

# How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction Efforts?

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## Foreword

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer outlined his transformation agenda in a June 2005 address at Allied Command Transformation to NATO's Permanent and Military Representatives and Strategic Commanders. He stated that :

“NATO'S experience in Afghanistan confirmed the need to upgrade NATO'S ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ required for post-conflict stabilisation...transforming for stabilisation operations is not ‘just’ a new capability initiative,...it is about developing a ‘new mission model’ that successfully integrates the Alliance's actions with those by international actors. To that end, we need to improve our processes to better anticipate all aspects of stabilisation operations and genuinely support civil-military interaction.”

In response to the Secretary General, to follow-on requests from the North Atlantic Council and individual Alliance members, and in support of Allied Command Transformation's mission, the Atlantic Council established an international working group on NATO stabilisation operations and reconstruction efforts to better understand how NATO should handle these important functions. This report and its recommendations represent the consensus of the members of the working group, all of whom were acting in their individual capacities; it does not represent the official position of any institution. The weight of the recommendations derives from the expertise and experience of the participants and the diversity of the group's membership. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in complete agreement, the working group members concurred with the paper as representing the consensus of the group. In addition, the report benefited from the comments and participation of several government representatives and others who participated in their personal capacity and, for professional reasons, cannot be formally associated with a report of this kind. Several of these individuals are listed as observers, but bear no official responsibility for the final form of the report and its recommendations.

I would like to thank the members of the working group for their unselfish contributions to this work. I also want to acknowledge the contributions of John Sandrock who organized the effort, the insightful management of Dick Nelson, the principal drafter, who subsequently led this project, the skillful administration of the project by Magnus Nordenman and the diligent research support provided by James Ballas and Craig Seyfried. Finally, this project has also benefited from the support of Allied Command Transformation (ACT). This support, however, should not be construed as official endorsement of the paper by ACT or NATO.

Jan M. Lodal  
President  
The Atlantic Council of the United States



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## Executive Summary

### Key Judgments

The challenges of winning the peace, as well as winning the war, have gained increasing attention among NATO members. This development reflects hard-learned lessons from Alliance experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Despite attention at all levels, corresponding changes have yet to be institutionalized within NATO. This resistance to change is, in part, normal bureaucratic inertia, but it also reflects a lack of consensus about the extent to which NATO should be involved in establishing and sustaining a peace. Differences within the Alliance on appropriate roles for NATO beyond winning wars are coming to the surface in the debate over the immediate post-war tasks of stabilisation operations and initial reconstruction efforts, which we refer to in this report by the acronym “S&R”.

Much of the controversy surrounding NATO’s roles in S&R is due to different understandings of what is implied by the terms “stabilisation and reconstruction” and disagreement on appropriate roles for civil and military organizations. Some would prefer to rule out “reconstruction” for NATO because such efforts are more appropriately handled by civil organizations. Others argue that because civilian organizations are not often able to operate in a combat zone, military organizations may need to undertake preliminary reconstruction efforts until they can be transferred to other organizations. We agree with the latter view.

We define S&R as the process to achieve a locally led and sustainable peace in a dangerous environment. The military role in this process is halting residual violence and ensuring order and security, including those reconstruction efforts required to repair enough damage to enable restoration of the most essential services.

Definitions are helpful but not adequate to cover the full scope of activities that may be associated with the term S&R. Our comparison of how the term is translated and used within the Alliance highlighted many differences, but generally found that we are talking about a dynamic *process*. However, the concept may be so broadly conceived that it is almost limitless, with enormous budget, planning, legal and other implications. Therefore, we believe S&R is best understood by building consensus on the specific requirements that may be needed. Building on considerable previous work,<sup>1</sup> we have detailed those requirements in the Appendix.

Military-led S&R operations, as we conceive of them in this paper, are fully consistent with the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 2) and the roles authorized for NATO by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in the Balkans and Afghanistan. While we do not advocate a new role for NATO, we do suggest a more systematic approach to security efforts that previously have been generally *ad hoc* in nature.

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<sup>1</sup> The list of essential tasks in the Appendix was derived from the U.S. Department of State’s “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix”, published on April 1, 2005 and revised by the Atlantic Council Working Group. The State Department matrix was based on a joint AUSA/CSIS report “*Winning the Peace: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*”, published in May, 2002.

It is essential to connect military operations to their ultimate political objectives. Thus, the end-state of NATO military operations should be a locally-led sustainable peace. This process involves the coherent application of political, military, economic and civil instruments of power to reach the agreed end-state. In this comprehensive or effects-based approach, NATO's role should be focused on the security aspects of S&R operations because security is the core competence of the Alliance. Security operations, however, require both combat and S&R efforts.

Therefore, we believe that future NATO military operations should include forces assigned to the S&R mission from the start. The distinction between these forces and those assigned to combat missions is important because combat forces and S&R forces are dealing with fundamentally different target groups. The combat forces are focused primarily on the organized enemy forces and spoilers, while the S&R forces are focused primarily on the local population even though each force may have to deal with either target group to some extent during its deployment.

**Within NATO, S&R should be viewed mainly in terms of a mission, and not in terms of new capacities.**

This does not mean that NATO needs fundamentally new capabilities for S&R operations. The S&R forces are for the most part the same forces already available to NATO (e.g., infantry, military police, engineers, and civil affairs units), but with separate missions and training for specific operations. For example, when the NATO Response Force (NRF) is being considered for a specific operation, the NRF should have separate task forces dedicated to the combat mission and to the S&R mission, with both task forces under a single commander. The S&R task force should be tailored to the requirements of the special contingency, and should include a civil-military team capable of coordinating with non-military agencies and organizations and providing civilian expertise. Ideally, NATO forces would be capable of assignment to either mission with supplemental training and unit attachments as needed, depending on the specific circumstances and overall force requirements.

The S&R mission is not yet a part of NATO's defense planning process and force requirements planning despite more than a decade of NATO experience with these operations. Thus, establishment of an explicit S&R mission would stimulate the development of appropriate planning and organizational changes.

## **Focusing Attention**

NATO needs to transform its approach to S&R operations. The following areas deserve immediate attention:

-- **S&R Tasks.** NATO does not yet have a common understanding of military S&R operations so further attention is needed to build the necessary consensus on the concepts, tasks, responsibilities, doctrine and other features that need to be standardized throughout the Alliance. The appropriate place to begin these efforts is by agreeing on the tasks that may be required in conducting successful S&R operations. We have detailed a proposed list of such tasks in the Appendix. This proposed list of tasks would focus NATO's role on providing security for a broader S&R process that also involves governance, humanitarian assistance, economic S&R, and justice.



-- **Architecture.** Once there is sufficient consensus within NATO on the tasks defining military S&R operations, the NAC should establish S&R operations as a core NATO mission on a par with major combat operations and establish appropriate responsibilities. Table 1 provides a suggested distribution of S&R responsibilities within the Alliance.

-- **Planning and Exercising.** S&R operations place a premium on planning long before deployment. Furthermore, each case is unique. This requires NATO to develop detailed studies and country-specific contingency plans well in advance of any S&R operation. S&R plans, like plans for combat operations, are greatly improved when they are tested by exercises.

-- **Coordination Outside NATO.** One of the distinctive characteristics of S&R operations is the requirement to coordinate with other organizations outside NATO's authority. Cooperation with the UN, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the leading humanitarian organizations, is often necessary and can be facilitated by a series of planning conferences prior to any S&R operation. To improve planning and coordination, the Alliance should build familiarity, trust, and habits of cooperation with relevant non-military institutions prior to operational deployment.

-- **Common Funding.** The costs of S&R operations should be shared by all members, not just those participating directly in an operation. In addition, some of the costs of transforming NATO for S&R operations, also should be shared in common.

-- **Contracting.** The use of contractors to provide logistics, transportation, training and, in some cases, security support to military forces is increasing, particularly for S&R operations. But oversight capabilities, especially involving well-trained contracting officers, have not kept pace with the increasing demands. Thus, NATO needs to devote more attention to training, along with standardizing contracting procedures and oversight among members and partners.

## Key Recommendations

1. NATO should transform its institutions and practices to include S&R operations, beginning with the NAC establishment of S&R as an explicit mission.
2. The NAC should produce an annual S&R contingency planning agenda and task NATO military authorities to develop specific planning and force requirements. This should then be followed with appropriate training, exercises, experiments and evaluation to prepare S&R forces for various contingencies. Additionally, the NAC should direct appropriate staffs to coordinate S&R procedures with the UN, EU, OSCE and others.
3. The Political Committee should study S&R resourcing, including appropriate common funding, and report findings and recommendations to the NAC. The Political Committee should also review S&R operations for the purpose of developing generic mandates and strategic guidance to help NATO planning and training.
4. The Military Committee (MC) should provide recommendations to NAC for an annual agenda for S&R contingency planning. Additionally, the MC should establish a baseline inventory of member and partner S&R capabilities, and provide recommendations to the NAC on commitment of S&R forces.
5. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) should take the lead in recommending how NATO could be transformed to better handle S&R operations. This should include all aspects of mission conceptual analysis and experimentation, defense requirements review, subsequent changes to defense planning, and resulting training and education updates.
6. Allied Command Operations (ACO) should designate a headquarters for S&R planning and operations. ACO should also recommend appropriate command arrangements, force composition, and deployment concepts.

Additional recommendations for the transformation of NATO's approach to S&R operations are highlighted in *italics* in the following report.





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# How Should NATO Handle Stabilisation Operations and Reconstruction Efforts?

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## The Challenges

One of the main lessons from operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan is the requirement for a mix of military and civil capabilities to achieve the desired political goals. Now spanning two decades, it has become clear that these challenges should be viewed as formative experiences for post-Cold War NATO; they can no longer be considered as exceptions to the way NATO does business. A major lesson they teach is that to meet these kinds of complex and protracted challenges successfully, NATO must orchestrate a broader set of capabilities -- both within and outside the Alliance. This will require a fundamental transformation of NATO so that winning the peace receives the kind of attention that the Alliance traditionally focused on winning the war.

In addressing future challenges, the North Atlantic Council may decide to involve NATO in preventing or terminating conflict in a wide range of situations with NATO in the lead (the supported organization) or in a supporting role with another international organization in the lead. Furthermore, depending on conditions, the NATO operation may be quite limited in scope and duration, as in Macedonia, or may be comprehensive and long in duration, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.<sup>1</sup> In either case, each conflict is unique and requires a response appropriate to specific conditions. These conditions will include some or all of the following: hostile armed forces, insurgents, political instability, terrorism, large-scale criminal activity, economic disruption, human suffering, infrastructure destruction, environmental damage, disinformation and other obstacles to achieving the end goals.

## Developing a Common Understanding

If NATO is to coordinate effectively the efforts of 26 members and more than 30 other partners<sup>2</sup> and affiliates, it must have a common understanding of what needs to be done. Indeed, standardization of terms and procedures has long been a key attribute of NATO's success. However, despite extensive experience conducting non-combat security operations, NATO does not yet have a common understanding of the concept of S&R.

In part, this problem stems from the imprecise nature of such operations and the broad scope of associated activities. Also, other terms -- such as peace enforcement, state-building and operations other than war -- are often used to describe similar efforts. Furthermore, the concept of S&R is controversial within NATO because it implies using military forces for civil tasks.

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<sup>1</sup> For simplicity, Bosnia and Herzegovina will henceforth in this report be referred to as Bosnia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be called Macedonia.

<sup>2</sup> In this context, "NATO partners" include the countries of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), along with the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as international and regional organizations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, in addition to non-governmental organizations (humanitarians).

Nevertheless, some members have developed detailed understandings of the role of military forces in S&R while other members have yet to develop the concept in detail. Such differences in thinking surfaced in Afghanistan, for example, where about 70 national caveats on the operations of NATO forces initially limited common operational approaches. Because S&R concepts and terms have not reached the same level of standardization that characterizes much of the NATO military lexicon, it is important that NATO build a consensus understanding of the concept of S&R operations.

## End-State, Roles, Missions and Tasks

### How to Think About S&R

Stabilisation Operations and Initial Reconstruction Efforts (S&R) may be understood within a traditional military framework that includes goals, roles, missions, concepts of operations and tasks/effects.<sup>3</sup> Military operations must first be placed in their appropriate political context. In this case, the strategic goal or geopolitical end-state may be conceived of in terms of the increasingly widely accepted parsimonious definition of the concept of S&R operations as *a process to achieve a locally led, sustainable peace in a dangerous environment*. Such a definition clarifies that the end-state is more than victory on the battlefield. This is consistent with the NATO definition of stabilisation.<sup>4</sup> It also requires the orchestration of a broad set of civil and military activities and cooperation among a wide range of international actors. Emerging concepts within NATO and member states such as an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), concerted planning and action (CPA), Unified Action, and Comprehensive Approach are consistent in the need to coordinate political, military, economic, and civil actions to achieve the coherent effects desired to establish a locally led, sustainable peace. Thus, to a large extent, thinking about S&R represents not just another round of an old debate about civil-military boundaries and coordination, but rather a growing consensus on the complex interdependencies involved for NATO and other international actors to effectively prevent or resolve a crisis.

**Political S&R defined:**

**A process to achieve a locally led and sustainable peace  
in a dangerous environment**

This definition also puts the problem in the appropriate local perspective. For the peace to be sustainable, it must be locally led. Nevertheless, outside powers must be prepared to address immediate requirements across five broad areas of S&R operations—security, governance, humanitarian assistance, economic stabilisation with the beginning of reconstruction and justice, as depicted in Figure 1. This figure outlines the general scope of S&R activities. We highlight the security area because this is the appropriate area for NATO focus in keeping with its core competence: the ability to provide security.

<sup>3</sup> Although we call this framework “traditional,” it is fully consistent with the NATO Military Committee’s position on “an effects-based approach to operations” as outlined in MCM-0052-2006, dated 6 June 2006.

<sup>4</sup> According to MCM-0048-2005, stabilisation describes the process of achieving an effective transition from immediate responses to an insecure situation to long-term development. It involves enabling a local population to develop politically, economically and socially in the long term so that it can sustain itself without threatening itself or others.

Furthermore, we divide security into two types of efforts, one involving combat operations and the other involving S&R efforts by military forces. Although initially NATO forces may be the only ones on the scene and thus have to perform some immediate roles in the other four areas of S&R, they should transition out of other non-security as soon as practical.

There is a symbiotic relationship between stabilisation and reconstruction. In most cases, reconstruction is not possible without stabilisation and stabilisation without some reconstruction will not likely lead to the desired end-state. Within the security area, we view S&R as the process of halting residual violence and ensuring order and security, including those reconstruction efforts required to repair enough damage to enable restoration of the most essential services until the completion of that work can be transferred to civil assets<sup>5</sup>. *We recommend that NATO adopt this definition of military S&R and develop supporting doctrine, policy, and operational concepts.*


**Military S&R defined:**

**The process of halting residual violence and ensuring order and security, including those reconstruction efforts required to repair enough damage to enable restoration of the most essential services until the completion of that work can be transferred to civil assets.**

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<sup>5</sup> This definition is based on work by Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. It was published in *Defense Horizon Report No. 45*, September, 2004.

Figure 1: Scope of S&R Missions and Operations





NATO's execution of the security role will require organizing forces and resources for the two broad security mission areas noted in Figure 1: Combat operations, including counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts; and S&R operations. Different target groups are what mainly distinguishes combat operations from S&R operations: combat operations are focused on enemy forces, insurgents and terrorists; S&R operations are focused on bringing security—in a broad sense—to the local population, including former belligerents, members of the armed forces and intelligence services. These two types of operations can take place in the same dangerous environment at the same time; thus it is not useful to plan S&R operations as a separate phase. Also, a specific location may revert back from one that is characterized mainly by S&R operations to one that requires more combat operations. The shaded area in Figure 1 highlights the scope of missions that NATO S&R forces should be prepared to undertake.

## Concept of Operations

NATO security S&R operations should begin early—as soon as feasible in the view of the commander. *They should include steps to begin an early, incremental transition to local control. NATO forces should focus initially on establishing a safe and secure environment for the local population, then transitioning to the development of legitimate and stable local security institutions, and finally fostering sustainable indigenous capacity for security and normal peaceful pursuits.* In building a safe environment, efforts should focus mainly on the security forces. Much of the S&R effort should be concerned with building relationships with the local community and establishing a broad network of connections. Such a network of contacts will provide an understanding of local perceptions of the security environment and may reduce the chances of NATO forces being misled or misused in conflicts among local factions. Moreover, it will aid greatly in the protection of NATO's own forces. Finally, it will help the outside powers better understand the critical local infrastructure and establish appropriate priorities for restoring key functions.

The timing of the transitions to local authority or other international management should depend on the local security conditions and local government capacity, not arbitrary deadlines. These conditions will reflect the availability of other organizations and local skills to take on the more long-term, systematic development of infrastructure and many other activities associated with state building.

Managing S&R operations requires mechanisms to provide for consultation and coordination with groups outside NATO as well as the more typical command and control arrangements for forces and resources under NATO authority. Altogether, these have been termed “4C mechanisms” (consultation, command, control and coordination) that provide the necessary linkages to ensure overall unity of effort. NATO experience with S&R operations provides useful examples for building such mechanisms. For example, prior to the expansion of NATO efforts in Afghanistan, NATO Headquarters organized consultation seminars that brought together representatives from the government of Afghanistan and key international organizations, such as the UN, the EU, the OSCE and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

Effective consultation and coordination mechanisms rely heavily on personal relationships among key personnel, plus adaptable information and communications tools. These relationships and the tools that support them must be exercised regularly to establish patterns of cooperation to facilitate S&R operations. *NATO training and education programs should be adapted to reflect the best practices for consultation and coordination.*

Another important issue is providing for continuity in S&R operations. This is a difficult challenge because of the frequent turnover in personnel and the usually long-term nature of the problems. An approach that may help mitigate the lack of continuity is to provide for longer tours, especially for the more senior personnel. Continuous feedback loops are essential so that the next rotation is well-briefed. Finally, more standardized policies and procedures can be helpful.

Rules of Engagement (RoE) for S&R forces need to be sufficiently robust so that they authorize the use of force to deal with any inappropriate challenges to authority. Without such authority, private militias and others may be able to spoil S&R operations.

One of the more distinctive aspects of S&R operations is the proven utility of providing commanders with the ability to use cash payments to the local population to undertake emergency repairs and provide emergency services until these can be undertaken by local authorities or appropriate international or non-governmental organizations. In Afghanistan, cash payments to fund local projects have been an essential tool for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Such efforts also provide an important source of jobs which may also help improve the security situation. Funding for such activities should be substantial and NATO leaders should conduct pledging conferences early in the process. In some cases, additional funding may be available from the UN, EU, and other sources for these purposes. Additionally, NATO should also look to making funding available to CIMIC trained forces to use in situations where civilian entities are not able to operate. Once S&R efforts are well underway, funding will increasingly become the responsibility of the local government and public, with help from foreign direct investment, the World Bank and others.

Special attention also needs to be given to the illicit transfer of funds into the area of operations. By supporting insurgents and organized crime, such funds have contributed to undermining NATO stabilisation efforts in the past and are likely to pose similar threats in the future. Thus NATO should insure appropriate focus on such efforts by intelligence organizations and coordinate interdiction efforts as needed.

## **Security S&R Requirements**

Given the wide variation in conditions in which NATO may be involved, the specific S&R actions required, as well as their priority and timing, will depend on the specific situation to be addressed. For example, NATO's tasks in Bosnia and Kosovo were much broader and over a longer timeframe than in Operation Essential Harvest in Macedonia. Furthermore, NATO may only be supporting an S&R operation, such as with the NATO training mission in Iraq. The scope of these tasks within the security role is summarized below and developed more fully in the Appendix. These tasks are organized according to eight types of missions addressing the security needs of the local population. They do not include basic combat operations which would comprise a separate, but integrated, effort by NATO

forces. Note in this case that S&R forces are directed to provide security to other S&R personnel outside NATO, including contractors. Such details should be addressed in discussions of the mandate and early planning. *NATO efforts to achieve a common understanding of S&R operations should begin with agreeing on the specific actions that may be required. A proposed list is provided in the Appendix and includes actions in the following eight areas.*

### **1. Disposition of Armed Forces, Security and Intelligence Services and Belligerents**

The foremost security priority is to transform the engagement space from hostilities into a safe and secure environment before initiating other confidence-building S&R activities. Key mission areas include enforcing ceasefires, disarming belligerents, collecting/destroying weapons, establishing/controlling demilitarized zones, and establishing communications with the local population. Securing armories and ammunition dumps should be a high priority for S&R forces. Experience from NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as from several UN peacekeeping operations, indicates that a successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of combatants (DD&R) process that may also be a difficult, but key factor in the long-term stability of a post-conflict area.

**2. Public Information and Communications.** NATO forces must be able to communicate with the local population. S&R forces should utilize public affairs and media organizations to provide factual information, help control or counter rumors and to disseminate important public announcements in the local language. Accurate public information could help win “hearts and minds” and help defuse some of the ethnic tensions that may be present in a post-conflict environment. Public information is also needed to ensure that NATO gets credit for local reconstruction, particularly in areas with low literacy rates.

**3. Territorial Security.** Another set of security tasks is designed to preserve the cessation of hostilities by establishing control over borders and points of entry in order to stop the smuggling of weapons, contraband, the infiltration of insurgents, organized crime, and terrorists, as well as ensuring the safety of returning refugees. The return of refugees also may involve S&R forces and resources. In addition, NATO S&R forces may become involved in establishing and maintaining internal freedom of movement in order to start the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as facilitating legitimate trade and travel.

**4. Public Order and Safety.** An additional set of security tasks deals with establishing public order and safety. Key efforts include the protection of non-combatants, ensuring humanitarian access, performing interim policing and disposing of land mines and other unexploded ordnance. The risk of ethnic strife in a post-conflict environment can be quite high, so continued public order can be a decisive factor in S&R efforts. In maintaining a cohesive society and state. Experience from Afghanistan and Kosovo suggests that organized crime, and groups involved in the production and trade of narcotics, can become serious obstacles to S&R efforts. Finally, the appropriate “Rules of Engagement” need to be clear and reviewed regularly.

**5. Protection of Indigenous Individuals, Infrastructure and Institutions.** Concurrent with the other security tasks, S&R forces must protect and secure critical infrastructure. In addition, the protection of key leaders, public institutions and former military facilities is essential for creating a secure environment.

**6. Protection of Reconstruction and S&R Personnel and Institutions.** The need for S&R force protection is self-evident, but must be addressed in planning and sufficient resources must be provided for the tasks involved. The role of S&R forces in protecting contractors, NGOs and other humanitarian agencies is not generally agreed upon and requires clarification on behalf of participating NATO member states.

**7. Security Coordination.** Throughout the S&R process, security coordination is essential among NATO forces, any other international military forces, indigenous military forces as they become established, civilian police, and others. This coordination must include as much transparency as possible regarding rules of engagement and concepts of operations. Custody and handling of detainees, information sharing and intelligence support, also are important areas for coordination.

**8. Initial Reconstruction for Emergency Relief.** If local or other reconstruction resources are not available NATO S&R forces should launch efforts to repair critical facilities. Initial reconstruction could include repair of damaged infrastructure to facilitate the flow of emergency relief, provision of electricity, water, food, medical care, and transportation. As NATO's reconstruction partners deploy into the area of operations, they should begin to assume increasing responsibility for these tasks, as well as for long-term reconstruction and development projects.

## **S&R Force Capabilities**

The tasks listed in Appendix I also provide a useful starting point for determining the kinds of S&R capabilities and forces that are likely to be needed for planning and force generation purposes. For the most part, these kinds of forces already are available from NATO members and partners.

*At this point, we do not see a need for creating new types of units specially configured for S&R operations. Civil affairs units, however, may be developed or modified based on the PRT experiences and will probably be needed in greater number than are currently available to NATO.* S&R task forces would probably include: maneuver battalions that are necessary for territorial security and a wide variety of other functions; military police that are needed for crowd control, handling prisoners, protecting key installations and individuals; engineer units that are needed for ordnance and weapons disposal, as well as repair of critical infrastructure including roads, water and electricity. Civil affairs, intelligence, psychological operations and logistics units are also likely to be important components of any S&R force. Special operations forces may prove useful if their skills include the local language and capabilities to help organize and train local security forces. Carabinieri-type forces, such as the ones that have been deployed alongside NATO forces in the Balkans, might also prove useful, particularly as the transition toward a more stable and sustainable state progresses. Additionally, civil-military advisory groups will most likely be needed to provide advice and facilitate coordination. While specific S&R capabilities will be determined by each unique situation, general models of the composition of an S&R task force should be derived from a combination of lessons learned, experiments, and other analysis.

For NATO, these kinds of capabilities could best be organized for stabilisation tasks in a modular fashion. To do this in an efficient manner, it would be useful to have a complete inventory of the S&R capabilities of NATO members and partners. A general set of S&R forces should be ready to deploy within the same timeframe as the NRF, and ideally as part of the NRF, so this would preclude tasking

the same units for both combat and S&R roles simultaneously. This general S&R force could then be augmented as additional requirements are identified for the specific mission. Some NATO members and partners who are unable or unwilling to commit combat forces to an NRF rotation may find it possible to make important contributions to the S&R component force. However it is designed and managed, NATO S&R advance planning and training should ensure that the modules assembled for any specific operation can operate as a fully integrated NATO force.

The current debate about military transformation in Germany is instructive in terms of organizing for S&R operations. German military forces are currently slated to be restructured around three categories of forces: a rapid response force of about 35,000 troops; an S&R force of about 70,000 troops and support forces of nearly 150,000 troops. Each of these categories are joint forces and will be organized from existing army, navy and air units; the new structure does not include any new types of units for the S&R or other missions. Overall, the reorganization represents a slight reduction in total forces.<sup>6</sup>

Within this structure, the new rapid response force will provide Germany's main contribution to NATO's response force and the EU's battle groups. The S&R force is designed for a wide spectrum of stability operations and for long deployments. While the S&R forces are intended for "low to medium intensity," they will have robust combat capabilities, including armor units.

Part of the debate over a restructuring of this kind involves a concern that such a division of labor within the Alliance would also create a sense of "second class" units among those soldiers not assigned to the more elite combat force. While acknowledging the concern, many believe that such perceptions can be mitigated by communicating the valuable roles played by each of the forces. Also, units could be assigned to different mission categories from time to time.

Experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans are also instructive. At this point, however, it is not clear whether NATO's PRTs operating under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will prove to be unique to the situation in Afghanistan, or if they represent a general model for future NATO S&R operations. The PRTs themselves are evolving and they reflect somewhat different national approaches. One assessment concludes that PRTs are best suited for mid-level violent environments, where full combat operations are no longer necessary, yet it is too dangerous for heavy involvement of NGOs in humanitarian and reconstruction operations.<sup>7</sup> In any event, they do provide valuable first-hand experience and a useful basis for analysis of alternative approaches. At a minimum, we believe that the broad set of PRT experiences that involve 36 countries will be useful in developing and/or modifying civil affairs units in the force structures of member nations and partners. To assist such efforts, NATO could analyze best practices and propose modular, adaptable PRT-type structures as part of the defense requirements and planning processes.

Important skill sets for S&R leaders at every level include negotiation and problem-solving in the context of the local cultures. In addition, personalities matter even more in S&R operations than in combat operations because of the need to convince those outside of NATO authority to cooperate.

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<sup>6</sup> See <http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde> for a description of Bundeswehr plans along these lines.

<sup>7</sup> "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment," by U.S. Department of State, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Agency for International Development, April 2006, p. 24.

NATO *should develop appropriate curricula at its senior schools to train leaders to manage effectively civil-military relations.* Moreover, leaders chosen for S&R operations should be well-informed on the area of operation, well beyond what is involved in a typical country orientation. In this connection, the need for adequate local language capabilities in any S&R operation cannot be overemphasized. To the extent possible, NATO should encourage national militaries to develop and train regionally specialized officers and soldiers.

The different nature of S&R operations suggests that such forces should probably have considerably longer deployment and rotation schedules than the six-month cycle that has been the standard for the UN and other NATO operations. For sustained operations, the requirement is for 3-times the number of forces needed for a basic operation because one set will be in training while one is deployed and a third is refitting after deployment.

Currently, NRF forces, along with any accompanying S&R forces, deploy with an initial 30 days of supply, after which they are supported by a Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC). *Thus the MJLC must organize and plan for supporting the S&R contingent on a sustained basis. Consideration should be given to establishing pre-positioned stockpiles for S&R operations at appropriate military bases of NATO members and partners.* Because of the similarity in requirements with disaster relief operations, such stockpiles could also be used by NATO in that role. Given the frequent occurrence of natural disasters around the world, such stockpiles have a high probability of being used. Indeed, the first NRF deployment was to Pakistan for earthquake relief.

## Resources for S&R

S&R efforts require adequate resources, but at this point there are no provisions for determining how much is enough. Indeed, the answer will be particular to any given deployment situation. Given the critical importance of the function and its relative absence from the structure and processes of NATO, it probably is under-funded. To help understand how S&R fits in the overall picture, NATO needs a comprehensive evaluation of all of its capabilities packages to determine if resources are being allocated in accord with overall NATO priorities – Afghanistan, now essentially an S&R operation, is NATO's top priority. At first glance, many of the capabilities included in the Prague Capabilities Package are useful for S&R operations, such as strategic and theatre air and sea lift, and deployable headquarters, along with combat support and combat service support units. *To better understand the full implications, the NAC should task the Senior Political Committee to study the S&R resources issue. Furthermore, NATO should consider using common funding initiatives to pay for some of the efforts involved in transforming NATO for S&R operations. Finally, operational costs should be shared by all NATO members, not just the participating states.*

## Planning

### Defining the Problem

Correct diagnosis of the problem is essential. NATO will probably face more than just a single problem in future contingencies, so it is important how the set of problems is aggregated into a description of the overall challenge. This requires a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the target political, security, economic, cultural, and social system—there is no substitute for local knowledge. S&R planning must be country-centric.

In developing this understanding and, more importantly, when involved in S&R operations, NATO officials should keep in mind at least two views of the problematic situation: an external view and an internal view. The inside view is from the perspective of local officials and the population. This view reflects long-standing struggles between local factions. The external view will probably reflect a series of functional problems along the lines of the various individuals and agencies engaged in the effort; they tend to define problems mainly in terms of their own expertise. Law enforcement officials focus on crime, for example.

Reconciling these two views is essential for successful S&R operations. Given the goal of achieving a locally led, sustainable peace, successful S&R operations will need to do more than just functional problem-solving. They need to transform any local conflict into a situation in which key local leaders see it as in their own self-interest to develop a process of collaborative decision-making—away from a more typical zero-sum game view. With such requirements in mind, a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the local political and security systems is crucial. Such an understanding also can reduce the chances that S&R resources may have the unintended consequences of exacerbating local rivalries.

### Prior Planning

Based on the hard-learned lessons from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, S&R operations are too important to create on *an ad hoc* basis after the forces have been deployed. Thus, a high priority for NATO should be developing a process to ensure adequate planning for S&R contingencies well in advance of decisions to employ NATO forces. *An important step in this direction would be for the NAC to authorize an annual agenda for S&R contingency planning. The NAC should task ACO to designate a subordinate command to do detailed planning for S&R contingencies. In addition, the NAC should task ACT to develop and update a series of country studies to support such planning.*

These studies can draw upon and be coordinated with studies by the UN, the World Bank, the OSCE, NATO members and partners, along with other institutions as appropriate. Assessments of S&R operations often stress the importance of understanding the nature of instability in each case. In Afghanistan, for example, violence is often related to tribal competition, narcotics trade and revenge.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment,” by U.S. Department of State, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Agency for International Development, April 2006, pp. 24-25.

Another element to be considered is the extent to which participating NATO members share common views of the ultimate political objectives underlying the NATO operation.

In addition, *NATO's defense planning process needs to be changed to better deal with S&R operations.* In particular, specific plans are needed to deal with real situations that may lead to NATO involvement. This, in turn, would lead to a review of defense requirements, consideration of relevant, unique legal issues, as well as the chain of events needed to prepare properly for such contingencies, including exercises, experiments, and evaluations.

For planning purposes, *it would be useful to have an inventory of NATO member and partner S&R capabilities, similar to NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center.* Such an inventory would help NATO plan for, mobilize and organize assets needed to conduct specific S&R operations. Indeed, many of the same capabilities would be appropriate across multiple events because the requirements for disaster relief are similar to S&R. For example, the NRF was deployed for disaster relief in response to Hurricane Katrina in September 2005 and the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005. *To assist in establishing such an inventory, NATO's defense planning questionnaire should be expanded to include S&R capabilities.*

Like any civil-military operation of such a scale and complexity, a combined campaign plan is needed to guide S&R operations. It should state explicitly the end-state goals and include annexes to span the full range of anticipated efforts including: security, governance, humanitarian assistance, economic S&R, justice, along with public affairs and communications. If the NATO mandate covers all of these roles, then appropriate outside organizations with expertise in specific areas should be brought into the planning process as early as possible. If the NATO mandate is limited to the security role, then it would be responsible for the security annex to the combined campaign plan.

The combined campaign plan also should provide rules of engagement for the S&R forces. If S&R forces are authorized to use force only in self-defense, this can embolden local aggressors to destabilize the local situation. In some cases it may be necessary to authorize pro-active initiatives with appropriate rules of engagement to stabilize a volatile situation.

A key feature of S&R operations is the requirement to plan for the transition from NATO leadership to other international organizations or local authorities. To do this NATO officials must actively consult and coordinate with outside and local groups. Once agreements have been reached about the conditions and nature of transitions in specific areas of responsibility, these terms need to be incorporated into NATO plans. But even without such agreements, *NATO planning from the outset should include strategies for transitions.*

Over the lifespan of an S&R operation, NATO will see its partners come and go during different stages of the operation. There may be humanitarian groups present in a crisis area even before NATO forces are deployed and more of them may come, together with reconstruction contractors, after basic security has been established by the NATO forces and remain long after NATO troops leave. Thus the operational timeframes of various international organizations will probably not coincide with that of the NATO forces.



Given these differences, NATO commanders should pay special attention to “periods of transition” when organizations come in, leave, or transfer their responsibilities to other partners, or locally led agencies and organizations. In this connection, the early establishment of a civil-military coordination advisory group will be essential.

Planning also should include provisions for outsourcing, at least on a contingency basis if there is a gap in capabilities pledged by NATO members and partners. Contracts for logistics support and transportation will probably continue to be needed in support of NATO expeditionary forces. If the details of such contracts can be thought through in advance, then the chances are better for working out satisfactory arrangements when the needs occur.

Another issue for planning is the role of international police. They are typically not under NATO’s authority, they are often critical in the establishment of the rule of law. International police forces will generally serve in training and advising capacities, they can also be responsible for law enforcement in the initial phase of an S&R operation. The size of international police forces in S&R operations can be substantial. Currently, the UN has deployed some 7,000 police officers in post-conflict environments around the world. During NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia, the UN International Police Task Force had about 1,400 police officers deployed in the country, but effective coordination between SFOR and UNIPTF took several years to achieve. The UN also maintained over 4,000 police officers in Kosovo after the initiation of NATO’s KFOR mission there.

International civilian police officers can be integrated into S&R operations in different ways. For example, in Bosnia and Kosovo the UN was in charge of the international police force, while in Afghanistan some countries responsible for PRTs, such as Canada and the United States, have chosen to integrate civilian police officers into their PRT organizations. The OSCE also has supported police training in the Balkans and Afghanistan. For example, the OSCE established a police training school staffed by international instructors that has trained more than 4,000 Kosovars who were then assigned to UN civilian police elements.

## Exercises

Over many years, NATO has enhanced its capabilities to conduct combat operations through a regular program of peacetime exercises. Such exercises not only sharpen the skills of those who participate, but they lay the groundwork for effective collaboration among Allies during actual operations, and they are invaluable in identifying and correcting defects in plans that arise from untested assumptions and from misunderstandings of other countries’ operational concepts. The same benefits can be expected from well-conceived S&R exercises.

In keeping with the recommendation that S&R activities be thought of and planned as integral parts of NATO combat deployments, it would be desirable to include in the program occasional “capstone” exercises in which both combat deployments and S&R activities are exercised as integrated aspects of an NRF mission.

Additionally, it would be valuable to invite representatives of other organizations with which NATO would collaborate in an actual S&R mission to participate in, or at least observe, selected NATO S&R exercises. The following section on “Coordination Outside NATO” discusses the wide range of

such organizations and institutions. Even if their own definition of their missions precludes actual participation in a NATO exercise, their presence as observers would serve to sensitize NATO commanders to their points of view, sensitize them to the problems NATO must surmount in providing the security component of S&R, and perhaps expose for corrective action unrealistic aspects of NATO plans.

## S&R Architecture

### Mandates

Authority for conducting S&R operations will be derived from a mandate that will be established by the NAC, in some cases acting under a UN Security Council resolution, or an agreement among appropriate “parties” that could include participating states and other international organizations such as the EU.

This mandate should define the geopolitical end-state, such as the nature of the locally-led peace. It should also establish a central authority to manage the effort. This position is known by various terms, but called the “Special Representative” for the purposes of this paper.<sup>9</sup>

*The mandate or subsequent agreements by the authorizing parties should describe the specific tasks, powers and responsibilities of the Special Representative, thus detailing the scope of S&R efforts envisioned. Such mandates also should empower the Special Representative explicitly with “final authority to interpret” how the mandates applies to specific situations. This enables the Special Representative to make decisions and take appropriate actions in cases where differences arise on the ground about S&R operations. Of course, participants who disagree may always use their national chains of command to independently raise an issue with the NAC or other overall authority.*

Although the Afghanistan model with the Senior Civil Representative (SCR) provides the most recent NATO case, there are other examples to consider for providing political oversight on behalf of the authorizing powers. *NATO’s Senior Political Committee (Deputy Permanent Representatives) should undertake a review of previous S&R operations, in collaboration with the UN, to develop generic mandates for S&R operations that provide appropriate guidance to the person in charge of future operations, as well as help guide contingency planning and training.*

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<sup>9</sup> High Representative is the term used commonly by the EU, so we believe “Special Representative” would help distinguish the NATO position. The UN uses various terms for similar positions; for example, the senior UN official for Afghanistan is entitled the “UN Special Representative of the Secretary General.” The senior NATO official there is called the “Senior Civilian Representative.” While the term “Civilian” distinguishes this person from the military commander of the International Security Assistance Force, the term would not be appropriate if, in the future, the NAC decided to put a military person or retired military person in the most senior position.

## Oversight: The Afghanistan Model

Afghanistan provides a useful example of how mandates can be established and political oversight exercised. Under the authority of the UN Security Council, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is providing security in Afghanistan. NATO assumed leadership of ISAF in August 2003 and has been expanding its area of operations subsequently. The objectives of the PRTs remained the same as they were under U.S. leadership, to: (1) improve security; (2) extend the reach of the Afghan government; and (3) facilitate reconstruction in priority areas. Following NAC agreement, the Secretary General appointed a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) responsible for advancing the political-military efforts of the Alliance. The SCR receives guidance from the NAC. The ISAF Commander provides necessary support to the SCR and maintains the liaison to assist the SCR in the discharge of his duties. Also, based on political guidance from the NAC, the Supreme Allied Commander, Operations, exercises military strategic command and control over ISAF.

NATO's role is limited to security in Afghanistan and it participates accordingly as a partner in the broader nation-building effort and the political oversight process. For example, the authorizing parties, including NATO, along with the Afghan government agreed to the Afghanistan Compact in early 2006 that commits participants to achieving detailed outcomes, benchmarks and timelines for delivery in three interdependent sectors of S&R: security, governance, and economic and social development.

This compact states that:

“Security remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and development in Afghanistan. It cannot be provided by military means alone. It requires good governance, justice and the rule of law, reinforced by reconstruction and development.”

It further notes that:

“ISAF will continue to expand its presence throughout Afghanistan and will continue to promote stability and support security sector reforms in its area of operations.”

Further oversight of these guidelines is provided by a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board co-chaired by an Afghan government representative and the UN SRSG. NATO is represented on the Board by both the SCR and the ISAF Commander. The Board is a political body in the sense that it resolves strategic issues, provides strategic advice and sustains high-level political support to the Afghanistan Compact. The SCR is co-located with ISAF and the military chain of command for civil-military cooperation runs through the Board to ACO and the IMS to the NAC. The SCR provides a direct channel of communications from the theater to the NAC and the International Staff.

A key function of the SCR is to help maintain the support of contributing members of the Alliance. To do this, the SCR holds regular meetings with the ambassadors of the participating governments as well as other international organizations. These meetings are now co-chaired with the UN SRSG and the members are called the Group of Principals. This provides a useful forum for consultations at the key operational level.

## Who's in Charge?

As noted, NATO's role in S&R operations will be set out in a mandate. Under the mandate, the NAC should select a Special Representative. The Special Representative would have the authority to speak on behalf of the Alliance and would be responsible for carrying forward the political/military aspects of NATO's assistance. The Special Representative would also be responsible for coordinating with other organizations outside NATO's direct authority. In addition, given the wide scope of S&R operations, the Special Representative will be concerned with allocating resources, setting priorities and determining when the transfers to local authorities or other institutions should occur. For such roles the Special Representative must retain the confidence of the leaders of participating NATO countries, relevant international organizations, and the local parties. This latter function may be facilitated in-country by organizing a committee comprised of the ambassadors of the participating countries that meets regularly with the Special Representative and includes local government officials as soon as they are capable.

To achieve unity of command, *ACO should task an overall commander for the security operation from a subordinate component command.* The commander would be responsible for both combat and military-led S&R operations, with forces organized accordingly into two combined joint task forces. Using ISAF as an example, a composite headquarters would be comprised of both components.

*One of the important functions of the Supreme Allied Commander Operations should be to conduct liaison with the leaders of participating countries.* Such efforts may help eliminate or reduce national caveats that have hampered NATO S&R operations in the past. Some PRTs in Afghanistan, for example, reportedly were handicapped in accomplishing their missions initially by restrictions intended to reduce the chances of casualties.

## Responsibilities

In order to manage large, complex and protracted S&R challenges, NATO should assign specific responsibilities to the Special Representative and the Military Commander. Appropriate tasking should come from the NAC so that it is understood to be a primary responsibility, not just an additional duty.

*Table 1 provides a proposed list of S&R responsibilities for consideration. The NAC also should designate a committee to help coordinate the various S&R efforts within NATO. We believe this should be the Military Committee to ensure integration of S&R into military planning and operations.*

**Table 1.***Proposed Responsibilities for S&R Within NATO*

<b>Institution</b>	<b>Responsibilities</b>
<b>North Atlantic Council</b>	1. Task NATO with the mission of conducting S&R operations.
	2. Determine specific responsibilities for S&R.
	3. Establish coordination with the UN, the EU, osce and others as appropriate.
	4. Provide ACO with annual agenda for S&R contingency planning.
	5. Decide on specific commitments of NATO S&R forces; provide mandate.
	6. Select Special Representative to provide strategic oversight.
<b>Political Committee</b>	1. Study S&R resourcing, including appropriate common funding, and report findings and recommendations to the NAC.
	2. Review S&R operations to develop appropriate generic mandates for future S&R operations to help guide contingency planning and training.
<b>Military Committee</b>	1. Coordinate the full range of S&R activities throughout NATO and report the status of these efforts to the NAC.
	2. Provide military advice to NAC on all S&R matters.
	3. Provide recommendations to NAC for annual agenda for S&R contingency planning and direct appropriate staffs to develop threat assessments for S&R contingency planning.
	4. Establish an inventory of member and partner S&R capabilities.
	5. Provide recommendations to NAC on commitment of S&R forces.
<b>Allied Command Operations</b>	1. Direct subordinate command to plan, mobilize and lead NATO S&R forces and resources.
	2. Conduct S&R exercises in conjunction with ACT.
	3. During stabilisation operations meet regularly with leaders of participating states.
<b>Allied Command Transformation</b>	1. Lead the transformation of NATO to better handle S&R operations, particularly by recommending changes needed in policy guidance and defense planning, based on analysis, experimentation, modeling, and evaluations.
	2. Organize S&R conferences to include international and non-governmental organizations.
	3. Prepare S&R training and education modules for NATO schools and members/partners.
	4. Prepare country studies of likely failing states or other political conflict areas to support S&R planning and operations.

## Operational-Level Architecture

The daily management of S&R operations will require one or more dedicated, deployable headquarters that should be appropriately organized, staffed and trained. In addition to typical military staff components such as intelligence, operations, combat service support, and logistics, the S&R HQ staff should include a civil-military advisory group (CAG) with the capability for conducting joint operational planning as well as coordinating with local government leaders, other international organizations and NGOs. The CAG staff could be drawn from the International Staff, potentially including Political Advisors, Civil Emergency Planning Directorate experts, or seconded national personnel. Additionally, the staff should also include legal, contracting and comptroller expertise, beyond that normally required for combat operations.

The number of such headquarters required depends on the deployment approach. If the S&R HQ is part of or patterned after the NRF, then the on-call headquarters responsibility rotates among three headquarters every six months. This approach also involves different sets of forces, usually programmed 18 months in advance, for each rotation.

## Coordination Outside NATO

### Relations with Other Multilateral Institutions

For NATO to be more effective in future S&R operations, it must be able to collaborate with other key organizations, especially those that can handle tasks that fall outside of NATO's military expertise. These organizations vary widely in terms of mandate, size, and method of operation, and each will present challenges to NATO's standard operating procedures.

Because of NATO's traditional focus on Europe and the significant overlap in memberships, three institutions are especially likely to be frequent partners with NATO on S&R operations: the UN, the EU, and the OSCE. These have all been active in post-conflict situations, although their strengths and mandates vary significantly. In addition, they are all institutions in the midst of change. The EU is reassessing its own internal governance following the defeat of the constitutional treaty, but it has continued to expand the range of its civil and military operations around the world. The UN has long been in the forefront of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance programs, and now has a new Peace-Building Commission under construction. The OSCE has seen many changes in its mandate and activities since its founding in 1975 and currently has 19 field operations in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, with widely varying mandates. NATO has also changed considerably in recent years, enlarging its membership and launching operations far outside the European theater. As its operations become more global in scope — and involve partners distant from Europe — NATO will also have to learn to cooperate with multilateral institutions from different regions.

NATO's cooperation with the EU, UN, and OSCE has been generally *ad hoc*, especially in dealing with the full range of tasks that comprise stabilisation operations. That cooperation has existed primarily at the operational level. Nevertheless, NATO's cooperation with these institutions has seemed to improve

through various experiences — Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and now Afghanistan. NATO military forces have developed ways to work with UN political authorities and humanitarian programs, and with EU police forces. Even in the case of the support missions for the African Union in Darfur, which began with uncoordinated EU and NATO operations, NATO and the EU were able to develop a working relationship on the ground. But such *ad hoc* cooperation relies on individuals to be flexible and imaginative—something that cannot always be guaranteed. *Ad hoc* efforts also lack the benefits of prior planning (*i.e.*, the necessary relationships and resources may not be available) and they contribute little to future operations in terms of “lessons learned.” Finally, such *ad hoc* cooperation does not involve the political leadership of NATO and the other institutions, and thus lacks any real institutional legitimacy.

For NATO to move beyond *ad hoc* measures in its cooperation with these institutions, there must be more involvement at the highest political levels. In the last few years, there has been some evolution in this direction. Major documents, such as the 2005 UN Summit Declaration and NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance, now mention the importance of working with other institutions. However, moving beyond these rhetorical statements has proven very difficult.

NATO’s relations with the EU are perhaps the most developed of its ties with any multilateral institution. The 2002 EU-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) welcomes the prospect of partnership between the two institutions, and pledges that their crisis management activities should be mutually reinforcing. NATO and the EU have remarkably complementary capabilities for S&R operations — NATO, with U.S. forces, has more robust military forces while the EU can bring to bear relatively small, expeditionary military units (the EU battle groups), along with a range of crisis management assets, from gendarmerie and civilian police to judicial and administrative officials trained to fill gaps in the local government. The EU also has significant foreign assistance resources.<sup>10</sup>

In reality, however, NATO-EU cooperation has been seriously hamstrung. The basic mechanism of NATO-EU cooperation — the “Berlin Plus” arrangement — provides an EU-led military operation with access to NATO assets. It does not provide NATO with assets other than those it has already, and so does not enhance NATO’s stabilisation capabilities. Berlin Plus also provides for regular joint meetings of the NAC and the EU’s Political and Security Committee, but for political reasons these meetings have been blocked from discussing anything beyond specific Berlin Plus operations. As a result, NATO and the EU have been unable to discuss possible S&R operations, except in the specific context of Bosnia and the shift from SFOR to EUFOR. For the same reason, it has proven extremely difficult for NATO and the EU to share information about capabilities or plans for any type of future operation, including those related to S&R.

NATO’s relations with the United Nations are also mixed. NATO forces in a number of operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan, and others) have worked under a UN mandate. Cooperation in the field has existed for at least a decade, since NATO and the UN were both present in the post-Dayton Accord architecture in Bosnia. The NATO Secretary General has participated in the last few UN General Assemblies, and addressed the UN Security Council in 2004. Yet efforts to negotiate a NATO-UN memorandum of understanding have stalled. The MOU would establish more regular meetings and

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<sup>10</sup> NATO and the EU share the same military forces, for the most part, except for U.S. forces, so these forces should not be double counted as available for S&R operations.

some principles for cooperation. NATO's contacts with UN headquarters remain largely restricted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) even though other UN departments and agencies regularly play roles in S&R operations. Broadening NATO representation at the UN would probably be helpful.

NATO's relations with the OSCE are more developed in terms of regular consultations: staff talks occur several times per year and the NATO secretary general regularly briefs the OSCE Permanent Council. A NATO letter to the OSCE, urging cooperation in anti-terrorism, small arms decommissioning, border security, security sector reform, and other areas, provides political guidance for the relationship. According to observers, there is considerable overlap between NATO and OSCE activities — especially in areas such as security sector reform and small arms decommissioning — but few joint efforts. The real difficulty with building NATO-OSCE cooperation has been the lack of consensus within the OSCE itself about its own priorities and future. Although the OSCE could be a valuable partner with NATO in S&R operations, especially on supervision of elections and removal of weapons, that is unlikely to happen as long as divisions within the OSCE membership persist.

NATO must move beyond these rather rudimentary relationships with other international institutions to build real cooperation that can be effective during S&R operations. It must develop appropriate mechanisms and sufficient political will, particularly with the EU and the UN — and the OSCE when it is ready — to ensure that a full range of assets can be brought together effectively in future S&R operations.

*As a first step, NATO and its partner institutions must plan pro-actively. They should establish:*

- *A pre-operation conference of interested parties.* This was done prior to ISAF's expansion in Afghanistan, and should become part of the regular planning process. Such a meeting could bring together major multilateral institutions as well as NGOs.
- *Regular joint planning prior to operations.* This report recommends considerable enhancement of NATO's planning for S&R missions. That planning should include other institutions that are likely to be involved in such operations. NATO and the EU already have military liaisons with each other, and NATO has some contact with the small UN military staff. These officers should move beyond their liaison function and begin jointly identifying potential contingencies and developing plans that address the full range of civilian and military tasks required for a successful S&R operation. NATO might find joint planning with the EU to be especially valuable, since the EU planning cell, although small, brings military and civilian planners together in an effort to anticipate S&R requirements.
- *Mechanisms for identification and recruitment of appropriate assets.* In developing an inventory of NATO member and partner capabilities, NATO should also seek to include assets that might be provided under the auspices of other institutions, such as the European gendarmerie or UN humanitarian relief capabilities. But without a better understanding of what is needed and potentially available already for collaborative operations, it will be impossible to plan effectively for any S&R operation.
- *Regular joint exercises focused on S&R contingencies.* NATO and the EU have already held a few joint exercises, but these have been mostly focused on Berlin Plus contingencies. Exercises should be



expanded to involve a full range of international institutions and NGOs in preparing for a realistic contingency requiring S&R.

These improvements will only work if there is sufficient political will. Too often, proposals for greater cooperation between NATO and other institutions founder out of concern that NATO wants to “take over” a particular area of operations, to the detriment of other institutions. To overcome such concerns, NATO must clarify the role it can play in S&R operations, identify the benefits that it can bring to such a mission, and build partnerships with various constituencies within each institution.

- NATO’s role. NATO should make clear that the primary role of the alliance in any S&R operation is the provision of security. On occasion, the security situation may be so difficult that only military forces can be present, and so they must be able to perform some basic functions to provide services to civilians who remain in the area. As soon as possible, however, NATO should hand over predominantly civilian tasks to an institution better equipped to handle them over the long-term.
- NATO’s skills. NATO obviously brings significant military power to an operation, but it also brings other skills to operations which are often overlooked. Along with an emphasis on the importance of planning, NATO has been instrumental in establishing standards to be met by alliance forces and providing relevant multinational training opportunities. *In coordination with other institutions, NATO could lead an effort to develop uniform standards for all military forces participating in S&R operations, and assist in designing the necessary training. NATO standards should not be weakened in this effort; if anything, this is an opportunity to demonstrate the importance of high standards in this area. Also, by sharing the process for creating military standards, NATO may be able to contribute to a similar effort to establish standards for civilians engaged in S&R.*
- NATO’s partners. NATO must reach out to various elements within each institution, to engage the right individuals and create wider support for the cooperative relationship. NATO has only recently developed relations with the European Commission, which is now supporting some elements of ISAF. The Commission has both resources and expertise focused on rebuilding societies. At the UN, NATO has focused almost exclusively on the DPKO, yet the lack of ties with the Political Department seems to have hindered the development of real cooperation. Moreover, a multitude of UN agencies can be involved in any S&R operation. These tend to work autonomously, requiring that NATO establish relations with each separately. *At present, NATO does not have the staff resources to manage such a demanding task; to get those resources, it will have to upgrade and enlarge the current office dealing with multilateral affairs.*

## Humanitarian Organizations

Humanitarian relief organizations are essential non-NATO actors in emergencies and S&R operations. In many cases they will have been involved in a crisis area long before external military forces arrive and will be there long after the forces leave. In any event, they bring valuable capabilities to bear that can alleviate the immediate suffering of the civilian population in conflict or post-conflict areas, and they are also crucial in assisting war torn areas move towards a locally led and sustainable peace. Because of humanitarian organizations' unique access to the local population and parties involved in conflict and their special qualifications for aid and reconstruction work they may be very helpful if their cooperation can be gained. This has proven difficult, however, because in most cases they highly regard their independence; thus, they tend to avoid close association with military forces.

Humanitarian organizations come in a wide variety of sizes, range of capabilities, and motivations. For example, some are very large, internationally based, and draw upon capable and seasoned staffs with wide and deep knowledge of humanitarian aid operations and long-term development work. Others are much smaller, and concentrate on specific tasks, such as medical assistance. In addition, humanitarian organizations perform work with both immediate (minimizing the direct consequences of armed conflict) and long-term impact (reconstruction and development). NATO forces deployed in an S&R operation can expect to find humanitarians engaged in, but not limited to, the following activities in the field:

**Table 2.**

### *Humanitarian Activities in S&R Operations*

Short-term, immediate impact	Long-term, reconstruction and development
Assisting refugees and displaced persons	Removing land mines for civil access
Emergency shelter	Infrastructure reconstruction
Basic medical care, including help for wounded combatants	Economic and social reconstruction
Food aid	Monitoring of human rights
Water treatment	Education reform and modernization
Assistance with demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration efforts.	Sustained public health assistance

While some humanitarian organizations rely upon funding from private sources, others rely more heavily on funding from governments or international organizations. Humanitarian organizations that work in post-conflict environments number in the hundreds, but some of the major ones are the UN agencies, World Vision, MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam, and the ICRC.

**Challenges for NATO Forces.** While humanitarian organizations are key players in S&R operations, NATO forces have experienced difficulties in cooperating with them in the field. These challenges have several sources.

Many humanitarian organizations highly value their principles of neutrality and impartiality. This practice is intended to allow them almost unfettered access to all sides and areas in a conflict, so that they can bring aid to all needy groups in a conflict area. The appearance of impartiality and neutrality also brings a level of protection to humanitarian organizations; therefore close association with military forces can cause such organizations to become identified with the military forces in a way that jeopardizes their neutrality and independence. Some humanitarian organizations will not accept military aid (logistics, transport, etc.) for this reason.

Interpretation of neutrality and impartiality varies somewhat among humanitarian organizations so it is important for NATO force planners to understand these nuanced differences because they will affect the prospects for cooperation. In general, neutrality refers to a position with regard to the *parties* in a conflict, whereas impartiality refers to the *beneficiaries* of humanitarian action. Thus, neutrality describes an attitude of equal treatment of the parties to a conflict and impartiality refers to the allocation of resources according to humanitarian needs—so the party with the greater humanitarian need would be favored. Neutrality implies that the organization is not a direct participant in the conflict and usually politically neutral or equidistant towards the parties. For the UN, neutrality refers to the notion of even-handedness and loyal implementation of the Security Council's intent by UN officials who should serve the UN rather than their own governments.

Security is another key issue in NATO-humanitarian relations and it pulls in different directions. On the one hand, attacks on humanitarian workers have been linked to their association with military forces. At the same time, military forces operating out of uniform (as in the case of some special forces operations) have blurred the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, thus perhaps contributing to the problem. On the other hand, humanitarian workers who come under attack would welcome assistance from military forces in most cases. These kinds of security issues need to be worked out explicitly in advance.

Humanitarian organizations also tend to have a different organizational structure from military forces. While military forces are hierarchical structures, humanitarian organizations generally are more decentralized organizations. This factor can make it difficult for both humanitarians and military leaders to coordinate at various organizational levels. Military forces may rotate in and out of an S&R operation, while humanitarian groups tend to be there for the long-term and may well understand local needs differently. There may be controversies over roles. Some military forces may be engaged in limited reconstruction activities, and this could be perceived by the humanitarian organizations as inappropriate for an organization tailored to providing security. The use of military forces for

reconstruction can also be perceived as competition for limited resources (funding). Finally, some humanitarian organizations are concerned that military forces engaged in humanitarian activities will militarize the humanitarian space, and will therefore jeopardize the security of humanitarian workers, since they may be seen as no longer neutral and impartial in the conflict.

**Enhancing Cooperation.** While complete coordination and cooperation between military forces and humanitarian organization is unrealistic, measures can be taken to reduce friction and improve working relations. *NATO should consider:*

- *Inviting humanitarian organizations to participate in S&R exercises, games, and simulations.*
- *Familiarizing commanders with the mandates, missions and modes of operation of the major international humanitarian organizations.*
- *Making commanders responsible for knowing which humanitarian organizations are active in their area of operations, and the location of their activities.*
- *Encouraging commanders to establish regular liaison with humanitarian organizations.*
- *Educating the humanitarian organizations about military humanitarian assistance and initial reconstruction efforts and transition periods.*

## Contracting

### Trends in Contracting and Development

NATO-led and other S&R operations are increasingly characterized by the need to enter into contracts with private firms for a wide range of services including logistics support, transportation and security. These contracts can fill gaps in important capabilities on relatively short notice. Although they are often conceived of as temporary measures to provide a quick response to a critical need when available resources are insufficient, contractors may also be used to provide for longer-term surge capabilities beyond what is maintained in the regular alliance force posture. For example, civilian augmentation programs for logistics support (LOGCAP) of expeditionary operations provide a useful mechanism for some members to regularize such relationships.

What is not appropriate for outsourcing is offensive operations. In addition, some NATO members probably would not support contracting security services because of national views that only the military and police are permitted legitimately to use force. Concerns also have been expressed that contractors are not as responsible to commanders as are their own troops and they may not be subject to the same kinds of extraterritorial jurisdiction as regular military forces. Nevertheless, local governments may decide that employment of private security firms is in their best interest (high-value personal security, less-restrictive RoE). Thus, if NATO standard operating procedures were established with the private security firms, coordination would be facilitated.

In addition to the need to provide more S&R capabilities, the increasing demand for contracted support is a result of the substantial reductions in military personnel by nearly all Alliance members since the end of the Cold War. The situation is compounded by the corresponding reductions in defense budgets so that shortfalls in capabilities that might be filled by contracting are not provided for in most current budgets of NATO members.

Properly designed and managed, contracting can be a “force multiplier” by not tying down combat forces in base security, administrative and other roles that may be effectively and efficiently performed by contracted personnel. Managing contracts, in most cases, is a national responsibility; however, NATO also can play an important role in standardizing contracting procedures, oversight, and accountability. Standardization can improve the overall performance and cost effectiveness of the services provided. In addition, it can help reduce chances of corruption and mismanagement that can undermine NATO operations.

The industry supporting S&R operations is currently comprised of three types of companies:

*Logistics and Support Companies.* These companies provide a wide variety of services including construction, strategic and tactical transportation, disposal of unexploded ordnance and medical services. The personnel of these companies are generally unarmed and they do not provide security services to clients. In terms of numbers of personnel and value of contracts, this group of firms accounts for more than 90 percent of the total industry business.

*Security Sector Reform Companies.* These companies are used to improve the long-term strategic environment by enhancing local security capabilities through the training of police, military and border guards as well as setting up court systems and correctional facilities. In some cases these companies work with international bodies to facilitate governmental reforms and develop more democratic, representative and accountable local institutions.

*Private Security Companies.* These firms provide armed and unarmed security to a person, place, or thing. This could be diplomats, officials, governmental buildings, elections, prominent dignitaries, logistics convoys, construction sites, critical infrastructure, military bases, etc. If contracts allow, they will often use a mix of local personnel, third country nationals and Western managers.

## Key Contracting Issues for NATO

As outsourcing becomes an increasingly important part of NATO S&R operations, contracting deserves more attention at the strategic and operational levels. Among the important issues are:

**Cadre of Contracting Officers.** Over the last several years NATO activities have suffered as a result of having too few well-trained contracting officers. At a time when the burden on NATO for contracting is increasing substantially, there is widespread concern that the current system is broken; it does not regularly deliver well-designed contracts nor does it provide for timely payment of services rendered. And the burden will likely become much greater. *NATO is in need of a well-trained cadre of contracting officers.*

**Planning.** *Contracting should become an integral part of strategic and operational planning.* Specific requirements for outsourced capabilities need to be identified as early as possible so that the appropriate arrangements can be made, particularly if this will require NATO common funding. Furthermore, such planning would be useful in determining important guidelines for commanders and contractors, including rules of engagement, identification and access to information.

**Standardization.** The approaches to contracting have varied widely among services, agencies and member nations. *Thus, one of the most useful measures NATO can take to improve outsourcing is to provide standardized training for contracting officers. This training should be designed around a set of common contracting procedures and a code of conduct for all firms desiring to compete for contracts.* Standard contracting rules and procedures and contract language benefits both the sponsors and companies by facilitating agreements, by clarifying expectations and by anticipating requirements. Most importantly, the bidding process must be fair and open; otherwise contracting can contribute to local corruption and other problems. Effective contract management also would be facilitated by standard deployment of contracting officers for periods of at least one year.

**Oversight.** Provisions for both national and NATO oversight of contracts are critical. *NATO-level oversight could provide useful information for the evaluation of firms in future contracting competition—assuming reports are widely shared among NATO members and partners.* Such oversight reports can help identify poor performers and establish reputations for better firms that will enhance their ability to win future contracts.

**Accountability.** Similar to the members of the NATO armed forces, *contractor personnel must be held accountable for their actions.* This can be a problem in terms of determining which laws apply, particularly in operations where there is no local legal authority and structure. In some situations, existing status of forces agreements may include contractor personnel, but this may not always be the case. Special arrangements may be needed for determination of how infractions by local employees should be handled. Again, the more standardization NATO can achieve, the more likely that the overall Alliance will benefit.

**Coordination.** Friendly fire, or “blue on white,” casualties are a serious problem because contractors are often armed, performing security duties, and not in uniform. To reduce the chances of such casualties, electronic identification and position locating devices can be used. Nevertheless, procedures need to be established in advance to coordinate operations, to provide recognition procedures, to prepare for quick reaction forces and to reduce the possibility of accidental clashes. *At the operational level at least, doctrine should provide for information on contractor locations and operations as part of standard military briefings on friendly and enemy forces.*

## Summary of Best Practices

This final section of the paper combines insights about NATO and other stabilisation efforts noted in this report and elsewhere in an effort to highlight those issues likely to be relevant and important in future S&R operations. In some cases, these “best” practices are lessons learned from failures, problems or shortfalls.

### Summary of Best Practices

- Conduct country-specific S&R studies, analyses and planning
- Develop habits of cooperation with key outside actors at strategic and operational levels
- Train NATO civil and military leaders for S&R operations
- Plan and strive for transfer of security responsibilities to local authorities or follow-on international organizations
- Provide for continuity in S&R operations
- Use cash incentives to engage local population in S&R work
- Coordinate with contractors within area of operations
- Establish communications links with key outside organizations, local leaders and government authorities as early as possible.





## Members of the Working Group

The members of the working group believe that the recommendations stated in this paper promote an overall effective approach to NATO S&R operations. While there may be some parts of the report with which some participants are not in full agreement, each participant believes that the report, as a whole, provides a sound basis for future actions by NATO. The views of the participants do not represent the official position of any institution.

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## Appendix I

### S&R Security Requirements

The following matrices describe the S&R requirements that NATO should be prepared to undertake. Of course, specific operations may involve only some of these activities; however NATO forces should be able to conduct the full range of requirements. This appendix builds on considerable previous work on the subject.<sup>1</sup>

<b>1. Disposition of Armed Forces, Security &amp; Intelligence Services and Belligerents</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Cessation of Hostilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Enforce ceasefires</li> <li>* Supervise disengagement of belligerent forces</li> <li>* Identify and neutralize potential spoilers</li> <li>* Define and enforce terms for exchange of prisoners of war</li> <li>*Engage indigenous forces capable of promoting immediate stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish control, and enforce buffers, including demilitarized zones</li> <li>*Monitor and facilitate exchange of POWs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Progressively and selectively transfer functions to indigenous security authorities</li> </ul>
Enforcement of Peace Agreements and/or Other Arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide security for negotiations among indigenous belligerents</li> <li>*Develop confidence-building measures between indigenous belligerents</li> <li>*Conduct counterinsurgency operations as required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Investigate alleged breaches of agreements</li> <li>*Support and enforce political, military, and economic arrangements</li> <li>*Support confidence-building measures among belligerents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Transfer enforcement to indigenous authorities</li> <li>*Support and sustain confidence-building measures</li> </ul>
Disposition and Constitution of indigenous Armed Forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Implement plan for disposition of indigenous armed forces and other national security institutions</li> <li>*Identify future roles, missions and structure</li> <li>*Vet senior officers and other individuals for past abuses</li> <li>*Coordinate and integrate with DD&amp;R plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Train and equip indigenous military forces</li> <li>*Establish transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems</li> <li>*Establish programs to support civilian oversight of military, including military budgeting and doctrine</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide military assistance programs</li> <li>*Establish military-to-military programs</li> <li>*Sustain international support</li> </ul>

1. The lists of essential requirements in Appendix I were derived initially from the U.S. Department of State's "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix", published on April 1, 2005 and revised by the Atlantic Council Working Group. The State Department matrix was based on a joint AUSA/CSIS report "*Winning the Peace: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*", published in May, 2002.

Disarmament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Discuss and agree on procedures with belligerents</li> <li>*Establish and enforce weapons control regimes, including collection and destruction</li> <li>*Identify international arms dealers</li> <li>*Provide reassurances and incentives for disarmed faction(s)</li> <li>* Establish monitoring regime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Disarm belligerents</li> <li>*Reduce availability of unauthorized weapons</li> <li>*Collaborate with neighboring countries on weapons flows, including apprehension of illegal arms dealers</li> <li>*Cooperate with legal authorities to prosecute arms dealers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Secure, store, and dispose of weapons<sup>1</sup></li> <li>* Develop indigenous arms control and weapons storage capacity</li> </ul>
Demobilization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Establish demobilization camps as required</li> <li>*Ensure adequate health, food provisions, and security for belligerents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify, gather and disband structural elements of belligerent groups</li> <li>*Monitor, enforce, and verify demobilization</li> <li>*Ensure safety of quartered personnel and families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Decommission camps</li> </ul>
Reintegration of Combatants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Design reintegration strategy, including assessment of absorptive capacity of economic and social sectors</li> <li>*Provide jobs, pensions or other material support for demobilized forces</li> <li>*Coordinate with overall political and economic recovery plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide job training, health screening, education, pensions, and employment assistance for demobilized forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Reintegrate ex-combatants into society</li> <li>*Provide follow-up services</li> </ul>
Disposition and Constitution of National Intelligence Service(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Implement plan for disposition of indigenous intelligence services and other national security institutions</li> <li>*Identify future roles, missions and structure</li> <li>*Vet individuals for past abuses and activities</li> <li>*Coordinate and integrate with DD&amp;R plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Assist, advise, and monitor the rebuilding and reorganization of national security institutions</li> <li>*Promote civilian control</li> <li>*Establish transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish service-to-service programs</li> </ul>

<b>2. Public Information and Communications</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Disseminate Security Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify or establish effective outlets for international, national, and local news media</li> <li>*Utilize media as public information tool to provide factual information and control rumors</li> <li>* Issue effective press releases and timely provision of information services as needed in local languages</li> <li>* Assist National Transitional Administration and/or National Government to inform public regularly</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Invest in the development of indigenous print and electronic media capacity</li> <li>*Train journalists, expand capacity of outlets, and improve interaction with local population and linkages with the international community</li> </ul>	

<b>3. Territorial Security</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Border and Boundary Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish border security, including customs regime to prevent arms smuggling, interdict contraband (i.e., drugs and natural resources), prevent trafficking of persons, regulate immigration and emigration, and establish control over major points of entry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Train and equip border security personnel</li> <li>*Vet and develop state level ministry and associated personnel responsible for border security</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Begin transfer of border, port and airport control to indigenous actors</li> <li>*Ensure air and naval freedom of movement</li> </ul>
Freedom of Movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement</li> <li>*Facilitate internal travel of key leaders</li> <li>*Dismantle roadblocks and establish internationally manned checkpoints<sup>41</sup></li> <li>* Regulate air and overland movement</li> <li>* Ensure freedom of movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop indigenous capacity to assure and regulate movement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide full freedom of movement</li> <li>*Transfer responsibility to indigenous actors</li> </ul>
Identification Issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish identification regime including securing documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, birth certificates and driving licenses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop mechanisms for dealing with long term disputes relating to property ownership, court records, etc.</li> </ul>	

<b>4. Public Order and Safety</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Protection of Non-Combatants (See Protection of Indigenous Institutions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Actively Protect vulnerable elements of population (refugees, IDP, women, children)</li> <li>* Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to and protection of endangered populations and refugee camps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish and maintain order in refugee camps and population centers</li> <li>*Establish and enforce interim security programs for at-risk populations</li> </ul>	

Interim Policing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Perform civilian police functions including investigating crimes and making arrests</li> <li>*Supervise incarceration processes and transfer to prison facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Maintain positive relations with indigenous population</li> <li>*Mentor indigenous police forces in all aspects of their activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Transfer public security responsibilities to indigenous police force</li> <li>*Develop state-level ministry and associated personnel responsible for policing functions</li> </ul>
Controlling Crowds and Disturbances Control	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Control crowds, prevent looting and manage civil disturbances</li> <li>*Conduct special police operations requiring formed units, including investigations and arrests</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop and maintain positive relations with indigenous populations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Transfer public security responsibilities to indigenous police force</li> </ul>
Clearance of UXO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Conduct emergency de-mining and UXO removal</li> <li>*Conduct mapping and survey exercises of mined areas</li> <li>* Mark mine fields</li> <li>*Identify and coordinate emergency requirements</li> <li>*Establish priorities and conduct de-mining operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Initiate large-scale de-mining and UXO removal operations</li> <li>* Promote mine awareness</li> <li>* Train and equip indigenous de-mining elements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Transfer de-mining and UXO removal operations to indigenous actors</li> </ul>

**5. Protection of Indigenous Individuals, Infrastructure and Institutions**

	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Private Institutions and Key Leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify and protect key political and societal leaders</li> <li>*Protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites</li> <li>*Protect private property and housing stock</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Create indigenous capacity to protect private institutions and key leaders</li> </ul>	
Critical Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Protect and secure critical infrastructure, natural resources, civil registries, property ownership documents</li> <li>*Secure records, storage, equipment and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Create indigenous capacity to protect critical infrastructure</li> </ul>	
Military Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify, secure and protect stockpiles of conventional, nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical materials</li> <li>*Secure military depots, equipment, ammunition dumps and means of communication</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Create indigenous capacity to protect military infrastructure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify modernization needs and means to achieve them</li> </ul>
Public Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Protect and secure strategically important institutions (e.g., government buildings, museums, religious sites, courthouses, communications, etc.)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Create indigenous capacity to protect public institutions</li> </ul>	

Witness and Evidence Protection	*Locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents and other evidence related to key ongoing or potential investigations and prosecutions		
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6. Protection of Reconstruction and Stabilisation Personnel and Institutions			
	Initial Response	Transformation	Fostering Sustainability
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Official Civilian Stabilisation and Reconstruction Personnel and Facilities	*Protect government-sponsored civilian stabilisation and reconstruction personnel *Provide logistical support to sustain them in the field	*Create indigenous capacity to protect government-sponsored civilian stabilisation and reconstruction personnel	
Contractor and NGO Stabilisation and Reconstruction Personnel and Facilities	*Protect contractor and NGO stabilisation personnel and resources * Provide logistical support	*Create indigenous capacity to protect contractor and NGO stabilisation personnel and resources	

7. Security Coordination			
	Initial Response	Transformation	Fostering Sustainability
	<b>Goal:</b> Establish a safe and secure environment	<b>Goal:</b> Develop legitimate and stable security institutions	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
International Security Forces	*Develop integrated command, control and intelligence and information sharing arrangements among international military, constabulary and civilian police forces *Determine agreed and effective rules of engagement; clearly define roles and responsibilities, including custody/transfer of detainees		
Intelligence Support	*Provide integrated intelligence support for international military, constabulary and civilian police forces		
Coordination with Indigenous Security Forces	*Develop coordinated arrangements between international and indigenous security forces		

International Civilian-Military Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop coordinated military and civilian information sharing arrangements</li> <li>*Establish an effective civil-military planning cell/operations center to enable regular, real-time information-sharing and coordination, to include non-governmental organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Progressively include indigenous authorities in civil-military planning and operations</li> </ul>	
Regional Security Arrangements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish or modify regional security arrangements with all interested parties</li> <li>*Negotiate the enhancement of cross border controls and security</li> <li>*Consult with neighboring countries on border security plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish mechanisms for implementing regional security arrangements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Monitor compliance with and reinforce arrangements</li> </ul>

**8. Initial Reconstruction**

<b>Initial Response</b>	
	<p><b>Goal:</b> Prevent further loss of life due to a humanitarian emergency and enable the disrupted local population to restart their normal activities.</p>
Mine Detection Mine and UXO Clearance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide initial mine and UXO detection and clearance.</li> </ul>
Public health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Ensure availability of drinking water</li> <li>*Distribute emergency medical supplies and drugs</li> <li>*Repair and rebuild hospitals and clinics.</li> </ul>
Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Repair key airport, road, and railway infrastructure</li> <li>*Repair and manage key ports and waterway infrastructure.</li> </ul>
Telecommunications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Repair key telecommunications facilities</li> </ul>
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Repair national energy infrastructure</li> <li>*Repair power generation and distribution facilities</li> </ul>
Criminal Justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Repair prison facilities at key sites</li> </ul>

## Appendix II

### S&R Requirements for:

1. Governance and Participation
2. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being
3. Economic Stabilisation and Infrastructure
4. Justice and Reconciliation

This appendix provides a detailed list of tasks that may be required for S&R operations beyond those identified in Appendix I as essential for the security sector. These tasks fall outside of NATO's competence and would only be undertaken by military forces in the absence of civil capabilities and then only until other more appropriate organizations can take charge of such efforts. As with Appendix I, these tasks were derived from considerable previous work.<sup>1</sup>

### 1. Governance and Participation

#### 1.1 National Constituting Processes

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
National Dialogue	*Establish processes at state, regional, and local levels to represent views of citizenry, consider political pressures and interests	*Encourage dialogue at state level to define and reinforce national identity (citizenship criteria, languages, etc.)	*Support long-term requirements generated by national dialogue to establish and reinforce a legitimate and self-sustaining state
Constitution (See Justice and Reconciliation, Legal Reform)	*Work with indigenous actors to establish constitutional commission and determine method of adoption *Provide technical and legal advisors with expertise on key issues in constitutional process (regional, ethnic, and religious; division of powers)	*Establish fair, inclusive process for drafting or reform of constitution *Launch public information campaign to promulgate new/revised constitution	*Work with state, regional and local authorities and parliament(s) to ensure adoption of constitution with amendment mechanism *Create outlet for popular discussion of impact of new constitution

<sup>1</sup> The lists of requirements in Appendices I & II were derived initially from the U.S. Department of State's "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix", published on April 1, 2005 and revised by the Atlantic Council Working Group. The State Department matrix was based on a joint CSIS/AUSA report *Winning the Peace: Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*, published in May, 2002.



**1.2 Transitional Governance**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
International Transitional Administration	*Determine requirements for international transitional administration *Establish domestic transitional political authority and interim civil administration, placing advisors into key Ministries and regional and local governments	*Consult with indigenous leaders in designing future governance system *Progressively devolve selected functions to indigenous authorities, building indigenous capacities	*Transfer power to indigenous government through elections or other means (e.g., establishment of international/multinational governing body, hand-over to a transitional authority)
National Transitional Administration	*Establish rules, realistic timetable and workable lines of authority for interim state government	*Prepare for transition to permanent national government	*Phase out transitional government in favor of permanent indigenous government through previously decided means

**1.3 Executive Authority**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Executive Mandate and Structure	*Prioritize government functions *Identify unmet institutional needs *Determine structure, selection process and affordable size of civil service to meet immediate and future needs	*Reform or establish ministries and independent agencies, including specifying organization, lines of authority, and mission objectives	*Provide ongoing technical and financial support for institutional development of the public sector *Implement civil service reforms
Civil Service Staffing	*Develop transparent process to vet executive officials, civil servants and employees of state owned enterprises and to identify individuals to receive training *Encourage members of the diaspora with leadership skills to return to country *Establish a closely monitored, merit-based selection process for civil servants that is free from cronyism and corruption	*Review skills and past records of executive officials, civil servants, and employees of state-owned enterprises *Provide management, technical assistance and training	*Move towards merit selection of new hires *Build indigenous capacity for ongoing professional development *Appoint and empower state employees at national and regional levels

Revenue Generation and Management (See Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, Legal and Regulatory Reform)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Assess existing mechanisms for generating and managing revenue at different levels of government</li> <li>*Establish effective and impartial anti-corruption measures</li> <li>*Allocate resources across levels of government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop and implement plans for revenue generation, management and collection, banking, customs, taxation, and financial services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide ongoing technical, financial and legal support to ensure and enforce transparent and non-corrupt revenue generation</li> </ul>
Government Resources and Facilities (See Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, General)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Establish basic facilities to enable State Transitional Infrastructure Administration to function</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Improve physical infrastructure of executive branch (e.g., buildings, libraries, information systems, and office equipment)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Establish line-items in budget to sustain physical infrastructure of executive branch</li> </ul>

#### 1.4 Legislative Strengthening

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish interim legislative process at state, regional and local levels</li> <li>*Establish authority of state-level legislature to participate in policy-making process and provide effective oversight of executive authority</li> <li>*Conduct similar initiatives at regional and local levels as soon as resources permit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Support development of legislature's role in political system,</li> <li>*Develop legislative process and procedures</li> <li>*Review roles and platforms of political parties to ensure consistency with overall goals and objectives of legislative development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop mechanisms to facilitate working relations and resolve disputes among various branches and levels of government</li> <li>*Strengthen legislative oversight</li> </ul>
Citizen Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify legal, institutional, and political obstacles affecting citizens' input to legislative process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Promote citizen access and media coverage of the legislative process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Guarantee public right to attend meetings, hearings, and examine records (e.g., through freedom of information acts, open-meeting rules, etc.)</li> </ul>
Staffing and Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide basic training and support for provisional lawmakers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Implement advanced training for permanent legislative officials and staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Institutionalize training of legislators and staff and civic education</li> </ul>
Resources and Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Assure the initial lawmaking process is adequately resourced</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Assure adequate resources for transition to a permanent lawmaking body</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Expand administrative systems to foster monitoring and evaluation capabilities for effectiveness</li> </ul>

<b>1.5 Local Governance</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Local Governance Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Restore essential local public services</li> <li>*Establish mechanisms for local-level participation, taking into account history and culture</li> <li>*Establish temporary liaison process between state and local governing institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Determine whether decentralization is appropriate, and if so, its scale and form</li> <li>* Avoid unnecessary conflict with traditional structures; accommodate such structures to the extent possible</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide for local participation in decision-making and for budgetary transparency and oversight</li> <li>*Match revenues with responsibilities</li> <li>*Institutionalize liaison process between state and local governing structures</li> </ul>
Staffing and Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop transparent process to vet local officials and civil servants</li> <li>*Establish a closely monitored, merit-based selection process for civil servants that is free from cronyism and corruption</li> <li>*Initiate local service delivery training and support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Initiate local level strategic planning</li> <li>*Devise training for officials and staff</li> <li>Reinforce performance-based civil service system</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Institutionalize training of service delivery, local government, and civil society representatives</li> <li>*Regularize procedures and standards for staffing</li> </ul>
Services, Resources and Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Assure resources for personnel, supplies, and equipment to deliver essential local services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Create knowledge base and political consensus for rational fiscal policy</li> <li>*Match revenues with responsibilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Institutionalize monitoring and evaluation capabilities</li> <li>*Fine tune revenue and disbursement assignments</li> </ul>

<b>1.6 Transparency and Anti-Corruption</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Anti-Corruption (See Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, Legal and Regulatory Reform)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Provide international legal advisors and consultants</li> <li>*Create mechanisms with enforcement capabilities to curtail corruption across government institutions</li> <li>*Design and implement anti-corruption campaign, including education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop laws and administrative procedures requiring accountability and transparency across government institutions and in the private sector</li> <li>*As a key joint international community/indigenous authority task, identify and dismantle organized crime networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Enforce anti-corruption laws, including removal of corrupt officials</li> <li>*Prosecute violators and enforce standards</li> </ul>
Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Encourage formation of watchdog organizations in public and private sectors to monitor indigenous institutions as they stand up</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish legislative protections for indigenous watchdog groups</li> <li>*Ensure adequate resources, standing and authority for oversight mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Legislate indigenous transparency monitoring presence in public and private sectors</li> </ul>

<b>1.7 Elections</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Elections Planning and Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*When circumstances permit, set realistic timetable, goals, and budget for elections</li> <li>*Conduct thorough analysis of pros and cons of early elections (i.e., elections in advance of viable state structure and establishment of functioning, effective rule of law)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish state-level electoral commission with international advice and support</li> <li>*Assist electoral commission in developing appropriate laws, procedures, and rules for elections</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Provide logistical support for elections (ballot boxes, voting stations, ballot tabulation, etc.) as required</li> <li>*Assist state electoral commission in planning and execution of election</li> </ul>
Elections Monitoring			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Recruit and deploy indigenous and international election monitoring teams</li> <li>*Support development of domestic monitoring and watchdog groups</li> </ul>
Elections Outreach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*As circumstances permit, gauge public opinion through polling</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Disseminate information about electoral process</li> <li>*Undertake voter education campaign</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Make election results widely available to avoid fraud and misperception</li> </ul>

<b>1.8 Political Parties</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Party Formation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Support political competition</li> <li>*Ensure clear legal status, protections, and regulations of political parties</li> <li>*Review past policies, practices and roles of existing political parties for indications of undemocratic behavior</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Encourage creation of multiple parties</li> <li>*Require transparent and legal funding mechanisms</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Support political activities by backing democracy promotion objectives</li> <li>*Link parties to legitimate international counterparts</li> </ul>
Party Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Identify and assess capabilities of potential political party leaders and structures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Sponsor workshops and provide assistance to develop political parties</li> <li>*Foster active youth participation in political activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Facilitate democracy, governance, management, and negotiation skills training for elected representatives and party leaders</li> </ul>

<b>1.9 Civil Society and Media</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Civil Society Environment	*Review existing regulations on NGOs and civil society actors *Identify and assess civil society actors, their roles in the conflict, membership and capacity	*Draft or alter statutes establishing legal rights and restrictions of NGOs *Educate public officials and the public about the role of civil society	*Encourage enforcement of NGO-related laws
Civic Education	*Establish civic education and public education campaigns to raise awareness and understanding of new political structure, human rights, tolerance and other issues		*Institutionalize civic education into the formal school system
Strengthening Capacity and Partnerships	*Provide support to civil society to deliver services, promote democracy and tolerance, and give voice to concerns of vulnerable populations	*Provide funding, technical assistance, and training on communication skills, transparency, advocacy, tolerance, conflict resolution	*Develop indigenous capacity to advise, fund, and train new indigenous groups * Create and strengthen umbrella organizations of NGOs to represent civil society views
Professionalism and Ethics	*Institute short-term training for journalists, editors, government spokespersons, and other media professionals	*Upgrade university journalism depts. *Create journalism programs and internships with universities	*Improve administration of training institutions *Promote free-functioning Media through less dependence on donor or government financial support
Media Business Development	*Train media managers, advertising department staff, and business consultants *Provide small grants and low interest loans for start-ups and/or rebuilding	*Develop in-country business training and consulting capacity	*Develop viable media/ad markets *Assure even playing field by privatizing state media or converting them to public service media
Media Environment	*Develop regulatory environment for use of access to the media *Ensure appropriate balance between government and independent media	*Provide media law training to lawyers, jurists, and media personnel *Build media rights advocacy groups	*Raise general citizen awareness of importance of independent media

<b>1.10 Participation – Public Information and Communications</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Determine governance structure and establish foundation for citizen participation	<b>Goal:</b> Promote legitimate political institutions and participatory processes	<b>Goal:</b> Consolidate political institutions and participatory processes
Disseminate Governance Information	*Identify or establish outlets for international, national, and local news media *Utilize media as public information tool to provide factual information and control rumors	*Invest in the development of indigenous capacity *Train journalists, expand capacity of outlets and improve interaction with local population and linkages with the international community	

## 2. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

### 2.1 Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Prevention of Population Displacements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Ensure humanitarian access to populations in need</li> <li>*Assess total food and medical needs for affected populations</li> <li>*Determine the reliability of local market and medical channels; assess availability of local supplies to meet needs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*(I) Continue to ensure reliable and adequate supply of assistance to population centers; maintain essential services (water, health, education)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop and provide economic opportunities and services to support permanent populations</li> </ul>
Refugee Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Urge asylum countries to keep borders open to refugees</li> <li>*Establish registration and screening mechanisms</li> <li>*Assess total food needs for affected populations food, water, sanitation, shelter, and medicine. Pay special attention to the needs of vulnerable groups, including women, children and the elderly</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Continue to provide humanitarian assistance as necessary</li> <li>*Expand basic services to include education, health, education, and, if appropriate, psycho-social programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*When conditions allow, assist in voluntary repatriation, local-settlement and/or resettlement of refugees</li> <li>*Facilitate and monitor reintegration in country of origin; begin to reduce programs in countries of asylum</li> </ul>
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Ensure freedom of movement to the greatest extent possible</li> <li>*Establish registration and monitoring mechanisms</li> <li>*Determine the reliability of local market and medical channels; assess availability of local supplies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Continue provision of protection and assistance to IDPs in camps, homestays and communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*When conditions allow,, facilitate and assist return and reintegration of IDPs</li> <li>*Support local integration where appropriate</li> <li>*Monitor conditions for IDPs after their return</li> </ul>
Refugee and IDP Camp Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Ensure adequate protection and monitoring, with effective and well publicized rules of engagement for protection forces</li> <li>*Ensure humanitarian aid and security force access to endangered populations and refugee camps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Establish and maintain order in refugee camps</li> <li>*Provide interim security measures for at-risk populations</li> </ul>	

### 2.2 Trafficking in Persons

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Anti-Trafficking Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Assess levels and forms of trafficking in persons in region, sub-regions, and country</li> <li>*Collect and analyze data to map trafficking levels and routes</li> <li>*Establish benchmarks for measuring trafficking</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Develop programs that support and reinforce direct anti-trafficking activities</li> </ul>	

Assistance for Victims	*Provide assistance to victims of trafficking including rescue, shelter, and access to psychological, legal and medical assistance	*Increase access to the justice system	*Continue to support repatriation, counseling, social integration, education, and income generation for trafficking victims
Anti-Trafficking Legislation	*Assess indigenous political will to combat trafficking as evidenced by legislative reform and enforcement, prosecution of traffickers, and cooperation with NGOs, faith-based institutions, and governments to prosecute traffickers	*Promote development of anti-trafficking legislation and policies in source, transit, and destination countries through civil society, legislatures, national, regional and local governments, and judicial systems	*Continue to promote anti-corruption efforts and legislative reform *Create enabling policy and legal environments that will facilitate efforts to eliminate trafficking *Promote local and national public awareness of the problem

### 2.3 Food Security

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Famine Prevention	*Monitor and analyze food security by conducting livelihood-based food security analyses	*Work with decision-makers to use the analyses to provide customized decision-maker support	
Emergency Food Relief	*Conduct rapid food and nutrition assessments with particular attention to: (i) market prices, channels and infrastructure; and (ii) local agricultural production of basic food stuffs, including the harvest cycle	*Collaborate with international and local relief actors to implement distribution programs *Prevent and punish theft and misappropriation of food resources	*Phase out emergency relief distributions *Transition to traditional food aid programs (but not at the expense of domestic production)
Food Market Response	*Identify existing markets including market interferences, such as bottlenecks and failures (monopolies, cartels, policy interferences)	* <b>(I)</b> Establish transportation and distribution networks	*Continue to use government resources to promote public needs *Consider private-public investment partnerships

### 2.4 Shelter and Non-Food Relief

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Non-Food Relief Distribution	*Conduct rapid non-food needs assessments * <b>(I)</b> Secure emergency non-food relief distribution channels	*Collaborate with international and local relief actors to implement distribution programs	*Phase out emergency relief distributions
Shelter Construction	* <b>(I)</b> Provide emergency shelter for immediate needs	* <b>(I)</b> Repair existing housing stock	* <b>(I)</b> Construct affordable housing

<b>2.5 Humanitarian Demining</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Mine Awareness	*Through a dynamic mine awareness program, teach people how to recognize, avoid, and inform demining authorities of the presences of land mines.	*Include mine awareness programs in all primary and secondary school curricula throughout the country, as well as on all electronic and print media outlets	
Mine Detection Mine Clearance	*Conduct a country-wide landmine impact surveys to determine the nature and extent of the landmine problem: identify broad areas within the country where mines exist and estimate the extent of the problem.	*Leave mines in their location. Mark and destroy mines *Assess mine clearance operations through quality assurance processes	*Work with demining NGOs and international peacekeeping forces to train local deminers and begin the clearance process, focusing first on urban areas and farmland
Survivor Assistance	*Treat initial injuries *Develop survivor assistance strategy	*Assess needs for prosthetic limbs in population	*Provide long-term treatment and prosthetics to landmine survivors

<b>2.6 Public Health</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Potable Water Management	* <b>(I)</b> Ensure proper quantity of drinking water	* <b>(I)</b> Evaluate water sources to meet needs and protect against contamination * <b>(I)</b> Construct water treatment and distribution facilities	* <b>(I)</b> Build indigenous capacity to deliver clean drinking water, sanitation and manage wastewater
Sanitation and Waste Water Management	* <b>(I)</b> Ensure proper sanitization, purification and distribution of drinking water	* <b>(I)</b> Support indigenous waste and wastewater management capacity	* <b>(I)</b> Expand regular waste management activities to rural areas
Medical Capacity	* <b>(I)</b> Stockpile and distribute emergency medical supplies and drugs	* <b>(I)</b> Ensure sufficient stockpile of medical equipment, supplies and drugs	*Modernize medical equipment and solidify public health sector
Local Public Health Clinics	* <b>(I)</b> Evaluate need for new clinics * <b>(I)</b> Repair and rebuild clinics	* <b>(I)</b> Open clinics	* <b>(I)</b> Maintain and enlarge new or restored clinics
Hospital Facilities	* <b>(I)</b> Evaluate need for new hospitals * <b>(I)</b> Repair and rebuild hospitals	* <b>(I)</b> Open hospitals	* <b>(I)</b> Expand hospitals to provide specialized care for greater numbers
Human Resources Development for Health Care Workforce	*Recruit doctors, nurses, and staff and community health workers	*Train medical and public health care providers	*Build capacity for local administration of clinics *Transfer administration of clinics to indigenous actors
Health Policy and Financing	*Evaluate cost and efficiency of health care system to ensure basic health care needs are being met	*Develop strategy for the provision of effective health care to the greatest number of people, taking into account budget constraints	
Prevention of Epidemics	*Prevent epidemics through immediate vaccinations	*Establish vaccination and screening programs to deal with potential epidemics	*Institutionalize countrywide vaccination programs to prevent infectious disease



HIV/AIDS	*Assess HIV/AIDS prevalence especially in most vulnerable populations	*Develop HIV/AIDS programmatic response as necessary	
Nutrition	*Assess chronic and acute malnutrition *Begin emergency food deliveries to neediest areas immediately	*Continue general population assessment *Expand emergency food deliveries as supply and security situations allow	
Reproductive Health	*Assess emergency care needs (e.g., transportation, birthing facilities)	*Train birth attendants	
Environmental Health	*(I) Identify most dangerous public health hazards and isolate from public when possible	*Continue to assess for most serious environmental hazards	
Community Health Education	*Support a public information campaign to educate population about crisis-induced health risks *Obtain medical educational materials	*Develop multi-sectoral community-based programs geared to identify, prevent, and reduce health risks	*Implement short-term and long-term health care education programs, including family planning and HIV/AIDS education

### 2.7 Education

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Education Reform	*Review past practices in primary and secondary education, e.g. teaching methods, curriculum, textbooks, discrimination by race, religion, ethnicity, etc. *Inventory existing school buildings and educational infrastructure	*Establish local parent-teacher councils to advise on education reform *Develop a basic common curriculum for primary and secondary schools, leaving room for local conditions and social differences *Work with international NGOs to modernize educational practices and train teachers	*Introduce new legislation, as required, to enforce equal educational opportunity and eliminate discrimination and segregation in all classrooms and textbooks
Human Resources	*(I) Reopen schools as quickly as possible *Use them to reach civil populace with programs	*Identify and recruit teachers and administrators at all levels *Register school-aged population; create equal opportunity education policy	*Train teachers and administrators at all levels
Education—Schools	*(I) Evaluate need for new schools *(I) Build and repair schools *Obtain educational materials	*Open schools	*(I) Maintain and enlarge new or restored schools
Education—Universities	*(I) Evaluate need for new and existing universities *(I) Build and repair universities *Assess university-level curriculum, schoolbooks and admissions policy for evidence of discrimination by race, religion, ethnicity, etc.	*Open universities *Develop curriculum that respects diversity	*(I) Maintain and enlarge new or restored universities *Distribute curriculum and supporting teaching materials

Literacy Campaign	*Survey literacy levels and linguistic groups *Develop literacy campaign	*Conduct literacy campaign	*Institutionalize opportunities for adult education to sustain efforts of literacy campaign
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**2.8 Social Protection**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Social Protection	*Launch program for social protection and empowerment of vulnerable populations	*Launch domestic violence awareness programs	

**2.9 Assessment, Analysis and Reporting**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Humanitarian and Social Well-being Assessment, Analysis and Reporting (Also see each subsection above for specific sectoral information needs)	*Identify what critical information is needed, where to find it, what are major gaps, and how to share, present and disseminate the information. If possible, conduct this assessment in advance and identify the gaps in data, information and knowledge	*Continue to analyze information in context; relate to other thematic information; evaluate issues and responses; make projections about the future; recommend policies and actions	*Train host country officials and build capacity of local emergency preparedness institutions
Census	*Establish policy dialogue with planning leaders to plan statewide census	*Provide technical and financial assistance to state government to plan, conduct, analyze and report census results	*Ensure that census results are taken into account in updating voting registers at all levels of government
Land Registers	*Establish policy dialogue with planning leaders to develop land registration records	*Provide technical and financial assistance to national government to plan, conduct, analyze and report census results	

**2.10 Public Information and Communications**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Provide for emergency humanitarian needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Disseminate Humanitarian and Social Well-Being Information	*Identify or establish outlets for international, national, and local news media	*Invest in the development of indigenous capacity	

### 3. Economic Stabilisation and Infrastructure

<b>3.1 Employment Generation</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Public Works Jobs (See SECURITY, Reintegration)	* <b>(I)</b> Design initiatives to provide immediate employment, soliciting projects ideas from local communities	* <b>(I)</b> Implement public works projects	* <b>(I)</b> Rationalize public works projects with long-term development program
Micro and Small Enterprise Stimulation	*Assess skills deficiencies	*Assess market opportunities for particular skills	
Skills Training and Counseling	*Assess and determine immediately employable labor force for appropriate critical and emergency needs	*Organize and mobilize local and foreign assistance necessary to initiate training and development of vital skills	
Retraining of Former Military	*Assess the number of enlisted men/women and officers as military forces are downsized *Create a skills bank for those released from service	*Working with qualified NGOs (e.g. IOM), launch a large-scale retraining program to prepare decommissioned soldiers for a broad range of opportunities in the private sector	

<b>3.2 Monetary Policy</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Central Bank Operations	*Assess capability of Central Bank to conduct essential operations such as make domestic payments and settlements *Assess present and future viability of domestic currency/ies presently in use	*Develop institutional capacity to perform on-going central bank operations (e.g., reserve management) *As required, revalue current currency or introduce new currency	*Ensure Central Bank staff have been trained and have the institutional capacity to manage on-going central bank operations
Macro-Policy and Exchange Rates (See Fiscal Policy and Governance)	*Begin dialogue with policy makers to identify priorities and assess capacity to undertake basic macro and exchange rate policies	*Develop policy instruments to manage monetary policy consistent with macro-economic program (e.g., T-Bills, currency auctions)	*Ensure that sufficient institutional capacity and trained staff exist to manage monetary policy within macro-economic policy framework
Monetary Audit	*Determine skill capacity of key central bank individuals, and if necessary facilitate return of diaspora	*Enhance government ability to absorb and administer donor funds *Audit Central Bank	*Develop funding capacity for long-term institution-building
Monetary Statistics	*Survey statistical capabilities and begin collecting key statistics	*Develop capabilities of statistical unit within the Central Bank	*Ensure training is available to develop long-term statistical capability

**3.3 Fiscal Policy and Governance**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Fiscal and Macro-Economic Policy (See Macro Policy and	*Begin dialogue with policy makers to identify priorities and assess capacity to undertake basic fiscal policy	*Develop capacity to manage fiscal situation within macro-economic program	*Institutionalize capacity to manage on-going fiscal situation within macro-economic program (e.g., develop long-term fiscal targets)
Treasury Operations	*Reestablish government payment mechanisms to pay recurrent and emergency expenditures	*Institutionalize financial management and treasury payment and budget execution system	*Institutionalize improvements in treasury operations, payments and budget execution
Budget	*Develop budget *Rationalize revenues and expenditures and establish priorities	*Develop and implement a budgetary process, including input from line ministries	*Institutionalize process to develop budget and ensure sufficient trained staff exist to manage on-going budget processes
Public Sector Investment	* <b>(I)</b> Prioritize public investment needs *Develop a plan to allocate resources *Pay civil service arrears *Determine structure and affordable size of civil service to meet ongoing and future needs *Strengthen ethics regulations	* <b>(I)</b> Invest in critical projects neglected by the private sector (i.e., large-scale investment in education, health care, electricity, mining, oil, and public transportation)	*Continue to use government resources to promote public needs * <b>(I)</b> Consider private-public investment partnerships
Revenue Generation, Tax Administration	*Identify tax structure and sources of revenue *Design an efficient tax structure with a clear collection policy *Manage public accounts	*Implement plans for revenue generation, customs taxation	*Implement strategy for improved tax audit, collection and enforcement
Customs Reform, Enforcement (See Trade, Trade Structure)	*Assess customs revenues and efficiencies and weaknesses of customs service *Identify immediate physical and capacity barriers to import administration	*Ensure incentives in place to conduct efficient and non-corrupt customs service	* <b>(I)</b> Build an integrated, nationwide customs administration capable of minimizing corruption, protecting the rights of importers and foreign exporters
Tax Policy	*Determine the efficacy of alternative short-term tax policies (e.g., tax holiday)	*Rationalize tax policy to provide tax revenue and redraft necessary tax laws to increase efficiency in revenue collection	*Approve and implement long-term tax policies
Fiscal Audit	*Identify audit capacity of relevant institution *Determine base line data for audit *Create or strengthen compliance laws	*Create appropriate legal framework for accountable government operations (procurement, expenditures, etc.)	*Implement a functioning and transparent auditing system *Ensure sufficient trained staff to carry out sustainable audit process

**3.4 General Economic Policy**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Strategy/Assessment	*Survey economic situation (needs assessment), including assessment of absorptive capacity of economic and social sector, financial imbalances, and real sector distortions	*Finalize and implement plan to facilitate economic revival	*Strengthen strategic planning and policy analysis capability *Continue to strengthen relations with the IFIs.
Prices and Subsidies	*Evaluate subsidized sectors, industries, and firms *Prepare recommendation and timetable on elimination of subsidies and price controls	*Rationalize subsidies with regard to cost to government and impact on employment levels	*Eliminate subsidy distortions in the economy
International Financial Assistance—Donor Coordination	*Establish relations with international donor community	*Negotiate agreement between indigenous authorities and donors concerning targets of aid and terms of aid conditionality	*Reschedule or forgive debts, as appropriate, and resume repayments of rescheduled and post-cut-off-date debts
Public Sector Institutions (See Fiscal Policy and Governance, Public Sector Investment)	*(I) Identify operational capacity, including physical structure and security	*Establish ministries and independent agencies, including specifying organization and lines of authority	*Provide ongoing technical support for institutional development of the public sector

**3.5 Financial Sector**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Banking Operations	*If banking sector operational, start up commercial banking operations, i.e., open LOC mechanism and trade credits to reintegrate into the international financial community	*Implement medium-term banking strategy	*If commercial banks are insolvent, address long-term banking sector problems
Banking Regulations and Oversight	*Evaluate the regulatory framework *Review and prepare bank licensing standards and procedures	*Begin bank licensing process to ensure commercially viable private banks have access to the market	*Institutionalize regulatory system to govern financial transactions by banks *Enforce banking regulations
Banking Law	*Review/prepare banking law and determine viability vis-à-vis international standards	*Revise and rewrite banking law if needed to accommodate structure of existing banking sector	*Support implementation of banking law in accordance with international standards
Bank Lending	*Provide immediate credit including access to micro and SME lending *Ensure standard banking practices to approve loans are part of early credit programs	*Develop on-going credit programs including access to micro and SME lending	*Expand long-term savings programs as a source of funds for credit programs
Asset and Money Laundering	*Freeze accounts of combatants *Block international access of overseas accounts, money laundering	*Trace assets and remit back to the government	

Non-Banking Sector		*Evaluate the needs for insurance, equities, and non-bank credit sources	*Develop non-bank financial institutions as appropriate for the country
Stock and Commodity Markets		*Assess feasibility of equity markets as a way to increase investment resources as alternative to debt	*Create conditions conducive to formation of stock and commodity markets

3.6 Debt			
	Initial Response Goal: Respond to immediate needs	Transformation Goal: Establish foundation for development	Fostering Sustainability Goal: Institutionalize long-term development program
Debt Management	*Evaluate external position vis-à-vis external and domestic creditors and clear arrears, where possible	*Creation of control system for effective debt management	*Develop long-term sustainable debt strategy
Arrears Clearance	*Conduct inventory of multilateral and bilateral arrears to creditors	*Make necessary payments to creditors	

3.7 Trade			
	Initial Response Goal: Respond to immediate needs	Transformation Goal: Establish foundation for development	Fostering Sustainability Goal: Institutionalize long-term development program
Trade Structure	*Evaluate tariffs, tax structures and barriers to trade	*Continue to evaluate viability of reducing tariffs, taxes, and barriers to trade	*Foster economic integration through local, regional, and global organizations
Trade Facilitation	*Open or maintain LOC mechanisms and trade credits to trade critical goods	*Provide technical assistance to firms and trade groups to develop non-traditional export capacities	*Increase export diversification to enhance economic stability *Seek accession into regional or global trade organizations

3.8 Market Economy			
	Initial Response Goal: Respond to immediate needs	Transformation Goal: Establish foundation for development	Fostering Sustainability Goal: Institutionalize long-term development program
Private Sector Development	* (I) Assess the depth of the private sector, including weakness of the goods and service sector and its distribution channels	*Encourage investment by international actors, including diaspora communities	*Establish a business environment for long-term growth
Small and Micro-enterprise Regime	*Identify constraints to small business development and take steps to remove them where possible in the short-term (e.g, lack of credit, onerous taxes)	*Develop strategy for removing obstacles to small business development and implement the strategy	*Working with IFC and other institutions, explore option to develop micro-enterprise/micro credit entity
Privatization	*Assess impact of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) on fiscal balance to determine whether fiscal drain or resource loss from unproductive firms can be offset through some type of privatization	*Assessment of SOEs and their fiscal impact *Develop a strategy for privatization of loss-making enterprises, as necessary	*Ensure legal and regulatory frameworks support privatization
Natural Resources and Environment	* (I) Assess and secure access to valuable natural resources *Initiate process for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues	*Prevent capture of proceeds from natural resources and commodities by faction(s)	*Rationalize national resource policies with long-term economic development strategies

**3.9 Legal and Regulatory Reform**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Property Rights	*Evaluate existing laws pertaining to land rights, registration of property, and collateralization of movable and immovable property *Ensure that property laws are supportive of refugees and IDPs seeking to recover properties unjustly seized during conflict	*Establish procedure to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources	*Ensure equitable implementation of laws, regulations, and codes
Business/Commercial Law	*Evaluate restrictions on trade, commerce, and open market operations	*Design laws and regulations to provide incentives for economic growth and development	*Implement laws and regulations, including provisions to protect intellectual property rights
Labor	*Evaluate existing laws pertaining to labor rights	*Design laws and regulations to protect labor rights, including workplace safety, minimum wage, and the right to form independent trade unions	*Implement and enforce labor laws and regulations *Promote management-labor dispute mechanisms
Economic Legal Reform	*Review civil and commercial codes	*Draft and promulgate revisions	
Competition Policy	*Assess market for obvious problems with legal and regulatory framework for free market environment	*Ensure regulatory framework allows free entry and exit in market, non-discriminatory pricing and access to markets, credible bankruptcy laws,	
Public Utilities and Resources Regulation	*(I) Assess policy, governance and regulatory framework to rebuild utilities, power, mining, and other key infrastructure and facilities	*Review and revise as necessary policies for pricing, distribution, concessions, etc., of sectors	
Economic Enforcement and Anti-Corruption	*Identify incentives to reduce corruption *Assess threat/existence of corruption in political system	*Design and implement anti-corruption campaign, including education and codes of conduct	*Development and implement enforcement mechanisms *Prosecute violators and enforce standards

**3.10 Agricultural Development**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Agricultural Land and Livestock	*(I) Secure existing post-harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops	*Identify constraints to production *Assess health, diversity, and number of animals	*(I) Improve design and maintenance of rural farm-to-market roads
Agricultural Inputs	*(I) Rebuild small scale irrigation systems and use technologies for collecting rainwater	*Determine cost-effectiveness of different irrigation plans	*(I) Improve drainage during road construction to reduce excessive runoff

Agricultural Policy and Financing	*Identify policy makers in the agricultural, natural resources and the environment areas and discuss their priorities for their respective sectors	*Promote diversification of agriculture and livestock as well as supporting service sectors	*Develop land reform plan *Implement land reform measures
Agricultural Distribution	*Channel food aid to promote market activities	*(I) Establish transportation and distribution networks	*Re-establish and facilitate market-oriented domestic food production

### 3.11 Social Safety Net

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundation for development	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Institutionalize long-term development program
Pension System	*Assess existing pension systems for government, and parastatal employees	*Design or reconfigure pension system based on agreed criteria and ability of new government to support them	*Secure funding stream and institutionalize pension system
Social Entitlement Funds	*Assess availability of social entitlement funds for disabled, widows, orphans and unemployed	*Rationalize funding for social safety net programs	*Ensure programs are sustainable
Women's and Minority Issues		*Identify legal and de facto barriers to full participation by women and minorities, including property rights, land tenure, etc.	

### 3.12 Transportation

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundations	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Transportation Sector Policy and Administration	*Assess overall condition of transportation infrastructure	*Develop regional and transportation plans	*Develop a national transportation system that links key nodal infrastructure
Airports Infrastructure	*Assess condition of existing airport facilities	*Develop regional and state-wide aviation transportation plans	*Implement programs and projects for sustainable airport operations
Roads Infrastructure	*Assess condition of existing roads and bridge facilities	*Develop municipal, regional, and state-wide road transportation plans	*Implement programs and projects for sustainable roads, highways, bridges, and tunnels operations
Railway Infrastructure	*Assess condition of existing railway facilities	*Develop municipal, regional, and state-wide railway transportation plans	*Implement programs and projects for sustainable intra and intercity railway and terminal operations
Ports and Waterway Infrastructure	*Assess condition of existing coastal and inland ports, harbors, and waterways facilities	*Develop regional and state-wide port and waterway transportation plans	*Implement programs and projects for sustainable port and waterway operations



<b>3.13 Telecommunications</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundations	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Telecommunications Policy and Administration	*Assess overall condition of national telecommunications infrastructure	*Develop regional and state-wide telecommunication plans	*Develop state-wide telecommunications system
Telecommunication Infrastructure	*Assess condition of existing telecommunications facilities	*Develop regional telecommunication	*Implement telecommunications programs and projects

<b>3.14 Energy</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundations	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Fossil Fuels Production and Distribution	*Assess overall condition of national energy infrastructure	*Develop regional and state-wide energy plans	*Develop state-wide energy infrastructure system
Electrical Power Sector	*Assess condition of existing power generation and distribution facilities	*Develop state-wide power grid plans that encompass generation to delivery	*Implement electrical power programs and projects
Energy Infrastructure	*Assess condition of existing natural resources conversion and distribution facilities, and power generation and distribution facilities	*Develop energy investment plans	*Invest in energy programs and projects that support national energy priorities

<b>3.15 General Infrastructure</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundations	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Engineering and Construction	*Assess condition of existing facilities that are integral for effectively implementing other post-conflict sector essential tasks	*Construct facilities that restore and promote overall indigenous governance, commerce, and social well-being	
Municipal Services	*Assess condition of existing local, municipal facilities that provide essential services to local population.	*Construct facilities that restore and promote local, indigenous governance, commerce, and social well-being	*Work with municipal authorities and local NGOs throughout the country to encourage buy-in by the local populace for responsive municipal government

<b>3.16 Public Information and Communications</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Respond to immediate needs	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Establish foundations	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Consolidate indigenous capacity
Disseminate Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Information	*Identify or establish outlets for international, national, and local news media	*Invest in the development of indigenous capacity	

## 4. Justice and Reconciliation

<b>4.1 Interim Criminal Justice System</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Interim International Criminal Justice Personnel—Judges	*Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement indigenous criminal justice system	*Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions *Review and vet the previous performance of all judges; retain only those with unblemished past records	*Transfer responsibilities to indigenous justice institutions
Interim International Criminal Justice Personnel—Prosecutors	*Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement indigenous criminal justice system	*Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions *Review and vet the previous performance of all prosecutors; retain only those with unblemished past records	*Transfer responsibilities to indigenous justice institutions
Interim International Criminal Justice Personnel—Defense Advocates	*Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement indigenous criminal justice system	*Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions *Review and vet the previous performance of all defense advocates; retain only those with unblemished past records	*Transfer responsibilities to indigenous justice institutions
Interim International Criminal Justice Personnel—Court Administrators	*Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement indigenous criminal justice system	*Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions	*Transfer responsibilities to indigenous justice institutions
Interim International Criminal Justice Personnel—Corrections Staffs	*Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement indigenous criminal justice system	*Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions. *Review and vet the previous performance of corrections staff; retain only those with unblemished past records	*Transfer responsibilities to indigenous justice institutions.
Interim International Criminal Justice Personnel—Police/Investigators	*Deploy interim justice personnel to supplement indigenous criminal justice system	*Dispense justice in central or sensitive jurisdictions	*Transfer responsibilities to indigenous justice institutions
Interim International Legal Code	*Enact interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law		
Organized Crime	*Assess indigenous capacity to combat organized crime *Establish multidisciplinary approach to address organized crime involving international intelligence, law enforcement and criminal justice personnel	*Strengthen the capacity of indigenous criminal justice institutions and personnel to combat organized crime	*Transfer responsibilities to permanent justice institutions *Support integration with international efforts to combat organized crime

Law Enforcement Operations	*Identify, secure and preserve evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, corruption, and transnational crimes, including terrorism, organized crime, financial crimes, trafficking in humans and narcotics	*Strengthen the capacity of indigenous criminal justice institutions and personnel to handle the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of complex criminal cases	*Assure the full integration of specialized and non-specialized criminal justice institutions and personnel into the reinvigorated criminal justice system
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#### 4.2 Indigenous Police

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Indigenous Police Personnel	*Vet and reconfigure existing police forces	* <b>(I)</b> Establish or reform police academies *Retrain indigenous police in modern, democratic policing techniques and practices	*Provide ongoing technical support and training
Essential Police Facilities	* <b>(I)</b> Inventory police stations, police mobility capabilities, police communications systems, data management systems and police headquarters	* <b>(I)</b> Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities	*Introduce better maintenance practices, police information management systems
Accountability / Oversight	*Assess requirements to eradicate corruption in law enforcement community *Reinforce oversight mechanisms	*Establish office of Inspector General/ ombudsman to investigate police corruption and abuse	*Institutionalize offices of Inspector General and ombudsman by securing line-item budgetary funding

#### 4.3 Judicial Personnel and Infrastructure

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Vetting and Recruitment	*Inventory indigenous legal professionals	*Vet existing judicial system personnel, including judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and court personnel	*Reform law school curricula and recruit new faculty *Establish professional code for the judicial system
Training/Mentoring	*Educate criminal justice personnel on interim legal codes	*Develop training plan closely linked to institutional reform; identify and train local professionals who can train their colleagues	*Initiate training programs based upon institutional reforms and new laws. Establish mentoring programs with both international and local professionals
Judicial Support Facilities	* <b>(I)</b> Inventory courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations	* <b>(I)</b> Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities	*Introduce more transparent, efficient, and accessible court and case management
Citizen Access	*Establish liaison mechanism between civilians and judicial authorities on legal matters	*Inform indigenous population on accessing the judicial system	*Extend legal representation to underprivileged community through a public defender system and legal services organizations

<b>4.4 Property</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Prevent Property Conflicts	*Implement mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land/property *Review existing property laws and revise them as required to ensure basic right to private ownership and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure	*Establish flexible but structured mechanism for resolving property disputes	*Implement mechanism for adjudicating property disputes

<b>4.5 Legal System Reform</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Legal System Reorganization	*Develop strategy to rebuild criminal justice system	*Promote laws fostering judicial independence and transparency	*Institutionalize new structures and responsibilities
Code and Statutory Reform	*Review current laws and resolve questions of applicability	*Facilitate discussions leading to new codes	*Implement legal code reform through legislation
Participation	*Create and strengthen legal aid and NGO groups	*Initiate public dialogue with all sectors of civil society on legal reform	*Provide oversight and monitoring of code implementation
Institutional Reform	*Assess court administration capability and resources	*Incorporate credible local leadership	*Finance and implement reform plan

<b>4.6 Human Rights</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b>	<b>Transformation</b>	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b>
	<b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Abuse Prevention	*Monitor vulnerable groups and act preemptively to deter human rights abuses; implement effective warning mechanisms	*Support local capacity to resolve conflict and prevent abuses	*Fold “abuse prevention” efforts into larger judicial and social programs
Capacity Building	*Assess capacity of indigenous communities, human rights and other groups; engage local communities, consult leaders	*Foster support for/establish mechanisms and local capacity to protect human rights and resolve conflict;	*Create mechanisms for organizing human rights and other NGOs; design processes for government/NGO interaction on human rights.
Monitoring	*Establish international monitoring presence *Develop indigenous human rights monitoring capacity	*Conduct joint human rights monitoring missions with indigenous monitors	*Create sustainable indigenous human rights monitoring mechanism

**4.7 Corrections**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Incarceration and Parole	*Vet corrections personnel *Determine status of prisoners held (political prisoners and war prisoners)	*Institute standards for case review and prisoner disposition	*Transfer penal authority to indigenous authorities
Corrections Facilities	*(I) Refurbish prison facilities at key sites *(I) Provide emergency lock-up facilities	*(I) Rebuild correctional institutions, including administrative and rehabilitative capacities	*Ensure continued funding, oversight and management of correctional facilities
Training		*Train officers according to internationally accepted standards	*Establish indigenous sustainable corrections training programs

**4.8 War Crime Courts and Tribunals**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Establishment of Courts and Tribunals	*(I) Acquire secure facilities	*Recruit court staff	*Bring cases to trial and conclude as expediently as possible
Investigation and Arrest	*Set up an atrocity reporting system, refugee interviews	*Assist in investigation, arrest, and transfer of suspected war criminals to international courts	*Assist indigenous forces efforts to arrest and transfer human rights violators and war criminals
Citizen Outreach	*Publicize progress and work *Publish indictments and statements	*Broadcast court proceedings *Support media access	*Translate and disseminate court records and decisions

**4.9 Truth Commissions and Remembrance**

	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Truth Commission Organization	*Solicit voluntary contributions from international donors	*Determine mandate, mission, size, duration, and enforcement powers	*Deploy investigators; hold hearings
Reparations	*Identify classes of eligibility	*Identify appropriate means and levels of reparations	*Collect testimony *Implement reparation measures
Public Outreach	*Establish broad public information programs to promote efforts for reconciliation	*Dispel myths through educational curricula	*Evaluate reconciliation mechanisms; widely disseminate proceedings and documents produced by commission

<b>4.10 Community Rebuilding</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Ethnic and Intercommunity Confidence Building	*Identify mediators with dispute resolution skills to build trust and cooperation *Enhance participation through public outreach	*Provide reconciliation training and resources *Bring adversaries together where possible	*Foster informal, indigenous mechanisms for dispute resolution
Religion and Customary Justice Practices	*Identify customary judicial practices, religious institutions and other leaders on local and national levels	*Ensure participation of diverse religious elements *Rebuild places of worship and sacred sites	*Create and implement faith-based initiatives to rebuild communities
Assistance to Victims and Remembrance	*Provide localized counseling to victims *Establish missing persons initiatives	*Implement counseling programs focusing on redress and post-violence trauma	*Preserve memory through public activity and historical records (e.g., museums, archives, and oral histories)
Women	*Assess traditional role of women in society and their potential to contribute to reconciliation process	*Support initiatives devised by women's groups	*Ensure women's rights and influence
Vulnerable Populations	*Assess needs of vulnerable populations (e.g., war-wounded, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees)	*Deploy strategies for successful reconciliation of vulnerable populations	*Assist communities in devising strategies for lasting integration and progress
Evaluating and Learning		*Debrief returned international professionals	*Evaluate results and compare with similar cases

<b>4.11 Public Information and Communications</b>			
	<b>Initial Response</b> <b>Goal:</b> Develop mechanisms for addressing past and ongoing grievances	<b>Transformation</b> <b>Goal:</b> Initiate the building of a legal system and process for reconciliation	<b>Fostering Sustainability</b> <b>Goal:</b> Functioning legal system accepted as legitimate and based on international norms
Disseminate Justice and Reconciliation Informations	*Identify or establish outlets for international, national, and local news media	*Invest in the development of indigenous capacity	