Contents

Protecting Democracy From Terrorism: Lesser Evil and Beyond
Asta Maskalunaite ......................................................... 5

Rebuilding Afghanistan – Is That Post-Conflict Reconstruction?
Gintautas Zenkevicius .................................................... 28

The ‘Cultural Awareness’ Factor in the Activities of
the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan
Egidunas Racius ....................................................... 57

Kosovo: A Gordian Knot
Mark Winther ............................................................ 79

Opportunities and Limitations for the Baltic States of the EU-
Russia Strategic Partnership
Kristian L. Nielsen ................................................... 109

Relations of Russia and Georgia: Developments and Future
Prospects
Ivars Indans ............................................................ 131

Russia’s Information Policy in Lithuania:
The Spread of Soft Power or Information Geopolitics?
Nerijus Maliukevičius ................................................. 150

The Demilitarization of Kaliningrad: A ‘Sisyphean Task’?
Matthieu Chillaud, Frank Tetart ................................... 171

Strategic culture in Latvia: Seeking, Defining and Developing
Airis Rikvalis .......................................................... 187

Business Concepts for the Security Sector: Benchmarking, Core
Competencies and Outsourcing
Kevin D. Stringer ..................................................... 210
How to Win a Counterinsurgency War? The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US Escalating Stalemate in the Vietnam War
Kadri Kukk

236

Book Review:
Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO. The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War
Anthony Lawrence

261

Book Review:
Eric A. Sibul

267

Defence Policies’ 06 in Brief
Estonia

273
Latvia

279
Lithuania

286
Prognostications into the world’s future sometimes are correct, but more often than not they end up wrong. Probably few have been more wrong in writing about this issue than Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 1989). Even though one can interpret his writings in different ways, taking into account what already appeared from the developments in the end of the 20th and especially the beginning of 21st century, it can be said that history is far from over. While the conflict of ideologies characterizing the world politics since the French revolution in 1789 might have given way to the triumph of the market economy and liberal democracy, the years following the great changes of 1989 showed that there are now different enemies for the liberal democracies. History, as it often did before, put some new actors on the stage and introduced some new twists to the screenplay.

The fall of twin towers in September 2001 was exactly such a twist. The atrocities committed by a small group of determined men, prepared to sacrifice their lives to produce carnage as great as possible, left millions appalled, scared and terrified. Most of the countries offered their unconditional support and condolences for the deeply wounded US, including the ones that could hardly be accused of having deep sympathies for the victim, such as Iran and Cuba. At the same time, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which had never been used even in the worst periods of the Cold War. Everyone seemed to be prepared for an unleashing of the righteous wrath: when the “principal values” and the “way of life” are under attack, no response is too harsh.

Or so it seemed at least at the moment. It took some time for the civil and human rights organizations to recover their voice and to raise concerns about where the newly announced “war on terror” was heading. Numerous events, situations that surfaced in the years following the

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September 11th attacks – Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and secret CIA flights being probably the most notorious – were alarming and especially so, if we consider the nature of the current war and what it means to win or lose in this fight.

In this article, I will explore some aspects of this question: how are we protecting our democracies from terrorism and does it work? As “war on terror” is often said to be waged in order to protect our democracies, I will start my analysis by asking what the nature of the democracy we want to protect is. I will then move on to the question of dilemmas of values in the democratic states. While the democratic states are there to protect certain sets of values, some of those values are contradictory – liberty and equality, security and freedoms, etc. Balancing between them entails some risks. Therefore, in times of great danger, some of the liberties that the citizens enjoy in “normal times” are curbed. This process itself depends on the evaluation of the threat, because it is the scope of the threat that will determine how much security will come first and how much freedoms will be forgotten. Hence, we have to ask how this threat is evaluated and how this evaluation leads to the framing of the situation in terms of “politics of necessity”, with no other alternatives for actions available or even thinkable. The last questions to be analyzed will then be: are the actions undertaken as necessary as they are presented? Do the harsh measures adopted really work?

The following investigation into democracies’ reaction to the threat of terrorism has its roots in the attempt to view the current “war on terror” through the prism of historical cases of democracies in fight against terrorism. Many of the ideas presented here, however, were inspired by a critical reading of Michael Ignatieff’s (2004) Lesser Evil, which provided an essential starting point for this essay and to which I am greatly indebted.

Naturally, the limited scope of this article does not allow going into serious philosophical discussions about the essence of democratic state and a deep debate of the measures adopted in its defence. Therefore, my examination of the nature of democratic state and its values is necessarily limited. At the same time I will not go into the discussions on the essence of terrorism – these issues were amply addressed elsewhere (e.g Maskaliunaite, 2002).
1. Protecting what? The nature of a democratic state

If we want to understand this entity we want to protect from the threat of terrorism, we need to consider the nature of the democratic state. The concept of democracy, as many other terms in political sphere is laden with different meanings, understandings and sometimes conflicting senses. Etymologically, democracy means the rule by the people (in Greek: *dēmos* - the people and *kratos* - to rule), but for example, for Aristotle, democracy was a corrupt form of such rule, threatening the social order and in particular, not respecting the rights of property. In the Ancient Athens, where democracy was first introduced, it meant the direct rule by the citizens who would gather from time to time to discuss the important issues of the city and to legislate. All the offices needed on daily basis were filled by randomly chosen representatives who took turns frequently. At the same time, the participation in this form of governing was extremely restricted – slaves, who constituted a majority of the population, could not participate in the governing process; neither could women or the people who were not born in Athens. The system of government itself was largely ineffective, doomed to failure (Hague et al, 1988, p. 21).

No matter how bad was the quality of democracy in Athens, it should be paid due respect for establishing the principle itself. Today few elements of the Athenian democracy remain in place – referendums and plebiscites with which the democratic countries consult their citizens on the matters of extreme importance or controversy. However, these elements of direct democracy are minor compared with the times of Ancient Greece. In addition, in some cases the meaning of the term itself was so distorted that nothing was left not only from the legacy of Athens, but also from the rule of demos. The best examples of this distortion are probably the Communist “people's democracies” where nominal “rule by the people” was in fact a “rule of a party.”

Hence, “democracy” as such became a “floating signifier” (Laclau, Mouffe, 1989), which gains its meaning only in connection with some other element in the discourse. And when we are talking about democracies in the contemporary West, we are, first of all, talking about a type of democracy which is characterized by an adjective “representative”, i.e. a system based on citizens electing their
representatives and also ensuring the equality between the citizens themselves with the “one person – one vote” principle. However, this element, describing mainly the technical aspect of democratic rule and concentrating on the process of elections (democracy here equals to the presence of “free and fair” elections) is hardly the only one. Western democracies, at least in theory, are also characterized by an adjective “liberal” or “constitutional,” i.e. they do not only hold “free and fair” elections at the established periods, but also, during all the time, are committed to guarantee its citizens their individual and collective rights. In such a way, democracy becomes not only the technical method of electing the elites as some elitists would have it, but a system of government which is based on a set of values that are deemed important by large parts of the societies. Ignatieff calls this a “moral view” of democracy, which means that democracy is “something more than majority rule disciplined by checks and balances. It is also an order of rights that puts limits to the power of the community over individuals” (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 5).

The development of democracy in the Western world is closely related to the rise of the modern state as such. During Renaissance, the medieval idea of the state as a fiefdom of the ruler was gradually changed into its understanding as a separate entity independent from the King and which possesses the ultimate authority in all the matters of civil government (Skinner, 1989, p. 90). In addition, contrary to the medieval times when the system of rights and obligations was much more complex, when the system of loyalties was much more diffuse, the modern state that started forming itself in the Renaissance Europe claimed the monopoly of legitimate violence and demanded all the allegiance from its subjects. The state was gradually transforming from the personified charismatic entity embodied in the figure of the King to an impersonal Leviathan that existed for the mutual benefit of its entire people (Skinner, 1989).

However, the concentration of coercive power in one central authority brought out the need to check its power. This check was achieved in different ways in different countries: in England, the civil wars and the pressure from aristocracy resulted in the constitutional monarchy with the habeas corpus at its base; in the United States, the system of checks and balances adopted in the Constitution was meant to protect the citizens from the abuse of power; in France, the absolutist monarchy developed
and was later checked with the Declaration of Rights of Man and of Citizen, etc.

With the advent of the French Revolution and especially with the developments of 200 years after it, the protection of citizens from the arbitrary use of the state power has become one of the paramount elements of the modern democracies. If the possibility to legitimately use violence is concentrated in one set of hands, it is necessary to ensure that those hands employ the violence only in the ways that protect the wellbeing and values that are important for the citizens, not against them.

Therefore, the democratic states cannot be characterized only by the presence of elections, but must also possess such important elements as the rule of law, protection of rights of the minorities (be they political, racial, national, or any other), and protection of human rights in general. Without these elements democracy is only nominal, crippled, a pseudo-democracy. Of course, it would be impossible to claim that any of the existing states complies to the fullest with the ideal of a democratic state; however, what probably distinguishes these states is exactly that these elements are viewed as values and strengths while deviations from them are seen as harmful exceptions.

2. Value dilemmas. Security vs. liberty

If we agree on such a “moral” view of democracy, we should ask, what are the values here that the state is supposed to protect? First of all, obviously, is the right to life.1 Hobbes, one of the first philosophers to deeply consider the reasons for the people to be loyal to a state, explained the relation between them as a social contract where each person has to sacrifice some of the freedoms she/he enjoys in the state of nature for the guarantees that her/his life will be protected (Hobbes, 2002 [1651]). Of course, the state that Hobbes talked about was not exactly the democratic state as we know it today. Thus, it could be said that any state has as its task to protect lives of its own citizens and to provide them with security which would allow them to engage in the “pursuit of happiness” the way they see fit though always within the limits set by the state.
When Hobbes was writing, England just ended a series of bloody civil wars. As Van Creveld rightly emphasizes: “During a period of intense religious and civil conflict, its [state’s] overriding purpose was to guarantee life and property by imposing law and order; anything else – such as gaining the consent of the citizens and securing their rights – was considered secondary and had to wait until peace could be restored” (Van Creveld, 1999, p. 189).

Since the times of Hobbes, however, security became only one of the values that a democratic state was committed to protect. There were others added to that: the popular sovereignty, meaning that authority of the rulers emanated from the ruled and was not imposed by some divine sanctions upon the rest of the people; political equality – the principle of “one citizen, one vote”; the control of majority and the protection of minorities (Hague et al. 1998, p.22) and the whole set of civil rights and individual freedoms. Over the last half a century these rights and freedoms were expanded in the legal system, introduced into the international law and some of them given clearly expressed non-derogatory meaning. Such conventions as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (December 10, 1984) both limit the powers of state sovereignty and expose the values by which democratic states and societies are evaluated in the world. They sets the standards for democratic rule, they embody the value component of the notion of democracy.

Yet, as we have seen from the quote of Van Creveld – in the situations of conflict, strife and the imminent external attacks, one of the values – security usually gains an increased prominence at the expense of the civil rights. This situation is usually called security-liberty dilemma.

With the threat of terrorism hanging like a sword of Damocles over the heads of most of the democratic societies after September 11th attacks in the US, March 11th bombings in Spain, July 7th attacks in UK, the security-liberty dilemma appeared on the agenda clearer than ever before. One of the first reactions to the September 11th attacks was a claim that the country has been too open and created too many opportunities for immigration for all who wanted. It had, in short, too many freedoms and too many enemies to afford that.
Such rhetoric is easily expected from a strongly hit country. The spectacular nature of the attacks combined with the possibility to view all the events “from close” on the TV screens, made it so real that one could easily say one participated in them. No matter how grounded or not fear for one’s life is in such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand why people of the US, the UK and other countries have easily given their support to all kinds of restrictions of the liberties that their co-citizens and visitors enjoyed. When security is at stake, freedoms can well wait.

Another reason why security easily wins over the freedoms is also that the costs and benefits of the two are not distributed evenly between the minority and the majority. As Ignatieff writes: “An enduring weakness of democracy is that citizens as a whole do not feel the impact of the civil liberties infringements imposed on vulnerable minorities. Democratic citizens do not actually have to balance their liberty against their security, but their security against the liberty of others, usually noncitizens” (Ignatieff, 1998, p. 22).

The utilitarian ethics helps to justify such a balance: if the rights of a limited number of individuals are violated in order to save millions from a terrible fate, there is no reason not to violate them. These violations, however, as the entire idea that more security has to be created by more limitations imposed on at least certain individuals (if not all – think of the new regulations of the EU airports) rests on two assumptions which have to be seriously examined: that these measures are necessary, that they have no alternative and secondly, that they, in fact, bring us closer to the victory in the “war on terror.”

3. Politics of necessity

Curbing of the freedoms and the entire balance between freedoms and security depends on the evaluation of the threat. Sometimes, the threat is obvious – in war, for example, the survival of a political community itself can be at stake. If any value is given to the political community, it is necessary to protect it with all the means available. At other times, the threat is not so obvious. Or, to put it more concretely, the threat is obvious, but what exactly it threatens and how great it might be is not. And as it is not clear how great is the threat and what it implies, it is difficult to evaluate also the measures implemented to address it and the
balance between security and freedoms as such. This, I would say, is the case of a terrorist emergency.

In his theory of Just War Michael Walzer analyzes at length when the situation should be considered demanding some extreme measures (such as war, violation of rights of neutrality, etc.) (Walzer, 1992). Of course, his theory is more related to the situation of war, but some aspects of it can well be applied in the case of discussion of terrorist challenge. One of these is the understanding of “supreme emergency,” a term used already by Winston Churchill, but which is expanded and given a more concrete understanding in the writings of Walzer. Supreme emergency is understood here as “... fear beyond ordinary fearfulness (and frantic opportunism) of war, and a danger to which that fear corresponds.” And being such “this fear and danger may well require exactly those measures that the war convention bars” (Ibid, p. 251).

Having in mind that a supreme emergency allows overlooking some of the basic conventions of war or, as in the case of the terrorist challenge to a democratic state, setting aside some of the basic democratic values, one has to be very careful when using this argument. Walzer himself determines two conditions for the supreme emergency argument to be valid: the danger has to be imminent and serious. If both of these apply, like in the case of the threat posed by Nazism after the fall of France, they “bring us under the rule of necessity (and necessity knows no rules)” (Ibid, p. 254).

The problem is, though, that it is not easy to determine the seriousness of a threat and this evaluation is inevitably subjective. This is definitely the case with the threat of terrorism. As there is no objective data, which would suggest us how great is the threat of terrorism, the level of alert will always be to a significant extent a matter of interpretation and so would be the perceived need for extraordinary measures. And in making the interpretation there are different mechanisms at work: some of these mechanisms have to do with the nature of the democratic rule as such, i.e. with the electoral terms and a well-recorded dynamics of the electoral periods; others have to do with the general psychology: e.g. actions taken after the large cataclysms that are directed towards reassurance of the public but do not have significant impact in, say, the deterrence of the future attacks.
Democratic politicians think in terms of the responsibility to the public, but also in the electoral terms, as the elections are always looming in the horizon to a greater (in the end of the term) or a lesser (in the beginning) extent. As terrorism challenge is one of the most visible front-page threats, the need to reassure the public and to create a feeling of security is paramount. The result of this thinking is that sometimes decisions taken are somewhat myopic, targeting only the short-term problems and not thinking about the longer term impacts. Some measures may have a short-term deterring effect on the terrorist groups, but would increase the number of recruits for the terrorist organization in the longer run; would prevent some attacks now, but would lead to more later. For example, the measures to curb the emerging Provisional IRA in the Northern Ireland during the 1970s, such as home searching for weapons and the internment without trial resulted almost immediately in the exponential growth of recruits for the Republican paramilitaries. As Bishop and Mallie write, it was not so much the deep ideological convictions but “an experience or series of experiences at the hands of the Army, the police or the Protestants” that led many to join the PIRA in order to protect themselves and “to get back at the state” (Bishop, Mallie, 1987).

This is not to say that the politicians in the democratic country do not truly believe that there is a situation of emergence which has to be dealt accordingly. Talking about the aforementioned example of Great Britain and its reaction to PIRA threat, even the European Court of Human Rights ruled in one case that an emergency situation in the country existed. The Court defined emergency here as “an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole nation and constitutes a threat to the organized life of the community of which the State is composed” (Bonner, 2000, p. 55). This, however, was only stated later, when the Republican militants got so strong that they could move the campaign for secession into the main island. It could be thus said that the measures adopted to fight IRA had only a limited impact on reduction of terrorist violence and in fact led to situation of emergence in the entire country.

The threat also tends to be exaggerated after some critical events. For example, after the September 11th attacks, the panic and the necessity of doing everything to prevent a further attack was comprehensible and still is, in retrospect. The measures adopted, though, were often inefficient
and also damaging to the quality of democracy. In this respect, Ignatieff makes a comparison between the reaction to September 11th and the Red Scare. In the later case, the events in Russia, Germany, and the general strikes in the US itself, the lack of clear criteria for evaluating the threat understandably resulted in the extreme and inefficient measures. Looking at the events from the time-perspective, it is easy to say that the threat was much smaller than it was perceived and the reaction was truly inadequate (Ignatieff, 2004a, p.57). However, nearly a century after this lesson was learned, another situation – September 11th attacks – created a very similar reaction. Again, thousands of people were detained without any evidence of their involvement in anything illegal; again there was an action on basis of suspicion and nationality alone. In this respect, Ignatieff writes: “If the Palmer Raids proved that indiscriminate roundups of aliens are unlikely to reduce a terrorist threat, then this lesson ought to have been applied to the roundups after September 11, which predictably yielded the same result” (Ibid, p. 58).

Yet, the lessons are easily forgotten and the rhetoric of emergency demands the same measures to be applied again and again. This is done not so much out of concern of what they will bring in the future or how efficient they are at the moment, but from the desire and need to show the terrified public that something is being done. Thus, faced with terrorist threat, most countries took “measures in haste that they repented at leisure” (Ibid, p. 57). The necessity to “do something” reigned supreme in these situations and led to many errors that have to be corrected afterwards.

Finally, the politicians of democratic countries will most often try to play on the “safe side,” i.e. prefer to exaggerate the threat trying to avoid the possibility that they would over-minimize it (Ignatieff, 2004a, pp.58-59). Ironically, this rational calculation is exactly the calculation that many terrorist organizations have in mind when they launch the attacks.

Since the 19th century, no terrorists truly believed that they can destroy the state and a political order by themselves. For the Russian Narodnaya Volya, its actions, which included killing of tsar Alexander II, were aimed at awakening the people for a great revolt against the regime. For one of the most prominent strategists of the “urban guerrilla” tactics – Carlos Marighela – the aim of this tactics was to create an endless war of
attrition, where the state’s reaction would fall blindly in different
directions and at the same time create a feeling in the population that the
“government is unjust, incapable of solving problems and that it resorts
simply to the physical elimination of its opponents” (Marighela, 1969).
However, this “urban guerrilla” strategy is only the initial phase of the
fight, the others, the “true” guerrillas, would then wage a proper war
against this government and destroy the regime completely.

The “spiral of violence” strategies were important for other terrorist
organizations as well. For example, the Basque ETA based its fight on
“action-reaction-action” scheme. The essence of it was to provoke by
some separate actions a disproportionate reaction of the government,
which would fall not only on the organization itself, but also on the entire
Basque population. Or, better said, would fall much less on the
organization itself than on the population, which is a much easier target
than a clandestine group. This unrestrained reaction would provoke the
revulsion in the society, leading to more recruits and more support for
the organization, leading to more action and consequently more
unmeasured reaction and finally resulting in a popular revolt, which
would lead the Basque nation straight to the independence.

All these examples show well how important is the state’s reaction for the
terrorist tactics to work. As Ignatieff emphasizes, “... the historical
record shows that while no democracy has ever been brought down by
terror, all democracies have been damaged by it, chiefly by their own
overreactions” (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 80). Such situations thus result in the
ultimate paradox of the response of democracies to the threat of
terrorism: it is not the terrorism itself, but the reaction to that threat that
can destroy the democratic states.

But let us go back to the discussion of necessity and emergence. The
critics of treatment of terrorism as supreme emergency often remind that
there are more people dying, for example, in the car accidents each year
than there are casualties of the terrorist attacks. A crisis situation created
by a natural disaster may often be much more damaging and destructive
than that of a terrorist attack. The necessity to fight against terrorism with
all the harshest measures is thus not absolutely obvious.
However, it is important to remember the differences between ordinary crises and terrorism. Terrorism, as Loren Lomasky writes, is important “because of what it represents and not just because of what it brings about” (Lomasky, 1991, p. 97). Furthermore, it is a “rejection of politics that would limit the domain of authorized violence” (Ibid, p. 99). As violence itself is “deplorable whatever its provenance ... that is precisely reason to be concerned to limit the number and variety of the sources from which it emanates” (Ibid, p. 100) In addition, Hermant and Bigo are emphasizing that “what is at stake is in fact more of a symbolic order, of the political emotion, than of the rationality and instrumentality of the public politics” (Hermant, Bigo, 2000, p. 78). Thus, as the terrorists attack the fundamental principles of any state (as the only source of legitimate violence) strong reaction is very understandable. It seems then that there is no other way of coping with terrorists than the “inflammatory rhetoric” and the most serious police and military measures.

Thinking about the possible impacts of new terrorist attacks, it becomes clear that we have to take terrorist threat seriously. And we have to do that not so much because of the devastation that the terrorists themselves can cause, but because of the reactions of the democratic states and their citizens. Ignatieff writes in this respect: “A succession of large-scale attacks would pull at the already-fragile tissue of trust that binds us to our leadership and destroy the trust we have in one another. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves, in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous alert, with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny over the cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection. ... That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves” (Ignatieff, 2004b).

The picture that Ignatieff paints looks gloomy enough to take the threat of terrorism seriously. But it also shows that we have to be careful and try to avoid excesses in this fight. Otherwise, we “would survive but would no longer recognize ourselves” (Ignatieff, 2004b). In this respect we could agree that surely terrorist threat is a significant one. Whether it has
the same significance in all the countries is a different issue. Here again the subjective interpretation of the terrorist threat looms large in the picture.

Think of the attacks of March 11th in Madrid. Contrary to the very widespread myth created right after the elections of March 14th, 2004, in the country and promoted all over the world by the supporters of the Popular Party government, what the reaction to these attacks showed is exactly that the governments should not try to manipulate the reaction of people to the terrorist incidents, because such a manipulation can easily turn against them. The reaction to Madrid bombings brought millions of people to the streets in silent protests. They were also followed by an investigation into the events by the appropriate authorities, staying within the limits of the rule of law. No round-ups of the “aliens” were needed here and no serious excesses actually took place. Of course, Spain has its own issues with the protection of human rights in case of terrorist suspects and the country is often denounced by international organizations, such as Amnesty International, for not keeping up with the standards. However, the reaction of the public and the authorities to the events in Madrid was very moderate.

The difference between the reaction of the US and Spain is significant. Of course, Spain is more used to dealing with the internal terrorist incidents than is the US, for which it was one of the very few attacks on its own soil. This explains, to a certain extent, the differences and also points out that the reaction to terrorist incidents does not necessarily have to be panic. And if we control panic as a reaction to these incidents and consequently control the demands for the strong hand in dealing with the situation, we could well say that, in fact, terrorism threatens democracies less than it is meant to. Politics of necessity can thus hardly be a justification here. Again, I should emphasize, this is not meant to say that there is no threat in terrorism. This is only to say that the threat it poses can only very rarely be seen as that implied in the notion of supreme emergency.

4. Lesser evil and romanticism of dirty hands

I understand that there can be disagreements about the level of threat that terrorism poses. I realize that in an extreme case, which I did not
mention so far - that of the terrorists using WMD for their attacks - the physical impact of the terrorist attack would be tremendous. I am conscious that such a possibility should always be kept in mind and evaluated. I am not suggesting that the threat of terrorism is a pure invention. The discussion of the previous section, however, showed which mechanisms are at work in evaluating this threat and that the determination of its true scope is not so simple. But even if we agreed that the threat is great and it demands all the necessary measures to deal with it, the question remains about what kind of measures should those be and, if these are radical measures, derogating the essential principles of democracy, are those measures actually bringing us closer to victory in the “war on terror.”

In his Lesser Evil, Ignatieff criticizes many instruments used by the US government to tackle the terrorist threat, and rejects the idea that anything goes in the fight against terrorism. At the same time, he criticizes what he calls “moral perfectionism,” i.e. the idea that a democratic state should never engage in actions that have an immoral character, should never deviate from its commitments to the “universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war” (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 20) His approach put in the middle of these two different views of how the “war on terror” should go “maintains that necessity may require us to take actions in defence of democracy which will stray from democracy’s own fundamental commitments to dignity” (Ibid, p. 8) This position implies that: “in a terrorist emergency, neither rights nor necessity should trump” (Ibid) Therefore, in some extreme cases, like the war on terror “either we fight evil with evil, or we succumb” (Ibid, p. 19) In those extreme situations “to defeat evil we may have to traffic in evils: indefinite detention of suspects, coercive interrogations, targeted assassinations, even pre-emptive war” (Ignatieff, 2004b)

Talking about Ignatieff’s position, a critic, professor Irfan Khawaja, seems to be right - Ignatieff does succumb to a certain romanticism of dirty hands (Khawaja, 2004). Like Walzer before him, inspired by Sartre, argues that “a particular act of government (in a political party or in the state) may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong” (Walzer, 1974, p. 63),
so according to Ignatieff, some rather appalling measures might be needed in order to save democracies.

Such existentialist romanticizing of actions against terrorism can find its place in the thinking of philosophers, researchers and politicians themselves. For example, this thinking is one of the explanations for launching a “dirty war” against Basque separatist ETA in mid-1980s. This “dirty war” claimed 27 fatalities, some of which were ETA members, others – innocent bystanders. It appeared later that the organization responsible for the attacks, the GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación – Antiterrorist Liberation Groups), was financed and organized by some governmental officials. The minister of Interior at the time was sentenced for organizing GAL, and there were suspicions that the prime minister himself might have been implicated, though this was never proved. Explaining GAL, Paddy Woodworth uses words of Javier Pradera arguing that: “… the young PSOE leadership was deeply influenced by ‘Leftist’ ideas. He cites especially Jean-Paul Sartre’s insistence, in Les Mains Sales, that only naive idealists imagine they can exercise political power without getting their hands dirty” (Woodworth, 2002, p. 409).

While Khawaja is right in pointing out a possible influence of Walzer on Ignatieff, his further criticism, it must be said, does not have much value. It completely mixes up the morality of means and that of the ends with its principal argument that “what is genuinely ‘necessary’ to preserving rights is not a necessary or lesser evil; it’s not an evil at all.” In addition, the author claims, it is “profoundly demoralizing to a population at war” because “it’s not clear that anyone can sustain a long-term commitment to policies and principles avowed as ‘evil’ or to do so in a consistent and clear-headed way” (Khawaja, 2004) This, I would argue, is a completely Machiavellian argument. It is dressed in the rhetoric of “good” and “evil,” which is a mark of ethics, but these robes only conceal the reality that these are the political reasons of expedience, not the moral reasons of right and wrong. In some circumstances we could possibly be convinced that the tactics employed in a dirty war are necessary and useful, but that killing, maiming or torturing human beings can be anything more than a lesser evil cannot be assumed by any ethical system on which democratic governments are based. This argument is the same as to say “in order to protect democracies, anything goes” which leaves a question
what would be left of the democracies if anything goes in their protection. And this question invites a very gloomy answer.

Problems with Ignatieff’s approach are different. Firstly, it assumes too easily that the measures described above in fact work in bringing democracies closer to victory in the fight against terrorism; that they do in fact make us safer and our political systems more protected. The problem with it is also that it is not clear what kind of acts does he actually justify: “acceptable degrees of coercive interrogation” but not torture, secrecy but not too much of it, indefinite detention but with legal guarantees, targeted killing but not an unlawful assassination (Ignatieff, 2004b)? The author himself admits that it is extremely difficult not to fall into the greater evils from the lesser ones. The second, related problem is the same as he accuses “moral perfectionists” (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 20) – he often contradicts himself talking about some policies as “lesser evils” and at the same time arguing that they should be abandoned.

While Ignatieff often just talks about the general perceived necessity to use some techniques that go against the conceptions of how democracy should work, he explicitly points out four techniques which might be considered as lesser evils: indefinite detention, coercive interrogation, targeted killings and pre-emptive war. Let us talk about each of them.

Ignatieff mentions indefinite detention as one of the “lesser evil” methods to deal with the terrorist threat. However, elsewhere he himself argues that this strategy does no good and the democratic states should rather deal with the issue in a different way. As he writes: “Release upon detention, though, does not preclude surveillance upon release. ... we would be better advised to let a few bad characters go than continue to run a global network of detention facilities that, right now, are an open invitation to abuse” (Ignatieff, 2004b).

With this we could say that the case for the indefinite detention is closed. Next is the coercive interrogation. Ignatieff himself admits that it is difficult to realize where and when the coercive interrogation would slip into torture. Obviously, any interrogation is by definition coercive in a sense: any interrogation puts a person where she/ he would rather not be, any interrogation can be said to use a psychological pressure which is never pleasant for a person involved. The question is whether in the case
of “terrorist emergency” there is a need for some additional coerciveness. Again as with the indefinite detention, Ignatieff himself has a case against torture (Ignatieff, 2006). He still assumes that torture might be used in some cases as that of a “ticking bomb terrorist” but, according to him, this should not change the rule of the total ban on torture. Other scholars go further in the discussions of the torture issue showing clearly that it does not work and that the instances of “ticking bomb” are so rare that they should be definitely dismissed as the norm-forming cases (Bellamy, 2006). In addition, as Ignatieff himself notices and the historical examples show: “[if] you want to create terrorists, torture is a pretty sure way to do so” (Ignatieff, 2006).

The idea of “targeted killings” is now pushing itself through to our understandings of how the “war on terror will” and should be waged. There are however major problems with this type of action. Contrary to the other two discussed above, Ignatieff does not ponder much on this issue. It is thus difficult to say whether he accepts it as something absolutely necessary in the war on terror.

The problem with the targeted killings, though, is the same as with torture. While it is much vaunted in certain circles as one of the best ways to stop the terrorist attacks, there is little evidence to support their efficiency. Recently targeted killings became popular in the Israeli dealings with the Palestinian terrorists and with this raised their popularity. However, the historical examples show that such methods do not work and are actually counterproductive. For example, the aforementioned case of Spanish GAL can be seen as similar to the “targeted killings.” In this case too there was an attempt to eliminate the important members of ETA and to eliminate the sense of security that they enjoyed in the French Basque Country. However, the tactics backfired to such an extent that, according to some researchers, GAL is the main reason why ETA survived so long as it did (Reinares, Jimenez). British Army used a similar strategy in dealing with the IRA in Northern Ireland in the same way. Again, the strategy was abandoned because of its inefficiency. Even in Israel, there are voices claiming that such assassinations are not achieving what they are supposed to achieve. The deputy speaker of Knesset noted on one occasion that it “is an ineffective policy. It breeds more hatred and more terrorism instead of eliminating or even reducing it” (Silke, 2006, p. 211).
Having this in mind it is difficult to understand why such immoral and, in addition, inefficient methods should be applied. They might be supported by the population, which wants to see “something serious” done about the threat of terrorists, but they do nothing to advance the victory in the war on terrorism and are therefore not a “lesser evil” but simply wrong.

Finally, there come the pre-emptive wars, which according to the existing international law norms are illegal. Preventive or anticipatory strikes can sometimes be considered legal, but this is not the case of the pre-emptive strike. In addition to being illegal, these strikes are just creating a legal disparity between the states, advancing an idea that the “powerful of the earth” can do as they please and do not need to heed the international norms. Ignatieff here also seems to contradict himself showing pre-emptive strikes as a “lesser evil” and at the same time emphasizing the need to adhere to the international norms and international law.

Besides, as targeted killings, pre-emptive strikes can have the same side-effects of increasing instead of decreasing terrorism. Andrew Silke writes in this respect: “Terrorist groups can endure military strikes, ‘targeted assassinations’ and other harsh measures not because the people and resources lost are not important, but because the violence works to increase the motivation of more members than it decreases, and works to attract more support and sympathy for the group than it frightens away” (Silke, 2005, p. 254).

Having in mind all abovementioned, it is difficult to understand why we should employ the “lesser evil” approach and especially how this “ethics in an age of terror” should be significantly different from the ethics before or after such an age. Most of the states have quite restrictive laws in dealing with terrorism and the threat of terrorism. Most of the countries have laws that regulate states of emergency and other such matters. Even in principal conventions of human rights, such as the European Convention of Human Rights, there are clauses suggesting that states can limit certain rights during certain times, what matters only is that these limitations should not be made permanent. In that sense, the “age of terror” should not be much different from any other age. While there are many cases, and Ignatieff himself discusses quite a few of them, when the states did not manage to conduct the “war on terror” within the framework of the rule of law, there are also some significant examples
when the fight against terrorism was won exactly by such lawful methods. Take the Italian Red Brigades. Their power in the end of the 1970s and the ability to shake the political system can hardly be underestimated. However, the principal methods that worked in dealing with the threat they posed were the legal methods, not significantly different from those used in the cases of criminal investigations. As in any case that involves the state authorities, there can appear a problem of abuse of power. However, that abuse of power has to be curbed and limited, not understated.

Finally, Ignatieff himself mentions that the fights between the states and the terrorists are mainly the “battles of opinion”, or in the old parlance of the counter-insurgency, a struggle for “hearts and minds.” The measures employed thus are not less important than the magnitude of the ideal to be protected. If the states start employing the same methods as the terrorists, in what sense could we say that they are better? In addition, if democratic states start employing all kinds of dubious measures, they set a really bad example for the other states, whose democratic credentials are pretty weak if not non-existent. We can already see that happening in many countries in the world, where the idea of “fighting against terrorism” serves as a good excuse to silence all the opposition, including the peaceful one. For example, as Sonika Gupta writes, “the Chinese have successfully renegotiated the US definition of terrorism to include movements for self-determination” (Gupta, 2002), that way affecting not only the country’s dealing with East Turkestan Islamic Militants but also a largely peaceful Tibetan self-rule movement.

All in all, the illegal and immoral means in the fight against terrorism should be dismissed not only because they are wrong, but also because they just do not work. They do lead to the Pyrrhic victories, which indeed are “worse than useless” (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 20). They allow achieving some short term objectives, but create numerous long-term problems; they do not allow winning “hearts and minds” which should be a necessary part of any fight against insurgency or terrorism; they give a bad example for “bad states” to follow; they do not allow democracies to retain that higher ground they would like to claim. This might be called a moral perfectionism, but this is also a sensible strategy in a war where opinions and perceptions matter much more than any sophisticated means of destroying enemies. Democratic states have existed long
enough to have developed an apparatus of law-and-order agencies that function within the framework of the rule of law and are perfectly capable of “tracking down” and “bringing to justice” the suspected terrorists. They do sometimes abuse their power, but that is also foreseen and there are mechanisms in place to deal with this. As Ignatieff himself mentions, the experience of European countries shows that “improving the command and control of counterterrorist operations is more effective than giving these units more search-and-seizure and arrest powers or further abridging the liberties of citizens” (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 77). Such increased effectiveness, not more restrictions of rights, is what we should seek in the war on terror.

It seems that Ignatieff is too much influenced by the idea that the threat of terrorism comes from the outside of our democratic systems. Therefore, there is a need for the undercover detentions, for the preemptive strikes and targeted assassinations, as the people involved while posing a threat to, say, the United States, are under the jurisdiction of a different country. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Actually, as, for example, July 2005 events in the UK showed, the terrorists are brought up in the countries they attempt to strike or live in those countries for a long enough time. They are, in fact, part of the societies they attempt to strike at. Taken this into account, it becomes questionable whether there is a need for these “dirty hands” techniques in tackling their threat and whether the existing legal and security systems (probably modified somewhat to reflect more the changes in the recent years) are not enough to deal with this issue. As Ignatieff contradicts himself with first claiming that we cannot win without resorting to evil and then not being able to justify any of these “evil” practices, it becomes unclear how the lesser evil approach should be different from that of the moral perfectionists. If “we cannot torture because of who we are” (Ignatieff, 2006) and we cannot do many other things for the same reason, maybe we should still keep the high moral standards and admit that the techniques that go beyond the laws in fight against terror are inefficient and should be abandoned.

Conclusion

The modern state has come a long way not only in establishing its monopoly on violence but also in the protection of the people from that
same violence. If terrorism threatens the former, then the unmeasured reaction to terrorism seriously threatens the latter. The task of the democratic states is not only to physically protect the citizens from any harm, but also to keep at minimum those places beyond the law that are the indications of things going wrong and the democracies not being as ideal as we would wish them to be. Necessity to fight terrorism is obvious, but the methods chosen should be measured, otherwise the fight is lost. That is why it is strange that Ignatieff who pays so much attention to preserve the human rights is still succumbing to the idea that it is necessary to fight evil with even more evil and does not really seriously consider the fact that the measures he thinks are necessary to protect the state and societies are actually not giving anything in terms of strategic benefits but are the short-term victories that might result in long-term tragedies. There is no excuse to use the torture, to create secret flying prisons and to run places like Guantanamo, places beyond any existing laws. There is no excuse because these measures fuel terrorism more than they solve whatever short-term goals their designers come up with. A position like this is based not on the moral perfectionism, to which Ignatieff might want to attribute it, but on the historical learning and the understanding of the nature of the current fight against terrorism, the nature which Ignatieff does not fail to appreciate. It is the fight for hearts and minds and therefore any reaction has to be measured and mistakes are to be avoided.

A position that we should fight evil with evil and that is the only way the democracies can win is unsustainable. The difficulty in the fight against terrorism involves not a “trading in evils” but the need to reject following a momentary instinct of revenge, not to give in to fear and to the temptation to change unrecognizably our political systems. As Ignatieff himself writes, democracies are stronger than they think they are (Ignatieff, 2004a, p. 73) and their strength lies more in the commitment to the values than in any secret “lesser evil” techniques that they could develop.

References:


I should emphasize here that I do not want to enter into the “right to life” vs. “free choice” debate, though the terms used here might be similar; the aim of this article is to discuss different issues.

2 Emphasis author’s.

3 These include the studies of the “political business cycles,” lame-duck effects, etc., concentrating on the behaviour of politicians depending on where in the electoral cycle they find themselves. According to these theories, more radical measures will be taken in the beginning of the term in office and in the end of the term, different measures will be implemented depending on whether the government is leading in the poles or is behind its opponents.

4 It is not a place to discuss in detail the events preceding the Madrid bombings and their immediate aftermath before the elections of 14 March. It is, however, necessary to emphasize certain misconceptions that are often brought forward when mentioning these events, especially, the myth that “terrorists changed the results of election.” Here, as in any case where terrorists have some success, they could not have achieved anything without a “help” from the side of the government. The government of the Popular Party then in power showed itself completely unscrupulous about lying to its citizens on already numerous occasions: Prestige, Yak-42 scandals, occasions of mismanagement if not outright manipulation of the information and public opinion were not yet forgotten. The insistence of the government that it was ETA behind the attacks of March 11th with more and more evidence pointing to the direction of the Islamic militants was probably the last drop in this cup. The government itself, however, basing its entire electoral campaign on the threat of ETA could hardly change its line in the course of a couple of hours. The scope of the catastrophe and government reaction, consequently, brought many more people to vote in the elections. While the low turnout traditionally favoured the more disciplined voters of the Right in the country, the increase in turnout understandably brought in more votes for the Socialist party. In this respect, it could be said that the results of the Spanish elections show not the victory of terrorists but the victory of democracy itself with lower abstention rates in the elections, with the citizens telling the governments that they are not allowed to manipulate them into supporting them because of the terrorist threat. The idea that the Spanish voters are cowards who easily succumb to the blackmail of terrorists is completely pointless in a country which suffers from terrorism already more than thirty years. It is the idea which is very promoted by the demised government which cannot accept the defeat after being promised a victory. Their attempts to show their actions in a more favourable light and provide their own interpretation of the events is understandable, but the sober minded researchers should think twice when using the myth of terrorists influencing elections because their insistence on this reading of the events plays more into hands of terrorists themselves (who might start believing that they truly have a power to change political configuration in a country) than it is useful for democratic societies as such.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction: 
Rebuilding Afghanistan – Is That Post-conflict Reconstruction?

By Gintautas Zenkevicius

Since the end of the Cold War at least 116 armed conflicts have taken place (Kegley, 2006, p 401). These were mostly conflicts inside the states (civil wars) not conflicts between the states. During the same period United Nations Security Council launched more than 30 international military interventions (Dobbins, 2005) to resolve these conflicts. All these military interventions have mostly been successful in achieving their military goals; however, they ended up dealing with tasks which are normally run by the state civilian administration. Because there were no proper state administration, international military forces had to deal with nation building tasks or, in other words, to conduct post-conflict reconstruction in failed states. Recent examples of such international military interventions are Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, where initial military operations were successful and achieved their aims, but the aims of post-conflict reconstruction tasks that have been conducted for long time have not still been accomplished and success is in doubt.

Afghanistan is a recent example of the success and challenges of a nation building process. During four and a half years after the fall of Taliban, Afghanistan has achieved huge success: democratic governmental institutions have been formed, the president was elected in 2004, Parliament elected in 2005, elections were free and fair, and economy is growing more than 10% a year. In January 2006, London Conference declared that the aims set in Bonn Agreement in December 2001 for the Afghanistan political reform have been achieved, and that new Afghanistan Compact setting new aims for the development of Afghanistan, has been adopted. At the same time, we have seen a huge increase in attacks against the Afghan authorities, security forces, local population, coalition forces and ISAF in 2006. Large areas of Afghanistan, especially in the south and east, are not controlled by Afghan Governmental institutions. International aid organisations are

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afraid to operate outside main towns. Local warlords control huge areas in the south of Afghanistan and run illegal drug trade, which flourishes and provides incomes higher than Afghanistan’s budget with all international aid. Corruption is at high levels, the Taliban is coming back and so forth. Some already call the reconstruction in Afghanistan a failure (The Economist, 2006, pp 23-25). What is happening? Why is it so difficult to achieve success in a post-conflict reconstruction? What are the causes of a successful initial military operation not transforming into a successful post-conflict reconstruction? What has to be done to make post-conflict reconstruction successful? Can post-conflict reconstruction be successful at all? These and many other questions are arising while looking at modern international military interventions.

This article attempts to answer some of these questions. Its aim is to analyse the nature of post-conflict reconstruction, its main elements and actors - how the post-conflict reconstruction security pillar is run in Afghanistan, and whether what we have in Afghanistan is really post-conflict reconstruction.

Firstly, this article will look into the post-conflict reconstruction theory and the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction: security, justice, and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation - how important these pillars are and how are they interrelated, what actors might be involved in post-conflict reconstruction and how should these actors co-operate and co-ordinate their activities.

Secondly, this paper will analyse in detail post-conflict reconstruction that Afghanistan is going through a security pillar. First of all, it will analyse how security is provided for Afghan population, how Security Sector Reform (SSR) is carried out; how new Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) are built; what results have been achieved in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) processes; how the process of Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) began and is progressing; how successful is counter narcotics campaign; how different actors - UN, SSR leading nations (US, UK, Germany, Italy, Japan), US - led Coalition, NATO - led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan authorities are co-operating in building secure environment for the Afghan citizens.
Thirdly, this article will analyse how judicial reform is carried out, what is the status of law enforcement institutions, how fair is the law system, how human rights are observed, what is the status of dealing with former abuses and resolving all grievances, how different International Organisations (IOs), Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Afghan authorities and people are co-operating in this area. The conclusion of this paper tries to explain whether the events taking place in Afghanistan currently really designate a post-conflict reconstruction.

1. Defining post-conflict reconstruction

Francis Fukuyama defined post-conflict reconstruction as the first phase of nation-building, which applies to failed states after violent conflict and where international community has to provide security and all essential needs and/or services. The second phase of nation-building, according to Fukuyama, is the creation of self-sustaining state institutions which are providing security and all essential needs with the help of international community. It normally starts after the completion of the first phase and once the international forces have assured security and stabilised the situation. The third phase involves strengthening of weak states (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 135-136). Following Fukuyama’s definition of nation building, post-conflict reconstruction is only needed when international community is dealing with failed states, the government institutions of which are not functioning effectively. As a term, post-conflict reconstruction was first defined by the World Bank in 1995 as “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society” and the “reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002, p. 89). John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan expanded this definition including justice and reconciliation, and security, which according them is central (ibid).

Security encompasses collective and individual security to all actors and “addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions” (Feil, 2002, p. 98). Security pillar has the following tasks: “control of belligerents; territorial security; protection of the populace; protection of key individuals, infrastructure and institutions; reform of indigenous security institutions; and regional
security” (ibid). Provision of security is one of the most important tasks because not before the assurance of security can other reconstruction tasks be successfully implemented. International military forces are normally responsible for providing security in failed states. It is not until later that the security provision can be handed over to local security institutions, military and law enforcement that have been developed. It is very important that security provision structures are sufficient in number and quality. It is assessed that for sufficient security at minimum 20 security personnel are required for every 1,000 inhabitants. However, security cannot be sustained if justice, social, and economic well-being or governance are not reconstructed and implemented.

**Justice and reconciliation** addresses the need to deal with past abuses and create an impartial legal system (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002, p 91). It includes the following key elements:

“(1) Law enforcement instruments that is effective and respectful of human rights;
(2) An impartial, open, and accountable judicial system;
(3) A fair constitution and body of law;
(4) Mechanisms for monitoring and upholding human rights;
(5) A humane corrections system; and
(6) Formal and informal reconciliation mechanisms for dealing with past abuses and resolving grievances arising from conflict” (Flournoy and Pan, 2002, p.112).

This pillar not only includes elements about building law enforcement structures, but has a long-reaching aim of building and implementing justice system, which should eliminate causes leading to future conflicts or failure of a state. It is one of the most difficult because local population and legal system can have different approach to human rights and law. For instance Islamic countries are exercising Sharia Law which is different from Western Law. Security and governance pillars are crucial in supporting and providing conditions for justice and reconciliation. However, sufficient justice system cannot be sustained if social and economic well-being is not ensured.

**Social and economic well-being** “addresses fundamental social and economic needs, in particular providing emergency relief, restoring
essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program” (Hamre and Sullivan, 2002, p 91). This pillar is orientated towards providing emergency humanitarian relief for local population at the beginning of post-conflict reconstruction. Later it should concentrate on long term development especially in the areas of education, infrastructure and economic development. However, social and economic well-being cannot be implemented and sustained until there is a security or justice system that is fully functioning coupled with building sufficient governance.

**Governance and participation** “addresses the need to create legitimate, effective political, and administrative institutions and participatory processes, in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public-sector management and administration, and ensuring an active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of the country’s government and policies” (Fukuyama, 2005, pp. 135-136). Effective governance is normally absent in post-conflict situation because the failed state’s public sector is in most cases incompetent and corrupt or non-existent. Moreover, there are not any fundamental political agreements about the state’s political system and wider representation. Post-conflict reconstruction has to start from creating some transitional administration which would prepare political and legal conditions for the future governance and wider population participation in governance. Creating a legitimate and effective political system is the most difficult and critical task in post-conflict reconstruction because it ought to ensure that the state can function properly in the future. However, governance and wider participation cannot be implemented if there is no security because all governmental institutions or officials should be protected from any possible lethal threats. Otherwise, post-conflict reconstruction would fail.

These are four main pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. However, a lot of different actors are participating in implementing these activities: international organisations, states, national governmental organisations, international non-governmental organisations, local institutions, local non-governmental organisations, etc. Each organisation has its own agenda and aims which are not always orientated towards the same direction. These are very often looking and working at different
directions. An effective co-ordination structure has to be developed and implemented. This structure ought to ensure that all actions, taken by these actors, are co-ordinated and that there is no overlapping or competition.

The four main pillars of post-conflict reconstruction, their complexity and the amount of different actors, make post-conflict reconstruction very complicated. Afghanistan is a classical example of a failed state in Fukuyama’s words, in which international community had to conduct nation building starting from the first phase – post-conflict reconstruction. Since the Soviet withdrawal at the end of the 1980’s, Afghanistan was falling into disorder and chaos; no state institutions were functioning; there was no police or judicial system; everything was decided by force or religion leaders; those who had weapons were in power – gun power policies were flourishing; education and health care systems were non-existent, and so forth. This paper will look at the security pillar of post-conflict reconstruction in more detail and focus on the level of security and safety of the Afghanistan environment established so far.

2. Security provision in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a mountainous Southern Asian state, the area of which is 647,000 square kilometres. It shares borders with China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. During the ‘90s it became the heaven for Al Qaeda terrorist organisation. Many terrorist training camps, planning and logistics infrastructure were established in the country. Following terrorist attacks in New York on September 11th 2001, the USA started Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on 7th of October 2001, with an aim to destroy Al Qaeda’s network and the Taliban regime that was providing support to Al Qaeda, and start reconstruction ensuring that international terrorism could not use Afghanistan as their operating base in the future (Maloney, 2006, pp. 6-7). Taliban regime fell down in November 2001, and Northern Alliance militia forces, supported by the US air power and Special Forces, entered Kabul removing the Taliban from power and gaining control over all territory of Afghanistan. On 5th of December 2001, Afghan leaders and representatives of international organisations and donor nations signed Bonn Agreement, which established Afghanistan Interim Authority (AIA), designed legal
framework and the road map of political development (Bonn Agreement). Bonn Agreement also put all Afghan armed forces and armed groups, commanded by different warlords, under the command and control of AIA and called for international security assistance. However, it urged international community to recognise the heroic role played by mujahedin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and asked “to assist in the reintegration of the mujahedin into the new Afghan security and armed forces” (ibid). On 20th of December 2001, UN Security Council passed a resolution 1386 establishing ISAF with the mission to assist AIA in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that AIA as well as the personnel of the UN can operate in a secure environment (UN Security Council Resolution, 1386). It was not until November 2001 that the US Army and Marine units started their deployment to Afghanistan, mostly to Bagram and Kandahar under OEF. In December UK assumed command over ISAF and started operations under UNSCR mandate in Kabul. Thus, international forces started their deployment to Afghanistan after Afghan Military Forces (AMF), loyal to Northern Alliance and led by different military warlords, removed the Taliban from power and assumed control over whole Afghanistan. Moreover, international forces concentrated their operations in urban areas; ISAF: 4,800 strong, only in Kabul; US led coalition, some 8,000 strong, mostly round Kabul and Kandahar, very seldom conducting operations in other areas of Afghanistan. OEF operations were aimed at fighting terrorists, but not providing security for Afghan people. Moreover, OEF and ISAF actions had little co-ordination. OEF did not want to be involved in post-conflict reconstruction, and ISAF did not want to be involved in operations combating terrorists; ISAF actions were dependent on the lead nations’ policies towards Afghanistan such as the UK and later Turkey and Germany.

To sum up, there was no ambition to conduct a classic post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan in 2001. The main tasks were to remove the Taliban from power, to fight terrorists, and to provide security for AIA and the UN in Kabul. The rest of Afghanistan was left to non-existent Afghan security institutions. All security pillar elements described by John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan as tasks run by international military forces were unfulfilled. They were left to AIA, and the creation of a security vacuum by international forces began.
This situation continued throughout the whole 2002. International military forces were too thin (some 0.5 soldier per 1,000 of Afghan population) and only focused on providing security in Kabul for Afghan central governmental institutions, but not for Afghan population. The rest of Afghanistan was left to AMF, or in reality, to local warlords, who, after the Taliban was removed from power, rushed back to their held areas to assume their power bases. At first, warlords were scared and ready to surrender their weapons, but once allowed to keep their weapons and forces, they seized the opportunity and strengthened their power. AIA was too weak, there were no Afghan security institutions or efficient international military forces capable of providing security to the Afghan population, and so it had to rely on local warlords. Warlords assumed power in regions and, in many cases, were even blackmailing AIA. This created an insecure situation in the whole Afghanistan and allowed the lawless situation to continue. Local warlords often started armed clashes between themselves, were collecting illegal taxes from local farmers and shopkeepers, got involved in criminal activities, which allowed them to finance their forces, and even cooperated with former Taliban officials.

Not until 2003 did the US decide that they had to be involved in reconstruction besides fighting terrorism, and started their expansion into Afghanistan provinces establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with a mission to promote governance, security and reconstruction throughout the country. During 2003 there were 7 PRTs established: 5 led by OEF and 2 by ISAF nations - the UK and Germany (Peritto, 2005, p.15). In August 2003, NATO took over command of ISAF, and ISAF mission was extended outside Kabul (UN Security Council Resolution, 1386 and 1510). During 2004, 12 more PRTs were established: 9 led by OEF and 3 led by ISAF. At the same time, ISAF assumed control over north of Afghanistan. However, military force in the north hardly exceeded 1,500, troops and there were only 5 PRTs operating in 9 provinces. In 2005 ISAF established 4 more PRTs in 4 provinces assuming command of western Afghanistan. Again, less than 1,500 ISAF troops were deployed in the west. By the end of 2005 international military presence reached some 32,000 troops: 9,000 ISAF and 23,000 OEF, but it was still only some 1.3 soldier per 1,000 people – far too small number. In 2006, ISAF started expansion into south, establishing 4 more PRTs in 6 provinces. The number of PRTs is
reaching 24, 13 of which are under ISAF command and 11 under OEF, but it is still far away from 34, that are needed for having constant international military presence in every province.

PRT is typically a small force of 70-250 military and a few civilians that do not engage in combat operations, but have robust reach back capability for coalition or ISAF combat support. The main PRT tasks are to help the Government of Afghanistan extend its authority, to facilitate the development of a secure environment in the Afghanistan regions (note, not to provide security, but to facilitate the development of secure environment) including the establishment of relationships with local authorities, to support security sector reform activities within means and capabilities, to facilitate the reconstruction effort. The US OEF-led PRT’s structure is standardised: all civilian personnel responsible for reconstruction are subordinated to a PRT commander - they have unified command and control, their actions are coordinated, and they focus on physical reconstruction, not combat actions. Meanwhile ISAF PRTs structure and actions do not have one unified standard and depend on the leading nation’s policy: some concentrate on ensuing security, others - on physical reconstruction. Military personnel of ISAF PRTs are subordinated to an ISAF commander, while civilian personnel are not, and in many cases they are not subordinated to a PRT commander either, since they are responsible to their ministries back in capitals. This creates a lot of tension, frictions, inefficiency, and decreases PRTs and ISAF performance and credibility and further develops insecurity in different provinces in Afghanistan. As ISAF commander summarized in 2005, “ISAF PRTs have many weaknesses - there is no common approach - individual nations source the PRT, so national objectives and organizational preferences shape its modus operandi and this is confusing for Afghans and International Community” (Presentation by ISAF commander on 05/11/2005). If NATO is serious about achieving its operational aims and fulfilling their tasks in Afghanistan, all PRT’s structures should be standardized, all civilian personnel responsible for reconstruction, police, and judicial reform and etc, should report not to their capitals, but to the PRT commander. All PRT’s actions should focus on fulfilling tasks associated with ensuring security and supporting governance, PRTs should not run physical reconstruction projects - all reconstruction projects should be run by Afghanistan government or NGOs’, with nations providing financial aid to Afghan government.
PRTs should become a platform for further reconstruction through building secure environment, but not running reconstruction by themselves. Otherwise ISAF efforts will be fruitless.

PRT’s military force is very small and they cannot provide security for Afghan population, neither can they assure territorial security. However, current ISAF PRTs, if they are in every province, can improve, and in many cases are improving, security situation only by their presence and constant patrolling of the entire province, alone or together with ANA and ANP. They are also acting as a deterrent force to criminal and illegal groups. PRT’s presence in province and active patrolling diminishes warlords’ credibility, increases confidence amongst local population and shows international communities’ commitment to Afghanistan. Alongside ISAF expansion into the south, where lawlessness flourishes, Government of Afghanistan does not have control and illegal military commanders and Taliban are running their activities freely. PRTs will have a different structure and more robust military capabilities. Every PRT will have a combat battalion, and a total number of ISAF troops is planned to reach 6,000 troops in the south. However, only 4 provinces out of 6 will have PRTs. The deployment of such a scale reflects that international community has recognized existing security problems. Afghan warlords have provided security for 4 years and they have gained too much strength and now they are threatening the existence of the Afghan state, credibility of Afghan central government and international community.

Summing up, AIA and the following Afghan Government have been responsible for providing security since the fall of the Taliban. International security forces have been too thin, and nations committing forces have been too reluctant to provide enough personnel and resources with adequate mandates. Provision of security was not in accordance with post-conflict reconstruction theory requirements: local Afghan government has been responsible for that, and international community has been helping to develop local capabilities. Hence it is more the second phase of nation building and not the first phase - post-conflict reconstruction. This paper will now look into security institutions’ reform or, in the case of Afghanistan, Security Sector Reform (SSR).
2.1 Afghanistan's Security Sector Reform

Following the signing of Bonn Agreement, Tokyo conference in January 2002 prepared a general outline of Security Sector Reform (SSR) for Afghanistan, and Geneva conferences in April and May 2002 approved SSR’s structure and the leading donor countries. SSR is based on 5 pillars: Afghan National Army (ANA) reform – the leading nation of which is the US; Afghan National Police (ANP) reform – the leading nation of which is Germany; the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants – the leading nation of which is Japan; Judicial reform (JR) – the leading nation of which is Italy; Counter narcotics (CN) – the leading nation of which is the UK. This paper will now analyse all SSR pillars and how it has been conducted and what results have been achieved.

2.1.1 ANA reform

Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghan Northern Alliance was the only armed security force which took the opportunity to fill the security vacuum. AMF had a very big structure of 9 Corps consisting of 40 divisions and few separate brigades (Jalali, 2002, pp.78-79), but it did not have unified command structure and it was expressing the interests of separate warlords, but not AIA. Moreover, different AMF commanders were fighting each other in order to control more territory and assume more power. AMF was not real Armed Forces and it wasn’t until May 2002 that the creation of a new ANA was commenced and when the US started training the first ANA recruits. They were drafted civilians and not combatants from AMF which was in contradiction with the requirements of the Bonn Agreement. At the same time the US established the Office of Military Cooperation Afghanistan (OMCA), which was responsible for ANA recruiting, training, equipping and building. In July 2005 the OMCA was renamed into Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan (OSCA) and became responsible for the ANP reform too. By the end of 2005, ANA consisted of some 30,000 soldiers organized into 27 Kandaks and 18 combat support and combat service support battalions (Briefing by ISAF HQ 05/11/2006). There are currently 5 Territorial Corps or Army Regional commands established that consist of one combat brigade with every brigade consisting of 3 or 4 Kandaks and 1 or 2 support battalions. Every Kandak has US Embedded
Training Team consisting of 10-15 US military personnel responsible for helping Kandak commander to plan and run training and operations. Embedded training teams are assigned to brigades and Corps in the same way. OMCA is equipping ANA, building barracks and also running training centres. Moreover, OMCA is financing ANA and paying salaries to all ANA personnel. In addition, OMCA trained some 1,700 MOD General Staff personnel, established and equipped a Joint Operations Centre. ANA has so far been quite successful in conducting platoon and company size operations fighting the Taliban and insurgency. It also provided security for Presidential elections in 2004 and Parliamentary elections in 2005 and performed quite well, but it still lacks combat support and combat service support capabilities.

ANA has not got enough transport for deployment, logistics structure is not robust and ANA Kandaks cannot be sustained on operations for a longer time, especially during the winter time. As a rule, Kandaks are quartered in their brigade and Corps barracks not in provinces and districts during winter, because they lack sufficient infrastructure, and ANA lacks winter equipment and training. During summer, Kandaks are capable of deploying throughout the whole Afghanistan providing security, but during winter they are only present in central areas with good infrastructure, and all remote areas of Afghanistan are left without ANA’s presence. When deployed, ANA units rely heavily on Coalition and ISAF air transport support, and medical support or evacuation, especially in remote areas.

ANA still lacks any operational combat support capabilities and it relies on the combat support of the Coalition or ISAF. This is causing a lot of problems as ANA does not have sufficient communications for calling artillery or air support. Once it is called there are many instances where ANA troops or civilians are attacked instead of the Taliban fighters. This deficiency has been tackled by deploying embedded training teams, which all run in co-ordination with coalition and ISAF forces. From 2006, ISAF has begun the development and employment of Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) (NATO, 2006) which will work with Afghan Ministry of Defence, ANA Corps, brigades and Kandaks. Their tasks involve mentoring, supporting, and helping training and operational employment of ANA units.
ANA is recruiting soldiers country-wide, and 34 provincial recruiting agencies have been established. Recruits sign a 4 year contract and are sent to central training centre where they undergo a 14 weeks long training course before being assigned to units. Initially training was run by US trainers, but now Afghan military are running basic training course supervised by US military personnel. ANA tries to recruit from all Afghan ethnic groups, and in 2005 ANA composition included 49% Pashun, 21% Tajik, 6% Hazara, 3% Uzbek and the rest from other ethnic groups (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005, p.11). Even though desertion has been decreased, every Kandak is always short of some 20% of personnel who are taking authorized or unauthorized leave up to 2 weeks or sometimes longer (according the OSCA, in May 2006 some 2,500 military personnel were missing from their units) (Associated Press, 05/30/2006) for bringing their pay to their families that live far from their place of service. Success in building ANA allowed the disbanding of AMF structure in June 2005 that will be discussed later, and decreased reliance on warlords for providing security.

However, ANA is still far away from reaching target of 70,000 trained troops and according to estimations it might not happen before 2010 (Afghan Compact). It was not until 2005 that the ANA troops were capable of assuming more security tasks to combat insurgency, especially in the south and east. However, they still cannot operate without credible support from international security forces. This shows that developing credible military force might take some 10 years and during all this time international forces need to have sufficient numbers and capabilities to provide security. Moreover, Afghanistan is not capable of sustaining ANA financially and all finances would have to be provided by donor nations till at least 2010, as it was agreed in the Afghanistan Compact during London donor conference in January 2006 (ibid).

ANA reform shows that having one seriously committed leading nation that establishes credible structure and assigns substantial financial resources (3.3 $ billion in 2002-2005 (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2005, p. 9) compared to US $ 193 million from other nations (ibid, p. 41-42)) can built suitable conditions for achieving success. ANA reform is a clear example of reforming (in reality building) security institution by international community in post-conflict situation.
2.1.2 ANP reform

Likewise ANA, ANP had to be built from scratch. Civil war and the Taliban rule totally destroyed police structure Afghanistan had. Police functions were performed by local military commanders; there was no impartial and independent policing. The building of ANP started in February 2002 and Germany became a leading nation responsible for ANP reform, coordinating donor nations’ activities, training ANP officers and policemen and equipping them.

Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) responsible for ANP was established as a result of the Bonn agreement. It was agreed that ANP will be 62,000 strong and will consist of National Police responsible for policing around the country, Highway Police, responsible for traffic mostly on roads around Kabul, and Border Police, responsible for border security. National Police structure was established and filled very fast. Every province got its ANP structure from 600 up to 1,000 policemen, depending on the size of the province. Provincial ANP consists of districts police (40-50 strong) and provincial centre police HQ and support staff. Most strikingly, more than 50% of provincial police force is located in provincial capital, not in the districts and this does not allow ensuring security for vast rural areas. Such deployment has not been changed, and every provincial chief of police is trying to have as many police forces next to him as possible. This deployment reflects the trends in the whole ANP deployments in some manner - some 25% of ANP are deployed in Kabul or areas around Kabul. The MoI, provincial Chiefs of police are focusing on providing security for governmental institutions, but not for Afghan population. This is why the ANP deployment is thin at the district level.

ANP started from scratch, it has been recruited locally, and all posts at the beginning were filled by militants, loyal to local warlords. All ANP command positions at a district and province level were taken by military commanders and their subordinates. Only at the end of 2004 did President Karzai, who appoints all chiefs of ANP at the province level, manage to assign chiefs of provincial police persons from other provinces. It improved the work of ANP little as provincial chiefs of police were rotated from one province to another. They often took a large number of their subordinates and equipment from the province.
they were leaving as still saw the police as their personal force, which served for them as much, as for the state. District chiefs of police, who are appointed by the MoI, still in most cases remain loyal to local warlords and are their relatives or tribal members. Policemen are young Afghans, who adhere to Afghan traditions, and never stop and check elders, tribal leaders or warlords. Even they are not prepared to keep order during riots or other disturbances and, as the May 2006 riots in Kabul showed, young policemen, instead of keeping order, were joining those who were protesting (The New York Times, 21/05/2006). They still have an understanding that they have to be with Afghan population and support Afghans and not follow governments’ orders and policy. Local recruitment and influence of tribal leaders haven’t still allowed building sufficient and impartial police force. In 2005, MoI reform was designed by the US and Germany to decrease the number of high level officers, as well as basing promotions and appointments on merits, not on loyalty. However, in June 2006, when an independent commission selected and proposed 83 high ranking police officers to be appointed to high positions, President Karzai personally appointed 13 former military commanders in addition (The Guardian, 12/06/2006). This activity shows that ANP personnel appointment is still based on loyalty and tribalism, not on merits. Moreover, in June 2006, the Afghan MoI announced plans to establish community policing in southern Afghanistan (Reuters, 12/06/2006). This plan foresees allowing warlords to recruit and arm their own militia force, which will provide security in districts and will be paid by the government of Afghanistan. These two actions are a big step back, because they are diminishing all efforts for building impartial and sufficient police force.

ANP officers and policemen, at most, did not have any formal police training and understanding how police should work. Few police officers had had some formal police training in the former Soviet Union in the 1980’s, and their policing experience and understanding was based on former Soviet policing understanding. Only few police officers have got some education in such areas as criminal investigation. To counter this problem, donor nations have established Kabul Police Academy responsible for police officers training, and 8 Police training centres responsible for policemen training. Kabul Police Academy was established and is run by Germany and it trains police officers using a German model, where training courses last for more than a year. Police
training centres were established by Germany and the US, and they concentrate on policemen training. Mostly, they are run by the US civil company DynCorp, which uses former US police officers for running training courses, and are concentrating on training policemen and police sergeants. Policemen’s training is very complicated as more than a half of the policemen are illiterate. Training courses for illiterate policemen are longer and require more resources. Even though it is stated that by the beginning of 2006 more than 53,000 policemen would have been trained, at a district and province level many policemen still are untrained. Since trained policemen come back to their police stations under the command of untrained police officers, they either follow their incompetent orders and policies or leave the ANP, which many do. MoI does not have an effective and sufficient ANP personnel accountability system. All policemen personnel files are run at the province level and their careers are decided by the district and provincial chiefs of police. The decision to concentrate on police training is the right one and it is producing large numbers of trained policemen. However, without a sufficient follow-up supervision at the province and district levels, all training efforts by donor nations are not achieving sufficient results.

Unlike police in any western country, ANP member looks more like a soldier than a policeman. Police equipment includes automatic rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers. There is no policeman who wants to be armed only with pistol. Even so, ANP is short of automatic rifles: at the district level there are normally some 15-25 rifles with some 100-120 rounds per rifle and policemen never have shooting practice because of ammunition shortage. At the province level almost every policeman has a rifle, but the same shortage of ammunition appears. ANP not only lacks weapons but uniforms too, and especially wintertime uniforms. ANP buildings at province and district level are in poor conditions. They do not have sufficient detention facilities, and detained persons share the same space together with policemen. Transport is another shortage. Transport, donated by donor nations, normally stays in Kabul at MoI. Transport, which goes to provinces, normally stays at province level, so districts normally have one vehicle, Russian-made UAZ as a rule. The police foot patrols are most common in rural areas, because of an old vehicle that cannot provide sufficient transport capabilities for patrolling. Moreover, every vehicle has financing only for 200 litres of fuel per month which in many cases is used by district chief of police to fill his
personal car. More striking situation is with communications. District and province police stations have one short wave radio station for communications and no communications equipment for patrols. Every province has few satellite or mobile phones, issued by the MoI, but no faxes or computer communications. Hence, all information is travelling either by radio or by official post making information exchange very slow and coordination of activities almost impossible. To improve the situation, many police officers are showing an initiative and using their private phones and cars but such ‘initiative’ legalizes the bribes they are taking from drug traffickers or illegal military commanders. The shortage of equipment and finances increases corruption of ANP, and decreases its ability to provide security for the Afghan people.

Nevertheless, ANP works very hard in ensuring security for the Afghan population. They establish checkpoints, conduct patrolling, investigate crimes. However, their abilities are not only limited by the shortage of equipment, but the shortage of specialists who can professionally run a crime investigation. ANP is also short of qualified support personnel; it lacks mechanics for their vehicles, weapons, for their radio equipment and etc. All recruiting efforts focus on policemen rather than specialists’ recruitment. In addition, no training courses are run for specialists. This leads to a situation where transport is out of order and cannot be used by ANP because there is nobody who can fix it. US designed a plan in 2005 which should allow coping with the situation. The Plan foresees the establishment of 5 ANP regional commands with the same borders of regional military commands, where every ANP region will have logistics capabilities developed. Provinces will also be subordinated to regions instead of being directly subordinated to the MoI (OCSA Briefing, 03/11/2005).

Germany is a leading nation for the ANP reform and is responsible for coordinating all ANP reform activities carried out by other donors. However, Germany has been focusing more on running Kabul Police Academy, not coordinating the ANP reform. Every ISAF PRT has national police adviser, but actions taken by these advisers are poorly coordinated, because they are not subordinated to ISAF: Every nation conducts its activities according to their national policy towards Afghanistan reconstruction. UNAMA is not coordinating ANP reform and has not established a UN police mission like in Kosovo. The US has
been running policemen training since 2003 and was the biggest donor for ANP. It spent $1.8 billion till 2005, while other nations only spent $246 million during 3 years (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005, p. 9). This lack of coordination between different nations and Germany’s inability to coordinate all actions lead to many problems with ANP.

In 2005, the US decided to become a leading nation for this pillar together with Germany and prepared the ANP reform plan which includes equipment, buildings for police, police pay and rank reform. Most importantly this plan establishes the concepts of Police Mentors Team taken from ANA reform plan - Embedded Training Teams. These Police Mentors Teams will be embedded at all levels, starting from the MoI and going down to the provinces (every province should have them) and districts (2 districts will have one Police Mentors Team). In addition, the US expanded OCSA functions by creating a division responsible for the ANP reform (OCSA Briefing, 03/11/2005). This plan should improve situation within the ANP and should allow achieving the aim agreed in the Afghan Compact. Not until 2006 did the US assign $1.2 billion for the ANP reform and delivered more than 8,000 vehicles for ANP in June 2006 (Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 14/06/2006).

In conclusion, ANP reform has already achieved substantial results, but is still far from the established goal. Local recruiting, influence of local warlords, Germany’s inability to take full responsibility as a leading nation for the ANP reform and produce a sound reform plan without relying on Afghan Government lead leaves a lot of weaknesses in ANP and its ability to provide security. If the aim, as described in Afghan Compact is to achieve “a fully professional, functional and ethnically balanced Afghan National police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 being able to meet the security needs of the country effectively,” far more coordination and will by donor nations, in combination with efforts by Afghan Government is needed to support ANP reform plan.
2.1.3 DDR

One of the most important issues for ensuring successful post-conflict reconstruction is the disarmament and reintegration of all militias and combatants as it takes away the means of fighting and waging conflict again. DDR process for Afghanistan was agreed to start during Geneva conference in May 2002, but was not launched until October 2003. It took 1.5 years of preparations until the UN, international community, leading nation Japan and the AIA were ready to start the process. The main purpose of DDR was to disarm AMF, to demobilize militia soldiers and to integrate them into a society by providing them vocational training and some capital to start their own business. Disarmament and Demobilization phase ended in June 2005. Although figures look quite impressive and a huge amount of ammunition was collected, the results of DDR are very controversial; some 63,000 combatants entered the process, some 35,000 light weapons and over 9,000 heavy weapons were collected (ISAF HQ Briefing 05/11/2005).

Firstly, collected weapons were heavy: tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery guns, which had no utility when international military force was in the country and which were mostly unserviceable. Collected light weapons were mostly obsolete. Figures also show that only some two thirds of whose who entered DDR process handed in weapons. Others handed in only ammunition. This meant that a lot of weapons, in reality the biggest part of them, remained in the hands of Afghan population or illegal military commanders.

Secondly, DDR process allowed disbanding the AMF and had many of AMF Corps’ and divisions’ commanders kept under the governmental control. However, many of them are criticizing Afghan government policy decisions and are very disappointed that they are left out of policy making or without governmental positions. Many of them still maintain their own illegal military groups, which control small areas, few villages, collecting illegal taxes or are involved in drug trade. Lots of them are village elders and have huge power and influence. This means that DDR process did not disarm combatants. It only allowed disbanding the AMF as a military force. The influence of AMF was diminished at a national level, but many former military commanders preserved their influence at provincial, district or village level.
Thirdly, reintegration phase ended in July 2006 and allowed some 55,000 former combatants entering the process to integrate into society and receive vocational training or start their own business. Every ex-combatant was paid $700 for every weapon to be handed in, and Japan spent some $150 million to complete the project. Their labour skills, however, are very poor. For example, they are taught how to make tables for schools the quality of which was very low. Most of them became shopkeepers and only a small amount of them became farmers. When they came back to their villages they still maintained their loyalty to their former military commanders, or some of them continued their service for them with weapons.

Fourthly, even according to the official estimates there are still some 1,800 illegal armed groups left which have some 120,000 troops with weapons. In reality, this figure should be some 20-30 times higher. Afghan population still illegally keeps at least some 3-4 million light weapons and big amount of ammunition. In June 2005, a new process started - Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), which aims to get rid of all illegal armed structures and re-establish rule of law. It is organized in three phases: voluntary, negotiated and forced. Some 23,000 light weapons were collected up till June 2006, but the process has been run with greater success only in four provinces, Laghman, Kapisa, Herat and Farah, and with some success in some northern provinces. However, there were no DIAG activities in the south of Afghanistan. The first challenge of DIAG was the preparation for National Assembly and Provincial Council Elections. 207 candidates were identified as illegal military commanders and called for disarmament, 24 candidates handed over some weapons, 34 candidates were disqualified, and others withdrew their candidature. According to Afghan Compact, all illegal armed groups should be disarmed till the end of 2007. This, however, looks very unlikely while looking especially at the decision of President Karzai that allows community policing in southern districts of Helmand province. This could stop all DIAG activities.

Finally, DDR process allowed establishing disarmament structure, procedures and developing Afghan capabilities for running the process. In addition, DDR pillar is the only one in SSR for the UN to have bigger involvement in the process. The DIAG Steering Committee is chaired by the vice-president of Afghanistan (Strategy of Disbandment of Illegal
Armed Groups in Afghanistan, 2006) and all activities are coordinated with international community. DDR and now DIAG processes were not run by international community. Afghan authorities, with the help of international community, are in charge there. Japan’s leadership was only shown by financing the process, not running it.

2.1.4 Counter-narcotics

Counter-narcotics as a separate SSR pillar is special feature of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. It normally belongs to the pillars of justice/law and order. This is different in Afghanistan. ANP is one of the main structures conducting all implementation of counter-narcotics operations. It established counter-narcotics departments at provincial level, but UK was assigned and established a separate pillar. Drugs (opium and later heroin) production has a long history and tradition in Afghanistan. The production, however, dramatically increased during the 1980’s (Medler, 2005, pp. 275-291) and in 2005 Afghanistan produced 87% of the world opium quantity (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005, p. 8). The biggest part of this production reaches Western Europe. Due to this, drug production is the most challenging issue for Afghanistan security in a longer perspective and thereby to the global security as well. In reality almost half of Afghan economy relies on illegal drug business but as Ali Jalali states, Afghan farmers and drug traffickers get only 10% of the Afghan drug sales income. The rest 90% goes to traders outside Afghanistan (Jalali, 2006, p. 11). Counter-narcotics were designed as a separate SSR pillar because of this threat to the rest of the world, and especially the UK (Foreign and Commonwealth Office).

Since 2002, there have been many talks, planning and preparations. Afghan Government has declared poppy growing illegal each year, which, despite of the prohibition, continued to increase with the exception of 2005. Local warlords are paying villagers for poppy growing and getting huge profits, which are used to finance their private military armies and to bribe government officials. A lot of governmental officials are also involved in this activity either by not seeing who is growing or destroying the opponents’ poppy fields. District, provincial officials, policemen are bribed for these activities thereby destroying the Afghan farming and moreover the trust in governmental authorities.
UK designed a counter-narcotics plan, which draws up 4 lines of operations: targeting the traffickers and the trade; strengthening and diversifying legal rural livelihoods; developing effective CN institutions and demand reduction. This plan has been run for a few years. However, it was not until 2005 that the ministry of counter-narcotics was established and the counter-narcotics force was established and trained. In 2006 large poppy eradication campaign began, destroying poppy fields especially in south of Afghanistan and mostly targeting farmers who were cultivating poppy. This was met by fierce resistance from farmers, as they are mostly paid by drug traffickers or, in many cases, forced to grow poppy. Many Taliban medium level commanders in the south and the east are involved in this business too. They get their activities financed and, at the same time, target government authority to undermining it. Farmers started an open resistance to poppy eradication force and governmental forces at the same time, because for them it is the government and international forces that are destroying their main source of living. Suddenly, many areas in south and east of Afghanistan became no go areas for governmental officials and internationals. These became the areas where illegal military commanders, and in many cases the Taliban, are in control and exercise their authority. The campaign has concentrated on farmers, not drug dealers and traffickers. This raises a question: is it right to target farmers, but not dealers, and who is gaining an advantage in the situation? Moreover, there are many cases where some fields were destroyed and others were left growing. This meant that local government officials destroyed their opponents’ fields and preserved their supporters’ fields. Focus on farmers, but not traffickers and dealers, challenges the security situation and further increases corruption. It would be better going after traffickers and dealers by arresting them and confiscating drugs. Farmers should be targeted through alternative livelihood programmes.

Alternative livelihood programmes for farmers have so far focused on giving them seeds and fertilisers. However, they also need water for growing wheat and other crops. The farmers have little knowledge of how to grow crops and lack sufficient agricultural equipment. Most importantly, a hectare of poppy fields provides a profit 10 times higher than that of wheat. Alternative livelihood projects should concentrate on irrigation, farmers’ education and granting them cheap loans. In addition, infrastructure needs to be developed for the delivery and distribution of
agricultural products. Moreover, alternative livelihood programme concentrates on provinces, where poppy growing is the biggest industry and provinces with smaller quantities of poppy fields are left without any help from Afghan governmental authorities. Alternative livelihood programmes there are much more limited or virtually non-existent. In seeing that they were left without support by following government's policy and not farming drugs, these farmers would start growing poppies next year. Alternative livelihood programmes should first and foremost concentrate on helping farmers who are not growing poppies and present them as role models for those who are. Poppy growers should see a model. The present situation is the opposite: those who grow poppies get help from the government and those who do not - are left without help. This does not help to eradicate drug industry. It fuels it.

80% of Afghan produced drugs end up in Pakistan where they are shipped to the drug underground. ANP does not control border with Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan authorities are unable to control border with Afghanistan, especially in Balochistan province. Having this border open facilitates drug trafficking. So far, no attempts have been made by the Afghan government or international military forces to secure this part of the border with Pakistan.

International community - mainly the UK and the US - helped Afghanistan to create institutions to fight the drug problem: Central Poppy Eradication Force, Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and a Criminal Justice Task Force. In 2005 these forces arrested about 600 drug traffickers, including 19 governmental officials, seized 40 tons of drugs, destroyed 15,000 hectares of poppy fields (News International: Pakistan, 6/07/2006). These figures look quite impressive; however, it only made up 1% of Afghan drug production in 2005, and only 63 of arrested were sentenced. Formation of a special counter-narcotics force created an additional law enforcement structure that has basically not achieved any of the declared aims. The amount of produced drugs has not decreased, Afghan farmers are threatened and oppose the government, security is decreasing, and the Taliban is increasing its influence and has a wider recruiting base. Counter-narcotics operations have so far not enhanced security in Afghanistan.
2.1.5 Judicial reform

According to the post-conflict reconstruction theory, justice and reconciliation is a separate pillar in post-conflict reconstruction. However, judicial reform for Afghanistan is set under the SSR as a separate pillar, and Italy is the leading nation. Judicial system was worse off than Afghan police. Afghan judicial system during the Taliban regime was based on Islamic *Quran*, and judges’ functions were conducted by mullahs. There was no independent judicial system separated from religion and the ruling regime or local warlords. Bonn Agreement established the legal framework for future Afghanistan where it was decided that the judicial power is independent and vested in the Supreme Court.

Following Bonn Agreement, AIA established Ministry of Justice, responsible for developing laws and correctional facilities (prisons), Attorney General Office, responsible for prosecution, and the Supreme Court, responsible for implementing justice. Courts with 2-4 judges and 4-5 court officials were established in every district. District courts are subordinated to province court, which consists of 8-11 judges and up to 20 court officials and is subordinated to the Supreme Court, the judges of which are appointed by the President. Every province has an Attorney’s office and a prison, which are subordinated to the Attorney General Office and the Ministry of Justice respectively. In addition, the MOD has its own military prosecution system for military personnel. The MOD has a military Attorney General and a military Attorney in every province. Judicial Reform Commission was established, the task of which is to rebuild justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal tradition.

All these judicial institutions were established by AIA very fast and all positions were filled. However, the level of competence amongst these people raises lots of questions and problems, especially at the provincial and district level. Judges are mostly mullahs, educated in madrasas without any education in law. They are mostly using *Quran*, not legal codes, and their understanding about human rights and legal system is very basic. Attorney offices are mainly filled with personnel without any legal education and who are largely former mujahedin commanders or fighters. Their understanding about prosecution is non-existent and in
many cases they follow the guidance of provincial governors’ about who has to be prosecuted and how. Not a single warlord or more influential person has so far been prosecuted. There have been many cases where a provincial governor or a chief of police decides who and how has to be prosecuted. This shows that judicial system at the province and district level is far from becoming independent. Uneducated personnel still follow Afghan legal traditions and Islamic laws and not the rule of law and international standards. There have been many instances where village elders are conducting justice in their villages even in such cases as murder. Moreover, judges and district authorities recognise their decisions. Many of the villagers do not still know that they can go to a court; they rely on the decisions of village elders and mullahs. All this shows that the shortage of educated and experienced personnel prevents a society from having efficient and transparent legal institutions.

Italy, as the leading nation, focuses on education and training; Italian Justice Project office is running training courses for judges and prosecutors, but so far only some 20% of judges and prosecutors went through some formal training courses (ISAF 05/11/2005). Additionally, National Training Centre has been established and work is underway on restructuring curricula for academic institutions to educate future judges and lawyers. Work is also in progress on reforming Afghan law, the process of which is very slow. It will take a few decades until Afghanistan can have some sort of a functioning judicial system, especially at the province and district level.

More appalling is the situation with addressing past abuses and crimes. Courts are not dealing with them. People and villages often start conflicts with each other because of the killings, land occupation and kidnappings in the past. Nothing has been done so far and since many of these who conducted abuses in the past have now been elected to the Parliament or have governmental positions, it is hard to tell whether addressing these issues will be possible in the future. The UN helped establish the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, which collects all data, promotes human rights and tells people about human rights. Yet, no case has reached the court.

To sum up, the judicial reform led by the Afghan Government and international community is only advising and consulting. So far,
Afghanistan has not managed to build any independent judicial system and there is little hope that this can be accomplished. Afghanistan judicial system is too dependant on **Quran**, mullahs and governmental officials. Reconciliation process has not begun and the international community has made too few efforts to start it.

**Conclusion**

This article analysed how the two pillars of post-conflict reconstruction - security, justice and reconciliation - have been conducted in Afghanistan. International military forces have been fighting terrorism and insurgency, providing security for the AIA and the UN, facilitating development of secure environment and reconstruction efforts. Tasks, which should be run by international military forces in a failed state under the security pillar - control of belligerents, territorial security, protection of the populace, protection of infrastructure and institutions - were left to the Afghan Government. The security pillar, which is central in conducting post-conflict reconstruction and creates conditions for implementation of other 3 pillars, has therefore not been implemented by the international community.

Security Sector Reform was designed with the aim to reform Afghan security institutions, ANA and ANP, rather than reconstructing them. Moreover, before being reconstructed, they had to provide security. Only ANA reform has been clearly led by international community. ANP reform has been led by the Afghan Government. DDR and judicial reforms have been led by the Afghan Government too, but have not achieved their aims. AMF structure was disbanded, but former fighters have not been disarmed, and means for waging future conflicts still remain in the hands of the population. Neither has justice reform eliminated the causes, which might lead to future conflict. International community has put much effort in counter-narcotics, but has not achieved any positive results.

It could be stated that in Afghanistan we are dealing with a nation in the building process and not post-conflict reconstruction. International community has not taken responsibility for providing security and meeting all the essential needs as is required in post-conflict situation in a failed state. International community has focused on political reforms and
building governmental institutions, which can provide all essential needs with its own help. However, security was not assured by the international military forces and provision of security was left to the Afghan institutions. By doing so, governance was left without security. This does not meet the requirements or definition of the post-conflict reconstruction theory. Instead of the first phase – post-conflict reconstruction, where we should have started, we are in the second phase of nation building where international community is helping to create self-sustaining state institutions.

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1 Author established and commanded ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan Ghor province in June-November 2005. Many of examples and thoughts are from author’s observations and meetings with local people, local warlords, provincial and districts governmental officials, and different organisations in Afghanistan.

2 Interviews with local warlords in Ghor province in 2005.

3 For more details see ‘Revised operational plan for NATO’s expanding mission in Afghanistan’ 18 May 2006, at http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan_stage3/index.html

4 For more details see ‘Revised operational plan for NATO’s expanding mission in Afghanistan’ 18 May 2006 at http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan_stage3/index.html


8 See more at http://www.diag.gov.af/

9 See ‘Field Notes Afghanistan Insurgency Assessment, Op Cit.

10 Ghor province has 18 judges, but only chief judge of province was educated in university in Pakistan. His subject was Islamic studies. Other judges are mullah, educated in madressas, or even madressa students who are undergoing on the job training in order they could become judges in future. The same situation is almost in every province.

11 Author observed 6 conflicts in 6 months, which were between families or villages, where everyone was accusing each other for killings, kidnappings and land occupations in the past.
The ‘Cultural Awareness’ Factor in the Activities of the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan

By Egdunas Raciūs

Continuous failures to achieve stability and lasting peace in Afghanistan have brought about the question of impediments standing in the way of the occupying coalition’s efforts. A frequent explanation of this issue first puts the blame on the very same Afghani nation – its insurgents, war- and drug-lords, incapable, weak, and extremely corrupt government, fledgling security forces, nonexistent civic society, etc., before recognizing the mistakes and shortcomings emanating from the pursuers of this joint US and NATO (ISAF) venture. But there are plenty of them amongst which the shortage of troops on the ground and lack of funds for reconstruction (sometimes translated as lack of commitment on the part of some allies) are the most often cited. Bulks of failures in Afghanistan, however, have their roots in a single notion of ‘cultural awareness’ or rather the lack of it.

‘Cultural awareness’ indicates basic acquaintance with the history and language of the society that is being dealt with. It is assumed in this article that ‘cultural awareness’ is the essential prerequisite for any transnational relations. Whoever is involved in them has to have a minimal amount of knowledge about the local culture as this would save human and material resources and facilitate smoother interaction producing more favourable results.

Where does Lithuania stand in all this with its Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in a central Afghanistan province of Ghor? To what extent do Lithuanian governmental institutions supervising the mission (primarily the MOD and MFA) perceive the ‘cultural awareness’ factor as a crucial step in the successes and failures of the Lithuanian PRT’s activities in the province as well as in the capital, Kabul? Do Lithuanians possess enough ‘cultural awareness’ and what is being done to advance it in making their mission successful?

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1. The background

Many international observers think that the beginning of the 21st century has been marked with a new chapter in the evolution of the relations between the North and the South. The events of September 11, 2001 triggered a reaction which led to a military intervention of unprecedented scale in the post-Cold War world in Afghanistan and later Iraq. Though led by USA, these invasions were supported by many in the Old continent. Both invasions were argued by their instigators to be forms and means of fighting international terrorism and spreading the democratic values worldwide. Incidentally, Lithuania has fully subscribed to such rhetoric (Adamkus, 2005a, 2005b).

Afghanistan (and a little later Iraq) proved that the American military machine worked perfectly well – it was as good as it could only be at deposing the Taliban regime. Yet, it appeared that the U.S. administration was not as successful in peace and nation-building (or post-conflict rehabilitation) there. It turned out that the Americans had no real plan for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. In the words of W. Flavin, ‘with regard to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, because there was no interagency plan before the operation started, there was no clear idea about what termination or a post-conflict scenario would look like’ (Flavin, 2003, p. 101). Even worse, the Americans (notably, the Administration) apparently had hardly any idea about the nature of the Afghani society and its culture. This added to the international community’s growing puzzlement as to where Afghanistan (under the American guidance) was heading to.

1.1 ‘Cultural awareness’ and ‘cultural literacy’

The term ‘cultural awareness’ (also used as ‘cultural understanding’, ‘cultural sensitivity’ or ‘cultural intelligence’, and coupled with ‘cultural training’) has recently become a routine one in American and British (and increasingly in other NATO member states) military terminology. Special ‘Cultural Awareness’ and language (chiefly based on ‘A Call to Action for National Foreign Language Capabilities’ by the U.S. Department of Defence released on February 1, 2005) courses and practical (for instance, ‘Iraq Culture Smart Card’) as well as academic texts (Beleaga, 2004) are offered to military personnel to be posted to missions abroad, especially
to Muslim countries. The U.S. Army is, amongst other things, in the midst of designing ‘cultural awareness’ training systems for its personnel posted to Afghanistan. For example, a New York Times journalist wrote about mandatory ‘cultural awareness’ training that the 10th Mountain Division of the U.S. Army underwent while preparing for the tour of duty in Afghanistan. The training would include classes in the history, morals, customs and culture of Afghanistan (Kifner, 2006). Mounting deaths and overall failures during the conflict resolution in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have made ‘cultural awareness’ a kind of obsession among U.S. military as by now it has been realized that the beliefs of a culture are as critical as terrain features. The unit should have those coordinates as well (Skelton, 2004, p. 14).

As ‘cultural awareness’ implies basic acquaintance with a culture (history, traditions, economy) and the languages of distant societies, it might be maintained that ‘cultural awareness’ is indispensable to extensive transnational engagements like post-conflict rehabilitation situations that involve nation and state-building by outside powers. As I. Skelton and J. Cooper argue in the case of the American involvements, ‘it is cultural awareness that helps determine whether a host population supports long-term American military presence – and may determine the outcome of the mission’ (Skelton, 2004, p. 14; also Duffey, 2000, p. 151, where she forcefully argues that ‘maintaining good relations with the local community, a prerequisite for successful operations, relies on peacekeepers’ understandings of the local population’s culture and respect for their cultural traditions). It could also be argued that ‘cultural literacy’ is even more desirable. This includes not only superficial familiarity with the basic aspects of indigenous cultures, but some deeper knowledge of intellectual currents and undercurrents, stratification of society under question, pressure groups, informal authorities, and religion, all supported by in-depth studying of the respective local language. Duffey furthermore distinguishes between ‘culture-general’ and ‘culture-specific’ components in the overall ‘cultural training’ (Duffey, 2000, p. 164).

One cannot, of course, expect every single government official or employee in private sector be well versed in the intricacies of the cultures, the territories of which they have specific duties in or related to. Yet, it is expected (or even demanded) that either the decision makers themselves
possess the knowledge of cultures that their decisions will affect or have expert-assistants to advise them. Only ‘culturally literate’ decisions have propensity to be welcomed by partners. It is also advisable that even lower-level government and private sector employees are exposed to prior ‘culture training’ - e.g. courses in the history, language, religion, and society of the countries they are posted to. Some private enterprises world-wide have already started this practice. Certain governmental agencies also do this but the results are so far not up to the expectations unfortunately.

‘Cultural awareness/ literacy’ serves in general at least two purposes: firstly, to get to know the culture of the enemy (e.g. Taliban, al-Qaida, jihadists, anti-government elements, drug- and warlords) and secondly, to get to know the culture of the potential friend (those willing to cooperate with the foreign powers). The culture of the enemy primarily entails ‘difficulties that would be encountered during the present “cultural” phase of the war where intimate knowledge of the enemy’s motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proven to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expansive bandwidth’ (Scales, 2004, p. 2). Although for the military it is most important to tackle the problem of the enemy on the ground, it is also up to the civil authorities to direct military’s activities to yield best results both in short- and long-term perspectives. In other words, knowledge about the enemy’s ‘culture’ – ideologies, motivations and aims, as well as mobilization channels – would enhance the effectiveness of the decisions of civilian authorities and military performance . As for the culture of the potential ally, the focus revolves around enlightened relationships based on mutual trust coupled with understanding, tolerance, and respect. The biggest risk and mistake pervading today’s post-conflict rehabilitation efforts is the ignorant (and often arrogant) behavior of the occupiers which alienate the locals and even push them into the hands of resistance (in the Afghani case, the Quran had allegedly been flushed down the toilet, burning of the corpses of Taliban fighters, roadblocks on major thoroughfares in Kabul and similar blunders and cultural insensitivity).
1.2 The trap of Orientalism

The issue of ‘cultural awareness/literacy’ revolves around enlightened relationships based on mutual trust coupled with understanding, tolerance, and respect. Yet, ‘cultural awareness/literacy’, if handled neglectfully, is prone to become auxilia Orientalis. Orientalism, a broad notion denoting unique European view of non-European cultures, implies a dichotomy and binary opposition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, where ‘they’ are perceived to be of lesser (civilizational) status. Orientalism, in its critics view, is a vice, which has been crippling the relations between Europeans and ‘Orientals’, especially since its virtual institutionalization in the colonial era. As Edward Said has passionately argued in his Orientalism (Said, 2003), too often have imperial European (and recently American) decision- and policy-makers assumed to have grasped the essence of respective non-European societies (their cultures) and acted upon that perception, while in reality acting upon wrong assumptions and misjudgements.

W.P. Lang, in the opinion of many an heir to and the inheritor of the European imperial heritage, argues in the case of the U.S., ‘we Americans, as a group, and the governments that we create for ourselves, have a continuing inability to understand that other peoples really are different than we are’ (Byman, 2005, p. 9). An even graver problem is that ‘we believe we understand how these people ought to be and that we can organize them with minimal effort because they really want to be like us’ (Byman, 2005: 10). In Duffey’s words, ‘this approach assumes a prescriptive stance: “we know what’s best for them”’ (Duffey, T, 2000, p. 152). Lang’s and Duffey’s reasoning is echoed in the National Interest Editorial, which has split the editorial board of the magazine into two camps: ‘we should abandon the demonstrably false pretence that all nations and cultures share essentially the same values. Every country, every region, every civilization has its own cycle, circumstances and path of development’ (Ellsworth, 2004/05).

R.F. Ellsworth and D.K. Simes accuse the contemporary American approach of infantilism toward alien cultures. They passionately argue that the U.S. administration ‘proudly pronounced that the liberation of Iraq was just a beginning of a grand democratic transformation of the Greater Middle East. It required an inordinate degree of naivety, and
frankly, ignorance about the real conditions in Iraq and in the Middle East in general to believe that this overly ambitious scheme could work'. Indeed, failure to understand and appreciate differences among cultures is one of the core aspects of today’s neo-Orientalism. Yet, this can be changed through educational means like ‘culture awareness training’.

A much more complex problem rests in the ‘knowledge’ generated in the process of studying the cultures which too often represents not the actual reality of those cultures but rather our perception of that reality. In other words, there is a gap between ‘what is out there’ and ‘what we think is out there’. Therefore, there is a major difference between unprejudiced inquiry into remote cultures for getting to know them better and searching for proofs to preconceived stereotypes about those cultures that merely confirm our already held ‘knowledge’ and expectations. In the latter case, the whole process of study does not lead to genuine ‘culture awareness/literacy’ but rather to becoming a transmitter of the very Orientalist notions. In such a case, the locals will most likely not subscribe to the picture drawn by outsiders about their culture since the outsiders assume to know the local culture whereas in fact they based their decisions on stereotypes the locals might forcefully reject.

2. The Lithuanian case

Where does Lithuania stand in all this? Especially since it has taken the responsibility for leading a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the Afghanistan’s Province of Ghor.

Afghanistan was the first place outside Europe Lithuania sent its troops to at the request of the U.S. back in 2002. At the time, Rolandas Paksas, the newly elected president of Lithuania travelled to Afghanistan in the beginning of 2003 to visit the Lithuanian soldiers on his first trip abroad as the head of state. Though the trip was not officially regarded as a state visit, it was highly symbolic. It was to show Lithuania’s position in regard to NATO (the member of which it was seeking to become) and Lithuania’s role in NATO as well as its determination to fight against international terrorism. In other words, it was to show the world that Lithuania ‘cares and is capable’.
More of this show-up came when in the Spring of 2005 Lithuania accepted repeated invitations from NATO to lead one of the new long-term Provincial Reconstruction Teams to be set up in the West of Afghanistan. The initial NATO invitations (starting from November 2004) called for the establishment of a joint Baltic states’ PRT. Estonia refused to join it from the very beginning. Latvia promised to join at first but later changed its mind. Latvia is reported (Tvaskiene) to still consider PRTs a venture of ‘military tourism’ and refuses to join any operations.

It was the first mission where Lithuania took upon itself the role of the leader that required not only technical (encompassing material and statistical) knowledge but also ‘cultural awareness’ if not ‘cultural literacy’. Knowing the local society, its history, language, values becomes indispensable if any positive results from this endeavour is expected.

2.1 The Province of Ghor

The Ghor Province is in the north-western corner of the central part of Afghanistan, in the western part of the Hindu Kush. Its territory is over thirty six thousand square kilometres. The Province is divided into ten districts, with the capital Chaghcharan located in the north-eastern part of the Province. Distance to the capital of the country, Kabul in the east is some 360 kilometres while the closest city in the west is the second largest city Herat, some 350 kilometres from Chaghcharan by dirt road.

Practically the entire territory of the Province is mountainous, with the peaks varying between two and a half and three and a half kilometres in height with steep slopes and deep valleys. Because of the high altitude, the climate of the Province is one of the harshest in the whole country – winters tend to be particularly long and severe and last anywhere between October and April. During the winter months, when temperatures fall below zero (in some higher places they go as low as minus fifteen) and deep (up to a meter and deeper), snow covers mountain passes and dirt-roads, life in the Province comes to a virtual standstill.

Because of the difficult topography, the system of roads in Ghor is particularly poorly developed. There is not a single square centimetre of paved roads. Only suitable for use between late April and October are a half dozen regional roads operable throughout the year, a majority of
local gravel-covered and dirt roads (often in summer time dry river beds are used as roads) as well as animal paths.

Though the natural conditions in Ghor (established in 1974) are not favourable, its territory has been inhabited by small human communities from early on. It is believed that Alexander the Great passed the region on his way to India in the 3rd century B.C. In the 7th century A.D., Ghor, along with neighbouring regions, hitherto under the Persian influence, was incorporated into the then fast expanding Arab Khaliphate Arab conquests brought Islam which in its Sunni form soon became the religion for the majority of the land’s inhabitants.

Despite the fact that today the majority of the inhabitants of the Province are Tajik (Dari) speakers (Tajiks - the second-biggest ethnic group in the country after Pushtuns), Ghor’s history is intimately connected with the history of the Hazarajat (sometimes spelled as Hazarjat) - the territory inhabited by the Hazara ethno-religious group which lies between the capital of Afghanistan and Ghor. Hazaras, who also speak a dialect of Dari, live practically only in Afghanistan (and also as refugees in Pakistan and Iran) where an estimated of two and a half million people they make around 10 per cent of the country’s total population. Today Hazaras make up to 20 to 30 per cent of the population of the Ghor Province (the total number of inhabitants is estimated at 670 thousand) while in one of the ten Districts, the north-eastern Laal wa Sarjangal, they constitute 100 per cent of inhabitants (around 130 thousand) (“Ghor District Profiles”).

Most of the development escaped Ghor in the monarchic Afghanistan - while big cities and their environs received a bulk of investments (both foreign and locally procured), the city-less and rural Ghor remained one of the most backward regions in the country with no paved roads, little electrification, no industry, and no proper education. As it held no strategic significance, Ghor was virtually ignored by the monarchs. Little changed during the brief republican period under the presidency of Daud Khan.

After the Communist takeover of 1978 and especially during the Soviet occupation in the 1980’s, many of the Province’s inhabitants joined armed resistance against the new central regime and the occupation. Due to its difficult topography, Ghor was difficult for the Soviet and local
military to access and even harder to control (Soviet presence in the Province was virtually limited to its capital Chaghcharan) and mujahids used it as a relative sanctuary. Mujahids, operating in the western provinces of the country had their depots and bases in Ghor and would occasionally hold regional meetings there. One such meeting is reported to have been held in July of 1987, at which several hundred commanders from the western provinces took part (Kifner, 1988).

Likewise, as most non-Pushtuns elsewhere in the country, inhabitants of Ghor resisted the rule of the ultra-Sunni Taliban, though some of the local warlords opted to serve the Taliban as local petty officials. Overthrow of the Taliban regime was welcomed by most of the Ghoris. However, not all were ready to submit to the will of the new government in Kabul. This was well shown by a widely reported armed and bloody ousting of the President-appointed Governor Malikzada by a rival warlord Abd as-Sallaam Khan in the summer of 2004. Abd as-Sallaam Khan had accused the Malikzada’s administration of corruption and misbehaviour toward local population but was in fact opposed to the disarmament of militias initiated by the Central Government.

The Province has practically no industry. 99 per cent of the inhabitants of the Province are farmers (only some five thousand of 670 thousand Ghoris live in a single town - the capital Chaghcharan) who live in approximately two thousand villages spread over the territory of thirty six thousand square kilometres.

Though grain cultures dominate in agriculture, opium poppies are also widespread. Opium poppies are cash crops that bring real profits in comparison to other crops. In a particularly good year there are up to two harvesting seasons for poppies. This provides relative security and stability even in the harshest years. The Ghor Province, the inhabitants of which make just over three per cent of the total population of Afghanistan, was ninth in opium poppy cultivation and eleventh in opium production among all the provinces in 2006. Significant increase in poppy cultivation could be observed in Ghor between 2005 and 2006. (United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006)

Development of the economy in the Province is among other things impeded by poor educational system. Ghor has no single institution of
higher education or vocational training. There are only some schools which offer complete secondary education while the majority of schools in the villages are only able to provide primary education. Due to the small number of literate inhabitants, the Province does not have any local print media and central media does not reach Chaghcharan.

The health system is in an extremely poor condition – though Chaghcharan has a hospital with several physicians and a surgeon and District centers have clinics, most villages have no access to medical services. This sector is entirely dependent on supplies and all sorts of support from NGO’s and international donors.

2.2 Lithuania in Ghor: the mission of the PRT

The mission behind the PRTs in Afghanistan is generally described through PRT Objectives. These include supporting the Government of Afghanistan in the development of a more stable and secure environment, maintaining public support to the international community, facilitating the reconstruction effort and reinforcing national development priorities. PRT Tasks involve improving the security environment for the Afghan people through a dialogue with provincial leaders, confidence building activities, mitigating likely areas of conflict, assisting the Government of Afghanistan in dissemination of its decisions and policies to the regional leaders, organizing and facilitating periodic principals' meetings to induce dialogue and liaison between the Government of Afghanistan/ UNAMA and regional leaders. (ISAF, 2005) One might argue that both Objectives and, especially, Tasks a priori imply the necessity for acquaintance with the ‘cultural terrain’ of the region under supervision by different PRTs. Top Lithuanian officials confirmed on more than one occasion (Businskaite, 2005) that these objectives and tasks are entirely shared by the Lithuanian side and that its PRT fully adheres to them and thereby implicitly accepting the necessity for ‘cultural training’ and ‘cultural awareness’. ‘Cultural intelligence’ becomes even more obligatory given the remoteness of Ghor and the lack of reliable information about it.

Yet, a number of observers suggest that generally the PRTs are in fact culturally illiterate and ignorant (Kucheide and Tekelioglu, 2006, p. 21). For example, a British Army Major Andrew Roe argues that ‘the coalition
also suffers from a deficiency of cultural awareness, regional knowledge, and local language skills. (...) PRT members' inability to speak tribal languages is a barrier to basic understanding and communication. Language difficulty prevents tactical units from establishing working relationships with village elders and receiving local intelligence’ (Roe, 2005). The level of ‘cultural awareness’, however, varies significantly among the PRT personnel from different countries. The British, for example, being the former colonial power both in South Asia and in the broader Muslim world, manage better as they had a certain tradition of cultivating ‘cultural awareness’. And this is what Roe so passionately argues in his article. One might add that the French and the Dutch are also familiar with the concept of ‘cultural training’. The other, especially smaller, countries have not yet had time to look into the issue of ‘cultural training’ simply because of the lack of earlier involvements overseas.

This especially applies to Lithuania - a new actor in the international arena with very limited experience of participation in international peace-keeping and peace-building operations. Though Lithuania has contributed troops for such missions in the Balkans for more than a decade by now, the experiences drawn in the Balkans can, despite their value, only be applied to such a totally different ‘cultural terrain’ as Afghanistan to a very limited extent.

Structurally, PRTs consist of two components – a dominating military (usually comprises of 90 to 95 per cent of the PRT personnel) and a rather symbolic civilian. The maintenance and local day-labourers are not included in the calculations as a rule. The first Lithuanian military detachment of 70 arrived in Ghor in June 2005 and immediately set up a makeshift camp by the runway of an airfield near the provincial capital Chaghcharan. When the PRT personnel grew bigger (with the joining of the other half of the Lithuanian military personnel of some 60 persons, a small military detachment of Danes, Croats and Icelanders of some 30 persons, and the maintenance component - chiefly consisting of employees of the camp service provider, the American KBR company around 50 persons, and finally four members of the civilian Special Mission), the camp was moved several hundred metres to its permanent location. In addition to just over 200 permanent residents of the camp, the camp is served by several dozens of local day-labourers, used mainly in building and construction works.
2.2.1 Evaluation of the military component

As the PRTs are of military nature, the leading role in the Lithuanian endeavour naturally fell on the MoD rather than the MFA, with the latter serving as a lesser partner. Thus the mentality and rationale of the MoD regarding the Lithuanian PTR in Chaghcharan invites to be addressed first. Upon launching the mission Gediminas Kirkilas, then the Minister of Defence and currently the Prime Minister expressed his opinion that if everything progresses effectively (it) can last four/five years. Once state and economic structures are rebuilt, the troops would be withdrawn (Businskaite, 2005). Juozas Olekas, the current Minister of Defence, estimated back in March 2005 that the mission would take more than ten years and that Lithuania had to get ready for it. (ELTA a, 2005) These words might be read as statements of long-term commitment that by default calls for comprehensive planning on all levels - strategic, tactical and operational - involving not only Armed Forces and several ministries but also the entire government with its legislative and executive branches.

However, by the end of 2006 it was becoming increasingly evident that this mission remained solely within the interest of the MoD - neither the Parliament nor the Government showed any enthusiasm in boosting it: the request of the meagre amount of 1.5 million USD by the Government from the State Budget of 2007 (this indicates that the Government is unresolved about the endeavour) for the reconstruction projects in Ghor was met with resignation and resistance in the Parliament. See, for example, the position of Algis Kaseta, the deputy head of the Parliamentary National Security and Defence Committee (BNS a, 2006).

MoD’s commitment to the mission, on the other hand, has been attested subsequently on many occasions - it has successfully lobbied the Government for more and more funds for equipment and even troops. Rhetorically, the top MoD officials and military chiefs would stand by the commitment Lithuania had made.

Yet, at least one dimension of the mission tends to be disregarded permanently and that is the ‘cultural awareness’. For example, Renatas Norkus, Undersecretary for Defence Policy and International Relations at the Lithuanian MoD, correctly points to the need for greater
‘interoperability of minds’ among the allies while discussing the vital prerequisites for a successful international peace mission abroad in his paper ‘Lithuania’s Contribution to International Operations: Challenges for a Small Ally’. He argues that ‘achieving interoperability of minds is a far more difficult goal. Understanding each other on a battlefield comes only through constant and intensive common training and education. Without it, our militaries would be forced to build familiarity with each other’s mind-set, practices and capabilities during actual operations, which do not help in terms of effectiveness’ (Norkus, 2006a). He fails to even mention ‘cultural training’, which, one might argue, would enable the allied militaries, paraphrasing Norkus, to become familiar with the mind-set of the people of the mission area (Norkus, 2006b). In describing how international military operations and defence transformation are intertwined, even when discussing the Lithuanian PRT in Afghanistan, he almost exclusively concentrates on the usability of armed forces and their effectiveness in eliminating the enemy, totally ignoring the ‘cultural training’ phase, which as many proponents of ‘cultural training’ argue would help keep locals away from turning into the very same enemies. Norkus’ disregarding of ‘cultural awareness’ as one of essential features of overseas deployments is symptomatic: into the second year of the mission, MoD is still slow in allocating funds for pre-deployment ‘cultural training’, relying rather on that provided for troops on their way to Afghanistan by allies like the UK on the British soil.

Lithuanian Armed Forces, though directly under the MoD control, seem to be pursuing a somewhat more culturally sensitive approach to the issue. As of January 2007, with some 500 Lithuanian soldiers having already served in Afghanistan so far (a number of them two tours of duty) the Lithuanian Armed Forces had managed to design pre-mission training, which has a small component of ‘cultural training’. The Warfare Training Center in late 2005 signed an open-ended agreement with one NGO, the ‘Multicultural Relations Center’, fellows of which (academics in the field of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies with grounding in Farsi and Arabic) were providing both language (Dari, one of the two widest spoken languages in Afghanistan) and culture (Muslim in general and Afghan more specifically) classes. This was a follow-up to the signing of a similar agreement between the MoD and Vilnius University in May of 2005 under which University’s Center of Oriental Studies was to provide language training to the Lithuanian troops prior to their deployment to...
Afghanistan on the premises of the Warfare Training Center. The agreement, however, was short-lived, since it soon became apparent that the quality of language instruction was low, yet heavily overpriced. For this reason, the Warfare Training Center decided to look for a new contractor and resolved on the ‘Multicultural Relations Center’. However, due to lack of interest and shortage of funds from the Ministry, the ‘cultural training’ component was virtually soon abandoned reverting to reliance on outside help by allies and impressions by those returning.

Informal learning from brothers in arms returning from Afghanistan, who bring along filmed material, photographs and most importantly, live impressions about life in Afghanistan in general, and Ghor in particular is gaining ground and there are first steps to formalize it. The MoD announced its intention to set up a special post-mission follow-up center, where those returning would systematize their experience and knowledge and pass them onto the consecutive detachments.

However useful (for relaying survival skills in a difficult climatic environment, and some rudimentary advises on patrolling, communicating with locals and intelligence gathering), such surrogate peer ‘cultural training’ would be profoundly deficient. First of all, returning soldiers bring back at best anecdotal information, which not necessarily is ‘culturally correct’. Themselves with little background in the Muslim cultures they are rather transmitters of latent Orientalism referred to earlier in this text.

### 2.2.2 Evaluation of the civilian component

Lately, MoD officials and especially military commanders have started expressing out loud their irritation at the sluggish behaviour and ambivalence of the Lithuanian MFA toward the mission in Afghanistan. In unison, they call upon the MFA to finally start initiating civilian projects in the Province the coordinator of which falls under jurisdiction of the MFA and particularly its Special Mission (BNS a & b, 2006). The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petras Vaitiekunas, realizes the precariousness of his position and has been responding positively to the urgings to improve MFA’s performance in this field. Recently he publicly invited NGO’s and other private and public institutions to submit reconstruction project proposals to the MFA’s newly established
Development Cooperation and Democracy Promotion Department. (ELTA a, 2007)

However, MFA’s but in the broader terms also Lithuania’s indecision in regards to its Afghanistan policy is in big part caused by the fact that being a relatively young state, Lithuania has no history of relations with any of the countries in that region of the world. Additionally, geographic distances make such relations (especially commercial and cultural) even now at best tentative.

As there is no such thing as Lithuanian Middle Eastern or South Asian policy, it is not surprising that in the Lithuanian MFA a total of three diplomats cover the entire region of Africa and the Middle East (Africa and Middle East Division), roughly one third of the world’s countries (sic!). One of these three diplomats has traditionally been specifically charged with dealing with the state of Israel. Lithuania has only two embassies in the region (Israel – 3 diplomats, Egypt – 2 diplomats) if not counting one in Turkey (Lithuanian MFA considers Turkey to be a European country, therefore it is covered by one of numerous European divisions). Two other diplomats (Asia and Pacific Division) at the Ministry cover the South, South Asian and Far Eastern regions (with the Lithuanian embassies in China and Japan, each staffed with 3 diplomats). Only those diplomats dealing with the South Asian and Far Eastern regions have background in the relevant cultures. The Middle East and Africa, unfortunately, are covered by those who have never had any even informal advance ‘cultural training’, and whatever expertise they hold comes from practical experience acquired while serving in the region.

However, in fact, it is even not the Asia and Pacific Division (the staff of which have been routinely doing paperwork related to Afghanistan) of the Americas, Africa, Asia and Pacific Department but the Security Policy Department which coordinates the civilian side of the Lithuanian PRT. None of the diplomats at that Department have background (educational or other) in the regional cultures.

The lack familiarity with the cultural terrain of Afghanistan and more specifically the Province of Ghor has already proven to be a hurdle on several occasions. For example, when preparing parcels of books and stationery supplies to the Ghor children, the MFA (and other, non-
governmental, organizations) was met with a problem of contents in the books that might be offensive to a Muslim population. The MFA requested professional assistance, which is to its credit. Yet, so far there has been very little cooperation between the MFA and experts (first of all in the Lithuanian academia) versed in local languages and familiar with cultures. All in all, one might argue that the Lithuanian MFA (and by extension other governmental agencies charged with formulating and executing foreign policy, like the Office of the President and the Executive Office of the Prime Minister) has so far been ‘culturally illiterate’ in regards to the region under discussion. This has naturally been extended to the PRT.

The civilian component of the PRT on the ground (consisting of the officially called ‘Special Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’, established in June of 2005 (Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 2005) and other civilian members of the PRT) has so far been a meagre one - next to three heads of the Special Mission (Mr. Dainius Baublys, July 2005 – May 2006, Mr. Gediminas Serksnys, June - December 2006, and Ms. Birute Abraitiene, February 2007 - present, all from the MFA), there have only been one deputy head of the Mission (civilian from the Lithuanian MoD), two Lithuanian police officers and one Icelandic and one American (from the USAID) development specialists.

As might have been guessed none of the members of the civilian component (not even the heads) have been subjected to ‘cultural training’ and thus did not posses any forehand knowledge of the region’s specificity, not to mention familiarity with local language. Unlike Armed Forces, which require their military commanders to undergo a minimal, ‘cultural training’ either at home or on their way to Afghanistan, the civilians are spared the burden. One might accuse the MFA of shortsightedness, but there is another aspect to this – there are very few civilians who want to serve in the Special Mission at all. And those who choose, knowing that the tour of duty is very short (six to eight months), do not see a point in bothering to learn about the culture of the people one is going to work with.

Even worse, the MFA tends to send people as the heads of the Special Mission who have not even worked either in the Departments of the
MFA covering the region or in the region itself. For example, the current Head of Lithuanian Special Mission in Afghanistan Ms Abraitienė has worked at the Lithuanian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Department of Multilateral Relations of the Lithuanian MFA, Lithuanian Parliament, and the daily “Lietuvos Aidas”.

On the one hand, one might argue that there has not been any great need on behalf of the MFA to consider ‘cultural training’ seriously – too few people, practically no action. But with the growing consensus on the urgency to expand and strengthen the Civilian component of the PRT – including both diplomats and specialists in such diverse fields as construction, engineering, agriculture, health care and even education – it should also be realized that in the case of civilians, who would be exposed to the local people much more than the military, ‘cultural awareness’ would become indispensable and maybe even life-saving. Moreover, the Armed Forces have announced a tender to assume the place of the American KBR in providing maintenance services for the PRT. As KBR kept a permanent staff of 50 in the camp, in the case of successful bid by a Lithuanian company, one might expect several dozen Lithuanians to travel to Chaghcharan to join the military and the Special Mission. These people, having minimal contact with the outside of the camp, would also need some rudimentary ‘cultural training’.

In order to improve ‘cultural awareness’ one needs a bulk of reliable data and information on the region of concern. Unfortunately, Lithuania looks poor in this regard. Therefore, in order to alleviate the situation of virtual absence of concise and systematic information on Ghor, the two ministries (MFA and MoD) prepared a tiny (some 30 pages) handbook on the Province of Ghor in the beginning of 2006, which would include two to three page chapters on history and geography of the Province and its economic, social, and security situation. Up till now, Lithuanians had to rely on a general Afghanistan handbook prepared by Americans, which, however, is of limited use in Ghor, for it deals with things common to entire Afghanistan and largely leaves out the peculiarities of different ethnic, religious and social groups of Afghanistan. Moreover, in ‘cultural awareness’ terms, its value is at best superficial. In addition to diplomats and military, at least one scholar familiar with the region was commissioned to write several chapters. Unfortunately, the work has
been stalled for almost a year because of uncommitted clerks at the very same ministries in charge of the editing work.

Closely related to Lithuanian PRT military and civilian personnel’s cultural illiteracy, there is another dire problem – that of able and reliable interpreters on whom the entire PRT personnel depend. A number of hired local interpreters had to be soon fired for lack of qualifications (as a rule, because of insufficient English). Luckily Denmark had lent one of the Danish interpreters well versed both in Farsi/ Dari and English. Yet, this was only a temporary solution. Without the knowledge of the local vernaculars and with total dependence on non-Lithuanian interpreters, the entire effort is severely handicapped. Virtual non-existence of Lithuanian citizens capable of interpreting from and to Dari is unfortunate (there are just two in the whole of the country and both of them have taught it to the soldiers at the Warfare Training Center in 2005 and 2006), but neither MoD, nor MFA have addressed this issue. And this is in the case of a major long-term overseas commitment!

**Concluding remarks**

‘Cultural awareness’, not to mention ‘cultural literacy’, has been so far one of the most neglected elements in recent post-conflict rehabilitation efforts around the world in which members of the Euro-Atlantic community have been taking part. As the experiences in Afghanistan (and also Iraq) suggest, better acquaintance with both the ‘enemy’s culture’ and ‘friend’s culture’, would have enormously enhanced the results of international missions, not the least of which would have been saving of lives on both sides. Greater realization that the ‘institutions of governance also need to be developed in the context of Afghan history and social relations rather than simply implanted from off-the-peg models of liberal democracy’ (Cramer, 2002: 905), would help to set more realistic goals, which would be more in line with local cultures and therefore more acceptable to local populations.

Though it is officially recognized that the mission in Afghanistan is of big importance in the sphere of Lithuanian foreign policy (Rugsejus, 2006), there still seems to be no consensus among politicians as to what Lithuania seeks to achieve with it. The belated joint Resolution of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence regarding the functions and
relationship between the military and civilian components of the PRT (Lietuvos respublikos Seimas, 2006) testifies to the Lithuanian Government’s uncertainty about the direction it wants the PRT to pursue. The unconfirmed suggestions by high ranking officials about Lithuania anxiously looking for a nation to take over the burden of leading the Chaghcharan PRT, suggest that the mission is becoming unpopular even with its designers. In any case, it is expected that Lithuania will lead the PRT at least until 2009.

Regarding the ‘cultural awareness’ dimension of the Lithuanian PRT in Ghor, although increasingly gaining attention from the authorities, it is still not up to the level comparable to the scale of the mission undertaken by Lithuania. The military component (MoD and especially the Armed Forces) is leading in this regard, while the civilian component (primarily MFA, but also Ministry of Interior), badly lags behind. It is yet difficult to ascertain if the increase in civilian component (especially from the side of Lithuanian NGOs and maintenance providers) would push the authorities to turn to ‘cultural training’. As too often happens in Lithuania, financial concerns (drive to save money) might prevent the MFA and other institutions from investing in ‘cultural awareness’. If so, one would only have to hope that no grave consequences follow.

In order to improve the ‘cultural awareness’ situation among the Lithuanian military and state employees (and not only those working for the PRT), at least three things are needed – the realization of the situation, the will to change it, and a recourse enabling the change. Unfortunately, at this time, all this seems to be still lacking. Most importantly, there is no realization for a greater need of ‘cultural training’ on the state level – though ‘cultural awareness’ is indispensable not only for MoD and MFA but also employees of many other governmental institutions, such as Migration Department, Refugee Reception Center, State Border Guard Service, State Security Department, even Police Department. Lithuanian Government does not envision establishing any cultural training division either within the already existing state employee training centres or separately, where formalized centralized ‘cultural training’ would be provided to state employees from various institutions. As long as there is no will for change, many ways to withhold its funding remain. This, however, might turn up to be very costly in a long run.
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Kosovo: A Gordian Knot

By Mark Winther

“I realise painfully that I have visited the most miserable corner of Europe.”
H.N Brailsford, 1908.

It is almost eight years since the NATO lead Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) entered Kosovo, acting on behalf of the International Community (IC), under Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244). This resolution created then a framework for a solution in the province, outlining also the immediate way ahead.

Having spent two periods in Kosovo, thirteen months in all, working within civil-military cooperation and intelligence brigades of KFOR, the author reaches the conclusion that nothing has really changed significantly there since 1999. The status quo of the province is in reality little more than 1999 plus. In an article from spring 2005, Richard Holbrook, the experienced former US envoy to the Balkans, outlines the situation quite clearly. Holbrook argues that UNSCR 1244, passed just prior to the intervention, aimed at having the final status of Kosovo worked out through negotiations that would lead to either return under Yugoslav rule; partition or independence, and that:

“…Instead of starting this process years ago, Washington and the European Union fashioned a delaying policy the called ‘standards before status’, a phrase that disguised bureaucratic inaction inside diplomatic mumbo jumbo. As a result, there have been no serious discussions on the future of Kosovo for the past four years…’ (Holbrooke, 2005)

This could not possibly be what the IC aimed at in 1999. Six years without a solution could encourage one to ask what went wrong in the process. Specifically, one could ask which factors could have halted the

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creation of a solution for the province. The quick answer might be that the IC suffers from a lack of consensus on Kosovo’s future.

As one will discover, studying the matter, this answer has so far been partially correct. Looking into the matter of a lacking solution to the Kosovo problem, one realizes that there could easily be more factors having caused the problem than just this one. The purpose of this study is to analyse such identified factors, in order to eventually suggest what has so far caused the lack of a solution to the Kosovo problem.

1. Conditions present for a solution when the international community entered Kosovo in June 1999

Re-vitalized ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, already in the early 1980’s, signified the “opening-chapter” of the break-up of Yugoslavia (Silber, 1995, pp. 31-47). A retrospective analysis on the lack of IC success in Kosovo must therefore take the underlying reasons for these tensions into account. Understanding the context of the Kosovo problem, and thereby also the inherent challenges of creating a solution for Kosovo, requires understanding its history and other pre-set factors in place at the intervention in 1999.

Kosovo has changed hands over and over, and its history is first and foremost turbulent, violent and bloody. Fighting over Kosovo goes back several centuries (Judah, 2000, p.2). The conflict between Jews and Palestinians in the Middle-East (still unresolved in spite of countless attempts), Kosovo is a conflict about the rightful ownership of land, revolving around the national ideology of Albanians and Serbs (Pavkovic, 2001, p. 3). These ideologies are very much dominated by historical myths, and as it is common in the Balkans, such myths often matter more in the mindset of the general commoner, than historical facts.

Travelling the Balkans, or studying the Balkan-conflicts of the 1990’s, one realises that there, history is all about perception. Kosovo is no exception. This is where one of the basic problems of finding a solution for the province can be found, as for both the Albanians and the Serbs, Kosovo is very much connected to their individual self-perception as nations. The Albanians, calling the province Kosova and generally considering themselves as being descendants of the ancient Illyrians, claim a “we were
there first right” (ibid, pp. 5-7) to Kosovo, as territory belonging to an ancient Albania, notably larger than present-day Albania. This “Greater-Albania” includes Kosovo, present-day Albania, Western Macedonia (FYROM and Greece), and southern areas of today’s Serbia proper, among others the Presevo Valley.

Serbs consider Kosovo to be the core of the first Serbian state and thus the cradle of Serbian national identity. In Serbian, Kosovo and Metohija (liberally translated) means “The land of Blackbirds and Monasteries”, the latter referring to approximately one thousand Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches (ibid, p.4), spread out over Kosovo. Talking to Serbs about the historical and religious significance of Kosovo, one gets the idea of a value, similar to how Catholics generally perceive and value the Pope and the Vatican.

Important for an analysis in the fierce fight for Kosovo is that, contrary to the war in Bosnia, the fight for Kosovo is not primarily about a place to live and stay, but also a fight for the dominance of the territory that holds ones history and national identity. Naturally, something so significant can not be voluntarily given up by any party, no matter how rational and prosperous this may seem to be in a future perspective.

Balkans veteran Tim Judah points out that in Kosovo “history is war by other means” and “he, who holds the past, holds the future” (Judah, 2000, pp.1-2). This explains the traditional widespread ethnically motivated destruction in the Balkans, not least in Kosovo during the 1990’s. An example being if you destroy a mosque and remove the rubble, it never existed. Neither did the Muslims using it. And, consequently, the land where that mosque stood is not, never was, and never will be Muslim land. Such deeds, widely used in Kosovo, naturally breed hatred. Over time this has created a deep divide between the two ethnicities.

Historical facts to back either a Serb or Albanian claim to Kosovo disappear in the historical horizon, but both parties are equally determined on their exclusive right to Kosovo, and as it has been displayed over the last two decades, they are not willing to compromise. Important to the understanding of Kosovo history, and the very deep ethnic divide (Nicolic, 2003, pp. 53-69), consistently dominating Kosovo
even today (Steorts, 2005, pp.30-31), is the violent oppression by Serbs of Albanians and vice versa. A closer study will show that every reign of Kosovo, and every take over of the territory by one party or the other, has been accompanied by violence. When actually in power in the province, or when trying to rid themselves of the other party, both parties have employed every known tool of violence and oppression. This includes physical abuse, violation of basic rights; over-taxation, torture, rape, arson and murder. In past and recent history it has even included the total annihilation of villages and ethnically distinct city-quarters belonging to “the other side” (Judah, 2000, pp. 1-30).

The 1998-Exodus of hundreds of thousands of Albanians from Kosovo, caused by widespread violence by Serbs towards Albanians inside Kosovo, seemed completely out of proportions in a 1998-context. But, it was merely a repetitive event in Kosovo’s historical context, this time being caused by the Serbs. Naturally, memories of such historic and recent violence are deeply rooted in the mindsets of the parties and naturally, such memories will not disappear overnight, no matter how much international mediation is employed to remove them.

Although uncommon in today’s core-Europe, this kind of violence and brutality still very much exist in Kosovo, most recently displayed there by the destructive and bloody events of March 2004 (International Crisis Group Report No. 155). Mental scars and psychological remnants of ethnic violence should not be disregarded, when judging success in peace-support operations (Sletzinger, 2005, pp. 1-41). Regardless of six years of international presence in Kosovo, violence and brutality, exist even up to the present day and are factors not to be disregarded.

Consistent use of retaliation and revenge is very deeply rooted in both Serbs and Albanians, which is why the ability to forgive, or at least to forget, cannot be counted on when dealing with the province. Creating a democratic, multi-ethnic Kosovo, where human life and human rights are valued, would very much require such abilities, or at least the will to try. Those abilities were not present in 1999 and still today they lack in appropriate measures (Steorts, 2005, pp.30-31). Having spent thirteen months in Kosovo, the author is not in doubt. Kosovo never was a multi-ethnic society in any positive sense, and myths, revenge and
memories of past and recent violence matter very much. Most importantly, forgiveness is not what comes first.

These factors, present from the beginning of 1999, highlighted by the violent and bloody events just prior to and after the intervention, are bound to have an impact on how much democratic and multi-ethnic coexistence is possible to achieve in Kosovo.

1.2 Challenges caused by the legal basis of the intervention.

Another factor hampering a solution in the beginning was the way the international presence in Kosovo came to be. The entry-method of the IC led to a significant difference in how the entities viewed and view the IC. Albanians on their side naturally saw the IC as liberators, acting morally right by removing the violent Serbian rulers. Serbs on their side saw the bombing campaign and subsequent intervention as unlawful aggression, and thus the IC as illegally occupying Serbian territory and, at the same time conspiring, (Yannis, 2004, p. 71) with the Albanians about independence for Kosovo.

The intervention was contrary to the UN charter (The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, art. 2) and thus contrary to international law. This created an unfortunate imbalance in the will to cooperate from the side of the ethnicities. In retrospect, this was not a fortunate starting point for the IC in Kosovo.

Simultaneously, as it is widely recognized today, NATO’s bombing campaign, leading up to the intervention, carried with it significant collateral damage (Waller, Drezov and Gokay, 2001, p. 176) to Serbian civilians and objects of Serbian civil society. This can be interpreted as representing a breach of international humanitarian law (De Mullinen, 1987, pp. 91-104), and is largely perceived so by Serbs. Naturally this had, and still has, a very large impact on how Serbs view the legality of the IC presence in Kosovo.

Serbian perception of an illegal intervention has meant an impact on the extent to which Serbs, both in Belgrade and in Kosovo, have been willing to cooperate with the IC and its representatives, and consequently impacting the possibilities of creating a solution. Due to the questionable
legality of the intervention, all solutions required Serb consent from the beginning. Both in Kosovo and in Belgrade, Serbs have felt on relatively “dry ground” when claiming an illegitimate basis for the intervention. As one can discover, participating in various meetings between IC officials and the different ethnicities in Kosovo, it is very evident. Although Serbs generally represent a minority in these meetings, very little is done without their consent. When following the work of the IC in Kosovo, the philosophy seemingly often is that the IC came into Kosovo on a questionable legal basis. The only way to put this straight is to work on Serb consent in most matters, not least of when the final solution is worked out.

Up to now this underlying philosophy has been seeping through the layers of the IC (KFOR and UNMIK) in Kosovo, and thus also limited its working ability, when attempting to force unwilling Serbs into place, in many situations cooperation has proven difficult. In this sense the IC has been constrained from the very beginning, having to positively discriminate towards the Serbian minority in Kosovo.

Forcing solutions into place, including the final one, without the consent of the Serbs, and viewed in the context of international law and how the intervention came about, would however remove all relative legitimacy from such solutions. Simultaneously it would officially “cement” the IC breach of international law, rendering this law empty and useless. On the other hand, solutions reached in agreement with the Serbs could somehow correct the “legal wrongdoings” of the IC and thus add an element of legitimacy to the intervention, and to the final solution.

1.3 Demographical complications: minorities and majorities

The demographics of Kosovo impact the possibilities of creating a solution in several ways. When questioning members of Kosovo society, asking why multi-ethnicity is so hard to achieve, one very often receives the same answer from both Albanians and Serbs. It generally spells: “We never lived together – at the most we lived next to each other”.

Although Kosovo enjoyed a period of relative calm in post-1945 Yugoslavia, perhaps the calmest and un-bloodiest of the last 7-8 centuries, the pressure of one ethnic group to the other continued in
relative silence, while segregation was outspoken and continuous (Guzina, 2003, pp. 31-47). This is important to note when analysing the lack of success in implementing a democratic, multiethnic Kosovo from 1999 to 2006, because it shows how little co-existence and multi-ethnicity actually existed before 1999.

It may very well have been a prevailing idea from the side of the IC, at the time of the intervention, that moving in and establishing a relative peace, like in Bosnia four years earlier (Perlez, 1999, p. 1), would automatically lead to less tension and allow multi-ethnicity to grow. But, Kosovo never was Bosnia.

Religion and names excluded, the three main Bosnian ethnicities are all Slavs, speak the same language, and share many parts of their cultural habits. Often it is even very difficult to notice a visible difference. That is not the case in Kosovo. Differences between Serbs and Albanians are outspoken to a degree where this is clearly visible, and relating to almost all aspects of life. Albanians are non-Slavs and primarily Muslims, Serbs are Slavs and Orthodox Christians. Albanian family patterns are large-family clan structures, whereas Serbian family patterns rest in smaller families, resembling those in Western Europe. The languages are as different as Hungarian and English.

When the author asked locals about inter-ethnic marriages in Kosovo, comparing them with the relatively frequent inter-ethnic marriages in other parts of former Yugoslavia, the answer was that such marriages never really existed in Kosovo. In almost every respect, the picture of Serbs and Albanians remains one of oil and water. In addition to this comes the divide between them, created by history, and the completely incompatible wishes for a future Kosovo.

These existing differences and traditional segregation severely challenged the IC’s end-state of a peaceful multi-ethnic Kosovo already from the beginning in 1999. Moreover, prospects for an emerging wish to co-exist and live together, thus facilitating a solution, were poor from the beginning.

Another inherent obstacle present from 1999 was the demographical distribution of Serbs and Albanians in post-intervention Kosovo, and
how to create a solution based on that. It was difficult to find a solution which would satisfy the majority of Albanians, yet not neglect the few remaining Serbs.

The Yugoslav 1991 census shows a Kosovo-population of approximately 2 million, with roughly about 1.8 million Albanians and 200,000 Serbs. After the intervention, less than 100,000 Serbs remained, as approximately 100,000 Serbs left Kosovo (Sletzinger, 2005, pp. 36-37), following the NATO intervention and subsequent Albanian reprisals.

Looking at a demographical map of post-intervention Kosovo, the remaining Serbs are spread out all over the province, with no geographical cohesion between the enclaves. This added further difficulties to the construction of a solution for the province. Given the previously mentioned deep divide between Serbs and Albanians, it goes without saying that creating a system in this post-intervention Kosovo, where a dispersed Serbian minority could live, work and attend schools and universities (in Serbian language), would be close to impossible. On the other hand, the IC having a certain responsibility for this reverse situation, where Serbs had now taken the place of the victim, was, after the intervention, at least morally obligated to face the challenge of creating a solution, where Serbs could survive and sustain themselves.

1.4 Challenges caused by UN Security Council Resolution 1244

UNSCR 1244 “authorized” the intervention, and gave the immediate way ahead for the province (UN, 1999). Simultaneously, it provided constraints that were to haunt the mission in Kosovo from the beginning. Moreover, viewed in either a Serbian or Albanian perspective, it can be viewed as ambiguous. As a result of this, the implementation of it has not been easy and never to the full extent of its decree.

First, one must disagree with certain aspects of the statement by Holbrook, quoted in introduction, since the resolution mentions neither independence nor partition of Kosovo. In fact, the resolution gives very strict limitations to the direction of the future solution. It explicitly reaffirms the commitment of the member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and other states of the region (i.e. no partition or independence). It even specifically states that Kosovo
remains as autonomous to Yugoslavia. At the same time it reaffirms the call for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration / government for the province (Ibid).

Although the exact details as to how this should work were to be worked out as the mission in Kosovo went along, it does not change the fact that, in a 1999 context, the resolution can hardly be interpreted other than saying that Kosovo must remain inside Yugoslavia as an autonomous, self-governed unit, as it was prior to 1989.

This overall restraint as to what could happen caused one of the main obstacles to reaching a solution, since it was what neither the Serbs nor the Albanians wanted. Moreover, the resolution fails to take into account what basically caused the crisis, namely an Albanian wish for independence, a Serbian wish for larger control of the province, and a lack of ability to co-exist.

Thus Kosovo faced an outlined solution, which was not favoured by any of the parties, and where other solutions (i.e. partition or independence) could not be pursued. The six years following the intervention have proved that this solution was never really feasible, weighed against the actual situation on the ground. There is little doubt that this has contributed to the lack of progress, and thus halting of a solution. The commitment in the resolution to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia naturally gave the Serbs something to hold on to from 1999. It placed them in a situation where they could easily question any attempted solutions, where Kosovo would become anything else than what the resolution text allows.

But to the Albanians the resolution apparently left room for interpretation. One clearly experiences in Kosovo, that, in the 1999 context of just being freed from Serb oppression, and even more today, the resolution text about “substantial autonomy” and “meaningful self-administration / government” spells independence to the large majority of Albanians.

Additionally, many Albanians see the 2003 change, where Yugoslavia turned into Serbia and Montenegro, as reason enough to disregard the mentioned resolution commitments.
Another obstacle to the solution, caused by the resolution, is the text about the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (Ibid), initially written to ensure the return of vast masses of Albanian refugees from neighbouring countries after the intervention. As per paragraph 2.4, approximately 100,000 Serbs left Kosovo following the intervention. This caused another constraint from the beginning. Having ensured the return of the Albanian refugees in 1999, and bound to the resolution, the IC was from the beginning faced with having to ensure also the return of Serbian refugees. It could not morally allow itself to settle a solution before all refugees had returned, and thereby before a solution could be in place, this had to be met. This was not easy because the Serbian refugees mainly fled as a result of the intervention, and Albanian post-intervention reprisals. This has continued to pose an obstacle to a solution, since the return of Serbian refugees to Kosovo has failed to materialize.

Next in the line of obstacles, present from the beginning and caused by the resolution, is the obvious lack in the resolution of a clear end-state and exit strategy for the IC in Kosovo (Yannis, 2004, pp.71-74). The resolution gives certain mandates to UNMIK and KFOR in terms of various tasks and responsibilities, but it gives neither the success criteria for the mission, nor the conditions for the exit of UNMIK and KFOR from Kosovo. Moreover, it does not give to UNMIK the mandate of deciding on a solution. As such the mandate to UNMIK was unclear and open-ended from the beginning and it would be up to an international consensus outside Kosovo to “finish the deal”. As displayed clearly prior to the intervention, such international consensus on Kosovo matters can be very hard to achieve.

In addition, paragraphs in the resolution were never implemented. One is the part about limited numbers of official Yugoslav personnel, being allowed to return to Kosovo after the main withdrawal of 1999(Ibid), in order to perform liaison duties with the IC and maintain a presence at Serb patrimonial sites and key border crossings. Particularly important to the Serbs, was the sense of commitment, inherent in this paragraph, that Kosovo was still part of Yugoslavia. Recognizing that implementing the paragraph would have probably stirred the feelings of the Albanians, and potentially led to new outbreaks of hostilities, one simultaneously has to acknowledge that not doing it was to feed the general Serb suspicion of
an IC/Albanian conspiracy towards independence. This eventually led to even less Serb cooperation or respect for the IC and its resolution.

2. Analysis of the developments inside and related to Kosovo 1999-2006

The conditions present from the beginning in 1999 did not constitute a favourable basis to create a solution. Future developments would now determine whether a solution could soon be reached.

First, and naturally very importantly, was the way relations would develop between the remaining Serb minority and the Albanian majority, now in de facto control of Kosovo. Unfortunately, the already horrible relations got off to an even worse continuation following the IC’s intervention. The Albanians did not settle for having been freed from the oppression by Serbian authorities. They ventured into a typical (for Kosovo) large-scale, vengeance-driven vendetta (Yannis, 2001, pp.37-40) targeting remaining Serb civilians and other even smaller entities such as the Roma.

This vendetta prompted the already mentioned exodus of approximately 100,000 Serbs from Kosovo, and the destruction of whatever housing and property they left behind when fleeing (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This destruction, as experienced by the author, became a tremendous problem for UNMIK later on in the mission, in terms of ‘hard-to-achieve’ return- and reconstruction projects. Moreover, it naturally served to maintain the divide and distrust between the ethnicities, and the general Serb perception of being persecuted by Albanians who were supported by the IC.

Given prior events, the vendetta may be understandable in a human behavioural context, but the result was catastrophic for “the new Kosovo”, since it added a very negative value to the already fragile basis for reaching a solution, where the ethnicities could coexist.

Despite all the efforts invested by the IC in Kosovo to improve relations between the entities since 1999, they have generally been poor or very poor. Tensions have gone up and down, but they have retained a level far too high (Williams, 2005), to talk about a sensible basis for a solution.
Serbian enclaves and patrimonial sites still need permanent protection or frequent nearby patrolling by KFOR troops. Interethnic harassment consistently occurs, and there is no real freedom of movement for the minorities, primarily the Serbs. This means a constant need for KFOR escorts (Steorts, 2005, pp. 30-31), and segregation is as outspoken as in 1999.

March 2004 offered the intermediate culmination point. Almost five years of international effort to force the entities together caved in, and this time the Albanians were the offenders. The results were significant: 19 dead and 900 wounded. In addition, 700 homes, 10 public buildings and 30 Serbian orthodox churches were partly or completely destroyed by arson and similar actions, and an additional 4500 Serbs had to flee their homes (International Crisis Group, 2004).

Today it is mainly believed that this outburst of violence came from frustration over five years of lacking progress towards a final solution. What is important to note though, is the general lack of progress in interethnic relations, the consistently flammable tensions, the lack of will to reconcile, and the fact that in Kosovo, death and destruction still lie just beneath the surface. Such developments have clearly not facilitated a solution.

Much of the reason for this lack of progress is given in paragraph 2.2, but the fact that during the last six years the entities have still had something to fight for, is probably also part of the reason. From the beginning the end-state was as unclear for the entities, as it was for the IC, so why not continue the fight and hope for a better outcome?

2.1 The Pristina / Belgrade dialogue

From the time of the intervention and onwards, what could have facilitated both the inter-ethnic relations on the ground, and the overall political solution process for Kosovo, was a sensible political dialogue between the Albanian majority in Kosovo, from 2001 represented by the Albanian dominated, Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) in Pristina (established by UNMIK), and the Serbian Government in Belgrade. In spite of encouragement from UNMIK and the rest of the IC, and hampered by the lack of political will and stubbornness on both
sides (Transitions Online, 2003) this dialogue did not start before late 2003, four years into the mission in Kosovo.

This meant that contributions towards a solution, which could have been powered partly by the two sides, were completely absent for four years. Clearly this has had a significant impact on the possibilities of creating a solution, since dialogue and consent, as deemed necessary in paragraph 2.3, were key elements in order to create a legitimate and feasible solution.

Following the beginning of the dialogue in late 2003, it has been a half-hearted, IC-driven, inconsistent and generally fruitless effort, dominated by the same stubbornness on both sides, which kept it away for four years (McMahon, 2004). The March riots of 2004 delivered a blow to the dialogue, which took it back to the starting point.

In general Belgrade has consistently stalled the process by not showing any willingness to compromise on the claim that Kosovo is an integral part of Yugoslavia (Serbia) (International Crisis Group, 2004). Likewise, Pristina has halted the dialogue by generally only wanting to discuss minor issues with Belgrade, such as the issue of missing persons, thus refusing to enter into serious discussions (Kupchan, 2005, p. 14) about real issues concerning the future of Kosovo, thereby also making the political statement that such issues are not for Belgrade to discuss.

So; in the overall perspective the dialogue has not really been there, and thus an important aspect of the solution process has been missing along the way, which again has further depleted the process.

2.2 The Kosovo society: societal standards and status

The initial impression that one is likely to get arriving in Kosovo, is one of a polluted, ill functioning, generally lawless and completely backwards society, with little hope for a prosperous future and little room for further decline. A longer stay is likely to cement that impression. Always among the most backwards and underdeveloped provinces of Yugoslavia (Pettifer, 2002, pp. 1-7) Kosovo was far from general European societal standards in 1999. Consequently, positive developments, also in the socio-economic field, were paramount the future sustainability of the
province, and thus the solution. No matter which solution would eventually become the result.

Taking the economy first, it can be said very shortly: Kosovo virtually has nothing to live from internally and nothing to sell to the outside world. The only significant economical assets, traditionally available in Kosovo, namely the farming, foresting and mining-industries, were already either worn out, underdeveloped or directly obsolete at the time of the intervention (ibid) (let alone competitive in any modern sense). Moreover, since the intervention, the crisis in the Kosovo economy has deepened and the GDP of Kosovo has declined (Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group, 2004).

Many estimates take the unemployment rate as high as 70%, and typically most of those who have jobs, are employed in the unproductive public system or with the international organisations and thus “...living off the crises” (European Stability Initiative, 2004, pp. 2-4). So, the picture is generally very depressing (European Policy Centre, 2004, pp. 1-4), with no real prospects of improvements, unless the economy is injected with massive investments from the outside. Logically enough, the state of the province and the unknown end-state have not encouraged any such investments in Kosovo from 1999 to now.

Inside Kosovo, talking to Kosovars, there is generally no will to enter into any kind of enterprise that could benefit the country in the long run. Thus the developments in the Kosovo economy, already miserable at the time of the intervention, clearly have not brought any hope of a future self-sustaining Kosovo into the solution process. Also in this field Kosovo society has moved from bad to worse and thus not promoted a solution.

One enterprise in Kosovo has however become very prosperous since 1999, namely that of organised crime. An article from May 2004, based on comprehensive studies of the subject, makes references to Kosovo as: “... the European capital for trafficking in human beings, and the most important transit point for drug smuggling on the continent”. Furthermore it attributes Kosovo a “notorious underworld, in which dealers in prostitutes, heroin, cigarettes and guns make vast fortunes” (Stefanova, 2004, p.257).
After two periods of working within Civil-Military Cooperation and Intelligence in Kosovo, one agrees to this. During these periods the author occasionally met with police officials from northern Europe, in Kosovo in search of connections related to the trafficking of drugs and humans, stretching as far as northern Europe and originating in Kosovo.

In Kosovo organised crime is very close to being physically visible, and it dominates various aspects of the society. Moreover, it has been spreading (Cobain, 2002) to the rest of Europe. What is worse, unfortunately the IC presence has not meant getting rid of it, let alone decreased it. Some of the lack of initiative from the side of the IC towards a solution is logically connected to this. Developments related to organized crime have not backed the solution process at all. Naturally enough, this has halted diplomatic efforts (Stefanova, 2004, p. 258) towards a solution.

The reason is obvious: if 18-45,000 KFOR troops and UNMIK’s 3-4,000 international police officers cannot eliminate or contain this organised crime, what would happen if these left Kosovo as part of a solution? What would happen if this territory, heavily burdened by organised, Albanian-dominated crime, was again to come under Serbian rule, or what if it was granted independence? The consequences of both scenarios have up to now given dire perspectives, and neither of them have spoken for pushing towards a solution, since this could both mean a re-emergence of hostilities and a further spreading of organised crime into the rest of Europe.

Following the deeply rooted organised crime is the corruption (Kupchan, 2005, pp.14-16), another problem and simultaneously an indicator of the immature Kosovo society. A society, which evidently could cause further problems locally, regionally and Europe-wide, if “set free” by the IC any time up to now.

Much of the organised crime is covertly related to remnants of the clan-based Albanian Kosovo Liberation army (KLA/UCK) (International Crisis Group, 2000, pp.1-2). Former KLA personnel also continue to be a dominant entity in most other spheres of today’s Kosovo society.

UNSCR 1244 demanded the disarming of the KLA. Instead, many of its members ventured into the emerging new spheres of political life and
public administration in Kosovo. As such, the new political establishment and public administration, emerging after the intervention, including the UNMIK-built Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), became influenced by KLA (Ibid), an organisation, once listed in several places as a terrorist organisation. The author often experienced that mayors, council members etc. came from a KLA background, having that as the sole selection criteria for acquiring their position.

Hacim Thacy and Ramush Haradinaj, respectively with PDK and AAK, representing Kosovo’s second and third largest political parties (and roughly about 50% of the voters) are both former KLA commanders. Haradinaj had to leave office as elected Prime Minister of Kosovo in early 2005, to appear before the ICTY, faced with numerous indictments of war crimes.

The above gives a good picture of how interconnected things are in Kosovo. Much of the political and official establishment is clan- and KLA-heritage-influenced, with links to organised crime (ibid). Based on the author’s observations, this is completely un-transparent and stretches far into Kosovo society. As such the newly emerged political and public establishment has remained weak, with the PISG in Pristina “... suffering from a whiff of scandal” (The Economist, 2005, pp. 60-61), and “... highly dysfunctional” (Steorts, 2005, pp.30-31). Obviously such an establishment cannot be left to itself and consequently, this has also halted a solution for the province.

From an Albanian point of view, the KLA-heritage is seen as something natural, but from the Serbian point of view, it has meant a complete lack of legitimacy of the new political and public establishment in Kosovo, now perceived by Serbs as being run by criminals. This has caused Serbs to generally distrust the political system and the authorities, now being officially backed by UNMIK. The Serbs have thus refused to cooperate, integrate and take part in the process and have generally done so since the beginning. In the overall context, developments related to the new political and public structures have also halted a solution.

Another element, obstructing developments towards a coherent society that could have facilitated a solution, are the parallel structures continuing to dominate Kosovo society. The Albanians developed theirs (parallel
administration, schools etc.) during the oppressive Serb rule of the 1980/90’s, and as the author often experienced in Kosovo, if they can not have their ways through the official chains of command (UNMIK), they turn to mobilize former parallel structures.

Likewise with the Serbs and their Serbian Coordination Council for Kosovo (CCK), an official Belgrade based support organ for Serbs in Kosovo, working parallel to official UNMIK backed structures in Kosovo. Thus the CCK has judges, police officers etc. working more or less covertly in Kosovo.

In Kosovo one experiences that the existence of multiple systems, contrary to using only the official one, established by UNMIK, have continued to hamper the development of a coherent common society and thus also halting the creation of the conditions for a solution.

In terms of developments to either facilitate or halt a solution is one final and rather important aspect, namely the time gone by 1999-2005. While waiting for positive developments to facilitate a solution (something which has obviously not happened), the prospects of implementing the solution, outlined in UNSCR 1244 have become less and less realistic. In fact, the process has been “biting its own tail”. Every year since 1999 the Albanian majority in Kosovo has become more and more used to a situation of de facto independence from Belgrade and, consequently, it has become more and more difficult to persuade the Albanians into the outlined solution of autonomy under Belgrade rule. Today, after more than eight years of de facto independence, it would be virtually impossible to bring this into effect.

With other solutions such as partition or independence ruled out from the beginning, the situation has turned into an increasingly tighter deadlock, where time has been working for the Albanians against the Serbs and against the solution initially given in UNSCR 1244.

3. The role of the international community in the solution process

UNMIK is the most ambitious nation-building project so-far in the history of the UN. As it turned out, it was probably too ambitious. Five Heads of Mission, Special Representatives of the Secretary General
(SRSG), is what the mission has “consumed” in six and a half years. Not necessarily a sign of success, when one counts the various problems the organisation has had in exercising its mandate since 1999.

UNMIK’s central tasks, according to UNSCR 1244, were to:
(a) Establish a functioning interim civil administration including the maintenance of law and order.
(b) Promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self government, including holding the elections.
(c) Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status.

The organisation was given almost absolute power in Kosovo to accomplish these tasks (Yannis, 2005, pp. 67-81). Judging on the last seven-eight years, one can hardly describe the tasks as accomplished. It is rather evident that UNMIK has not been able to deliver the needed results. A civil administration has been built up though, several elections have been held, PISG have been established in Pristina and The Kosovo Police Service has been established.

However, the administration and PISG are ill-functioning, influenced by corruption, KLA-heritage and thus also with links to organised crime. Administration, elections and the PISG have been boycotted by the Serb minority, and law and order in Kosovo, increasingly burdened by organised crime, do not resemble law and order in any well functioning democratic society. Finally, the facilitation by UNMIK of a political process in Kosovo, leading to the settlement of Kosovo’s future status, never materialized.

In 2004 Alexandras Yannis, personal assistant to the first SRSG Berhard Kouchner, expressed the result like this: “If success in Kosovo is measured in terms of conditions that would allow the withdrawal of international administrators, then the political challenges facing UNMIK in Kosovo today are almost as arduous and complex as when the mission first was established” (Yannis, 2005, p. 67)

Conclusions from previous chapters, related to pre-set conditions and developments inside Kosovo, could explain this lack of success for UNMIK. Even a well-functioning administration would probably encounter problems in dealing with such challenges. But, one could
always ask if at least not the developments as such, but their exacerbation can be partly or fully attributed to a failing UNMIK-system.

In his 2005 article Holbrook refers to UNMIK as semi-competent (Holbrooke, 2005, p.25), something which in the context of the article may be interpreted as a diplomatic under-statement. The United Nations appointed ombudsman in Kosovo over five years, Marek Antoni Nowicki, adds to this by critically questioning UNMIK’s ability to handle the challenges in Kosovo and by referring to Kosovo as an international experiment, which so far did not succeed (Nowicki, 2005).

The observations of the author, who worked closely with the UNMIK-system for thirteen months in different municipalities, at regional level (Mitrovica) and HQ-level (Pristina), concur with these impressions. UNMIK is not an efficient system. It has the attributes of a typical UN-system. It is very multinational in terms of manning, which is good for legitimacy, but at the same time, the organisation suffers from lack of cohesion, caused by differences in culture, working morale, standards etc.

The author’s impressions on UNMIK staff range from one of very competent and responsible staff-members, to one of utter incompetence. UNMIK has been burdened by various allegations of corruption (Freedom House, 2004). Moreover, a number of scandals, impacting the system since 1999, have had a direct effect on its credibility, seen from the side of the locals (Trofimov, 2003). Clearly, something like this will impact on the ability to achieve results.

A factor, seemingly also adding to UNMIK’s lack of results, is the very way it is constructed (Yannis, 2004, pp.68-72). Its four-pillar (Police and Justice, Civil administration, Institution Building, Economic Reconstruction) system is a joint venture between the UN, the EU and the OSCE under an overall UN-umbrella. It includes an impressive diversity of different sub-entities, which again belong to the different pillars of the different organisations involved.

Bureaucracy, competition and lack of practical cooperation between the pillars and different sub-entities haunted UNMIK from the beginning (Yannis, 2001, 31-34). When working in Kosovo, the lack of cohesion between all these different UNMIK-entities, with different external
chains of command and responsibilities to different organisations, becomes quite evident. Often there is seemingly little or no coordination between the entities. Overall, there is little doubt in the mind of the author, that part of the lack of success in Kosovo can be attributed to a very fluctuant quality of an UNMIK-system. In recognition of the general lack of progress in almost every area over the first three and a half years in Kosovo, the Security Council approved the “Standards before Status” or “Kosovo Standards” in November 2003, introduced by UNMIK in December 2003.

They were a series of benchmarks and a review-mechanism to work as an important factor deciding when the final talks on Kosovo’s future could begin. As such, the standards were to be sort of a “motivator” to guide the society of Kosovo and the Kosovars in the right direction.

The standards are: “... based on the principle that Kosovo should have functioning democratic institutions, rule of law, freedom of movement. Sustainable returns of Internally Displaced Persons and community rights, a well-functioning economy, property and cultural heritage rights, dialogue with Belgrade and the Kosovo Protection Corps operating within its agreed mandate and the law.”

If one takes the above standards as measures for success, combines them with the tasks given to UNMIK in UNSCR 1244 and compares this with the actual outcomes, one sees that virtually every success-criteria and task is short of being accomplished even today. As it turns out, the challenges described in chapters 2 and 3, combined with UNMIK’s own deficiencies, have proven to be too big for UNMIK to deliver the needed outcome in the first six-seven years into the Kosovo-mission.

Related to the above is the NATO-led KFOR, the “International Security Presence” in Kosovo, working to support UNMIK. KFOR appears somewhat more coherent as a system, most likely due to its military nature and its unified chain of command. There is, however, a point where KFOR has negatively impacted the possibilities to reach a solution. Unfortunately, this is related to its single task, namely that of providing security in Kosovo.

The missing return of the approximately 100.000 Serb refugees, leaving Kosovo in 1999, has consistently painted a picture of a Kosovo not safe
enough for them to return to. This is reinforced by the fact that those Serbs, who remained, need continuous protection from KFOR.

Having been close to multiple returns-projects in Kosovo, one realises that it is not a lack of financial donors that keep the returns from taking place. In the end the refugees and IDP’s continuously refer to the same reason for not returning, namely the lack of security.

Because of this the IC has not been able to proclaim the actual existence of a safe and secure environment in Kosovo since 1999. Consequently, an important condition of UNSCR 1244 has not been present and thus there is no basis for a solution yet.

An additional unfortunate thing is that KFOR directly and indirectly contributed to the exodus in 1999: “NATO- peacekeepers were not directed to stop the abductions, disappearances, retaliation killings and massive property destruction by groups of ethnic Albanians, which led to a vast reverse ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population” (Nowicki, 2005).

In some cases NATO peacekeepers even witnessed atrocities as described above, without interfering or watched in silence, allegedly acting under orders not to interfere (Judah, 2000, pp. 284-296). Having served two periods with KFOR, the picture above does not depict KFOR’s ability to provide security in Kosovo accurately as seen over the last six years. But, it gives the picture of KFOR that many of those who fled are left with. As such, many potential returnees maintain a perception of KFOR as not protecting them in 1999 and consequently, they do not return.

One cause for KFOR’s lack of ability to generate the adequate level of security has been the gradual downsizing of KFOR from the 1999-level of approximately 45,000 soldiers to the present level of approximately 18,000 soldiers. The downsizing has followed what appears to be the pattern from the downsizing of SFOR in Bosnia but the developments in Kosovo have not justified this downsizing. Consequently, the remaining KFOR-troops have become more and more dispersed, with most of them tied down at patrimonial sites, at enclaves or involved in escorts.
The March 2004 events, experienced by the author, sorely portrayed KFOR’s lack of ability to protect, which subsequently lead to harsh but relevant criticism (International Crisis Group, 2004, pp. 19-24) of KFOR’s ability to provide security in Kosovo, and thus in the larger context also to facilitate a solution.

3.1 The roles of important international actors and organisations

Initially, when looking into what has been going on outside Kosovo in 1999-2006, in support of a solution, it is necessary to roughly define the “political manoeuvre space” within which important international actors and organisations have had to manoeuvre. An analysis shows that this space has been very limited.

The questionable basis for the intervention is one reason. It was an unprecedented case of a regional organisation, attacking a sovereign country without prior authorisation from the UN Security Council. The prospects in 1999 of Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council (The Economist, 1999, p. 16), eventually led to NATO acting unilaterally without a UNSCR. This had implications that had to be taken into account when working out the further destiny of Kosovo. First of all, it created a major international debate and the rest of the process regarding Kosovo now had to be done “by the book”. International Law and international treaties now had to be followed strictly, in order not to further display them as useless, and to simultaneously add the needed legitimacy to the future solution in Kosovo.

The UN Charter prohibits interfering with internal matters of sovereign states, and the Helsinki Final Act prohibits forceful redrawing of borders. Consequently, there could be no solution for Kosovo without the consent of Yugoslavia. A future solution for Kosovo would also require international consensus, not least in the Security Council, in order not to pollute the atmosphere in the UN any further. Moreover, the NATO by-passing of the UN had severely damaged relations between NATO and China and Russia (Kissinger, 1999, pp. 41-43). Thus they had to be included in the solution process, to improve relations and compensate for the “humiliation” inflicted. Not least Russia, Yugoslavia’s (Serbia’s) traditional ally. With both countries traditionally backing the Yugoslav side in the Kosovo conflict and being permanent members of the
Security Council, further complications were added to the already complex basis for a solution.

Regional perspectives also imposed and are still imposing limitations. Serbia proper, FYROM and Montenegro all hold substantial Albanian minorities. For instance in the Presevo Valley of Southern Serbia, Albanians even constitute the majority. The impact of the solution in Kosovo on these other areas of the region, also had to and still have to be taken into account, since independence, as an example, could have a spill over effect to these adjacent territories (Sletzinger, 2005, pp. 35-41). Aspirations of a so-called Greater Albania, or a possible link-up of these Albanian populated areas with an independent Kosovo (Terzieff, 2001, p. 93), were and still are possible risks to be taken into consideration. Clashes in 2001 between Albanian guerrillas and FYROM government forces in northern FYROM, and between Serbian government forces and Albanian guerrillas in the Presevo Valley, demonstrate the dangers of the fragile situation in the region.

The question of the impact of a solution to the developments in Serbia has also acted as a limiting factor for the IC. The hand-over of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY in 2003, by Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, led to Djindjic’s assassination. Giving up Kosovo would almost definitely mean political suicide to any Serbian politician, willing to do so (Sletzinger, 2005, pp. 35-41). For the IC to choose the wrong solution in Kosovo could mean radicalisation and destabilisation of Serbia and perhaps halt the gradual ongoing democratisation process, underway since the hand-over of Milosevic.

In addition, Kosovo is a test-case, where a minority, constituting a majority in a certain part of a country, aspires for independence. Worldwide, several cases are similar to the Kosovo-case. Take Chechnya and Tibet just to name a few. Apart from explaining Russia’s and China’s interests in backing Serbia on Kosovo, it also explains the possible wide-ranging consequences a solution for Kosovo could have in terms of becoming a precedent, if the solution was to become partition or independence.

Finally, also limiting IC action from the beginning is that Kosovo already had / has a UNSCR outlining the possible solution. Breaking away from
the main contents of this resolution (e.g. independence or partition) could also become a precedent. If that was to become the case, what was to stop other ethnicities of the world’s crisis regions to have their resolutions terminated or re-written? What was to stop, for instance, Serbs and Croats from Bosnia from demanding a link-up with their mother countries?

Moving on to actual significant initiatives in support of a solution, by important international actors and organisations (other than UN and NATO), and trying to determine the influence of such initiatives, in relation to the lack of a solution, it can be summarized very quickly that no such initiatives appeared from 1999 to 2006. The described limitations of the “political manoeuvre-space”, combined with the developments inside Kosovo, have evidently had a big influence.

Reviewing the web-sites of the UN, OSCE, EU, The Contact Group, as well as those of the US, UK and Russian foreign ministries, one finds a countless diversity of different statements of intentions related to Kosovo. A simple internet-search on Kosovo will confirm this picture. Here one can find descriptions of multiple visits to Kosovo by various “high representatives” of various organisations over the last six years.

However, no significant initiatives have appeared and no major leverage has been put on Kosovo society, the PISG or Belgrade in 1999-2006. This is bound to have had a large impact. After all, it was up to an outside international consensus to eventually settle the future of Kosovo.

The 2005 article by Richard Holbrook sums up and sharply criticises the IC actions over the last five years. It refers to the US policy on Kosovo as years of “neglect; ignorance and mistakes”. It describes the UN as “semi-competent” on Kosovo. It accuses the US and the EU as “using the Standards before Status as a delaying policy”. Eventually, it refers to the Contact Group as “nearly moribund” and the EU as a “sluggish and process-driven” institution. All in all, the article basically says that Kosovo has been left alone in the hands of UNMIK (Holbrook, 2005, p. 25).

As for the US, the events on 11th of September 2001 and the subsequent “war on terror” have most probably played a role for the general US
interest in Kosovo and as such the lack of efforts over the last 4-5 years. Adding to this, the “Kosovo project” was taken over by the Bush-Administration from the Clinton Administration and Holbrook has been quoted for saying that the Bush Administration “… inherited a Balkans Policy, they never really understood” (Kessler, 2005, p.15).

This lack of US pressure has undoubtedly contributed to putting the solution process in the stalemate, it has been in since 1999. Not just because of the effects such pressure might have had in Kosovo, on the PISG and on Belgrade, but also because the US has been the locomotive in the Balkans efforts since the early 1990’s, and because the efforts of European countries and organisations in the Balkans traditionally have proven to be dependent on US leadership.

This was the case both in Bosnia in the 1990’s and later also in the lead-up to the Kosovo intervention. A stronger US involvement might have resulted in a stronger European involvement, and such mutual efforts might have created the necessary synergy to get the solution process moving.

UK actions in relation to Kosovo over the last six to seven years seem to follow the pattern of US actions, probably because it has basically been as tied up in the “war on terror” as the US and thus obviously had other priorities. Russia has played it very quiet in relation to solving the Kosovo issue, probably since a status quo in Kosovo has been in the interest of Russia.

As the three most significant members of the Contact Group are the US, the UK and Russia, the lack of initiative from this side becomes self-explanatory and can be seen as a consequence of the lack of initiative from its main members. As for the EU, the head of the EU Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Erhard Busek, in October 2005, was quoted for saying that the EU lacks a strategy on Kosovo, and that there is no clear position on the side of the organisation about what to do with it (Radio Free Europe, 2005). Although this may not be the official message from Brussels, it gives an idea about the reason for the lack of full-hearted effort from the side the organisation over the last five years.
Violent events of March 2004, sorely portraying the pathetic state of the solution process, led to a lot of criticism of the IC involvement in Kosovo. Amongst others, NATO, UNMIK, the US government and individual Contact Group members were criticised and were urged to re-engage in the process (International Crisis Group, 2004) to get it moving.

Looking at the world events over the last five to six years and looking simultaneously on the complexity of the Kosovo question and how little the developments in the province have actually provided in terms of facilitating a solution, this lack of outside international effort may seem understandable. The result though has been that Kosovo has been left in the hands of UNMIK and KFOR, whose capabilities have not been adequate enough to produce the needed results themselves.

There can be little doubt that this general lack of leverage from major international actors and organisations in 1999-2006 has contributed to the lack of a solution in Kosovo. And one thing should be very clear after 16 years of war and crisis in the Balkans, and that is that inaction, talks, diplomatic statements of intentions, visits of various “high representatives” and other soft diplomatic tools will not deliver the needed outcomes. There is little doubt that getting the parties involved in Kosovo to compromise on their demands will require much more effort.

Judging on the last 15 years of Balkans history and having worked there, one realises that in the Balkans and particularly in Kosovo, a stick is more effective than a carrot. The policy of “Standards before Status” introduced in 2003 was a carrot to Kosovo society, but this did not produce the desired effects. The Balkans’ wars of the 1990’s clearly showed that producing decisive results in that part of the world requires a concerted, coherent and full scale diplomatic effort from the IC, backed up by affirmative action. Anything short of that has so far failed.

**Conclusion**

Based on the conclusions drawn in previous chapters, this study concludes that there is no basis for singling out one overall factor that has so far caused the lack of a solution to the Kosovo problem. Lack of a solution has been caused by a set of interdependent factors and related
sub-factors of varying significance, which have created a still tighter deadlock in the solution process.

Possible solutions have either not been feasible on the ground, or they have been blocked by a diversity of obstacles including lack of international consensus, considerations regarding risks to regional stability, international law or the very UNSCR that aimed to facilitate the solution.

In retrospect, the possibilities for creating a well functioning Kosovo were already hampered from the beginning. The questionable legal basis for the intervention was a bad starting point for the mission, which at the same time lacked success-criteria and an exit-strategy. Traditional hatred and divide, recent violent events and completely incompatible wishes for a future Kosovo kept the entities segregated from the beginning, and the solution outlined in UNSCR 1244 was not wanted by either of them.

Subsequent developments inside and related to Kosovo from 1999-2006 have only further complicated a solution. Kosovo’s society has gone from bad to worse, suffering from continuous ethnic harassment, economical decline, immature political and public establishments and largely burdened by organised crime with a spill-over to the rest of Europe. Basically no dialogue between Belgrade and the PISG, combined with six years of de facto independence for the Albanians in Kosovo, has slowly but steadily erased any reality of the solution in UNSCR 1244 of an autonomous Kosovo under Belgrade sovereignty.

Burdened by various organisational shortcomings, UNMIK and KFOR have not been able to adequately influence the developments in the province. Consequently, the tasks in UNSCR 1244 have been only partially solved or not solved at all, and the “Kosovo Standards” have remained in contrast to the actual situation in Kosovo. Faced with a complexity of existing challenges, negative developments and an international “manoeuvre-space” severely limited by political and legal restraints and constraints, the sum of important international actors outside Kosovo have stalled and failed to produce any significant initiatives to push for a solution. Additionally, they have failed to apply any significant leverage to Belgrade, the PISG or Kosovo society.
Consequently, the traditionally important outside leverage, that might have decisively facilitated a solution, has been missing along the way.

The ultimate cause of the lack of a solution to the Kosovo problem has thus been the synergetic effect of all the abovementioned factors, which by creating so many challenges, limitations and obstacles to the solution process eventually turned it into a Gordian knot.

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Opportunities and Limitations for the Baltic States of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership

By Kristian L. Nielsen *

For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, accession to the European Union in 2004 was a major foreign policy triumph following a process that had lasted almost a decade since the three submitted their applications in 1995. The reasons for the Baltic countries, as well as other Central and Eastern European countries, wanting to join the EU were myriad. There were economic benefits, in the form of the market access and regional subsidies that membership would entail. Political benefits, such as democratic consolidation and reform assistance. On a deeper level, membership of the EU offered the prospect of a symbolic ‘return to Europe’ after the era of Soviet domination (Avery, 2004, p. 35). For the leaders of the Baltic states the drive towards integration with Western Europe was furthermore driven by an acute desire to move their newly-restored states out of the shadow of the former occupation power. This desire was only reinforced by Russia’s continual insistence on treating Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as belonging to its ‘Near Abroad’; a sphere of influence, where special rights of interference presumably existed (Ozolina & Rikvelis, 2006, p. 88). While forceful Russian objections made the ‘hard security’ guarantees inherent in NATO membership seem out of reach for the Baltic states during most of the 1990’s, the ‘softer’ form of security offered by the EU came to be seen as an attractive alternative, which would achieve the aim of Western integration without unduly antagonising the big neighbour to the East (Van Elsuwege, 2002, p. 175). Throughout the accession process Russia would occasionally huff and puff, but it was on the cards from an early stage, that it would eventually accept the Baltic states entering the European Union. This soft security aspect to EU membership was prominent in much public discussion throughout the accession negotiations, and also popped up during the referendum campaigns in all three countries in 2003, where the voters’ choice was partly set up as being for or against Russian domination (The Economist, 18/9/2003).

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Given this emphasis by the Baltic states on the relationship with Russia, the question arises as to what kind of security the EU has offered? To what extent the reality of EU membership has lived up to the expectations of enhanced security that the Baltic states themselves had put up while being candidates? Much as they would like to, the Baltic states can not escape the reality that they are small states bordering Russia, and thus have a strong interest in economic interaction and stable, cooperative relations. How have they been able to square these potentially conflicting demands of security and integration? And what lessons can be drawn from their experiences since 2004?

The answers to these questions depend not just on the Baltic states and Russia alone. As Vadim Kononenko correctly states, the relationship between the Baltic states and Russia must be seen in the context of the wider EU-Russia relationship, which in itself is mostly far from unproblematic (Kononenko, 2006, p. 71). Staying close to this line, I will argue that the very nature of the European Union as a foreign policy actor is also of major importance for understanding the way that EU membership will affect the Baltic-Russian relationship. The EU is not a homogenous actor like the classic nation-states, and in formulating policy the Union continually balances the competing interests of its member states. Being a small player in this process inevitably sets certain limitations. But being able to move certain troublesome issues out of a bilateral context, and into a common EU policy may also offer opportunities that can more than offset the disadvantages.

In order to argue these points, I will first give a short explanation of the EU as a foreign policy actor, highlighting those features that shape its policies and attitudes towards Russia. Second, I will make a brief overview of the evolving EU-Russia relationship, followed by an analysis of the experience of the Baltic states in trying to influence this relationship. Thereby I will show both the opportunities and the limitations for the Baltic states in achieving greater security by externalising their relationship with Russia through the EU system.

2. Foreign policy-making in the European Union

The European Union has throughout its history been a confusing mix of supranational and intergovernmentalist styles of integration. Not merely
an international organisation, not quite a state in any traditional sense, it embodies elements of both (Nugent, 2003, p. 463-477). That this is so, largely reflects the different wishes and objectives that the member states have brought to the negotiating table in shaping the integration process, as the member states have sought to externalise their national agendas. While the general direction of the process has consistently been an extension of EU competence into ever more policy fields, the member states have at various points been unwilling to accept too dramatic a loss of sovereignty. The institutional solution to this tension in the integration progress has been the division of the various competences and policy fields delegated to the EU system into different categories, each operated under different procedures and with different roles for the institutions. This was formalised in the pillar structure of the EU (fig. 1), which was introduced with the Maastricht Treaty in 1991.

**Figure 1: The Pillar Structure of the European Union**

While there are variations inside especially the first and third pillars, and while several policy fields to some extent cut across this structure, it can generally be said that pillar I, which consists of the original economic communities, is governed supranationally. This is the classic form of EU governance in which the European Commission has the sole right of initiative, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament makes the legislative decisions, while the European Court of Justice provides judicial oversight. Under this form of governance the member states have ceded considerable amounts of sovereignty, while supranational
institutions are vested with autonomous power, which they wield according to their perception of the common good of the Union.

In contrast, the second pillar is entirely intergovernmental, with decisions being reached by unanimity, with only a very limited role for the Commission, and none for the EP or the ECJ. The Council maintains sole control, acting through its secretariat, the Secretary-General of which doubles as the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The third pillar is mainly intergovernmental but with a strong role for the Commission in proposing, drafting and implementing proposals.

Traditionally supranationalism has been favoured by the smaller states, with larger ones having preferred intergovernmental models. At first sight this may seem counter-intuitive, as one might expect smaller states to be more sensitive about ceding sovereignty. However, smaller states have usually tended to see the supranational institutions, pledged as they are to upholding a common interest, as a shield against being pressured by the larger partners (Krok-Paszkowska & Zielonka, 2005, p. 154). For the larger member states the intergovernmental framework has held more attractions, as they would be in a stronger position to dominate policy, given their bigger resources and bargaining power. To understand why this bargaining power is important, one must keep in mind, that no state joined the European Union purely for idealistic reasons. Furthering integration has always first and foremost been a means to an end, which is for member states to further their national interests. Andrew Moravcsik has demonstrated that in intergovernmental negotiating situations, it has always been the preferences of the ‘big three’, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which has shaped the integration process (Moravcsik, 1998). If this logic is applied to foreign policy making, it follows that in many cases the ceding of sovereignty has for smaller member states mainly been a symbolic act, given that their freedom of action would necessarily be limited by their size. For them the supranational order provides a way of gaining some limited influence on events. Larger member states, on the other hand, have more interest in the intergovernmental order, as their size and resources will give them a stronger position to impose their views, while still retaining the option of unilateral action. France is the obvious example of this, having frequently treated the EU as a vehicle for advancing its own agenda, not least in
creating a counterweight to the United States, while at the same time not being shy of taking independent stands, often in contradiction to the agreed EU positions (Kux, 2005, p. 178).

This tension between big and small member states over how to institutionalise foreign policy cooperation in Europe manifested itself on a number of occasions during the early years of European integration. Thus France rejected the plans for the European Defence Community in 1954, as the mere thought of placing even a part of the French armed forces under supranational authority - especially together with Germany so soon after the Second World War - proved too unbearable (Dinan, 2004, p. 57-61). In contrast the smaller member states blocked the French-sponsored Fouchet plan for an intergovernmental political community in 1962, as they were suspicious of the motives of French President Charles de Gaulle (Ibid., p. 99-101).

When looking at the pillar structure, it is clear that the policy fields that are usually employed in foreign relations are spread over all three pillars. The economic parts are conducted through the Commission in pillar I, while the governments have remained firmly in charge of the 'high politics' in pillar II. In addition, the policy fields covered in pillar III have become increasingly important in recent years, as “soft” security has gained in prominence. This fragmentation inevitably leads to less efficiency in foreign policy. Not only are there a bewildering array of people - the Commission President, specialised Commissioners, Council presidencies, and the High Representative, all to some extent representing the EU externally - but the range of member states’ interests that have to be accommodated also imposes severe constraints. Although the EU’s foreign policy set-up has changed a lot over the years, and will gain a more structure when or, rather, if the Constitutional Treaty enters into force, the confusion over how various competences are administered and by whom, which originally prompted Henry Kissinger’s famous question, “who do call when want to speak to Europe?”, is still largely unresolved. Something which is of great importance in understanding the EU-Russia relationship to which we will now turn.
3. The EU-Russia strategic partnership

The Estonian historian Kaido Jaanson (2004) has once quipped that there is “one united Europe and 25 Russias.” His main point is that all European countries have each their historical relationship and hence each their perception of Russia, which influences the way that they wish to see cooperation develop in the future. This important point is quite visible in the way that the European Union and its member states have approached their big neighbour to the East.

EU-Russia relations only extend back to 1989, as the USSR did not engage directly with the EC before that time, preferring to take a strictly bilateral approach to individual EC member states. In 1994 a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed between the European Union and the Russian Federation. The PCA established the institutional framework within which the relationship was to develop. This included the twice-annual summit meeting at head of state level - in the case of the EU meaning the Council Presidency, the High Representative and the President of the Commission – and the Permanent Partnership Council, which works at ministerial level. While not as close as the Europe Agreements, which were signed with potential applicant states in the early 1990’s, the Russian partnership with the EU was closer than what any other country with a PCA enjoyed (Kux, 2005, p. 172-173). As the PCA had to be ratified by all member states, it did not enter into force until 1997, as some member states withheld ratification as a protest against Russian conduct during the first war in Chechnya.

The relationship was further upgraded in 2003 as part of the EU’s Wider Europe initiative, which the following year led to the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Unhappy with being merely one country among many covered by a new policy framework, and not wishing to be treated on a level with Belarus or Moldova, Russia’s response was a counter-proposal of forming a ‘Strategic Partnership’. The legal basis would remain the PCA, but the goal would be to develop four ‘common spaces’ between the EU and Russia. At the St. Petersburg summit in May 2003 this formula was agreed upon, and the EU started using the phrase ‘Strategic Partnership’, which had hitherto only been used by Russia, to describe the relationship. According to the European Commission (2007a) the aim of the new mode of cooperation is “... to
build a genuine strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared values to which both sides are committed, .... in particular democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy principles.” The common spaces envisaged are 1) the Common Economic Space, 2) the Common Space for Freedom, Security and Justice, 3) the Common Space on External Security, 4) the Common Space for Research, Education and Culture. During 2003 a series of action plans covering these four spaces were worked out. While superficially different, they cover the same topics as the European Neighbourhood Policy would have dealt with, using the same instruments but by a different name.

Since then some progress, although less than hoped for, towards the creation of a common economic space encompassing all the EU’s Four Freedoms has been made. At the same time the EU has officially been supportive of Russian efforts to enter the World Trade Organisation, provided Russia liberalises and opens its energy market (Barysch, 2005a, p. 117-121, 124-126). The EU common positions on relations and cooperation with Russia has since 1997 been supplemented by a regional focus on the Baltic Sea area in the shape of the ‘Northern Dimension’, a policy departure spearheaded by Finland to deal with concerns that are particular to that region, especially regarding environment and cross-border cooperation (European Commission, 2007b). The EU-Russia ‘energy dialogue’ was established in 2000, aiming to strengthen cooperation and enhancing the EU’s energy security (European Commission, 2007c).

Thus on the surface it would seem that the EU and Russia are conducting themselves as proper partners in a number of aspects and that the relationship is progressing successfully. The EU has to a large extent institutionalised cooperation with its biggest neighbour, and managed to forge one of the closest relationships it enjoys with any partner. In that sense it clearly operates on a collective understanding among its member states that the integration of Russia into the economic system is beneficial to all involved. Also, Russian cooperation in countering many of the “soft” security threats that have gained prominence since the 1990’s is considered essential. This is helping shape the EU common positions for negotiations with the Russian government.
At the same time a number of problems are clearly visible. Russia’s geographical position and its sheer size has always set it aside from the EU’s other neighbours. Its long history as a major European power has also put it in a different position from other countries. It was perhaps always inevitable that the EU’s relationship with Russia would be the most complex of all, and the one where reaching and sticking to a consensus would prove the hardest. Russia’s strong economic recovery on the back of high energy prices and slide in an authoritarian direction during the presidency of Vladimir Putin has made it increasingly assertive in its foreign relations. This has led to frequent clashes over both policy and values with the European Commission, supported by several national governments. This has, however, caused some tension inside the EU, as other governments in Western Europe have taken a more restrained line with Russia.

Clearly confirming Kaido Jaanson’s point about different perceptions, the overall purpose of developing the EU’s relationship with the Russian Federation is seemingly different depending on what Western European capital one is in. The shared European history with Russia is interpreted differently in each country and hence also the role envisaged for Russia in the Europe of the future. That France should be seeking to foster an anti-American alliance between Russia and the EU seems only natural, but will just as surely be resisted by others. At the same time the concept of a special partnership between Germany and Russia is being mooted from both sides (Kux, 2005 & Timmins, 2005). At different times both Britain and Italy have considered themselves acting as ‘a bridge’ to Russia. Their openness to such overtures is hardly surprising, given that a major policy objective since the end of the Cold War has been to reduce US influence in Europe and, since the latest NATO enlargement, in its own ‘Near Abroad’. Rapprochement with leading EU members can be seen as a means to that end (Klitsounova, 2005, p. 39). It must be said, though, that institutionalising cooperation with Russia in this fields, through f.ex. the ESDP will be very difficult as long as Russia is not an EU member, and the EU contains many committed NATO members with no wish to undermine the trans-Atlantic connection.

Dealing with Russia, moreover, has exposed the incoherence of the EU’s external representation, and the inter-pillar rivalry inside the EU has became ever more apparent. Dealing with this institutional issue through
better coordination has been a major concern for the EU since the 1990’s (Krok-Paszkowska & Zielonka, 2005, p. 157-158). More problematic has been that Russia has largely continued the practise of the USSR in ignoring the EU institutions as much as possible, instead focusing on bilateral relations with member states. This reflected both a traditional modus operandi of Russian diplomacy, but also an ingrained perception from the Soviet era, which was largely carried over after 1991, of the EU as being a somewhat unimportant organisation. Tellingly, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had, by 2005, still not set up a dedicated EU Department to handle relations with Brussels (Bordachev, 2005, p. 53). Instead Moscow has focused on its ties with particularly the larger member states like France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The implication from a small state point of view is clear; namely, that by influencing the bigger players Russia can attempt to undermine or shape the positions of the EU as a whole. Reach agreement with the bigger countries; settle the issues with them; and the rest of Europe will be bound to follow. That Russia has chosen this approach reflects not only an accurate assessment of the power relations inside the European Union, although this is certainly a major part (Kononenko, 2006, p. 73). What it also reveals is that Russia has realised that in many important ways the larger member states are far more easy to deal with than the EU institutions. Not only are the member states more inclined to consider their own narrow business interests, while the harder task of conducting a coherent trade policy is tasked out to the Commission. Moreover, EU common positions are the result of intense negotiations between the member states, during which hard compromises are reached. That often leaves the Commission with relatively little wriggle room once negotiations with third parties have commenced (Konnander, 2005, p. 121). The option of applying this ‘dual-track’ approach during the very frequent clashes with the Commission has, in certain cases, especially relating to matters of energy policy, enabled Russia to manipulate EU members sufficiently that the EU negotiating position has weakened towards Russia, or, frequently, the EU has had no real position at all, leaving the field open to the individual member states.

In such cases, the larger EU member states have occasionnally seemed to be locked in a competition for favour with Moscow. This has frequently taken the shape of certain national governments taking stances favouring Russia’s wishes, even when such stances were on areas which supposedly
are the exclusive preserve of the Commission, such as Russia’s potential entry into the WTO. Member states have also frequently blunted criticism from the Commission and the European Parliament of Russia’s human rights record and the state of civil society by breaking ranks from agreed common positions - even doing so as spokesmen for the union as a whole. A bemused Vladimir Putin could sit back and watch, as Italy’s then-Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, while holding the rotating Presidency during the EU-Russia summit in November 2003, launched himself into a spirited defence of Russia’s Chechnya policy, much to the embarrassment of the other EU partners (Barysch, 2005b, p. 31). More recently, former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, whose dealings with Russia while in office, and especially since, were frequently criticised for being too cozy, has, from the political grave, staunchly defended Putin as “A democrat through and through” (The Economist, 19/10/2006). The problem with such a ‘good cop, bad cop’ game, as Katinka Barysch calls it, is the damage to the EU’s own credibility. Of course, the Commission can only play ‘bad cop’ because the member states have authorised it to do so, and delegated authority to it on certain areas. And larger member states can only undercut the common EU line because they have actually agreed to one in the first place. But this game naturally tends to reinforce Russia’s original perception of the EU as being something which can be by-passed. If its own member states are not respecting the EU line, why should Russia (Barysch, 2005b, p. 32)? In contrast to the positioning of the larger member states, the smaller ones have generally been supporting the Commission in trying to formulate a coherent line for the whole EU to unite around. To them there is added power in standing together as one, as they would have too little leverage on their own. That has made them more willing to incorporate their interests in an all-EU policy.

The differences in historical backgrounds shape current perceptions and objectives, as can be seen in the relationship with Russia. It also tends to highlight just how novel the EU’s attempt at creating common foreign policies for sovereign nation states actually are. The Strategic Partnership has so far proven a decidedly messy affair.
4. The Baltic states, European integration and Russia

It was thus a complicated relationship the Baltic states found themselves part of when they joined the EU in 2004. At the time of their accession the speculation as to what role they would play in the enlarged EU’s relationship with Russia has been described by Vadim Kononenko (2006, p. 69) as coming down to the roles of either ‘normal neighbours’ or ‘troublemakers’. The short answer, as Kononenko also concludes, is that the Baltic states did not fit neatly into either category. Their involuntary past association with Russia did give the Baltic states a feeling of having a special knowledge of that country and its people, which the rest of the EU would be well-advised to heed. However it would be wrong to say that this line of thinking has made the Baltic states take unduly negativist stances on EU cooperation with Russia.

While Estonia in particular was initially slow to embrace the supranational style of politics that membership brought with it, remaining attached to traditional notions of national sovereignty, all three Baltic states have engaged themselves in the EU’s policies (Ehin, 2006, p. 23). In doing so, the Baltic states have attempted to externalise some of their own concerns, to influence the direction of policy in ways that can work to their benefit. For small states in the EU, the key to being influential in shaping external relations policies is to frame national interests in ways that converge with those of the EU as a whole. In other words, finding a European policy that satisfies national needs. The experience of the Baltic states in squaring this circle has been a mixture of normalisation on some issues, while satisfactory solutions to others have proven frustratingly elusive. I will, in the following, show some examples of the successes and difficulties that have been encountered.

The most immediate sign of normalisation was the inclusion of the Baltic states in the EU’s Common Commercial Policy upon becoming full members of the Union. With Russia being obliged to extend the PCA to them (and the other new countries in the 2004 intake), the practise of applying ‘double tariffs’ came to an end. The normalisation of trade did not happen without Russian attempts to rock the boat in the run-up to accession, but the value of a clearly defined policy showed itself in the firmness of the Commission response. Faced with a firm EU line Russia had to back down (Barysch, 2005a, p. 115-116). The way this dispute was
resolved might suggest a more lasting change in relations between the Baltic states and Russia. On the one hand, as Vilhelm Konnander (2005, p. 121) points out, future disputes would cease to be bilateral, and instead become disputes between Russia and the whole of the EU. On the other, being represented by the EU in certain matters may also have a beneficial de-politicising effect on some issues where the Baltic states have a clear interest in cooperating more closely with the Russians.

One such field is the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, which has included such “soft” security issues as organised crime, drug-trafficking, migration management, anti-terrorism and border security (European Commission, 2007d). The three Baltic states have, officially at least, been supportive of EU efforts to develop the Strategic Partnership with Russia in these areas. In the past, cooperation between law enforcement agencies and border guards in the Baltic states and in Russia have mainly worked through informal, personal contacts. This dialogue has now been partly institutionalised through the EU. The potential for undue politicisation of border security was always obvious. Indeed, to quote Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin (2004, p. 47), “… the Eastern border has become virtually synonymous with independence, statehood, and ethno-national survival. Becoming part of the EU’s Schengen zone may gradually change that in favour of more pragmatic attitudes. Sceptics may claim that this could eventually set the Baltic states up for pressure from Brussels to relax the border regime with Russia more than the national security discourses generally favours. Yet it is worth keeping in mind, that any future changes to the border regime will happen as part of an EU zone, and not as a result of bilateral pressure from Moscow. Besides, a more practical consideration is whether it will ever really be in the interest of the Baltic states to administer different rules than their EU partners?

Surprisingly, given the importance that the EU attaches to Schengen, the issue of borders is one which Estonia and Latvia have been relatively unsuccessful at pursuing in an EU context. Both are still, almost 16 years after restoring their independence without proper border treaties with Russia. While the current line is fully demarcated and operational, it came about as the result of an arbitrary re-drawing of the map by Soviet authorities in 1944, which saw both Latvia and Estonia lose parts of their territory.\textsuperscript{2} Treaties have essentially been ready for signing for almost a
decade, but have been stuck in limbo due to Russian foot-dragging. In part this was due to a mistaken belief in Moscow that neither NATO nor the European Union would contemplate accepting new members with outstanding border disputes. However the Commission recognised the position the Baltic states were in, and chose to view the administrative line as a de facto border (European Commission, 1997). Whereas in the 1990’s this stance helped clear the road to eventual membership for Estonia and Latvia, the EU has ever since been reluctant to take up the issue as part of its ongoing dialogue with Russia. Instead it is being treated merely as a bilateral squabble, which would suggest that the issue is not considered salient enough by all member states to provoke a row with Russia over it. In a sense such a stance is counter-productive in the present context, as it only serves to perpetuate an unresolved situation on the EU’s own outer border. In contrast the issue of Russian transit to and from the Kaliningrad exclave was considered rather more urgent in 2002, when the Commission intervened strongly in the negotiations on the Lithuanian side, and managed to settle the issue in a satisfactory way. Thus Konnander’s positive prediction of the future dynamics of the Baltic states’ dealings with Russia has clearly held true in some cases, but has also been shown to have its limitations.

The limitations in externalising bilateral conflicts have most strongly shown themselves over the differing interpretations of the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which Russia maintains was entirely at the Baltic states’ own wish. To date only the European Parliament has been willing to pass a non-binding resolution condemning the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which cleared the way for the Soviet occupation in 1939, while the Commission and the Council have remained silent. When this historical dispute came to a head over the VE-day celebrations in May 2005 in Moscow – which the presidents of Estonia and Lithuania declined to attend, stating that for their countries the war did not end until 1991 – the Baltic states found that their standpoint did not meet with much understanding in Brussels (Kononenko, 2006, p. 72-72, 83). Which only confirms Kaido Jaanson’s observation yet again. What the episode also highlighted was the importance of diplomacy directed at the EU partners, rather than merely taking support for granted (Ozolina & Rikvelis, 2006, p. 97). In the event, Russia fairly deftly managed to use the spat to drive a wedge between the Baltic states and the rest of the EU, presenting the Baltics as belittling
Russia’s role and sacrifice in the fight to defeat fascism. That the EU-Russia summit was planned to coincide with the celebrations in Moscow only made the Estonian-Lithuanian position seem all the more awkward.

Another legacy of the Soviet period with a seemingly endless ability to cause friction is the status of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. That this issue can turn up at all in the context of EU-Russian relations can seem rather odd, given that the EU itself has explicitly recognised the adequacy of minority protection in both countries. Indeed, many of the legislative changes enacted to facilitate the integration of the minorities were carried out as part of the process towards membership (Ehin & Kasekamp, 2005, p. 219). Yet the issue has a habit of turning up in many other, seemingly unrelated, contexts. It was claimed as one reason for Russia’s reluctance to extending the PCA to new EU members in 2004; it comes up in the border treaty negotiations; just as it appeared during the dispute over the VE-day celebrations.

Russia’s precise interest in keeping this particular issue burning is not obvious. Yet the whole case does show that the Baltic states are not the only ones who know how to externalise issues. While continuing the normal bilateral approaches to Western European countries, Russia has also been making direct representations to both EU institutions and the European Court of Human Rights. Kononenko (2006, p. 76) considers it first and foremost a tactic of ‘divide and rule’, in which Russia continuously creates the appearance of a crisis on an issue which for Western Europe seems peripheral in the hope of creating wider tension within the EU institutions and between member states. At the same time Russia’s persistence is expertly playing on Baltic insecurities, which EU membership has not managed to calm. In parts of the more radical discourse in Estonia, the fear that Brussels will at the end of the day prioritise relations with Russia is only just below the surface (Viktorova, 2006, p. 10). The fears may in themselves be overblown, as there is, in fact, precious little evidence that Russia’s linkage strategy is working. But the perception itself can be almost as damaging. Supportive mutterings for Russia’s grievances from some Western politicians are not helpful, and Brussels itself has not done all it could to dispel those fears. As for the minority issue’s future ability to raise temperatures between the Baltic states and Russia, the ongoing dispute over the Bronze Soldier in Tallinn
suggests that it is unlikely to diminish anytime soon. Not as long as there is populist mileage in it – for actors on both sides.

Divide and rule has certainly been Russia’s game in the field of energy policy. The EU’s growing dependence on Russian energy supplies is well-documented, and will not analysed in detail here. Yet the consistent failure of the EU to act forcefully together on the question of energy policy has potentially important ramifications for the Baltic states. Liina Mauring and Daniel Schaer (2006, p. 85-86) have pointed out the strength of the Russian energy sector in the Baltic Sea Region, and concluded that in a number of ways the “soft” security of the region is threatened by this. Part of the problem is already being addressed through the EU in the shape of environmental programmes which fall under pillar I and the Northern Dimension. However, on the equally pressing issue of energy supply it has been much harder to bring the EU countries together on a common position, which has left the Union in a precarious situation of dependency. The idea of a more united and coherent EU policy on energy supply has long been on the wish list of the Baltic states. That one has not yet materialised is not for want of effort on the part of the Commission, which has forcefully advocated deregulation of European energy markets, removing power from national monopolies and opening the market for energy supply. Most such efforts have so far been stymied by national governments and energy cartels, who are more content carrying on the old system of ‘national champions’ and bilateral deals with Russia (The Economist, 11/1/2007).

The bottom-line in the matter of EU energy policy is that there is no effective policy. Instead the member states are open to Russian ‘divide and rule’ tactics. In the words of Estonian president (then an MEP) Toomas Hendrik Ilves: “...when it comes to Russia, individual member states’ interests will triumph over the interests of the Union if a good bilateral deal can be had” (Quoted in Mauring & Schaer, 2006, p. 85). The truth of this statement is most clearly seen in the German-Russian pipeline proposal, which has been decided bilaterally between those two without any consultation with other Baltic Sea states. There are several objections made against the proposal, not least because of the environmental impact it may have. But the strategic advantage for Russia should also not be underestimated. By building a direct line from Russia to Germany, Russia will in the future be better able to bypass
troublesome neighbours, such as the Baltic countries, and in the process avoiding transit fees. Russia’s eagerness for stronger control of the network stretching into Western Europe can also be seen in the way its large companies have tried to acquire assets in the Baltic countries and the retaliatory measures it has been willing to take when its plans are frustrated. When Lithuania recently sold an oil refinery to a Polish firm rather than a Russian one, ‘trouble’ immediately started occurring with the pipeline supplying the refinery (The Economist, 13/12/2006). What is ironic about this state of affairs is that all expert knowledge points out that a common policy for the EU would be beneficial in all ways; in terms of bargaining power with suppliers, in terms of cost-efficiency in provision and spare capacity on the national level, and in terms of prices for consumers. Yet the ‘national champions’ that politicians in some of the larger member states are promoting, are some of the most powerful lobbyists around, and the interconnectedness with politics often appears too close to stand up to scrutiny (The Economist, 11/1/2007). The issue of energy is the most graphic illustration of the classic small state fear of things being decided over their heads by larger, more powerful states. The Baltic states, bordering as they do on Russia, and being bypassed by their partners in this vital policy areas, feel the pinch.

In other fields the Baltic states have explored ways of making the EU a vehicle for getting some influence on issues with crossborder implications. The Northern Dimension’s focus on environmental policy is one such case in point. The European Neighbourhood Policy another, through which the Baltic states have offered various support programmes for the transition processes in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. By focusing on both economic reform, administrative reform and civil society development the ENP has relied very much on the EU’s normative appeal, to extend the Union’s influence into those parts of Europe, that Russia still considers its ‘Near Abroad’. Having just recently escaped this definition themselves, the Baltic states have only been too keen to help others do the same. In Moscow much of this has been seen as untimely meddling (Ozolina & Rikvelis, 2006, p. 95). What has allowed it is the fact that the ENP is run on the basis of existing policies, and is conducted as an agreement between the Commission and the partner state. Its concrete manifestations have therefore been uncontroversial from a Western point of view. But even here, the Baltic states have had opportunities to push the limits of policy somewhat by engaging
themselves fully. Their support for the EU’s hard approach to the authoritarian regime in Belarus is an example. Lithuania in particular, has managed to ruffle Russian feathers by its clear support for the democratic opposition movement, and for its decision to let Vilnius be host to the Belarusian European Humanities University in exile. Other Baltic states have supported this move by creating scholarships and making study places available for Belarusian students wishing to study in public universities in their countries (European Commission, 2007e).

While the Baltic states have been active and fairly successful in influencing the ENP, their experience in the strictly intergovernmental CFSP framework has been more mixed. Maintaining a balance between the commitments as members of both the EU and NATO, and seeing to it that these two bodies do not become competitors, has been a major concern. In this the Baltic states are far from alone, and the likelihood of such conflicts occurring is very small. Towards Russia the Baltic states have tried to place emphasis on the EU’s values in the fields of human rights and civil liberties. In this the Baltic states have generally favoured a hard line, feeling that their hard-earned knowledge of Russia and Russia’s foreign policy modus operandi points to such a course as being the most likely to make an impression. Most of the older EU members outside Scandinavia do not share the same perception of Russia as a potential threat, and have favoured a softer approach.

Such sorts of differences have shown themselves, time and again, in a number of contexts, and have often left the EU paralysed when crisis situations have appeared. Preparing for the unexpected and creating the decision-making procedures for handling contingencies is always prudent. Especially when dealing with a country like Russia. Yet the EU’s intergovernmental parts remain rather slow-moving, not easily able to take ad-hoc decisions that fall outside of long-established policies (Krok-Paszkowska & Zielonka, 2005, p. 155). Then again, there are no rules without exception. Thus when the EU was initially unsure of what position to take during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in November-December 2004, it was Poland and Lithuania who took the lead in mediating between the conflicting parties in Ukraine while shoring up the peaceful movement towards democracy (The Economist, 23/6/2005). Although this does stand as an excellent example of two not very central players filling a policy vacuum, essentially dragging the other 23 member
states with them, and exercising an influence on the final outcome that was out of proportion with their size and power inside the EU, the set of circumstances that allowed them to do so are not likely to allow for easy repetition elsewhere.

5. Does the EU provide the expected security?

When looking back at all the expectations for enhanced security against Russia that the Baltic states held when they entered the EU in 2004 it is clear, that the realities of membership would, in some aspects, be somewhat disappointing. There hasn’t been one, dramatic ‘across the board’ recasting of relations with Russia as a result of EU accession. Even as they have moved from being the ‘Near Abroad’, relations have not quite turned to a ‘normal neighbourly’ mode either, and Russia has still been a menacing presence for the Baltic states, as some of the examples above will have shown. All the same, it does not mean that EU membership has been a failure in providing a certain improvement in the position of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Rather, the record up to this point shows that EU membership has provided the Baltic states with a multilateral framework within which to pursue their interests. The examples above would furthermore suggest that the interests of the Baltic states have been most adequately protected in those fields, where the EU has had clearly established policies in place to be administered by the supranational bodies such as the European Commission. A number of results, which it had proven impossible to obtain under the pre-accession bilateral arrangements, became possible under the more de-politicised EU umbrella. The Baltic states have a clear interest in as cooperative a relationship with Russia as possible, and have found the EU a useful route to achieving some progress. Vice-versa, the less well-defined policy areas - where the mandate of the Commission and other common institutions is less clear - are the ones where the EU has acted less efficiently. Baltic calls for more united EU approaches to Russia in further policy fields, and a strengthening of the EU’s energy policy in particular, should be seen as an expression of this realisation.

The intergovernmental aspects to the EU’s foreign relations seem to have served the Baltic states less well. The looseness of both policy formulation and execution has left too much room for Russia to exploit,
and several larger member states have been all too prone to pursuing bilateral relationships with Russia in contradiction of the common EU line. That a coherent EU policy inspiring respect in Russia has not materialised yet, is largely due to the EU members themselves paying little respect. Again, the energy issue stand as an obvious example of a policy field. But also on issues of human rights and protection of civil society the EU and its members could go a long way towards taking firmer and more coherent stands.

This should not be taken as suggesting that the spread of supranationalism can be without limits. Clearly sovereign states will not accept too many restrictions on their freedom of action in such vital fields as foreign policy, nor would it be desirable for the Baltic states to take such a route to the extremes. But the Baltic states should aim for the EU to clarify its policy positions more thoroughly, so as to eliminate doubts about their application and reduce the scope for confusion. Especially with Russia it is prudent to expect the unexpected, and be ready to take ad-hoc decisions. Amid all the other short-comings of the Constitutional Treaty, the improved coherence in foreign policy making was at least one point on which it would have brought a real improvement to the EU.

The most important lesson that can be drawn from the experience of the Baltic states during the first three years of membership is the importance of intra-EU diplomacy. It is not enough to simply be a member in order to enjoy the benefits of protection. Directing continuous effort towards the partners nations in the EU in order to build support for the Baltic positions inside the Union is absolutely essential to gain influence on the common policies. The art of being an influential EU member is to present national priorities in ways that seem ‘communautaire’, and which attempt to build common policies for the good of the EU as a whole. Blatantly trying to settle old scores with Russia, especially at the risk of taking the whole EU hostage in the attempt, is most certainly going to be both ineffectual and counter-productive, as the recent example of Poland rejecting the revised PCA with Russia would suggest. States doing so would simply run up against the interests of their bigger, more powerful partners, and would most likely be left isolated. It is not necessarily the direction of EU policies that the Baltic states should be most worried
about. Rather it is the absence of policies that is the most problematic situation, as Russia will be more than willing to fill that gap.

Thus Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are facing, and facing up to, the challenge of having to balance cooperative, even proactive, attitudes towards developing relations with Russia, while at the same time remaining firm and insistent on key issues, such as the unsigned border treaties, being addressed by the EU as a whole. Such a balanced stance may disappoint those who had been looking forward to thumbing their noses at Russia from the safety of the EU. It may also seem too close for comfort for some who still harbour deep, and often justified, suspicions towards Russia. But such a modest, multilateral approach will surely deliver better results for the Baltic states, and enable them to fully benefit from the soft security that the European Union provides.

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1 At the time of writing, Russian accession to the WTO was expected to be achieved in mid-2007.
2 Lithuania actually gained territory during the Soviet occupation, and settled its border with Russia in the early 1990’s.
3 Lithuania has not, given its much smaller population of ethnic Russians, and very different approach to integration, faced quite the same issues as Latvia and Estonia.
4 Furthermore, the closure by the OSCE of its offices in the Baltic region in 2001 was widely seen as final proof that minority protection was as strong as could be expected in liberal societies.
Relations of Russia and Georgia: Developments and Future Prospects

By Ivars Indans

Russian and Georgian relations go far beyond the bilateral problems between two countries. The main objective of this article is to describe the relations between both countries taking into account the Georgian and Russian vision of the problems. The western orientation of Georgia towards European Union and NATO, influence not only Russian politics in Caucasus, but also challenge the international organizations to identify their interests and role in the region. Therefore, Georgian and Russian relations will be analysed also from the European Union and NATO perspective. In this context another goal of the article is to identify the interest of the three Baltic states in Georgian - Russian relations.

Russian troops in Georgia were put on "high alert" on September, 2006 and ordered to "shoot to kill if provoked" while defending Moscow's two military bases in the Caucasian country. Tensions between Russia and Georgia were escalating after Tbilisi arrested four Russian officers on September 27, 2006 on spying charges.

As a consequence, Moscow withdrew its diplomats from Tbilisi and warned that it could postpone pulling out its troops by 2008 as initially planned. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the press on September 27 that the situation is "very serious," and, therefore, "when the UN Security Council will consider the Georgia-Abkhaz settlement in the next two weeks, we will insist on assessing Georgia's activities as subversive." (Newsgeorgia.ru, 28/09/2006).

The conflict is divided over a number of issues including trade, espionage and energy. However, most dangerously of all, the conflict is on the status of two pro-Russian breakaway Georgian provinces - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The risks to Georgia are not only economic, but also political ones. The deportations in which they were involved followed hard on the heels of the dramatic arrest in Georgia in late September of four Russian security service officers accused of spying. The fact that they

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were released only after intense western pressure, in the view of Moscow, has only compounded the insult. In response the Kremlin has been deporting Georgians from Russia, closed Georgian businesses, and cut air and road links with Georgia.

The stakes in the southern Caucasus region are significant. Georgia forms a gateway linking the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and is vital for the control of Central Asia's massive fossil resources, and the well-known Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Georgia's geographic position is also critical to NATO's ability to secure the Black Sea region, and it allows Washington to project power toward the Middle East. Furthermore, at a time of uncertainty on Turkey's EU accession bid and on Ankara's geostrategic orientation, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's unwillingness to subscribe to US military actions in Iraq. This indicates Georgia's geostrategic importance for Washington is increasing. (Asmus, 2006, p. 35).

1. Russian - Georgian conflict: recent history

The conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi goes back a long way. In April 1989, Soviet tanks put down massive demonstrations in the Georgian capital after considerable bloodshed and hastened the demise of the USSR two years later. Georgia was the first former Soviet republic to leave the Soviet Union and relations between it and Russia have been fraught ever since its secession. (Asmus, 2006, p. 37).

In 1993, Russian troops intervened in a civil war in support of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Georgian president. Since then, tensions have risen steadily over a number of issues, from the presence of Russian military bases in Georgia to Russian allegations that Chechen rebels used Georgia as a safe haven. For much of the 1990s, Moscow was powerless to reassert its authority in the "near abroad", as Russians refer to refer to the former Soviet republics. (Fall 2006, p. 198). However, since Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 the restoration of the Kremlin's authority has become evident. This is due to the recovery in the Russian economy powered by high oil and gas prices have allowed Moscow to rebuild its influence over Georgia, and other energy-poor neighbours. (Bondareva, 2004, p. 75).
In January Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly, doubled prices for Georgia to $110 a thousand cubic metres and proposes a further rise to $230 at the start of 2007 - the highest for the former Soviet Union Republics. Meanwhile, Russia has banned imports of Georgian mineral water, and wine. The reasoning being Gazprom says the price increases are commercial, and Russian officials say the wine and mineral water restrictions are health-related. Georgians see all these acts as political, and have retaliated by withholding approval for Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organisation.

2. A look from Georgian perspective

The current crisis in relations between Moscow and Tblisi originates in Georgia's Rose Revolution of late 2003, which brought President Saakashvili to power. His policies where aimed at bringing his country closer to the EU and NATO. He has pledged to close Russian military bases in Georgia, and wants to make the most of Georgia's position on the route of new pipelines taking gas and oil from the Caspian Sea region to the west. This would give western companies a route avoiding Russia.

For Saakashvili, the models to follow were the Baltic states. (Vashakmadze, 2004, p. 17).

By reforming the economy, Saakashvili has made considerable progress towards reducing Georgia's dependence on Moscow, even if the country of 4.5m still ranks among the poorest states of the former Soviet Union. His ministers have cut taxes, attacked corruption, reduced red tape, sacked 30,000 bureaucrats and sold about 150 state enterprises including ports, banks, and Georgia Telecom. The changes have stimulated growth, with gross domestic product rising 9 per cent last year and a forecast 8 per cent in 2006. The World Bank counts Georgia among the world's top reformers.

In spite of the economic upheaval, Saakashvili, who won the 2004 presidential election with over 90 per cent of the vote, has maintained his popularity. He concedes membership of the EU and NATO is a long way off, but he has deepened relations with both organisations - and secured substantial US and European aid.
In the conflict with Russia, Saakashvili has appealed to the European Union to take a strong common stand against Russian efforts to enforce its sphere of influence, and the attempts to divide the EU members with separate trade and energy deals. Saakashvili stated Russian sanctions, blocking Georgian exports of wine, fruit and mineral water, have failed to dent the country’s rapid economic growth rate, which could reach double figures this year. Faced with a likely doubling in the price it pays for Russian gas from Gazprom, Georgia will have to rely on neighbouring Azerbaijan as its principal energy supplier, with Iran as a standby for emergency. According to the president of Georgia, “Our trade balance has recovered, and I hope our economic growth will be in double digits. It is already around 9 per cent. The best thing that is happening is that lots of new investment is coming into the country from Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Western Europe” (Newsgeogia.ru 05/01/2007).

3. “Frozen” territories

Abkhazia and South Ossetia broke away from Georgia in the early 1990’s when the Abkhaz and Ossetian ethnic groups revolted against central Georgian rule, resulting in the mass expulsion of ethnic Georgians. Russia has warned that it would defend the separatist territories if the Georgian government launched an assault to win back control (Chepurin, 2004, p. 3).

Saakashvili has re-established Tbilisi's authority over one of his three problem regions - Adjara, a Black Sea province bordering Turkey. But South Ossetia and Abkhazia, lying next to Russia, have proved more difficult. Unlike Adjars, the Ossetians and the Abkhazians are ethnically different from Georgians. Both were involved in civil wars with Tbilisi in the early 1990’s, when they established de facto autonomy.

Of the two, Abkhazia, with about 200,000 residents, is far larger and more desirable to Russia. South Ossetia is a mountainous inland district with an estimated population of under 50,000. Its main asset is a tunnel through the mountains linked to the Russian region of North Ossetia, which Georgian officials say is used for smuggling guns, drugs and counterfeit $100 bills.
Flushed with early success in Adjara, Saakashvili tried, in 2004, to impose his will on South Ossetia. But his ill-judged attempt brought violent clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces. This deepened the divide between Tbilisi and Eduard Kokoity, a former wrestling champion and South Ossetia's self-proclaimed pro-Russian president, and his Russian advisers (Narochnitskaya, 2004, pp. 31-58).

Under pressure from the US and the EU to avoid violence, Saakashvili has switched to a less aggressive tack (Karaganov, 2004, pp. 24-35). When Kokoity staged an independence referendum and presidential election, Tbilisi responded with polls of its own in South Ossetian districts it controls. The result was the election of two presidents - Kokoity in Tskhinvali's polls and, in Tbilisi's, Igor Sanakoyev, a former South Ossetian prime minister who now favours a deal with Saakashvili.

The outcome gives Tbilisi the option of trying to undermine Kokoity by running a parallel administration. Saakashvili is playing a similar game in Abkhazia, where he has installed a government in the isolated Tbilisi-controlled Kodori gorge. But its influence is insignificant compared with the authority of the Abkhaz administration in Sukhumi. Abkhazia's leaders are divided between those seeking outright independence and those wanting to join Russia. South Ossetians, by contrast, see independence from Tbilisi only as a stage on the way to joining the North Ossetians under Moscow's rule (Ghebali, 2004, p. 282).

Backed by the US and the EU, Saakashvili says he is ready for a negotiated settlement based on maintaining Georgia's territorial integrity but he argues the key lies in Russia's attitude. Putin has recently urged both South Ossetia and Abkhazia to abandon separatism and build a common state inside Georgia. But, he has also accused Georgia of preparing for military action. Tbilisi has increased defence spending to about 3 per cent of GDP, with additional training and equipment coming from the US and NATO.

At the end of January 2006, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili presented to the Council of Europe a peace plan for South Ossetia. The offer granted the breakaway province broad guarantees of autonomy. The plan also gave citizens in South Ossetia the right to elect the province's government, which would oversee local culture, education, economic
policy, and environmental issues. It was expected to guarantee the rehabilitation of the province's economy as well. In addition, the president announced a three-year transitional period for building cooperation between the police of Georgia and South Ossetia and integration of the region's military forces into the national armed forces. To implement this plan the region would have to start demilitarising and be under permanent monitoring to "make sure that there are no military units that could violate the stability of the region" (Newsgeorgia.ru. 24.02.2006). In other words, the aim is to establish control of the border with Russia to prevent armed groups from entering the province.

Eduard Kokoity, the president of South Ossetia, has rejected this plan, saying the region has been independent, and has maintained no relations with Georgia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. South Ossetia, with 95 percent of its population being Russian nationals, wants to unite with North Ossetia, which is a part of the Russian Federation. According to several sources the financial resources of Kokoity are linked to the criminal world drug and gun trafficking, and he has even been convicted in Russia. Since Kokoity is dependent on Russia, Georgia has turned into some kind of a hostage of South Ossetia; everything will depend on whether Russia orders Kokoity to withdraw or makes him negotiate (Papava, 2006, p. 657).

4. A look from Russian perspective

Russian policy towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region is determined by economic expansion, and political domination. The first major entry by Russian companies into the Georgian economy took place under the earlier Shevardnadze regime. In the summer of 2003, United Energy Systems (UES), a power company with majority ownership by the Russian government, purchased Tbilisi electricity distribution company Telasi and the 9th (the only one in working condition) block of the Gardabani Power station from the American AES Corporation. UES also received the right to manage hydroelectric power stations Khrami-1 and Khrami-2, and through its 50 percent of the shares in the Sakrusenergo joint venture, acquired ownership of 50% of all the 500 kw power lines in Georgia. In early March 2005, the Georgian government and UES started negotiations on a new five-year cooperation plan. The details are still unknown, but it is expected that UES may
acquire ownership of other distribution and generation facilities in Georgia.

Developments have accelerated in early 2005. In mid-January, Russia’s Vneshtorgbank purchased 51% of the shares of the United Georgian Bank. The major shareholder in Vneshtorgbank is the Government of the Russian Federation. In the end of January 2005, the Georgian government signed a memorandum with Russia’s YevrAzHolding, the winner of a tender to buy the Chiatumargarzes (one of the largest manganese concentrate producers in the former Soviet Union and one of western Georgia’s biggest enterprises) and the Vartsikhe hydro cascade for $132 million. Manganese is one of the most important export commodities for Georgia.

The Russian state natural gas monopoly Gazprom made its first big move into Georgia in 2003, taking over the gas transportation business from Russian-American gas trader Itera, itself affiliated with former Gazprom officials. On July 1, 2003 the Georgian government and Gazprom signed a memorandum on strategic cooperation for 25 years. The agreement promised the supply of natural gas to Georgian customers and the rehabilitation of gas pipelines, a task that Gazprom never performed. In January 2005, Gazprom announced its interest in privatizing Georgia’s gas pipeline system. The Georgian gas pipeline system includes pipes which distribute gas in Georgia’s regions and pipelines which are used for transporting gas from Russia to Georgia and Armenia.

Georgian policies towards the EU and NATO have evidently angered the Kremlin. Like many in today’s Russian elite, President Vladimir Putin says he has no wish to restore communism, but nonetheless regrets the collapse of the USSR, and the independence of the former republics (Radzkhovsky, 2004, p. 150). In the Caucasus in particular, Kremlin officials fear the emergence of a stronger Georgia could complicate Russia’s handling of its own often troubled ethnic minorities in the region, most importantly Chechnya.

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned there could be a "bloodbath" in its breakaway regions. "The issue does not lie between Russia and Georgia, the issue is between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia," Putin said. "To our regret and fear, it is heading for a bloodbath. Georgia
wants to resolve the disputes with military action." He added that the recent deterioration of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi, were sparked by Georgia's arrest of four Russian army officers on spying charges which had been fabricated for political purposes. "The initiative to worsen relations originated not from Russia," claimed Putin (Newsgeorgia.ru. 25/11/2006).

Russia has also accused new NATO members of supplying arms to Georgia. According to Russia's former defence minister Sergey Ivanov, certain new members of NATO are supplying Georgia with weapons earlier supplied to them by the USSR, without the right to re-export them. The current deputy prime minister also said he would draw NATO's attention once again to "Georgia's inadequate actions against Russian servicemen." (Lenta.ru., 26/12/2006). Ivanov, further said that in accordance with earlier reached agreements, Russian servicemen would leave the country no earlier than in 2008.

According to Andrei Kokoshin, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on the CIS and Compatriots Abroad, the overwhelming majority of the Russian political class has a markedly negative attitude to the NATO enlargement. The same applies to the efforts to draw Georgia into the NATO orbit, and has been reflected in statements by the State Duma. Andrei Kokoshin noticed: “We have more than enough political, economic, and socio-cultural reasons to be negative about admission of these countries to NATO. Our military-strategic concerns are also growing” (Newsgeorgia.ru, 28/09/2006).

Russia considers that efforts of Washington and Brussels to draw Georgia into NATO do not help enhance stability in Europe. (Stulberg, 2005, p. 25). According to Andrei Kokoshin “they are encouraging the belligerent attitudes of those politicians who came to power in Tbilisi after a coup d'état in the wake of the Rose Revolution” (Newsgeorgia.ru, 28/09/2006). Russia blames Georgian leaders who continue rejecting the proposals of South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity, and his Abkhazian counterpart Sergei Bagapsh to sign agreements on the non-use of force.
5. Geostrategy in the South Caucasus

The clash between Russia and Georgia, is only a symptom of the broader strategic positioning of the West and Russia in and around the South Caucasus. In this scenario, at regional and global levels, countries and organizations are involved in a struggle for power and energy security (Stulberg, 2005, p. 25). Considering these two issues, what is the current situation in the South Caucasus and what can be expected in the future?

Affecting the region are the political-military and security policies of the players involved. These players include Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and their "frozen" conflicts of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Additionally, the leverage of regional powers, such as Turkey and Iran, and of global powers, such as the United States, Russia and China, is part of the power configuration in the region.

In addition to countries, international organizations are also involved in this game. At the regional level, there is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) the Caspian Sea Force (CASFOR), the cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the global level, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) also exercise political weight in the South Caucasus.

6. Energy security

In addition to the power configuration, is the issue of energy security. Energy security is high on the international agenda, as the United States, the European Union and NATO have expressed their concern about threats to energy security. EU countries as a whole currently import 50 percent of their energy needs (the U.S. imports 58 percent of its oil), and will import 70 percent by 2030. Furthermore, EU countries import 25 percent of their energy needs from Russia, which may rise to 40 percent in 2030 (another 45 percent comes from the Middle East). Besides this growing dependency, it has become clear that the energy instrument is an essential part of Russia's external security policy. This was further evident
after it used this to force Ukraine to pay a higher gas price at the end of 2005.

The geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus is based on the presence of energy resources. Stability in the Caucasus is a vital requirement for the uninterrupted transport of Caspian oil and gas. The Caspian Sea region (the South Caucasus and Central Asia) contains about 3-4 percent of the world's oil reserves and 4-6 percent of the world's gas reserves. In itself, the Caucasian share of global oil and gas reserves is not considerable. However, in light of the uncertainty over the reliability of Persian Gulf supplies, as well as the possibility that Russia may use energy delivery as a power tool, the transport of Caspian and Central Asian (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) energy supplies to the West via the Caucasus has gained vital importance.

The importance of the region has also grown as a result of energy policies by consumer states in the West that want to decrease their dependence on resources from Russia and the Middle East. A number of states and organizations are making efforts to end Russia's near monopoly on the transport of energy supplies in the Eurasian region by creating alternative pipeline routes to transport these supplies (Stulberg, 2005, 25). Thus, the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline (China and Kazakhstan), the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Kazakhstan) and the Nabucco gas pipeline (European Union, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria) are operational, under construction or planned.

7. “Defrosting” the “frozen” conflicts

Washington wants a stable South Caucasus region for its investment in the energy sector, as well as for its geostrategic interests in the region. (Asmus, 2006, p.75). The separatist regions in Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - have become areas of the major players' interests in the region (Russetski, 2005, p. 7). With the exception of the tensions surrounding Tbilisi, Russia has not played a very neutral role in these conflicts. Russia has used the conflicts as political leverage with the West.

The objectives are clear: the West and Russia have the aspiration of being the major players in the South Caucasus. Russia, however, is gradually
being forced to retreat from this region. To counter this development, one of Russia's tactics is to slow down Western advances by keeping the so-called "frozen conflicts" active. This makes it harder for Georgia to attract Western investment, and is complicating its accession to NATO.

The tensions are likely to continue if these global powers and their organizations cannot find consensus or "peaceful coexistence." According to Marcel de Haas, Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague, in these circumstances, a solution to the frozen conflicts is rather unthinkable. If that is the case, disputes - harmful to the economic development of the South Caucasus - are likely to continue until the time that these countries are consolidated into Western structures.

8. Military alliances as guardians of energy

Matters of energy security tend to attract the attention of military organizations. For example, military organizations are at the centre of the security of oil and gas pipelines against terrorist attacks. In GUAM, increasing tensions with Russia for Georgia and Moldova has forced it to reconsider its energy security and to find an alternative to dependency on Russian oil and gas. In such an alternative scenario, Azerbaijan is to play a crucial role both as energy supplier and a transit country for oil and gas from Central Asia. The sustainability of such a scenario is yet to be shown (Asmus, 2006, p. 75).

The Russian armed forces are currently tasked with the protection of energy resources, such as off-shore platforms. Also, for the Russian-led CSTO, energy security seems to be recognized as a task of growing importance. A recent exercise at a nuclear energy station in Armenia showed that the CIS Anti-Terrorist Center is already involved in this. It is not unlikely that in the future the CSTO will take over energy security tasks and other responsibilities of the CIS. Therefore, as de Haas predicts, the involvement of the CSTO in energy security, especially in the South Caucasus, specifically in Armenia, is likely to develop further.

The West is also directly involved in energy security in the South Caucasus. Allegedly, military officers from Turkey, together with their colleagues from Azerbaijan and Georgia, have regularly carried out
command staff exercises to practice the protection of the BTC pipeline (Asmus, 2006, p. 75). Furthermore, in 2005 an agreement had supposedly been reached which arranged for the United States and NATO to secure the BTC pipeline. In the future, they would also safeguard the BTE gas pipeline. In addition to this, military units of NATO and the United States would also support and/or train Georgian troops tasked with the protection of pipelines. However, Georgian, NATO and US officials all deny any NATO or US involvement in pipeline security in Georgia and claim that it has its own dedicated units for pipeline protection.

Considering that the United States and NATO are likely to be involved in energy security in the South Caucasus, as is Russia with the CSTO, this could lead to rivalry. de Haas considers that the worst case could even be a local arms race between their regional allies - with Iran and Armenia on the Russian side versus Azerbaijan and Georgia on the Western side - should not be ruled out (Asmus, 2006, p. 81).

9. US-Russian competition in the Caucasus

Energy resources, and the war on terrorism are the main reasons for the US presence in the region. The United States, with its heavy military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and following the switch of Uzbekistan to the Russian camp, has to seek strong points in the Caucasian area in support of its global geostrategy (Asmus, 2006, 79).

The recent involvement of the United States might upset the precarious power balance in these regions, which has evolved after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is especially true now that Iran and Russia, the greatest powers in the region, feel threatened. Russia regards the South Caucasus as its traditional backyard of influence and counters increasing involvement in the area by the West. The United States has chosen Azerbaijan as its most important ally in the Caspian basin and has developed a programme of intense military cooperation. Russian military analysts argue that the situation is reminiscent to the US-Georgian Train and Equip Programme, which since its start in 2002 has provided Georgia with a capable, well-trained and equipped army.

Russia has shown it is seriously interested in preserving its regional authority with its Caspian Flotilla. Yet with a growing US presence, it will
need to form alliances. A Russian-led CASFOR maritime force, including other littoral states in addition to Iran, still seems far in the future. A cause of potential conflict is the unclear legal status of the Caspian. So far, the littoral states have not reached an agreement on dividing the Caspian Sea. Near armed clashes have already occurred between Azerbaijan and Iran over disputed oil fields. Tensions are likely to continue as long as the legal situation of the Caspian Sea remains in dispute. Because of the geostrategic and economic interests at stake, and an apparent failure to come to a consensus from both sides, the competition between Russia and the United States in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea is likely to be prolonged in the years ahead.

10. EU role in conflict resolution

Recent statements by the European Union display a more active policy in the South Caucasus. The European Union has the reputation of an "honest broker" and as having a wide scope of instruments for achieving peace and stability (Vashakmadze, 2004, p. 13). Conversion of statements into an active security policy could be established by forming a military mission to be deployed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The purpose is not to replace the Russian peacekeepers, but serve as an additional asset to promote stability and reconstruction. Such a mission would be beneficial for the stature of the European Union, to prove that it is capable of conducting crisis management missions. Furthermore, this would adhere to the call of the Georgian government to introduce Western peacekeepers in the disputed areas.

Russia may oppose a competitive peacekeeping force, but it will have a difficult time openly disapproving of such an EU mission. It wants to maintain good relations with the European body, and also because it has no grounds to feel threatened by EU peacekeepers. A possible EU military mission to the separatist areas should be part of a larger EU operation, using its social and economic instruments as well for stability and reconstruction (Vashakmadze, 2004, p.19). Such an approach would strengthen a normal economic build-up, and thus be detrimental to the largely illegal economic structures of the current leadership of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With such an encompassing program, the separatist regions could gradually develop into stable societies, which would also be beneficial for their position toward the Georgian government.
11. Georgian perspectives towards NATO and the EU

Although the entrance of Georgia into NATO might still take some years, it is probable that the relationship between NATO and the South Caucasian states will further deepen, with Georgia taking the lead. Further NATO enlargement will be considered in 2008, when several Western Balkan countries could be invited to join the Alliance. The NATO Riga Summit Declaration (News agency LETA, 29.11.2006.) states that NATO’s enlargement has been successful so far, and ensured stability, peace and cooperation in Europe. NATO will continue pursuing its open door policy, and is ready to be accessed by countries that meet NATO standards and can contribute to trans-Atlantic security and stability. The declaration also acknowledges that NATO will continue active dialogue with Georgia in the areas of political, military, financial, and security.

For the development of Georgia the prospects of European Neighborhood Policy in the Southern Caucasus and implementation of the EU-Georgia Action Plan are issues of key importance (Vashakmadze, 2004, p. 87). Increased ties between the Georgia and the EU can also be expected, although membership of the EU for it seems further away than that of NATO, due to the enlargement fatigue within the EU.

Although formally denied, there is reason to believe that NATO has, or will have, a role in pipeline security in the South Caucasus, for clear geostrategic reasons. The EU is also likely to build up its activities in the South Caucasus, especially in energy infrastructure, economic development, rule of law, and probably also conflict solution - for which it has a more independent reputation than does NATO. Consequently, NATO and the EU will share an upcoming long-lasting involvement in the region, which, by establishing a labour division in their best fields of expertise, may be able to bring security and prosperity to the South Caucasus.

12. The interests of the Baltics in Georgia

As a member of NATO and the EU the Baltic states are interested in enlarging the European zone of security and economic prosperity towards the CIS region. From a geostrategic point of view the Baltic
states are interested in the balance of power and influence in the CIS region. Otherwise, a future dependency on Russia might create security risks for the Baltic states. Taking into account the economic expansion of Russia as well as the authoritarian system of power, it is essential that Western organizations and structures are involved in promoting democracy and market economy. Therefore, all three Baltic states have supported the aspirations of Georgia to move closer towards the EU and NATO. However, the priorities of the Baltic states have been different which also means more limited resources for reaching the strategic objectives.

Baltic states have called for unambiguous signals by the international community in regards to the territorial integrity of Georgia, and the denunciation of interference in the domestic affairs of Georgia by any third state. The sanctions imposed by Russia are contrary to the generally accepted principles of international law. According to Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga, the EU must continue trying to help resolving tension between Russia and Georgia (LETA, 02/11/2006).

Analyzing the role of the Baltic states, it seems that so far Lithuania has been the most active in dealing with security issues in Georgia. An illustration of this is the Lithuanian position regarding the “frozen” conflicts. Lithuanian foreign minister Petras Vaitiekunas has urged the OSCE to settle "frozen" conflicts and supporting the Georgian peace plan for South Ossetia presented to the Council of Europe. According to Petras Vaitiekunas, the OSCE should be more concerned about the settlement of "frozen" conflicts, strengthen prevention of terrorism, and control the commitments regarding human rights. "Settlement of 'frozen' conflicts in Moldova and South Caucasus should remain the key OSCE priority in the coming years," the head of the Lithuanian diplomacy highlighted. Vaitiekunas also called on Russia to fulfil its commitments undertaken in 1999 in Istanbul concerning the withdrawal of the armed forces from Moldova and Georgia. According to the minister, the implementation of the restoration projects in South Ossetia, led by OSCE, to which Lithuania has undertaken to allot 100,000 euros, would facilitate the settlement of the conflicts (ELTA, 05/12/2006).

The Lithuanian foreign minister has expressed support to Georgia's integration into the EU and NATO. He has also promised Lithuania's
assistance in the implementation of these targets. The Presidents of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine have issued a joint statement regarding the situation in Georgia. “The developments of the situation around Georgia stir our concern and anxiety. We call upon both sides to show restraint and calm, to refrain from mutual accusations, to proceed to dialogue and negotiations. The use of threats and the absence of readiness for concessions could lead only to further worsening of the situation. With satisfaction we mark the efforts by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Belgian Foreign Minister K. De Gucht, Finland’s Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja, whose country holds the EU presidency, as well as by other representatives of the international community, which assist in solving the problem. We are convinced that their involvement could serve as the main factor that would make possible the settlement of the conflict on the territory of Georgia for ensuring sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of this country. Every conflict may be settled through negotiations, in which we are ready to take part as mediators”, the presidents stated (ELTA, 06/11/2006).

Estonia and Latvia have been more active promoting development aid policy towards Georgia which would stimulate integration processes towards the EU. The main goal of development co-operation is support for the process of public administration, municipal and economic reforms, of European and transatlantic integration, promoting the development of democratic and civic society, and the launching of development co-operation projects.

On 3 October 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers approved Latvia’s Development Co-operation Plan for 2007, which states that the implementations of bilateral and trilateral co-operation projects and public information activities on the issues of development co-operation have been identified as key priority areas. In 2007, Latvia is determined to work in two main directions: to improve the quality and efficiency of assistance, and to progressively increase funding for the development co-operation purposes.

To reach the goals of bilateral and trilateral co-operation, appropriate support will be provided for projects emanating from the priority areas set out in the Development Co-operation Plan for 2007. This plan was developed by non-governmental organizations, local municipalities,
private and government institutions. At the request of other countries, Latvian experts will share Latvia’s experience gained during the transition period, and will provide consultations regarding implementation of reforms. Special seminars and training visits will be organized for representatives of recipient countries in Latvia.

Georgia is identified as priority country for 2007, in view of the contacts that have developed to date, the foreign policy direction of these countries, and their willingness to co-operate with Latvia. A significant element in the formulation of the Plan for 2007 is the European Neighbourhood Policy, which also encompasses the priority region identified by Latvia.

Estonia has a similar approach regarding the development cooperation policy towards Georgia. For instance, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will allocate financial assistance to the Deer Leap project initiated by the Georgian Ministry of Education and Science. Estonia will support the implementation of the project that is similar to the Tiger Leap one undertaken in Estonia, in Georgia. “Estonia as a small state has best options for providing knowledge-based counselling for development aid. Our e-experience in computerisation of the educational system and making the cyber space accessible to young people is much awaited in Georgia”, Estonian foreign ministry noted (BNS, 23/11/2006).

The objective of the project of the E-State Academy Foundation titled “Supporting of the Deer Leap programme in years 2007-2008” is to help the successful application of the Deer Leap programme. In the framework of the programme the schools will be equipped with computers and internet access, teachers’ educational programme will be planned and executed, an educational portal will be developed, the information and communication technology will be integrated into the curriculum, and e-study materials will be compiled that can be used in lessons. The Deer Leap programme was launched by the President of Georgia Saakashvili in March of 2005, and the foundation was established in August of 2005.
Conclusions

Tbilisi's pro-Western course is predicated upon a strategic relationship with the United States and NATO. It also serves the purpose of post-Soviet national elite that is eager to eliminate Russian hegemony. Disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia are worrying Tbilisi, but, on the other hand, they are enabling the Saakashvili administration to distract international attention from its increasingly authoritarian rule. It also provides him an effective ideological tool to boost nationalism, and use it against remaining Russian influence.

Thus, tensions are likely to remain high in the coming future. While it is unlikely that Russia and NATO will make moves that could openly put one against the other in the region, Moscow's support for separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will probably continue. Chances that a smooth diplomatic solution to Georgia's regional issues will be implemented soon are decreasing, while Tbilisi's approach to separatism remains militaristic.

This escalation signals that Georgia is likely to become the catalyst for US-Russian geopolitical conflict for strategic and economic influence in the Caucasus. Washington criticized Moscow's reaction to the officers' arrests and continues to sponsor Tbilisi's gradual integration into NATO. Saakashvili has never concealed his pro-U.S. stance and frequently accuses Russia of being the destabilizing force behind breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although Moscow officially says that Georgia is a sovereign state and is free to join NATO, Russia is working to maintain strong influence in the Trans-Caucasus region.

For the US and the European Union the dispute comes at a difficult time. While they support Saakashvili, Georgia's reformist pro-west president, NATO members face many other problems. They increasingly need Russia's co-operation on key issues, including Iraq, Iran, North Korea and the Balkan trouble spot of Kosovo. Georgians worry that, because of these other priorities, there may be limits to the western commitment to Tbilisi.
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Russia’s Information Policy in Lithuania:
The Spread of Soft Power or Information Geopolitics?

By Nerijus Maliukevicius

Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, thus attaining its vital political goals. However the merger of the Lithuanian information environment, in terms of culture and values, with the Western information environment still lacks clarity and stability. The results of electronic media (TV) monitoring (conducted by the author in 2005-2007) reveal a significant increase of Russia’s impact on the content of Lithuanian media products. Significant segments of Lithuanian society receive popular information as well as news about the world and the post-Soviet region through Russian TV networks (Civil Society Institute (CSI) – Vilmorus poll, 2006). The same study shows that many Lithuanians still have a feeling of nostalgia for the “soviet times”. This might lead us to think that Russian information policies are successful in this particular post-Soviet country. However, the CSI-Vilmorus poll reveals just the opposite: in Lithuania, Russia is considered to be the most hostile country (CSI, 2006).

This article focuses on the above mentioned paradox: the competitive advantage Russia has for its information policies in the Lithuanian information environment and, at the same time, an entirely negative image the Lithuanian public has formed about modern Russia. This dilemma tempts us to find a reasoned explanation. The article contends that the main reason behind this paradox is the strategy used by Russia in pursuing its information policy. The said strategy rests on the principles of resonance communication and on the theory and practice of information geopolitics – a strategy which fundamentally contradicts the current soft power principles so popular in international politics.

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1. Theory: soft power vs information geopolitics

When searching for an answer to what kind of strategy does Russia actually (or declaratively) use for its information policy in the post-Soviet environment, both Lithuanian and Russian experts immediately focus on the Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, headed by Modest Kolerov. This institution established at the beginning of 2005 was designated by Putin to enhance Russia’s image in the neighbouring post-Soviet countries. In most of his interviews, Modest Kolerov repeatedly states that Russia’s foreign policy interests should be supported by humanitarian instruments (Telegraf, 2005). Such statements and the official title of the presidential department imply that Kremlin wants to pursue soft power politics – a strategy applied by the United States in Western information environment. This strategy is specially designed to be popular and attractive and it is aimed at achieving the desired results through making others believe that they want what you want.

Patrick Tyrrell has predicted that linguistic, religious or cultural forms of sovereignty will develop alongside national sovereignty within the global information environment, which will not necessarily coincide with state territorial borders (Tyrrel, 1999, p. 73). So the important question is: “Who will be the sovereigns of the newly formed sovereign environments?” Western scholars Robert O. Keohane (Keohane, Nye, 1998) and Joseph S. Nye (Nye, 2004) think that future sovereigns would be the ones who are able to wield soft power. They define this power as “the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what you want” (Keohane, Nye, 1998).

It was already highlighted (Maliukevicius, 2006) that based on this concept effective foreign policy will depend increasingly more on the popularity and seductiveness of state-promoted political ideas and international initiatives. Coalitions will be formed more often through public relations or political marketing and less often by using hard power. Therefore social and communication resources (TV channels, radio, and the press) may eventually become more important than natural resources (crude oil and natural gas). In post-modern politics, power is transformed into communication structures.
In Russia, however, the concept of information geopolitics is more popular. Exponents of this concept (Panarin, 2006; Manoiло, 2003; Vorontsova and Frolov, 2006) see the post-Soviet environment as an information battlefield. According to Manoiло (Manoiло, 2003, p. 17), dominance in the information environment of a geopolitical adversary can be ensured only through the use of such tools as:

1. **Latent information management** of the opponent’s internal, economic and cultural processes - which would create the required background for informational, ideological, economic and cultural expansion, and predetermine the opponent’s decisions beneficial for the manipulator.

2. **Information-psychological aggression based on economic, political and diplomatic pressure** E.g. the recent wine blockade against Georgia and Moldova is still accompanied by intense information-psychological attacks (see news column „Zapret na vvoz moldavskih i gruzinskih vin i mineralnoi vody v Rossy“ at IA Regnum, http://www.regnum.ru/dossier/833.html).

3. **Information war based on economic blockade and the threat of use of force** Russia resorted to this tool after the arrest of Russian military servicemen in Georgia (see news column „Obostrenie otnoshenii mezhdu Rossy i Gruzyei“ at IA Regnum, http://www.regnum.ru/dossier/1056.html). The question of an economic blockade is currently on the agenda: Poland (meat issue), Lithuania (“Mazeikiu nafta” and “Druzhba” issue) and Belarus (gas issue). Moreover Russia continues to deploy its troops in some post-Soviet areas, which allows it to exert pressure on local governments by not only economic or informational means.

We can compare the impact produced by soft power politics and information geopolitics on the image of a country that chooses one or another avenue.
The distinction between the actors of international relations who choose one or the other strategy is the same as Machiavelli’s division of politicians into “foxes” and “lions”: political “foxes” are intelligent, manipulative, imaginative, consensus seeking, flexible, determined and enduring, whereas political “lions” are prone to confrontation, resolute, principled, impatient, merciless and unyielding (Rush, 1992, p. 64).

A country as a political actor can reach its short term goals using both strategies. In the long run however, soft power politics lead to mutual cooperation and understanding, while information geopolitics lead to conflict and strong negative images of each other. This is due to the fact that the concept of soft power is based on the ideas of attractiveness and aspiration, while the concept of information geopolitics, by contrast, is based on the ideas of competition and contest between countries in a global or regional information environment. As Nye puts it: “Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive” (Nye, 2004, p. X).
So why is it that the United States and Russia have decided to rely on conceptually different strategies of information policy? Nye believes that “soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics” and that “whereas leaders in authoritarian countries can use coercion and issue commands, politicians in democracies have to rely more on combination of inducement and attraction” (Nye, 2004, p. 6). However I would say that there are deeper reasons behind these differences.

When the United States emerged as the winner of the Cold War, it took up the All-Winner’s philosophy with a positive and pro-active attitude promoting American goals and ideals across the world. A political and cultural hegemony was thus established on the modern international arena guided by the principle that “a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries - admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness - want to follow it” (Nye, 2004, p. 5).

Meanwhile, an outlook with a hugely negative emotional charge prevails in modern Russian society and political elite, which distorts their perception of the existing international system: Soviet Union suffered an embarrassing defeat in the Cold War; its subsequent dissolution continues to ignite separatist tensions in Russia; and Russia has been humiliated by losing its status of a super power after the collapse of the bi-polar international system:

“Russians have been going through a major cultural trauma after losing their status of a super power, as revealed by most public opinion polls in post-Soviet Russia” (Simonian, 2005, p. 3, own translation from Russian text).

Most Russians believe that the international community is openly aggressive and that tremendous political, economic, cultural and information pressure is constantly exerted on Russia since the end of the Cold War, i.e. a “neo-taming” strategy is used against Russia (Rapoport, 2005). To regain the influence it had lost in post-Soviet countries, Russia resorts to information and communication technologies as well as the media and uses them as hard power tools of political and ideological struggle in a transformed international environment.
In addition, Russia may be objectively unable to use soft power for the simple reason that “a country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also some of its ability to shape the international agenda and some of its attractiveness” (Nye, 2004, p. 9). And such was the actual reality faced by Russia in the last decade of the 20th century.

2. Russia’s competitive advantage in Lithuania’s information environment

Before analyzing Russia’s resources for information policy in Lithuanian information environment we need to explore the very concept of this environment. In today’s high-tech world, relations between countries or cultures are developing within the global information environment, which can be defined as a totality of conflicting or interactive national or regional information environments. Differently from national information environments, regional information environments do not necessarily exist within strict geographical or territorial boundaries; they are based on cultures, religions or business practices. These environments are interconnected by information, telecommunications and media links which readily overstep geographical boundaries and easily overcome legal and technological barriers. However, interaction is possible only through a basic communication code: understandable language and common values.

National information environment can be defined as a communication, language, and culture medium where a specific society or community collects or receives information about itself and those surrounding it or about ongoing national and global developments. They work within this environment and also share information, knowledge, and mass culture products. Two aspects are essential in this context: technical and language-based knowledge and ability to participate in the global or regional communication process. Based on such skills and capacity, two types of national information environments are distinguished: open societies (Saulauskas, 2000) and closed or isolated national information environments. Lithuania, in terms of information environment, is a fairly open society.

National information environment encompasses three basic components:
1. Information and telecommunications technologies, media infrastructure, media and show business principles established in a specific national market, and regulatory legal framework;

2. People who live in the territory of a specific country or beyond, but psychologically associate themselves with the information environment of this particular country and their language skills and preferences of media use, and also moral principles;

3. Overall information circulating within the environment and mass culture products.

A detailed analysis of the Lithuanian information environment suggests that in most cases Russia has a substantial competitive advantage in pursuing its information policy goals:

- Most Lithuanians still have a good knowledge of the Russian language;
- Russia’s media channels (TV, radio, and the press) can reach significant portions of society and they are popular among local audiences;
- There is a sizeable Russian ethnic minority in Lithuania, which also contributes to Russia’s goals.

2.1. Russian language as resource of soft power

Let us start with the language issue - Russian is the most widely spoken foreign language in Lithuania:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge of Languages among Lithuanian Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, 2001 Population Census

Compared to the situation in the European Union (Eurobarometer, 2006, No 243), where Russian language ranks seventh in popularity (7% of the EU population speak Russian), it is an enormous advantage for Russia’s information policy.
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baltic state</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Statistics, 2001 Population and Housing Census

The knowledge of Russian, if not the native language, is similar in both Latvia and Estonia, while in Lithuania the percentage gap between those who understand and speak Russian and English is much larger. Of the three Baltic states, the Estonian population (one-fourth) knows English the best. Some consider that Russia has bigger advantage for its information policies in Latvia and Estonia because of numerous Russian minorities there, but statistics show that, in terms of language, Russia has an even stronger potential in Lithuania.

2.2. Russia’s dominance in Lithuanian media environment

Lithuanian media expert Laima Nevinskaite points out that Lithuania is emerging as a TV-viewing rather than a press-focused nation with all of the ensuing negative consequences for civil and political activity (Nevinskaite, 2006, p. 158). The pace of the development of TV broadcasting, re-broadcasting and reception infrastructures is the fastest in Lithuania; the same applies to the development of technical characteristics pertaining to television sets and TV networks. Digital television has already been launched in Lithuania. In 2005, only 1.5 percent of Lithuanian residents did not have a television set, while those with more than one TV set accounted for as much as 39 percent of the total population and only 1.8 percent of the respondents said that they did not watch TV at all (TNS Gallup, 2005). The data produced the same year show that most people in Lithuania get to know about international and local developments from television programmes.
What sources did you use yesterday to learn about events in Lithuania and the world?

TV and radio news programmes 81,8%  
TV and radio programmes 77,3%  
Daily newspapers 49,5%  
Friends and fellow colleagues 44,8%  
Internet 21,8%  
Magazines 15,8%  


The television era, which started in 1957 with the launch of the Lithuanian television network, is currently undergoing a rapid transformation: 31 TV networks and 57 cable TV networks (including 4 MMDS re-broadcasters) operated in Lithuania at the end of 2006 (LRTC, 2006).

National TV networks\(^4\) not only receive the lion’s share of income from television advertising, but they are also the most popular among the Lithuanian viewers: in 2005, the viewing time of four national television networks (LTV, TV3, LNK, BTV) accounted for more than 70 percent of the total TV viewing time in Lithuania (TNS Gallup, 2005).

Within this context, it would be interesting to compare the share of Russian programmes, serials, movies and talk shows in the broadcasting time of major TV networks (LTV, TV3, LNK, BTV and 5 Kanalas\(^5\)). The comparison is based on a qualitative analysis of TV programme guides published in magazines and TV websites. Three random periods were compared (seven days of broadcasting time, Saturday- Friday): April 30-May 6, 2005; February 25-March 3, 2006; and January 20-26, 2007.
During the above mentioned periods, the Lithuanian Television broadcasted two programmes in Russian: The Russian Street and News in Russian, which amounted to more than 1 hour of the LTV broadcasting time in the respective periods. In this aspect, LTV should be described as the most consistent television network that produces and broadcasts original programmes for ethnic minorities. We could even question whether the original programmes produced by the public broadcaster and intended for the Russian ethnic minority are adequate in terms of quantity. Having too few Russian-language programmes is likely to shift the Russian-speaking audience from local information and entertainment sources to Russian-language sources outside Lithuania.

Meanwhile, the amount of Russian programmes broadcasted by TV3, LNK, BTV and 5 Kanalas in the above mentioned periods greatly varied.

This survey reveals several important tendencies in the Lithuanian TV environment:

✔ first, some television networks broadcast a significant amount of Russian production (e.g. in 2006, during the reference week, 5 Kanalas broadcasted 46 hours of such programmes, which accounted
for nearly 42 percent of the total weekly broadcasting time (112 hours); other TV networks broadcasted less of Russian production (e.g. TV3 did not broadcast any Russian programmes during the same period);

✓ second, we can presume that the ongoing changes are mostly predetermined by economic factors and business decisions: e.g. in 2007, 5 Kanalas significantly reduced broadcasting NTV (Russian network) production; meanwhile in 2007, after its general director was appointed to head the DTV network (Viasat Group) in Russia, TV3 started broadcasting Russian-made humour programmes, reality shows and series;

**Chart 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>LTV</th>
<th>TV3</th>
<th>LNK</th>
<th>BTV</th>
<th>Total per week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 30-May 6, 2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 25-March 3, 2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20-26, 2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Media Content Survey conducted by the author: LTV, TV3, LNK, BTV and 5 Kanalas // April 30-May 6, 2005; February 25-March 3, 2006; January 20-26, 2007.

In spite of a decrease in the broadcasting of Russian production this year, Russian-made TV shows and series continue to fiercely work their way to Lithuania’s major national networks. This tendency is interrelated with the above mentioned language issue. Taking into consideration that the Law on Provision of Information to the Public (Article 34) states that foreign-language programmes must either be voiced over or subtitled in
Lithuanian and given that a major portion of people in Lithuania understand Russian, commercial TV networks prefer to use subtitles in Russian TV series and talk shows, while the English-language production is usually voiced over. This reinforces the Russian language position in the Lithuanian information environment.

The results of analysing the audience of radio stations airing news in Russian and playing Russian music (Russkoje Radio Baltija, Raduga) on the basis of the average share of radio stations in major cities are also quite interesting and revealing.

Chart 5


In Vilnius, Russkoje Radio Baltija has emerged as a clear-cut leader; while in Klaipeda the leading position belongs to Raduga. Meanwhile, LR1 and Pukas (which plays Lithuanian music) dominate in Kaunas. It means that the popularity of a radio station in Lithuanian major cities depends on the city’s ethnic composition.

2.3. Nostalgia for “Soviet times”

In addition to the above mentioned resources for information policies, the analysis of public values show that many Lithuanians have strong nostalgic feelings towards Soviet times: they assess in similar terms the political system which existed in the former Soviet Union and the
political system which currently exists in Lithuania (CSI, 2006). The respondents in this survey were asked to evaluate the political system of the Soviet Union and the political system of modern Lithuania: 24 percent of those questioned described the former Soviet system as good or very good and 25.1 percent describe the current political system of Lithuania in the same terms. 41.2 percent of Lithuanian residents assess the Soviet political system as bad and very bad; in respect of modern Lithuania, such respondents stand at 32.4 percent. The respondents were also asked to evaluate different aspects of life in the Soviet Union and modern Lithuania: education and health care, social welfare, public safety and law and order, employment, economic well-being, culture and arts, justice guarantees, equal opportunities and treatment, and respect for moral principles (CSI, 2006). The most different assessments were given in respect of health care: 47.4 percent of those questioned said that the Soviet health care system was good and very good compared to 18.2 percent of the respondents who said the same about health care in modern Lithuania. As regards employment opportunities in the Soviet Union, 72.5 percent said that they were good and very good compared to 29.5 percent of respondents who described employment in modern Lithuania in the same terms. 33.7 percent of respondents assessed public safety and law and order in the Soviet Union as good and very good compared to 16.4 percent who said the same about public safety and law and order in today’s Lithuania.

**Chart 6**

Despite the nostalgia for “Soviet times” the Lithuanian population assesses the political system of present-day Russia in a very different way:

**Source:** Civil Society Institute (CSI) – Vilmorus poll, 2006.
only 10.3 percent of those questioned describe it as good or very good (similarly as the political system of Belarus) and more that 50 percent of respondents think of it as a bad or very bad. This is a very important issue. Ney emphasizes that language, media resources are important for effective soft power politics, but even more importantly they should include a country’s “political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004, p. 11). And as the survey shows, modern Russia does not have such resources in Lithuania. To put it in terms of modern management theories – Russia can not lead other post-Soviet countries by its example.

3. Russia’s image in Lithuania: most hostile country. Why?

The public opinion survey focused on the image of other countries in Lithuania (CSI, 2006). It revealed that Lithuanian society perceives Russia as a major adversary and its current political and economic vectors are discarded. Modern Russia has a very negative image in this particular post-Soviet society in spite of the competitive advantage it has in the Lithuanian information environment.

![Chart 7](image)

**Source:** Civil Society Institute (CSI) – Vilmorus poll, 2006.

The opinions held by local ethnic minorities about Russia are quite unexpected and surprising: 40% of Russians in Lithuania perceive Russia as the most hostile country and only 9% of them think that Russia is a
friendly country. In general, Russia has a better image among ethnic Poles than among ethnic Russians.

**Chart 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Public Opinion Survey, Civil Society Institute, Vilmorus, October 2006.

The results of a public opinion survey conducted two years earlier by the same research centre showed that 46% of Lithuanians hold negative views about the reforms carried out by President Putin in modern Russia (CSI, 2004). This portion was even higher among the younger generation (almost 60%) but lower among ethnic Russians and Poles (around 20%). 51% of Lithuanian respondents at that time said they thought that Russia posed the greatest threat to Lithuania (CSI, 2004).
3.1. Reason one: global information environment, global audience

The problem seems to be not with the tactics of Russian information policy but with the whole strategy. First of all, Russian “spin doctors” do not realize that just like in political sciences, where a clear-cut divide has been obliterated between domestic and foreign policies, the divide between separate media audiences is also disappearing in the sphere of communications. That segment of Lithuanian society which is under the influence of the Russian information environment and uses Russian mass culture products or watches Russian-produced news programmes actually receives the same information which is consumed by Russia’s domestic audience.

Theoretically, this tendency can be defined as a modern phenomenon of “interpreting audiences” since the world of today no longer recognizes the existence of local or external, Russian or post-Soviet audiences. This new phenomenon asserted itself most pointedly when cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed published in a Danish newspaper and intended for the Danish readership caused an outrage in the Islamic world or when the remarks made by Pope Benedict XVI that were intended for a German audience were also heard by Islamic audiences, or when the video of Saddam Hussein’s execution was seen via the Internet by people all around the world instead of only the Iraqis. These specific occurrences produced a very strong world-wide reaction, but the process is spreading all around the world and its consequences will eventually become visible. In a similar manner, the audiences in Lithuania and other post-Soviet countries have been watching Russian TV broadcasts about the YUKOS trial, the investigation into the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, recent ethnic tensions in Kondopoga, the illness and poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko, and many other events or happenings that are assessed differently by Russian and Lithuanian societies. The Lithuanian audience consumes such information through ‘Western’ values and compares it with the information received from the Western media, thus making their own distinct interpretations.

The phenomenon of “interpreting audiences” and its impact on Russia’s image in Lithuania have been best described by a woman living in the Lithuanian province who said: “[…] I watch Russian TV programmes. I have cable television and I must say that Russian series and talk shows are
very interesting indeed. But life is so ugly there that I keep telling myself ‘Thank God I don’t live in Russia. They must be terribly unhappy over there’[…]” (Ziliukaite, Ramonaitė, Nevinskaite, Beresnevičiūtė, Vinogradnaitė, 2006, p. 173) Therefore, the fact that 40% of ethnic Russians in Lithuania consider Russia to be Lithuania’s most hostile adversary should not be very surprising after all.

3.2. Reason two: Russian information policy as a manifestation of information geopolitics

Russia’s information policy in Lithuania and the other Baltic states can be best assessed not by the declarations of the Kremlin officials but by concrete actions. The most visible during recent years were several TV documentaries that were broadcasted via Russian TV channels. The first one was “Secrets of the Century. Verdict for Europe”, which was broadcasted by the PBK TV network, closely related to Russia’s ORT TV, and which questioned the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact for Lithuania and its independence. Last year the TVCi network broadcasted „Nazism pa Pribaltijski” (Nazism Baltic way) based on the so-called FSB „historical archives“. The same archives were later used by Europa Publishing House to put out a book for each of the Baltic states. Those books can be called a classic example of black propaganda.

Such information attacks are difficult to comprehend within the context of soft power strategy. This is due to the fact that Russia’s information policy in Lithuania is based on the concept of information geopolitics which in turn leads to resonant communication with most post-Soviet societies. Against this background, the information warfare emerges as a tool for Russia in attaining its short-term foreign policy goals. But in a long term perspective Russia loses popularity and attractiveness among Lithuanian society. It also loses it’s image among Baltic populations.

In the future Russia will find it even more difficult to improve this image because it has started to lose the soft power resources it had. The Russian language is beginning to lose in competitiveness to other languages: the young generation in Lithuania does not understand Russian.
Lithuanian political scholars define the current Lithuania-Russia relationship in very similar terms: Raimondas Lopata describes it as a stalemate, while Gediminas Vitkus calls it **aporia** (Vitkus, 2006). The relationship between the two countries will not be set into motion even by the following statement made by the deputy editor-in-chief of the daily *Kommersant*: "Kremlin does not yet have sufficient strength to implement its doctrine “of friendship which cannot be rejected” on the international arena" (Rogov, 2006) for the simple reason that strength is not required in this context.

**Conclusions**

The analysis shows that Kolerov’s statements about Russia’s soft power politics in post-Soviet countries are only declarations unsupported by practical action. The Russian political elite enjoys a favourable image on the domestic scene and thinks that it should be the same abroad. In Western democracies, however, society applies other than Russian criteria to assess the government and its performance. Lithuanian publicist Spraunius emphasizes “that the weakest aspect of modern Russian foreign politics is the non-convergence of imperial Russian ideals: these
notions simply cannot be translated into other languages” (Spraunius, 2007) for foreign audience.

Although a single world-wide audience is being created by the “media without borders”, it does not mean that all viewers cherish and respect the same values: an image of a strong and resolute government greatly favoured by the Russian viewer is perceived as a major restriction of human rights or freedoms painfully reminding of the Soviet regime to the Baltic viewer. Thus Russia's dominance in the post-Soviet information environment does not actually mean that Russia has created itself a favourable image in these countries. The above mentioned CSI survey shows that the final result is quite to the contrary.

Even Kremlin has admitted that Russia has serious image problems in Europe and post-Soviet countries. Russia decided to launch a public relations campaign (Evans, 2005), but attempts to fix such problems by printing articles “written” by President Putin in “FT” and other big Western newspapers does not seem to be an effective new strategy for information policy.

**References:**


2 Some social groups within a particular national environment may belong to the information environment of another country or region: e.g. ethnic Muslim communities in Europe or ethnic Russian minorities in post-Soviet countries. [N.M.]

3 Excluding mother tongue.

4 National broadcaster means a broadcaster, whose programme broadcast by a terrestrial radio or television network is received within a territory inhabited by more than 60 % of Lithuania’s population (LRTC, 2006).

5 Biggest regional TV channel. [N.M.]
LTV also broadcasts Vilnius Album in Polish, Vilnius Sasiuvinis in Belarusian, and Labas (Hello) – a programme in Lithuanian about ethnic minorities. [N.M.]

Time rounded to hours in decreasing order.

Information agency “Regnum” is one of the founders of this publishing house and Mr. Kolerov is the founder of IA Regnum. [N.M.]

The Demilitarization of Kaliningrad: A ‘Sisyphean Task’?

By Matthieu Chillaud, Frank Tetart

Extremely militarized during the Cold War, Kaliningrad, from a soviet perspective, was to be a strategic outpost in order to prevent any western attack, to monitor the Baltic republics as well as the southern Baltic Sea, Gdansk and the Vistula estuary. Indeed, this high level of militarization was not only directed against NATO but also served as a possibility to exert pressure on Poland. Kaliningrad, having hosted the Baltic Fleet with roughly 200,000 soldiers, at that time was sealed off to foreigners and even Soviet citizens had limited access. It was akin to a ‘martial sanctuary’, the militaries dominated nearly all aspects. With the end of the Cold war, and without any clear strategic doctrine it lost its military raison d’etre. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, a lot of troops and military equipment were temporarily based in Kaliningrad in precarious conditions. This caused concern among Poland and the Baltic states. Since the early 1990’s, these countries have been seeking demilitarization of the Kaliningrad region. The reasoning being that a heavy Russian military presence on the shores of the Baltic Sea is not a stabilizing factor, and also handicaps needed economic investments. Kaliningrad’s demilitarization would be vital assistance to the Russian region’s economic growth. Recently, for instance the Lithuanian MEP Laima Andrikienė, argued that “It is almost impossible to find investors to make investments in the region full of the army and arms (…) it is even more difficult to dream of a functioning market economy in such regions.” Ferguson (2005). Based on this perspective, there is still an irrational ‘over militarization’ of the enclave, and only an immediate demilitarization of the region could reduce this negative impact. Nevertheless, the past concentration of excessive forces in the oblast is less perceived as a military threat, and more a troublesome Cold War relic which serves as a bargaining chip for Russia vis-à-vis its Baltic and NATO/EU neighbours.

In this article it is argued that the hope of a Kaliningrad demilitarized,
without necessarily being bound to fail, has been metaphorically like a Sisyphus. At each step in the construction of the project, some new problems and handicaps arise seemingly making the task unmanageable. One of the main reasons of this ‘endless task’ might lie in the consideration of the term demilitarization. The term often evoked, but seldom defined has been misused to the point that it has been strongly debased. The first focus in this article shall try to define comprehensively the word ‘demilitarization’ from a legal and geopolitical perspective. Moreover the strategic literature on Kaliningrad although rich, has only skinned the issue because of a troublesome confusion. The ambiguity coming from the fact that demilitarization is commonly used as the contrary of ‘militarization’ (de facto demilitarization) whereas it has also a legal context in the framework of international law (de jure demilitarization). Secondly, how far do the uncertainties of the strategic vocation of Kaliningrad provide links to the idea that the territory is more and more at the periphery of the Russian mainland.

1. The notion of demilitarization, or the uncertainties of a multifaceted concept

The ambiguities from multiple definitions to the notion of demilitarization that caused an additional issue related to Kaliningrad being allegedly free of nuclear weapons.

1.1 Demilitarization: between de facto and de jure

Demilitarization can be either the process of reduction in the shape of the army or the decrease of certain aspects of all types of military equipments (speaking only about reduction of armed forces is demilitarization). It has been defined by Belgian lawyer Jean Salmon, ‘measure which consists of forbidding on a certain geographic area the presence of military installations and forces, all forms of military exercises or any kind of armament tests. This measure may possibly entail the destruction of military structures’ (Salmon, 2001, pp. 318-319). The most significant difference lies in their motivation. In the first case (de facto demilitarization), one demilitarizes only for economic, strategic, political, etc. reasons (which is easily reversible since there is no binding effect). In the second case (de jure demilitarization), the objective is unambiguous stating that by the purpose is to prevent a given physical area from becoming either the source or the site of armed conflict (which is irreversible since there is a
binding effect). Thus, demilitarization conditions frequently forbid the introduction or maintenance of fortifications, and the presence or increase of armed forces and their equipment, in the given area with the explicit or implicit aim of preventing conflict. To the extent that demilitarization occurs typically by servitude, it is very seldom that a country accepts unilaterally to jeopardize its sovereignty on its territory. It can be noticed that all the de jure demilitarized territories have occurred to the country which has lost the war and of which some parts of its territory have been ‘subtracted’ by some disarmament measures. In the case of Russia, the only circumstance where the country had to demilitarize after it has lost a war was after the Crimean War won by French and English: by the Treaty of Paris (1856), Russia was forced to demilitarize the Aland Islands\(^3\). Other than that, when Finland, Estonia and Latvia got their independence in the aftermath of the 1917 Revolution, their border with Soviet Russia was demilitarized as well\(^4\). In that case, the disarmament measures on both sides were bilateral.

As it would be highly doubtful that Russia unilaterally demilitarizes Kaliningrad - even if the country were to decide unilaterally to demilitarize, it would be a moratorium without legal value. The only thinkable pattern would have been to set up such zone bilaterally (with NATO) or multilaterally (with Poland and Lithuania).

Since the early 1990’s the issue of demilitarization had arisen periodically in the discourse of some Polish and Lithuanian leaders and was always accompanied by some legal or strategic content on their definition. The first significant plea in favour of demilitarization came from Lithuanian President Brazauskas’ speech on September 28, 1994, at the UN General Assembly. In which, he proposed a round table discussion within the framework of the European Stability Pact on the issue of the Kaliningrad region. The Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vitalij Churkin opposed this proposal. In a letter from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Kaliningrad Duma and signed by him, it says, 'The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is against the proposal raised in Brazauskas's speech to discuss the issues of the Kaliningrad district at a round table within the framework of the Stability Pact, because its aim is to raise the issue of demilitarisation of the region, and probably even of its status, at an international forum’ (BNS, 1994). The Baltic Assembly, which represents all three Baltic parliaments, adopted on November 13,
1994, a resolution in regards to Kaliningrad. In which it indicated that the future of Kaliningrad is of concern to the whole of Europe. It stressed the necessity of demilitarisation of the region, and proposed an international round table discussion on the issue (Baltic Assembly, 1994). In 1996 a resolution Initiated by Christopher Cox, former Chairman of the Congress Policy Committee, the US House of Representative had adopted similar concerns demanding that Russia withdraws its military forces from the region (Expressing the sense ..., 1994). In the statement of the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry of July 4, 1995 it says that ‘American congressmen would hardly be delighted if someone from abroad suggested to demilitarize Alaska, for example’ (sic) (ITAR-TASS, 1995).

In a recent episode on September 15, 2005 a crash of a Russian SU-27 fighter which illegally passed into Lithuanian air space, showed that the demilitarization was again a pressing concern. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had seized on the SU-27 crash in Lithuania as an opportunity to reaffirm Moscow's proposal for joint airspace monitoring. Also suggesting civilian and military air traffic control by NATO and Russia over the Baltic states, under the aegis of the NATO-Russia Council (NAC) (Socor, 2005). The incident also demonstrated disorder and decay within the Russian military (Russian warplanes shuttling to and from Kaliningrad have been responsible for most of the violations of NATO airspace). From a Russian perspective, the demilitarization (whether it is de jure or de facto) is still not on its agenda. The Baltic countries' accession to NATO has had an adverse effect on the situation in the Baltic region, in fact causing a Russian decrease in confidence. This was the same argument when Poland joined NATO: 'According to the Russian Duma's anti-NATO group, Poland has doubled its military personnel in the region near Kaliningrad since 1994 to 22,000, while Lithuania has concentrated 3,000 troops on their common border. As a reaction to "NATO expansionism" by Poland and Lithuania, Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Mikhailov told reporters in early December 1998 that troops in the Kaliningrad region would play the role of a "deterrent" (quoted by Rompkey, 1999).

The only upshot being that all proposals for demilitarization of Kaliningrad have been consistently unclear because none in favour of this have defined 'demilitarization.' Two definitions remain opposite of militarization (this de facto demilitarization does not mean a
comprehensive demilitarization) or a total demilitarization (this *de jure* demilitarization means that there will be no arm at all).

**1.2 The nuclear issue within the concept of demilitarization**

Since the early 1990s, episodically, the issue of nuclear weapons allegedly stocked in Kaliningrad, has been a controversy. This is chiefly because some diehards from Poland and Lithuania argue that the enclave is a nuclear weapon free zone. The vagueness of its nuclear status is, to some extent, comparable to the one related to the demilitarization. Technically, a demilitarized area could be in addition denuclearized, but only if the treaty which states the conditions of demilitarization specifies it as well, and without ambiguity that it concerns nuclear weapons. By the same thought, a denuclearized area does not mean that it is also a demilitarized area. Moreover, none of the nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) which have been hitherto set up, are demilitarized. Only national legislation could set up such a zone, in that case, legally, it would be a moratorium.

The idea of a ‘nuclear weapon free Kaliningrad’ intermingled ambiguously with the project of a Nordic NWFZ. While in the late 1980s Gorbachev had pledged to withdraw Soviet nuclear weapons from the Baltic region. Denuclearization of the Russian enclave was first brought into discussion by some vague remarks made at the beginning of the 1990s during discussions between Moscow and Washington. These discussions touched on transferring certain tactical nuclear weapons from other former Warsaw Pact countries to the Russian mainland. According to the rumours, Moscow had chosen Kaliningrad as a place to re-locate these weapons. Poland and the Baltic states were alarmed, especially in view of Moscow’s strident opposition at the time to their plans to join NATO. Opposition had included occasional threats of a retaliatory arms build-up on their borders (not excluding nuclear weapons). Against this background, the *Washington Times* published an article in January 2001 reporting that six months before Russia had transferred some short-range tactical nuclear missiles to the soil of Kaliningrad (Gertz, 2001/Beeston, 2001/Barry, 2001). Polish spokesmen immediately called for an international inspection in order to get to the truth (Nougayrede, 2001). Analysts came up with several hypotheses for why the weapons might have been transferred: ranging from an attempt by Kaliningrad’s new Governor Yegorov to assert his authority and the strength of the military
in Kaliningrad, to Moscow’s growing reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in the context of force cuts and restructuring. Another rumour suggested a ploy by Russia to block NATO enlargement, a show of bad temper before an important US missile defence test in July 2000. Perhaps even a provocation organized by US hard-liners in order to highlight the role of NATO as the main guarantee for the European security and to score points during the ongoing US presidential campaign (Delpech, 2001, p. 11). It was well-known, in this context, that the journalist, who wrote the article, Bill Gertz, had strong connections with the Republican Party. Underlining the political impact of the enlargement, US Congressman Benjamin Gilman told the Washington Times: ‘if Russia has, in fact, transferred tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, we have to view that as an alarming development that threatens the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (… ) These reports underscore the need to promptly enlarge the NATO Alliance to include the previously captive nations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia’ (Quoted in Huang, 2001).

To this day, the veracity of the accusations is in question because no concrete evidence has ever been brought. In any event, at no stage was Russia acting under any legal obligation for restraint. Kaliningrad is sovereign Russian territory and has never been formally denuclearized. It is true that Gorbachev had pledged to withdraw Soviet nuclear weapons from the Baltic territories (ACR, 1990) in combination with existing Western restraints would make the Baltic a nuclear weapon free zone de facto but not de jure. Meanwhile, on the basis of an exchange of unilateral statements, the United States and Russian Federation have made deep reductions in their arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons. According to the pledges, all categories except one type of air-delivered weapon were to be either eliminated or transferred to central storage facilities while the remaining category was also subject to deep reductions. Russia was supposed to complete activities pursuant to these initiatives by the end of 2000. According to the National Report on the Implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty by the Russian Federation distributed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference on 25 April 2000 (National Report of the Russian Federation … , 2000), implementation of these unilateral obligations were nearing completion.

Was this crisis ado about nothing? Actually, it is notorious that Kaliningrad hosts a tactical (not strategic) nuclear storage site with some
land-based missiles and some nuclear warheads for artillery (SS21). Additionally, as Nilolai Sokov highlights ‘In fact, Tochka missiles according to some reports, have been regularly launched in Kaliningrad Oblast since 1995, including, in 1999, in the presence of representatives of the Lithuanian Consulate in Kaliningrad. The only new factor involved in the 18 April 2000 launch was the use of a different testing range: one closer to the Polish border (previous launches used a testing range closer to Lithuania)’ (Sokov, 2001). Nonetheless, it is true that so far nobody knows if these storage sites are full or empty. From a Russian perspective, this ambiguity can be an asset.

In reality, there are no legally binding agreements on the nuclear-weapon-free status of the Baltic Sea and the adjacent states. Since Gorbachev’s commitments were unilateral, they are not compulsory. The notion of a de jure nuclear weapon free Kaliningrad remains extremely dubious for many reasons. Moscow still sees its enclave as a strategic strong point in the Baltic Sea as it concerns that NATO enlarges further and further. Moreover, Kaliningrad is the only ‘western’ part of Russia that is not subject to the special ‘flank’ restrictions of the CFE Treaty, limiting troop re-deployments. The general international context since 2002, when the US denounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, has not been conducive to further breakthroughs in US-Russian nuclear disarmament. Further, President Putin has recently boasted publicly of Russia’s ability to develop new nuclear weapons that can overcome all present defences.

2. The military character of Kaliningrad: a reassuring or troublesome feature?

In the region of Kaliningrad itself, it seems difficult to consider and imagine a demilitarization process; then since its origins, the military character of Kaliningrad as a Soviet (then Russian) territory has printed the socio-economic development and organisation of the region, as well as the mentality of its population.

2.1 The military raison d’être of Kaliningrad

Before the end of the Second World War, Stalin had been aware of the strategic importance of the all-year round ice-free ports of the former Eastern Prussia (Konigsberg and Pillau), so much so that he asked for
them during his early discussions with the Allies in Tehran, in 1943. The Northern part of this German province including Königsberg was hence awarded to the Soviet Union under the Potsdam Accord in 1945. Immediately after the war, the Soviet Union turned this new territory into a military zone (renamed in July 1946 Kaliningrad after Kalinin, the president of the supreme Soviet, who died some weeks before), closed to foreigners and even to non-resident Soviet-citizens, and dedicated to the Red Army. The Headquarters of the Baltic Fleet was then transferred from Leningrad to Kaliningrad, which, with the break-up of the Cold War became the location of the East/West rivalry. The main strategic assignment of this military outpost was initially to control the new soviet influenced zone in Central Europe, it then transformed into a defensive stance in order to prevent any NATO attack. According to E. Buchhofer, the entire territory is organised for that purpose; at least 700 km² were used for military purpose in the region of Kaliningrad (Headquarters and communication centre are in Kaliningrad, a Navy base and a naval infantry brigade located in Baltiysk, 5 air and sea bases, 2 missiles sites, as well as naval logistics installations, weapon stocks and navy schools) (Buchhofer, 1989, pp. 71-87). The region also harboured the ground and air forces of the 11th Guards Combined Arms Army. This included: one tank division, three motorized rifle divisions, three artillery brigades and attack helicopters. They were deployed mainly in the cities of Kaliningrad, Baltiysk, Gusev, Tcherniakhovsk and Sovietsk (Frobarth, 2001, pp. 134-163). Just before the Soviet break up, the total Kaliningrad garrison was estimated between 100,000 and 120,000 military personnel, including around 25,000 naval forces. But in reality, most people living in Kaliningrad (approx. 900,000 inhabitants) were devoted to the functioning of this military outpost, working as engineers, scientists, technicians, or non-qualified workers. Even the remaining German population supported Kaliningrad, before their ultimate expulsion at the end of 1948 to Germany’s Soviet zone. Leading up to that point the Germans had been used by the Soviet military administration to restart the main economic sectors, especially the agriculture, providing the military with food (Frobarth, 2001).

The Kaliningrad Region made military-oriented sectors a priority (military-industrial complex, in particular naval construction...), and the lack of productivity of the agriculture was compensated by the Soviet economic specialisation. At that time, neighbouring Lithuania was
Kaliningrad’s main provider of fresh products (milk, meat and vegetables).

Even though Kaliningrad was inhabited by a civil population, the majority of the inhabitants had either family links with the militaries, or worked for the Army or military complex. In that context, the population of Kaliningrad developed a ‘military mentality’. Therefore, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the 15,000 sq.km Kaliningrad although forgotten by Russia, maintained its military organisation and characteristics. Throughout the 1990’s the population of the enclave continued to favour a heavy military presence in the region, but it was not because the inhabitants harboured aggressive intentions. It stemmed more from the fact that non-defence oriented jobs were scarce, and they depended upon military to make a living (Krickus, 2002, p. 137).

2.2 The military factor: burden or political instrument?

The high level of militarization of Kaliningrad was gradually seen by the region’s authority as a burden for further economic development. The end goal was to acquire more autonomy. The military power seemed incompatible with the then proposed scenario of transforming Kaliningrad into a ‘Baltic Hong Kong’. One initiative led to the implementation of the Yantar Free Economic Zone in 1993. How large is the appeal to potential investors to a heavily armed garrison, where the movement of persons is not totally free?

At the beginning of 1991, the Army denied the regional authority to let foreigners have free access to the whole territory of Kaliningrad. Only the cities of Kaliningrad, Sovietsk and Svetlogorsk were then accessible. Today, Baltiysk, the site of one of the two main Russian naval bases in the Baltic region, is still closed to foreigners and even to non-residents. This situation hinders the development of civil activities that are proposed by the local authority, especially in the tourism sector. The port of Baltiysk, is seen by the Kaliningrad Port Authority, as an appropriate location to receive ferry boats from the neighbouring countries. Yet, the building of a civil wharf in Baltiysk port necessitated ten-year-long negotiations with the military, which refused to share their facilities with civilian activities (passengers and goods traffic) (Sebov, 2003). When they finally agreed in 2003, attempts were made to impede the implementation
of the terminal, and the interconnection with the railway to Kaliningrad city. This was done by refusing the transfer of military lands to the port civilian authority. According to the then Baltic Fleet’s commander, Admiral Vladimir Valuyev, these economic interests did not weigh enough in comparison with the growing strategic value of the region, following the membership of the three Baltic states into NATO in 2004 (Konigshage Express, 2004).

In the early 2000’s the prospect of EU and NATO enlargement gave the military in Kaliningrad a new role as an instrument of Russian political influence. The pressure being applied in Kaliningrad towards local authorities, and outwardly towards the NATO and EU newcomers, especially towards the former Soviet Baltic States.

After the East German withdrawal of all its former Warsaw Pact forces from Poland, some Russian air, naval, and ground forces from the Baltic States were relocated to Kaliningrad from 1990 to 1994. This initially stemmed from housing shortages elsewhere in Russia. The image of Kaliningrad as a military bastion was reinforced, as well as the perception of Kaliningrad as a threat by the Baltic Sea’s neighbours, especially to Poland and Lithuania. In 1997, the 11th Guards Combined Arms Army was dissolved while the air, ground and sea forces were reunified into a military entity subordinated to the Baltic Fleet, the military district of Kaliningrad was placed under the authority of the district of Leningrad, and a reduction of the ground and naval forces held in the region was announced by the Russian Defence Minister (RFE, 1998). According to the estimations of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London (The Military Balance 2000-2001) the deployed ground forces in Kaliningrad went from 103,000 in 1993 to 10,500 in 2001. Include the naval, air personnel and the Border Guard, the total military forces can be estimated to some 25,000 men (Oldberg, 2003, pp. 270-285).

Despite the reduction process, the representation of Kaliningrad as military outpost did not disappear at the beginning of the 2000’s. On the contrary, it was used inside the region as a political instrument to reaffirm the Russian sovereignty on the enclave at the very moment when it seemed to be threatened by both the EU and NATO enlargement. At the time, Moscow feared the separatist tendencies that could occur with these enlargements. For instance, Sergei Pasko’s Baltic Republican Party had
favoured since the end of the 1990’s the creation of an autonomous Baltic Republic associated with the Russian Federation in order to cooperate closer with the EU. Even President Putin’s plenipotentiary representative (Polpredy) for the North-western District, Ilya Klebanow proposed during a short visit to Kaliningrad in February 2005 to give the region the status of a ‘foreign territory’. This also included the possibility of introducing the Euro currency there. Moreover, Moscow thought that cooperation with the EU made it necessary to reinforce its power in the region, because it tended to consider every regional initiative vs. the outside world as a breach of the Russian sovereignty. In that sense, the regional Duma’s proposal of allowing EU-citizens to enter the region of Kaliningrad visa-free was totally misperceived by the Russian federal authorities. They feared that this project could weaken Kaliningrad’s links with the Russian Federation, and contribute to a ‘drift’ of the region to the West, or even separatism (Kortunov and A. P. Klemeshhev, 2003). Under these circumstances, the election of Vladimir Yegorov, the former commander in chief of the Baltic Fleet, as governor of the region in 2000 – supported by the Kremlin – placed a military person to manage civilian affairs. It was seen in Moscow as a way to protect Russia’s security interests, while underlining the prestige of the officers in the region, and perhaps the importance of Kaliningrad’s military character.

On an international level, Russia was very reluctant to accept the NATO enlargement to the Baltic States. Dmitri Trenin wrote, as cited by Krickus (2002), ‘the Baltic States are regarded as a lost part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Baltic independence during the period between the two World Wars, as well as today, is considered the result of temporary weakness of Russia’. Moscow therefore played the card of Kaliningrad, in order to express its opposition to this enlargement. This was perceived as a threat by it’s neighbours because Russia’s government began to consider any demand of demilitarization of Kaliningrad as a breach of its territorial integrity. Some Russian representatives also did not hesitate in warning the Baltic states of a possible change in the reduction process of the armed forces deployed in Kaliningrad. Russia even proceeded with force demonstrations in the region by organising regular military exercises without informing the neighbouring states. In 1999 the largest military exercise organised by Russia for years took place in Kaliningrad. Called Zapad 99 – which meant in Russian ‘West 1999’ – this exercise simulated the retort to a NATO attack on Kaliningrad!
Conclusion:  
the demilitarization of Kaliningrad – a ‘wrong good idea’?

It seems that the issue of the demilitarization of Kaliningrad is intimately connected to some economical considerations. The less Kaliningrad is militarized the more the Russian territory will be a beneficial ‘civilian’ investment. There is also still an underlying hypothesis strongly linked to military arguments. The less Kaliningrad is militarized the less it will jeopardize the security of the countries in its vicinity. The balance between these two assumptions has led more than ever the Russian authorities to consider Kaliningrad as a kind of laboratory for the ‘new’ economical and political ambitions of Russia.

At the crossing point between strategy and geography, in the field of disarmament, the practice of demilitarization is usually chosen either after a conflict or in order to avoid one. It is also strongly linked to the notion of confidence-building. It has an indirect aim to provide confidence-building between a country burdened with the servitudes, and its neighbours. It is possible as well, to build confidence without necessarily demilitarizing. For instance, Lithuania and Russia agreed on bilateral measures reinforcing mutual confidence by establishing verification visits to military forces stationed in Lithuania and in Kaliningrad. This goes beyond the ones foreseen by the CFE Treaty. As the Baltic states are not members of the CFE regime, the bilateral arrangements that have been reached between the Baltic states and Russia are perceived as a substitute of the CFE Treaty regime of verification and transparency. However, as Kaliningrad is henceforth separated from the Russian mainland by a belt of NATO countries, it remains a confidence asset of the Russia. This enclave has been described as a ‘buffer area’, which is designed to reduce risk and/or minimize territorial disputes by obviating direct contact between hostile armies. This is indeed more and more on the political agenda between Russia and NATO.

In addition of this confidence-building vocation, Kaliningrad, and indirectly the Russian Army, is more than ever involved in the defence of the mainland’s economical interests. According to Russian Federation’s Navy doctrine approved (Morskaya doktrina ..., 2001) till 2010 by the Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2001, the priority regarding the Baltic Sea region is the development of the port infrastructures, the
modernisation of the commercial fleet, the economic cooperation with the bordering states of the Baltic Sea region, and the demarcation of the sea sovereignty. The demarcation is especially because of oil prospecting. In fact, this less military and more economic doctrine conveys Russia’s evolutions as a whole. In January 2001, Vladimir Putin declared in front of his Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russia’s foreign policy ‘must give us the means to focus on the State’s economic and social missions’ (cited in Lynch, 2003). In October 2006, the Russian president announced that the Baltic Fleet will be mobilised to be involved in the security of this submarine infrastructure during the building of the gas pipeline Nord Stream through the Baltic by a Russian-German consortium led by Gazprom.

Indeed, in a context where the sentiment that we have ‘lost the Cold War’ prevails in Moscow, the modernisation of the military tool attests to the Russian determination to show the enclave still constitutes one of the last concrete manifestations of the Second World War, and belongs to the mainland. The idea that Kaliningrad is only dedicated to military purpose is unquestionably over. Indeed, from time to time, in Poland as well as in Lithuania some officials will continue to argue in favour of the demilitarization of Kaliningrad, and in Russia some ‘diehards’ will want to strengthen the military presence in the enclave. Nonetheless, the political elite in Moscow is more and more aware that it becomes pointless to fully utilize Kaliningrad, like in the 1990’s, as a military lever in order to defend its interests in the Baltic sea region. In that sense, if there is a ‘real’ demilitarization of Kaliningrad, it is more in the strategic profile dedicated to the enclave, rather than in the amount of weapons.

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Arms Control Reporter 1990, 404.B.81.


Konigsberger Express, n°5, May 2004.


Personal Interview with Gregory Sebov, Director of the Kaliningrad Sea Port Authority in 2003.


1 According to the Greek mythology, as a punishment from the gods for his trickery, Sisyphus was compelled to roll a huge rock up a steep hill, but before he reached the top of the hill the rock always escaped him and he had to begin again. Gods had thought there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labor.

2 ‘Mesure consistant a interdire sur une zone geographique determine la presence de forces et d'installations militaires, toute man?uvre m?ilitaire ou l'essai d'armes de toute sorte. Cette mesure peut eventuellement entrainer la destruction des ouvrages militaires existants’.

3 ‘Sa Majeste l?Empereur de toutes les Russies, pour repondre au desir qui lui a ete exprime par Leurs Majestes la Reine de Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande et l'Empereur des Francais, declare que les Iles d'Aland ne seront pas fortifiees, et qu'il n'y sera maintenu ni cree aucun etablissement militaire ou naval’. [His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias (…) declares that the Aland Islands shall not be fortified and that no military or naval establishment shall be maintained or created there]

4 On October 14 1920, the Soviet Russia and Finland signed a Treaty of Peace in Tartu. According to Article 6, Finnish warships over a certain tonnage submarines, and naval aircraft were debarred from certain coastal waters. Besides, Finland was obliged to demilitarize (the actual words used were ‘militarily neutralize’) a larger number of small islands in the Gulf of Finland. The ‘other’ treaty of Tartu, the one signed between Estonia and the Soviet Russia on 2 February 1920, established a ‘neutralized’ area: the two states committed themselves not to have a quantity of troops exceeding the limit established by the treaty in the eastern part of the Pskov region. The Treaty of Riga (August 11, 1920) between the Soviet Russia and Latvia was largely similar in these respects to the Treaty of Tartu between Soviet Russia and Estonia. It is noteworthy that while all three treaties provided for measures that would clearly fit the definitions given above of demilitarization, they all referred to the process as ‘neutralization’.

5 The original idea to create a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NNWFZ) dates back to 1957, when the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin sent a note to the Danish and Norwegian governments stating that if either nation accepted nuclear weapons on its soil it would be considered by Moscow as a casus belli, and meanwhile inviting them to consider the idea of a nuclear free zone in the area. At the time, the latter option was tempting to many people in the Nordic countries. The two neutral countries saw it as an excellent means to reinforce their own active policy of neutrality, while some politicians in Norway and Denmark saw a chance to show their public opinion (which was still reluctant) that it was possible to reconcile belonging to NATO with measures of nuclear disarmament. Moscow, for its part, naturally aimed to weaken NATO by exploiting the long-standing tradition of Nordic pacifism and raising the popular profile of the anti-nuclear cause. The Soviet
Union further hoped that such a NNWFZ would set off a chain reaction in the other small NATO countries where pacifist militancy was strong. All this explains the USA’s equally strong resistance at the time to the zone initiative. For their part, the Nordic countries did see some snags and uncertainties in the Soviet proposals. If the zone was to have a positive strategic effect, they would want it to cover some Soviet territory, but they knew that Moscow would be more than reluctant to accept that idea. It was, in fact, only in June 1981 that Soviet leader Brezhnev stated for the first time that such a zone could incorporate some elements applying to Soviet territory. His successor Andropov stated at Helsinki in June 1983 that a NNWFZ zone could concern the entire Baltic Sea, but his proposition was again immediately rejected by Washington. President Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech of 1 October 1987 relaunched the project of a NNWFZ, including the Baltic Sea and the Norway Sea. Gorbachev had meanwhile also stated that the Soviet Union was going to dismantle all its short and middle range missiles deployed in the area. Nordic countries, where pacifism and anti-nuclear forces were at their climax, were very enthusiastic about his proposals. Nevertheless, the latter remained somewhat woolly and no concrete follow-up actions were taken.

Yantar means amber in Russian, which Kaliningrad holds the world’s largest deposits (90% of the total reserves).


The Baltic States are not yet parties to the CFE Treaty, although all have indicated openness to joining the Adapted version of the Treaty signed in November 1999 as when a larger Russia-West controversy that has delayed its entry into force is resolved. And they are also highly aware of the CFE flank issue and of the implications for their own security. As Estonia and Latvia share a common border with that part of Russia affected by the northern flank limitations, they have followed with an extreme interest, and an understandable concern, the evolution of Russian build-up in the region. Both these countries considered the CFE Flank Agreement of 1996 as a betrayal of their interests by the NATO parties, since the agreement allowed Russia higher troop ceilings in the Pskov region. See Dunay, 2003/ Lachowski, 2002 and Chillaud, 2002.

Russia’s navy plans to expand its Baltic Sea submarine flotilla from three to as many as nine combat submarines during 2007. The expansion follows a cut-back in the number of submarines operated by the Baltic Fleet after the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse. Of the three subs currently in the fleet, two are in a state of permanent combat readiness. The fourth generation Project 677 Lada submarine can carry up to 18 torpedoes and evade detection by radar. It has a surface speed of 10 knots and travels at 21 knots underwater. The 67-metre (221-foot) long vessel weighs 1,765 tons and can remain underwater for 45 days. See Agence france-presse, ‘Russia to Expand Baltic Submarine Fleet’, 09/ 15/ 05 (http:// www.defensenews.com/ story.php?F=1104824&C=landwar).
Strategic culture in Latvia: seeking, defining and developing

By Airis Rikveilis

The way the values and ideas of the elite shape policy formulation and implementation is an intriguing problem for students and practitioners of international relations these days. Decision making as a process has visible and invisible parts. In a democratic society, the first part is achieved by the oversight of modern media and involvement of civil society. Quite to the contrary it turns out, when we analyze the initial policy formulation, which is dictated by the timing and urgency within the political process. Variables such as culture, traditions, political ethics and attitude towards the acceptable and non-acceptable in the political battle are not always perceived as part of a complex that determines strategic culture.

The analysis of strategic culture provides valuable explanations to the decision preferences of political and military actors that can later be used for projecting possible trends and challenges for policy making in a given society or political entity. Therefore, the aim of this article is to formulate the most important components of the strategic culture within the Latvian political and military elite and to explain how these characteristic elements shape the institutions and their policy choices in the regional and wider security environments.

In this paper I argue that the strategic culture in Latvia is characteristic of states in the post-Soviet realm. It is influenced by the elites’ experience of the Soviet past and therefore values a strong transatlantic link and relations with the United States of America. My other statement is that the geo-strategic disposition of Latvia and the changes in the international system such as the enlargement of NATO and the EU have caused a fundamental re-evaluation of defence policy in Latvia leading to abolition of conscription. As such, I claim that the Latvian strategic

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culture will change towards more encouraged use of the Latvian military in international operations, and the gap between soldier and society has a tendency grow. In order to explain the formulation of strategic culture in Latvia, I shall examine the most important milestones of Latvian history that have shaped the beliefs and formed attitudes of the strategic elite, as well as analyze the security and defence policy documents of the Republic of Latvia. By this, my intent is not to provide a comprehensive description of majority of aspects of the political history of Latvia, but only to emphasize that elements of contemporary strategic culture in Latvia take roots in the past and do not seem to be separated from the current generation of politicians. This paper does not seek to analyse foreign policy making, but will discuss how the changes in global security have influenced security and defence policy formulation in Latvia. In general, this paper is one of the first attempts to identify the components of strategic culture in Latvia and to mark the peculiarities of Latvian attitudes towards the political military agenda in the sphere of security and towards the issues of war and peace.

1. Defining strategic culture

The development of a nation’s strategy in regard to its security, foreign affairs and defence can in many cases be characterized as pure calculations based on the available tools of political and military power. At the same time policy makers, while developing fundamental policy documents, usually do not emphasize the importance of symbolism and certain patterns of behaviour with respect to the use of force, even though they are not free from them and cannot escape the background of culture in which their political organization and traditions have its roots. Thus, in order to analyze strategic culture we cannot ignore the psychological and social dimensions of political life, or as it was put by Heikka (2002, p. 5), “fantasies of national missions, tragic misperceptions of balances of power or the intentions of other states, exaggerated beliefs in both offensive and defensive strategies, and by domestic considerations”

In order to analyze strategic culture more specifically, we have to seek strategic “culture objects” basic documents in the sphere of national security; symbols and “culture-bearing units” such as national security elites, strategists, military leaders and military ceremonies etc. (Johnston,
In the works of scholars of strategic culture we can find different definitions of what has been considered important for the formulation of strategic culture. For example, Clifford Geertz (1973, p. 89) defines strategic culture as “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” Jack Snyder (1977, p. 8) pointed out that strategic culture is ‘a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour patterns socialized into a distinctive mode of thought.’ Collin Gray (1981, p. 22) gave an even broader perspective to this subject, claiming that “strategic culture refers to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms and the civic culture and way of life.”

In the last decade scholars very often turned toward strategic culture as “an integrated system of symbols” (Johnston, 1995, p. 46), meaning that out of many symbolic actions, meanings and patterns of behaviour, none takes the position of a super-symbol and symbolism itself becomes even more complex. This means that within the strategic preferences and political choices, there will be a complex of explanations and links between them. This can also be observed in the research of the Canadian Armed forces, studying the development of the strategic culture in Canada—referring to Ben Lombardi, who concluded that strategic culture consists of "the traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force." (Lombardi, 2002)

The importance of strategic culture not only as an imaginary and theoretical concept can be observed in the very practical approach to politics in the transatlantic realm. For example, the second wave of NATO enlargement of the post-soviet period, which included the three Baltic states and four states of Central and Southeast Europe, developed successfully through the integration roadmap called Membership Action Plan (MAP). This commitment paper, a sort of agreement between the aspirant country and the Alliance, was a template consisting of five chapters: political and economic, defence and military, resource,
information security and legal issues. Important in regard to strategic culture is the first chapter, which among many political implications of integration emphasized efforts at democratization that every society must make in order to correspond to the same standard of democratic practice accepted throughout the transatlantic community. These requirements are clearly linked to Article Two of the Washington Treaty which claims a necessity to “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”

The change in political decision making tradition, initiated by MAP, does not, however, seem to be moving only in one direction. The Alliance partners were also adapting the experience of new members, by bringing a more cooperative mood to the regional level of military collaboration. After the successful example of the Baltic militaries, some other regional frameworks were created, for example, among the Balkan states.

Integration into NATO significantly changed elements of strategic culture in Latvia. Starting from 1996 Latvian soldiers participated actively in many peacekeeping operations that were basically perceived as a good way to acquire experience and establish closer ties with the militaries of other states. The closer the moment of full fledging membership in NATO approached, the more explicitly the Latvian political and military leadership affirmed that participation in missions is a crucial tool for enhancing Latvia’s own security – i.e. its national interests (Slakteris, 2006, p. 2).

From this perspective we see that strategic culture does not develop separately from the broader security environment. Even more, globalization of international relations means bringing the strategic cultures of a security community closer and thus creating communities of values, to which we may count NATO and the European Union (EU). The interaction of ideas and values brings policy makers closer to each other on the international stage. This does not necessarily correspond to what occurs at the domestic level, where “the national” still remains the dominant and in making choices politicians are not yet in a cooperative mood. Therefore, to perceive strategic culture as a certain system of
symbols still means to have definitive boundaries of a larger social and political system, that is also called “ideational milieu that limits strategic choice” and from which predictions concerning available strategic choice can be drawn (Johnston, 1995, p. 46). The existence of ideas in a given area alone however, cannot explain the development of a certain political environment; they must be formulated and implemented and in the long term also maintained by a certain group of political actors, who can formulate “concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.” (Johnston 1995, p. 46)).

From the definitions mentioned previously one can derive the conclusions that for the strategic elite history and military victory (as interpreted by the local environment) and symbolic traditions and ceremonies are extremely important in forming and defining strategic culture. Since a majority of other state policies actually derive from national security policy, it in particular requires a certain level of expertise that is not possible from the broad populace. Here the role of the political and military elite in the contemporary environment becomes crucial to sensing the limits of available political power, formulating ideas and pushing them through the political process. Later, to these tools the elite adds instruments for attracting not only its members, but also broader society- such as ceremonies and specific rituals that are aimed at creating a feeling of tradition.

Bearing in mind the above mentioned and adapting it to the Latvian environment, one could define strategic culture in Latvia as the position of the political and military elite towards state security and approach to political power, conflict and strategy, including organizational design and the behaviour of institutions dealing with national security in the context of history of Latvia, its traditions and ceremonies as well as symbols and perception of Latvian statehood.

2. The history as determinant dimension

The Latvian strategic elite, in its historic consciousness, is inevitably bound by three important events in the history of Latvia. Unlike many other European nations, who have developed a firm basis of pride for
legends and statehood from medieval times, this part of political history does not exist in Latvia. While, for example, the Lithuanian state was spreading from the Baltic to the Black Sea, Latvians had neither statehood, nor any political rights in their own land.

Political history for Latvia starts in the late 19th century with the formation of the educated middle class and raising movement of nationalism, similarly to that in the rest of Europe. But the most important events of Latvian political life take place after the end of World War I.

The first crucial moment in Latvian history was the national army’s fighting for independence in 1919-1920 that resulted in the defeat of the Bolsheviks. This created both military and civilian heroes and ensured relatively high popularity of the military within society for at least the next generation of Latvians.

The post-war years can be compared to those in the France at of the end of the 19th century - service in the military and conscription were popular and rather a matter of honour. As it is put by Eugen Weber (1976), patriotic stories of heroism of their countrymen served as a promoting force for nationalism or, in this case, “the best school of the fatherland.” Many army conscripts learned the history of the country, they had the possibility to improve their language skills and make their way in society through, for example, benefits of reduced university fees. Characteristically, many young soldiers from the poorest regions of the country expressed the wish to stay in the army after conscription, because it was true to all of them that “diet, lodging, bedding, hygiene, dress, the soldier wellbeing was well above the standards of the rural working class.” (Weber, 1976, p. 298) Basically every garrison in Latvia was involved with local community life, through different patriotic events and youth programmes. In addition, the Latvian armed forces were not ethnically homogeneous: soldiers represented all ethnic groups, thus creating a real “smithy of patriotism.”

Another event of crucial importance was the invasion by the Soviet troops and the occupation of Latvia in June 1940. The tragedy of the Latvian political and military elite is in the obvious miscalculation of the nature of Soviet intentions by signing a number of agreements of “quasi
assistance.” When the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum for the entrance of an unlimited number of Soviet troops and they entered Latvia in June 1940, the authoritarian government did not order resistance and, similarly to its neighbours Estonia and Lithuania, the state surrendered without a shot fired. Later the political and military elites perished senselessly by being either executed or deported to Siberia just within a year. These events prelude the whole complex of events during World War II and must be analyzed in context with the later controversial division of Latvian society - where one part of the citizens fought against Nazis in the Soviet army, but others fought against Communists within the Baltic Waffen SS divisions.

Later, by the end of the 1980’s, when the Soviet Union was economically too weak to sustain itself, the barricades that people built in Riga in January 1991 marked the turning point for the nascent Latvian security elite. The majority of military institutions, the national police and prosecution offices find their origin in the turbulent days of January 1991.

The renewed Latvian military relied explicitly on the traditions and memories of all these events, even though there was no such thing as a Latvian army during the Soviet time. This is a rare peculiarity that distinguishes the Baltic states from other European countries and countries of the former Soviet Union. The very next day after the declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, the Latvian defence system could not find even a dozen legally possessed infantry weapons, not to speak of artillery or any considerable amounts of armour. There were no cadres either: officers of Army, Navy, Air Force and National Guard initially came from either the Soviet military or from civilian life. Later they were joined by officers of Western military of the Latvian origins. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) that never existed before had to be build from scratch. It is of no surprise that during all the years of independence generation of predominantly young people were in key administrative positions building defence system and creating the defence policy. Nobody else was capable of maintaining the pace while building the system due to the fact that a colossal process – from learning global affairs to implementing commitments for NATO integration – had to be covered in a relatively short period of time.
On a daily basis in Latvia (as much as in Lithuania and Estonia) young people are in charge of business. It is not a rarity that chief executives of financial institutions are in their early thirties. Moreover, nobody is surprised that ministers and state secretaries of ministries and senior diplomats are well under forty. Therefore strategic culture of Latvia has a young, but already experienced face. Symbolism here plays a crucial part: the freedom of the 1919-1920 period was also achieved by students and soldiers of a very young age.

The forming political elite of the 1990’s, though not directly linked to the military glory of the interwar sovereignty, based its claims for independence on the strong determination to bring Latvia back to Europe and defined the foreign policy directions, namely integration into the European and transatlantic security mechanisms. Their policies were supported by an overwhelming majority.

“In pastalas, but in Europe” 1 was a slogan that encompassed an understanding of the material poorness, the spiritual adherence to Europe and its culture, the desire to achieve the wealth and prosperity that Europe was associated with and eventually, the return to Europe was also seen as a part of the European peace dividend.

These commitments have had a very clear positioning in the most important policy papers. The first time the desire of Latvia to integrate into NATO and the EU appearing on the table was in 1995, with the Foreign Policy Concept. Later this commitment was repeated in the Defence Concept and the National Security Concept (NSC). All these papers have certain limitations in time according to Latvian laws, which reveals the relatively high level of unity of the political elite in regard to their vision of Latvian future as an indivisible part of Europe that is, to speak the words of American president George W. Bush – “whole and free.” (Bush, 2001).

Development towards the EU and NATO indicated from very early on that the Latvian strategic elite was deeply interested about the presence of American interests in Latvia and, sought every way, to facilitate this process. Latvia has multiple times repeated its position that America is a strategic partner to Latvia, thus emphasizing that it seeks all possible ways to countervail the potential Russian influence. This clause has been
inserted into all most important security and defence policy papers and
the claim that “the Latvian foreign policy is directed towards the
strengthening of the NATO and the EU, as well as towards the co-
operation with the democratic countries in the North America and Asia.
Latvia [...] supports the US involvement in the European security
provision processes, which is still one of the basic elements of the
European stability.” (NSC, 2005)

The commitment of security elite to the United States a strategic partner
does not derive from a perception of America as an uncontested
superpower or the “only strongman on the street.” The American
idealism that stands for “freedom, justice and human dignity” (US
National Security Concept, 2006) is identical to the values of the majority
of security elites in the post- Soviet realm. These elites therefore consider
the USA more responsible towards its allies than states of “old” Europe
and multilateral regimes. This is considered proven by American efforts
to maintain non-recognition policy of the Baltic annexation into the
Soviet Union; this was also visible during the waves of NATO
enlargements in which the voice and commitment of American
leadership was one of the strongest.

This being said, we should not conclude that the Latvian position creates
any kind of schism with regard to American and European positions on
global security and risk assessment. Quite the contrary, the Latvian
leadership has always emphasized the need for complimentarity between
NATO and the EU efforts to promote security and stability in the
Balkans or in Afghanistan. From this perspective there has never been a
choice between embarking on the European or the American security
gondola as it was wrongly constructed by the French and German
leadership before the war in Iraq. This dichotomy does not exist today,
either. It is the arrogance of the French president Jacques Chirac when he
considered that the Vilnius-10 countries or, according to former US
Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, new Europeans “missed a good
opportunity to keep quiet,” which somehow reminded everybody that
European politics has been historically pursued at the expense of small
nations. From this perspective, the rhetoric of the French president was
not only impolite; it reminded at the old Europe not only in the sense used
by Rumsfeld, but also in the way the balance of power policy was
constructed before World War II. Such a reminder is far more influential
in the mind of Latvian policy makers, bearing in mind what were historically the consequences of the mistakes of European great powers, than any attempt to ease its impact by the diplomatic efforts.

Another aspect of Latvian history, which is linked to the previous one and strongly determines the formulation of strategic culture, is the relations with Russia. Notwithstanding the commitment to integration and the eventual success of NATO and the EU enlargement, the Latvian elite, starting from the moment of regaining independence extensively discussed the consequences of the Soviet occupation. Since Russia, the legal successor of the Soviet Union has never condemned the wrongdoings of the communist regime, part of the Latvian political actors have always been tempted to build their political platform on very complex issue that includes not only the demand for recognition of occupation, but also non-recognition of the changes of the Latvian border and the even stronger requirements for the citizenship law.

We may consider placing history as a centrepiece of modern politics, a relic of the past or a psychological trauma, but that would be a flat and incomplete point of view. In reality, the past is a legitimate and important part of states’ strategic culture. Take Russia, for example, whose political elite is using history for its own fame and glory in the same manner. This is not just to pay tribute to the soldiers and veterans of war. As it was put by one of the most distinguished scholars of Russian history Martin Malia (1994), the time of World War II is one of the rare occasions in Russian history, when the political elite and the populace were united in their vision of the future or to be more specific, “the regime and the people had a task and a purpose together.” Seeking for the same kind of purpose and new Russian missionarism is a very characteristic policy of Putin’s administration as well.

On the international stage, the Russian position seems rather a misuse of history because we should see among two formally democratic states (and Russia claims, it is such state) that “what is right (or wrong) for one actor must be right (or wrong) for any actor in similar circumstances” (Singer, 1960, p. 5 cited in Kratochwil, 1982, p. 7). This is not the case between Latvia and Russia; the latter totally excludes the possibility of agreeing on Latvian (and for the same matter - Lithuanian and Estonian) interpretation of the Soviet actions before and after World War II as
unlawful, claiming Latvian position a revisionism of history. Hence, perceptions are absolutely antagonistic and make each state unfriendly in the eyes of the other. This extends particularly to the elites.

One more question where strategic culture has something to say is about institutions, their role and design. The role of institutions in a particular environment depends significantly not only on historical discourse within the society or the political system, but also on the position and the role of the strategic elite. For example, if there is a need to change policy implementation, the institutions of the political process themselves cannot be expected to serve as a moving force for these changes. Especially in the field of defence and security policy implementation, it is widely understood as the duty of institutions of public administration or civilian and military bureaucracy. Within this process the bureaucracy of democratic states, as a matter of necessity, needs an impulse or political guidance to start policy formulation and implementation. In this regard, the Latvian government established a commission to investigate the damages caused by the Soviet occupation in August 2005. Even though the possibility to receive such compensation from Russia is close to zero, the commission, predominantly comprised of middle level civil servants will continue its job for at least some years to come. This particular commission will deal with apparently political question, but its status is relatively low which actually implies unwillingness, of behalf of top political actors, to deal with the problem due to its high sensitivity. Such approach to the problem does not signal about proactive political culture and thus, in a long term, may be unhealthy for developing feasible policies.

The debate around the occupation and illegal annexation of the Baltic states has everything to do with contemporary Latvian attitude towards the necessity to use force to defend freedom and independence of the state. Even though it is not as profound as it is in the Lithuanian case, the Constitution of which contains the clause that “each citizen shall have the right to oppose anyone who encroaches on the independence, territorial integrity, or constitutional order of the State of Lithuania by force,” it generally mirrors the perception and feeling of the Latvian elite, that the Finnish choice to fight for freedom in 1939 against the Soviet Union was the right choice and the Latvian people would have enjoyed much better life, had not the leadership of that time simply surrendered.
From this angle, the Latvian strategic elite for a long time has pursued the neo-idealist approach that the existence of dictatorships in international politics is a potential danger *per se* even though it does not directly affect Latvia. In a practical sense, it leads to much higher acceptance of the use of force against authoritarian and totalitarian regimes in the world, as it is, for example, in Germany or France, and that we saw so profoundly during the debate over invasion in Iraq in 2003. Even if Latvian elite chose to support the position of the United States partly as the fact of gratitude for the commitment of the Americans to defend the enlargement of NATO that included the Baltic states, it is a mistake to consider this the only argument for participation in the coalition of the willing. The arguments for the support of invasion linked freedom of Latvia of 1991 with the efforts of the West to defeat the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as derives from the debate in parliament (Saeima) in March 2003. From this perspective, the general acceptance of the use of all means possible to destroy tyrannies seems grounded in the belief of Latvian elites that dictatorships do not deserve the right to exist in the international system and that democracies not only have the right to destroy tyrannies, they also have moral obligations to help other nations to acquire their freedom.

Under the slight modification of these arguments Latvia participates actively in the *New Neighbourhood Policy* development of the EU. Active cooperation in defence and security field with Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova is important for Latvian defence and security experts and allows using their knowledge and experience in overcoming transitional challenges within the military and political elite of new democracies next to the EU borders. The experience that comes from the past and knowledge accumulated during the integration into NATO and the EU will be used to ensure that “in the EU’s neighbouring countries and proximate regions, long-term stability is maintained, democracy is strengthened, economic and social development continues to progress, and the policies of the various countries are focused on co-operation with European institutions” (Foreign Policy Guidelines, 2006).

3. Defence and security sector institutions

The existence of the principal security documents in the sphere of security policy such as National Security Concept (NSC), Defence
Concept and Foreign Policy Guidelines mean that strategic culture objects and culture-bearing units in Latvia exist, however they are not explicitly mentioned as integral parts of Latvian strategic culture and do not contain such reference.

The language of most important national security documents in a majority of cases covers general principles. As to threats, all these documents imply that Latvia does not have a direct military threat at this moment and such threats are not expected to be important at least for foreseeable future (NSC, 2005).

International involvement is another important principle that derives from either NSC, or Foreign Policy Guidelines and Defence Concept. The approach on how and when to use military force is not emphasized, which implies support to or neglect of potential participation in international operations depending on the occasion. Such position signals, firstly, the change from idealism to more pragmatic approach in international affairs. As it was put by the Minister of Defence Atis Slakteris, Latvia cannot allow for participation with one or two barely equipped soldiers in international missions, because modern military assistance cannot be compared with the principle that puts participation in the mission above its utility. Therefore, “we will send units that not only are able to participate in missions with separate tasks, but also ensure visibility of these units for domestic and international audiences” (Slakteris, 2006, p. 2).

Eventually, the defence of the state, according to Defence Concept, relies on both the ability of the state to protect the most important strategic objects at least for some period of time and NATO assistance in any type of crisis, if Latvian national resources are not sufficient to protect itself.

Some scientists (Kier, 1995, p. 67; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000, p. 75) are in accord reminding that the culture stands before the institutional design and the role within the political environment. It means that elite does not exist in the closed environment or is limited to access of ideas and moods of the broader society and, in a long term depends on public opinion. Here the question of legitimacy of the actions of the elite becomes crucial. Since legitimacy is a virtue that varies from the society to society, there is no single answer on how to measure universally the urgency and
legitimacy of actions. As it is emphasized by some scholars of international relations, “the legitimacy of the public authority, and its resultant ability to make binding decisions, depends crucially upon perceptions that its decisions are in the public interest” (Kratochwil, 1982, p. 9). Public support seems important for development of strategic culture, because people in the democratic society vote for certain values. Therefore the set of values and beliefs of the elite nevertheless have significant influence on the support of the society towards the policies implemented by the elite.

It is the issue of legitimacy in Latvia that has been recently widely discussed with regard to the intention of the Latvian government to change legislation that touches upon oversight of intelligence services. The move of the President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, who postponed the publication of the amendments to the National Security Law and Law of Security Institutions, revealed that Latvian political elite is not united on the question what actually should be understood by oversight of the intelligence services and what consequences can cause looser requirements for accessibility to state secrets, and for the same matter, also the secrets of the EU and NATO. In a broader sense, it means that the measurement of the role and function of the special services in the democratic society (that is, a question of values in using a coercive power of intelligence) has become a matter of discussion and thus signals the changes in strategic culture of the Latvian elite.

Interesting, from the point of view of strategic culture, is not the debate about the role of intelligence (even though it is, when studied as a separate subject), which may happen in any democracy; for the same matter, the content of the amendments is not an interesting topic, because it is not a subject of this analysis. The thrilling aspect is how the idea of an amendment of a law has been presented as something of crucial necessity for successful oversight of security institutions, just if there were to be a problem. The arguments of protagonists of this idea were not at all touching upon the reasons of changes, and this issue is still not answered appropriately. As a result of that, the President, saying that she considers the haste within the deciding upon subject of national security inappropriate, promulgated the possibility for national plebiscite concerning the amendment. To put it otherwise, the voting is not about changes in law, but about legitimacy (in its broader sense) of the elite to
adopt decisions that, in eyes of the public may seem neither urgent, nor necessary.

Another discussion concerning the formation of strategic culture in Latvia during the last years have very often focused on the polemic between the supporters and deniers of professionalization of the armed forces. In other words, the fundamental choice of defence policy makers revolves around the possibility to use either poorly motivated or relatively basically equipped conscript army or to invest available limited resources in volunteer force, the motivation of which for service goes beyond the date and time of the mandatory time at the garrison.

In the Latvian case, politicians, as early as in 2002, turned for polling of the society, in order to find out, what would be the possible reaction of people, if the conscription could be abolished. The results confirmed that the overwhelming majority of Latvian citizens supported such change in the defence policy of the state. For example, in 2005, according to the data of the MOD, the supporters of abolition of conscription comprised 80 per cent of population, maintaining this level for at least two consecutive previous years.

These results should not be considered surprising, because the prestige of mandatory military service in Latvia was never a subject of high popularity. Here the reasons can be sought in a whole complex of components, but to put it simply, the image of conscription as “a waste of time” that relatively widely spread between the Latvian youth, gradually created a situation that all who somehow could avoid the service, did not hesitate to do that. Either for the reasons of health or reasons of studying or by the reasons of simply avoiding the attendance, absolute majority of young males did not fulfil conscription. The state, from another side, was actually not ready to follow its own commitment for mandatory conscription for all citizens on the equal requirements. In the middle of the 1990’s the annual number of those eligible for draft reached well over ten thousand. Out of this number, only approximately one quarter were called for service due to limited budget, facilities and equipment available for training of conscripts. In such situation, there was a raising feeling of injustice within the society, because only those who did not manage to enter the universities and those, who were not
able to receive the “adequate” medical records entered military service. Those who opted to enter service voluntarily were single cases.

The integration into NATO set up new requirements for both specialization of the armed forces and their deployments for international missions. According to the Latvian legislation from the end of the last century, Latvian conscripts could not be sent for missions, even if they would express such a wish voluntarily. Therefore, a growing need for participation in international operations made the conscription an impediment for active policy implementation. As a result of that, starting from January 1, 2007, Latvian military is comprised only of the volunteer soldiers.

The traditional debate around conscription vs. volunteer force has everything to do with a change of approach in strategic culture, because volunteer army raises the question of efficiency of a military system and its ability to perform its duties. Such a majority of supporters of abolition of conscription implies that Latvian elite and society believe that all-volunteer force will be more effective than conscription. Even if this, as noted by Segal (1984), is not approved by general practise, the very feeling that professional military can perform their tasks better may trigger a temptation to use the force in less restrictive manner, because the society will pay less attention to the very existence of military. In light of Latvian policy papers and international situation that basically requires participation in missions, we may conclude that the only limit for international involvement will be available resources for the defence system.

The post-war trends of relations between military and society, or, more specifically, the question of professionalism and its impact on civilian society, which was emphasized already four decades ago in dispute of Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington, is still the actual concern among many defence policy experts in Latvia. Therefore, there is awareness that some compensatory mechanisms must be put in place, as a necessity to save the link between people in uniform and people in civilian. In Latvian case this task will be performed by National Guard (Zemessardze).
To sum up, whether the change from conscription to the all-volunteer force could be considered a success or this system will prove unable to attract the attention and support of the Latvian population, will be seen in a timeframe of three to five years. In any case, Latvian commitment to participate actively in the missions of the Alliance and European Union is a policy decision that has been supported by overwhelming majority of political forces. To implement it, Latvian military will need not only enough resources for purchasing new equipment, it will also need highly motivated, socially secure and well paid soldiers. If this colossal systemic experiment succeeds, it will have implications on defence policies of neighbouring countries and will prove that sceptics of volunteerism are outdated. Other than that, we will have a case, where the elite not only will have to be on verge of failure to comply with its own international commitment or, and that is even worse, simply fall into a problem of limited ability to perform tasks of national defence.

4. Future challenges and political choices

The Latvian policy makers do not reside in the socially empty environment; they are successors of certain historical and cultural heritage and their decisions highly depend on their experience and perceptions that, to a large extent, formulate their beliefs and preferences in international politics.

The painful experience during the Soviet regime, as well as disastrous results of neutrality of the 1930’s, make Latvian foreign and defence policy makers exclusively rely on the alliance politics. NATO and the European Union are, as declared in the NSC and foreign policy and defence concepts, guarantees for Latvian independence and sovereignty. Thus, the available choices of Latvian policy are basically limited to two. One choice is an active support to transatlantic link, or support to long lasting involvement of America in the European affairs. The other is the move towards deeper and stronger European voice in global affairs. Even though both choices are not conflicting in general terms – i.e. there is a possible compromise between the two – the question is how to make them more complimentary and whether that is possible at all? For Latvia, strong EU is as much desirable as strong NATO, and at this particular security composition, only the convergence of both gives Latvia the maximum security and expression in the international arena. Therefore
we will see the continuation of support of Latvian strategic elite for both - strong transatlantic relations and stronger EU.

This reliance on the alliance policy becomes now particularly interesting, with Russia’s movement towards acquiring more power on international stage and dealing coercively with its immediate neighbours in order to ensure more influence on their domestic economic and political processes. Latvia and Russia have for a long time been unfriendly states, whose deep differences on the citizenship issue and the role of Latvian language within the multinational society was noticed by the EU and NATO. After signing the border treaty, both states have good prospects for easement of their differences. At the same time, as noted by Alexander George (1993), in order to improve relations, states need to go through four stages of development: 1) detente; 2) rapprochement; 3) entente and 4) appeasement. Being at the second stage currently, the elites of both states very soon will face the need for most difficult decisions that touch upon the common vision of the past and readiness to remove differences from the bilateral and international agenda that, at the end of day, is another change of principles of strategic culture in Latvia (and in Russia). If so, we have to rely on that both Latvia and Russia have, first and foremost, rational intentions and have shared view on costs and benefits of their cooperation. This is not, however, true. If we see obvious change from idealist approach to foreign policy towards more national interest affected actions, the Russian policies are to lesser and lesser extent predictable. Hence, the differences among the states are quite fundamental and do not allow for substantial comfort.

The importance of the alliance politics does not change and diminish the traditional Latvian support for deep and integrated cooperation in defence and security sector among all three Baltic states, whom Latvia considers closest security cooperation partners, and not only in terms of geographic proximity. The notion of importance of regional cooperation in the European Union as well as necessity of implementing a number of serious procurement projects makes Latvian defence elite to support the Baltic cooperation and to see it as an integral part of its security vision. Interestingly enough, the common history and markedly convincing mood for cooperation makes the Baltics a surprisingly positive example for many European nations in the field of defence and security cooperation. While most of other European nations during their
history had been deliberately revising their relations and finding neighbours in charge of many historical injustices, the nations living in the Baltic states in the timeframe of last thousand years have never gone beyond the level of friendly rivalry, and in the modern history, multi-ethnicity, multi-culturality and multi-religiosity were within these countries not a permanent source of hatred and fuel for conflicts among them.

At the same time, there are differences among Latvia and its other Baltic neighbours. Estonia and Lithuania did not follow the Latvian steps to change conscription to all-volunteer force. These states also have implied differences in dealing with the issues of the past and linking them to the contemporary political process, as for example, not able to reach similar position on attending 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in Moscow that seriously doubted the ability of the Baltic leaders to have similar position towards Moscow. In a broader sense, this means that even in democracies within one region there can be more than one approach to a problem of national, regional or global scope. If so, we have to analyze differences not only of organizational and normative nature, but also deeper cultural and historic backgrounds, in order to find genuine areas of difference of these strategic cultures.

**Conclusion**

In Latvia, the research of strategic culture is relatively new and not well enough developed discipline of political science. By understanding the close and far reaching connections between the ideas and beliefs of security elite and the shape of institutions and their policies, we can create an image of a political system, whose strong support of transatlantic link derives from painful and complicated puzzles of experience of the past. At the same time Latvian strategic elite considers the cooperation between three Baltic states of crucial importance and will follow this path in future.

Strategic culture in Latvia will most likely be subject to change in the near future. These changes will be caused by two important aspects - the development of professional all-volunteer service and the dynamic of Latvian-Russian bilateral relations after signing the border treaty between the two states. In the first case, Latvian defence and security policy
makers, who consider participation in international missions one of the most crucial components of national defence strategy, will be able to use more troops for international commitments that are better equipped and better motivated for service. It means that the international missions will remain a cornerstone of defence policy, but the participation itself will be chosen more carefully, with the maximum positive outcome for gaining military skills, prestige and public support. Moreover, the link between military and society in a society that, to a large extent, based its pride of the past on the heroism of soldiers of different generations cannot be maintained if it is not adequately supported by the vivid and successful image of contemporary military.

In the second case, potential changes in the Latvian strategic culture from relatively idealistic towards more rational can be influenced by the position of Russia and its strategy on economic cooperation with the Baltic states. If Russia indeed transforms its rhetoric that claims interest in mutually profitable cooperation into real improvement of economic relations, Latvia will also change towards more rational foreign policy in this direction. In other case, Latvian strategic culture will develop around currently existing policy of “historic injustice”, or emphasizing Latvian negative experience of relations with Russia in the past.

In this regard, research of strategic culture in Latvia should pay more attention toward finding commonalities and differences between the Baltic states. This region has for long time been considered almost mirroring the political and social conditions in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. If we believe that the culture and the experience of the past is the starting point for political elites to formulate their preferences in the strategic environment, observing the differences in political and cultural environment, the Baltic states appear substantially different and so should be their strategic cultures and preferences for cooperation.

Strategic elite in Latvia currently faces the problem of challenging relations with broad society with regard to national security that results in the low trust to the political elite and some institutions. Particularly problematic is the need for development of more inclusive political values in the sphere of national security that would represent less of a party perspective and more of a kind of statism. It will affect the future role of a soldier in a Latvian society and overall relations between military
and civilians, because military is not just another profession in the labour market and will never be attracted by salary or social package only. The military, either professional or citizen in uniform, will, to a large extent preserve a sense of duty and honour of service for country. It is particularly important in a small state, such as Latvia, with a deep and widely spread memory of combat.

Another area of research that derives from findings in strategic culture and requires more attention in the future is the link between perceptions and beliefs within a given political culture and formulation of national interests. As it is rightly pointed by Zaneta Ozoliņa (2004), in formulation of national security policy the elite plays the decisive role and the society only serves as a tool for legitimizing political process. Even though, the society must be given enough expression for discussion of policy formulation, because national security policy is not only a tool for enhancing the influence and capabilities in the international arena, it is also a matter of increase of the prosperity of a society. Here Latvia has to improve its policy making, to invest more into inclusion of non-governmental actors in the policy formulation, in order to avoid policy making behind closed doors, which affected negatively in particular the discussion over the signing of border treaty with Russia and the future of bilateral relations.

Latvian strategic culture develops along the lines of strong cooperation within the transatlantic relations, in which both civilians and military recognize existing boundaries of acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour within Latvian political culture. Even though these, by definition, are different social organizations and cannot be expected to align or fully merge, the establishment and maintaining of strong social ties between them is a task of utmost importance that is fully recognized in Latvia. Here, the bridges not only must be built, they must be consequently broadened and strengthened. At the end of the day, yesterday’s civilian is probably tomorrow’s soldier and military elite; and most definitely, today’s soldier (whether or not representing the elite) is a tomorrow’s civilian. The strategic culture, furthermore, becomes more capable of accommodating different views on national security and the decisions are of better quality thus ensuring growth and adequate adaptation of values and ideas in the political environment.
References:


Publications

**Official documents**


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1 pārlas - simple footwear of Latvian peasantry, made of one piece of leather;
2 The stages of policy implementation are more complicated and thus challenging and the question - who is influencing whom more - politicians bureaucrats or bureaucrats politicians - is not yet answered. There are cases, when policy outcomes are rather different from those initially proposed and announced; in these cases politicians have tendency to blame bureaucrats for weak performance and lower level executives refer to badly formulated policies. For further reference in regard to policy decision making and foreign policy formulation see Alexander George, *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1993, 10.
Business Concepts for the Security Sector:
Benchmarking, Core Competencies, and Outsourcing

By Kevin D. Stringer*

The 21st century brings tremendous transformation requirements for the typically industrial age, Cold War era defence sectors found in most countries. Asymmetric threats, joint and combined operations and shifting and ambiguous missions within multilateral security arrangements are just some of the challenges to be faced. The private sector offers several concepts, that when properly applied, can help defence establishments in their organizational and functional transformation for the realities of 21st century conflict.

Defence policy makers have often attempted to apply business principles to the security sector with varying degrees of success. Great care must be taken in applying business models to military matters. Examples of mistakes in this process abound -- ranging from U.S Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara’s use of body count metrics based upon business statistics and systems analysis during the Vietnam War to “just-in-time” supply concepts for military logistics operations. The application of any principle or practice from the business world to the security sector must be carefully considered as the goals, cultures, and organizational attributes of private companies and defence organizations are quite different. Naturally, a comparison between the business world and the military is at times imprecise, but some relevant crossover can be found given the generic fundamentals all organizations possess -- structures, hierarchies, functions, processes, missions assigned and required outcomes.

This article aims to show how the three business concepts of benchmarking / adopting best practice, focusing on core competencies, and outsourcing are relevant to national security organizations and that use of these concepts can benefit defence establishments. The article will highlight how a considered application of these three principles by military institutions can lead to enhanced organizational effectiveness.

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1. Comparative benchmarking for best practice

To promulgate and assess directions for organizational reform in military institutions, the fields of comparative politics and business benchmarking provide a foundation for identifying and selecting potentially new organizational structures for a wide range of existing or emerging missions. Comparative politics as a subfield of political science is concerned with identifying both similarities and differences between international institutions in a systematic way. This approach enables political scientists to seek out patterns to answer useful questions and then make informed judgments (Calvert, 1993, p. 9 and 241). Comparative politics is constructive in establishing a framework to identify similarities and general patterns among political institutions to understand the political universe (Macridis and Burg, 1991, p. 2). Through comparative studies, political scientists can compensate for the lack of laboratory experiments by comparing political experiences and phenomena in one setting with those in other settings (Wilson, 2002, p. 2). This possibility is valuable since the variability of human behaviour, both individual and organizational, makes it very difficult to enunciate scientific laws in social sciences. But comparative analysis does enable political scientists to make propositions that have a high probability of being accurate and durable (ibid p. 4). This discipline can be applied when viewing military institutions, a subset of political organizations. The validity of this statement is supported by a 1996 RAND study, also using the comparative approach, which stated, “Comparisons with other armies can highlight different approaches to the preparation and conduct of warfare” (Dewar, Debra, Builder, 1996, p.2-3, 8, 42).

With a comparative framework established between two military institutions, a modified form of functional benchmarking from the business world can be used to extract pragmatic examples of possible organizational solutions that are based upon existing or historical templates. The primary assumption is that certain existing or historical organizations may represent the “best of breed” examples for addressing certain types of missions and therefore set a qualitatively high benchmark to be emulated. These then are the models to be examined and possibly adopted or adapted by the evaluating military.
Benchmarking is commonly used in business to evaluate different institutions and their performances in various fields of endeavour. Functional benchmarking is the comparison of functions between organizations whose overall mission or operations may be the same. The key elements of benchmarking are simple: at its core, benchmarking is about systematically comparing the performance of operations with a view to stimulating performance improvement by extracting the principles of “best practice” from higher performing operations (Camp, 1989). It is a rational technique for continuously improving key business processes and practices using, as the driver, comparative measurement against best practice regardless of industry or location (Codling, 1995 and Codling, 1998). As G. Watson states, “Benchmarking is a continuous search for and application of significantly better practices that lead to superior performance” (Watson, 1993, p. 4). Robert Camp identified four types of benchmarking -- the one applicable for the defence sector is benchmarking against the equivalent functional operations of non-competitors, in this case, other military organizations (Camp, 1989). The recommended methodology is to fuse the comparative approach found in comparative politics with the deriving “best practice” method from benchmarking to provide organizational solutions. The process is to identify those international formations that have successfully performed equivalent functional operations for the given mission, describe the inherent qualities or capabilities of these institutions, and extract their beneficial aspects. This approach enables the distillation of possible organizational structures derived from successfully performing comparative organizations, which could be considered “best of breed” for each type of mission evaluated. These structures would then be the organizational models to adopt or adapt for use (Stringer, 2006).

The approach of adapting business practices for the military is not new. For example, the U.S. Army’s focus on efficiency and economics led to an effort to adopt “business practices” into the work of the military. This effort has a long history. Robert McNamara, himself a retired Ford executive, attempted to bring business models into the Pentagon in the 1960s. He applied new metrics to the Vietnam conflict, centring on body counts. He introduced a “game-theory” approach to war in the form of “graduated pressure” in which military forces were explicitly used to send messages to the enemy. Since then, the armed forces have adopted successively almost every major business fad, like “total quality
management,” “velocity management,” and “just-in-time logistics,” among others. Efforts to reduce the defence budget in the 1990s in order to expand the “peace dividend” led then-Secretary of Defence William Cohen to announce a “revolution in business affairs” in the Pentagon, to parallel and support the “revolution in military affairs” that he sought to bring about by transforming the military (Kagan, 2003, p. 4). The overall goal of these business applications has generally been directed to creating “efficiencies” that might not be practical or applicable to the military’s role of conducting successful operations along the spectrum of conflict.

Yet while some of these attempts at using business practices may have produced unwanted results, their application in other areas has had remarkable outcomes. For example, in the United Kingdom, a military armoured vehicle repair shop that introduced a lean production transformation -- improving the configuration of assets, material resources, and staff -- generated a 44 percent increase in the availability of equipment, a 16 percent reduction in turnaround times, and a more than 40 percent increase in “right the first time” production. This achievement put about 40 more vehicles into operation at any one time. Moreover, the repair shop progressed from constantly missing its vehicle delivery deadlines to never missing them (Bhatia and Drew, 2006).

Similarly, using functional benchmarking to evaluate other real and often tested military organizations for their potential adoption offers a pragmatic application of a business concept to the military world. One reason for the need of a truly pragmatic direction is that the types of operations found in today’s security environment are so diverse and complex, with aspects of some types of operations mixing or tangentially touching with others, that a purely theoretical approach based upon artificial models or nonexistent, synthetically constructed, or fanciful structures would lead to lack of credibility in their application, reader scepticism, and examples that are not realistic for real-world operations. Winning wars and winning peace require unique and varied capabilities (Armitage Jr. and Moisan, 2005, p. 5). The aim is not to create force structure efficiency, but effectiveness. Proposing organizational change via benchmarking leads to one of the lessons of history where superior organization, and not technology, has often been the key to military success (Van Creveld, 1985, p. 101).
To illustrate the application of functional benchmarking, the mission of post-conflict transition provides a good example. A distinctive feature of the security landscape of the post-Cold War era is that the once clear dividing line between the realms of internal and external security has become increasingly blurred (Lutterbeck, 2004, p. 45-68). In the current and future security environment, armies will have a continuing mission in assuring general security and law and order to enable post-conflict reconstruction in critical areas (Fieald and Perito, 2002, p. 77-87). Post-conflict transition can be defined as the time that exists between a state of national emergency and that of routine national development. In the immediate aftermath of a military intervention or the collapse of a state, general lawlessness and looting invariably occur. Military combat forces are neither appropriately trained nor equipped to deal effectively with this problem, nor do most military commanders want the policing job. Local police forces are also not the solution, however. Even a legitimate and functioning indigenous police force can be easily overwhelmed by the well-armed former combatants or organized criminal actors that swiftly emerge in post-conflict situations (Gantz, 2004).

A case in point for the extreme worst case post-conflict situation is found in Iraq after Gulf War II where there were no functioning indigenous police forces and no occupying gendarmerie. Post-conflict states must provide their populations with security, stability, safety, and the assurance that transparent law enforcement and judicial processes provide the same protections and penalties for all citizens. They invariably need help in accomplishing this. Recent peace operations demonstrate that the international peacekeeping force has to make immediate progress in this area; without it, the international engagement will be jeopardized by a loss of credibility and an entrenchment of organized crime, extrajudicial processes, and terrorist activities (Field and Perito, 2002, p. 79-80).

As military missions in Bosnia and Kosovo have demonstrated, post-combat operations reflect one of the most complex and challenging phases of the conflict spectrum. Part of the reason for recognizing this as a new phase is that, although organized hostility has ended, order has yet to be restored (Armitage Jr. and Moisan, 2005, p. 1). The challenge of this mission vexes a number of militaries today since the organizational capability to address this task is not available or extremely immature.
Functional benchmarking provides a way to derive best practice from other organizations.

A case example for using functional benchmarking for addressing the post-conflict phase is the United States. The U.S. military in particular suffers an organizational deficit in being able to address this mission. With the exception of military police forces, the U.S. military is not formally trained to perform law enforcement functions. Addressing criminal activity and the rule of law requires a force structured, equipped, and trained to perform these tasks (Field and Perito, 2002, p. 80). While the military is able to mobilize and deploy rapidly in large units, most are uncomfortable with, ill suited to, and not generally trained for police tasks that are central to post-military conflict operations (for example, riot control, border control, domestic surveillance, securing/protecting sensitive sites) (Armitage Jr. and Moisan, 2005, p. 2). The U.S. has neither a national police force nor constabulary police, which suggests the U.S. will not be able to provide a solution to this capacity gap anytime soon. The U.S. is faced, however, with a growing need for the capabilities that constabulary police can provide. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, the U.S. has acted to meet national security interests without all the tools necessary for success in the post-conflict environment (Gantz, 2004).

With both the mission and organizational deficit identified, the next step is to find an organization that performs the task well, and explore what form and capabilities it has for adoption. The functional model for addressing this type of mission is found in the military and civilian constabulary units fielded by other nations. These formations straddle the military-civilian fence and can deploy with their own transport, communications, and logistical support. They can respond to situations requiring greater use of force than civil police, such as crowd control and area security. They also serve as a bridge between military and civil police forces and assume task that are not clearly set in either camp (Field and Perito, 2002, p. 80-81). The European allies have substantial experience in the use of forces with the kind of training, organization, and equipment that is directly relevant for future law enforcement missions in stability and reconstruction operations. There is much Washington could learn from its allies to overcome the temptation that elite special operations, military police, or special Army/Marine units can do the job alone (Armitage Jr. and Moisan, 2005, p. 2).
The term constabulary refers to “a force organized along military lines, providing basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment” (Schmidl, 1998, p. 22). Constabulary police in certain European countries are armed forces that have both military and police capabilities, and can therefore operate independently or in cooperation with other police forces in either a military or civilian capacity. The French Gendarmerie and the Italian Carabinieri are examples of this type of highly trained police force. Their primary function is the protection and well-being of the country and its citizens. In peace and stability operations, a constabulary force can provide for public security after the military combat units have pulled back, but before international civilian police are deployed and local law enforcement capabilities are restored (Gantz, 2004).

Though serving as police, constabulary forces are highly skilled in the tactics and doctrine of light infantry, including rapid deployment and an ability to sustain themselves logistically. The Dutch Marechaussee, for example, can deploy a 50-person detachment as a rapid-response unit within 48 hours (Perito, 2004, p. 42). These forces are also highly trained. For example, the Italian Carabinieri, serving as part of Kosovo Force, averaged 10 years of specialized training, about twice the time of their military counterparts. Other training includes martial arts, use of firearms and light weapons, intelligence-gathering and interrogation techniques, international law, negotiation, social skills, use of communications equipment, and foreign languages and cultures. Most European constabulary forces also have specialized dog units and sniper teams. Their equipment reflects a hybrid of police and military gear as well: flak jackets, shields, batons, tear gas, and automatic weapons. (ibid, p. 158) They are able to secure and protect traffic routes, facilitate the introduction of civilian rebuilding and assistance, set up and manage prisons, and establish and train certain types of national police and law enforcement institutions (Armitage Jr an Moisan, 2005, p. 5). These units can even have armoured cars, small airplanes, and helicopters Lutterbeck, 2004, p. 47). In the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo, the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have successfully used constabulary police for special events security, border patrol, high risk arrests, election security, and the protection of VIPs and international judges and prosecutors. The constabulary police units have
proved critical to restoring law and order, combating organized crime, and responding to civil disturbances (Gantz, 2004).

Prominent voices in both the US and Europe propose creating specialized structures, e.g. constabulary forces, for this purpose (SWP/SSI Working Group, 2003, p. 2-3). With the business practice of functional benchmarking, the U.S. can identify an array of constabulary organizations that can be considered “best in breed” for post-conflict transitions. These formations can then be evaluated for adoption or adaptation for the U.S. force structure. Given the post-Cold War change in security requirements, most Western states can expect to see a need for these so-called transitional law enforcement forces as part of all future stability operations (Kelly, 2006).

Similarly, the mission of homeland defence is another challenge facing defence organizations worldwide. Critical installation security looms large in the planning for homeland defence. Again, functional benchmarking can be applied to the American defence situation. Protecting America’s critical infrastructure and key assets is a formidable challenge. The open and technologically complex U.S. society presents an almost infinite array of potential targets (Office of Homeland Security, 2006). The U.S. Patriot Act defines critical infrastructure as those “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters” (ibid, p. 30).

Given the dependency U.S. society has on a number of important objects, this mission grows to overwhelming proportions. Not only are individual objects challenging, but the U.S. society and the modern way of life are also dependent on networks of infrastructure -- both physical and virtual (ibid, ix). This vulnerability is also noted in the Strategy for Homeland Defence and Civil Support that gives the Department of Defence (DoD) responsibility to assure access to defence critical infrastructure. This infrastructure could also include selected civil and commercial infrastructures that provide the power, communications, transportation, and other utilities that military forces and DoD support organizations rely on to meet their operational needs (Department of Defence, 2005 p. 18).
In this regard, the Director of Central Intelligence has warned of the possibility that al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups might try to launch attacks against critical U.S. infrastructure nodes, such as airports, bridges, harbours, and dams as well as the electronic and computer networks that support these systems (Tenet, Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2002). The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1997, in assessing the vulnerabilities of the nation’s critical infrastructure, included 400 airports, 1,900 seaports, 6,000 bus and rail transit terminals, 1,700 inland river terminals, 1.4 million miles of oil and natural gas pipeline, and other banking, financial, and energy-related networks (White House, 1997 and Davis and Shapiro, 2003, p. 72). Not only terrorist groups present a threat to critical nodes, but also natural disasters, industrial accidents, and transnational criminal activity are to be considered when protecting objects of national, regional, and local importance.

After September 11, 2001, President Bush asked governors to call up over 7,000 National Guard personnel to supplement the security at the nation’s 429 commercial airports. Guardsmen also reinforced border security activities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p.44). This trend has continued and since the September 11 terrorist attacks, some 8,000 National Guardsmen have been involved in the security of 420 airports and some 3,800 National Guardsmen have undertaken security operations around reservoirs, nuclear power plants, seaports, and civilian and government facilities (Davis and Shapiro, 2003, p.73). Governors have activated the Guard to perform additional missions, such as guarding bridges and nuclear power plants (General Accounting Office, 2004, p.1-2). National Guard troops were called upon to perform many manpower-intensive duties following 9/11, some more meaningful than others (Kelley, 2003, p.40). Protection of critical infrastructure such as airports, dams, nuclear generating facilities, and chemical plants will be first-order issues for the nation’s governors. Manpower will be at a premium, and the National Guard is the primary source of readily available, trained, organized, and well-led emergency manpower for the nation’s governors (ibid, p. 41). The following are some examples of how the Army National Guard (ARNG) has supported homeland defence missions, particularly for critical installation security:
• The New Jersey ARNG provided security for bridges, tunnels, and nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 and continues to provide security at two nuclear power plants.
• The Oregon ARNG provided security at federal installations, such as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Fort Lewis, Washington, in 2002 and 2003.
• The Texas ARNG performed security missions at U.S. Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from October 2001 to October 2002.
• The Georgia ARNG provided airport security almost immediately after September 11, 2001, and continues to guard Army and Air Force bases as required (General Accounting Office, Reserve Forces, 2004, p. 20—21).

Yet these National Guardsmen are often not trained specifically for critical installation defence, and depending on the site to be secured and protected, their knowledge of local factors and interoperability with civil agencies based upon a lack of habitual, developed relationships might be less than adequate. In fact, the arrangements are very much of an ad hoc, “come as you can” nature. More importantly, with the constant manpower drain caused by pacification duties in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the availability of dual-use ARNG assets is reduced for state governors.

Given the large number of objects and networks listed in the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1997, security coverage of all might not be practicable given resource and personnel constraints. To provide a starting point for critical installation security, commercial airports are critical nodes for commerce and travel. How to defend these installations with general purpose reserve forces is trying at best. Therefore, applying benchmarking to seek “best practice” for his type of mission could provide a useful model to evaluate. Given the importance of major commercial airports to trade, defence, and local and national economies, the Swiss Army developed a concept in the 1980s to address the specific security needs and protection requirements of airport infrastructures.

The genesis of the Swiss Airport Regiment 4 began in 1984 at the Swiss Federal Government level. The key concern for Swiss military planners
was an airborne Soviet assault on the Zurich-Kloten International Airport, a Swiss object of national economic and military importance, and its consequences for the NATO alliance's flank. Although Switzerland was neutral during the Cold War, an inability to defend her territory in the face of Soviet aggression might have caused unwanted military reactions from NATO that would have violated Swiss neutrality. By the direct order of the Swiss Federal Council, a dedicated airport defence unit was created at a rapid rate and became operational in 1987.

The formation was a small brigade composed of 3,400 reserve soldiers who were on standby duty the entire year just like the fire or police departments, and who could be alerted within 2 hours via a pager system. They were responsible for the defence and security of two collocated airports -- an international civil airport and a smaller military airport 15 kilometres away. This type of organization brought a number of advantages to executing its mission of defending the airport. One major advantage was the deep knowledge built-up in terms of the airport area -- terrain, geographical and spatial expertise, and the long-term, established working relationships with airport authorities, airport police, fire, and rescue services. A second was its focus, without dilution or distraction by other major tasks, on one key mission. This allowed the serving citizen-soldier unit member to learn his job well over a number of years in an annual or biennial training rhythm. A third benefit was that unlike other formations, the Airport Regiment did not require mobilization authorization from the political authorities. As an autonomous unit, its soldiers were alerted for duty like the fire department, and the personnel assembled on their complete equipment and uniforms at their organizational headquarters near the airport. Because at any given time a certain number of these reserve personnel may have been away from the region on business trips, vacation, or foreign travel, the regiment was always kept at an overstocked level in terms of manpower and all key positions were double slotted (Egger, no date). The only perceived disadvantage was a more complex personnel management challenge given the timelines for alerts and the consequent need then to recruit from the local region. For certain military specialties, this requirement placed stress on the military personnel system to source "hard to find" military occupational specialties.
Given that since the 1960’s, airports have been prone and vulnerable to terrorist actions, the airport regiment provided a deterrent effect against such assaults. With the extensive use of liaison officers, the regiment was well integrated into the airport crisis staff, and had intense contacts with the state and the local police, air traffic control, and airport medical services. This high, value-added quality as a specialized reserve formation is one reason for it to be considered by countries struggling to defend critical installations of this nature. Its best practice example, derived from benchmarking, shows a path for organizational change or adaptation.

2. Core competencies

C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel developed the idea of corporations focusing on their core competencies in order to develop a competitive advantage over other companies. According to them, the real sources of advantage are to be found in the management’s ability to consolidate corporate wide technologies and production skills onto competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities. In short, core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology to achieve synergies and create unanticipated products (Prahalad, and Hamel, 1990, p. 79-90).

In other words, by selecting and focusing on an organization’s core competences, the management is able to bring value which enables the institution to achieve a superior output. The desired outputs for a corporation are increased revenues and profits. The output for a military organization is mission success in warfighting, stability operations, or homeland defence. Senior leadership will therefore be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit core competencies that make success possible -- growth and profit for a corporation; effectiveness and mission accomplishment for a military.

While large countries generally tend to develop big, all purpose forces to cover all contingencies and military roles, smaller countries, with both reduced populations and budgets must consider what core competencies they should focus in order to provide value added contributions as alliance members, peacekeeping donors, and ad-hoc allies. These competencies may imply focusing on certain niche capabilities for
multilateral efforts within a more general national defence framework. Highlighting the need for effectiveness, Lithuanian Undersecretary for Defence Policy Renatas Norkus stated, “The most important thing is getting the job done. It is not a matter of which flag to use [United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union], but a matter of getting the right capabilities to the right place at the right time” (Norkus, 2006, p. 167). In times of shrinking defence budgets and overstretched forces even small contributions matter (ibid, p. 169). This point is especially true if the contribution is a core competence of the sending state and harmonizes with the contributions of other states in the peacekeeping mandate.

This thinking resonates also in the wider European security community. One view is that Europe as a whole, primarily for financial, strategic and ultimately political reasons, will generally not be able to match the depth and breadth of U.S. transformation efforts, so its militaries will be relegated to either a complementary or specialized role in joint operations with the U.S (SWP/SSI Working Group, 2004, p. 2-3). This approach implies focusing resources and development on certain military core competencies for alliance or peace operation contributions. As the NATO Parliamentary Assembly 2005 Annual Session noted on the Prague Capability Commitments:

“Not all members need to have the same capabilities. As part of a larger alliance, it is possible, and in fact preferable, that smaller Allies concentrate on particular capabilities that are often in high demand. This makes both fiscal and strategic sense. The smaller Allies cannot be expected to develop large expeditionary forces, but they should be encouraged to develop deployable units in particular high-demand areas. The same amount of money, for example, could be used to purchase a few fighter aircraft or maintain a state-of-the-art brigade specializing in chemical and biological protection or emergency medical care. But it is clear that in today’s strategic environment a specialized brigade will be far more useful in the Alliance’s missions than a few additional fighters” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 170 DSCTC 05 E, 2005).

A good example of a country focusing on core capabilities for an alliance contribution is the Czech Republic. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
(NBC) defence has long been a niche specialty of the Czech armed forces. This competence was developed during the Cold War by the then Czechoslovakia. Based on the knowledge that any East-West exchange of such weapons would likely have occurred over Czechoslovakia, NBC brigades were established to operate alongside each Army Corps. After the Iron Curtain fell in 1989, the new Czech military continued this high quality capability tradition. As a next step, its NBC units were deployed to the Middle East as part of the 1991 Gulf War coalition.

Since the Czech Republic’s induction in NATO, the Czech Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Battalion has been the most high-profile example of niche capabilities in action. The battalion has been on operational standby as part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) since the summer of 2004. It arose directly in response to the Prague Capability Commitments identified need for improved CBRN capabilities (ibid).

In 2003, an elite 250-man military unit from the Czech Republic, specializing in NBC weapons defence, was on the ground at Camp Doha in Kuwait. The unit was participating in training and exercises in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom, said a Czech diplomat in Washington. “The specialty of the unit is consequence management,” said Vratislav Janda, deputy chief of mission at the Czech Embassy. “They are special troops like [the U.S. Army’s] Green Berets,” he said (Book, 2003). In this case, the Czech military is using its expertise in CBRN protection to contribute a numerically small but highly useful specialized unit to a coalition.

Amidst growing fears of terrorist attacks and weapons of mass destruction, NATO is setting up a 500-strong multinational battalion specialized in nuclear, biological and chemical detection. The Czech Republic, a respected international authority in this field, has been given a lead role in setting up the unit, ensuring its action capability and being in command in the first year of its existence. This new multinational battalion is being set up in reaction to the new security situation in the world and the heightened danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction. It is to serve not only in times of war but also for eliminating weapons of mass destruction in peacetime and in cases of dangerous accidents, such as factory leaks endangering the population, anywhere in
the world. The Czech Republic, whose anti-chemical unit played a key role in protecting allied forces in the Gulf War, is to mastermind the setting up and training of this multi-national unit and will remain in command through the first 12 months of its existence (Lazarova, 2003). On the same theme, the Czechs are also developing an epidemiological centre in Techonin to provide treatment and research on exposure to biological weapons (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 170 DSCTC 05 E, 2005).

The Baltic countries are also engaging in some specialization and focus on core competencies for alliance contributions. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have focused on several niche capability areas: Mine-Clearing Measures (MCM), military medics, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Special Operation Forces (SOF). Lithuania is also currently conducting a deployment of SOF in support of combat operations in Afghanistan (in addition to its lead role in one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Western Afghanistan). Additionally, Lithuania, together with Latvia and Estonia, is planning joint Baltic specialization areas in: diving capabilities, military medicine, and EOD. Estonia and Latvia have both developed explosive ordinance disposal expertise and deployed those forces (ibid).

For peacekeeping contributions, the Swiss model provides a useful example. Switzerland, while maintaining an untried, but full spectrum force for national defence, has based its contributions to UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) peacekeeping missions on functions where it has a “competitive advantage” to other nations. Given it world class reservoir of doctors and excellent medical infrastructure, Switzerland provided the contingent medical units for its first two forays in UN peacekeeping -- the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia and the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).

For the orderly administration and implementation of the election process in Namibia, the UNTAG had been established by the Security Council to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary General to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the control of the UN (UN Security Council, 1987). At
maximum deployment strength of approximately 8,000 personnel, consisting of 4,500 military personnel, 1,500 police, and 2,000 civilians, UNTAG was to help the Special Representative ensure that:

- All hostile acts were ended.
- Troops were confined to base, and in the case of the South Africans, ultimately withdrawn.
- All discriminatory laws were repealed.
- Political prisoners were released.
- Namibian refugees were permitted to return.
- Law and order were impartially maintained.

The military component of UNTAG consisted of three infantry battalions (Finland, Kenya, Malaysia), an engineer battalion (Australia/New Zealand), two logistics units (Canada, Poland), an administrative company (Denmark), a helicopter detachment (Italy), a flight detachment (Spain), a communications unit (Great Britain), and a medical unit (Switzerland) (UN, 2001).

On September 7, 1988, a half a year after the Swiss Federal Council decided to enlarge its engagement in peacekeeping actions, the Swiss Federal Military Department and Foreign Department received the order to produce a proposal for providing medical support to the UNTAG organization. In October of 1988, a Swiss military team reconnoitred the situation in Namibia.

The planning for the Swiss Medical Unit (SMU) engagement began in earnest in December 1988 (Wirz, 1991, p. 137). By the end of February 1989, the Federal Council approved the recruitment of volunteers for the SMU for the support of UNTAG. Within a week after this decision, the first volunteers were recruited for the mission from a hospital in Bern. Until the end of the UNTAG mandate in March 1990, Switzerland had an average of 150 personnel deployed within the SMU. The tasks of the SMU were defined as follows:

- Provide medical care for the approximately 8,000 personnel of UNTAG, both civilian and military component, which together had no assigned or integral medical services of their own.
- Operate four medical clinics at defined sites in Windhoek, Grootfontein, Oshakati, and Rundu. In particular, the clinics were to be in a position to provide a full range of surgical, tropical medicine, dental, and psychiatric care.

- Furnish free medical capacity to local hospitals if required, support the UN observers deployed in Southern Angola, and perform medical and hygienic controls for the ongoing refugee repatriations.

- Ensure a steady supply of medicines and medical material for all UN contingents. (Hiltbrunner, 1991, p. 131)

As this was the first Swiss unit contingent deployed under the UN peacekeeping aegis, the SMU had its share of growing pains in terms of material procurement, transport in the operational area, and logistical support. As the UN reconnaissance period given to the unit was limited, the logistics staff did not know what supplies were locally procurable. Also, the large purchases of UNTAG in a small country of only 1.2 million inhabitants drove prices to astronomical heights. Thus, all critical equipment was brought from Switzerland (Scherz, 1991, p. 132). Many "lessons learned" were incorporated in the follow-on deployment of a Swiss medical unit with the UN under the MINURSO mandate.

For the Western Sahara operation, the UN requests for national contingents came very late for the MINURSO mandate, and only under tremendous time pressure did the preparations for the Swiss contribution occur. On May 21, 1991, the so-called leadership committee composed of Swiss Federal Foreign Ministry and Military Department officials met to work out the directive for the Federal Council for the creation and deployment of a second SMU to support the MINURSO mission. The official order followed at the end of May 1991. Concurrently, the Section for Peace-Keeping Actions on the Swiss General Staff took responsibility for the project leadership and commenced planning in large scale in May 1991. The Swiss Federal Council approved the mission on June 26, 1991. The training course for unit staff began in mid-July and the entire contingent was ready to depart on August 12, 1991 (Schneider, 1992, p. 497). For a variety of political reasons, it was not possible for the responsible planners to reconnoiter the operational area prior to the unit's departure, therefore the decision on how to best realize the UN requirements had to be taken in a partial vacuum. The tasks of the second SMU were similar to those of its predecessor and defined as follows:
• ensure the medical care of the military and civilian component of MINURSO (3000 personnel).
• operate three medical clinics at defined locations (Laayoune, Smara, and Dakhla) and provide overall UN force dental and pharmacy services.
• provide transport capabilities for patients requiring level 3 medical services either to the Canary Islands or for repatriation.
• be ready to provide free medical capacity for the benefit of the civilian population if required.
• in emergency, supply services to the members of the two conflicting armies.

Although smaller in size than the SMU-Namibia, this SMU was in operation over a much longer period (33 months instead of 12 months) and in a much more difficult environment from a climate and infrastructure perspective. It also holds the distinction of being the only Swiss force-level peacekeeping operation with casualties to date. Two members of the unit were killed in transportation accidents. Since the military logistic support unit for MINURSO was never deployed (Krattli, 1992, p. 227), in the course of its stay, the Swiss took on additional non-medical logistical tasks as a matter of practicality for the entire mission. In particular, the SMU became the de facto food and supply unit for the MINURSO organization (Haudenschild, 2001, p. 29). This last almost imperceptible and unforeseen shift signified a slight extension and expansion of the military tasks assigned to the Swiss unit which displaced the unit’s raison d’être from a narrow medical service focus to one with a broader logistical support focus for the MINURSO organization. These additional logistical tasks, including foodstuff and material resupply for the benefit of the overall MINURSO organization, naturally increased the complexity of the mission for the SMU (Haudenschild, 2001, p. 29). This expansion of the task spectrum was an indicator to the future and heralded the more multifunctional units that would follow in the footsteps of the two medical pioneers, and signify a wider role for Swiss military peacekeeping detachments. Clearly for both UNTAG and MINURSO, a focus on Swiss core competencies drove their contribution to both missions. Stated another way, a sub-Saharan African or small Pacific island nation would not be in a position to contribute a highly
qualified medical unit to a UN mandate given a lack of core competencies in this function.

A more advanced proposal for the Swiss that shows a focus on core competencies is proffered by Louis Geiger, consultant to the International Red Cross for the Relationship to the Military. He noted that given the Swiss military aptitude and personnel reservoir for logistics and staff tasks, the Swiss Army should develop a headquarters battalion for international peace operations. Such a unit would consist of a staff, signals company, a transport company, a protection company, logistics company, and an information centre (Geiger, July – August 2000, p. 6). This proposal would be a logical outgrowth of the Swiss provisioning of core competency contributions in medicine to UN operations in Namibia and Western Sahara, and logistical functions for the OSCE operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In business as in the military, though, overspecialization on a valuable and specific competency can be adverse. As the Undersecretary for Defence Policy and International Relations at the Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania noted: “Then there is the issue of role specialization, or so-called niche capabilities. As an Ally, we are looking into some areas where a small contribution could bring about significant effects. However, we should avoid the trap of what could be called overspecialization. Politically, it is not palatable for the small guys to “serve water and do laundry” while the big guys will do the fighting. For example, Lithuania could develop a Water Purification Brigade to fill in this niche in the Alliance and scrap all its combat units. Although such a move would seem economically sensible, it would be a political suicide for any defence minister of any country. Small states need to share the same risks and challenges with the big countries in order to demonstrate their equal stature within the Alliance and acquire necessary combat expertise. Multinational projects are a better way to fill various gaps, instead of relegating small nations to the militarily secondary role of service support” (Norkus, 2006, volume 8, p. 167-171).

Clearly, a careful focus on organizational core competencies, particularly for smaller nations in relation to their contributions to alliances or peacekeeping missions can be worthwhile. While certain dangers must be avoided, the application of this business concept can bring both efficiencies and effectiveness to a military institution.
3. Outsourcing

The classical definition of outsourcing is the act of transferring to another company an activity that was formerly conducted in-house, and, by extension, the resulting state of not conducting that activity in-house anymore (Dragonetti, Dalsace and Kool, 2003). It can also imply purchasing a function that does not exist in-house and will not be developed due to cost or lack of internal expertise. Outsourcing, properly utilized, can bring enormous benefits to any commercial firm or institution by creating new capabilities, reducing costs, and enhancing effectiveness. The same principles hold true for the military sector. Typically, outsourcing firms are broken down into three types -- service providers, consultative firms, and non-core service companies. These categories mirror the services offered by equivalent military units and correspond to how the privatized military industry is organized.

P.W. Singer in his groundbreaking book on the subject, Corporate Warriors, develops the framework linking privatized military firms to their service provision for the defence sector. His book provides a superb definition of the three generic types of military service providers. According to Singer, this industry is organized into three broad sectors -- military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms (Singer, 2003, p. 7). A short overview of each will highlight the services they provide and the subsequent value they can bring to any defence establishment or government.

Military provider firms are defined by their focus on the tactical environment. In a military sense, such firms provide services at the forefront of the battlespace, by engaging in actual fighting, either as line units or as specialists, such as combat pilots (Ibid, p 92). Examples of this type of outsourcing are found in countries that lack certain capabilities and buy them from private service providers. Examples include Sierra Leone buying both combat units and air assets from South African firms for defeating insurgents and Ethiopia outsourcing air combat capabilities to Ukrainian and Russian companies.

Military consulting firms comprise the second sector within the military services industry. They provide advisory and training services integral to the operation and restructuring of a client’s armed forces. They offer
strategic, operational, and/or organizational analysis. They may influence the battlefield, but they do not operate on the battlefield like military provider firms. This is a critical distinction (Ibid, p. 95). In illustration, a consultant company like MPRI provides the instructors for the U.S Army Reserve Officers Training Corps programme at American universities and faculty for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Ironically, future American junior and senior officers are being trained under an outsourcing contract run by consultants.

Firms that provide supplementary military services characterize the third sector of the industry. These privatized functions cover non-lethal aid and assistance, including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation. As with what is occurring with supply-chain management in general industry, the benefit of this type of military outsourcing is that these firms specialize in secondary tasks not part of the overall core mission of the client (Ibid, p. 97). Here, the concepts of outsourcing and focusing on core competences are interrelated. Capabilities that are non-core can logically be considered for outsourcing since they are not essential to the survival or central function of the institution. Outsourcing in the military and defence sector in this sense can mean giving existing functions like logistics or administration to suppliers that are able to provide an equal or higher quality service at a lower cost over specified periods of time. Most of the logistics for recent operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo and other crisis locations has been handled by military support firms that provided everything from mess hall administration to postal facilities.

From a benefits perspective, outsourcing can be very compelling for a defence department or government. The U.S. military’s first experiment in formalized reliance on private firms for its logistics support was considered a success, even though the company Kellogg Brown and Root garnered criticism for its apparent failure to control costs in the Balkans. Even despite the possible over billing outlined in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessment of the Balkans operations, a 1997 Logistics Management Institute study determined that Kellogg Brown and Root had done with $462 million and 6,766 civilian employees what would have otherwise required $638 million and 8,918 troops (Pelton, 2006 p. 101 – 102). In a similar vein, Erik Prince, owner of Blackwater USA, one of the largest providers of privatized security, is
an apostle of how outsourcing brings such efficiencies to the battlefield. He stated, “We replaced 183 men with twenty in one of the CIA installations [in Afghanistan]. The army needs that many support troops and men to provide the same effective force that we did with twenty” (Ibid p. 296).

The Sierra Leone example is also instructive. There, the South African company Executive Outcomes in 1995, for a modest $35 million, cleared out the rebels that were terrorizing the countryside, returned control of the diamond mines to the legitimate government, and saved thousands of lives all within 21 months. This contrasted greatly with the ineffective United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) beginning in 2000 that was costing $1.5 million a day and ended with total expenditures of $2.8 billion by 2005 (Venter, 2006, p. 143 and 150).

But outsourcing has its problems. One is poor cost control. Military and defence sector organizations do not seem to possess the same vendor management skills found in private companies using outsourcing. The GAO reported that U.S. Department of Defence outsourcing results were overstated by at least 75 percent because of both poor accounting and contract cost growth (General Accounting Office, 1997, NSIAD-98-48). This pattern recurs because although the military has set a policy of becoming more businesslike, it does not control rigorously whether it saves money or improves operations by using metrics and standard vendor management controls (Murphy, 2000).

Compounding this difficulty is the propensity of governments to use outsourcing as a cost-cutting measure without always considering the impact of the outsourced service on the overall process flow. Outsourcing the work of hospital staff or transportation and logistics in a supply chain may reduce the fixed and variable costs of that particular activity. Yet these moves may drive up total costs and reduce the quality of service (Bhatia, Drew, 2006). Even worse, with ill conceived implementation, such a step could also affect capabilities within a military force by complicating organizational interfaces between combat units and contractors on an increasingly non-linear battlefield.

Finally, outsourcing can also be fraught with risks in terms of control and governance. For example, outsourcing occurs in the deployment of
Civilian Police (CIVPOL) formations for international stability and civilian police operations to places like Haiti, Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Under U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 71, the Clinton Administration assigned responsibility for fielding U.S. contingents for international police missions to the Department of State. In turn, the State Department has outsourced responsibility for the recruiting, training, and logistical support of U.S. CIVPOL contingents to a commercial contractor. One reason for this outsourcing is that the U.S. Department of State has a core competence concentrating on diplomacy, foreign policy issues, and consular affairs. In terms of its skills, knowledge, and processes it is not a law enforcement agency, and these capabilities are marginal at best. Hence, outsourcing a non-core competency makes classical sense.

Yet the U.S. government’s governance oversight in this case is limited. Police officers participating in U.S. CIVPOL contingents are independent contractors of a commercial firm. The United States is the only country to use contractors of a commercial firm as police officers for its CIVPOL contingents. These contractors wear U.S. uniforms, carry weapons provided by the U.S. government, and have authority to use deadly force -- but work for a commercial contractor (Field, Perito, 2002-2003 p. 77–87). Given this governance set-up, wrongful use of force by contractors has unclear liability implications for the contracting government.

Nevertheless, outsourcing provides some unexplored terrain for the future, particularly in terms of international peace operations. The owners of HART and Blackwater USA, two of the largest private military companies, expressed frustration at the complete lack of interest by governments and aid organizations in utilizing the experience of a private army to solve major security and stability problems in Africa. As George Simm of HART asserts, “The Congo contains all that is evil about social disintegration -- AIDS, child soldiers, disease, warfare, crime, the list goes on. Everything in every segment of scientific and human studies is abused in this massive region. Yet a small [private] peacekeeping force could fully protect the tiny population per mile with little trouble” (Pelton, 2006, p. 298). The future could very well include governments and the United Nations renting armies to perform operations that do not mobilize the military will of the international community.
Conclusion

As illustrated in this article, the private sector offers three concepts -- benchmarking, focusing on core competencies, and outsourcing -- that when properly applied, can help defence establishments in their organizational and functional transformation for the realities of 21st century conflict. Benchmarking allows institutions to look beyond their paradigm and find functional examples from “best of breed” organizations existing elsewhere in the world (Stringer, 2006). Their relevant capabilities or structures can then be adopted or adapted for use. A focus on core competencies, combined with the interrelated concept of outsourcing non-core functions, allows defence organizations to concentrate on areas where they bring value, particularly for alliance and stability operation contributions, while allocating peripheral functions to firms that can bring a better performance at a lower cost. Carried further, outsourcing can enable the purchase of new or non-existing capabilities and bring efficiencies to the deployment of resources within a defence establishment.

Nonetheless, all three concepts have to be applied with care as commercial models that work well in the private sector may lead to unwanted or unforeseen outcomes in the defence sector. In the end, though, military and defence policymakers bear accountability for their decisions and non-decisions, and an evaluation of the private sector concepts mentioned here could lead to greater organizational efficiency and effectiveness for the future.

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1 Level 3 medical care is a UN definition. The lowest level is 1. Level 2 is an extended medical clinic, and level 3 means possessing transport capability into a hospital, which for this SMU was Clinica Roca on the Canary Islands.
How to Win a Counterinsurgency War? The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the US Escalating Stalemate in the Vietnam War

By Kadri Kukk

“…both domestically and internationally, any time we undertake a slightly different or increased initiative, it is characterised by those opposing US policy as ‘escalatory. As you know ‘escalatory’ has become a dirty word, and such charges, true or false, impose further inhibitions here against moving ahead to win this war.”

General Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1964-1970

Deliberate escalation of war in a rapid and decisive manner, is one of the means to defeat the enemy and obtain victory in war. In line with Clausewitz’s perception of unlimited nature of war, one has to engage in the battle and aim for making the enemy defenceless (Clausewitz, 1906 [1874]). According to this approach, the engagement aimed at overthrowing the enemy, is central and most immediate means to victory (Gat, 1991, p. 206). Once the enemy’s means of resistance have been destroyed, the political aim of whatever kind has been automatically achieved, because the enemy could do nothing but surrender (Honig, 1997, p. 112). The strategy of overthrow prevailed in the 19th century wars of national liberation, in which ends and means of war were defined in unlimited terms, and defeat in war was equated with national extinction. The emergence of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, transformed such prospect of victory, which otherwise followed when the enemy had been made defenceless, to the prospect of suicide. In order to avoid mutual destruction that the nuclear weapons were capable for inflicting, and rescue the political aim from paralysis, one needed to identify military aims short of complete destruction of the enemy (Stone, 2004, p. 415). The utmost problem for the strategy-makers appeared to be the question of how to use the military in a way which one is able to achieve the political purpose of war, and survive at the same time.

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At the start of the US involvement in Vietnam in the 1950s, the Administration saw the political aims of war in unlimited terms. Osgood argues that the Communist aggression in Asia was equated with American security, in the context of balance of power that urged the US to stop Communism, without questioning the price of the war (Osgood, 1970, p. 115). Yet, by mid-1960s when the US Vietnam engagement had gathered speed, this image had changed. The war in Vietnam was no longer viewed as a direct threat to US security (Ibid). Therefore the desire to limit the Vietnam War did not only stem from the fear that its escalation may lead to nuclear war with Communist countries, but equally from the US political interests that were not vital enough to warrant the involvement at any price (Ibid). In order to achieve the limitations of the war, the Administration anticipated the use of force as an instrument of coercive bargaining, and carefully managed every step of the military from Washington. The strikes were to hurt, as opposed to destroy, and compel northern Vietnam to stop its war in the South (Buzzanco, 1995, p. 328-333). Thus, the US air and ground campaigns were to have deterrent rather than destructive purpose, while holding back larger capabilities able to annihilate the enemy, if the enemy would not yield (Ibid, p. 329; Schelling, 1960). Unanticipated US defeat in Vietnam led some analysts to argue that limited escalation on behalf of the US were among the reasons that led to the undesired war ends, as it had rendered the US military inflexible to respond to the changing battlefield conditions and had given the enemy an advantage (Rosen, 1982 and Summers, 1982). Equally, the reasons of defeat have been found in US military’s micromanagement, that did not allow effective civil-military cooperation and caused difficulties in finding a common ground on US ends and means in war (Buzzanco, 1995; McMaster, 1997). It has also been argued that the US military for the war fell short of national support, which downplayed US military’s motivation in war (Summers, 1982). Also, that the attritional strategy that the US military practiced in war against the guerrilla enemy was simply unsuitable (Bergerud, 1991; Gibson, 1988).

This article studies the US Joint Chiefs’ of Staff discussions and arguments in regards to the US war in Vietnam throughout 1966. It further argues that the Joint Chiefs’ understanding of the nature of war prevented them from finding the keys to win the war in Vietnam. This paper finds that the Joint Chiefs’ reading of war had two main features.
First, the war was viewed as a conventional military engagement. Second, the enemy was viewed as an evil, which was to be made defenceless before any political resolution of the conflict could take a hold. By studying how the military understands the essence of war, one could seek to provide a new angle to analyse why certain strategies might have trouble in the present day conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. This paper does not aim to analyse the parallels between Vietnam War and the present day conflicts, but maintains that all wars are different. It nonetheless highlights the prevailing strategic considerations in Vietnam, which led the US into defeat, in order to encourage further consideration on the current military engagements from a similar point of view.

During 1966 in the Vietnam War, the US Administration and the military had learned their first lessons from the large scale engagement. They began exploring a wide range of options to make their strategy work, and undermine the Vietnamese enemy. On a political level, some of the primary architects of the Vietnamese campaign within the US Administration had started to doubt in the existing strategy, and were looking for new approaches to succeed. For example, the Deputy Defence Secretary John McNaughton, in early 1966, feared that the US was on its way to an ‘escalating military stalemate,’ but saw merit in escalation and suggested intensified bombing campaign (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, pp. 43-44). Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara had become increasingly sceptical throughout 1966 and suggested limiting the troop numbers and attacks on Vietnam (Pentagon Papers, 1971b, pp. 529-530). The White House and President Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, did not share the Defence Secretary’s worries and did not think that de-escalation would help in Vietnam (Ibid, p. 534). This kind of search for a workable plan most likely encouraged the Joint Chiefs’ discussions and proposition of a winnable war plan for Vietnam. One can also see this from the vast variety of military means the Chiefs considered for Vietnam in 1966, ranging from search-and-destroy operations, to development tasks and to technological constructions to stop the enemy. This is what makes it an appropriate year to analyse to understand their comprehension of the nature of the war. Moreover, the position of the Joint Chiefs on political and military levels, and their possible desire to exercise greater influence within the Administration may have bolstered their discussions on strategy. Four service chiefs (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) plus the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, from 1958 onwards,
performed as the Defence Secretary’s staff to assist him with managing the unified commands (Palmer, 1984, p. 18). The Joint Chiefs were freed from administrative issues with regards to unified commands, yet they were closely linked to the political level, as well as to the military through their own services. This should have made them the best institution to build a strategy that is sensitive to both the US political considerations and the military capabilities (Ibid).

1. Overview of Vietnam War 1950-1975

The US involvement in Vietnam dates back to 1950, when President Truman approved military aid for anti-Communist activities in Southeast Asia, and sent the first US military advisers to southern Vietnam. The assistance was aimed at supporting the development of an anti-Communist Vietnamese army and helping France to fight against nationalist and communist organisation in Vietnam (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 77; Bowman, 1985, p. 34). French defeat in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and shortly thereafter signed Geneva Accords in 1954 resulted in the establishment of temporary demarcation line along the 17th parallel. This separated French and Vietnamese units and created de facto partition of Vietnam into two entities – southern and northern – which were to be united only on the basis of free elections in 1956 which did not materialise (Encyclopaedia Britannica). While the US presence in Vietnam remained small throughout the 1950s, it started to steadily grow in 1961, after the inauguration of President John Kennedy. Kennedy viewed southern Vietnam as a “cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia” and committed the US to fight against “the Communist wars of national liberation,” which, if not stopped, could inflict the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia (Buzzanco, 1991, pp. 81-83). By the end of the President Kennedy’s era in late 1963, the US military mission in Vietnam had grown to 16,000 people and included Special Forces, aerial reconnaissance units, fighter bombers, and specialist ground troops that were engaged in combat operations on behalf of southern Vietnamese government and against northern Vietnamese units and insurgency in the South (Bowman, 1985, pp. 50-56; Buzzanco, 1995, p.82) President Lyndon Johnson’s Administration marks the introduction of numerous US ground combat troops to Vietnam and the launch of large-scale bombing campaign against northern Vietnam in 1965. The Administration’s Vietnam strategy anticipated the use of force as an
instrument of coercive bargaining. The gradually intensified strikes were meant to hurt, as opposed to destroy the northern Vietnam. It also served to compel the cessation of the war in the South, and to prevent the widening of the war in the region or introduction of nuclear weapons (Buzzanco, 1995, pp. 328-333). Unfortunately, the ideologically motivated northern Vietnamese enemy effectively matched the US escalation, and caused the US to steadily increase its involvement. The de-escalation of war and the US withdrawal started with the administration of President Richard Nixon in 1969 (Ibid, p. 313). The Paris peace agreement in 1973 ended the US involvement in Vietnam. The following civil war led to the establishment of Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976 (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

1.2 Methodology and sources

The article follows the line of qualitative research, and borrows from the research methodology of history to study the available documents and discussions of the Joint Chiefs on the US war in Vietnam throughout 1966. The method of history, according to Aron, requires ordering the documents in accordance to their date and approaching the whole in order to be able to convincingly compare different texts that deal with the same phenomena. Furthermore, threefold distinction emerges from such methodology: the study of actor in relation to its historical context, and the in relation to its work, as well as the interpretation of the actor and his work in present day context (Aron, 1983, p. 7). This article aims to analyse the documents and discussions of the Joint Chiefs by first, placing them within the political and military environment of 1966 in relation to the US engagement in Vietnam, and secondly, by analysing the documents and discussions of the Joint Chiefs as they in context might have considered them. Nonetheless, the article departs from the method of history in two aspects. First, the texts will be presented in accordance to the type of engagement rather than the sequence of their date, and secondly, the article seeks to address whether the Joint Chief’s understanding of the nature war helped them to achieve the desired war ends. The texts of the Joint Chiefs throughout 1966 will be organised in accordance to the nature of engagement – air campaign, and ground war – this enables one to better address how the Joint Chiefs had identified the ends and means in each particular engagement in Vietnam War. This is done for the purposes of the research question and is necessary to re-
construct the Joint Chiefs war plan and their understanding of the nature of war. The texts will be studied by looking into what were the military ends and means in the war, as defined by the Joint Chiefs, and how the Joint Chiefs had planned to use the means in order to obtain the desired ends. Having addressed these questions, one should be able to comprehend how the Joint Chiefs had understood the essence of the engagement between two conflicting parties, and whether that understanding helped them to achieve the desired war ends.

Due to unbroken confidentiality of some of the documents, as well as physical remoteness of the researcher from the US governmental archives, the number of the available original Joint Chiefs’ texts from 1966 on US military engagement in Vietnam is somewhat limited. In particular with regards to the US ground campaign. There are eight Joint Chiefs’ original memorandums to the Secretary of Defence from 1966 on the conduct of the US air campaign in Vietnam, which the author was able to access via digital National Security Archives, or which were reprinted in the Pentagon Papers. These memorandums are dated 8, 18 and 25 January, 19 February, 10 March, 14 April, 14 October and 22 November 1966. Two original documents that were available on US ground campaign are dated on 7 and on 14 October 1966. In order to fill the gaps that stem form the scarcity of original documents and provide a better overview of the Joint Chiefs’ discussions thereby obtaining a more balanced account, the original documents will be supplemented by the official and "quasi-official" accounts of the history of the US involvement in Vietnam War: the History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War in Vietnam 1960-1968, issued by the Historical Division of the Joint Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1970, and the Pentagon Papers, edited by Senator Mike Gravel in 1971 and by Neil Sheehan of the New York Times in 1971 (Blumenson, 1962, p. 4). There is always a possibility that the official history is biased towards the government, serves its interests, justifies its undertakings, is incapable of being truly balanced, or objective and independent in its judgements as the evidence would require (Ibid, pp. 1-3). Additionally, taking into account the accessibility and transparent research methods, the desire to get to know what really happened in war, and allowing for the history available to be used with confidence, should push the government for allowing the record to speak for itself (Ibid, pp. 8-9). The author finds the above historical volumes suitable for studying the Joint Chiefs’
discussions on US engagement in Vietnam throughout 1966, as long as the presented evidence allows confident credibility checks.

2. The Joint Chiefs discussions in 1966

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussions throughout 1966 reveal that five generals were not able to identify military means that would have fit into the limited political aims of war, nor produce effective resolution for the conflict. Furthermore, the Joint Chief’s considerations were almost exclusively operational and tactical, leaving the political context effectively aside. The Chiefs tended to support means which brought to bear the maximum US military effort, and aimed at making the enemy defenceless.

2.1 The air campaign

The Joint Chiefs’ memorandum from 8 January 1966 argued against the US bombing pause on northern Vietnam. It was imposed for the time of religious holidays, and should have signalled to Hanoi that the US was willing to resume diplomacy. The memorandum states that “the stand-down contravenes the purpose and greatly weakens US negotiating leverage,” and continues arguing that “as time passes, it would become increasingly difficult to disengage from the stand-down,” hence “the early resumption of offensive air operations [is] essential if we are to avoid a misinterpretation of US resolve in Southeast Asia, redress advantages accruing to the DRV from the stand-down, and enter into negotiations from a position of strength” (National Security Archives, 1966a, pp. 2-38). Another memorandum on bombing pause from 22 November 1966 again argues that “a cessation of military activities must be accomplished with minimum over-all degradation of military operations... the JCS would limit such stand-down to a maximum of 48 hours... all air operations in Laos and air reconnaissance in both North and South Vietnam should be specifically exempted from any such arrangements... [the military should be allowed to] strike unusually lucrative or threatening military targets in North Vietnam” (National Security Archives, 1966b, p. 2). The Chiefs further recommended a “sharp increase in the intensity and, if possible, the scope of air operations in North Vietnam both prior to and immediately after any stand-down.” (Ibid, p. 3) At a political level the entire war was a negotiation game
aimed at communicating to Hanoi that every further step towards escalation causes the US to inflict painful retaliation. The periodical pauses and escalations were inherent parts in the process of persuasion. The Joint Chiefs seemingly were willing to enter into such negotiations only after they had definitely prevailed over the enemy. The desire was to injure the enemy until the balance on the battlefield clearly favoured the US, also reflects the Joint Chiefs desire to push towards nothing shorter than clear victory in war. Equally it may indicate that the enemy was viewed as an evil against which nothing but complete overthrow would work, as only destruction is able to oppress the evil will of the enemy (Stone, 2004, p.416).

The Chiefs memorandum from 18 January 1966 sheds light on how the Joint Chiefs defined the aims of the air war. It posits the purposes was to “deny the DRV large-scale external assistance; destroy those resources already in NVN which contribute most to the support of aggression; destroy or deny use of military facilities; and harass, disrupt and impede the movement of men and materials into SVN” (National Security Archives, 1966c, p. 3). The best means to achieve these ends according to the Joint Chiefs was “offensive air operations against NVN... with a sharp blow and thereafter maintained with uninterrupted, increasing pressure” (Ibid). The means, which the Joint Chiefs posited, demonstrate their desire to destroy the northern Vietnamese war-capabilities. The memorandum prescribes the following: “closing of the ports as well as sustained interdiction of land LOCs from China... present sanctuaries should be reduced... destruction of entire [northern Vietnamese] POL bulk and dispersed storage, distribution and transportation system... an intensified armed reconnaissance programme, without sortie limitation [to harass] supply and transport activities... day and night air operations against LOC counters, predicted traffic flow areas, transhipment points, vehicle/boat concentrations, and LOC exits from the DRV. Electric power would be disrupted in order to hamper command and control as well. This was to drive home to the DRV leadership and populace, the heavy price of continuing the war” (Ibid).

The desire to carry out a decisive pursuit against the northern Vietnamese enemy is demonstrated by the Chiefs’ criticism on the incremental use of force in war. The memorandum argues further that “restrained air strikes against the north, as conducted thus far, will not achieve the primary
military objective... the piecemeal nature of the attacks against the DRV has permitted the enemy greater freedom to replenish and disperse his stocks, redirect the flow of materials, and improve defences" (Ibid, p. 2). The war aims to "destroy", "harass," "disrupt" in an "offensive" manner reveal the Chiefs’ goal to take the fight to the enemy and make him defenceless. Gibson argues that the gigantic technological capabilities of the US Air Force were able to inflict destruction far beyond the capabilities of physical force. Although, theoretically speaking the physical forces were able to destroy everything in northern Vietnam, and hence should have been able to persuade Hanoi to back off (Gibson, 1988, p. 319). Northern Vietnam’s small air force with its old airplanes and few rudimentary anti-aircraft systems were no match for the US, with the most technologically sophisticated equipment of the world (Ibid, p. 320). Such huge difference between the US and enemy’s capabilities, at least in the beginning, left little doubt that the US, at least in terms of technology, had a decisive advantage in the war. Still, there seem to be a disconnect between the aims and means of the air campaign. At a political level, the overall idea for the use of force was to bargain and convince the enemy to yield, as opposed to destroy him. As it appears from the Joint Chiefs’ target list, the air campaign on a military level was meant primarily to destroy the enemy’s military capabilities, and hence make the enemy defenceless. In order to convince the enemy to pull back, the aims and means of the air campaign could fall short of destruction of enemy’s military capabilities. In contrast to the political and psychological targets which, at least theoretically, have more bearing to the enemy’s will (Kaplan, 1983, p. 328). As General Taylor, special adviser to President Johnson, had put it: “if we support... that the really important target is the will of the leaders in Hanoi, virtually any target north of the 19th parallel [inside the territory of the northern Vietnam] will convey the necessary message” (Gibson, 1988, p. 326).

The operational ideal of, surprise and maximum concentration of force, appears also from the Chiefs’ 25 January 1966 memorandum. The Joint Chiefs suggested “armed reconnaissance operations against the LOCs and simultaneously strike the infiltration associated DRV POL system... without any prior announcement so as to achieve maximum surprise and effectiveness” (National Security Archives, 1966d, pp. 2-4). By February 1966 the US military had hit most of the Joint Chiefs’ targets within the area that were authorised for the air campaigns at the time. Meanwhile
the enemy had, with the assistance of the USSR and Communist China, increasingly strengthened its military capabilities. This allowed the continuation the war in the South with same intensity and determination (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 58). The natural means to the Joint Chiefs pursuit towards victory appeared to be even more rapid escalation. This is evident from the Chiefs’ requests to ease sortie limitations, reduce sanctuary areas, widen target set, and most importantly intensify war efforts. Their memorandum from 19 February 1966 proposed to adjust the boundaries of current northeast quadrant sanctuary, which would open up an additional “5,000 square miles of territory... for air operations,” and utilise “all available combat sorties... to apply them to an expanded area” (National Security Archives, 1966e, p. 3). Further requests mirrored earlier memorandums and recommended “the early destruction of the NVN POL system and other high-priority targets in the northeast area” that the Chiefs deemed as a “minimum essential effort against NVN required furthering our military objectives in Southeast Asia” (Ibid, p. 4). Continuing on that path, the Joint Chiefs discourse urged political authorities to widen and intensify the war, appear in the remaining memorandums during 1966. The memorandum from 10 March 1966 states that “because of the immediate effect upon the NVN ability to move war-supporting materials both within the country and southward through the infiltration routes, destruction of the known POL storage system is considered to be one of the higher priority action not yet approved.” (National Security Archives, 1966f, p. 2) The Joint Chiefs memorandum from 14 April 1966 noted that “restrains have caused a piecemealing of air operations which has allowed enemy a latitude of freedom... that significantly increases his combat effectiveness” (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 70).

The formula the Joint Chiefs used to effectively pressure northern Vietnam consisted of “initial application of air attacks over a widespread area against the NVN military base structure... intensity of air operations and the number of targets to be attacked, gradually increase... the destruction of NVN/VC forces and bases in SVN and Laos, [which should have caused] reappraisal in Hanoi to continue aggression” (Ibid, p. 71). The US political levels supported escalation in spring and summer 1966 and approved the long requested strikes on petroleum, oil, and lubricant targets [POL]. This possibly stemmed from the earlier slowdown in escalation that had not produced the desired results in stopping
the enemy from continuing the war (Gibson, 1988, p.346; Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 55; 107) Still, in late summer the US intelligence community observed that even though 70% of the northern Vietnamese petroleum, oil, and lubricants capacity had been destroyed, the enemy had still sufficient resources to support the war at the same level of intensity (Gibson, 1988, p. 346). Gibson notes that the failure of the petroleum, oil, and lubricants strikes led the US “techno-war” into crisis apparently due to the fact that the technological superiority had not been able to deliver promised results (Ibid, p. 346). Seemingly the enemy was able to wage the war at any price regardless of the attacks inflicted by the US superior technology.

Following the failure of intensified bombings in summer of 1966, some of the key policy-makers in the Johnson Administration changed their views on the Vietnam War (Pentagon Papers, 1971b, p. 525). The most sceptical of them appeared to be Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, who argued in October 1966 that the US had not found “the catalyst, for training and inspiring them [southern Vietnamese leadership] into effective action… ,” and recommend establishing a limit to the number of US troops in Vietnam and stabilising the air campaign (Ibid, pp. 529-530).

The Joint Chiefs’ memorandum from 14 October 1966, in response to the Defence Secretary’s proposal to de-escalate, inversely urged further escalation. The memorandum argued that the best military results would be obtained with a “sharp knock on NVN military assets and war-supporting facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing pressure which was adopted,” and requested the Defence Secretary to “decrease the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorise attacks against the steel plant, the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs... and POL” (National Security Archives, 1966g, pp. 4-6). The Pentagon Papers argue that northern Vietnam had mobilised nearly the entire population behind the war effort. The Vietnamese people were working to reconstruct bombed sites, supply, build and guard the bases (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 58). If this kind of mobilisation by the populace to support the war effort was taking place, and the entire nation was involved in supporting the war mechanism, the attacks against pure military establishments, at least in theory, fell short of one’s maximum effort against the enemy. This was a concern as much of what upheld the enemy’s war machine remained untouched. One reason
behind the Joint Chiefs desire to apply more extensive attacks might be that the US military found it hard to draw the line between Vietnamese combat and non-combat efforts. The natural step to reduce the fear of defeat was to increase the scale of damage by applying it to everything and everybody in northern Vietnam.

The Joint Chiefs perhaps struggled to comprehend the motivation and extent of the enemy; this is based on the Joint Chiefs’ requests to widen the war theatre area. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reveals that, throughout 1966, the Chiefs had requested that the US naval vessels be allowed to employ naval gunfire in the coastal waters of northern Vietnam in order to bungle the enemy’s air defences (The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1971, pp. 36-28). The study also discloses that the Chiefs had sought the permission to strike the enemy’s logistical and training areas inside Laos, infiltrate targets in the demilitarised zone, and carry out strikes and reconnaissance operations north of the demilitarised zone. This was all aimed at blocking the flow of people and material into southern Vietnam (Ibid, pp. 35-10 and 35-13). Such positions speak to the Joint Chiefs concentration on pure military victory, and lack of sensitivity towards the political context of war. Rapid escalation of the war in and around southern Vietnam probably enabled the capability to kill more enemies, but not without the prospect of violating the sovereignty of the neighbouring countries. The means of warfare proposed by the Joint Chiefs essentially threatened the political aims of the US – to preserve independent southern Vietnam – and would have rendered it insignificant, if the commencement of expanding war in the entire region took place.

2.2 The ground war

The Joint Chiefs’ first strategic concept for Vietnam dated back to August 1965. In February 1966, the concept was reviewed by re-assuring the following four US military objectives in Vietnam: first, to cause northern Vietnam to stop its support to the Communist insurgency in southern Vietnam and Laos; second, to help the government of southern Vietnam to defeat the Viet Cong and northern Vietnamese army in the southern Vietnamese territory, third, to help the government of southern Vietnam to extend its authority throughout southern Vietnam, and finally, to deter Communist China from intervening in the conflict (Ibid,
The goals of the strategic concept were to be executed by waging war in all of Vietnam. This was to be done by selectively destroying northern Vietnamese military capabilities, finding, harassing and defeating Viet Cong and northern Vietnamese army units, destroying their bases, and disrupting their lines of communication (The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970). The Joint Chiefs expected the US combat forces to focus on search-and-destroy operations, whilst the indigenous forces were to pursue reconstruction tasks. The Pentagon Papers have re-printed the communique of the Force Generation Conference in February 1966, which stated that the “US military operations are aimed at creating operation environment and opportunity for the GVN to gain control and establish security” and argued that operations “against VC/PAVN forces and base areas attrite VC/PAVN main forces and destroy VC base areas and in-country supplies” (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 315). The frequent reference to northern Vietnamese Army [PAVN] in the discussions indicates that the Joint Chiefs might have attempted to identify and focus their combat effort against these insurgent groupings. According to the Chiefs’ perceptions, the constituted the enemy’s fighting force, or perhaps armed forces, in most conventional terms. Logically enough, such framing might have enabled the US military to concentrate its effort against these enemy units – the army – those that were most experienced in war. By destroying these units, the enemy, at least in theory, should have been weakened and capable of less resistance, which in turn should have strengthened the US and southern Vietnamese government’s prospect for victory. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs’ frequent reference to North Vietnam indicates that they regarded the state of North Vietnam as the source of enemy’s will to fight. Even if northern Vietnam did support the war in the south, the view that the conflict is only between two governments ignores other roots of insurgency that stemmed from other sources in southern Vietnam (Beckett, 2001). Hunt has argued that the root of insurgency in Vietnam were incorrect, for example, during French colonial rule, in southern Vietnamese regional, religious, ethnic and class relationships, versus the communist and nationalist ideologies floating in Vietnam (Hunt, 1995, pp. 1-10; Beckett, 2001). Vietnam, prior to the US engagement, had a nearly 20-year long history of insurgent warfare against the French-backed governance structures and colonial rule (Hunt, 1995, p. 4). Such a long-term struggle, both internally and
against the French rule, might have equally fed the resentment and insurgency in southern Vietnam.

According to the Pentagon Papers, the Chiefs yet again re-examined the strategic concept for Vietnam in November 1966 and planned to expand operations in northern Vietnam and intensify the search-and-destroy missions in southern Vietnam (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 385). The Pentagon Papers reveal that the Chiefs’ suggested “mining of ports, naval quarantine, spoiling attacks and raids against the enemy in Cambodia and Lao” (Ibid, p. 362). They requested permission for manoeuvre operations in Cambodia and the utilisation of force for operations in Laos (The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970, pp. 35-2, 35-4, 35-5, 35-6). Access was also requested to the demilitarised zone, and the northern Vietnamese territory (Ibid, pp. 35-12, 35-17). Such actions, according to the Pentagon Papers, were to “support intensified and accelerated development and nation building programs” (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, pp 362). The proposals were to again widen the war theatre area, demonstrating another time the point, that the Chiefs had dismissed political limitations and focused purely on military effectiveness.

The preservation of the independence of southern Vietnam by the means of violating the independence of its neighbouring countries was not in line with the US political aims in war. The approach essentially insisted on peace in southern Vietnam, at the expense of the peace in its neighbouring countries. Such lack of sensitivity towards political aims of war means that the Chiefs were not discussing war strategy, but war tactics. As Stone has argued, success at the tactical level can easily be measured against military efficiency – skilful combination of military means at the tactical level that are able to produce tactical advantages over the enemy should be efficient. Yet if the war plan is to be effective, it should step out from its tactical loneliness, and be waged against the political purposes of war (Stone, 2006). The reasons why the Joint Chiefs essentially ignored political limitations could be manifold. According to Stone, such ignorance might stem from the traditions of the US military that perceived the war as a resistance against evil forces, and were trained to perform in the manner that did not recognise limitations (Stone, 2004, p. 416). Equally, the poor state of affairs with US civil-military relations, and military's resistance against the tight political control over their conduct may have influenced the Joint Chiefs to focus on pure military
matters (Rosen, 1982; Buzzacno, 1995). The Joint Chiefs’ difficulty in translating the limited political aims into limited military means is shown additionally in the discussions regarding US troop numbers to Vietnam. The Chiefs’ letter to the Defence Secretary from December 1966 criticised McNamara’s decision to approve less troops in the Vietnamese deployment. This was suggested by the Joint Chiefs and argued that “the forces listed... will reduce the military capability to achieve our national objectives and execute our military tasks in RVN. The rate at which [the endorsed programme] can undertake area control, open land LOCs, and provide essential security for development and other associated programmes will be slower... the intensity and frequency of combat operations may therefore be restricted, resulting in a slower rate of progress in SVN, some loss of momentum in operations, and possibly a longer war at increasing costs” (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 401; The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1970, pp. 32-11).

Increased amounts of US troops were requested to the war theatre by the Joint Chiefs, and the field commanders mirrored the view, that the aim to overwhelm is the only means to prevail over enemy. The Pentagon Papers note that it was largely a numerical thinking behind the US ground deployment, which was based on the initial assumption that 4 to 1 US superiority provides greater probability for the US success in war (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 295). Four times larger the force, at least theoretically, should have been able to destroy the enemy forces. If engaged in the fight against one another, overwhelming the enemy by more troops in a quicker fashion was the strategy, because the enemy’s pure physical limitations would prohibit the enemy from responding in a similar manner. On the other hand, if the US was to limit troop numbers and deploy slowly against the enemy, the limited physical presence of the US would have given the enemy an opportunity to overwhelm the US/southern Vietnamese government’s structures. The escalation that stems from the contest of overwhelming one another again indicates that the Joint Chiefs were not able to identify military means that would have limited the escalation. If a military means had been established it would have saved the US from the need to constantly pour resources into war.

The US forces in carrying out search-and-destroy missions roved over large parts of southern Vietnamese territory with the aim to destroy enemy’s units, instead of occupying parts of territory permanently this
caused them to have to visit the same places over again (Gibson, 1988, p. 101; Bergerud, 1991, p. 132). The essence of the search-and-destroy operation, as Gibson has put it, was to utilise higher technology and aggressively “hunt for enemy base areas in the countryside to achieve the ‘cross-over point’ of killing the enemy faster than he could replace troops” (Gibson, 1988, p. 102). The measurement of military efficiency was the number of enemy killed (Ibid, pp. 131-139). Despite the efforts to take the battle to the enemy, combat occurred nearly exclusively on the occasions when the enemy guerrilla units had taken the initiative and ambushed the friendly forces (Bergerud, 1991, pp. 126-127). Even superior technology did not prove particularly useful in this context. US ground combat troops, according to Bergerud, were heavily equipped with lethal weaponry with each soldier carrying about twenty loaded magazines for his rifle, smoke and hand grenades, mines and other explosives. Even with this advantage their tactical weakness on the ground had made them heavily dependent on helicopters and air support for their survival in the Vietnamese jungles (Ibid, p. 131). Noisy machines also exposed the US military’s locations in war, and enabled the enemy to use its guerrilla tactics to inflict massive casualties on US military (Stone, 2004, p. 422). Another problem with the practice of search-and-destroy missions by US forces was lack of clear distinctive lines between insurgents and non-insurgents. This according to Gibson, resulted in random killing of non-insurgents and strikes against entire southern Vietnamese villages. Killing the enemy was the ultimate aim of the search-and-destroy missions, and might have enabled the US a win over the enemy in a most rapid and decisive manner. They could have employed a strategy of massive slaughtering of southern Vietnam villages, which might have worked against the US/southern Vietnamese forces. This would have also automatically increased their troop size of their opposition because the large offensive sweeps would have left many Vietnamese with no other choice except to join the insurgency for their survival. As Michael Geyer has argued in relationship to the Nazi German experience in the Second World War: “the unpremeditated outcome of the German practice of war was to escalate force and terror to the point that it stiffened the resistance of old enemies and created new ones” (Geyer, 1986, p. 593).

The essence of clear-and-hold missions was to secure certain territory and allow development and reconstruction to commence. The US Marines
proposed to “... initiate expanding clearing operations [aimed at] creating steadily growing geographic regions” (National Security Archive g, pp. 15-16). An important aspect of the proposal was to protect people from the insurgent attacks and expand the area under the US/southern Vietnamese government’s security control. It also suggested “attacking enemy continuously by air and at a very much higher level than at present” (Ibid). The US Army’s approach to clear-and-hold operation suggested that a bulk of US military “should be directed against enemy base areas and against their lines of communication in SVN, Laos, and Cambodia... the remainder of Allied force assets must ensure adequate momentum to activity in priority Rural Construction areas” (Pentagon Papers, 1971a, p. 577). Even if these approaches by their nature were defensive, the majority of the troops remained in the villages protecting them, and engaged the enemy once he approached the village. This is opposed to going to the enemy and fighting him in the fields or at the enemy’s bases strategy, yet still acknowledged the need to destroy the enemy. The need to engage and kill the enemy, even through a defensive posture might stem from the fear that numerous enemy existed in southern Vietnam. If not attacked and destroyed, it gives the enemy a chance to regain the structures controlled by the US/southern Vietnamese forces. This again feeds into unlimited escalation of the war if one was to prevail. The most limited military means for southern Vietnam was possibly to build an anti-infiltration barrier between the two Vietnams. An attempt to establish an aerial and land-based blockade – a massive minefield across northern part of southern Vietnam and eastern Laos, supported by aerial reconnaissance – at least theoretically would have enabled the US to hold back incoming enemy. This may have precluded the necessity to engage in fighting with him or match the enemy’s escalation in troop numbers. Explosive technologies that would have made up this barrier would have been able to kill the enemy on behalf of the US soldiers. The Chiefs nonetheless doubted in the barrier’s efficiency throughout 1966. The memorandum from 14 October 1966 reveals the Chiefs “reservations concerning the currently-proposed air-laid munitions barrier... [as well as considerations] that this effort must not be permitted to impair current military programmes” (JCSM, 1966, p. 4). The direct soldier-against-soldier engagement with the enemy was apparently viewed by the Joint Chiefs as the most efficient means to obtain the war ends; hence anything that might threaten the military this efficient means was criticised by the Chiefs.
2.3 Analysis

As it has been already argued, there was disarray between the perceptions of the Joint Chiefs and their political masters on how to obtain the ends of the Vietnam War. It is demonstrated by how one sought to escalate rapidly, whereas the other incrementally in order to convince the enemy to back down. Escalation, which stems from the desire to impose one’s will over the other, and prevent the same by the enemy, is programmed into both perceptions. Hence, the war would progress towards higher levels of violence until natural limits, in terms of means, will or purpose, of either adversary would occur. North Vietnamese/insurgents unlimited will and disregard of cost in southern Vietnam aims, coupled with the fragility of southern Vietnamese political and military structures forced the US to steadily step up its engagement to prevail in the war. Envisioned as a conventional kind of engagement between the US military and the enemy’s “main force units” it had the aim to make the enemy defenceless. Conversely, it dismissed the great bulk of enemy’s actual manpower in the form of civilian, criminal or military resistance and forced the US military to constantly escalate if it was to triumph. The Joint Chiefs proposals throughout 1966, to mobilise and pour increasing number of troops into Vietnam, to widen the war theatre to neighbouring countries, and to concentrate on killing of the enemy reveal they were trapped in escalatory spiral. Recognising the futility of the strategy of technological superiority over the enemy, the Chiefs were not able reconsider the war plan and identify military means that were able to produce a workable solution to the conflict, short of complete destruction of the enemy.

The strategy of controlled escalation requires that the opponent must have the will to settle the conflict through the process of “bargaining” and, as Osgood has argued, that this might only be suited to adversaries that both either fight for limited objectives or possess lethal weapons capable of mutual destruction (Osgood, 1970, pp. 109-110). As northern Vietnam did not have that will, or the bomb, the only possible means to persuade him to yield might have been, as Osgood has put it, “a convincing prospect of nuclear war at the top of the ladder” (Ibid, p. 110). Escalation to that point would have rendered the limited US political aim in Vietnam which was to preserve southern Vietnamese
independence pointless, and therefore applying such military means was inherently impossible to the US.

3. The Joint Chiefs’ understanding of war

On the basis of the available Joint Chiefs’ discussions on Vietnam War throughout 1966, one may conclude that the nature of the war in regards to Joint Chiefs was a conventional kind of fighting against the evil enemy with the aim to kill him. Killing the enemy constituted the focus, and the most instant means to make sure that the evil has been made harmless. Offensive search-and-destroy operations that the Joint Chiefs had assigned to the US ground combat forces in Vietnam, in which the military efficiency was measured against the number of killed enemy, are amongst the most straightforward examples that mirror such thinking. All other efforts in war, short of destroying the enemy in combat, were regarded by the Joint Chiefs as ineffective, and an inherent risk that could strengthen the enemy’s prospect to victory. The thinking that other efforts were ineffective, by the Joint Chiefs, may also indicate that the enemy was viewed as utterly evil with whom no other end than destruction would work. The Joint Chiefs’ continuous criticism of gradual escalation and bombing pauses points to the view that anything less than a maximum effort could have given the enemy a dangerous advantage.

The only manner to prevail and steal away the advantage from the enemy, according to the studied documents, was to apply one’s maximum effort against the enemy, intensify and expand the military activities and aim to kill the enemy more rapidly than the enemy manages to reproduce his forces or kill back. Continuous requests to send more troops to Vietnam, to expand the military activities area-wise and employ more firepower against enemy’s forces, bases, communications, power stations and assembly sites effectively demonstrate that view. Hence the capability to undertake more rapid escalation than the enemy, to the Joint Chiefs, was equal to the increased prospect to victory. It also appears from the studied documents that the Chiefs tended to view the war as a purely military effort that must end with a military victory. Their steady requests to increase the US manpower in Vietnam and to violate the sovereignty of Vietnam’s neighbouring states in order to win over northern Vietnamese enemy reflect the Joint Chiefs’ disregard towards the political limitations. The Chiefs struggled against the political limitations in order
to apply maximum military effort and pursuit towards military victory. The aim to shed blood until victory had been achieved becomes apparent from the Joint Chiefs’ positions with regards to bombing pause - they were willing to enter into negotiations only “from the position of strength,” only when it had become crystal-clear that the enemy’s will had been decisively broken.

Seemingly, the Joint Chiefs saw the war also as a struggle between states that, on the ground, was carried out by clashing military forces. The consideration that the will of the northern Vietnamese government must be the primary target of the air and ground campaign indicates that the northern Vietnamese state was viewed as the fuel that fed the insurgency/enemy’s military activity in southern Vietnam. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs’ reference to Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army’s “main force units” against which the US ground operations were directed, indicate that the Chiefs sought to differentiate between the combatant and non-combatant enemy and wage the war as close as possible to traditional conventional manner. This obviously being US/ southern Vietnamese military against the enemy’s military force.

4. Difficulties with victory

Reviewing the basis of the Joint Chiefs’ discussions throughout 1966, one may conclude that, it might have also been the Joint Chiefs’ understanding of the nature of war that did not enable them to either reconsider the military strategy or figure out a key to victory for the US engagement in the Vietnam War. The reading of war as a conventional military engagement against evil enemy that has to be killed in the battle tended to disregard the political context of war and the particularities of the enemy. This should have been taken into account if the plan was to lead to politically effective solution.

The understanding of war as a struggle against an evil that has to be killed, and the escalatory spiral that stems from that, if the enemy aims for the same, could be viewed as a first problem that led the Joint Chiefs’ war plan into trouble. The US military intervened into a long lasting civil war between the southern Vietnamese Government and Viet Cong/northern Vietnam. The US entered into the crisis on behalf of fragile southern Vietnamese regime, against a fanatic enemy that had
already established itself in many areas in southern Vietnam. If they were to win the war in a conventional kind of combat, they should have sought to overwhelm southern Vietnam in order to preserve the state, a strength of the enemy (Ibid, p. 107). Furthermore, even with such an intervention, the US might not have been able to secure victory short of committing a massive slaughter of southern Vietnamese people. If the evil was to be rooted out, before the political solution could take a hold, there was also a possibility that Vietnamese civilians and militias equally fed the insurgency. If this is the case, the natural result would have been for the US to wage war against entire southern Vietnamese population. Moreover, if one would have refused to wipe out diverse evil, the insurgents would have automatically placed the detested southern Vietnamese regime into danger of being overthrown. Both of the above considerations stem from the Joint Chiefs understanding of war as a struggle against evil, which has to be killed if one is to obtain the ends in war, and in context of Vietnam tended to lead towards an ever increasing escalation.

The second problem with the Joint Chiefs’ understanding of war, in this context, stems from the tendency to view the war as a struggle between the states and their military forces. The Joint Chiefs narrow definition of enemy, as the northern Vietnamese state with Viet Gong/northern Vietnamese military as its executive hand on the ground, tended to dismiss the scope of the enemy's actual manpower. It is especially demonstrated by insurgents other than the hard core militias, which for their own reason, fought in support of northern Vietnamese against the US/southern Vietnamese government. Such wide-spread insurgency was capable threatening danger of extinction, over the heads of the government of southern Vietnam at all times. Coups and illicit changes of government in southern Vietnam during 1963-1965, stemming from southern Vietnam’s military or Buddhist resistance, demonstrate that possibility. The enemy’s immense manpower and commitment in support of war effort logically spurred the US escalation. If the US was to prevail in war it had to try to kill the enemy more rapidly than the enemy was able to kill back. Yet, the US political aims hindered allowing the escalation to such a high levels of commitment necessary to equal or supersede the enemy’s man strength.
The third problem was associated with the Joint Chiefs’ perception of war as a face-to-face combat engagement, and quite possibly led them into trouble. One particularity of the Vietnamese insurgent enemy was his tendency to avoid conventional and large-scale confrontations with the US forces, and press for guerrilla warfare, ambushes, and covert attacks, while utilising people far from hard core militias to fight against the opponent (CIA Memorandum, 1967). Such kind of tendencies towards guerrilla warfare, as Stone has argued, enable the enemy to play on US weaknesses, which caused a high number friendly casualties, and increased the US political and military costs of war (Stone, 2004, p. 421). The Joint Chiefs’ consideration of the war as a face-to-face combat with the enemy’s military, logically considered the superior manpower and more advanced technology as decisive advantages over the enemy, if the enemy had represented a conventional army. In Vietnam the enemy tended to avoid the engagement to which the US army had been most prepared. Even though the modern and mobile technology was supposed to give the military flexibility it did exactly the opposite. Largely due to its noisiness, it effectively exposed the US military’s locations to the enemy for attack. Neither the preparations for offensive battle, nor advanced technology proved considerably efficient against the guerrilla enemy.

Finally, the consideration that war is a purely military entity, which appears from the Joint Chiefs’ discussions throughout 1966, shows it could not possibility have led them to figure out workable strategy in Vietnam. As it has been argued earlier, military efficiency can be waged against tactical considerations in war, yet if the war plan was to work on enemy and produce politically effective solutions to the conflict, it must have taken political considerations into account.

Conclusion

The Joint Chiefs of Staff understanding of the nature of the war was as a conventional military matter against an evil that had to be made harmless, before the political resolution of the conflict could take a hold only hindered the Joint Chiefs. This did little to figure out the keys to winning the Vietnam War, but equally did not suit to the settings of Vietnamese guerrilla warfare. The tendency to see the war as struggle between the armed forces did not enable the Joint Chiefs to consider the numerous roots of insurgency. The desire to destroy the enemy for the purposes of
the resolution of the conflict and employ conventional battle engagement against the guerrilla fighters effectively launched an escalatory spiral that was unstoppable prior to becoming politically intolerable to the US. The Joint Chiefs’ understanding of the essence of war as unlimited, effectively limited their likelihood to reconsider the war strategy when trouble arose. The US strategy in Iraq with its clearing, holding and reconstruction operations, mirror the Vietnamese War plan and have not been particularly effective in reducing violence in Iraq. Hence it would be worthwhile to further study whether the military’s understanding of the nature of war, has yet again led them into trouble, and perhaps to reconsider a strategy that has run into difficulties to bring the war to a desired ending.

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258


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Book Review:

Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO. The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006)

By Anthony Lawrence

In response to those who criticise the alliance for failing to intervene in international crises – Darfur is a recent example – its defenders will often point out that NATO is not a free agent with independent authority, but a collection of member states. As such, it can only act with the unanimous consent of those members. While this is certainly true at one level, the reality is somewhat more complex. NATO’s twenty six member states are equal, but some are more equal than others and can more readily persuade allies towards consensus over actions they favour. Furthermore, in addition to national delegations, the alliance’s decision forming apparatus includes a permanent civilian and military staff that could, in theory at least, substantially influence policy. In Diplomacy and War at NATO, Ryan Hendrickson, Associate Professor of Political Science at Eastern Illinois University, looks at part of this question by considering the extent to which NATO’s post-Cold war Secretary Generals have been able to shape and lead one aspect of alliance policy – decisions over the use of military force. He shows that while these individuals have been unable or unwilling to directly change alliance policy over such decisions, they have nonetheless occasionally played instrumental parts in shaping consensus, and that their willingness to seize the few leadership opportunities presented to them has ensured that the role of the Secretary General has evolved along with that of the alliance.

Hendrickson begins his study with a short review of the role of NATO’s first six Secretary Generals, Lord Ismay, Paul-Henri Spaak, Dirk Stikker, Manlio Brosio, Joseph Luns and Lord Carrington, who held office during the Cold War. Their role in the alliance seems to have been marginal and while the factors limiting their freedom of action during this period –

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strong member interests, institutional checks, powerful SACEURs - may still exist today, the key restraint on them was that NATO’s Cold War mission was simply not one that demanded dynamic leadership. While the Cold War Secretary Generals were all experienced, competent and confident diplomats, the stability of Cold War planning meant that they were rarely called upon to exercise leadership roles. A large proportion of their time was instead devoted to more mundane managerial tasks, such as bringing order to the “milling mob”, as Lord Ismay characterised a NATO meeting from the alliance’s earliest days, before the position of Secretary General was created.

But the end of the Cold War brought changes to NATO’s role, and Hendrickson sets out to explore the new leadership opportunities offered by the office of the Secretary General. These opportunities, and the Secretary Generals’ responses to them, are at the heart of his book. His approach is to build case studies around “use-of-force” decisions – occasions when the alliance, and its Secretary General, faced the question of whether and how to use military force. These, he argues, are especially worthy of study as they are particularly difficult political and moral decisions. Although this approach is unlikely to give a comprehensive picture of the Secretary General’s leadership - and, in fairness, Hendrickson does not hesitate to point out the limitations of his study - his decision to focus on these use-of-force occasions is probably a sensible one; not least because of the greater volume of source material available. One of the great strengths of Hendrickson’s work is that it includes material from a wealth of often candid interviews with key players at NATO and capitals, providing fascinating accounts of the behind-closed-doors workings of the North Atlantic Council. Nonetheless, the nature of the Secretary General’s position and the nature of the alliance itself mean that there is unlikely to be enough data to allow for a comprehensive assessment of the question at hand. It is probably no coincidence that the book’s most detailed account – that of NATO’s military support to Turkey before the Iraq war - is not only the most recent event, but also one that took place in the context of a major, and very public, crisis in the transatlantic relationship.

Hendrickson’s book, then, includes separate chapters on use-of-force decisions that concerned each of the first four post-Cold War Secretary Generals. The chapter on Manfred Worner, who held the position of
Secretary General from 1988 to 1994, deals with his role during the development of the crisis in Bosnia that would eventually lead to NATO’s first military action. The chapter on Willy Claes (1994-1995) is concerned with NATO’s bombing of the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, while the chapter on Javier Solana (1995-1999) focuses on NATO’s seventy-eight day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. Finally, the chapter on Lord George Robertson (1999-2003) deals with his management of NATO as it considered defensive measures for Turkey prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

In each case, Hendrickson studies the actions of the Secretary General in three areas. At the systemic level, he looks at international conditions at the time of the decision and the extent to which these influenced, and could be influenced by, the Secretary General. At the organisational level, he examines each Secretary General’s handling of the North Atlantic Council. As NATO’s primary decision making committee, chaired by the Secretary General, this might be expected to be the forum in which he could most obviously lead the alliance. Finally at the level of civil-military relations, Hendrickson considers the relationship between each Secretary General and the respective SACEUR.

NATO’s adaptation has been studied from such a wide range of angles, and in such great depth, that it is sometimes difficult to imagine there is anything left to be said. It is to Hendrickson’s credit that he has managed not only to find a new theme, but also to add much to the body of academic understanding of post-Cold War NATO. His case studies offer a valuable and fascinating insight into NATO’s inner workings and the styles and personalities of its post-Cold War Secretary Generals. His uncomplicated, but insightful accounts bring to life the practice of multinational diplomacy and the business of the North Atlantic Council. In the chapter on George Robertson, for example, he paints a vivid picture of the transatlantic crisis as seen from within the transatlantic community’s principal multinational forum and describes Robertson’s diplomatic gambles in invoking the alliance’s silence procedure and using the Defence Planning Committee (in which France does not participate) as a decision making body. Perhaps his most striking account, though, concerns Manfred Worner’s April 1994 appearance at the North Atlantic Council, defying medical advice and leaving his sick bed to lobby passionately for a more active alliance policy over Gozazdze. The story is
all the more poignant as Worner was to die in office a few months later, without seeing NATO act. But Hendrickson is surely correct in his judgement that Worner’s keen advocacy for NATO action, and the courage he displayed in making his case in person despite his illness, were key factors in steering the alliance towards action and, furthermore, in shaping the role of the Secretary General to the benefit of his successors.

From Hendrickson’s evidence, Worner comes across in many ways as the strongest of NATO’s post-Cold War Secretary Generals. His personal determination and skills are in no doubt, but he also appears to have recognised – and seized – the opportunities the changing security situation offered his office: more than the other three, he viewed the Secretary General position as an independent force for action within the alliance. He is also notable for his willingness to challenge the US and, especially, the Powell doctrine. Hendrickson quotes him from September 1993, stating that “the purpose of intervention is not necessarily to win a war, but to influence the behaviour of the party concerned. We need to have limited military options for limited political and military objectives. It is wrong to think only in categories of all or nothing.” By contrast, the other post-Cold War Secretary Generals usually preferred to follow the US line.

What conclusions can be drawn from Hendrickson’s case studies? He demonstrates that the role of the Secretary General has certainly grown in the post-Cold War period and that the personalities and actions of successive Secretary Generals have been important in shaping that role. The Secretary General is clearly an important component in consensus building at NATO through his management of the North Atlantic Council – both in the meeting room and in the corridors of NATO headquarters and capitals – and a key interface with the alliance’s military structures. There is much he can do to lead the alliance at the organisational level and at the level of civil-military relations.

But at the systemic level, the level that counts above all, it is clear that more often than not, the Secretary General remains NATO’s servant, rather than its leader. The constraints identified by Hendrickson are simply too great to allow even the strongest of Secretary Generals to unduly influence alliance policy – as they themselves have recognised: for example, both Willy Claes and George Robertson waited until a broad,
US-led consensus existed outside the North Atlantic Council before they tried to approach the questions of what to do in Bosnia and Turkey within it. Hendrickson himself notes that it is difficult to correlate policy changes with the efforts even of NATO’s most active post-Cold War Secretary General, Manfred Worner, and concludes that “NATO’s member states, especially the United States, still largely define the parameters for NATO’s engagement in international security affairs.”

That the member states steer the alliance is as it should be, and that the larger states have heavier hands on the wheel is as it will be. On the evidence of these case studies at least, NATO’s Secretary Generals have mostly tended to favour alliance military action – who, after all, would want to manage a team that never plays? But NATO’s use-of-force decisions have not all been without controversy. When General Michael Ryan first requested permission to fire Tomahawk missiles during Operation Deliberate Force, for example, Willy Claes chose not to refer the request to the North Atlantic Council, or even to contact key allied ambassadors. The strikes, authorised in effect by Claes himself, were a controversial escalation of NATO’s military campaign. While most analysts today regard them as instrumental in ending the war, at the time they were a serious concern to many capitals and to NATO ambassadors who were only able to express their opposition after the event. No doubt there is some dented ambassadorial pride to be subtracted from this picture, but the point remains that using Tomahawks was not necessarily the “right” decision in the wider context of alliance politics. While Hendrickson’s study is strong at showing where Secretary Generals have been influential in advancing use-of-force decisions, it is less strong at assessing whether these were “good” decisions, and therefore whether the Secretary General’s leadership can be judged good or bad (as opposed to simply effective in spurring the alliance towards military action).

From the perspective of leadership studies, it is hard to draw any conclusions about the ingredients of effective Secretary Generalship. Hendrickson’s case studies illustrate very different men with very different styles, but with effective leadership behaviours ranging from Worner’s willingness to advocate his own views and to challenge the US, through Claes’s (perhaps theatrical) short temper and Solana’s occasional use of his personal and extensive diplomatic network to bypass ambassadors at NATO, to Robertson’s injection of self-deprecating
humour into tense NAC meetings. It is clear, however, that they were all confident and competent individuals who shared a determination to see the alliance succeed in difficult circumstances. None can be regarded in any sense as weak leaders, although, given the sometimes bizarre diplomatic circus that leads to their appointment – which Hendrickson documents in each case – perhaps NATO has simply been fortunate in this respect.

So is there an alliance that is in some way independent of its member states, of which the Secretary General is the most visible representative and advocate? The answer would seem to be “yes” only when it suits those member states, and in particular the United States. In the chapter on Solana, for example, Hendrickson argues that the NAC was willing to use him as its lead voice in Belgrade at least in part because the Clinton Administration wished to avoid the accusation that it was trying to divert attention away from the impeachment proceedings against the President. Fortuitously, several European states were also happy to see the focus of decision making shifted from them to NATO, thus heading off domestic criticism over the bombing of Kosovo. But the Secretary General needs to be complicit in this arrangement as well – the intense media scrutiny of Willy Claes’s entanglement in a Belgian bribery scandal seems to be one factor behind his unwillingness to advocate – in public at least – NATO action in Bosnia. In the alliance context too, it seems, that all politics is local.
Book Review:


By Eric A. Sibul* 

Donald Stoker’s *Britain, France, and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic 1919 - 1939: Grand Strategy and Failure* provides new insight to international relations and military and naval affairs in the Baltic area during the interwar years. These are areas where there is a dearth of academic research, and the conditions and events in the region during this period are frequently misunderstood and misinterpreted by scholars studying the larger question of why the security system developed at the end of the First World War collapsed and why Europe was plunged into another world war.

Stocker’s work provides two cautionary lessons currently applicable for the small and medium powers in the Baltic region. Firstly, the importance of active cooperation between small and medium powers to build an effective security and defence system and, secondly, friendly larger powers, in the provision of armaments and equipment might be acting more in the interest of trade and their domestic defence industries, rather than what of the best interest of their small clients and regional security.

The pioneering work on the history of Baltic international relations and military and naval affairs can almost solely be attributed to the late Edgar Anderson who was on the history faculty of San Jose State University in California from 1957 to 1988. Through Anderson’s meticulous research, ability to track down obscure source material, linguistic abilities in the Baltic languages as well as German, French and Russian and ability to write in a clear and concise manner, his work still remains the primary core of scholarship for the Baltic diplomatic, military, and naval history from 1918 to 1940. As there still very few scholars working within these specializations, the Stoker’s work provides new material to a sparse field.

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Britain, France, and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic 1919 – 1939: Grand Strategy and Failure was published as part of the Cass Series on Naval History and Policy edited by Geoffrey Till. The book was initially researched by Stocker as a doctoral dissertation in military and diplomatic history at Florida State University under the guidance of Paul G. Halpern who specializes largely in twentieth century British naval history. Stocker is currently an associate professor of Strategy and Policy at the US Naval War College.

The book is divided into eleven chapters and the chapters are generally divided to cover British and French policy towards Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on an individual basis. The first chapter provides a background the gaining of independence of countries on the eastern Baltic littoral to set the stage for discussion of naval policy during the 1920s and 1930s. Chapter two covers the naval developments in the Baltic from 1918 to 1922. The newly independent countries quickly developed navies generally from former Tsarist Russian and German vessels for service in their independence wars. Soviet Russia continued to be a threat to the security of the Baltic nations and it was in the interest of Britain and France to curb Soviet expansionist policies in the Baltic. Despite this communality of interest and active British and French naval support to Baltic countries in 1918 - 1919, assistance to develop the Baltic navies was not readily forthcoming. Britain refused requests to train naval officers in Great Britain, although the French were more accommodating in this regard. None of the allied great powers would turn over or sell at reasonable prices surplus naval vessels to the small states. This was largely out of hope that the newly independent would purchase new vessels providing contracts to British and French shipyards which were suffering from the postwar economic downturn and a decline of domestic naval contracts.

By 1923, a delineation of naval influence was in place. The Finns and Estonians cooperated with British, while the Latvians and Poles developed naval ties with France. The third chapter covers the unintended effects of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 which placed a ten-year moratorium on construction of battleships by the former entente powers. It also forbade the sale of all used vessels. While the treaty which meant to curb a naval arms race between the great powers such had taken place before the First World War and hence was
hoped to bring greater stability in the Europe as well as the Pacific. The effect was the opposite, the treaty hindered smaller nations from developing their navies which ultimately could be used only for defensive purposes, while the major powers rushed to build new smaller combatants not covered by the Treaty. Furthermore, it forced small nations to conclude contracts with foreign powers if they wanted continue developing their navies, principally benefiting British and French shipyards.

The next chapter deals with competition for the naval contracts between Great Britain and France in the Baltic littoral states from 1923 to 1925. Rather than concern of about building an effective collective security system in the Baltic, British and French diplomats and military representatives competed with each other to develop political and economic interests in the Baltic capitals. Naval arms sales were clearly and principally seen as a way to advance these interests. These representatives, the French in particular, were not above the bribery of government officials to receive naval contracts. The fifth chapter covers the military mission to Finland of British General Sir Walter Mervyn St. George Kirke in 1924 – 1925. The Finns requested advice from Britain how best use their meager defence budget and particularly how to develop sea and coastal defence and use air power. The effects of the mission were mixed. The Finnish naval high command largely rejected the naval and coastal defence recommendations, while the Finnish army and air force whole-heartedly accepted many recommendations which focused on land defences and air force development.

The mission also served to increase British influence vis-a-vis the French in Finland and its positive work for the army improved the perceptions towards Great Britain of Finnish “jager” officers who had served with German forces in the First World War. The sixth chapter deals with competition for naval contracts between Great Britain and France between 1926 and 1932. Estonia remained strongly under British influence, while Latvia retained under influence of the French. Poland became increasing dissatisfied with French because of the high cost and poor quality of the vessels they provided. The next chapter deals with the Finnish development of submarines based on German designs and constructed in Finland, 1926 – 1934. This building programme was covertly financed by Germany which was limited by provisions of the
Treaty of Versailles from constructing submarines. The benefit to the Germans was that they could continue developing submarine technology and use the Finnish boats to covertly train submarine crews. This represented a great defeat for British and French policy. Not only did they lose political and economic influence in Finland, the Germans where able to develop submarine technology and train submariners before their renouncement of the Treaty of Versailles. The eighth chapter deals with final British and French arms sales in the Baltic 1933 – 1939. The market for British and French naval arms sales to this region began drying up. The countries of this region found that it was preferable to construct their own vessels than trying to deal with the British and French governments and the various industrial firms of those nations. To a certain extent, the small states developed new methods of financing naval construction such as public subscription. Chapter nine covers the effects of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, where the British agreed to the Germans rebuilding their fleet with the hope that they could control or limit German naval construction and could maintain eroding British naval superiority through negotiation.

The agreement undermined British influence in the Baltic region as well as weakened the political and military position of the small Baltic nations which were dependent on Britain offsetting German and Soviet influence in the area. The tenth chapter is entitled, “Grand Strategy and Failure,” and outlines the failure of Anglo-French strategy in the area. By May 1939, Britain rediscovered the strategic importance of the Baltic, however efforts to establish a solid collective security system in the area and strengthening the Baltic nations’ militaries came too little and too late. By this time, Poland, France’s best client in the region, lost faith with French irresolute policy makers and largely went its own way.

The final chapter serves as an overall conclusion outlining the failure of British and French grand strategy in the Baltic region during the 1920s and 1930s. The principal reason for this failure was that British and French policy was driven mainly by selfish economic interests and the desire to counter the other’s political and economic influence than to construct a firm post-First World War security system. Although American naval arms sales policy is mentioned in passing by Stoker in the conclusion, the United States should share castigation as well. Despite Josef Stalin’s brutal purges and genocidal Soviet policies in the Ukraine,
civilian officials in the Roosevelt Administration approved a Soviet request to purchase a battleship and destroyers from American manufacturers. The purchases were only blocked through the protests of the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William D. Leahy, who objected due to the strategic implications of such arms sales. Despite these sales being blocked, the Roosevelt Administration approved numerous sales of American industrial goods to the USSR facilitating the development of the Soviet military-industrial complex. This is a different issue aside from the focus of Stoker’s work and perhaps should be further researched by other scholars.

Errors and omissions in Stoker’s work are relatively minor. On page 137, Admiral Herman Salza is identified as the replacement to Admiral Archibald von Keyserling as a commander of the Latvian Navy. Salza was actually the commander of the Estonian Navy. Keyserling’s replacement was Captain Theodor Spade. This was correctly stated on earlier pages and could have been caught if the publisher perhaps had a more careful editor. In fairness, the complex array of Estonian, Finnish, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish names is very difficult to deal with, especially to a novice to the region’s history. The replacement of Spade with von Keyserling was an interesting case. Von Keyserling resigned amidst a scandal in 1932. During a return trip of the Latvian fleet from Estonia, members of the Latvian Social Democratic Party observed the transfer of a large quantity of liquor from another vessel to the Latvian flagship Virsatis. Although Stoker states on page 127 that it was unclear what von Keyserling intended to do with the liquor and speculates that he had a drinking problem.

However, it is fairly clear that the incident was related to Finnish prohibition. Like the United States and Canada, Finland had laws prohibiting the sale and consumption of alcohol during the period. As the Latvian fleet was conducting combined fleet maneuvers the illicit cargo would have most likely been transferred to a Finnish naval vessel at sea and was perhaps no more than a token of camaraderie and friendship to the Finnish navy whose personnel would hardly enjoy the forbidden elixir. In August 1920, the Estonian Air Force had had its own liquor scandal. Two Second lieutenants were caught with one hundred liters of spirit abroad their hydroplanes on a training flight across the Gulf of Finland. The Estonian Minister of War had the two pilots reduced in
rank to privates and confined for a month. The commander of the naval aviation detachment, Lieutenant Rudolf Schiller, was also dismissed from his post. In the case of the von Keyserling, who was from a German aristocratic background, the liquor incident was perhaps just a convenient excuse for anti-German politicians to push for his replacement with an ethnic Latvian. Interestingly, Salza was also from a Baltic-German background, but had dropped the ‘von’ from his name out of a strong personal conviction that aristocratic titles were improper in a republic.

The only questionable issue regarding Stoker’s research in preparation of the manuscript is the lack of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish archival sources. As the dissertation was written in the 1990s, Baltic archives were open to researchers. However, dealing with the confusion of newly open national archives and difficult languages were obstacles to the use of these sources. The author did make extensive use of British, French, American and Finnish archival sources.

This work certainly has great value, in a field where new literature is all too sparse. Stoker paints a picture of Britain and France pursuing narrow and short-sighted national interests where comprehensive and cooperative grand strategy was necessary. Much of the equipment sold to small powers was of limited utility and lacked inoperability with that of their other small neighbors. Stoker’s work provides very much a cautionary tale for the small nation in contemporary times. Arm sales and military assistance policies of a larger power may be based more on the interests of its own domestic industry and does not take the true defence interests of the small nation at crux. For the large power policy makers, it also has a clear message. In the greater context of grand strategy it is sometimes necessary to sacrifice narrow national economic and political interests in the short term, in order to nurture and sustain the security and defence measures of its smaller partners.
Defence Policies’ 06 in Brief: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

Major Landmarks in
Estonian Security and Defence Policy in 2006

In 2006, Estonia continued to implement its security policy objectives by promoting international stability and safeguarding European security, with an emphasis on a strong transatlantic link and on solidarity among the democratic countries within the Euro-Atlantic security community. Membership within the EU and NATO has facilitated fulfilling the security policy objectives on a more qualified and advanced level. As a member of both organisations Estonia has enjoyed the opportunities of productive collaboration in strengthening its defence and military capabilities as well as acquiring the support of the allies in launching new policy initiatives. Continuous deployments of the Estonian troops into Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo manifest our contribution to international stability in an era of new security threats.

1. Riga Summit

NATO Riga Summit represented the most important political landmark for many NATO countries including Estonia among the key events in 2006. Taking place in Riga the summit carried a special symbolic significance for all three Baltic states. Estonia’s underlying message in Riga emphasized the conviction that NATO must remain the cornerstone of the Euro-Atlantic security. It is crucial for the future of the Alliance to retain its founding principles, such as collective defence and commitment of the member states to contribute to NATO’s overall defence capabilities and to further develop the common assets. Estonia also stays among the active advocates of the continuous open door policy of the Alliance which represents an invaluable motivation for the aspirant countries and thus providing for the incentives to reform their defence forces. Estonia considers the NATO Comprehensive Political Guidance endorsed in Riga as a key document that outlines the main principles of ongoing transformation: commitment to future enlargements and strengthening of NATO’s global partnerships. Riga Summit also

* Policy briefs, commissioned by the Baltic Security and Defence Review, were written and provided by the ministries of defence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
witnessed two important decisions with regard to NATO’s open door policy. Firstly, NATO’s invitation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia to join PfP and EAPC, would greatly contribute to further development of regional security in the Balkan peninsula. Secondly, NATO recognized the achievements of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia within the MAP process and noted the progress made by Georgia and Ukraine in reforming their security and defence sectors.

2. Developments in European security

Last year witnessed few serious international crises and tensions not far from Europe revealed the potential risks for European security originating from its immediate neighbourhood. It is of utmost importance for both the EU and NATO to be prepared for and be able to address a wide range of various security threats beyond their borders. Timely reaction to crises’ would depend on the availability of necessary capabilities, which makes the current processes of reviewing capabilities in NATO and the EU a central theme. In addition to the capability building, Estonia considers it important to further advance European security cooperation and to assist the democratic countries beyond the Eastern borders of the EU and NATO. Active political-military cooperation ultimately serves as the best conflict prevention tool. Not surprisingly, Estonia supports NATO’s outreach policies and the EU security sector’s reform initiatives in the neighbouring countries. As Estonian experience and expertise lie with the post-Soviet transition, one of the top priorities of the Estonian security policy remains to provide defence assistance to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Consequently, Estonia has actively assisted Ukrainian and Georgian defence establishments with their efforts in building modern defence systems. Both countries are making progress in restructuring their security and defence sectors. Estonia has also actively contributed to the two major multilateral security assistance frameworks: the South Caucasus Clearing House and the South East European Clearing House. Estonia intends to broaden its defence assistance also to other countries with democratic aspirations. For instance, in 2007 an Estonian defence expert will start to advise the Ministry of Defence of Afghanistan.
3. Estonian support for NATO and the EU initiatives

Estonia has joined a number of policy initiatives within a larger policy framework of the EU and NATO. The major initiatives addressed by Estonia within NATO are related to the advancement of defence capabilities and the development of common assets. In 2006 Estonia contributed to NATO’s Response Force (NRF) by giving mine countermeasure vessels, military police units and EOD capabilities. Estonia also intends to increase its share of NRF-14, where it is expected to form a battalion size military component together with other Baltic states and Denmark. Preparation for and participation in the NRF should serve as a catalyst to further modernise the Estonian Defence Forces and make it more professional. Whereas the NRF will help to restructure Estonian defence capabilities to those of more mobile, lighter and interoperable nature, the issue of deployability would be solved by developing NATO Strategic Airlift Capabilities. Estonia is among the proponents of developing common assets for strategic airlift requirements and intends to take part in the C-17 transport aircraft programme.

Recognizing that NATO’s jointly owned assets are essential for acquiring the capabilities that the Alliance needs in order to deal with new security risks, Estonia has proposed to create a Centre of Excellence in Cooperative Cyber Defence in Estonia. The idea has already gathered widespread support among the Allies and will hopefully become an Estonian contribution to the new, common capabilities of the Alliance.

Within an array of the EU policy frameworks, one of the essential Estonian security policy goals is to support the initiatives within the ESDP. Estonia has made a pledge to participate in the EU Nordic Battle group in 2008 and will contribute with infantry units, medical support team, logistic support and staff officers.

In addition to contributing to the ESDP military side, Estonia has joined the Intergovernmental Regime to Encourage Competition in the European Defence Equipment Market in 2006. From the standpoint of a small country joining this initiative will benefit also its industries as the regime intends to include a number of small and medium sized enterprises with specific competitive niches.
An inevitable concern of a country with limited resources is a need to rationalize the participation within the similar policy frameworks of different organisations. Therefore, Estonia has launched an initiative calling for a more coordinated institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU. An example that shows the relevance of this topic was revealed during different international military operations in which the need for better civil-military cooperation and for more efficient inter-organisational coordination received special attention. It is not only the crisis’ management but a number of other issues in which policy coordination between NATO and the EU will benefit the overall outcome. With the development of the EU military forces and in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of member states’ capabilities the focus on further institutional coordination will become crucial especially in the field of defence planning.

4. Deployment of Estonian troops in international operations

A total number of 225 Estonian troops were deployed in various crises areas in the end of 2006 in international military operations. In NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan an Estonian infantry company, de-mining team, logistical and other support teams, and a few staff officers are currently engaged. Following the decision by the Estonian Parliament adopted in December 2006 to continue support to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, Estonia participates in the Operation Iraqi Freedom with an infantry unit and staff officers throughout the end of the 2007. Estonian troops in Kosovo are divided in both missions, in the NATO-led KFOR and in the EU-led EUFOR-ALTHEA. Within KFOR and EUFOR Estonia participates with rotating infantry units and staff officers. Since 1997, Estonian staff officers serve in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Syria and Southern Lebanon.

Among other operations, the ISAF mission in Afghanistan serves as a proof of NATO’s relevance in an ever-changing international security environment. NATO countries bear the responsibility to ensure the success of ISAF by providing the adequate force response and capabilities that will determine the future of the mission. In addition to military relevance, NATO will have to pay growing attention to post-conflict reconstruction, and most importantly, to more efficient
coordination between different international organisations and other actors in crises areas. To make this happen, it will be necessary to introduce the principles of comprehensive planning and to establish an optimal division of functions with the organisations responsible for civilian crises management, particularly with the EU.

5. Developments in the Estonian defence system

In addition to policy initiatives discussed above, a number of significant developments for the Estonian defence system took place in 2006. Most notably, due to the rapid economic growth, the defence budget adopted for the 2007 foresees an unprecedented increase of defence expenditures by 33%. A large share of the budget will be allocated for purchasing military equipment and for implementing the salary reform in the Estonian Defence Forces. The defence procurement plans for 2007 envisage acquiring an air defence system, three mine-countermeasures vessels, a tactical communication system for the Army and various utility vehicles. For improving the force protection of the Estonian troops deployed in operations, advanced light weaponry with night vision devices will be obtained. The budget increase will also benefit the ongoing development of major infrastructure projects, such as the reconstruction of the Amari airfield with an aim to be able to support the air policing missions in 2010. In 2007, the renovation of the Tallinn Naval Base will be completed as well.

An economic boom of recent years has seriously influenced the recruitment in the Estonian Defence Forces. To address these challenges, a military personnel salary reform will be implemented that will optimise the payment system and will result in raising the salaries up to 15% for military personnel, including the troops deployed in international missions. In order to promote military career and to facilitate recruitment, the income of conscripts will be also dramatically increased in 2007.

Last but not least, Estonia has made noticeable progress in 2006 in establishing the regulations and procedures for national counterterrorism measures. In 2006, a governmental committee for counterterrorism was created with an aim to improve interdepartmental coordination and develop necessary legislation. In August 2006, the Estonian Government adopted a governmental regulation “The Guidelines of Countering...
Terrorism in Estonia” that outlines the major principles for preventing, detecting and defying terrorist activities in Estonia. The document lays down the specific tasks for different ministries and other governmental agencies providing so for efficient inter-agency policy coordination and enhanced preparedness for possible terrorist attacks.

Conclusion

Estonian security and defence policy witnessed a number of remarkable achievements in 2006. Successful participation of Estonian troops in major international crises areas and new initiatives within larger NATO and EU policy frameworks serve as essential accomplishments for Estonian security and defence policy. Estonia welcomes the decisions taken at the Riga Summit regarding global partnerships as well as outreach cooperation of the Alliance to assist security and defence sector reforms of other European democratic countries. Additionally, achievements in modernising Estonian defence system and adoption of the national regulations for counterterrorism have greatly improved Estonia’s ability to address a broad range of security risks of the 21st Century.
Latvian Security and Defence Policy in 2006

The collective defence guarantees provided by NATO, membership in the EU, and the support of allied countries, together form a solid basis for the security and defence of Latvia. However, Latvia cannot stop building on the security achievements made to date. Being a reliable partner, developing appropriate military capabilities as well as providing a commitment to common security now appear in the forefront of Latvia’s defence and security policy.

This policy brief will provide closer insight in the main defence policy areas in 2006. Generally in this period of time Latvia focused on moving to fully professional armed forces and continuing the ongoing modernization, contributing to Alliance’ security by continuing our participation in international operations and hosting NATO summit in Riga, as well as further developing security assistance cooperation with partner countries.

1. Professional Armed Forces

The development of our National Armed Forces in 2006 was guided by the goal of making it further professional.

The decision to move to fully professional armed forces was already taken in 2003, when, before joining NATO and the EU, the new State Defence Concept was approved by the Parliament. But the transition from mandatory military service to professional military service took several years of active reforms. This process was completed at the end of 2006 when the last conscripts finished their service. Thus, in 2007, Latvia has become the first country in the Baltic Sea region that has solely professional armed forces.

The ultimate goal of the transition to professional military service is to improve the operational capabilities and combat readiness of our armed forces.

Up until 2009, the total number of soldiers in our professional armed forces will not exceed 6 thousand. In order to ensure long term
competitiveness in the labour market and thereby be able to recruit the required number of personnel for national defence, special attention is being paid to developing a recruitment and public information programme, and social support and remuneration programmes. For instance, the average rate of remuneration, as well as partial compensation rates for accommodation expenses for soldiers were raised in 2006 and continue to be increased.

In the context of professional military service, the role of the National Guard - a voluntary militarized public self-defence formation - becomes more important. In 2005, efforts were undertaken on enhancing the role of the National Guard to ensure its compatibility with a modern - that is collective, defence system. This work was also continued in 2006, and the National Guard is becoming a significant support not only to national defence but also for NATO and EU tasks. The National Guard continues to develop specialized skills in the field of combat support and combat logistics - air defence, civil-military relations, artillery, logistics and defence against weapons of mass destruction. The National Guard will also continue its traditional duties of securing sites of strategic importance, assisting in maintaining public law and order, as well as providing assistance to the civilian emergency services in disaster relief when necessary.

The continuously growing defence budget - reaching 113.82 million lats (188.93 million EUR) in 2005 and 155.72 million lats (221.51 million EUR) in 2006 - provides a firm basis for further development of modern and professional Armed Forces.

In line with professionalization, the modernisation of armed forces in 2006 was focused on acquisition of new weapon systems and development of the infrastructure. In 2006, main modernisation projects were procurement of new infantry weapons (rifles, light machine guns), mine countermeasure ships from the Netherlands and air defence system. Development of sea surveillance system is in progress, and military bases in Lielverde (Air force), Edazi (Land forces) and Daugavpils (Navy base) are developed as well.
2. Participation in international operations

Latvia has participated in international operations since 1996, when the first Latvian soldiers were deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina, following by participation in operations in Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Georgia. Participation in strengthening international security has become an integral part of our security policy – as today there is no distinction between national and international security. Participating in operations is also a way to test whether knowledge gained in theoretical and practical training complies with real-life defence situations.

In 2006, Latvian National Armed Forces participated in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, the multinational operation in Iraq, EU-led operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Georgia.

In 2006, Latvia increased its contribution to Afghanistan from 12 till 36 soldiers. The contingent consists of unexploded ordnance specialists (explosive ordnance disposal), staff officers (support for operation headquarters) and force protection personnel (patrolling, escorting VIPs, general force protection). Contingent is mainly located in Norway-led Provincial reconstruction team in Meymana province. Latvia is also planning to continue to increase the number of Latvian soldiers in Afghanistan in 2007 to 64 soldiers.

In 2006 Latvia, continued participation in NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) with 10 soldiers. They carried out their duties in the ranks of the Military Police (maintaining public law and order) and as staff officers (supporting operation headquarters). Taking into account undefined international status of Kosovo, Latvia plans to maintain the current level of engagement in this operation.

In 2006, Latvia contributed with 120 soldiers to Iraq (an infantry company and staff officers). The Latvian soldiers’ tasks included maintaining law and order, patrolling, supporting the local security forces and supporting headquarters operations. Since the responsibility for security was transferred to Iraqi security forces at the end of 2006, Latvia has completed its tasks within the operation and plans to downsize the
contingent in Iraq by the middle of 2007, maintaining 5-10 persons with a focus on training Iraq’s security forces and performing headquarters work.

In 2006, Latvia also continued participation in EU-led operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 2 soldiers in operation headquarters. Latvia plans to maintain the current number of soldiers in 2007.

Till October of 2006, Latvia has also participated in the OSCE mission to Georgia with one observer.

The total number of soldiers deployed to international missions in 2006 was 339. Latvia plans to maintain at least the same level of engagement in international missions in future.

In 2006, Latvia continued to develop capabilities for international operations and prepared several units to be deployed both in NATO and EU-led operations. Latvia contributed to the NATO Response Force (NRF) for the first time in the second half of 2006 with an explosive ordnance disposal unit. Right from the beginning of this year Latvia contributes a military police unit and a countermine vessel to the NFR. Latvia considers that the NRF must be an effort on the part of all Allies and should be used as a first entry force for all future NATO operations - both as a tool for crisis management and humanitarian assistance and also as a first response in Article 5 situations.

The chance to host the meeting of Heads of State and Government in Riga in November 2006 was inevitably a unique way of making a contribution to the common security and the transformation of the Alliance. Carrying out this responsibility was an opportunity for Latvia to demonstrate, as a newcomer to the transatlantic club, that it can be considered a reliable partner.

3. Security assistance policy

In 2006, Latvia continued its support to the reform process of countries currently reforming their security and defence sectors and interested in establishing closer relations with the EU and NATO. This cooperation
focuses mainly on the South Caucasus and the South East European countries, as well as on Ukraine and Moldova.

3.1 South Caucasus region

Security assistance to the South Caucasus continues to be a priority for Latvia. The most active co-operation has been established with Georgia. The main areas of co-operation with the three countries are consultations on defence reform and personnel training. Several expert-to-expert on-the-job training events were in such areas as public relations, procurement and logistics, personnel management, protocol and standardization and codification. Non-permanent defence advisors for the European and Euro Atlantic Integration State Ministry continued their work in Tbilisi.

Another way for Latvia to assist these countries is through joint cooperation projects with other NATO countries. In 2006, several such projects were implemented. To mention a few examples: a Latvian expert together with the UK Security Sector Defence Advisory Team worked in Yerevan and a joint project was also carried out in Georgia together with Norway. Latvia also provides opportunities for studies at the Baltic Defence College for students from all three countries in the region.

To avoid overlaps in assistance from other partners and to coordinate efforts, countries supporting reforms in the South Caucasus and the South-East European regions joined donor foreign aid coordination forums. Latvia takes active part and supports the work of both the South Caucasus and the South-East European Foreign Aid Co-ordination Forums. Moreover, in 2006 Latvia assumed the leadership of one of these foreign aid co-ordination forums - the South Caucasus Clearing House, organizing assistance activities among the NATO and partner countries and NATO representatives involved.

3.2 South-East European region

As the South-East European region remains the focus of NATO and the European Union attention, Latvia also continues to closely follow the defence and security sector developments in the countries of the region. Good co-operation has been established with the countries of the
Adriatic Charter both on a bilateral as well as on a regional level through the Baltic-Adriatic initiative. Latvia recognizes the achievements of Croatia, Macedonia and Albania in implementing NATO’s Membership Action Plan, as well as in defence and security reforms. In the frameworks of the Baltic-Adriatic initiative, we have conducted both high-level and expert-level consultations, exchanging experience in different issues related to NATO integration. In the future, co-operation will continue to be focused on sharing experience on defence planning, public relations, legal issues as well as explosive ordnance disposal, maritime environment protection and diver training. For Latvia, it was important that Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were invited to join the Partnership for Peace programme during the NATO Summit in Riga.

3.3 Ukraine and Moldova

Like the other Baltic states, Latvia continued to support Ukrainian defence reforms in 2006 by sharing experience regarding NATO integration, as well as by financing the studies of one Ukrainian officer at the Baltic Defence College. Considering the Ukrainian desire to establish closer relations with the European Union and NATO, co-operation between the Ministries of Defence of the two countries has become more intense in the past few years. The activities planned for the future will be geared at sharing experience in defence planning and reform, public relations, co-operation in peacekeeping missions, military education and training, armed forces professionalization, environmental protection, etc.

During 2006, Latvia established good co-operation on a practical level with Moldova and has signed an agreement on co-operation in the area of defence. Latvia also provided funding for the education of one Moldovan officer at the Baltic Defence College. The Individual Partnership Action Plan has launched a new stage in NATO-Moldova relations. Latvia has offered its support and assistance with Moldova’s IPAP implementation and reform process. The bilateral and multilateral activities planned will focus on expert-level consultations, education and training.

Latvia closely follows the efforts of Moldova and Ukraine to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, which is why during the past year Latvia has advocated adherence to the 1999 Istanbul Summit Commitments.
In addition, in 2006, for the first time we trained foreign soldiers in Latvia, namely representatives of the Iraq Security Forces, in the area of explosive ordnance disposal. This practice will also continue in 2007 in the area of diver training.
Lithuania’s Defence Policy Aspects of 2006

Lithuania’s membership in NATO has changed the ways how Lithuania plans defence policy, how it makes and implements key defence policy decisions, how it structures and organizes Armed Forces. Being a full-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community Lithuania shall not remain on the sidelines of global processes. Lithuania considers the new global security environment with the new threats and a new role for Armed Forces, while planning its defence policy.

Lithuania assumes that security is indivisible in the Euro-Atlantic area and the countries of the Euro-Atlantic community may overcome modern threats only by working together. As a member of NATO and the EU, Lithuania develops and implements its defence policy by working and consulting with Allies and partners on the most challenging security issues.

Last year Lithuania followed these principles focusing its political-military activities on international defence cooperation, development of military capabilities and participation in international operations.

1. Defence cooperation

For already two years Lithuania is proving its intention to be an active member of NATO and the EU and fully contribute to the political and military activities of these organizations. Last year, Lithuania was actively involved in the various activities within the framework of NATO institutions and also significantly contributed to the NATO initiatives for strengthening partnership with the other countries.

In 2006, Lithuania further contributed to the development of the EU military capabilities and implementation of the initiatives in the field of capabilities development. Following the principle of “single set of forces”, Lithuania assigned to the EU with the same capabilities which have been previously declared to NATO. Lithuania also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of common EU Battle group with Poland, Germany, Slovakia and Latvia.
While NATO Air Policing mission continued in the Baltic states, Lithuania was consulting with Estonia and Latvia on the future of the Air Policing. The countries agreed to jointly seek for the continuation of the NATO Air Policing mission till 2018 the least. The continuation of NATO Air Policing mission would allow the Baltic states not only to allocate more resources for the implementation of the current force development plans that are based on allied and national priorities, but also to contribute more efficiently to NATO’s operations and commitments. Currently the rotations for the NATO Air Policing mission are generated till the end of 2008.

Lithuania seeks to ensure the continuity of Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Lithuania actively contributes to the promotion of Euro-Atlantic values and the projection of security and the sphere of stability to the other regions giving priority to Eastern Europe. In 2006, Lithuania has continued its participation in activities aimed at strengthening security of Ukraine, the South Caucasus countries, the Balkans, Moldova, and other NATO partners through practical initiatives such as: sharing experiences in regional defence co-operation projects; aiding the creation of modern armed forces and fostering interoperability with NATO forces in international operations. Lithuania’s defence policy towards its neighbourhood assumes that the transatlantic security framework will only be complete by involving Ukraine, Moldova, South Caucasus and Central Asia into the activities of Euro-Atlantic institutions.

### 2. Strengthening military capabilities

At the same time, Lithuania continues working on transformation of its own Armed Forces. A review of the Lithuanian Armed Forces is a part of the process of transformation that encompasses the entire Alliance. While reorganizing and modernizing its own Armed Forces, Lithuania also constantly monitors ongoing structural and functional changes within NATO. Lithuania seeks its Armed Forces to be mobile and capable of acting together with NATO forces in order to strengthen collective defence of the Alliance and ensure implementation of national needs.

The Lithuanian Armed Forces pays more attention to the security inside the country. The Lithuanian Armed Forces keeps on developing capabilities to protect objects of national importance and assist civilian
authorities in times of crisis, when civilian institutions lack or do not have necessary capabilities.

In 2006 Lithuania continued the development of Armed Forces in order to comply with the requirements of efficiency, deployability, sustainability, multi-role capability, survivability, efficient command and control. These requirements are applied both to regular forces and to active reserve.

The Motorized Infantry Brigade remains the top priority of the overall development of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Once transformed to fully operational and supported by national pool of combat support and combat service support units, the Motorized Infantry Brigade will be capable of deploying and sustaining an infantry battalion for the full spectrum of international operations. In striving to achieve final goal, special attention is being given to the armament of the brigade.

Last year the Motorized Infantry Brigade was affiliated to a Land Force division of Denmark. The aim of this affiliation is to promote interoperability between the Lithuanian and Danish Land Forces and to ensure deeper integration of the Lithuanian Armed Forces into the NATO force structure. Furthermore, such cooperation reinforces and consolidates collective defence ties and thus improves country’s security policy.

Major changes are taking place in the structure and capabilities of the Reserve Command. Currently the Reserve Command consists of National Defence Volunteers (NDV) units, which initially were designed for territorial defence. Meanwhile, they are in the process of transformation into modern reserve structures, which are smaller in size, though easily deployable and sustainable units. The NDV has been assigned new missions. Sub-units and individuals from the Reserve Command already have been deployed in Kosovo and Lithuanian-led PRT in Afghanistan. Considerable part of Lithuania’s combat service and combat service support capabilities will reside in the Reserve Command. Other missions of the Active Reserve comprise augmentation of Land Forces units, Host Nation Support (HNS), protection of key sites/strategic assets, disaster relief, training, sustaining and mobilizing the Active Reserve.
Lithuania continues to develop its Air Force, which is responsible for airspace control and surveillance, air defence of important national objects, air transportation of personnel and cargo, search and rescue tasks, support for special operations and host nation support to Allied forces. One of the Air Forces priorities is tactical air transportation. Their fleet is being renewed by strengthening capabilities that can ensure adequate execution of air transportation tasks, including those of logistical support to the units deployed in operations. Lithuania signed an agreement with an Italian company to purchase three tactical transport aircrafts C-27J “Spartan”. First aircraft was delivered at the end of 2006.

Lithuania seeks to develop and maintain a well prepared, NATO interoperable Navy that could ensure protection of national interests in Lithuania’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, conduct mine search and counter measure (MCM) operations, search and rescue tasks, and support special operations forces. Last year the Navy ship “Kursis” (M51) entered NATO Mine Counter Measures Unit SNMCMG1 on full rights.

The logistics system is another key area, in which Lithuania seeks to achieve major improvements. While Lithuania was planning for total defence there was no alternative need for a well-developed logistics system other than direct combat support. Now the task is to create a highly responsive logistics system that could support all services in any operation. Particular importance is committed to the deployable logistic capabilities.

Lithuania assigns high priority to the fight against terrorism inside and outside the country. Lithuania contributes to NATO and other bilateral and multilateral counter-terrorist efforts. The main tasks of fighting against terrorism are assigned to the Special Operations Forces. These forces are developed to carry out counter-terrorist operations as well as other missions beyond the territory of Lithuania: forward actions, special reconnaissance, and rescue of hostages. For the time being, the Special Operation Forces have the highest readiness level within the Armed Forces and are able to conduct Counter Terrorism operations. In 2005–2006 Lithuanian Special Operations Forces was on duty as a part of the NATO Response Force (NRF).
3. Participation in international operations

All ongoing defence reform efforts have already enabled a rather significant increase in deployability and sustainability of the Lithuanian Armed Forces in the international operations. The costs of operations, the limits set by the Parliament and actual deployment of troops have been constantly increasing during the past few years and will continue to increase.

As a NATO member, Lithuania holds the position that a threat to the Alliance or to any of its members constitutes a threat to Lithuania. Seeking to prevent crises where they are likely to arise, Lithuania will continue to be actively engaged in the international operations and, when needed, together with the Allies, take preventive actions against the potential sources of danger. Lithuania supports NATO aspirations to take greater responsibility for the international security and, in the future, even more actively to engage in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and when necessary in combat missions anywhere in the world.

In 2006, Lithuanian Armed Forces continued its participation in international operations and missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans region. The total number of Lithuanian military personnel deployed in those operations was about 600. Lithuania successfully continued the most important and challenging mission in Afghanistan. In the Ghor province, Lithuania-led Provincial Reconstruction Team worked to increase the security of the region and continued close collaboration with local authorities and population.

Active participation in operations enables Lithuania to consolidate its position in international organizations and have more influence in setting their agendas. In addition, real-time operation experience is essential to ensure adequate preparation of Lithuanian troops to act together with the allied forces and defend common values and security interests of Lithuania and the Alliance.

Participation in operations also fosters further development of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Units that are deployed in operations are being provided with more advanced equipment. They are structured and trained to be able to act smoothly as part of the multinational contingents.
The participation in operations especially that in Afghanistan, serves as a test for the required capabilities and examines whether these capabilities are developed in the right way. For example, the leading role in PRT allows testing and improving deployable command and control and deployable logistic capabilities, as well as the skills of military units. The lessons learned become valuable “feedbacks” for further Lithuanian Armed Forces development plans.

Summing up, only a small part of the more extended Lithuanian Armed Forces activities was overviewed. Those activities however are the main ones in striving for the ultimate goal to create small, modern, well-equipped, mobile, deployable and sustainable force, which could be able to participate in the full-spectrum of the operations.