EUROPEAN RESPONSES TO ISLAMIC TERRORISM THREAT: THE ITALIAN CASE STUDY

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Introduction
The interest of the European public and political decision makers regarding counterterrorism has steadily increased since the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. Though the threat of terrorism was recognized even before September 11 2001, the new situation and the reality of international terrorism banging at the European doors have led member states to rank security as a challenge of high priority. The fight against terrorism has become a central, all policy realms issue.

Shortly after the July 7, 2005 bombings in London, Italian interior minister Giuseppe Pisanu gave the warning that “terrorism is knocking at Italy’s door and the director of the Italian intelligence agency SISMI (Servizi per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare) stated that “in Italy there are cells ready to strike”. Indeed, Rome has been repeatedly
spotlighted by al-Qaeda as the next possible target. Explicit threats were published on the Internet on July 18 by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (the same group that claimed responsibility for the London bombings), if the Italian Prime Minister would not withdraw the country’s troops from Iraq. The threats became more plausible when it was found out that one of the failed copycat bombers fled London and sought refuge with a brother-in-law in Rome, plus he had attended grade school in Italy and spoke adequate Italian. In fall 2005, Italian news media reported that the Jordanian insurgent leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had sent “an agent” to Italy to prepare attacks, while hundreds of undocumented immigrants continued to arrive on the shores of Southern Italy. All of the above have urged the Italian government to move forward on an ambitious program to respond to the Islamic terrorism on two bases: with law measures aiming in high security and creating new structures to include “moderate Muslims” in the apparatus of Italian state-society relations.

**Italy: facing the challenges of a new immigration society**

Until the late 1970s, Italy was primarily an exporter of manual labour to other countries and not a destination country for immigration. Yet, due to its key geographic position among Western Europe, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and North Africa, the country became the landing place for millions of immigrant Muslims who arrived as working hands during the ‘80s and ‘90s. Before their numbers doubled in the course of the ‘90s, public debate was still dominated by “first generation” issues: prayer space and prayer time during work. As time passed, the first signs of significant demographic changes caused alarming concern to government ministries. An internal Interior Ministry memorandum estimated the number of Muslims in Italy at roughly 1,000,000 in 2004, and it is thought that Muslim immigrants now account for 35-40% of all foreign residents. The number of foreigners in Italian jails nearly quadrupled (to 14,000) between 1990 and 2002. Statistics showed the number of students of North African origin attending Italian schools nearly doubled from 10,312 to 19,044 from the 1996-97 to the 1998-99 school years. Moreover, the number of immigrant small business owners from Muslim countries has more than doubled since 2000, to 51,000.
Muslims in Italy constitute an heterogeneous population hailing from thirty different countries: roughly a quarter are of Albanian origin, another quarter are of Moroccan origin followed by smaller Egyptian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, and finally, a small (but vocal) group of between 20,000 and 50,000 Italian converts. The country has been one of the most active scenes for Islamic militants operating in Europe over the last 15 years. Islamic radicals have been present in Italy in large numbers since 1992, shortly after the defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan. Like in other European countries, the influx of former mujahideen volunteers from the Arab world had a great impact. Geographically and politically, the center of gravity for the Islamists was North Italy, where thousands of Muslim immigrants live and work. In Milan, the most active come from Egypt and Algeria, whereas Turin, Varese and Cremona are the territory of the Moroccans and the Tunisians. Further south, apart from a few small groupings in Rome, the most significant presence is in Naples, where the Algerians have established their bridgehead.

**Violent Trends**

After the London attacks, a court in the northern Italian city of Brescia convicted two North African militants who belonged to a cell that in 2002 had allegedly planned to bomb the cathedral of Cremona and the Milan metro system, the busiest in the country. Moreover, suicide bombers recruited in Italy have carried out deadly attacks out of the country, causing fear that they might soon strike at home.

At least five young Muslims recruited in northern Italy are believed to have carried out suicide operations in Iraq over the last three years. One of them is Lotfi Rihani, a Tunisian who had close ties to a Milan-based al-Qaeda cell that had planned chemical attacks in France in 2001. According to military intelligence, Rihani died in September of 2003 when he, along with two other Tunisian passengers, struck U.S. forces with a car laden with explosives. Algerian national Fahdal Nassim, died in the August 2003 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad that killed 22 people, including UN special envoy to Iraq Sergio Vieira de Mello. Kamal Morchidi, a 24-year-old Moroccan who had served on the board of a Milanese company used as a front to launder
money by al-Qaeda operatives, died in October 2003 during an attack against Baghdad’s Rashid Hotel.

There are a lot of groups operating in Italy that can be called part of the al-Qaeda’s network of affiliates and might attempt to carry out an attack, even in collaboration one with another. One of the most dangerous groups is the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the loosely-connected but extremely dangerous network, believed to be behind the attacks in Casablanca and Madrid. After the Casablanca bombings, Moroccan authorities passed information to their Italian counterparts about a number of members of the group living in Italy and since then DIGOS has been monitoring suspected cells in various northern Italian cities such as Turin, Varese, Vercelli, Udine and Vicenza. The confirmation that the group was active in Italy came in June 2004, when Rabei Osman El Sayed Ahmed, an Egyptian believed to be one of the masterminds of the Madrid bombings, was arrested in Milan. Another hazardous organization is the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which, over the last few years, has established an extensive network in Italy, based of in Naples and Milan, where they have established a sophisticated recruiting network. These Algerians have worked very closely with the Tunisians, who also have several cells active in the Milan area, despite repeated anti-terrorism operations carried out against them by Italian authorities.

The targets for a possible attack in Italy are plenty, due to the country’s history as the heart of European civilization and Christianity: museums, churches and historical monuments are in special danger. For example the church of San Petronio in Bologna is considered to be a likely target because one of its most famous frescos which is said to show Prophet Mohammed in Hell. In addition, the public transportation system, airports (Milan’s Malpensa and Linate, Rome’s Fiumicino and airports in big cities such as Naples, Turin and Florence), train stations, underground trains and major ports like Civitavecchia near Rome represent potential targets too. Aqueducts have also been mentioned by analysts as possible targets, particularly in relation to the use of chemical or biological agents. Italy also offers to terrorists high-value hit list places, like U.S. military bases throughout the country: in Aviano, Vicenza (both in the northeast), Camp Darby (Pisa), Sigonella (Sicily), and the naval facilities of Gaeta (Naples) and La Maddalena (Sardinia).
Responses to the Islamic terrorism threat

Italy has long been unable to find the political unity to pass effective anti-terrorism legislation or to effectively enforce the existing immigration and terrorism laws. Divisions amongst the center-right parties have prevented the government from being consistent in its efforts to reach out to Muslims. The Italian government has reacted by implementing measures against the activities of potential terror cells, designed to enhance the government’s capability to counter terrorist activities. The laws are intended, among other things, to deploy the army to patrol public buildings, to allow the military to search and arrest suspected individuals, and to strictly monitor internet café users. The core of Rome’s strategy is based upon the enhancement and the effectiveness of its human intelligence resources. In the summer of 2005, Italian authorities ordered Milan, Rome and other big cities, to prepare themselves for possible attacks by engaging in public exercises and evacuation plans. Thousands of security operators have been scheduled to hold counter-terror exercises in Milan, also against chemical and biological attacks. Air traffic around these areas is constantly monitored, so that attempting a guerrilla-type operation with rocket launchers or similar weapons would probably not succeed. To prevent an attack to U.S. warships as they navigate near the base by suicide bombers driving motorboats loaded with explosives, there is constant monitoring naval traffic and the theft of boats and explosives.

An Italian refined version of Islam: Consulta Islamica

The growing proportion of persons of Muslim origin in state institutions has raised a number of practical questions that require somewhat policy responses: from the issue of religious schools, to the creation of Muslim cemeteries, to the nomination of chaplains in prisons. Beginning in 2003, the Center-Right government began to engage in a plan for state-Islam relations. Interior Minister Pisanu Pisanu expressing his faith in integration affirmed that: “There is room for Muslim students in schools today, as there will be room for them tomorrow in the workplace, which they will have access to so long as they grow up in respect of our laws” and declared that he would set out to find a moderate
majority in order to marginalize the extremist minority: “Italian mosques must be liberated from preachers of violence, from the recruiters of holy war, and the agents of foreign interests.”

Since 1974 the Saudi and Moroccan dominated Centro Culturale Islamico d’Italia (CCII) in Rome has been the de facto representative for organized Islam in Italy. Chartered well, the CCII’s administrative council is made up mostly of ambassadors of most Muslim countries accredited with the Italian state and Vatican City. CCII boasts the largest mosque in Europe (5,000 person capacity including outdoor spaces), but counts only twenty-five other prayer spaces under its organizational umbrella. The government has been loath to jeopardize diplomatic relations with these international guardians of Islam, who oversaw the creation of prayer spaces for labour migrants in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Several other umbrella organizations claiming to represent Islam in Italy have competed for government recognition since the 1990s, the largest being the Ancona-based Unione delle Comunità ed Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia UCOII (1990). This organization has been associated with the political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood. The UCOII claims to have a big appeal in Italy, representing 200-300 Muslim associations and approximately 70-120 prayer spaces.

In a crucial change from previous models of consultation in Italy that relied in the monopoly of “Embassy Islam,” the new Consultative Council will include a representative of the UCOII along with “lay” civil society leaders and non-prayer associations in Italy. The UCOII secretary general, Mohamed Nour Dachan- previously been snubbed in official meetings- has increasingly tried to present UCOII as a moderate organization, protesting against September 11, “against war and terrorism.” Yet, according to Italian officials, the Muslim population is not ripe for formal representation via the existing state-church mechanism, called an Intesa, used with assorted Christian and Jewish communities and which can only be signed with Italian citizens. This is why, the interior ministry used a non-traditional formula to make individual appointments to the Consultative Council, targeting the “95% of moderate Muslims who attend neither mosques, nor madrassas nor Islamic cultural centers and who only came to our countries to improve their living conditions and with the sincere intention to respect our law and order.”
Thus, the Consultative Council reflects the range of Muslim civil society in Italy without any pretence of “representing” Muslims in Italy. The 16 members named in November 2005 and approved by the government in February 2006, include an UCOII representative, a CCII/Muslim World League representative and a representative of the Comunità religiosa islamica d’Italia (COREIS) alongside three association leaders, three journalists, two health workers, an imam, a literature professor, a student leader, an author, and a charity worker. There are four women; one 22 year old student; twelve national origins are represented (only nine of the sixteen members are of Arab origin); and eight of the sixteen are Italian citizens (several have been naturalized). This is a sharp departure from the short-lived Consiglio Islamico d’Italia (Islamic Council of Italy, 1998-2001), which included just five leaders from religious federations, and which fell apart because of differences between representatives of the Muslim World League and the UCOII before it could present a common request for an Intesa.

Legal responses to the danger of terrorism

While membership in a terrorist organization was introduced as a new crime in the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the Italian Parliament repeatedly failed to pass measures that would have granted more surveillance powers to anti-terrorism investigators. Only after the London attacks, proposals for new measures have been passed following violent debate among political parties. There have been indeed cases where authorities did have the legal tools they needed, so their case fell apart because of the judges’ interpretation of the law and of events in Iraq. Such an example took place in January 2005, when Italy was shocked by the sentence returned in the trial of a group of Ansar al-Islam affiliates accused of recruiting fighters for the Iraqi-based group. Although the Milan judge, Clementina Forleo, decided that the men were indeed part of a network that was recruiting fighters for the Iraqi conflict, she interpreted the operations taking place in Iraq as “guerrilla warfare” and not terrorism, thereby acquitting them of all terrorism-related charges.

The changes that occurred finally in Italian law, so that the danger of Islamic terrorism can be better contained are the following:
1. The definition of terrorism in Article 270 bis of the Italian Penal Code has been widened by Law 155/2005, which came into force on 2 August 2005. Thus, it is considered a crime promoting, constituting, organising, managing or financing organisations which intend to carry out violent activities, or assisting any individual (excluding a close relative) who participates in such organisations. It also outlaws enrolling or training individuals to carry out violent activities if, in view of their nature or context, such activities might cause grave harm to a country or international organisation, and are intended to intimidate the population or to constrain the powers of the state or international organisations to carry out or not carry out any activity, or to destabilise or destroy fundamental political, constitutional, economic and social structures of a country or of an international organisation. This includes foreign states and international organisations or institutions. This definition is in addition to other acts defined as terrorism or as carried out for terrorist purposes in international conventions or laws to which Italy is bound.

2. Law 438 of 15 December 2001, on Urgent Measures Against International Terrorism, extended the provisions of Art. 270 of the Penal Code to cover international terrorism. Art. 270 bis provides for a term of imprisonment of between 7 to 15 years for individuals found to promote, constitute, organise, lead or finance organisations which promote violence for terrorist ends or to upset the democratic order. It also provides for imprisonment of 5 to 10 years for individuals who associate with such organisations. Art. 270 tris calls for imprisonment for up to 4 years for those harbouring or assisting terrorists, with the exception of close relatives.

3. Law 438/2001 and Law 155/2005 give the police and other investigating authorities increased powers to pursue terrorists, such as “agent provocateur” techniques. These permit, for example, the authorities to make use of false identities or receipt of money or drugs, subject to safeguards. They also allow the interception of communications by law enforcement agencies where necessary to gain information for the prevention of terrorism. The maximum period of interception permitted by the Procurator is 40 days (which may then be extended for further 20-day periods). There must be clear justification of the need, and the information so acquired can be used only for investigative purposes, not in criminal proceedings.
4. Law 155/2005 strengthened the provisions in the above mentioned Law 438/2001. Notably, Art. 2 of the Law enables the discretionary granting of one-year renewable (and also rescindable) residence permits, or full residence permits, to illegal foreigners who collaborate with the authorities. The existing law pertaining to Italian residence permits for foreign nationals was updated to provide for compulsory electronic cards containing information on the individual.

5. The Interior Minister has been empowered to control the movement and sale of certain types of detonator and explosive. Those who unlawfully instruct in the use of explosives or other dangerous substances, including over the internet, may be imprisoned for 1 to 6 years. The Minister is also empowered to make licensing or training of pilots subject to the prior authorisation of the Chief of Police for six months to two years while the latter verifies that there are no contra-indications for public or state security.

6. New provisions for identification of individuals include authorisation to take samples of saliva or hair for DNA testing without consent in cases of suspected terrorism, with the caveat that the dignity of the individual must be respected. Suspects may also be held for up to 24 hours without access to a lawyer to enable identification to be verified. Those using false documents may be imprisoned for 1 to 4 years, longer if they help others to use false documents.

7. Law 438/2001 made the confiscation of assets of convicted terrorists obligatory when the assets were destined for use in the commission of crimes or were the profit, product, price or work of crime.

8. Italy does not maintain a separate national list of terrorists or terrorist organisations, but enforces the EU and UN lists.

9. Provisions developed in the context of combating illegal immigration allow for the expulsion of foreign nationals under Italian law. Italy permits dual nationality and once a non-Italian has acquired Italian citizenship, it can only be revoked where the individual accepts public or military service for a foreign State against the express wish of the Italian authorities or bears arms against Italy.

can be carried out. There are three sets of circumstances under which administrative expulsions are possible:

a) The Interior Minister may order the expulsion of a foreign national – whether resident in Italy or not – on the grounds of a threat to public order or State security or where there are good reasons to believe that the continued presence of such foreign national may in any way facilitate terrorist activities or organisations, including of an international nature. It must be noted that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs must be informed prior to the expulsion. This expulsion order prohibits the expelled person from re-entering Italy for at least five years, and usually for ten years. In general, such expulsions are permitted when there is information to show that an individual is a threat to national security but the evidence is not considered sufficient for prosecution and the Interior Minister's ability to rapidly expel individuals has been demonstrated in several cases in August and September 2005. This type of expulsion may be appealed only to the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio or, if based on Law 155/2005, to the local Regional Administrative Courts. The Administrative Court’s decision is subject to two further appeals to the Council of State and, only on points of law, to the Court of Cassation. The appeal is non-suspensive and the expulsion order is immediately enforceable. Furthermore, under Law 155/2005, if the information based on which the expulsion was ordered derives from secret investigations or involves state secrets, the information may be withheld for two years thus, effectively, suspending the appeal process for that period. Both of these provisions will expire automatically on 31 December 2007.

b) A Prefect can expel a foreign national not complying with the conditions under which they were permitted to stay in Italy (for example an expired visa, working illegally).

c) A Prefect can expel a foreign national if he habitually engages in criminal activity; lives wholly or in part from the proceeds of crime; behaves in a way that offends or puts at risk the moral or physical wellbeing of young people, public health or the public peace; or belongs to a mafia type organisation. Since 2 August 2005 a Prefect may also expel a foreign national if he is operating in a group or alone to carry out criminal acts aimed at subverting the democratic order of the state.
Appeals against an expulsion order made by the *Prefect* may be made only to the Justice of the Peace (*Giudice di Pace*). Such appeals have no suspensive effect on the expulsion and can also be lodged through Italian consulates overseas. However, under Law 286/1998, as amended by Law 271/2004, the enforcement of such expulsion orders must be made through escort orders to the frontier, adopted by the local Chief of Police, which are subject to prior judicial review by the Justice of the Peace through a judicial ratification process (*convalida*). Thus, within 48 hours of the adoption of the escort order the judge must be informed and a hearing in the presence of the subject of the escort order and their legal representative must be held. The judge then ratifies or annuls the order within 48 hours of the hearing. The Constitutional Court has stated in its decision 105 of 10 April 2001 that: “...it is the very force of the constitutional principle set out in Art. 13 which imposes interpretation of the control demanded of the judge of the ‘*convalida*’ in its widest sense: a control which cannot stop at the boundaries of the expulsion proceedings, but which must involve the motives which have induced the administration to adopt that peculiar executive modality of the expulsion – the escort to the frontier – which is the immediate cause of the limitation of the personal freedom of the foreign national...” (unofficial translation). The judge’s decision is appealable by both the individual and the State, but only to the Court of Cassation on points of law. Such an appeal is non-suspensive.

Counterbalancing the above provisions, the 1998 legislation provides explicit protection against expulsion in circumstances where the individual may be persecuted for reasons of gender, language, citizenship, religion, political opinions or social conditions, or where they may risk being extradited to another country where such protection from persecution may not exist. This reflects guarantees set out in Art. 3 of the Italian Constitution, which also guarantees to all individuals, citizens or foreign nationals, the inviolable rights of man (Art. 2), and that the legal condition of foreign nationals is to be governed by the law, in compliance with international rules and treaties (Art. 10). In addition, the Italians are signatory to the ICCPR and the CAT and allow individual petitions to their respective human rights monitoring body for both instruments.
Concluding remarks

In general, the attempts to reach and empower the moderate aspect of Islam has been welcomed by Muslim civil society leaders—including the representatives with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood—and greeted (although cautiously) by leaders of “Embassy Islam” tied to diplomatic representatives. A number of prominent Muslims published a “Loyalty Pact to the Italian Republic” in May 2003 and in response, the Interior Ministry has encouraged a complementary process of political integration at the level of local government, which some local administrators have started to explore (e.g. in Siena and Imperia). In a three-page memorandum on “Inter-religious Dialogue” sent to all Italian prefects, the Minister laid out instructions to the prefects to engage in informal consultations with the broad reality of associational life in Italian towns and cities.

Regarding the legal provisions adopted, it is very soon to tell how successful they will be. There are of course concerns about civil liberties, the respect of human rights and the avoidance of discrimination, but the need for security has made clear that the law cannot be blind to the terrorism hazard. In addition, there are various measures that the Italian intelligence services in close coordination with European, U.S. government and other states counter-terrorism services can take to secure the country’s safety: Police must continue with monitoring individuals believed to be linked to Islamic militancy.30 There should also the selective expulsion of radical Islamist Imams and other individuals under Italy’s new counter-terrorism law, which makes it easier to expel foreigners who are deemed a risk to national security or found supporting terrorist groups. Other practical security tips should include: an increase of border security by checking containers and individuals (especially those who recently travelled to Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan); keeping record of all forms of communication between known and suspected radical Islamists in-country as well as their conversations with individuals outside of Italy; having an eye for CBRN substances, by tracking the purchase/selling/theft of industrial chemicals and radioactive materials and ensure effective communication through the G-5’s new “CBRN alert mechanism network”.31
References:

1 Corriere della Sera, July 15, 2005.
2 The Italian Minister of Justice, Roberto Castelli had declared that an attack would take place during the Winter Olympics in Turin and just two months before the national elections. Fortunately, no terrorist operation took place.
3 The bombings in Madrid and London have proven beyond doubt that the terrorists’ goal is to attack European countries that have or had a presence in Iraq.
6 Moroccan nationals made up a majority of these small business owners (61%), followed by Tunisiains (15%), Egyptians (13%), Libyans (3%) and Algerians (2.5%). See “L’islam in Italia ha voglia di impresa,” Agenzia Internazionale Stampa Estero, January 3, 2006.
7 The Palestinians are of less importance, being fewer and generally more wary of extremist doctrines.
8 Corriere della Sera, July 13, 2005.
11 The draft of a document about the formation of the group was found in Cremona in 1998.
12 Italian special police.
13 Corriere della Sera, July 15, 2005. Al-Qaeda has, in the last several years, has especially threatened Venice, which it dismisses as the “Jewish Ghetto”.
16 In 2002, five people (one Italian and four North Africans) were arrested as they were allegedly conducting “hostile surveillance” around the church.
17 On February 19, 2002, four Moroccan citizens were arrested in Rome as police found them in possession of a cyanide compound, allegedly destined to be released in the aqueducts running in the U.S. Embassy’s area—of which the four individuals had a detailed map.
18 Unfortunately the recent elections that polarized Italy do not promise unity in future policy, as one should bear in mind the very different political approach of the new Prime Minister Carlo Prodi.
19 The Lega’s inflammatory rhetoric has caused considerable tensions with Muslims, and deep divisions have also emerged concerning immigration policy between the Lega and Berlusconi’s Forza Italia party.
20 Il Corriere della Sera, August 26.
21 On the subject there have been strident objections of the Lega Nord, with some of its leaders insisting “there is no such thing as Muslim moderates.” On the other hand Pope Benedict XVI, whose recent forays into domestic Italian politics have been noticeable, encouraged the government’s consultation in a July 2005 speech calling for the search for “elements for dialogue within Islam.”
22 La Repubblica, May 2003.
23 Dachan also volunteered his aid in negotiations to free Italian hostages in Iraq and Yemen.
24 It should be noted that the Christian community of Italy - expressed both through the Catholic Church and former Christian Democratic Party members within the governing coalition- has demonstrated sympathy for the respect of religious customs and interdictions of the Muslims. This was shown indicatively with the creation of the Consultative Council to support for religious expression like the headscarf and caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed.
26 Article 270 bis of the Penal Code.
27 For example prolonging detention without charge of a suspected terrorist from 12 to 24 hours, faster deportations for illegal aliens deemed “security risks” and easier procedures to allow investigators to tap phones.
28 Tribunal of Milan, Sentence against Maher Bouyahia and others, January 24, 2005.
One should bear in mind that Italian law is rooted in the 1948 Constitution. Legislation is decided upon by Parliament and the Senate and formally promulgated by the President and may be subject to constitutional scrutiny by the Constitutional Court. Legislative provisions found by the Constitutional Court to be incompatible with the Constitution are repealed and must be amended.

La Repubblica, July 8, 2005.