A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

by KOURIS KALLIGAS

PN07.01

University of Warwick
Department of Politics and International Studies
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MA in International Relations
ABSTRACT
This dissertation pursues an analytical examination of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU) through historical institutionalist lenses. The central argument of this dissertation is that the EU, by launching the ESDP, has entered a path towards becoming a sizeable military and defence actor in the international system. In brief, the EU has locked-itself-in military and defence integration. The central argument is developed by using historical institutionalist concepts (path dependency, unintended consequences, increasing returns, lock-in) as the basic tools for analysing the ESDP. In particular, the EU has established permanent political and military structures which might prove very difficult to overturn in the future. Moreover, the formation of the European Defence Agency is a key development, and it is steadily becoming a very influential tool for defence integration of the EU Member States. Finally, the continuing engagement of the EU in military and civilian operations has created the unanticipated consequence of increased expectations, which impel increased capabilities. Nevertheless, it is also stressed that a historical institutionalist analysis of the ESDP suffers from the failure of Historical Institutionalism to explain policy change, and its unsuitability for solving the inherent complexity of the relationship between the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the United States of America.

Key Words: EU, ESDP, Military, Defence, Historical Institutionalism.
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<td>Armoured Fighting Vehicles</td>
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<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>BGC</td>
<td>Battle Group Concept</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>BTO</td>
<td>Brussels Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control and Communications</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
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<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>Research &amp; Technology</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) has become a principal locus of research and analysis from academics, journalists, and students due to its evolution in becoming a major actor in international politics, its uniqueness in terms of structure and operation, and its transformation in the second half of the 20th century from an area of war-oriented states to a peace-oriented Union, where war is unthinkable today for the States composing it. Nonetheless, although the EU has established itself as a major economic and trade power, the same cannot be said about its military and defence capabilities. The launching of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) seems to be changing this perception of the EU as a military laggard, although this is far away from saying that it already has. Following a historical institutionalist analysis, this dissertation focuses on the implications of the establishment of the ESDP.

The principal question which this dissertation poses and pursues to answer is: has the launching of the ESDP locked-in the EU in the path of becoming a capable military and defence actor in the international system? In other words, have the EU Member-States locked-themselves-in a project which might prove extremely difficult to overturn in the future? By using the theory of Historical Institutionalism (from now on HI) it is possible to reveal what implications the ESDP project involves. It is argued that the EU has entered this path for three reasons. First, the creation of the ESDP structure represents an obstacle in reversing what has already been decided. Second, the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is a major development
in the EU, since it seems to be locking-in the EU Member-States in the process of defence integration by a continuous collaboration in defence programmes and initiatives. Third, the continuous engagement of the EU in military operations has raised the expectations of the EU in the international system, which can only be met by increasing its capabilities. Nevertheless, it is also stressed that the failure of HI to explain policy change and its incapacity to incorporate the intricacy of the relationship between the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United States of America (from now on US) are important weaknesses of a historical institutionalist analysis of the ESDP.

The structure of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter two unfolds the theory of HI and its basic concepts, while it also justifies the choice of HI for examining the ESDP. Chapter three makes a necessary historical examination of the events before and after the establishment of the ESDP, in order to discover the role of defence and security issues in the EU since its inception. Chapter four is where the main argument is developed and justified. Chapter five identifies the limitations of HI in analysing the ESDP. Finally, chapter six concludes the dissertation by reiterating what has been argued before, while it also offers a more general conclusion.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter intends to establish the theoretical ground on which this dissertation is based on. The first part of this chapter unfolds the theory of HI and its basic premises. The second part explains why HI can be utilized for the study of the ESDP.

2.1. HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Theories are important because they help us decide “which facts matter and which do not” (Smith and Baylis 2005, 3). A useful parallel is that of sunglasses (Smith and Baylis 2005, 3). An individual who wears a pair of blue sunglasses will have a very different view of the world from an individual who sees the world through a pair of green sunglasses (Smith and Baylis 2001, 5). Moreover, as Rosamond puts it, “theories are necessary if we are to produce ordered observations of social phenomena” (Rosamond 2000, 4). Thus, it is pivotal to have a theoretical framework when one tries to understand, explain, or even predict social and political phenomena. The theoretical framework utilized here is the theory of HI.

HI is one of the three variants of the ‘New Institutionalism’ (the other are Sociological Institutionalism and Rational-choice Institutionalism) “with a distinctive set of hypotheses and insights about the EU” (Pollack 2004, 137). Generalizing the basic premise of the ‘New Institutionalism’, it can be said that it mainly stresses that “institutions affect outcomes” (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 3), or that “institutions matter” (Rosamond 2000, 113; Rosamond 2003, 114). In short, institutions are not cars waiting for a driver, but the way they are formed affects enormously “how smoothly the car runs,
which roads it can take, and how sure we can be that the car will not break
down” (Peterson and Schackleton 2002, 5).

HI came out in the surface as a new theory focusing on the role of
institutions, as Cram puts it, in “shaping the norms, values and conventions
shared by actors involved at the EU level” (Cram 2001, 67). HI seems to
have taken a position in the middle of the two other variants of the ‘New
Institutionalism’, stressing that institutions constrain the actions of the actors
who establish them (Pollack 2004, 139; Pollack 2005, 20). It is important to
remember that HI is not a theory which pursues to explain all the aspects and
policies of the EU. It is a theory, as Rosamond puts it, “which purport[s] to
explain elements or particular slices of the EU polity” (Rosamond 2000, 126).

The first question which suggests itself once one examines any one of the
three variants of the ‘New Institutionalism’ is: how do we define institutions?
It can be said that, in general, “all approaches understand institutions as rules
and norms” (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 6). More famous though, is the
definition offered by Peter Hall: institutions are defined as “the formal rules,
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy”
(quoted in Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 1). Historical institutionalists define
institutions “as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political
economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).
An analysis of HI must start by explaining its actual phrasing. This is well illustrated by Pierson. This theory is ‘historical’ because it identifies that the examination of a political phenomenon is best comprehended “as a process that unfolds over time” (Pierson 1996, 126). It is ‘institutionalist’, as Pierson puts it, “because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are embedded in institutions – whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or norms” (Pierson 1996, 126).

The next step, one has to take in order to comprehend the theory of HI, is to understand the role that history plays in this theory, and concepts such as ‘path dependency’, ‘lock-in’, ‘increasing returns’, and ‘unintended consequences’. Before taking this step, though, two points should be mentioned. First, HI does not make any predictions with regards to if integration will proceed or not (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 18; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 12). It only predicts “that agency rationality, strategic bargaining, and preference formation” will take place within a constraining institutional framework (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 18; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 12). Second, the emphasis which HI attributes to the role of institutions or policy structures does not overturn the principal role of the states within the EU (Pierson 1996, 158). It rather stresses that, by examining the process of European integration over time, the influence of the Member-States is constrained (Pierson 1996, 158).
Now that the two points have been clarified, we can proceed to the next step mentioned above. Historical development plays a vital role in HI (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). This might seem as a self-evident feature of any examination of social and political phenomena, but historical institutionalists justify their emphasis on history by stating that “it is not the past per se but the unfolding of processes over time that is theoretically central” (Pierson 2000, 264). To put it simply, historical institutionalists are interested in knowing “how something came to be what it is” (Pierson 2005, 34). Pierson makes a very good point with regards to the value of historical development. He suggests that to examine the European Community as a moving picture “gives us a richer sense of the nature of the emerging European polity” (Pierson 1996, 127).

Path dependency is one of the principal characteristics of HI (Kay 2005, 555). Path dependency occurs when a process, which has moved down to a particular track, is followed by additional moves on this same track (Kay 2005, 553). In the EU context, path dependency means that once an institution or a policy structure has been established, it is not easy to overturn its development (Cowles and Curtis 2004, 300). This is so, because Member-States might find it more convenient to ‘stick’ with the institution or policy structure already established, rather than change it - due to the hard efforts already made in coming together to a mutually agreed institution or policy (Cowles and Curtis 2004, 300-1). Moreover, further moves towards the chosen path will continuously increase the costs of changing any agreed
process, making it extremely difficult to consider any alternative path (Pierson 2000, 261). This is even truer if one considers that political institutions are usually characterized by the short time horizons of politicians and “the strong status quo bias” against any change of the present decision rules (Pierson 2000, 261).

The idea of path dependency is intimately connected with the concept of increasing returns (Pierson 2000, 252). Increasing returns means that “the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path” (Pierson 2000, 252). This is so, because the more moves down the chosen path, the more the “relative benefits” of staying on that same path (Pierson 2000, 252). In other words, the costs of exiting - and thus choosing an alternative path - the chosen path increase (Pierson 2000, 252).

As mentioned above, when an institution or a policy structure has entered a chosen path, the concept of increasing returns informs us that further moves down that same path will reduce any chances of switching to an alternative one. This implies that this institution or policy structure has become ‘sticky’. As Pierson argues: “political institutions are often “sticky”” (Pierson 1996, 143). This means that the institution or policy structure has locked-itself-in “equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political change” (Pollack 2005, 20). Hence, the concept of ‘lock-in’ refers to a situation where an institution or a policy structure will remain intact regardless of a sizeable alteration to its political environment.
Another concept associated with HI is that of ‘unintended consequences’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941-2). Unintended consequences occur because even though actors can design an institution or a policy structure, they cannot hope to foresee the eventual development of their own actions (Pierson 2005, 43-4). On the one hand, actors may pursue to take full advantage of their interests, but on the other hand they may decide an alteration of the institutions and policy structures in such a way that they produce unintended (or even undesired) consequences (Pierson 1996, 126). Moreover, Pierson argues that even where policy makers do not discount the long-term consequences of their actions, “complex social processes involving a large number of actors always generate elaborate feedback loops and significant interaction effects that decision makers cannot hope to fully comprehend” (Pierson 1996, 136).

2.2. WHY ESDP THROUGH HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST LENSES?
Although the issues analysed here are analysed in more detail later (fourth chapter), it is pivotal to explain at this point the reasons behind the choice of HI as a basis for analysing the ESDP. There are three reasons why HI represents a valid basis for analysing the ESDP.

The ESDP project has developed as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was ratified at the Treaty of Nice (King 2005, 44). Moreover, within the ESDP there has been created a structure of political-military bodies. HI stresses that policies tend to carry on “unless there is a
strong force exerted for change” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1282). Thus, the first reason for applying HI to the ESDP, is that the creation of the ESDP structure might prove very difficult to overturn in the future. The responsibilities of a policy are set out in the Treaties (Bulmer 1994, 365), while to revise a Treaty is a very difficult task since it requires “unanimous member-state agreement, plus ratification by national parliaments and (in some cases) electorates” (Pierson 1996, 143). Moreover, this policy structure might prove difficult to overturn because although “structure may be created by agents...like Frankenstein’s monster, structure takes on a life of its own” (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 10).

Second, besides the ESDP structure, the EU has created the EDA which seems to be locking-in the Member-States in a continuous collaboration in the defence industry sector and in armaments cooperation. Although initiatives within the EDA are not always binding, its rapid development and its continuing acquirement of more responsibilities will eventually lock-in the Member-States in incrementally creating a ‘Common Defence’. Pierson stresses that “when actors adapt to the new rules of the game...previous decisions may lock-in member states to policy options that they would not now choose to initiate” (Pierson 1996, 144). This seems to be happening in defence issues through the EDA.

By taking the step to collaborate - even voluntarily - in defence issues, the Member-States have raised the exit costs of this collaboration. In the end, it is common sense to realize that the Member-States alone do not have the
same leverage as when they collaborate collectively. In addition, historical institutionalists argue that policies tend to ‘push’ individuals or organizations in investing “in specialized skills, deepen relationships with other individuals and organizations, and develop particular political and social identities” (Pierson 2000, 259). Thus, the more responsibility is given to the EDA, the more investments will be made from the Member-States towards the activities of the EDA, and the more will the choice of an alternative path be kept far away.

Finally, third, the engagement of the EU in a number of military and civilian operations across the globe has created the unintended consequence of increased expectations for the EU as a military actor, which can only be met by increasing its military and defence capabilities. One can contrast this argument, though, by stressing that the EU might choose to reduce these expectations - instead of increasing its capabilities. Nevertheless, there are two significant reasons against this line of reasoning. First, there are projects and initiatives already under way which are not likely to end in the near future (more on this on the fourth chapter). Second, the EU, by its participation in military and civilian missions, has established itself - for the first time in its history - as a reliable (compared to its history and not to the US) international actor in all fronts (economic, developmental, military, civilian). Thus, it is very likely that the EU will not take any actions which will put in danger this development.
To conclude this chapter, one can argue that HI seems to have valid insights into the ESDP. This makes HI a very good ground for analysing the implications of the ESDP, with regards to whether or not the EU has entered the path of becoming a significant military actor in the international system.

3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Following the argument of HI, that we shouldn’t be simply interested in the past but we should examine how is it that something took its present form and not an alternative one (Pierson 2005, 34), this chapter reveals that even though the pragmatic development of the ESDP became feasible only a few years ago, ideas of defence and security issues were always present within the European Community.

Defence and security issues should not be thought as a new development in the EU (Menon 2004b, 222). As Menon states, “from its inception, European integration has been concerned with issues of foreign and defence policy” (Menon 2004b, 222), or as Shepherd stresses, the “ESDP is by no means a new idea” (Shepherd 2003, 40). After all, the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) in 1948, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 were created primarily for security reasons (Menon 2004b, 222; Collester 2000, 373; Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 189). The BTO became the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954 (Collester 2000, 373).

Nevertheless, even before the launch of the first European Community – ECSC – there were ideas, from some European leaders, with regards to the creation of a European security framework. In particular, the French were
the prime initiators (Howorth 1997, 12). Howorth informs us that “as early as 1934, Charles De Gaulle, in his Vers l’Armée de Métier, had argued for an integrated European security structure” (Howorth 1997, 12). In the aftermath of the World War II, this call for initiating a European security construction became a regular characteristic of Gaullist declarations (Howorth 1997, 12). The 1949 Washington Treaty, and the following Korean War the year after (indicating that Germany should rearm itself) stimulated European leaders to find a ‘middle way’, which would “establish the correct balance between Germany and Europe, and between Europe and the USA” (Howorth 1997, 12). The outcome became what is known as the Pleven Plan for the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1954 (Howorth 1997, 12). The EDC was never launched due to the unsuccessful ratification from the French National Assembly (Menon 2004b, 222).

After the breakdown of the EDC, important facts were the failures of the Fouchet Plan in 1960-2 and the Franco-Germany Treaty in 1963, which “both aimed in rather different ways at the fundamental objective of forging a more unified European defence entity” (Howorth 1997, 13).

In 1970, the important development was the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which constituted an informal forum for consultation and coordination of the national foreign ministries (Peters 2004, 384; Howorth 2005, 180). The EPC was integrated in 1986 in the Single European Act (SEA) (Missiroli 2006a, 1), and finally replaced by the CFSP of the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Shepherd 2003, 40).
Despite the fact that the idea of a European security and defence community was always present, on the ground nothing came close to the implementation of this idea until recently. Thus, through NATO, the US - throughout the Cold War - played a major role in European security (EU Website 2003, 1). One should not underestimate, though, the role of ideas in policy development. One can argue – wearing historical institutionalist sunglasses – that even if nothing came to resemble a European defence community, only the fact that some European Member-States desired this to happen (and having learnt from the previous unsuccessful plans) was important. This is so, because it was only a matter of time for this idea to come to the surface again and – under certain conditions and certain reconfigurations in the international system – become a reality.

In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War changed the “geopolitical context in which Europeans had provided for their security” (Whitman 2004, 431). This led to the TEU (Whitman 2004, 432). The most important development of the inclusion of the CFSP into the TEU was that it incorporated defence issues as a subject for discussion within the EU (Whitman 2004, 432) “which might in time lead to a common defence” (ECSC-EEC-EAEC 1992, 126). Furthermore, the TEU, in a declaration, clarified the role of the WEU by stating that the “WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance” (ECSC-EEC-EAEC 1992, 242). Indeed, the WEU was perceived as a key piece on the ‘European puzzle’ (Missiroli 2006a, 1).

Before the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA), another important event was the Petersberg Declaration, which took place on 19 June 1992 in the North-Rhine Westphalia castle of Petersberg (Keane 2005, 91). As Keane successfully stresses: “the Foreign and Defence Ministers [of the WEU] ...- perhaps unknowingly – carved out the agenda of European Union foreign policy for the 1990s and the new millennium” (Keane 2005, 91). These Petersberg tasks consist of “humanitarian and rescue tasks, plus peacekeeping, crisis management and peacekeeping responsibilities” (Keane 2005, 91).

The Petersberg tasks were eventually included in the ToA in 1997 (Missiroli 2006a, 2). The ToA did not make major alterations to the CFSP or to the forming of a common defence policy (Missiroli 2006a, 2; Menon 2004b, 223). Apart from the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the ToA, three facts are worth to be mentioned: first, the option for the EU to “avail itself” (instead of request) of the capabilities of the WEU (Missiroli 2006a, 2), second, the replacement of the word ‘eventual’ from ‘progressive’ in Article J.7.1. of the TEU (Whitman 2004, 450). In particular, J.7.1 states that “the progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments” (European Communities 1997, 12). Third, the establishment of the position of the High Representative (HR) for the CFSP and the subsequent
From 1998 onwards the ESDP started to become a reality. In St Malo, in December 1998, France and Britain produced a common declaration, which, in a nutshell, called for the development of those military tools that would make possible for the EU to respond to international crises without questioning NATO or duplicating its forces (Missiroli 2006a, 2). As Howorth argues, “St Malo represented a paradigm shift in European security thinking” (Howorth 2004, 222), and this was because for the first time it seemed that the EU was beginning to make a realistic move to military and defence integration. This move, though, did not come out from parthenogenesis, but it was a product of ideas and failed plans. As Merand puts it: “as students of path dependency have argued, the history of failed experiments provided an important backdrop to what was deemed feasible circa 1998” (Merand 2006, 135).

In June 1999 the Cologne European Council strengthened the common European security and defence policy by declaring the intention to provide the EU with decision-making and military capacities, and by pinpointing the transfer of functions from the WEU to the EU in order to assist the EU in its future tasks (European Communities 2000, 220).

The ESDP was created as a part of the CFSP (Missiroli 2006a, 2). The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 agreed to the Headline Goal
(Lindstrom 2006, 1). This “called for EU member states to be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days and sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg Tasks” (Lindstrom 2006, 1).

The Council, on 14 February 2000, set up interim political and military bodies, along with a civilian crisis management committee (European Communities 2001, 230). The Feira European Council in June 2000 welcomed these developments, and the Nice European Council in December 2000 approved a presidency report on the ESDP, stressing “that the objective was that the European Union should quickly be made operational in this area” (European Communities 2001, 231). In particular, the presidency report states:

> The aim...is to give the European Union the means of playing its role fully on the international stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises...to take decisions and actions in the security and defence field (Cowgill and Cowgill 2001, 198).

On 22 July 2001, the Council established the military and political bodies agreed at the European Council in Nice (European Communities 2002, 253). On 20 July 2001, the EU also set up the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) and the European Union Satellite Centre (European Communities 2002, 253). Moreover, the Laeken European Council, which took place on 14 and 15 December 2001, declared that the EU was ready “to conduct crisis-management operations over the whole range of Petersberg missions” (European Communities 2002, 410).
The Seville European Council, which took place on 21 and 22 June 2002, confirmed that the EU was capable of crisis management missions, which was displayed by the decision on the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) (European Communities 2003, 283).

In 2003, the Iraq War brought in the surface disagreements among the EU Member-States with regards to the nature of the relationship between the EU and the US, and the role of the EU in issues of international security (Menon 2004a, 632, 638). Consequently, the reliability of the ESDP project was undermined in the face of these disparities, to the extent that the Iraq War became to be considered “the death knell for ESDP” (Menon 2004a, 640). Nonetheless, the EU benefited from this crisis (Menon 2004a, 632). As Menon argues: “the Iraq War has...convinced some previously sceptical European states about the utility of an EU military capability” (Menon 2004a, 645). In fact, the EU conducted real military missions at the rear of the crisis in Iraq, which implied that the disagreements between the Member-States in the Iraq crisis “proved to be something of a cathartic experience for the Union as far as ESDP was concerned” (Menon 2004a, 632, 642).

On 17 November 2003, the Council reached an agreement on the establishment, within the year 2004, of a defence agency (European Communities 2004, 264), while on 16 June 2003, it expressed its satisfaction for the quick launch of operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (European Communities 2004, 269). On 12 and 13 December 2003, the European Council, approved the European Security Strategy (ESS)
of the CFSP HR Javier Solana (European Communities 2004, 264), and declared that the EU was ready for a military mission in BiH - based on the Berlin-Plus agreement (European Communities 2004, 269). The Berlin-Plus agreement was concluded on 11 March 2003, after a dispute between Turkey and Greece was resolved (Haine 2006a, 3). This agreement basically means that the EU has access to NATO capabilities and assets (Whitman 2004, 442), and “that NATO has the right to decline involvement in mission before the EU can decide to get involved” (Watanabe 2005, 13).

In 2004, the Council launched the EDA and adopted ‘The 2010 Headline Goal’, which set out a plan for the development of the military capabilities of the EU (European Communities 2005c, 198). Moreover, on 22 March 2004, the Council welcomed the Battle Group Concept (BGC) proposal (European Communities 2005c, 199), while the term of office for Javier Solana was renewed (European Communities 2005b, 59). With regards to operations, the EUPM and ‘Proxima’ (in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) were extended, the first ‘rule of law’ mission was launched, and the military operation ‘Althea’ replaced the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in BiH (European Communities 2005b, 59-60). Furthermore, in 2005, the EU participated in approximately eight military and civilian operations (more on this on the fourth chapter) (European Communities 2006a, 169).

What one must keep from the above analysis is: first, the idea of integration in defence and security issues, within the European Community, is not a new development. On the contrary, it goes way back to history even before the
establishment of the ECSC. Second, plans which centred on creating a
defence community within the European context, helped the European
leaders in creating what it came to be the ESDP - instead of discouraging
ideas of defence integration. Finally, third, by examining the history behind
ESDP it is possible to realize that the path, which the EU has entered by
creating the ESDP, is not a new one. It is just now that it became visible to
the ‘naked eye’. The Gaullist declarations, the Pleven Plan and the EDC, the
Fouchet Plan, the 1963 Franco-Germany Treaty, the EPC, and the CFSP were
all vital stages to the establishment of the ESDP. They were all means to an
end and not an end themselves. The same logic can be applied to the ESDP.
The ESDP is the vehicle which will lead the EU in becoming a more reliable, a
more capable, and a more sizeable military and civilian international actor.

In an era where the US is willing to act unilaterally, where international crises
and atrocities - occurring in different parts of the world - require military
action and support, and where the need for more influential voices (other
than the US) in the international system are necessary, the ESDP should be
considered as a good development. This is so, because the EU has no
intention of becoming an opposition pole to the US. It rather pursues to
become a reliable military international actor who will be able to influence
international affairs in promoting peace and stability. As Solana states: “The
EU started as a peace project. And in many ways it still is” (European
Communities 2005a, 13).
4. THE ESDP IN PERSPECTIVE

This chapter argues that due to the establishment of the policy structure of the ESDP, the implications of the creation of the EDA, and the increased expectations of the EU’s role in the international system, there are valid reasons to suggest that the EU has entered the path of increasing even more its military and defence capabilities, which implies that the EU is becoming a substantial military international actor.

4.1. THE POLICY STRUCTURE OF THE ESDP: IMPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS

The European leaders decided, at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, to create a political and military structure which will allow the EU to conduct military operations (Missiroli 2006b, 1). The European Council in Nice took the decision to make these political and military bodies permanent in the structure of the EU (Shepherd 2003, 45). These bodies are: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

The PSC is responsible for issues referring to the CFSP, it is intimately connected to the Secretary-General/ HR, it cooperates with the EUMC by forwarding guidelines and receiving its suggestions, and - under the watch of the Council - is charged with “the political direction of the development of military capabilities” (Missiroli 2006b, 1). In case of a crisis, the PSC handles all the aspects of analysing the crisis, examining the range of actions feasible to the EU, and the strategic plan for any such action (Missiroli 2006b, 1).
The EUMC is the military instrument of the Council (Missiroli 2006b, 2). Its duties include military advice to the PSC, crisis management development, “risk assessment of potential crisis, as well as the elaboration, assessment and review of capability goals” (Missiroli 2006b, 2). In case of a crisis, and when a request from the PSC has been made, the EUMC – in cooperation with the EUMS - is accountable for proposing the strategic military planning of the crisis and its execution (Missiroli 2006b, 2).

The EUMS is responsible for supplying military know-how to the ESDP, the carrying out of the military operations and the decisions of the EUMC, and it ensures the connection involving the EUMC and the EU’s military resources (Missiroli 2006b, 2). In addition, within the EUMS, there has been established a Civil-Military Cell in order for the EU “to enhance its capacity for crisis management planning and achieve greater coherence of the civilian and military instruments and structures at its disposal in responding to crises” (European Communities 2006b, 7).

Other bodies - albeit with not the same institutional standing - include the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (with consultative duties), the Situation Centre, which monitors possible crisis and refers them to the Council, the Satellite Centre in Torrejon of Spain (transferred from the WEU), which provides the EU with surveillance support tools, and the EUISS (transferred from the WEU) (Missiroli 2006b, 2). A very recent development is the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). In particular, it was
created in July 2005 “to provide training in the field [of ESDP]...at all strategic levels” (European Communities 2006b, 10).

Now that the role of each body is clear within the ESDP structure, it is possible to develop the arguments of this subchapter. Following the theory of HI, and with regards to the ESDP structure, there are three reasons why one can suggest that the EU has locked-itself-in defence and military integration. First, the ESDP is a policy which “was developed as a specific programme within the CFSP and was ratified at the Treaty of Nice in 2000” (King 2005, 44). This suggests that to overturn the ESDP is a very difficult task since a Treaty revision - apart from the fact that it is time consuming - is a complex and demanding process which requires unanimity among the Member-States of the EU, national parliament ratification, and sometimes electorates (Pierson 1996, 143). Although HI, as mentioned in the second chapter, does not tell us if integration will proceed or not (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001, 12), it does tell us that a policy or an institution is persistent. The same can be said for the ESDP structure, and this constitutes one of the contributions of a historical institutionalist analysis of the ESDP.

Second, the creation of the ESDP, and its structure, is not a ‘dry’ process. It involves people from different cultures with different ethics getting together to produce a result which will be a European one. It is also a policy where old ideas meet new ones and together construct a shared mutual understanding of the goals of the ESDP, a policy which resolves disparities and creates new ones, but ultimately serves the goal of a common aspiration.
This means that the ESDP structure might have been created with specific guidelines and procedures, and its creators might have had something very specific in their minds when they established it, but one should constantly recall that sometimes (not to say always) a “structure takes a life of its own” (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000, 10). After all, who can undeniably say that what has become the EU today is what its founding leaders planned it to be. The recent creation of the ESDC is an example. It was created with the ultimate goal of building “a shared security culture” (European Communities 2006b, 3). That is, a culture which everybody understands, accepts, and works for its preservation.

Third, and concluding this subchapter, it is very likely that the Member-States will want to see a result for the resources they have invested in the creation of this policy structure - and continue to invest today. Despite the political difficulties of the Member-States to reach to common decisions and common actions in military and defence issues, it is utopian to argue that they will one day decide to reverse its operation and development. Moreover, there are continuously new European initiatives - where the Member-States pool their resources in order to develop them - which have high exit costs (more on this on the next subchapter). Finally, perhaps the most important contribution of HI is, simply, its prediction that the ESDP is here to stay.

4.2. THE LOCK-IN OF DEFENCE INTEGRATION THROUGH THE EDA
The ESS of 2003 states that “a more capable Europe is within our grasp, it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway - notably the establishment of a defence agency - take us in the right direction” (EU
This defence agency became a reality in the form of the EDA. An appointed team prepared the groundwork on which the EDA was created by the Council on 12 July 2004 (EDA 2006a). The role of the EDA is “to assist the Council and the Member States in the area of crisis management and to support the ESDP” (European Communities 2005c, 198). Javier Solana is the Head of the Agency and also chairman of its Steering Board (EDA 2006a). The decision-making body consists of the Ministers of Defence of the 24 participating Member-States (pMS) in the EDA (Denmark has opted out) and the European Commission (EDA 2006a). The Council is the authority over the EDA’s Steering Board (EDA 2006a).

The tasks of the agency are: (i) to work towards the capabilities needs of the ESDP, (ii) to promote collaborations in defence capabilities which will reorganize the defence industry in Europe, (iii) to promote collaborative Research & Technology (R & T) initiatives, and (iv) to cooperate with the Commission in creating “an internationally competitive market for defence equipment in Europe” (EDA 2006a). The fulfilment of these objectives depends on the Member-States of the EU putting together their separate national functions under the same ‘umbrella’ (and in accordance with ESDP priorities), and in collectively pooling their resources (EDA 2006e). In the end, as Martin and Roper stated in 1995, “there are...economies of scale...to be sought from collaboration” (Martin and Roper 1995, 2).
At the time, the EDA is carrying out its 2006 programme, which is centred on developing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), in order to “increase European standardisation and interoperability” (EDA 2006a), Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs), as a means to establish “a European family of vehicles” (EDA 2006a), and Command, Control and Communications (C3), which is meant to promote coordination and satellite communications (EDA 2006a).

The EDA also consists of five directorates, each of which has specific duties and responsibilities. The Armaments Directorate is charged with finding effective ways of collaborating in defence equipment (EDA 2006b). It intends to promote, coordinate, and manage new collaborative programmes (EDA 2006b). Nonetheless, armaments cooperation in Europe is not a new development (Schmitt 2005b, 1). It first started in the 1960s and it continues today, where the most notable collaborations include HOT, Milan, and Eurofighter (Schmitt 2005b, 1). Table 1 lists all the programmes which at the time are ongoing. This tradition in collaboration reveals that if we examine a project or a policy over time, we are able to see the full picture of its development. The fact that armaments cooperation has only now become more visible - through the Armaments Directorate of the EDA - does not mean that it did not exist. In fact, it implies that what is feasible today is because previous steps towards armaments cooperation in Europe facilitated the path which the EU is currently experiencing in military and defence integration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROGRAMMES</th>
<th>COUNTRIES CONCERNED</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A400M</td>
<td>Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Luxembourg, UK, Portugal, Turkey</td>
<td>Future transport aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCS</td>
<td>NATO countries</td>
<td>Command and control support system for air operations integrated at European level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONUS</td>
<td>France, Sweden</td>
<td>Guided anti-tank shell programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>BREVEL</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
<td>Remote-controlled light drone system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRA</td>
<td>Germany, France, UK</td>
<td>Counter-battery radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EH 101</td>
<td>Italy, UK</td>
<td>Military transport helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurofighter</td>
<td>Germany, Spain, Italy, UK</td>
<td>New generation combat aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSAF</td>
<td>France, Italy</td>
<td>Air defence systems family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELIOS</td>
<td>Helios I: France, Italy, Spain Helios II: France, Belgium</td>
<td>Optical observation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HORIZON</td>
<td>France, Italy</td>
<td>New generation anti-aircraft frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOT</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
<td>Long-range wire-guided anti-tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NG MRL</td>
<td>Germany, US, France, Italy, UK</td>
<td>Development of precision rocket modernised file control system and exercise rocket</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METEOR</td>
<td>Germany, Spain, France, Italy, UK, Sweden</td>
<td>Medium-range air-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDS</td>
<td>Spain, US, France, Italy, Germany</td>
<td>High-speed inter-ally and inter-army tactical data transmission system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILAN</td>
<td>Germany, France, UK</td>
<td>Medium-range portable wire-guided anti-tank missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAV/GTK</td>
<td>Germany, Netherlands</td>
<td>Multi-role armoured vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU90</td>
<td>France, Italy</td>
<td>Light torpedo for anti-submarine combat vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGIFF</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
<td>New generation air-to-air and ground-to-air Identification Friend or Foe system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH90</td>
<td>Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal</td>
<td>Military transport helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAAMS Principal Anti-Aircraft Missile System</td>
<td>France, Italy, UK</td>
<td>Principal weapons system of future Franco-Italian Horizon and British T45 anti-aircraft frigates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLYPHEME</td>
<td>Germany, France, Italy</td>
<td>Fibre-optic guided missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RITA</td>
<td>Belgium, France</td>
<td>Modernisation of RITA tactical telecommunications network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCALP EG/Storm Shadow</td>
<td>France, UK, Italy</td>
<td>Long-range air-to-ground missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLAT Anti-torpedo combat system</td>
<td>France, Italy</td>
<td>Anti-torpedo detection and reaction system for surface vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIGER</td>
<td>Germany, France</td>
<td>New generation combat helicopters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Schmitt 2005b, 1-2)

The Capabilities Directorate aims at cooperating with the pMS in supporting the ESDP, by continuously developing its defence capabilities, and by pooling their “efforts and resources in the development of transformed, interoperable and cost-effective armed forces” (EDA 2006c). This is being developed through a capability development process (Figure 1) (EDA 2006c).
FIGURE 1

The Capability Development Process

WHAT IS EUROPE’S ROLE IN THE WORLD?
WHAT DOES EUROPE WANT TO BE ABLE TO DO, MILITARILY?
WHICH MILITARY CAPABILITIES WILL THAT REQUIRE?
WHAT DOES EUROPE HAVE? PLAN TO HAVE?
WHAT IS LACKING? WILL BE LACKING?
WHAT IS THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS?
WHICH LOOKS MOST PROMISING?
WHO WILL TAKE IT UP AND COMMIT RESOURCES?
PROJECT INTO NATIONAL PROGRAMMES
DELIVERY

COUNCIL/PSC
EUMC/EU
MS
EDA
EUMC
INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES

Source: (EDA 2006c)

As can be seen in Figure 1, this capability development process requires a number of specific steps, which begin with the aspirations of the ESDP and end with the actual delivery of the necessary military means to accomplish them (EDA 2006c).

The R & T Directorate works towards promoting more collaboration in the R & T activities (with an emphasis on defence capabilities), and heading for creating strategies which will improve the European defence technology (EDA
The activities carried out from this Directorate are not only very important but also very challenging. At the time, there is an increase on the overall spending on Defence R & T of 5.3 % (EDA 2006g). This is played down, though, for three reasons: first, the percentage of spending on Defence R & T is only 1.25% of the €180 Billion total defence expenditure, which is obviously “not enough to sustain Europe’s future technological and industrial base” (EDA 2006g). Second, the majority of defence R & T spending takes place within national borders (87.7% in 2006), which proves the need for a more collective approach in Defence R & T expenditure (EDA 2006g). And third, 80% of the overall defence spending in the EU is carried out by six countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands), while the first four appear to be far ahead from the others (Schmitt 2005c, 3).

Despite these shortcomings, which will take time to resolve, it is pivotal to note that even the fact that the Member-States have realised the need for collaboration in this field is vital. In fact, the more they realize it, the more the EU moves down the path of continuous defence integration, which will be unimaginable and impossible to overturn in the future.

The Industry and Market Directorate intends to establish a “competitive European Defence Equipment Market” (EDA 2006d), it works towards reinforcing the European Technological and Industrial Base, and sustains a channel of communication with the Commission, the industry, and “other stakeholders on defence industries and defence Market issues” (EDA 2006d).
An important development is the European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM).

A new EDEM was created on 1 July 2006, where 22 out of the 24 pMS in the EDA took part in this initiative (EDA 2006f). The establishment of the EDEM is meant to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDA 2005, 1; EDA 2006d). Moreover, the EDEM operates under a Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement agreed by the Ministers of Defence on 21 November 2005 (EDA 2006f). The character of this Code of Conduct is voluntary and intergovernmental, and it covers purchases of defence equipment - which do not operate under the standard rules of competition of the EU single market (EDA 2006f). The Member-States, which follow the Code of Conduct, are committed in using an Electronic Bulletin Board where they publish procurement openings (EDA 2006f). In a nutshell, the Code of Conduct is a “non-binding intergovernmental regime aimed at encouraging application of competition in this segment of Defence procurement, on a reciprocal basis between those subscribing to the regime” (EDA 2005, 1). The Member-States, participating in this regime, will have to open up their countries to suppliers based on each others land, with regards to “defence procurement opportunities of € 1m or more” (EDA 2005, 1).

The development of the EDEM is a very significant step towards the path of defence integration in the EU and it will be even more if it continuous to develop with the same pace. Unfortunately, this EDEM suffers from the non-binding approach of the Code of Conduct, which means that the Member-
States can opt out whenever they wish (EDA 2005, 1). Nevertheless, the future implications of the EDEM are enormous, since the Member-States have put down the groundwork on which future initiatives - within the context of defence collaboration - will be based on. It can be argued that the Member-States, by subscribing to such a regime - even voluntarily - and investing resources, money, and people in the field of defence equipment, have created an obstacle to reverse their own actions. One can oppose, though, that the Member-States can decide today, if they wish so, to cancel their participation in this regime. Although it is true that this is a legally easy decision, it is very unlikely that the Member-States will take such a decision due to rising sunk costs.

Before the establishment of the EDA, though, the creation in 1999 of the European Aeronautic, Defence and Space Company (EADS) – which grew out of a merger of the German Dasa, the French Aerospatiale-Maltra, and the Spanish CASA - shows that European defence companies have an interest in pulling together their efforts and resources (Watanabe 2005, 12). Moreover, this merging of EADS indicates that the European defence companies were eager to take advantage of the developments in the context of the ESDP. This implies that the European leaders, by launching the ESDP, and subsequently the EDA, have created the unintended consequence of mergers and acquisitions in the defence sector, which increases even more the sunk costs, and hence, induces more steps towards the path of creating a defence community.
After the analysis of this subchapter, one can argue that the operations, initiatives, and programmes of the EDA facilitate extensively the path towards defence integration. Although there is clearly a lot to be done – such as an improved collective defence spending on R & T, a more binding EDEM, and a transformation of the approach to defence spending from ‘how much we spend’ to ‘where we spend’ – one should not underestimate the importance of the achievements already accomplished. In time, and with more resources invested in the operations of the EDA, the Member-States will have no interest in opting out to any initiatives with regards to defence development.

As a conclusion for this subchapter, it can be said that the implications of the creation of the EDA show that the Member-States, within the context of the ESDP, are constrained from their very own actions. This happens because to reverse such a process of continuous collaboration in defence initiatives (UAVs, AFVs, C3, EDEM) will be an extremely difficult task due to sunk costs (invested resources and people), unintended consequences (the forming of EADS), and increasing returns - the more European defence programmes are launched, the more the EU will continue down the path of becoming a defence community, and thus a more sizable military actor.

**4.3. INCREASED EXPECTATIONS IMPEL INCREASED CAPABILITIES**

The concept intrinsic in the analysis of this subchapter is the ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’. This concept is useful because, as Hill puts it, “it enables us to see that if the gap is to be closed...then either capabilities will have to be increased or expectations decreased” (Hill 1995, 119). It is argued, here,
that the involvement of the EU in a number of military and civilian operations around the globe has increased the expectations of the EU as an international actor, which can only be met by increasing its capabilities. Consequently, the more the EU conducts operations, the more will the Member-States take steps towards the path of transforming the EU into a sizeable military international actor. In other words, the Member-States are locking-themselves-in a situation where their only choice is increasing their capabilities. Furthermore, it is stressed that two other developments, which indicate that the EU is interested in a continuous upgrading and improvement of its capabilities, is the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), and the introduction of the BGC.

Since the signing of the TEU, the EU showed in various crises - Bosnian War, Aegean crisis, Albania, Kosovo - an inability to meet the expectations raised by the inclusion of the CFSP in the TEU (Ginsberg 1999, 430). With the inclusion of the ESDP as a part of the CFSP this inability seems to be vanishing. In particular, the EU has already conducted successfully military and civilian operations, and continuous to be alert in order to conduct new ones. Figure 2 shows the military, civilian, and police operations which the EU has conducted under the ESDP from 2003 until the end of May 2006.
FIGURE 2

ESDP civilian, police and military operations since 2003

Source: (EU Website 2006)

It is important to stress, at this point, that to argue that the EU has entered the path of becoming a military actor, and that is likely to stay in it, does not imply that this has been achieved. On the contrary, there are a lot of issues that need to be solved and this is why the EU needs to increase its capabilities. In particular, problems have to do with the high reliance on conscript personnel, the fact that “ground forces...are still characterized by territorial defence thinking...as well as substantial personnel costs” (Haine 2006b, 1). On the other hand, even before the launching of missions under the ESDP, the EU had proven that it has the potential to proceed as a military
actor (Haine 2006b, 3). In fact, the EU-15 Member-States provided a vital contribution to the SFOR in Bosnia and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Specifically, the EU-15 contributed 53% and 69% of the overall forces in SFOR and KFOR respectively (Haine 2006b, 3).

As Figure 2 indicates, since 2003 the EU has engaged in the following operations:

1. On 1 January 2003, the EU set off the EUPM in BiH, which signifies the first civilian crisis management mission under the auspices of the ESDP (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 1).

2. On 31 March 2003, the EU initiated its first military mission ‘Concordia’ in FYROM, in order to ensure an environment of stability and security (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 3). This mission made use of the Berlin-Plus agreement (Wallace 2005, 446).

3. On 15 December 2003, the EU launched the police operation ‘Proxima’, with the goal of improving FYROM’s police forces (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 4).

4. On 12 June 2003 – and after an appeal from the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) – the EU launched the military operation ‘Artemis’ in the DRC (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 4). The goal of ‘Artemis’ was to help bring the situation in Bunia – the capital of the region Ituri – under stability and security, with an emphasis on improving the
humanitarian conditions (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 4). The operation was concluded on 1 September 2003, and was succeeded by a UN mission (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 4). Two important characteristics of this operation were that, first, it was the first military mission outside Europe, and second, that it did not depend on NATO assets (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 4).

5. On 16 July 2004, and after an invitation from the Georgian government, the EU set out the first rule of law mission ‘Themis’ (Wallace 2005, 447). This mission showed that there exists also a civilian ESDP which is ready to take responsibilities in any available opportunity (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 6).

6. On 2 December 2004, the EU launched the military mission ‘Althea’ in BiH, which took over the responsibilities of the SFOR mission (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 6). This operation is the symbol of the EU’s willingness to take more responsibilities in providing for security in Europe (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 7). Compared to the situation in 1994 “the contrast...could not be greater: EU member states are united and pursue common policy objectives” (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 7).

7. In January 2005, the EU launched a police mission in Kinshasa of the DRC, in order to establish an Integrated Police Unit, and in June 2005, the EU also launched a security reform mission in
the DRC – both with duration of one year (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 8-10).

8. In April 2005, the EU created the EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support, in order to support efforts for police reform (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 10). In addition, on 14 November 2005, the EU launched “the ESDP mission EUPOL-COPPS: the first ever police mission in the Palestinian Territories conducted by third parties” (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 15).

9. In 2005, the EU decided to support missions AMIS I & II, which were launched by the African Union (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 11). By supporting these missions, the EU proved that it is also committed in assisting regional associations (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 11).

10. On 21 February 2005, the Council launched the rule of law mission ‘Lex’ in Iraq, in order to support efforts towards improving the criminal justice system (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 12).

11. On 9 September 2005, the Council decided to establish the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 13). This ESDP mission has a civilian character, with contributions from five ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 13). The AMM is the first operation conducted in Asia, and hence, symbolizes the
willingness and commitment of the EU in promoting stability and security in territories far away from its own with the cooperation of regional associations (Grevi, Lynch, and Missiroli 2006, 14).

12. Last, but not least, the EU is about to set off its fourth military mission, which will act as a supportive instrument of the UN force, MONUC, throughout the election period in the DRC (European Communities 2006b, 3).

All the above military and civilian operations have raised the expectations of the EU in the international system in military terms. As Solana states: “the more we [the EU] do, the more we are asked to do” (European Communities 2005a, 3). Thus, in order for the EU to be ready for its responsibilities it has one choice: to increase and improve its capabilities. Although Solana stresses that “the EU is now in a position to play a role that matches its responsibilities” (European Communities 2005a, 11), this will require increased capabilities which will match the high expectations. In particular, the EU will have to focus on improving its logistics, command, and communications systems (Howorth 2005, 201). Nonetheless, what has already been achieved is quite remarkable (Howorth 2005, 201; Whitman 2004, 430). If someone attempted to predict any of the developments associated with the ESDP in 1999, he/she “would probably have been laughed out of court” (Howorth 2005, 201).
Two important developments, which demonstrate that the EU is uncompromising about increasing its capabilities, are the ECAP and the BGC. In 2001, at the Laeken European Summit, the European Council set out the ECAP in order to tackle with capabilities problems and needs (Schmitt 2005a, 1). Since 2002, 19 teams, comprised of national experts, have come up with potential solutions (Schmitt 2005a, 1). Even though the ECAP is seen as a promising process, it needs to be improved if it is to realistically contribute in increasing the capabilities of the EU (Schmitt 2005a, 3). Specifically, the ECAP is a voluntary regime, with limited funding, with no effective leadership, and without any creativity in the working methods (Schmitt 2005a, 3). Despite ECAP’s shortfalls, though, its importance is enormous, since the Member-States, by launching such projects, recognize that the capabilities need to be improved and they show a willingness to deal with them.

The BGC was pronounced on 9 February 2004 at a UK, French, and German summit (King 2005, 99). This concept means that small and quickly deployable military teams will be able to assist the EU in responding rapidly and effectively to military missions (King 2005, 99). In a nutshell, a battle group is “the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations” (European Communities 2006b, 24). Non-EU countries can also participate in battle groups (European Communities 2006b, 24). A battle group must be ready to carry out its objectives within ten days from an EU decision, and be able to sustain its forces for at least 30 days –
with a possible extension to 120 days (European Communities 2006b, 24-5). The first operational battle group was ready in January 2005, while arrangements have been already made with regards to which Member-States will offer battle groups until the end of 2007 (European Communities 2006b, 25).

The development of the BGC is significant for two reasons. First it indicates that the EU is searching continuously for ways to improve its responsiveness in international crises which require military action. Second, it indicates that the EU does not just stay within a philological discourse about the need to increase its capabilities (which will match the high expectations), but it actually proposes and implements innovative ways of increasing its capability status – such as the BGC.

The raised expectations, produced from the recent amount of military and civilian operations conducted from the EU, illustrate that the EU needs to advance its capabilities. The development of the ECAP and the BGC demonstrate that the EU is working towards increasing these military capabilities. Thus, it seems that the European leaders are constantly taking more steps towards the path of making the EU a more ‘robust’ international military actor. This is so, for three reasons. First, it will be very difficult for the EU, in the future, to put limitations to its military presence around the globe once it has established it. Second, having invested in developing plans and mechanisms, in human capital, and in collective ESDP projects, the Member-States have created high sunk costs, which prevent them from taking
back what they already decided. Third, the ESDP is not just a project within the EU. It is not just a policy. It is one of the most important developments in the EU since its inception. It is unrealistic to argue that the ESDP is a process which can be reversed easily or that the Member-States are willing to accept the consequences of such an action. In other words, as Shepherd successfully puts it, “this project [the ESDP] is almost too important for the EU to allow to fail” (Shepherd 2003, 60).

5. LIMITATIONS OF A HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS OF THE ESDP
The previous chapters of the analysis have emphasized the useful insights of the theory of HI for the examination of the ESDP. Nonetheless, HI is not a theory without weaknesses or limitations, nor is its application to the ESDP. In fact, two weaknesses of HI have been identified here. These are explained right after a short general criticism of the theory of HI, which is useful for the following analysis of this chapter.

HI is a theory that might be very helpful in explaining stability and path-dependent policies, but it is ill-equipped in explaining change in these very same policies (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1288). Historical institutionalists have not been quick in identifying “the general processes involved in institutional creation and change” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 955). Perhaps the principal weakness of HI is that it focuses on “structural variables” which “limits the possibilities for a theoretical explanation of change” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1277). This causes the incapacity, of historical institutionalists, to explain why policy change occurs or under what conditions
it will occur, and an inability to see “the political conflict...within what at the surface might appear to be stable, path-dependent time periods” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1277). Historical institutionalists argue that a policy will stay stable for an undetermined period until it moves away from this path and a new period of stability is feasible (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1289). What cannot be identified, though, is exactly how can somebody anticipate when will a persistent policy switch to another path, and therefore, to a new equilibrium (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1289).

In addition, a concept of HI which struggles the most to explain change is path dependency. Raadschelders makes a quite straightforward criticism to the concept's inability to explain change: “the concept does not come even close to pinpointing a mechanism or the mechanisms that propel social change” (quoted in Kay 2005, 561).

The above shortcomings of the theory of HI also constitute its first weakness of its application to the ESDP. In particular, historical institutionalists are unable to explain what made possible the shift to developing a defence and security policy within the EU. It is true that the idea of defence and security, as mentioned in chapter three, was always present within the EU. However, this is not enough if we are going to understand how is it that the European leaders took decisions which made possible the switch from an EU strong in the international economy, in the World Trade Organization, in foreign aid, and in the developing countries but weak in military terms, to an EU powerful in all fronts - including military and defence capabilities. As Peters, Pierre,
and King stress, HI is useful in “describing persistence once a program or policy is initiated, but it is less capable of explaining the initial adoption of the program” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1282-3). This is also the case with the ESDP. Why did ESDP took off? What were the reasons which led to the adoption of the ESDP?

At the moment, the only response of historical institutionalists to these questions is that historical development will be interrupted by moments of considerable institutional transformation, which will eventually move the policy onto a new path (Hall and Taylor 1996, 942). The events leading towards this institutional transformation, though, or how the new path will take place, are issues which historical institutionalists leave – at best – vague. In fact, it is not an easy task to explain policy change if someone wears ‘historical institutionalist sunglasses’. This is because “if institutions are rigid then the need for an account of change is excised” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1297). If historical institutionalists incorporated in their analysis the role of exogenous factors stimulating policy change (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1297), then, they would be more well-equipped to explain why does a policy take a specific path, or why did it actually start – for example, they would be able to accommodate the role of the Kosovo crisis in launching an official EU defence identity at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 (Collester 2000, 383).
The second weakness refers to the inability of HI to explain the complexity of the relationship, in defence and military issues, between the EU, NATO, and the US. If we accept that the EU has entered the path of becoming a significant military international actor, which is likely to persist with the establishment of the ESDP structure, the role of the EDA, the mergers in the defence sector (EADS), and the continuous military operations, then, what can be said about the role of the US and NATO in such a development? It is not very wise to argue that the US will warmly welcome an EU capable of comparison with the US’s defence and military capabilities. Although the US desires a more contributing EU, they also declare their hegemonic intentions “denying Europeans any stronger voice in security affairs” (Peters 2004, 382). These hegemonic intentions appeared at the conflict in Yugoslavia in 1999, where the feeling of distrust from Russia and China for NATO’s (and mostly the US’s) strategies and plans became stronger (Wyllie 2004, 29). The Iraq War in 2003 confirmed that the US will proceed with its plans with or without NATO (Peters 2004, 382).

Thus, it is obvious that the NATO and the US decisions are putting a constraint on the path which the EU has taken in becoming a sizeable military and defence actor in the international system. This US hostility to a more capable EU became apparent when the EU military operation ‘Artemis’, to the DRC, did not make use of the Berlin-Plus arrangements (Whitman 2004, 445). The US reception was “less-than-favourable” (Whitman 2004, 445).
These constraints cannot be explained by historical institutionalists, nor can they explain what will the eventual triptych relationship between the EU, US, and NATO will look like. If we are going to accept that the EU has indeed entered a path which is extremely difficult to reverse, it is pivotal to know what this path is made of. It seems that applying HI to the ESDP needs to be completed by a thorough analysis of where the US and NATO interests lie in the ESDP project. If the role of these interests is not addressed, then, historical institutionalists will always be missing many parts of the ESDP puzzle.

To conclude this chapter, it must be mentioned that the two weaknesses identified, here, do not overrule the value of a historical institutionalist analysis of the ESDP, but they do correspond to a hole in the ESDP puzzle. In the end, the process of using a theory to examine policy development will not stop here. The value of an academic work is exactly its ability to contribute a step more (even a small one) to what has (or hasn’t) been said or argued before. The value of applying HI to the ESDP is that it reveals that the EU has started a procedure or a process or a project, which will become extremely difficult to overturn in the future - due to a ‘sticky’ policy structure (PSC, EUMC, EUMS), unintended consequences (the military operations raised the military expectations of the EU), and the lock-in of defence integration through the EDA.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation argued that the decision to launch the ESDP locked the EU in increasing its defence and military capabilities, and thus, becoming a sizeable military international actor. The creation of the ESDP structure, the establishment of a European defence agency, and the continuous involvement of the EU in military and civilian operations (which impel increased capabilities) have become important obstacles in reversing the ESDP project. Consequently, the EU is ‘walking’ on a path of military and defence integration which is not easy to reverse. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the EU has already developed enough its defence and military capabilities in order to be considered today as a robust military actor. It does imply, though, that the EU is on the process of achieving this, and that to reverse this process seems very unlikely. Moreover, it was stressed that although the ESDP project is only a few years old, ideas of military and defence integration have been present in the EU even before its inception. In fact, these ideas facilitated the way towards the creation of the ESDP, but the establishment of a security and defence policy in the EU ensured that the EU will proceed towards military and defence integration.

Despite the benefits of using HI in analysing the ESDP, this dissertation also stated that there are limitations to a historical institutionalist analysis of the ESDP. In particular, the inability of historical institutionalists to explain policy change leads one to wonder how change can occur, how can a policy switch to a different path, and what conditions are required for such a policy change
Moreover, HI is not capable of uncovering the complexity inherent in the ESDP with regards to the interests of NATO and the US.

As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the EU seems to be transforming from a military dwarf to a military giant in the international system. In many ways this transformation is not complete. The important fact, though, remains that the ESDP is developing rapidly and this is not likely to stop any time in the near future. The most important contribution of this dissertation, and of a historical institutionalist analysis of the ESDP, is not that defence and military integration within the EU will proceed without doubt, but that the EU has entered a specific path which will be enormously hard to overturn.
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