

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY NETWORK

LAW AND ORDER IN RUSSIA: THE WELL-ARRANGED POLICE STATE



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Nicole Gallina




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INTRODUCTION

“Russia needs strong state power and must have it.” In this way the then-Presidential candidate Vladimir Putin wooed potential voters in the run-up to the March 2000 presidential elections in the Russian Federation. For many voters his promise to re-establish security and order in the country was a good reason to elect him for president.

After the elections, he turned to active governing, and there were rare occasions (besides the war in Chechnya) when the Russian president explicitly outlined the role of the Russian leadership in terms of order and security. But, day-to-day governance in Russia has demonstrated that the president has been indeed determined to follow a strong state concept and to re-establish the strength of the Russian state. First, this meant more control over the social chaos. Under Yeltsin, regional political leaders and economic enterprises increasingly retained control of their resources (including not paying federal taxes, for instance). The central government rapidly became unstable and was unable to pay salaries to its employees, to maintain a functioning army and police, and to provide an effective educational and social system. Because control over society has included coercive means, the state has sought to restrict the influence of non-state actors, such as economic oligarchs, non-governmental organizations and the media. Second, as a former security agent, Vladimir Putin strengthened executive agencies and the security services loyal to him.

The result was that Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, the most important economic oligarchs, left the country and the independent television stations were bought by state-controlled enterprises, namely Gazprom. The state re-established control over the economic and public spheres, which had at one time been characterized by struggles between organized crime groups over privatized companies and economic assets. In time, life has become more secure in Moscow and other cities. Thus, for the ordinary Russian, the results of Putin’s government were initially positive. The president and his entourage had successfully enforced law and order after the collapse of the Soviet Union under their leadership. Everything was in order under Putin, albeit with less civic freedom.

THE RUSSIAN STATE AS A DISCIPLINARY AGENCY: HISTORICAL REFERENCES

The Russian state concept of law and order is connected to the traditional Russian concept of a strong state. This implies a huge gap between “modern” Western state concepts and the current Russian state, which is reminiscent of a classical administrative state. In particular, it recalls the concept of the well-ordered police state (originating from the German term *wohlgeordneter Polizeistaat*).¹ It is here, where the roots lie for the disempowerment of Russian society, centralization and unification of state power and an exaggerated tendency to enact decrees on every aspect of life.

In history, the modernization of the Russian state as a concept is strongly interlinked with the German understanding of a well-ordered police state. Since the 17th century, Russian rulers closely followed the German model of law and order to reform the Russian state.² The organization of the state according to this model was largely a European phenomena that evolved hand-in-hand with absolutist rule in pre-modern Europe. It was to become most prominent in Prussia. At that time, European politics and policy weren't yet transformed by the French Revolution and public protest around the question of proper political organization and leadership was categorically impeded.

The Russian fundamentals of a well-ordered police state were similar to the Western European: absolutist rule that places the ruler and the state administration above society. The Czar understood himself as a “good, but severe father” having the right to exercise absolute power. Within the framework of an absolutistic state he was free to set his own directives and was restrained only by the laws of God. Governing was based on the specific duties and rights of the emperor: It was the ruler's duty to safeguard the spirits of his subjects and to prepare them for salvation. Besides spiritual well-being, the emperor was expected to actively pursue the material well-being of his subordinates. He was the state's highest servant: ensuring the public good and the general welfare of the population. The sovereign also obliged himself to enact decrees essential for ensuring the efficiency of the state. An independent government

and a powerful ruler were believed to be the preconditions of the spiritual and material welfare of the subjects. The happiness of the latter was ensured when maximizing potential strengths of the state in a God-pleasing manner. Therefore, an important concern of the sovereign was the control of socio-economic activities to maximize resources and to benefit from income sources that promised the highest returns.

The monarchy was the primary state actor, and the ruler and its state administration organized all the needs of society. Responsibility for the well-being of the population was assigned exclusively to the leader and his subordinate administration. The well-ordered police state was very concerned with the promotion of the rational organization of all public activity, including the Church. Its primary concern was to protect and to develop economic and financially-oriented corporations and institutions whose productive potentials were most beneficial. Public organizations, such as the church or civil associations, were weak and co-opted by the government. A state concept of this kind was intolerant of dissent from a public that was at the bottom of the hierarchy. The individual was not so much relied on for his or her productive capabilities, but more for their subordination to the community. As a consequence, a central determinant of the state order was the suppression of critical voices by the state secret police.³

Modernization took place under the conditions of increased centralization of power and a higher degree of control, and with the advent of public functions and institutions were dependent on the will of the sovereign. If institutions proved to be out-dated, the state administration or police agencies took over their role. Peter the Great was the most prominent reformer in the Russian Empire in this sense. His modernization of Russian society was continued by his successors who stressed the development of a passive and obedient subject. On the agenda were rigid and all-pervading state controls over all aspects of public and private life – copying and even exaggerating earlier German administrative regulations. The rules aimed to maximize the wealth and creative potential of selected social groups so that the people could play their assigned role in the total economy of the state.

These measures strengthened the central state and impeded development toward self-governance and corporate principles.

In Western Europe – in contrast to Russia – the corporate bodies and autonomous social institutions that developed eventually drove the state to its modern forms. This process led to more individualism that fostered the modernization of society and, subsequently, of the state as a whole, finally resulting in the present modern European state.

In Russia, the state suppressed the self-expression of peasants, aristocrats and urban intelligentsia, even after the liberation of the Russian peasants in 1850. It reached with state violence to more autonomous social organization. Thus, a disruption of group solidarities in the direction of individualism didn't take place and the development of individual initiative did not materialize. The strong state measures of the sovereign led to more reliance on state direction and control, and the Russian version of the well-arranged police state survived well into the Soviet period.

The modern Russian ruling concept of *derzhavnost* illustrates this understanding of the state. It implies a strong and paternalistic state, and goes hand-in-hand with a well-ordered police state. This expression unites patriotism with orthodoxy, includes commitment toward the fatherland, but also authoritarianism and faith in Russian grandeur (such as in the aspiration for a great power status). This concept allows for the glorification and mystification of the state, but also requires the uncritical obedience of its subjects.

The understanding and personalization of power in Russia is different from the modern concept of political rule that includes a separation of power, an orderly change of power (through elections), and the possibility of political opposition or civil initiative expressing views that contradict the ruling party. Instead, power in Russia has the implication of exclusivity and subordination. But still, the persons in power do not believe they are omnipotent and they continuously search for possible threats and enemies. Managing these dangers require not only a strong ruler, but also absolutely loyal and strong executive agencies.

An organized and controlled society continued to exist until the collapse of the Soviet Union and Boris Yeltsin's rise to power as the first president

of the newly-established Russian Federation in 1991. Yeltsin failed to provide law and order in the country with his clientelistic approach to state rule. To the detriment of economic reform initiatives and effective governance, he consolidated his own power. During his presidency, the country faced regional disintegration and political chaos at the central level of the government. Regional governors, freely elected by the people of their respective regions, became important critics of the central institutions and some of them were only connected loosely to Moscow or pursued their own political and economic programs.⁴ What was badly needed in this situation was a strong president who would re-order the country and reinforce central control.

PUTIN'S RULE

It was only when Vladimir Putin was elected for president in December 1999 that the Russian Federation returned to a more stable and organized leadership. He promised to end the disorder of the Yeltsin years through a “dictatorship of law” (that is a rule-based society in which he would enact the rules). Vladimir Putin was determined to re-establish law and order in the state, and to finally tackle the urgent problem of state re-development after Socialism. In contrast to Yeltsin, Putin held a clear vision of a strong ruler who guarantees law and order in Russia. For him, Yeltsin had failed. He, however, aimed to achieve both strong rule and state restructuring, according to the wishes of the majority of the population.

For the purpose of re-ordering the state, Vladimir Putin turned to measures that fall within the conceptual framework of the well-ordered police state: state control of society and problem-solving with the exclusive help of the Russian bureaucracy. His first measures aimed at restructuring the administrative apparatus to enforce strong hierarchies.

President Putin managed to reach a consensus on the common goal for state development, which was tightly bound to authority, efficiency and security, features that couldn't be guaranteed during the chaos of the Yeltsin presidency. The majority of the population accepts his kind of policymaking if security and order are guaranteed. The ruling political elite have similar ideas about a strong and unified country. Therefore, the president was able to proclaim five (official) national projects: to improve the situation in the agricultural, housing, education, health and energy sectors and provisions. Additionally, he suggested the redistribution of wealth in the interest of the whole society, at the expense of the individual or group interests. A good example of this is the area of energy policy and the re-nationalization of former private enterprises in the energy branch. Therefore, the state is now in control of large natural resource companies that are restructured and enlarged to ensure their profitability within the national and global economy resulting, consequently, in the strong performance of the whole state.⁵

The outside view suggests that Vladimir Putin is in control of every state task and is the only source of legitimacy. The existing presidential political system

suits the personalized nature of politics and power in Russia very well. The 1993 Constitution did not strengthen the political power of representative political institutions, such as the parliament. Instead, it has enabled the executive institutions to exert more influence, and has provided strong instruments of power to the disposal of the president.⁶ The president acts within this framework and is aware of the weaknesses of the constitution. This implies that he may also enact his own decisions that may undermine government or parliament proposals.

Consequently, the Russian president has become the most powerful person in the state. Vladimir Putin re-centralized power and became much more powerful than his predecessor. He is the center of political gravity, the image of an energetic advocate for the people's call for law, order and security. This plays well with the traditional understanding of the state by the ruler who represents and incorporates the state as the principal organ (“I am the state” and “the state is in me”). According to perspectives derived from a well-ordered police state, the ruler is the “good, but severe father,” taking care of his subordinates and also punishing them if necessary.

He is also the *derzhavnik*, who has the power to make autonomous decisions without considering alternative voices. The president firmly controls Russia's politics and economy and is the center of planning and coordination of the state administration with its adjacent organs and persons.

STRENGTHENING BUREAUCRATIC AND SECURITY ORGANS AND DEPOLITIZING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The consolidation of state power mainly relies on three pillars: the strengthening of the administrative apparatus and of security structures, and a centralization of the state.

An important pillar of Vladimir Putin's state renewal based on law and order is the strengthening and consolidation of vertical state power. The sovereign wouldn't be strong and capable without a loyal bureaucracy. Therefore, it is very important for the political leadership to have a strong and powerful administrative apparatus. After Vladimir Putin's election, the number of power institutions subordinate to the president has risen steadily. Executive structures have undergone several reforms since his inauguration and there are nearly a hundred agencies that exclusively execute the instructions of the president.

The presidential administration is the core power center. It is under the control of *siloviki*, persons such as Igor Sechin, Deputy Chief of Staff of the presidential administration, who are loyal to the president, have a long-term relationship with him, and originate from the security services.⁷ These persons are also responsible for the successful consolidation of power and the state renewal project.

To ensure a loyal and efficient bureaucratic apparatus, Vladimir Putin imposed public administration and civil service reform at the beginning of his first term. This included the abolition of institutions that had an open, democratic character, such as the Commission for Emergency Situations and the Federation Council.⁸ The reform aimed to enforce professionalism, but also to replace politicized and oppositional officials with neutral bureaucrats, that is bureaucrats loyal to the president. The president sought to establish power networks and reciprocal dependencies within the public administration. Ideally, the bureaucratic system should be dependent on the goodwill of the president and his intimates.

However, the reforms did not overcome authoritarian thinking and repressive state structures, and the Russian state administration still remains largely unreformed concerning procedures and hierarchies. In fact, the administrative

apparatus "survived" the short democratic period after the collapse of the Soviet Union and remained strong because of its hidden power mechanisms and dependencies that could be used by the respective officials to impede unwanted reforms and developments. Well-placed individuals within the bureaucracy still used their position to steer policy as they wished. In this respect, the system also proved to be flexible towards change and inputs from outward agencies and was able to form anew without actually reforming in the sense of a transparent and accountable administration.

Executive structures use well-established methods to undermine critical persons or petitions (for example with last minute decisions to exclude electoral candidates for reasons such as insufficient documentation or operational registration errors. Also common is the spread of *kompromat*, material discrediting the competing candidate and policy. In the context of political or economic actor harassment this material is readily accepted as judicial evidence as the judicial branch is also a compliant ally of the state.⁹

However, the bureaucracy and the president depend on each other. The bureaucratic machine and its different groups, especially in the highest levels of government are dependant on personalized rule of the political system to achieve a broader and effective outreach. With the help of the political leadership, the bureaucracy combines (power) capacities and appears to the public as a monolithic bloc that is able to achieve all of its aims. Whenever the administration fails to fulfill certain promises, it is the highest representative – the president – who is to blame, not the apparatus itself. This becomes particularly relevant if the highest representative is to be replaced. This framework suits the bureaucracy perfectly to fulfill its needs and interests.

The bureaucratic-presidential nexus is connected closely to security structures and the intelligence apparatus. Within the president's understanding of state rule, the security agencies play an important role. Much like the well-ordered police state where the autocrat controls a national security apparatus that guarantees the security of the motherland and of its citizens, the security services are an important arm of the executive. The security services (among

them the FSB, former KGB) are an important instrument to regain and maintain control over the economy, society and politics.

Vladimir Putin is the personalized representative of these networks and relationships. He (a former KGB lieutenant colonel and chief of FSB) counts on a reliable network of security agencies and related persons and has placed many of his former security service colleagues in important positions within the FSB and other state agencies.¹⁰ The director of the Institute for Applied Politics Olga Kryshstanovskaya estimates that Putin has placed *siloviki* (members of the security services, the police or the military) in 60 percent of the leading state positions.¹¹ Security agencies are also an instrument of oppression as they operate in secret and beyond legal constraints. Their actions are justified by the president's conviction that these services enhance national security – consequently, the questioning of security service activities is dangerous and unpatriotic.¹²

The FSB is actively involved in state development, and supports the strengthening of the vertical power and the re-centralization of the country. Formal FSB competencies include the control of the border security forces and the counting of electoral votes, as well as the guarantee of general state security. However, the failed management of the events in Chechnya and the North Caucasus (mainly in the Beslan hostage crisis in 2004) by Russian security and special-forces has shed a dark light on their quality and the state-security service connection. The failure of the special task force in Beslan didn't result in the review and reform of the secret and special police structures, but instead led to a revision of the political-administrative system of the Russian federation. Thus, these events legitimized the politics of exercising central control and extending the central power base. Political subjects were placed under a central tutelage thus as a result the president now benefits from centralized political structures.

The power increase of the Kremlin after Yeltsin resulted in higher control over economic activities. In order to enforce the vertical power structure, political-administrative frameworks were interconnected with economic ones. According to the logic of a strong state, a strong economy with state controlled industries of national interest is necessary. For this purpose, President Putin restructured the economic, energy, industry and trade ministries in May 2000 for the first time. Four years later, a super-ministry, the Ministry

of Industry and Energy was formed, which enabled the government to regulate powerful economic branches.¹³ The Ministry of Industry and Energy oversees the branches under state control, such as the gas and energy sectors.

The Russian president has demonstrated repeatedly that he is determined to push state interests in key sectors of the economy. So far, the most prominent example is the re-nationalization and liquidation of the Yukos Oil company.¹⁴ It should be viewed as an exemplary study of coercive police state methods in which the internal revenue (tax) authorities played a crucial role in driving Yukos Oil into bankruptcy. Following the logic of protecting the national interest, the oil industry was nationalized and Gazprom (the monopolist gas company) emerged as an integrated state-controlled energy conglomerate.¹⁵ In a second step, the two biggest state-controlled enterprises in the gas and oil sector, Gazprom and Rosneft, signed an agreement on strategic cooperation to ensure the energy security of the country and sufficient energy incomes for the state.

As a goal of the Russian government is the strengthening the country's unity and to centralize decision-making, executive power and vertical power structures have been modified. First, Vladimir Putin reclaimed power from autonomously-acting federation subjects by creating seven federal districts in order to better control the regional and local governance levels. Second, he (unconstitutionally) limited federalist structures in 2004, by instituting direct central control of the Russian provinces by replacing popularly-elected governors with Kremlin appointees.

Since then, governors have been elected by the regional legislatures in conformity with presidential recommendations. There are now also loyal representatives in Russia's Second Chamber, the Federation Council. This means that the president effectively ended the omnipotence of regional leaders and decreased the number of "troublemakers" significantly, but also reduced the federal subject's responsibilities to purely administrative ones. Additionally, he restrained the election of local mayors.¹⁶ Thus, Vladimir Putin regained power from the regional and local levels and succeeded in restoring vertical governance. The price was that the Russian Federation is now only *pro forma* a federalist state.

The reduction of institutional powers reflects a policy that strengthens the state not only at the expense of other institutions, but also at the expense of citizen's rights. Changes to the election laws, for example, have eliminated single-mandate districts and deny citizens the right to participate in the Russian Parliament. Officials also removed the "against all" voting option from the ballot list thereby forcing additional votes to president-loyal candidates.

In addition to strengthening the executive branch at the central level, another goal is to weaken legislative and judicial institutions. In a well-ordered police state the strict separation of powers is abandoned for maximal control. The less politics and independent developments that "dangerous" political institutions, such as the parliament, political parties and regional agencies can initiate, the better they serve the state. Thus the need for the government to be dominated by hand-picked supporters of Vladimir Putin, most of whom have a similar background from the security services (*siloviki*).

The depoliticization of parliament is also high on the agenda. This goal has been achieved for the most part: a single party dominates the Russian parliament. This party calls itself "Unified Russia" (*Edinaya Rossiya*) and holds two-thirds of the parliamentary representative seats thanks largely to active administrative election support. The party chairmen are closely connected with the presidential administration, inhibit critical inputs and ensure that presidential-friendly plans are realized. It isn't politically feasible that the party so closely linked to the president would accept legislative initiatives not backed by the president. In general, the parliament is composed of representatives according to party lists that have been agreed to by the president and its administration. Parliament has thus become a loyal ally of the country's leadership and, in a sense, almost an enlarged arm of the executive.

On the subject of political parties, the political leadership has adequate measures at its disposal to control liberal and democratic political parties that are not consistent with the official line. Because potentially dangerous parties don't have high public support, in 2006 the president raised the barring clause for political parties seeking election into parliament to seven percent. This has created a veritable hurdle for small and critical parties, for example for the liberal party *Jabloko*.¹⁷ Since January 2006, all political parties are obliged to

register at least 50,000 members and to establish representations at least in half of all the Russian federal subjects, otherwise they lose their right to be registered as a political party. This measure has brought small and independent parties to the brink of extinction.

Currently, liberal and democratic opposition parties don't present political alternatives that would challenge the official policy of the state leadership. And the political opposition is too fragmented and too weak to turn to a strong parliamentary political party. While the political opposition has held protests in the run-up to the election campaign for the 2008 presidential elections, but they don't have the support a significant part of the Russian population.

It is the central power itself (the Kremlin), that installed a system-compliant opposition party when it established "Just Russia," which united three parties in October 2006.¹⁸ Thus, the real political opposition is even more marginalized and the majority of the political activists and representatives seem to agree silently with the measures of the present state. In this situation, the Kremlin wouldn't be obliged to ban certain critical and inconvenient political parties. Administrative provisions are sufficient to ensure that opposition parties represent no danger to the actual political leadership and its policy.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Authors such as Anne Applebaum have argued that there is no longer a civil society in Russia. It seems that Russian political leaders, including the president, support a state concept that regards society and its single individual as something that has to be weak and should be kept under control. Recent events such as the deportation of naturalized Georgians or the ban against non-Russians working as market vendors, suggest that state interests are placed above the interests of ordinary citizens, especially above individual or minority interests. These developments go hand-in-hand with an empowerment of the Russian central state and a strong focus on hierarchies and the bureaucratization of the society. In the strong Russian state the society is only an appendix to the state, and strength is only connected to the state itself, never to society. Society is rather equated with disorder and therefore has to be disempowered.

Only the state – using knowledge and power – is able to hold the state together. This doesn't exclude cooperation with selected actors in society. In theory, this cooperation allows ordinary individuals to pursue their interests. But, contrary to European states that have to cooperate with society because the state is no longer legitimized to enforce everything on its own, the Russian state "cooperates" on a top-down and arbitrary basis. This kind of cooperation excludes a modern state concept that regards the state as a "limited state" with restricted power and influence on society.

If questions of administration, domination and steering of the state become prevalent, then the political space – where society constitutes and defines itself and assures its values and identity – becomes irrelevant. This does not signify that the state will impede efforts to activate the creative potential of society, but, that it will only support initiatives that fall within official state concepts and under state supervision. Both the modernization process and citizens are monitored for evidence of scrutinizing state structures. If hierarchies and the concept of a strong (police) state are central to Russian governance, then individual social, economic or political activities are only possible when the individual does not question the established order.

During his second term in office, Vladimir Putin managed to deprive the majority of social spheres

of their political influence and to bring them under state control. The state dominates society in terms of resources, initiative and scope of activity. A multi-faceted civil society doesn't exist in Russia, and civil engagement is mostly based on individual motivation and is not backed by the whole of society. Citizens that don't subordinate themselves to state ideology, or at least pretend to do so in public, are suspected of subversion. The media was the first sector that had to bear the consequences of this thinking: all bigger media groups were dissolved and placed under the state control of Gazprom. Of particular importance was the disempowerment of the media organizations belonging to "hostile" oligarchs, including Boris Berezovsky or Vladimir Gusinsky. As a consequence, mass media (particularly television stations) have been streamlined, that is they are politically compatible with the power elite and do not produce independent news coverage.¹⁹

The regime exercises (subtle) power to ensure media orthodoxy. A popular method is to change ownership and to install an owner who complies with the editorial guidelines desired: that is, one that does not to criticize the political leadership. Other state methods include the control of (financial) resources, economic pressure, appeals on patriotism and implicit threats. An example of using pressure in this manner, Russian regulators have forced more than 60 radio stations to stop broadcasting news reports produced by *Voice of America* and *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* in 2006. Officials threatened to cancel the to cancel the renewal of the offending radio stations' broadcasting licences – as a consequence, most of the Russian stations stopped rebroadcasting these news reports.

The few reporters who do cover issues such as the corruption of high state officials or offer independent reports on the situation in Chechnya face significant personal danger. In fact, several inconvenient (and non-conformist) journalists have been murdered, Anna Politkovskaya's murder was the most prominent case in 2006. The president's reaction to her murder, naming her an enemy of the state, shed a clear light on his image of critical journalism and the role of media in a strong state.²⁰ It is clear that most of the assassinations of journalists have been politically-motivated – despite [or perhaps given] the lack

of sufficient proof to bring a single case to trial. These assassinations are also a warning by the state not to cross the invisible line between “legal” and “illegal” media coverage. However, not only journalists face the threat of political assassination, politicians, former oligarchs and former security service colleagues have also been targets. Yuri Shchekochikhin, a journalist and former member of the Russian Duma, who investigated criminal activities of the FSB was assassinated in June 2003. A most recent case showed that “enemies” are even not safe abroad. Former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko was assassinated in London in November 2006. (He accused FSB agents of corruption and the bombing of apartment blocs in Moscow in 1999.)

Terrorist attacks, such as the Dubrovka Theater in 2002 and Beslan in 2004, were the starting point for increased state pressure on independent organizations and associations of civil society. As a consequence, their activities such as information and courses on democracy and human rights have been encumbered or declared illegal. Moreover, human rights activists have faced death threats (for instance *Memorial* activists). Active opponents of the regime are in danger of being condemned as “terrorists” and then dealt with accordingly. In this context, the highest state representatives hinder the work of foreign associations, some of which have been closed, such as the Soros Foundation which promotes democracy. A new state law on non-governmental organizations in general suspects foreign NGOs of conducting illegal activities and undermining state authority. Some, such as Memorial, have fallen from grace because they collect and disseminate alternative information on recent Soviet history or Stalin’s atrocities. Those organizations affected are demonized and marginalized by state propaganda and officials.

An indicator for the depreciation of civil and human rights is the renaissance of forced labor prison camps and the detention of political critics in the latter – Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Yukos Oil director, so far the most famous political prisoner, was deported to a prison camp in Siberia.²¹ The strengthened position of the security organs is also demonstrated by state measures aiming at higher social control of the average apolitical citizen. So far, the majority of the Russians accept that Russian human rights standards are different from Western European ones.²²

The “carrot-and-stick” method is a popular method

for controlling society and seems to apply to Russia as well. The state organizes society within state-accepted associations and threatens non-conformist groups. The state aims to channel popular opinion in the desired direction in order to pacify potential critics and unify the population behind the official state goal of a secure and prosperous country. It supports civil society activities within official limits, even more if they propagate state ideology. As a consequence, civil society manifests itself mainly in the official youth organization *Nashi* and in activities against illegal immigration. The society and the state seem to have reached an unofficial consensus that other manifestations of civil discontent, such as protests against environmental damage or against human rights violations in Chechnya, aren’t desirable.²³ In sum, the state rewards conservative and “backward” movements that suit its concept of a well-ordered police state. These movements receive an official platform and are accepted by the state as well as ordinary citizens.

The Russian society can be broadly characterized as having a “provision” mentality, that is, a widely-accepted belief that the state that should always be ready to care for the well-being of its citizens. Economic-oriented thinking and individual responsibility are not part of this concept. The Russian reform politician Alexander Jakovlev named this attitude – in which the individual awaits everything from the state, but isn’t prepared to contribute to it – “parasite-socialism”. The majority of the population and political actors still stick to this old provision-mentality. In this setting, the police state maintains a façade of charity and preoccupation that is readily accepted by the population. Also, Vladimir Putin’s value codex includes a caring welfare state that at the same time controls all aspects of public life.

The expectations of the majority of the population are ambiguous: In principle, citizens mistrust the state, but at the same time expect the state to help and care for them, and regard it as a “higher authority”. In contrast to Western models, where people tend to perceive the state as a stranger to their daily-life, even as an enemy and do not trust it. Despite the mistrust of the state and its political elites, there is a significant and rather utopian belief on the part of the Russian population that a good paternalistic state is able to guarantee the common welfare of all citizens. Vladimir Putin’s success is due to his ability to meet these ambiguous expectations. Since his election, public opinion

polls have consistently shown that Russians want President Putin to improve the standard of living, maintain law and order and to protect them from terrorism.²⁴ President Putin's approval ratings show that he delivers on these requirements. However, the strong "father" is also capable of detrimental decisions: the August 2005 welfare reform replaced entitlements with cash allowances and was a *de facto* benefit reduction that considerably damaged his commitment to improve the standard of living of ordinary Russians.

Most of the inhabitants still consider themselves *subjects* of the Russian Federation – and not as *citizens* having certain civil rights – and are ready to cede all responsibility for their well-being.²⁵ The political culture of the Russian society could be characterized as a culture of subordination (or by the common German term *Untertanenkultur*). This attitude encourages authoritarian and arrogant bureaucratic behavior. Except during elections, citizens remain passive and are supposed to be so. Accordingly, most citizens are interested in the results of politics and not in its making. This position ignores the egoism of bureaucrats (who aren't ready to fulfill social tasks and decline participation and a constructive role on the part of citizens), doesn't question administrative procedures and suits the all-mighty bureaucracy to maintain its power.

Additionally, there is a silent consensus in society about which topics should not be discussed critically in public. This includes various aspects of political or economic doctrine as well as entire issue areas, such as the legislation and jurisdiction in the media or the status of NGOs. Other issues include the situation in the different branches of the military, Russia's Chechnya policy, and the health of the Russian population (its rapidly decreasing average age, life expectancy and rising xenophobic tendencies).²⁶

While procedures are not supposed to be questioned from society and single citizens, in principle, critique is possible from within the state and "legitimate" critics. In the beginning, this system-inherent critique covered the fact that criticism from society barely existed. Critical voices prove the openness of the regime, even more if they are placed within the government. At the end of Vladimir Putin's second presidential term – and perhaps as a result of efforts to consolidate power in the run-up to the 2008 presidential elections – the number of critics has diminished significantly.

Interestingly, the most prominent critics within the system were economists such as central banker Andrei Kozlov (who was assassinated in September 2006), German Gref the minister for economic development, and the president's economic consultant, Andrei Illarionov, who criticized the degeneration of the state and its administration as "supremacy of an egoistic bureaucracy."²⁷ But still, fundamental discussions in the bureaucratic and Kremlin apparatuses that do take place rarely become public.

MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA

Russia's modernization framework includes a nationalistic discourse that emphasizes national unity vs. internal and external threats. Current "state ideology" includes traditional values and is enriched by a new role of the Church. These developments stand against modernism in all social spheres. Administrative procedures foster this modernization complex.

On the one hand, the identification of state enemies has proven useful for the purpose of state modernization and social unity. On the other, legitimizing state measures go together with the state call on potential threats. Since his election as Russian president, Vladimir Putin has evoked a national security crisis in Russia. He has taken emergency measures to deal with security threats and has demonstrated at the same time the efficient state management of the given critical situation. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Vladislav Surkov regularly warns Russians about terrorist activity in the country and demonizes the "colored [non-Russian] revolutions" or "Ukrainian scenarios" – that is the Orange Revolution and the political chaos that followed it – in the Russian Federation. North-Caucasians and Tatars are treated as a potential fifth column that endangers the security of the country and will provoke "Caucasian conditions."²⁸

In autumn 2006, the Russian regime profited from tensions with Georgia to label the whole Georgian nation, especially the Georgian population in Russia, as a security threat. Drastic measures were taken to justify a "state of emergency" and "illegal" Georgians were searched for and deported to their homeland. Such "security threats" are resorted to when suitable as an instrument for securing power. The April 2007 demonstrations on the part of opposition groups under the leadership of Garry Kasparov were also treated as proof of the existence of threats to Russian unity and security. Particularly, the fear of terrorism is an adequate justification to implement "reforms" that strengthen vertical state power and state control over society. Evoking potential ethnic threats, however, is inherently linked with xenophobia and racism. It is a dangerous policy instrument that has resulted in increased ethnic hatred and nationalist assaults on individuals or targeted groups.²⁹

Security threats require the combined efforts of all Russians that are supported naturally by state

authorities. The overall accepted logic is that if all stand together, then a given security, social and political crisis can be overcome. According to this logic, the country's unity will contribute significantly to the modernization of the Russian Federation. At the end of this common quest stands national strength and greatness. Thus, an important part of the newly-forming Russian state ideology consists of a return to the idea of Russian greatness, which is also inherently linked to *derzhavnost*. This implies protecting the fatherland from harmful domestic and foreign influences. Therefore, Vladimir Putin's statements are understandable, namely that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the "biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."³⁰ The glorification of 9 May 1945 and the idealization of Stalin and his regime have to be seen in the context of recalling imperial greatness to enhance the country's self-esteem,³¹ as well as the April 2007 dispute with Estonia regarding the removal of a Soviet era war *memorial* in Tallinn. Foreign policy threats are constructed to demonstrate the renewed power of Russia. Currently, these threats are concentrated in Central Europe and the US and are connected to US plans to deploy missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. In this context, Russian threats especially target NATO, because of its planned activities in Central Europe and its expansion to countries such as Georgia are interpreted as security threats to Russia. In an overreaction directed to the national audience, Vladimir Putin threatened to point nuclear missiles at Europe if the US missile defense base in Central Europe were realized.

A new pillar of state modernization is the Russian Orthodox Church. Religion was allowed a come-back in order to fill the gap left behind by communist ideology. Under Putin, the Church isn't a neutral independent institution, instead it is a loyal, inherent part of the state and incorporates the conservative and nationalist values set from above. Moreover, the Orthodox Church has reached the status of a "holy institution" whose guidelines have to be followed by the ordinary Russian if he wants to be a "good" citizen. Thus, it is the Church together with the state that issues moral guidelines and ensures the morality of citizens. Everything that is beyond the morals and the values proclaimed by the Church and the state is suspicious and sooner or later prohibited, if necessary through coercive means. In this system, patriotism and religion form an inseparable alliance and reinforce each other.

In this environment, other religions and nations are understood to be potentially problematic threats to the country's unity and security. Additionally, modern art and literature are potential problem areas as they normally express ideas that are not in line with official values. Unconventional art and literature that follow different moral principles and also include critiques of religion or nation, are treated as an insult to the Russian nation as a whole. Artists working in this way face incomprehension, threats and physical attacks. The 2002 exhibition "Attention Religion" criticized religion. Consequently, those responsible for it were deemed "enemies of the Russian state." In October 2006, an exhibition was destroyed because of its critical content. Another example is Vladimir Sorokin's opera "Rosenthals' Children", which has faced severe public attacks because of its criticism of Stalin. Certainly, the attacks regard only a few artists, but in reality they aim to discredit all non-conformist social movements and media, including foreigners and homosexuals.³² In addition, those artists, intellectuals and thinkers that represent conservative values are popular, for example the unprogressive, anti-Semitic and Europe-critical writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky has become a national center of reference embodying "Russian values." and the Russian nationalist Alexandr Solzhenitsyn was granted one of the highest Russian state awards, the State Prize in Humanities in June 2007.³³ Russia has re-established an official national discourse that is supported by most citizens, because it is rooted in a moral tradition that Russians understand.³⁴ Also, this discourse coincides with the new Russian nationalism; more than 50 percent of ethnic Russians support the phrase "Russia for the Russians."³⁵

Because as the goal of the strong state is to govern and to control an uncritical "mass", the state suppresses critical thinking from the very earliest phases of human socialization. Therefore, the education system concentrates on ideological, schematic, theoretical knowledge and teaching approaches that discourage flexibility, creativity and individual viewpoints. Most pupils fail when confronted with tasks that require the latter. The (Russian) explanation for low performance in this area, for example in the PISA study, has simply defended and justified the results on the basis that these reflect cultural and educational traditions, and further holds that the results of the mass aren't relevant, but only those of the highest performing group.³⁶ This reflects a thinking that supports the idea of a well-educated, small and loyal elite

and an easy-to-govern and uncritical population. However, official thinking emphasizes patriotism, supports the values of the Orthodox Church and promises security, but offers no solutions to the fundamental problems of social and human development. It also implies that religious fundamentalists and nationalists are allowed to express and act on racist and anti-Semitic beliefs and will face no consequences. The religious and political leadership has failed until now to take clear positions against nationalism and racism, such as by clearly condemning racially-motivated attacks on foreigners in Russia or by enacting a system of propagating severe penalties for such attacks.

The Russian path to state modernization relies strongly on the state administration. However, the danger is real that administrative procedures will become as important as the respective goals that lay behind them. Thus, administrative methods can always become an end in themselves. In the historical well-ordered police state, the very routine of government operations became uncontrollable and the bureaucracy evolved into a separate class with its specific interests, interests identified with the state rather than with society and other social interests. In this context, Raeff reminds us of the arrogance and self-righteousness of administrative power reaching an extreme degree, such as that in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great.³⁷ In present day Russia the clear danger is that the state may become dependant on its bureaucracy. In a perfectly well-ordered police state, the state is identical with the bureaucracy and is not capable of its own decision-making. In this setting, the political leadership is in danger of turning into an instrument of the bureaucracy. Relying on a strong bureaucracy is a double-edged sword: on the one hand the president and his staff need a strong administrative "hand" to implement the policies of state modernization, but on the other hand, the executive is always in danger of losing his or her ability for independent decision-making. Moreover, in such a state every aspect of life can become a matter of administrative organization.

Hierarchical and inflexible administrative instruments impede the development of dynamic and independent structures. A state of this kind doesn't accept dangerous developments that may challenge its power and politics are reduced to an administrative affair. The state becomes a "black box" whose decisions can be influenced only by being part of the system. But when facing socio-economic challenges, the state lacks adequate

political instruments. In this context it may be dangerous to rely on the bureaucracy to direct the exploitation of resources or the development the economy, because the state administration is still not efficient enough to exploit resources adequately and for the benefit of society as a whole. Thus, the state builds on a bureaucracy that cannot fulfill the expectations of society. However, bureaucratic predominance and autocratic instruments are considered necessary to ensure the modernization of the country. Social discipline is achieved through sanctions that may include threats, an atmosphere of fear and the concrete persecution of individuals. The idea behind this approach is that the more organization there is, the more control of society is possible. But the most probable outcome of social discipline is not a society of independent citizens, but of organized groups and mass culture.

In society organized in this way, state political and democratic institutions (particularly the parliament and the judicial system) are mostly instruments of those in power to reach the higher-order goal of a strong state. Elections have a system-supporting function: political elites and executive organs only accept candidates from their own political constituency and use “administrative methods” to hinder possible rivals from entering the political arena. There is in fact no alternative to a “strong man” for achieving the state’s goals of law and order.

CONCLUSION

After a decade of struggle, Russia has returned to its tradition of state development: law and order. Under the guidance of strong state structures (the president and his bureaucracy), social and economic interests have become an administrative affair whose regulations take place by decree, to the exclusion of the public. This Russian model of an authoritarian regime manifests itself in a paternalistic, administrative state that is strong, centralized and in control of society, which is constantly monitored. Under such circumstances it cannot be expected that broad opposition evolves independently. As a consequence, society and the public sphere are “depoliticized” and counteract forces disciplined by the state. Critique from outside the system is unwanted. The logic of the system requires the pacification of the media and the few critical civil society actors that exist within a generally weak civil society. Indicators for a well-ordered police state include the large influence of security agencies, the deprivation of power from political institutions, hidden political processes, bureaucratic omnipotence and the subordination of the economy to the state. At this stage of societal disempowerment, opposition and upheaval seems to be only possible from within the bureaucratic apparatus.

The well-ordered police state is a metaphor for “the state of the state” and political leadership under the President Putin has focused on placing the state over society. This implies that there should be no public space for social self-development, and that all development should be under state control. Thus, the Russian state continues to develop in a direction that is contrary to modern concepts that view politics as a public, open and free arena for holding debates and resolving conflicts in society. The logical result is the abolition of politics, if we define politics as the public debate between the different positions of different stakeholders and political parties.

Another question is whether this direction of state development is efficient? Within the structure of police/state corruption, maladministration and lack of innovation are not immediately apparent. But a well-ordered police state doesn't automatically imply a corruption-free state. Conversely, power accumulation within a closed bureaucratic apparatus fosters corruption within the system. Institutionalized corruption is based on the

arbitrary behavior of the bureaucracy acting in an opaque environment with fast-changing rules. Considering the individual interests of the political elite, the elite can profit from the corrupt structures of the hierarchic state administration, thus enabling clientelist relationships and providing them with career possibilities or monetary compensation. In contrast, organizations, businesses and ordinary citizens have always had to face the problem that the bureaucracy will find an unknown rule or will change measures without communicating them – in this case, the only rational solution to overcome superior bureaucratic power and behavior is most likely one that entails corruption. Additionally, the clients of the political elite within the bureaucratic apparatus need to be rewarded for their cooperative behavior, which also averts political unrest. Thus, they have to be incorporated in decision-making and, consequently, resource allocation processes. Thus, corruption is widespread in Russia; some researchers even write of a culture of corruption.³⁸

In Russia, unlike in the Western world, efficiency and modernization are not equated with democracy, but with control. The legitimization of the strong state is to provide law and order, and in this sense, the strengthening of the state and modernization take place for their own benefit.³⁹ Control impedes individual creativity and democratic participation. At the same time, seeking control causes the state to drift away from the needs of its population – a good example of this is the Russian health sector. The state is in full control of responses to undesired developments, such as the rapid spread of tuberculosis. In this case, this has meant that the state does not spread information on the urgency of the situation, and, as a result, does little to improve the general situation of the population.

Even if politics are reduced to the state administration, political energy is a part of society. In a surprise to some observers, studies have found that under President Putin, Russians feel independent for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They do so, because the regime allows citizens to express their feelings: in particular, mistrust towards the Western world and aggressive behavior towards “the other”, which has culminated into a progression of anti-Semitic and racist incidents in the domestic sphere.

The apparent lack of measures against the rise of xenophobia is proof that a strong state may not solve all the self-created and self-perpetuated internal problems. One goal of the state renewal project has been achieved: law and order in the context of a strong state controlling society. But the state expansion into society doesn't always follow the principle of a good and severe state. Some developments have outgrown the leadership's ability to cope with them, such as the inadequate response of the Russian authorities and law enforcement agencies to the problem of violent racist attacks. These developments seem to be going out of control despite the state's claim to have expanded into society to the extent that it can regulate anything a bureaucrat chooses.

It is increasingly obvious that President Putin and his supporters are not striving for democracy, but for control. The so-called "sovereign" democracy in Russia implies authoritarian rule.⁴⁰ The Russian leadership insists that it has its own, Eastern interpretation of Western democracy and adapts democratic values to a specific Russian context. In this context, democracy (as a setting in which discussions take place in order to select the best solutions possible) manifests itself in the control of society, for example in electoral engineering. The strong are willing to submit themselves from time to time to political elections, but without allowing for any real political competition.

Hence, one shouldn't cherish illusions about the Russian political system. Under the former Russian President Yeltsin, the Western world devoted itself to the idea of the birth of a genuine Russian democracy. It ignored the development of potential obstacles such as the strong constitutional position of the Russian president that ultimately impeded the installation of a truly democratic system. The window of democracy that was open to Russia after 1991 was too small to call into question the traditions of Russian authoritarianism and state strength. The supporters of Russian democracy soon had to accept the fact that a democratic changeover wouldn't take place. Once Vladimir Putin claimed the presidency, authoritarian measures and state control increased, and his first term of office was generally characterized as a "guided democracy." On various occasions, the president has made it clear that a liberal democracy according to Western principles isn't suitable for Russia.⁴¹ His rhetoric then was followed by activities that limit pluralism and increased the monitoring of society. In terms understood by the Russian political leadership,

democracy equates the loss of domestic authority and an increase in foreign (that is, Western) dominance. This stands in contrast to the Russian concept of a "sovereign" democracy, which allows for strong, independent central decision-making both in domestic and foreign policy.

Despite its authoritarian nature, most scholars agree that the Russian political system includes some democratic features, such as elections and a publicly-elected parliament. They have proposed several of their own categories to characterize the Russian system, including "democracy's double" or a "semi-authoritarian regime."⁴² But when analyzing modern autocratic regimes researchers note that all of them have some elements that we tend to link with democratic regimes. But to avoid any misunderstanding, it is best to use the classic categories that distinguish authoritarian political regimes by their tendency to limit pluralism and restrain opposition.⁴³ This label is justified if a given regime cannot lose elections, restricts independent entrepreneurship and represses the independent media in such a way that the freedom of expression doesn't exist in practical terms. In Russia, these characteristics do apply, but authoritarian policymaking is not an end in itself, it is just what one can observe with a coherent understanding of the relationship between state and society and the state's role in guiding society and initiating development.

Thus, behind the growing authoritarianism in Russia looms a whole concept of state development. The political leadership acts on a certain understanding of the state and the state's role in society. In this concept, state leadership is based on a strong, personalized figure (the president) that guides the state and society through an unstable world. The ruler relies on the state bureaucracy for rule enforcement, as well as on security and law enforcement agencies. The executive branch has taken over responsibility for policymaking and implementation, and political institutions such as parliament have lost their relevance. Moreover, independent modes of expression in the form of demonstrations or critical media coverage have become difficult. Instead, the state offers alternative, official modes for self-identification, such as religion and nationalism. The result is a culture of subordination dependent on state control and guidance.

HISTORICAL EVENT TIMELINE

THE STATE IN RUSSIA

1991–1999: Presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin is the first president of the Russian Federation after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He fails to reform and reorder the state after the collapse of the Soviet Union – the result is economic and social chaos across the country.

1993: New constitution significantly strengthens the power of the president.

1994–1996: First Chechen War due to incompetence on both sides in defining Chechnya's status within Russia. The Russian state's weakness is revealed in ineffective and demoralized federal troops that have to withdraw from Chechnya.

1999–present: Second Chechen War officially begins in retaliation to apartment bombings in Moscow and Volgograd. The new prime minister, Vladimir Putin, says the campaign is needed to eliminate terrorism. The war mainly serves to demonstrate Russian state strength and its refusal to allow the independence of one of its subjects.

31 December 1999: Vladimir Putin becomes Acting-President of Russia.

7 May 2000: Vladimir Putin is sworn in as president. He immediately begins a state restructuring program and in May 2000, restructures the most important ministries and creates seven federal districts to better control the subnational levels of the Russian Federation.

October 2002: Terrorist attack in Dubrovka Theater results in the death of approximately 150 people.

7 December 2003: The official government party "United Russia" wins 38 percent of the seats in the Duma (parliamentary) elections.

25 October 2003: The CEO of Yukos Oil company, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, is arrested.

31 May 2005: Mikhail Khodorkovsky is sentenced to nine years in prison for tax evasion. The company's ownership is frozen and its assets sold.

1 August 2006: Yukos Oil is declared bankrupt.

9 March 2004: President Putin issues a presidential decree for the creation of a super-industry ministry: the Ministry of Industry and Energy (Minpromenergo), which unites and subordinates several governmental agencies under this new umbrella agency.

September 2004: Terrorist attack in Beslan results in 344 dead, among them 186 children. After Beslan, President Putin takes over direct central control of the Russian provinces by replacing Russia's directly-elected governors with presidential appointees, to "secure the unity of state power and the logical development of federalism."

August 2005: Welfare reform provokes mass protests in Russian cities.

1 January 2006: Political parties are obliged to register at least 50,000 members.

17 January 2006: New requirements for public associations, non-commercial organizations and foreign nongovernmental / non-commercial organizations come into force. They restrict who may form an organization in the Russian Federation and expand the supervisory functions of the state.

Spring 2006: President Putin raises the barring clause for political parties to seven percent.

Autumn 2006: Hundreds of ethnic Georgians are deported from Russia.

7 October 2006: Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya is murdered.

28 October 2006: The Kremlin installs a system-compliant opposition party named "Just Russia".

November 2006: State-controlled Gazprom and Rosneft sign an agreement on strategic cooperation.

Early 2007: Gazprom acquires approximately 90 percent of the Russian media, among them *NTW*, *NTW-plus*, *TNT*, *Izvestija*, *Itogi* and *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

Spring 2007: State repression against opposition groups in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election campaign begins to rise.

1 April 2007: Russia bans all foreigners from working as retailers in its shops and markets.

April 2007: President Putin warns Russia will target Europe with its missiles if US plans to deploy an anti-missile defense system in Europe are carried out and that this will sharply increase the danger of another arms race.

9 March 2008: Expected date of the 2008 presidential elections in Russia.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ This idea was developed together with Nicolas Hayoz. The first significant examples of the interventionist and regulatory *Polizeistaat* are found in the Protestant states of Germany in the second half of the 16th century. We are aware of the fact that it might cause problems to transfer historical concepts and terms to present-day political realities. However, we think that the concept of a well-ordered police state is adequate to characterize the Russian state, because its concepts and policy measures map astonishingly well with the present-day situation in Russia.
- ² Raeff, Marc. "Russia's Autocracy and Paradoxes of Modernization," *Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 117fn.
- ³ Raeff, Marc. "The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach," *The American Historical Review*, 80, no. 5 (December 1975): 1221-1243.
- ⁴ Examples include the republics of Tatarstan and Kalmykia.
- ⁵ See Harley Balzer, "Vladimir Putin on Russian Energy Policy," which underlines the importance of a strong, state controlled economy to achieve state strength and development. <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/November2005/November2005Balzer.html>
- ⁶ Critics to the 1993 Constitution say that it established a "super-presidential system in Russia." See Andrei Ryabov in McFaul, Michael/Petrov, Nikolai/Ryabov, Andrei: "Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Russian Post-Communist Political Reform." Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, p.92f.
- ⁷ For an overview on the issue, see: "The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They Are and What They Want," *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2006-2007) http://www.twq.com/07winter/docs/07winter_bremmer.pdf. Grigori Pasko, interview with *RFE/RL*, 10 March 2005. The fact that the president controls the appointment of judges underlines this statement.
- ⁸ Shevchenko, Yulia. "The Central Government of Russia." Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004, p.168.
- ⁹ Grigori Pasko, interview with *RFE/RL*, 10 March 2005. The fact that the president controls the appointment of judges underlines this statement.
- ¹⁰ The Russian presidential administration is dominated by security agents with its two deputy chiefs Igor Sechin and Viktor Ivanov being the most prominent ones.
- ¹¹ Other estimates are up to 70 percent. An example for a government based *silovik* is Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. <http://www.bu.edu/iscip/voh4/Staar.html>.
- ¹² Vladimir Putin is said to be in favor of the FSB-ization of the country because of the service's "professionalism."
- ¹³ Shevchenko, p. 168, 2004 and <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/govt/ministry.htm>
- ¹⁴ Yukos was the country's largest private and most modern company at that time, but was on its way to become an economic and political threat to state power. Therefore, the enterprise was liquidated and its former owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky was jailed on accusations of tax crimes. See http://www.osw.waw.pl/files/PRACE_25.pdf on the Yukos Affair.
- ¹⁵ Gazprom was involved in the nationalization of the "economic empire" of the former oligarchs Vladimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. In this context, Gazprom is of geopolitical-strategic importance as the company's advances toward German energy-connected enterprises show. (Source: *RWE and E.On*). Enterprises loyal to the Russian state in general show rising interests in important shares of strategic European businesses. An example is EADS producing armaments and aircrafts, and is the majority shareholder of the Airbus-syndicate.
- ¹⁶ In this context, the state center also encourages the unification of Russian regions. In April 2005 the regions of Taymyr, Ewenk and Krasnoyarsk were unified to a region called Krasnoyarsk. Since 1 December 2005 a new region Perm exists (former oblast Perm and autonomous oblast of Komi-Permyak). Stanislav Belokovsky, the director of the National Strategic Institute, predicted a federal reform with less regions in an interview with *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 20 September 2004. See also Leon Aron, "Putin's Risk," in *Russian Outlook*, 12 January 2005.
- ¹⁷ Interview with Grigori Javlinsky, *Neue Züricher Zeitung (NZZ) am Sonntag*, (Zürich) 2 July 2006.
- ¹⁸ See *NZZ*, 30 October 2006.
- ¹⁹ *RFE/RL*, 18 February 2005 and *RFE/RL* 10 March 2005, "Interview with the chief editor of *Izvestia*," *Tages-Anzeiger* (Zürich), 28 June 2005, and *RFE/RL*, 23 May 2007.
- ²⁰ For details see the *International Press Institute (IPI) Watchlist* on Russia: http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/watchlist_detail.html?country=KW0078.
- ²¹ Initially for nine years (*NZZ am Sonntag*, 5 June 2005). However, in 2006 he faced additional charges of corruption that could prolong his detention in Siberia.
- ²² *The Financial Times* cites Vladimir Putin of referring to human rights as "artificial standards" that should not be forced on Russia.
- ²³ *The Financial Times*, 21 July 2005.
- ²⁴ From the Levada Institute. http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_performance.php?PHPSESSID=c98cdf336e884d3aa0e05dac6f9c05ad (accessed April 2007).
- ²⁵ Semen Novoprudskij: "Provincija zla," in *Gazeta.ru*, 3 December 2004.
- ²⁶ Only grave incidents make a discussion on these topics possible, such as the mutilation of an

army recruit on New Year's Eve 2005, *NZZ*, 9 February 2006). A discussion on racism, however, is barely possible, despite alarming increases in the numbers of murdered foreigners on this account.

- ²⁷ Interview with Andrei Illarionov, *Sonntagszeitung*, 8 May 2005.
- ²⁸ Vladislav Surkov in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 29 September 2004 and *Der Spiegel*, No. 25 / 2005.
- ²⁹ See the report of *Amnesty International* on Russian racism. <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/document.do?id=ENGEUR460162006> and <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4969296.stm>.
- ³⁰ See RFE/RL, 29 April 2005, <http://rfe.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/04/725c2b55-eoco-488f-b720-0283bdf98c10.html>.
- ³¹ A survey among 2,000 young Russians showed that 20 percent would elect Stalin as President, *NZZ am Sonntag*, 2 July 2006.
- ³² The circumstances around the planned Moscow gay parade in May 2006 also reflect the anti-liberal and aggressive climate.
- ³³ *NZZ*, 7/8 May 2005 and *NZZ* 5 June 2007.
- ³⁴ *Financial Times*, 17-18 July 2004. Lesley Chamberlain: "Motherland: A Philosophical History of Russia," London: Atlantic Books, 2004.
- ³⁵ See the analytical Levada Center (<http://www.levada.ru>) for polling results or the above mentioned amnesty international report on Russian racism.
- ³⁶ Schmidt, Gerlind: TIBI Nr. 5: PISA - Reaktionen der teilnehmenden Länder im Spiegel ihrer Presse: Russland, 25 July 2005. http://www.dipf.de/publikationen/tibi/tibi5_russland.pdf
- ³⁷ Marc Raeff: "The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach," in *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 80, No. 5, 1230, December 1975.
- ³⁸ See the Freedom House Report "Nations in Transit 2006" for details: <http://www.freedomhouse.hu/pdfdocs/russia2006.pdf>, and also Vladimir Putins Annual Address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml.
- ³⁹ Babaeva, Svetlana / Bovt, Georgi: "It Is too Early to Relax, Russia," in *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 3, 72-88, 2004.
- ⁴⁰ A concept focusing on state rule by the "national elite" developed by Russian Deputy Chief of Staff Vladislav Surkov, one of the main political technologists of the Kremlin. See: Vladimir Ryzhkov: "Sovereign Democracy and the Usurper State." *Moscow Times*, 16 August 2005, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/08/16/006.html>.
- ⁴¹ For example in: Natalia Gevorkjan: "Ot pervogo litsa. Razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym" (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000).
- ⁴² Ivan Krastev: "Democracy's Doubles," in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, 2, April 2006 and Marina Ottaway: "Democracy Challenged. The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism" (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).
- ⁴³ Linz, Juan, J.: "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in *Handbook of Political Science*, 175-412, Fred Greenstein, Fred / Polsby, Nelson (eds.). Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975.

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