

What are NATO's next steps on missile defence?



Moderated by

Giles Merritt, Director, Security & Defence Agenda
Robert Bell, Senior Vice President for European Business, SAIC
Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President for European Business Development, Thales
and Norman Ray, President for Europe, Raytheon

SDA Monthly Roundtable
19 March 2007, Brussels
Rapporteur: John Chapman

Organised with the support of

SAIC

Raytheon

THALES

ThalesRaytheonSystems

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

CONTENTS:

<u>PROGRAMME OF THE DAY</u>	<u>p. 3</u>
<u>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</u>	<u>p. 4</u>
<u>DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS</u>	<u>p. 6</u>
<u>SESSION 1 – WHAT WILL A THEATRE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM BRING TO NATO?</u>	<u>p. 7</u>
MODERATORS GILES MERRITT ROBERT BELL	
PANELLISTS CHRISTIAN JONNAS TED WHITESIDE	
<u>SESSION 1 – Q&A</u>	<u>p. 10</u>
<u>SESSION 2 – SHOULD NATO PURSUE A MISSILE SHIELD FOR ITS TERRITORY AND POPULATION BEYOND FORCE PROTECTION?</u>	<u>p. 14</u>
MODERATORS EDGAR BUCKLEY NORMAN RAY	
PANELLISTS SAMUEL GRIER JANA HYBASKOVA ROBERT RANQUET TIM WILLIAMS	
<u>SESSION 2 – Q&A</u>	<u>p. 19</u>
<u>LIST OF PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>p. 21</u>
<u>ABOUT THE SDA</u>	<u>p. 27</u>

PROGRAMME OF THE DAY

WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?

What will a Theatre Missile Defence System bring to NATO?

Session I
12:00-13:30

European public opinion was deeply divided in the 1980s over the Reagan Administration's futuristic SDI project for a "Star Wars" shield against ICBMs. Now, at its recent summit in Riga, NATO signed a theatre missile defense systems engineering and integration contract designed to integrate different systems like PATRIOT, MEADS and SAMP-T, and to be operational by 2010. Against which threats is it designed to protect and how will this new system protect NATO's soldiers in the field? What does it mean for NATO's evolving capabilities?

Co-chairs: Giles Merritt, Director, Security & Defence Agenda & Robert Bell, Senior Vice President of European Business, SAIC and former NATO ASG for Defence Investment

- § Christian Jonnas, Programme Planning & Executive Branch Chief, NATO ALTBMD Programme Office
- § Ted Whiteside, Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre, NATO

SDA Members Lunch
13:30-14:30

Should NATO pursue a missile shield for its territory and population beyond force protection?

Session II
14:30-16:00

The number of missiles deployed in non-NATO member countries is increasing, all despite efforts to contain missile proliferation. Yet NATO allies remain divided in their assessment of the missile threats to Europe. How far should we rely on diplomacy to tackle non-proliferation challenges such as Iran and North Korea? Is deterrence still a viable policy or does NATO need a more active defence? Territorial missile defences for Europe against short - and intermediate - range threats could be provided either by piggy-backing on the three missile defence sites the US is establishing or by expanding the coverage of the NATO ALTBMD system. What would be the implications for NATO's evolving global role in either eventuality and are NATO's decision-makers ready to address the financial and strategic issues involved?

Co-chairs: Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President, Thales and former NATO ASG for Defence Planning and Operations & Norman Ray, President for Europe, Raytheon and former NATO ASG for Defence Support

- § Samuel Grier, Dean, NATO Defense College
- § Jana Hybaskova, MEP, European Parliament
- § Major-General Robert Ranquet, Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs, Strategic Affairs Department, Ministry of Defence, France
- § Tim Williams, Head of European Security Programme, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Organised with the support of



Executive summary

Missile defence – theatre today, territory tomorrow?

Although the latest SDA roundtable looked at two issues – Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and Territorial Missile Defence – the debate that flowed around them soon became one and the same. Several speakers argued they could not be separated, while others said that a focus on the defence of populations (Territorial Missile Defence) would dilute the current TMD programme.

SAIC Senior Vice President for European Business, Robert Bell, said NATO's ALTBMD¹ programme – designed to protect soldiers in the field - reflected the current "realities and consensus". Both NATO ALTBMD Programme Planning & Execution Branch Chief, Christian Jonnas, and NATO's Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre, Ted Whiteside, saw ALTBMD as a building block for the future. Whiteside stated that there was no further discussion necessary within NATO about the need to erect such a defence against medium-range missiles.

Bell illustrated the threat by describing the possibility of Iran closing the Straits of Hormuz (which is the route used to ship 40% of the world's traded oil) and threatening the West with its missiles. The West would be less likely to be deterred if it was preparing an attack to open the Straits and Iran threatened a nuclear strike if the West did not stop.

Distinctions became blurred when the discussion reached the US's recent announcement of a "third site", in Europe, (with up to 10 ballistic missiles in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic), as part of its National Missile Defense System. Raytheon's President for Europe, Norman Ray felt that the use of ALTBMD linked to this "third site" could dramatically reduce missile defence costs for Europe, but he saw many points that were up for discussion. These included the use of early warning systems (and who would have priority?), the responsibility of command and control, the issue of deterrents and project costs.

NATO Defence College Dean, Samuel Grier, MEP Jana Hybaskova and RUSI's Head of European Security Programmes, Tim Williams, all supported NATO's use of ALTBMD, linked to the US's "third site", for territorial defence. The French Ministry of Defence's Deputy Director Strategic Affairs, Robert Ranquet, did not totally agree, but described this as simply a matter of priorities. France saw the threat as being primarily against troops, adding that territorial defence systems had "doubtful cost-effectiveness." However, he did agree that it would be "interesting" if the system were free of charge.

Bell reported that the US was prepared to "contribute" the "third site" to NATO's defence and that there would be an estimated cost of EUR 1 billion to link ALTBMD to the site as well as enhance ALTBMD's capabilities (the cost worked out to EUR 50 million per year, to be shared by 26 allies). This would allow ALTBMD to fill gaps that the third site would leave in Europe to defend against Iranian short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. He noted that some American citizens said that this was described as being a deal that was almost too good.

Despite the panel's assurances that there was no need to discuss the missile threat, there were questions from the floor. MEP Giovanna Bono wanted more proof about Iran's intentions and the European Voice's Ilana Bet-El was not convinced that a missile defence system would provide more security, she wanted to know who was making decisions about European defence. On a similar tack, Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on Security and Defence, Girts Valdis Kristovskis, wanted to know more about the possible role of the EU in the future defence of Europe.

¹ The ALTBMD programme will provide protection against the threat of ballistic missiles to soldiers deployed on NATO missions. The importance of being able to defend deployed troops against theatre-range ballistic missiles, such as SCUD missiles, was made apparent during the 1990s. (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-036e.htm>).

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

Bell argued that the EU seemed happy to leave missile defence to NATO, while Thales' Senior Vice President, Edgar Buckley, said that territorial defences could enhance deterrence against missile-armed states with "radically different views of the world." He could see no need for further debate and argued that NATO should take a decision in this complex area as a matter of some urgency.



The Bibliothèque Solvay

DEBATE HIGHLIGHTS

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

- A political decision is needed on whether Europe needs an upper-layer missile defence, and if so, whether it should be developed by expanding ALTBMD or European capabilities, or by using exciting US capabilities.
- Practical command and control issues for a possible European territorial missile defence system need to be resolved.
- More dialogue is needed among NATO members and other relevant parties, in order to fully understand the implications of a "third site" in Europe.
- The cost issue for a European missile defence should be studied in depth in order to determine the financial implications of such a development.
- NATO should first focus on the development of ALTBMD before a potential missile defence expansion is considered, so as to not hamper the progress of a needed and already agreed upon system.

SESSION 1 HIGHLIGHTS

- ALTBMD is a building block for the future, as no further discussions are needed regarding its desirability and it will create new possibilities for future NATO missile developments.
- A comprehensive NATO missile defence shield is technically and operationally feasible.
- ALTBMD has been a model for how NATO procurement can be effective and smooth, as long as full consensus is reached among Alliance countries.
- While asymmetric threats exist, a missile defence shield provides an extra defence against one of several threats, as well as serving as a tool for crisis management situations by enhancing the bargaining position of its controller.

SESSION 2 HIGHLIGHTS

- Linking ALTBMD with the "third site" would dramatically reduce territorial missile defence costs for Europe, supposedly costing only EUR 1 bn, which represents a "bargain" for Europe.
- It remains unclear what level of missile threat Europe faces and if a missile defence system would provide the needed security for cities and populations.
- Doubt remained on whether the EU should start looking into the issue of missile defence, and how the "third site" would be run in regards to European security.
- While the concept of "indivisibility of security" remains vital for the long-term survival of NATO, participants could not agree if it applied to missile defence systems.
- While NATO has agreed to examine the need for territorial defence, issues such as how early warning systems or command and control systems will be operated need to be clarified.

Session 1: What will a Theatre Missile Defence System bring to NATO?

BACKGROUND

The recent NATO summit in Riga saw the finalisation of a theatre missile defence (TMD) systems engineering and integration contract designed to integrate different systems like PATRIOT², MEADS³ and SAMP-T⁴, to be operational by 2010.

The first SDA session aimed to explore the planned TMD system in-depth, to see:

- which threats it would protect against?
- how it would protect NATO's soldiers in the field?
- what it meant for NATO's evolving capabilities?

Introducing the topic, SDA Director Giles Merritt focused on the differences between the current debate and that raging at the time of the Reagan Administration's SDI project for a "Star Wars" shield against ICBMs. For Merritt, the political discussions were now more complex; as it was not obvious if the future – upper layer (for the protection of territory) - missile defence systems would be for the US, for NATO, or for some of the NATO states only. Clarification was needed in that area.

² PATRIOT is a long-range, all-altitude, all-weather air defence system to counter tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and advanced aircraft. Patriot (MIM-104) is produced by Raytheon in Massachusetts and Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control in Florida. (<http://www.army-technology.com/projects/patriot/>).

³ MEADS is a transatlantic cooperative effort between the US, Germany, and Italy to develop an air and missile defence system that is tactically mobile and transportable. (<http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp>)

⁴ SAMP/T is a land-based air defence system incorporating the Aster 30 missile, designed to provide area defence and point defence for land forces and sensitive sites. (<http://www.defense-update.com/products/s/sapm-t.htm>)

SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

Robert Bell, Co-chair, SAIC Senior Vice President of European Business, set the scene by making three main points:

- a) Differences between current (ALTBMD)⁵ and possible future NATO programmes had to be recognised: although they were complementary, Bell emphasised that the current programme reflected "realities and consensus". It was bringing together the various TMD assets and systems, as listed above, to demonstrate how they could work together. He added that the further debate, concerning territorial defence, was just beginning.
- b) ALTBMD has been a model for how NATO procurement can work, with the process showing "consensus and integrity".
- c) With the ALTBMD contract being signed in Riga, these are "early days". Operational capability is targeted for 2010, with upper level systems (in regard to territorial defence) being discussed as a second phase. However, Bell wanted to focus on today's realities – the ALTBMD programme.

“Unlike NATO, the US has already made the decision that it does not want to risk Iran having nuclear weapons without the US having missile defenses.”

Robert Bell

⁵ The Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) programme will provide protection against the threat of ballistic missiles for soldiers deployed on NATO missions.

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**



Robert Bell, Science Applications International Corporation



Christian Jonnas, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION - ALTBMD

Christian Jonnas, NATO ALTBMD PO, Programme Planning & Execution Branch Chief, described ALTBMD as an excellent example of transatlantic cooperation. It has the aim of designing, testing and fielding protection against ballistic missiles for NATO troops. Jonnas added that it was also a building block for the development of a system or systems to protect NATO territories at some future stage.

After outlining the scope of the first phase, Jonnas looked at a possible expansion of the programme to cover the protection of cities. He argued that a missile attack on cities could lead not only to extensive damage to military and civil targets, but they can also have a significant psychological effect on civilian populations, serving as instruments of blackmail, intimidation, and coercion. Noting that the world was watching Iran due to the extensive testing of Shahab-3 missiles and reports of a "clandestine nuclear programme", Jonnas stated that NATO Europe currently had no defence against such a threat.

Moving on to the US, Jonnas gave an overview of its planned programme to install a European site (the so-called "third site"⁶) that would offer protection against long-range missiles to the US and many European cities. He added that according to a classified CNAD analysis, the installation of a NATO missile defence shield is technically and operationally feasible. This would be a system-of-systems layered architecture and its costing would take into account that, a) NATO already maintains a robust Europe-wide command & control network, and b) NATO is building a TMD system.

⁶ The US objective in Europe is to establish a military base with up to 10 ballistic missiles in Poland and an associated radar system in the Czech Republic as part of its satellite-based anti-missile defense system known as US Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The Polish/Czech "third site" would be the first outside the US and the only one in Europe. (<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/>).

ALTBMD

- An incremental approach to the implementation of a NATO ALTBMD capability was recommended in a CNAD approved programme plan.
- This approach builds upon the planned and on-going ballistic missile defence development efforts of NATO Nations.
- The nations agreed to implement the ALTBMD follow-on programme plan and approved the Capability Package (CP) to fund the necessary TMD functionality needed within the NATO C3 systems.
- The BMC3I system underpins all the air defence requirements needed for ALTBMD.
- The threats are considered to be manned aircraft, TBMs up to 3000 kms, cruise missiles and UAVs.

Jonnas concluded by referring to a recent speech by Chancellor Merkel, in which she said that Germany preferred a solution (to the problem of protecting population and cities) within NATO and also an open talk with Russia on this subject.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION – WMD CENTRE

NATO's Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre, Ted Whiteside, also had three main points about the ALTBMD programme:

1. ALTBMD is primarily a building block for the future. It is a multi-national system of systems, being built bottom-up, using the skills acquired within NATO over many years.
2. There are differences with previous missile defence programmes in that this political debate will be extremely difficult:
 - a. The threat of medium-range missiles is "broadly understood" and there is no argument within NATO. Note: Whiteside compared this to Japan's acceptance of

the North Korean threat (no discussion needed).

- b. Regarding the longer-range threats, the issue of nuclear deterrents will play a larger role, as the Prague Summit has already looked at defending city populations, via a mixture of political & defence efforts, and deterrents (to dissuade the use of missiles).
- c. Russia has no problem with the short-range and intermediate-range elements of ALTBMD, but more discussion needed on the long-range responses.
- d. The issue of ALTBMD's creation of debris has to be addressed.
- e. The ALTBMD facility will be given to a commander in the field, but when continents are being defended, then the issue of whose finger is on the trigger becomes a major issue.

“It is far better for a nuclear warhead to explode above people's heads than for it to land on the public

Ted Whiteside



Ted Whiteside, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

3. The issue of defence against long-range missiles has to be addressed. Here, Whiteside did not see the point of making a distinction (between short-range and long-range) as R&D was evolving rapidly. He recommended that the planning should cover the next 20 years, as there would be major changes and ALTBMD would be an important building block.


The first session debate

GETTING SPECIFIC - SCENARIOS

Kicking of the debate, Merritt asked the panellists to be specific about the threat: which missiles would be targeted, in which countries and where would the (protected) troops be?

Noting that the deployment of Patriot missiles to Turkey had almost split the Alliance at the time of the Gulf War, Bell acknowledged that the need for more concrete scenarios was probably greater in Europe, as defence budgets were tighter.

He then focused on the Straits of Hormuz⁷, located between Iran and Oman.



⁷ The Straits of Hormuz consist of 2-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2-mile wide buffer zone. Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz account for roughly 40% of all world traded oil, and closure of the Straits of Hormuz would require use of longer alternate routes (if available) at increased transportation costs. (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html>)

He argued that while the West depended on the freedom to navigate those waters, Iran - with its missile tests and recent statements - might choose to close the straits if it was not in favour of the West's imposed sanctions. Then, there could be a standoff between the West's naval forces and Iranian forces, armed with missiles.

OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Defense News' Brooks Tigner wanted more details about the operational implications of a missile hitting a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead, what would the impact be on troops, the public, etc.?



Brooks Tigner, Defense News

Whiteside said it depended whether there was a "terminal closure" of the missile or an exo-atmospheric hit, then there would be completely different parameters. He added that numerous studies existed as to what happened to chemical molecules when they were blown apart in either of the two cases.

On the issue of the biological warhead, Whiteside said the general opinion was that most pathogens would be destroyed in a "tremendous fireball" that would develop. A nuclear warhead was more complicated, as it depended on the phase in which the hit occurred. He added that it was extremely unlikely ("very remote") that a nuclear-tipped warhead would explode under the impact of a kinetic kill.

Arguing for this technique (of destroying nuclear-tipped missiles) Whiteside concluded that it was far better for a nuclear warhead to explode above one's head (between 100 and 700 kms. up in space) than for it to land on the public. Bell and Jonnas echoed those feelings.

Tigner returned to the subject of rules of engagement. With an integrated military

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

command, who would take the decision to fire the missile – the EU, NATO, the US? Would it be left to the military? How has these matters been dealt with for nuclear use?

After covering some history of the rules of engagement, Bell argued that NATO now has the advantage of having embedded ALTBMD in the concept of “extended integrated air defence”. However, as an example, given that a missile might be passing over Europe on its way to Chicago, then NATO would have to be “agile enough” to develop a European dimension (assuming ALTBMD was tied to the “third site”) to its current “set of understandings”. SACURE might be involved, with upgrades of ACTS, or utilising EUCOM or NORTHCOM or STRATCOM back in the US. Tigner needed further clarification, and Bell insisted that these were early days and there was “no easy answer”.

Bell added that some people in the US were concerned – post Kosovo – about targeting decisions being taken by (the NAC) committee. He did add that, in general, the NAC process had worked well, but the negative feelings did exist and discussions were needed.

Responding to Tigner, Buckley added that in the case of nuclear missiles, the decision always lay with the nuclear power following a deliberate and well-considered consultation process agreed by the Nuclear Planning Group; there was no requirement for instantaneous launch.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament Committee on Security and Defence Girts Valdis Kristovskis wanted to know the EU's role in these discussions. As an MEP, he would have to explain to society what was happening and Kristovskis was unclear about NATO's and the EU's responsibilities.



Girts Valdis Kristovskis, European Parliament

Bell argued that the EU seemed to be happy to leave missile defence to NATO, although he commented that it possibly could get involved in TMD (but not territorial defence) at the high-end of the Petersberg Tasks. He also noted that with Poland and the Czech Republic potentially involved with the US in the “third site” scenario, those countries might have to review their obligations to discuss their actions: a) in the context of an EU approach, and b) in the context of a global NATO approach. This would mean the beginning of a new political debate.

Whiteside added that he saw a complementary role for the EU, as it could focus on stopping arms proliferation with NATO concentrating on missile defence.

Merritt saw a difference today compared with 20 years ago. Now the EU was interested in defence and that there were many foreign policy elements to consider, e.g. Israel's defence policy, China's anti-missile technology, etc. He said it was inconceivable that the TMD and territorial defence issues could be seen simply from a NATO viewpoint.

THE THREAT – IS IT REAL?

MEP, and the Parliaments' Administrator, Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Giovanna Bono, emphasised the importance of a debate about the protection of national territory. She asked for evidence that Iran posed a threat to Europe's citizens.



Giovanna Bono, European Parliament

Bell said most leaders were on record as saying that Iran was trying to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and that it could do so by 2010. He added that, unlike NATO, the US has already made the decision that it does not want to risk not having missile defences if Iran acquires nuclear weapons. The “third site”

was the defence against that possibility. He added that the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) was saying that Iran could have ICB delivery capability as an extension of Shahab-3. Bell also argued that if you had the capability to destroy missiles, you have an extra option. However, he did agree that the missile defence system would not be needed if diplomacy worked.

Whiteside argued that such a system of systems was another tool for crisis management situations. Its very existence would devalue potential weapons, as there was an effective shield against them. This would make the development of effective weapons more complex and expensive.

YESTERDAY'S WAR?

TNO-Defence Research's Ernst van Hoek was concerned that NATO – and the allies – were preparing for “yesterday's war”. With the current range of asymmetric threats, he reasoned that missile defence did not offer sufficient protection.



Ernst van Hoek, TNO-Defence Research

Bell returned to the Straits of Hormuz scenario, stating that in such a case, there was a need for as many layers of defence as possible. Yes, asymmetric threats did exist, but one had to have multiple defences against multiple threats.

US – ALL FOR ONE, ONE FOR ALL?

Norman Ray, President for Europe, Raytheon, moved to the topic of “layered” defence (the “L” in ALTBMD) and asked if this might lead to a division of labour once the US started developing the weapons for the upper layer, i.e. would they want to share them with others?

Jonnas explained that ALTBMD was aimed at the lower layers of missile defence (up to

3000 kms. range). He added that ALTBMD was based on connecting the various national systems, and that if the nations were also interested in having functionality at the upper layers, that would lead to more discussions in order to define what the various Member States could contribute.

Bell approached Ray's question somewhat differently, and looked at the situation if the US, and only the US, had an upper-level TMD capability and an exo-atmospheric inter-continental range intercept missile, and the allies were willing to stay at the lower level. With the US having already pledged Theater High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) to NATO via the DRR process, ALTBMD had to factor upper-level capability into its work programme. However, as to whether the allies might be considering enhancements to national programmes (e.g. exo-atmospheric upgrades to Aster) in order to gain upper-level capability, Bell looked to the floor for European industry guidance.

EADS's Jean Betermier said Aster was a fine programme but would not be the most efficient choice for upper-level capability. He added that EADS, with French government support, would be looking to develop an exo-atmospheric interceptor. This would be a collaboration (for political reasons) between US and European industry.

Thales' Luc Dini stressed the need for continuity, so the ALTBMD programme had to cover all threats (short and long-range sensors / interceptors, cruise missiles, against forces and against territory). Therefore, an upper-tier had to be added to ALTBMD, as there had to be multiple threats and multiple layers (responses).

Bell added that as NATO had embedded TMD in the extended integrated air defence programme, then the direction was already there. However, he looked to Whiteside for guidance as to whether Cruise missile defence had been added to the scope of the TMD capability. Whiteside confirmed that there had been no adjustment to the TMD feasibility study to encompass the threats from Cruise missiles.

Ray returned to his previous question, as the “L” in ALTBMD had not been added by accident. The Missile Defence Ad-hoc Working Group had stated that several layers were required (terminal, indo-atmospheric

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

and low exo-atmospheric) in order to defend efficiently against missile attacks. Hence, this upper layer could not be forgotten, as the focus was firmly on developing TMD capability by 2010. He knew there were political issues. As for Cruise missile defence, Ray said that was very difficult. It could not be assumed that it was covered by standard ballistic missile defence. There had to be a fully integrated advanced command and control system and if that were not developed, part of the functionality would be missing.

Merritt concluded by reminding everyone that there was an outstanding question: who would have access to the technology (the integrated systems that would be brought together in the ALTBMD programme) once it had been developed? Merritt saw Israel as the key issue, as there was always the possibility of Israel (with its nuclear power) being attacked by one of its neighbours. He saw this as becoming more likely, but he saw little chance of agreement on this topic within Europe.

Session 2: Should NATO pursue a missile shield for its territory and population beyond force protection?

THALES

Edgar Buckley, Senior Vice President for European Business Development, Thales, opened the second session by stating that the fundamental strategic debate about missile defence was over. There was no need for discussion about the potential threat facing Europe. Long-range ballistic missiles, that might eventually have nuclear warheads, were in the hands of states that had “radically differing world views to the West”.



Edgar Buckley, Thales

He saw a limited missile defence capability as a deterrent. That would give the West the capability to negotiate with such states from a stronger position and also dissuade them from acquiring missiles. Practically though, he did not want the developments (of missile defence systems) to undermine the strategic stability and confidence that exists between today's nuclear powers.

Buckley moved on to ask a number of questions:

- Was the development of such systems the best use of “defence euros”?
- What was the best system for territorial defence (as discussed)?

- What was the impact of the US “third site” announcement on systems development?

He also insisted that the West's strategic intentions had to be fully understood by both Russia and China, and a proper debate had to be held within the Alliance. The existing nuclear weapon consultation process could not be undermined – “alliance solidarity and risk-sharing” were too important. To that list, Buckley added:

- the need to resolve practical command and control issues (depend on the US or adapt the process for Europe?)
- the decision on the location of NATO facilities?

“The strategic argument about the desirability of missile defence is over; the issue now is one of priorities and choice

Edgar Buckley

Noting the need for an urgent decision by NATO about “territorial defence”, Buckley wanted all options to be examined. To that end, he saw the advantages of ALTBMD being extended for territorial defence, as it would build on an existing architecture, counter all threats and would bring Alliance cohesion. Further costing studies were required. In addition, any decision had to take into account the US's recent deployment decisions.

RAYTHEON

With a hint of *déjà vu*, Raytheon's President for Europe, Norman Ray, returned to the topic of the US and its allies, and the defence of Europe. With the US planning to place a “third site” in Europe, the debate was now at the top of many agendas. As the US was insisting that the system was to defend its allies as well as its own territory, Ray reasoned that those allies had the right to join in the debate as to how, when and where any such system was developed.

Ray did agree that the territorial defence discussions (and the “third site”) could be a distraction for NATO, as it had a carefully considered ongoing ALTBMD programme.

Noting that NATO had agreed to examine the need for territorial defence, Ray did admit that the development of a "third site" linked to a NATO system (built to defend European populations) could be "a blessing in disguise" (due to dramatically decreased costs).



Norman Ray, Raytheon

Ray moved to possible topics for the session:

- Early warning systems, for US only or a shared system?
- Command and control systems: who, how, feasibility?
- Deterrents, as the topic had to be debated again if the subject of defence of populations was on the table?
- Costing of such territorial defence systems?
- NATO, should it also operate the weapons as well as the command and control?

“The development of a “third site” linked to a NATO system could be a blessing in disguise as it could dramatically decrease costs

Norman Ray

NATO DEFENCE COLLEGE

Opening up, NATO Defence College Dean, Samuel Grier, defined his three topics:

1. The implications of NATO joining the US's plans for population defence.

Grier looked at the reasons why the US might build a missile defence system costing “10s of billions of dollars”, and focused on Iran and North Korea. He argued that these countries were in the process of developing nuclear weapons and building ICBMs. In the belief that Iran and North Korea were aiming their rhetoric in its direction, the US had decided to deploy missile defence systems to guard against attacks. Sensors had to be deployed to track, intercept and destroy incoming threat missiles, and Grier suggested that if missiles were sited near the sensors, the US would have (effective) “defence in depth”.



Samuel Grier, NATO Defence College

He then moved to the implications of NATO joining the US:

- It would give a strong signal of solidarity (in support of Article 5) against new and emerging threats
- It would acknowledge the technical and operational necessity of positioning missile defences where they could defend the US and its allies against long-range threats from the East
- It would acknowledge that there is a need (today) to define a different approach to security

2. Feasibility studies and issues

As an overriding consideration, Grier favoured “indivisibility of security”, so that all NATO nations had the same protection

against missiles. In addition, he argued that as the integration of TMD and territorial defence was already a reality in the US, distinctions were artificial.

3. Command and control issues

Grier noted that each combatant commander had an area of responsibility and associated missile defence resources to protect it. If resources were limited or more resources were required, then a negotiation (between combatant commanders) took place. If Europe were to join the US system, Grier reasoned that some (of the 10) missiles could be explicitly allocated to European defence.

“If the US has effective national defence systems, should it share them with countries that do not have those capabilities?”

Samuel Grier

Noting that the President had delegated authority (to use the missile defence system to protect the United States) to the 4-star NORTHCOM commander. A similar system might be put in place at the “third site” with a NATO officer in charge and connected to the other (two) sites (in the US), with the option to discuss resource allocations. Concluding, Grier said there were positive reasons for NATO to join the US system (and “third site”), linking in the ALTBMD technology, and that command and control issues could be incorporated into the current infrastructure.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Speaking in a personal capacity, Jana Hybaskova, MEP, European Parliament, stated that no European politician dared to say that Europe did not need a missile defence system. The key points, in her mind, were threat perception and assessment. Hybaskova identified three types of countries: those in the South West (strongly concerned about terrorists and taking steps), those in the South East (which needed to be covered by ALTBMD) and also those threatened by Iran.



Jana Hybaskova, European Parliament

Regarding Iran, Hybaskova focused on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) who, in her opinion, were focused clearly on the creation of an Islamic Caliphate state. Listing various involvements of the IRGC in bombings in Argentina, in Iraq and in Lebanon, she argued that no politician could exclude Iran (in fact the IRGC) having access to a three-stage ballistic missile in 2-5 years time.

“The ESDP is a tiny flower that will take many years for it to develop and get involved in matters such as missile defence”

Jana Hybaskova

Hybaskova saw the objective as being the creation of complete missile defence system, involving ALTBMD expanded to cover lower- and upper-level threats, and she appealed to the panellists for more details of the full costing. Defining this as just the beginning of a debate, she noted that the ESDP was limited to 3000 soldiers (2 battalions) and that NATO was the only game in town for security. The Alliance had to be strengthened, by whatever means possible.

FRENCH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The French Ministry of Defence's Deputy Director Strategic Affairs, Robert Ranquet, said France took the ballistic missile threat very seriously. He added, however, that the government reasoned the threat was more likely to be deployed against French troops

than against its territories – at least in the medium-term.



Robert Ranquet, French Ministry of Defence

Ranquet argued that the threat had to be monitored carefully over time (10, 20, 30 years), and that this was a high priority. Describing France as a medium-sized country, he said it had limited resources and this led Ranquet to look at further priorities. These were described as:

- Containing the threat by all the diplomatic and cooperative means possible, e.g. (the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Personnel Security Investigations (PSI), etc.) in which France was actively involved along with its allies
- Developing defences for forces against the shorter-range - theatre threats (TMD, ALTBMD, NATO-Russia TMD project, etc.).

By default, therefore, it was seen that defence of populations was not a priority. One reason was the rather "doubtful cost/effectiveness" of such systems, to meet a threat which was not seen to be at a high level. Ranquet added that "serious" threats would be addressed by France's nuclear deterrent, which remained as the ultimate response against larger scale, "state-like" threats, i.e. those states sponsoring global terrorism against France's national vital interests.

Ranquet moved on to the "successful" NATO Missile Defence Feasibility Study. It had shown

what such a system could and could not do, as well as pointing out issues such as debris, questions concerning the chain of command, etc. Noting that many open questions remained, Ranquet said France was willing to play its part in this on-going work.

“The systems designed to defend territories are not an affordable priority for France, due to their rather doubtful cost/effectiveness: our priority is definitively Theater missile defence.

Robert Ranquet

In conclusion, Ranquet made some observations on the intention by the US to install systems in Europe (in the Czech Republic and Poland) – the so-called "third site". This had first appeared to be a purely national US decision (i.e. the US enhancing its security with the cooperation of two long-term European allies); however, he argued that the decision raised a new set of questions. With Russia speaking (aggressively in some quarters), Ranquet saw the need for consultation with all parties. He put forward two questions that were at the forefront of France's mind:

- How would the defence of Europe's territories be improved by the development of the third site (as many open technical, strategic and political questions remained)?
- How would the system be linked to NATO's systems:
 - What information would be shared?
 - Would there be an early warning system?
 - How would decision-making, and command and control be shared?
 - Who would decide when the (10) missiles would be used, would it depend on when they were heading (New York, London, Paris, etc.)?

Overall, Ranquet saw the US "third site" as an issue that complicated an already complex NATO missile defence system. Noting that it would be interesting if it were "free of charge", Ranquet called for more talks with the US so that its intentions could be fully understood.

ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE

RUSI* Head of European Security Programme, Tim Williams, covered political themes and insisted that if diplomacy failed in the face of missile threats, than a "Plan B" was required. He looked initially at the various real threats (i.e. the leaked Solana staff – "we must expect Iran to acquire the capacity to enrich Uranium on the scale required for a weapons programme", the Iranian missile programme, the North Korean nuclear tests, etc.). To meet these threats, Williams saw the need for both "a sword and a shield" type response.



Tim Williams, Royal United Services Institute

Moving to the issue of territory missile defence, Williams saw the need for further consideration (about political consensus, the relatively high costs at a time of decreasing defence budgets, priorities for the use of US-based technology, command & control issues, etc.). Despite that, Williams argued that NATO should get involved, as it was not healthy that "territorial defence" was taking place outside of NATO today. This might lead to the European allies depending on a US system, without any say in its deployment (or indeed which member states would be covered).

There are compelling reasons for NATO to get involved, as it is not healthy that territorial defence is taking place outside of the Alliance today.

Tim Williams

Williams stated that missile defence touched on the core of the Alliance, as agreed at Prague 2002. Therefore, NATO's role might be questioned if territorial defence was introduced in Europe without the Alliance's involvement. There were political considerations, especially with calls inside Germany demanding NATO's involvement. He added that the third site was not a "done deal" with Poland⁸ and the Czech Republic⁹ ("hurdles to overcome") ... and Russia, although being kept informed, could influence the outcome as it was never particularly in favour of US missile bases in Europe.

Williams added that the possibility of the third site meant that Europe had the chance to get "something for nothing". Also, on the positive side for the US, it would be easier to get agreement in a NATO context, as this would dilute scepticism about the system.

⁸ Poland wants financial assistance or US support in Poland's bid to host NATO's new ground reconnaissance base.

⁹ The Czech Republic, the coalition is not united – and opinion is susceptible to Russian influence.

The second session debate

CONCERNS, CONCERNS

Chairing the Q&A, Buckley stated that no one was against the concept (of territorial missile defence) but concerns remained (e.g. costs, priority, feasibility, NATO's potential involvement etc.).

ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY OR NOT?

The Turkish Foreign Ministry's Tomur Bayer wanted to emphasise the importance of NATO to his country's defence. Regarding Iran, he saw it as a potential nuclear power and therefore a real threat to Turkey. He therefore wanted to know if the missile defence system was compatible with "indivisibility of security", Article 5 and Alliance solidarity. Ray argued that "indivisibility of security" was at the heart of NATO's future. Any disagreement might cause a "strategic de-coupling" of the Alliance. If the "territory defence" direction was right, Ray wanted everyone to go down the road together.

Ranquet agreed that discussions would be difficult, i.e. de-linking, de-coupling US and European security via this type of system. He added that these systems were much more likely to be used than nuclear weapons and this meant more difficulty in deciding because of more concrete discussions. As for Turkey, Ranquet did not see why NATO had to be the central body for all defence discussions concerning Europe.

Grier favoured shared risks and solidarity, but he was concerned that France, for example, did not share the US's perception of the current threat against populations. Grier agreed that questions existed in regard to Article 5: If the US had effective missile defence systems, should it share them with countries (Member States) that did not have those capabilities?

Ranquet agreed about the presence of threats. He was simply saying that France had to make priorities, taking budgetary constraints into account. Buckley did not agree that "indivisibility of security" existed, as there were lots of differences between Member States. He was not impressed by the discussion on usage, as no one would ask

where incoming missiles were heading, the 10 interceptors would simply be used to shoot them down.

COSTS

Bell returned to costing, stating that SAIC had looked at the issue following a strict NATO methodology¹⁰. His 20-year costing figure, using NATO common funding, was EUR 1 billion. This would take the NATO ALTBMD capability and make it fully compatible with the third site, filling any gaps in its coverage of Europe. The costs worked out to EUR 50 million per year, to be shared by 26 allies - Bell saw this as affordable for nations such as France. If there was indeed a military requirement to do this, then it was too good a deal to miss. In addition, he quoted John C. Rood, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-proliferation, as saying that the US would "contribute the third site to NATO defence". Bell described this as a real bargain for Europeans.

Tigner asked if those figures – EUR 1 billion – were reasonable figures, as no projects ever came in on budget. No one could argue with that estimate.

If NATO was working alone, Williams said that such a defence system would be expensive. However, if the Alliance could take advantage of the US's initiative, then Europe would get a bargain. Regarding "indivisibility of security", NATO had to get involved, that was its job! Buckley disliked the term "piggybacking" as a description of linking ALTBMD to the "third site". It was simply a way of using resources effectively.

ARE MISSILES NEEDED?

The European Voice's Ilana Bet-El was not convinced that a need for such a missile defence system existed, as the system was not proven and it was uncertain that it would provide more security. She was also unsure how it could be explained to the man (or woman) in the street, as they had been told that missiles, were, to some extent, no longer needed.

¹⁰ The one used in the Missile Defence Feasibility Study.

Bet-El wanted to know who was making decisions about European defence, would they be left to individual nations or would they be collective? If the latter, would that be through NATO or the EU? She wanted more input on how the EU, or Europe, would address this issue, as Bet-El felt that the US might be trying to formulate a "divide and rule" policy.



Ilana Bet-El, European Voice

In response, Buckley said there had never been collective decision-making in NATO in regard to the use of nuclear weapons. He insisted that the final decision always lay with a nuclear power, and that this had never been an Alliance responsibility. Williams said missile defences already existed, and the technology was proven. It could not be improved unless it was used. Williams saw no role for the EU in this scenario.

Hybaskova argued there was no time for lose. The Ambassador did not see any progress from the European CFSP, as there was no unifying base. The EU was not taking responsibility for the lives of European soldiers. Until that changed, Hybaskova was not optimistic. For her, the ESDP was a "tiny flower" that would take years (10-20 years) to develop. She wanted action now, as Europe could not afford to wait. As for consultation, the Czech Republic was open to talk to anyone.

FUTURES

As no one had resolved the issue of whether the US should work bilaterally, with NATO or with the EU (if at all), it was left to Ray to quote Yogi Berra, who had said "If you come to a fork in the road, take it."¹¹

¹¹ Berra also said, reputedly, "If you don't know where you are going, you will wind up somewhere else."

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 19 MARCH 2007

- Hanif Ahmadzai
Second Secretary, Mission of Afghanistan to the EU
- Muzaffer Akyildirim
Defence Counsellor, Mission of Turkey to the EU
- Paul Ames
Defence Correspondent, Associated Press
- Luis Balsells-Traver
Administrator, European Parliament
- Ayhan Batur
Staff Officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
- Tomur Bayer
Director General for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey
- Klaus Becher
Senior Advisor, Austrian Institute for European Security Policy
- Robert Bell
Senior Vice President European Business, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
- Ilana Bet-El
Op-Ed Editor, European Voice
- Jean Betermier
Advisor to the Presidents and CEOs, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)
- Alexander Bobrov
Counsellor, Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO
- Wu Bofeng
Assistant to Military, Naval & Air Attaché, Embassy of the People's Republic of China to Belgium
- Libor Boleslav
Defence Advisor, Delegation of the Czech Republic to NATO
- Giovanna Bono
Administrator, Subcommittee on Security and Defence, European Parliament: General Secretariat
- Edgar Buckley
Senior Vice President for European Business Development, Thales
- Hartmut Bühl
Head of Communications, AGS Industries
- René Bullinga
Expert C3 Systems, European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)
- John Burns
Director, Strategic Planning, Raytheon International, Europe
- Geert Cami
Managing Director, Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)
- Sergio Cantone
Brussels Correspondent, Euronews
- Gianluca Cazzaniga
Correspondent, Italian Defence Review
- Andrea Cellino
Deputy Secretary General for Partnership & External Relations, NATO Parliamentary Assembly
- Inge Ceuppens
Senior Manager, Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)
- John Chapman
Rapporteur, Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)
- Philippe Charruyer
Sales & Contracts Senior Manager, Head of MD & Advanced Programmes, Business Division Defence, ASTRIUM
- Carl Chevillon
Strategy Director, Europe, Defense & Space, Honeywell France
- Alexey Chitikov
Attaché, Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO
- Marzio Cuoco
National Armaments Director Representative, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU

WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT

Donato D'Ambrosio
ALTBMD POC, Ministry of Defence, Italy

Gabriel Dayre
Chargé de Mission, Thales

Luc Dini
*Director Systems of Systems, Air Systems
Division, Thales Division Systèmes Aériens*

Klaus-Peter Dörpelkus
*Space Initiatives Manager, Global Defence, Space
& Security, Cisco Systems*

Nicholas Fiorenza
*NATO and EU Affairs Correspondent, Jane's
Defence Weekly*

Régis Gautier
Delegate European Affairs, Thales

Renata Goldirova
EU Observer

Burçin Gönenli
First Secretary, Delegation of Turkey to NATO

Ann-Marie Göransson
Special Advisor, Mission of Sweden to NATO

Beata Gorka-Winter
*Security Analyst, Polish Institute of International
Affairs*

Dov Goshen
*Assistant to Head of Israeli Mission of Defence,
Embassy of Israel to Belgium*

Samuel Grier
Dean, NATO Defense College

Ernst Guelcher
*Advisor, Peace and Human Rights, European
Parliament: Green Group/European Free Alliance*

Andreas Hammer
*Vice President and Director for EU Defence
Policy and NATO, European Aeronautic Defence
and Space Company (EADS)*

Edward Hanlon
*President, Europe, Raytheon International,
Europe*

Scott A. Harris
President, Continental Europe, Lockheed Martin

Lars Christian Hedemark
*Assistant Defence Advisor, Delegation of
Denmark to NATO*

Jessica Henderson
*Senior Manager, Security & Defence
Agenda (SDA)*

Samuel Henze
Research Affiliate, American University

Martin Hill
Vice President, Defence, Thales

Jana Hybásková
*Member, European Parliament: Committee on
Foreign Affairs*

Radomir Jansky
*Assistant to Jana Hybaskova MEP, European
Parliament*

Steven Jantz
*Defence Fellow, Mission of the United States of
America to the EU*

Mark John
Senior Correspondent, EU and NATO, Reuters

Christian Jonnas
*Programme Planning & Execution Branch Chief
(ALTBMD), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO)*

Nawab Khan
*Brussels Bureau Chief, News Agency of Islamic
Republic of Iran (IRNA)*

Irina Khokhlova
Correspondent, Interfax

Jiri Konig
*Second Assistant to Dr Jana Hybaskova, European
Parliament*

Valeriy Kovalev
First Secretary, Embassy of Kazakhstan to Belgium

Sergey Kozhetev
*First Secretary, Mission of the Russian Federation
to NATO*

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

Bernd H.J. Kreienbaum
*Missile Defence Analyst and Advisor to the
NATO Expert Groups, , North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)*

Girts Valdis Kristovskis
*Vice-Chairman, European Parliament: Committee
on Security and Defence*

Lukasz Kulesa
*Security Studies Programme Coordinator,
Polish Institute of International Affairs*

Janne Kuusela
Defence Counsellor, Ministry of Defence, Finland

Johan Lagerlöf
Defense Advisor, Mission of Sweden to NATO

Brice Lançon
Director, European Affairs, Safran Group

Michael Langer
*Vice President External Relations EU, NATO,
Diehl VA Systems*

Loïc Langot
*Special Projects Officer, Armament Directorate,
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)*

Norbert Laurençon
*Vice President, Business Development & Tactical
Propulsion, Snecma Propulsion Solide*

Guillemette Le Menestrel
*Missile Defence Programme Manager,
ThalesRaytheonSystems*

Grzegorz Liszcz
NADREP, Delegation of Poland to NATO

Simon Lunn
*Secretary General, NATO Parliamentary
Assembly*

Pascal Mallet
Journalist, Agence France Presse (AFP)

Vittorio Merola
*Project Assistant, Security & Defence
Agenda (SDA)*

Giles Merritt
Director, Security & Defence Agenda (SDA)

Frédéric Meurice
*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgium Cabinet of
the Minister Karel De Gucht*

Jan Michal
*Deputy Permanent Representative, Delegation
of the Czech Republic to NATO*

Milena Mitic
*First Secretary, Transatlantic Relations, Mission
of Serbia to the EU*

Annalisa Monaco
*EU and NATO Relations Specialist, Boeing
International*

James E. Monroe
*Director, Benelux & NATO, Raytheon
International, Europe*

Dmitry Morozov
*First Secretary, Mission of the Russian Federation
to NATO*

Mircea Mudura
*Counsellor, Permanent Representation of
Romania to the EU*

Robert Müller
*Minister-Counsellor - Deputy Head of Mission,
Delegation of Austria to NATO*

James Neuger
Bureau Chief, Bloomberg News

Kai Niklasch
Journalist, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (ZDF)

Lars Nordrum
*Second Secretary, Delegation of Norway to
NATO*

Antonio Ortiz
*Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit, North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)*

Marek Orzechowski
Correspondent, Polish Television

Wolf Plesmann
*Counsellor, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator,
Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU*

Vit Pohanka
Correspondent, Czech Radio

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

Stephen Pullinger
*Executive Director, International Security
Information Service Europe (ISIS Europe)*

Christoph Raab
Manager, Copura

Robert Ranquet
*Deputy Director Strategic Affairs, Ministère de la
Défense: Groupement interarmées actions
civilo-militaires (GIACM)*

Norman Ray
*President, Europe, Raytheon International,
Europe*

Frédéric Remouchamps
Photographer, Keops

Kyriakos Revelas
*Senior Security Policy Analyst, Security Policy
Unit, European Commission: Directorate General
for External Relations*

Gonzalo Rodriguez Garat
*Defence Counsellor, Delegation of Spain to
NATO*

Jacques Rosiers
*National Armament Director, Ministry of
Defence, Belgium*

Francesco Salvati
*Deputy Military Advisor, Permanent
Representation of Italy to the EU*

Xavier Schoumaker
*Project Assistant, Security & Defence
Agenda (SDA)*

Mike Schwartz
*System Architecture Product Team Lead, NATO
Consultation, Command and Control Agency
(NC3A)*

Dmytro Shkurko
Journalist, National News Agency of Ukraine

Nigel Slade
Senior Technical Advisor, MBDA

Enrico Spagnoli
Armament Attaché, Delegation of Italy to NATO

Martin Stoussavljewitsch
*Senior Officer, Armaments, European Defence
Agency (EDA)*

Ronald Sullivan
*NATO Business Development Manager, Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC)*

Nagayo Taniguchi
Journalist, Shincho

Brooks Tigner
EU / NATO Correspondent, Defense News

Michito Tsuruoka
Special Advisor, Embassy of Japan to Belgium

Emilio Turina
Military Advisor, Mission of Croatia to NATO

Luc van de Winckel
Marketing Manager, NATO, Hewlett Packard

Ernst van Hoek
*Board of Management, Representative,
TNO-Defence Research*

Oleg Vonsyak
Counsellor, Mission of Belarus to NATO

Ziemovit Waligora
Counsellor, Delegation of Poland to NATO

Daniel Weng
*EU Defence Policy & NATO, European
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)*

Lutz Wenzel
*Head of Armaments, Electronic Section,
Delegation of Germany to NATO*

Ted Whiteside
*Head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Centre, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO)*

Tim Williams
*Head of European Security Programme, Royal
United Services Institute for Defence and
Security Studies (RUSI)*

Peter Wray
*Vice President, NATO Business,
ThalesRaytheonSystems*

WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT

Li Yi
Third Secretary, Mission of China to the EU

Roberto Zadra
*Deputy Head of the WMD Centre, North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)*

Olivier Zajec
*Defence & Security Consultant, European
Company for Strategic Intelligence (CEIS)*

WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT



Panellists discussing during the break



Hartmut Bühl, AGS Industries, and Norman Ray, Raytheon



Participants at Bibliothèque Solvay



The second session panel



The first session panel



Moderators and participants discussing during lunch



Edgar Buckley, Thales, Robert Ranquet, French Ministry of Defence, and Ted Whiteside, NATO



Christian Jonnas, NATO, one among several speakers interviewed on the day

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**



THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA (SDA) IS THE ONLY SPECIALIST BRUSSELS-BASED THINK-TANK WHERE EU INSTITUTIONS, NATO, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS, INDUSTRY, SPECIALISED AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, THINK TANKS, ACADEMIA AND NGOs GATHER TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICIES IN EUROPE AND WORLDWIDE.



Stefan Zollar and Gen Harald Kujat



Günter Verheugen and Karl von Wogau



Vecdi Gönül and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

BUILDING ON THE COMBINED EXPERTISE AND AUTHORITY OF THOSE INVOLVED IN OUR MEETINGS, THE SDA GIVES GREATER PROMINENCE TO THE COMPLEX QUESTIONS OF HOW EU AND NATO POLICIES CAN COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER, AND HOW TRANSATLANTIC CHALLENGES SUCH AS TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION CAN BE MET.

BY OFFERING A HIGH-LEVEL AND NEUTRAL PLATFORM FOR DEBATE, THE SDA SETS OUT TO CLARIFY POLICY POSITIONS, STIMULATE DISCUSSION AND ENSURE A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY ISSUES BY THE PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION.

SDA ACTIVITIES:

- § MONTHLY ROUNDTABLES AND EVENING DEBATES
- § PRESS DINNERS AND LUNCHEAS
- § INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
- § REPORTING GROUPS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

PROTECTING EUROPE – INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE – SPRING 2006



Franco Frattini talks to Giuseppe Orsi and Denis Ranque at SDA's annual security conference



Atlantic Rendez Vous transatlantic satellite debate organised in conjunction with SDA's event

WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT

THE SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA WOULD LIKE TO THANK ITS PARTNERS AND MEMBERS FOR THEIR SUPPORT IN MAKING THE SDA A SUCCESS



Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU, Mission of the US to NATO, Delegation of the Netherlands to NATO, Delegation of Italy to NATO, Ministry of National Defence, Turkey, Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, Centre for Studies in Security and Diplomacy (University of Birmingham)

**WHAT ARE NATO'S NEXT STEPS ON MISSILE DEFENCE?
SDA ROUNDTABLE REPORT**

A *Security & Defence Agenda* Report

Rapporteur: John Chapman

Photos: Frédéric Remouchamps

Cover Photo: A US payload launch vehicle carrying a prototype vehicle launched in 2001.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=3778>

SECURITY & DEFENCE AGENDA (SDA)

Bibliothèque Solvay, Park Léopold, 137 rue Belliard, B-1040, Brussels, Belgium

Tel: +32 (0)2 737 91 48 Fax: +32 (0)2 736 32 16 E-mail: info@securitydefenceagenda.org

www.securitydefenceagenda.org