He has allowed the military ample autonomy in its own institutional affairs and has also engaged officers and soldiers alike in a credible external orientation—international peacekeeping—while holding the military’s political involvement in check.

Based on the patterns elicited in these case studies, the following are shorthand recommendations to civilian policymakers seeking to reform these Latin American militaries in a direction more compatible with sustained democratic rule. In Argentina, they should stay the course. In Brazil, they should define military roles more clearly, more narrowly, and outside the realm of internal functions. In Chile, they should try to attenuate the military’s political prerogatives (a frontal assault would be politically impossible), yet taking caution to preserve some of the objective control mechanisms already in place.

If “missions matter” and objective forms of control are desired, what policies can civilians enact in the current political and economic milieu to keep up their end of the “bargain” and encourage the military to focus on strictly military functions? The following constitute fuller policy recommendations with these goals in mind. The first set focuses on what civilian leaders in Latin America should do to draw the military out of internal roles that could keep them mired in social and political conflicts. I then turn to the question of what policies the United States should pursue in this area.

First of all, civilians must do everything possible to promote downsizing and restructuring so that the armed forces save money on personnel and other basic operating costs in order to beef up conventional defense capabilities with existing resources. They should, in other words, increase military preparedness and professionalism by encouraging leading officers to do more with less; for example, by reducing standing troop levels and redirecting money toward newer weapons systems. In a further effort to find legitimate ways of channeling the energies and attention of the military outward, civilian authorities should promote external ventures such as peacekeeping operations and other kinds of collective security efforts.

Although the strategy of objective control entails the creation of a separate sphere for the military, this should not be implemented at the expense of trying to integrate the institution fully into the civilian world. In this connection, civilians need to take steps toward turning around their historically disparaging view of the military profession in Latin America. Measures that could serve this end include the promotion of educational exchanges between civilian and military institutions and the training of civilian defense specialists who can interact positively with military officers.

Civilians should also build up police and other nonsecurity forces and rely upon only them to handle what police typically handle: stopping crime and maintaining social order. To make sure the distinction between military and police functions is clear, civilian officials could delineate in clear and explicit terms where the jurisdiction of each institution begins and ends. In this connection, a reform of the police is imperative in many countries, such as Brazil, so that the military does not continue to be the “default option” when civilians decide they need to impose order. A reform of the police must include measures to root out corruption and to force greater compliance with human rights standards.

Similarly, U.S. policies should encourage the professional development of Latin American militaries based on the premise of “shared security.” Technological modernization could be promoted
through a variety of programs, such as equipment donations, discounted sales/procurements, and participation in joint programs. The development of professional norms and codes of conduct fitting for the military in a democracy could be promoted through the maintenance or expansion of the U.S. Department of Defense’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. New IMET programs in place since 1991 have focused on civil-military relations, trying to impart to Latin American militaries norms involving accountability—including the protection of human rights—and subordination to civilian authority.

To promote the simultaneous goals of downsizing and professional development, the United States should encourage some standardization of military spending as a confidence-building measure among Latin American states. Similarly, it would behoove the United States to promote collective or cooperative security arrangements in the framework of diplomatic initiatives, since the issue is still sensitive among the continent’s civilian and military leaders alike. Such measures would effectively provide Latin American states with the assurance to promote downsizing among their armed forces. Downsizing, in turn, would safely and gradually inhibit these militaries from taking on expanded role definitions in an effort to enhance their organizational justification.

While taking measures to enhance professional development and reduce force levels among Latin America’s militaries, the United States should also be wary of pushing noncombat tasks on them. In general, the United States should be cautious not to force new missions on reluctant Latin American military establishments. Officers may resist even sensible suggestions if they perceive them as paternalistic interference by the superpower to the north.

Drug interdiction carries the risk of undermining institutional integrity through corruption. Counternarcotics operations also threaten to draw the military into other internal tasks detrimental to sustained civilian control, such as intelligence operations. While the case studies offer relatively less evidence to draw such conclusions with regard to these particular programs, their relevance for Latin American civilian governments that are combatting drug cartels’ operations (for example, Colombia and Bolivia) lies in trying to assess the political implications of enlisting the military’s help in such campaigns, based on crucial similarities in the civil-military relations of these and the case-study countries.

Civic action and development roles may seem innocuous, at least in the short and medium terms, but they may be difficult to reconcile with the long-term goal of trying to reduce the comprehensive role that the military has historically played in the country’s society, economy, and politics. Rather than invite the armed forces to become involved in “transitional roles” that emphasize domestic functions, the United States should recognize that the activist history of most Latin American militaries imbues such roles with higher significance than when U.S. forces adopt them.

In short, if Latin American governments are serious about seizing the present moment to redefine the historical role of the military, they need to create the conditions for objective control. They can do this by encouraging professional development and discouraging involvement in extramilitary functions. How military missions are defined will largely determine whether the armed forces lose their traditional role as social guardians and come to see themselves as concerned specifically and solely with questions of external defense. The effectiveness of civilian governance will also be vital in shaping future military conduct. However, given the myriad of factors affecting whether future civilian leaders can preside over governments well enough and provide enough political stability to preclude a return to military guardianship, the careful definition and adoption of military missions with limited potential for role expansion is nothing short of imperative.
I would like to thank Claudio Fuentes, Joe Klaits, Brook Larmer, Peter Pavilionis, Francisco Rojas, Luis Tibiletti, and Kurt Weyland for their contributions to this monograph. Special thanks go to Ursula Tafe, my invaluable research assistant at the United States Institute of Peace. I would also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the University Research Council of Vanderbilt University and the United States Institute of Peace.


15. David Pion-Berlin, “Theories and Theory-Building in Civil-Military Relations” (Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, photocopy), 7.


21. I employ the term “professional” following Samuel P. Huntington, who emphasizes the dimensions of “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.” I do not equate “professional” with “apolitical,” as is sometimes done. To define the latter in terms of the former would invalidate on methodological grounds along the argument that professionalism helps draw the military out of politics. See Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 8.


24. Even in the United States, where the armed services arguably face more war-fighting possibilities than most Latin American militaries, civilian leaders are abandoning objective control, trying to influence issues once within the domain of military autonomy and asking the institution to play a greater role in internal activities, such as antinarcotics operations, disaster relief, and infrastructure development and repair. Civil-military relations have come under strain in the process. See Michael C. Desch, “Mission Matters: The End of the Cold War and Future Civil-Military Relations” (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, June 1995, photocopy), 19.

25. The preservation of ecology is also listed as a subsidiary mission. However, there is no firm indication that the armed forces are actually carrying out this mission. See “Misión Principal y Subsidiarias del Ejercito,” Verde Oliva, no. 8 (November 1993): 7.


29. Public opinion data collected in Argentina between 1992 and 1994 show persistent negative opinion of the armed forces in general. The data from 1992 report that 55 percent of Argentines surveyed believed the military’s prestige had diminished over time, and 23 percent believed that the institution’s prestige would continue to diminish into the future. Data collected between 1986 and 1994 reveal that positive public opinion of the armed forces, while increasing from a low of 24.6 percent in 1987 to a high of 40.2 percent in 1990, appeared to be stalled at percentages in the low to mid-30s (31.2 percent in 1991, 36.7 percent in 1992, and 36.3 percent in 1993). See Eduardo Rubilar, “Chilenos y argentinos


35. Apparently, Alfonsín deliberately tried to increase the status of the navy and air force at the expense of the army. In the first two years of his government, the navy’s share of the total defense budget rose from 37 percent to 43.4 percent, but the army’s share fell from 36.5 percent to less than 33 percent. In a similar vein, while Alfonsín cut many army programs, he allowed the air force to pursue the development of the controversial CONDOR ballistic missile program, which began in 1979. See Ruiz-Ramón, “Depoliticization of Military Organizations,” 364.


37. Complex generational and intraservice divisions were also at work. See Marcelo Fabián Sain, Los Levantamientos Carapintada, 1987–1991, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1994); and Norden, Military Rebellion in Argentina.

38. The carapintadas developed an increasingly nationalist outlook in response to President Menem’s neo-liberal economic and foreign policy orientation.


40. Among other demands, the rebels wanted the government to elevate the status of the army’s carapintada faction in order to address the institution’s budgetary problems and to veer off or slow its course in foreign policy in general, but in foreign economic policy in particular.


43. Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Latin American Democracies.”


50. A presidential initiative in August 1994 (later passed by the legislature) eliminated conscription.

51. Public opinion surveys carried out after this incident suggested that only 25 percent of all Argentine citizens favored the continuation of compulsory military service. See “Rebeldes con Causas,” Pagina, no. 12 (May 28, 1994). For a breakdown of opinion toward conscription based on gender, age, political affiliation, and level of education, see “Sondeo favorable a la eliminación del servicio militar obligatorio,” La Nueva Provincia, October 2, 1994.

52. Leaders of the armed services, while they would have preferred a higher degree of consultation regarding the terms of the shift, basically accepted the decision and noted that the earlier system of compulsory military service corresponded to the “socio-cultural, economic, political, and military situation of the early years of the century, which were not the same as those of the end of the century.” See “Quick-Marching the Army into the Future,” Buenos Aires Herald, June 28, 1994.


57. Two entire subsecretariats of the Ministry of Defense were devoted to the privatization and restructuring of military-controlled firms.


62. But there is a sense in which the military aspect of the question (i.e., changes in defense policies) have not accompanied the move toward economic integration. “La cuestión militar en la integración,” Ambito Financiero, March 22, 1991.


65. “La indefensión ocupa hoy el primer plano,” El Informador Público, November 5, 1993, p. 4. See also “Desde 1983 se redujo a la mitad el
For a statement that reflects this perception by the military, see “Predominio de imagen positiva en la opinion pública sobre las Fuerzas Armadass.” _Tiempo Militar_ 1, no. 3 (April 9, 1993).

A March 17, 1995 interview the author conducted with Admiral Emilio Ossés, former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Menem presidency, revealed the constraints perceived by officers on being outspoken. Admiral Ossés was “asked” to step down after expressing once too often his frustrations about low military budgets and for having said publicly that the government decided the military budget on economic factors alone. See “Ossés pidió evitar una visión exclusivamente economicista,” _La Nación_, May 15, 1991. See also, “Almirante Ossés: no existe hipótesis de conflicto,” _La Nueva Provincia_, September 28, 1991.


For a comparison of military salaries at various ranks to those of executive, legislative, and judicial officials, see “Las FFAA. están controladas, afirmó el presidente,” _Río Negro_, September 23, 1994.

A special edition of the military journal _Revista del Suboficial_ was dedicated to the question of Argentine involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. See _Revista del Suboficial_ 75, no. 611 (March–April 1994).


Civilians who have worked in the Defense Ministry report that a high degree of “de facto” military influence—in large part due to the omission of civilian policymakers—persists over issues that require a degree of technical knowledge. Author interviews with Virgilio Beltrán, former subsecretary of politics and strategy in the Menem administration, March 6, 1995; Rut Diamint, technical assistant in Subsecretariat of Politics and Strategy, March 7, 1995; and Guillermo Gasio, director of the National Defense School, March 15, 1995.

“El Presupuesto de Defensa para 1993 es superior a la suma de las partidas de Educación, Cul-


83. Author interview with Virgilio Beltrán, former subsecretary of politics and strategy in the Menem administration, March 6, 1995.

84. For an elaboration on some of these ideas, see Wendy Hunter, “The Brazilian Military after the Cold War: In Search of a Mission,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 31–49.


91. Computed from Secretaria de Planejamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República, *Anuário Estatístico do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-IBGE, 1985–1993). In computing these figures, I have corrected for the fact that this source includes the government’s internal debt and social security spending in the total budget. The former increased greatly in the 1980s. The latter, previously in a special budget, began to be included in the overall government budget after 1988. Not correcting for this anomaly (that is, including these budget items) vastly exaggerates the relative decline of military spending.


phisticated technology. Hence, it is not surprising that it cannot cover basic operations.

95. Malori José Pompermayer, “The State and the Frontier in Brazil: A Case Study of the Amazon” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1979), 89.


97. As U.S. military bases in Panama were in the process of closing, U.S. officials asked their Brazilian counterparts if they could use part of the Brazilian Amazon for jungle training. When Brazil responded negatively, the United States went to Guyana. In explaining its decision, Brazil accused the United States of having ulterior motives. See “O inimigo criado,” Estado de São Paulo, August 3, 1993, p. 3; and “Desocupação do Panamá preocupa,” Estado de São Paulo, August 15, 1993.


100. On the movement of troops to the Amazon, see “A floresta verde-oliva,” Istoé, April 13, 1994, pp. 40–42.

101. See “Collor baixa decreto que amplia presença militar nas regiões de fronteira,” Gazeta Mercantil, August 11, 1992. The jurisdiction of the northern command includes the states of Pará, Maranhão, Amapá, and part of Tocantins.


109. See Hunter, “Back to the Barracks?,” chapter 3, for a fuller discussion on this point.

110. It deserves reiteration here that Latin American militaries have not completely discarded the possibility of renewed guerrilla insurgency. See “Chefes de 16 exércitos debatem ‘subversão’ na América Latina,” Jornal do Brasil, November 9, 1993.

111. For three different opinions on whether the military should fight drug trafficking, see “As Forças Armadas devem combater o crime?,” Folha de São Paulo, April 9, 1994.

112. Recent opinion polls continue to suggest that the public has more trust in the military than in either the militarized state police or the civil police. While 40 percent of those polled expressed confidence in the military, only 21 percent said they trusted the police (either category). “A Hora da Reflexão,” Jornal do Brasil, June 11, 1995.


114. Brazil’s federal system presents a major obstacle to a thorough reform of the police. The militarized state police (Policia Militar) is under the
control of Brazil’s still very powerful governors, for whom such reform is not a high priority.


128. For these and other recent examples of army involvement in civic action, see “Militares prestam serviços à sociedade,” Correio Braziliense, August 25, 1994, p. 6.


134. Confidential interview with the author.


137. Informative sources about the terms of Chile’s negotiated transition include Mark Ensalaco, “In with the New, Out with the Old? The Democratizing Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile,” Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 409–29; and Brian Loveman, “¿Misión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 35–74.

138. This system, designed under the assumption that the center-left opposition coalition would have a majority and that the right would have
slightly more than one-third of the vote, makes it possible for a party (alliance) commanding a little more than 33 percent of the vote to end up with one-half of all legislative seats.


142. It should be noted, however, that this autonomy is far from absolute. Given Chile’s broader democratic framework, the military is necessarily counterbalanced by competing groups. The military budget has decreased in recent years in relation to social spending. In the years between 1989 and 1992, defense expenditures steadily fell from 12.82 percent to 10.08 percent of the national budget. In the same period, the percentage of the budget devoted to social spending rose from 62.13 percent to 65.64 percent. See República de Chile, Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos, Estadísticas de Finanzas Públicas, 1989–1992 (Santiago: Ministerio de Hacienda, June 1993), 57.


147. A recent public seminar sponsored by the Army attested to this persistent distrust of neighboring Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina. See Academia de Guerra, Seminario: Política de Defensa, Memorial del Ejército de Chile, no. 441, 1992.


149. For a brief but informative discussion of the major projects of each branch, see Varas and Fuentes, Defensa Nacional, 35–68. See also Claudio S. Fuentes, “Los Efectos de una Nueva Realidad Internacional en las Fuerzas Armadas de América Latina: El Caso Chileno” (Paper presented at the XVIII International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, March 10–12, 1994).


151. Survey opinion data show some public support for such participation. Of all those polled in Chile, 26 percent felt it was legitimate for the armed forces to carry out functions related to order and public security. See Andrés Fontana, “Chile y Argentina.” See also “Chilenos y Argentinos opinan de sus FFAA,” La Nación, October 18, 1992.


161. “Admiral Gets the Chop,” Latin American Regional Reports—Southern Cone, July 2, 1992, 3;


163. For a further elaboration of this contradiction, see Wendy Hunter, “Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the 1990s,” *Third World Quarterly* 15, no. 4 (1994): 633–53.
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