

DIIS REPORT

TERROR PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT AID:

WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW

Bjørn Møller

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It ain't what you don't know
that gets you into trouble.
It's what you know for sure
that just ain't so.

Mark Twain (1835-1910)¹

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I. Preface

This paper attempts to record what is known and not known about the links between terrorism and its associated prevention, highlighting factors which might be addressed by development aid, including the popular support for terrorism, i.e. the “terrorist constituencies.”

For rather obvious reasons this involves surveying literature from a number of academic disciplines, in which the author (a political scientist with another degree in history, previous studies of philosophy and some expertise in security studies) is not an expert – e.g. psychology, theology, sociology, anthropology, demography and economics. This approach, was selected as it was obvious that a holistic and multidisciplinary approach is required, and the author has about two decades of experience from the equally multidisciplinary field of peace and conflict research. Moreover, as a hedge against blatant amateurism, references are in most cases taken from the central journals of the respective disciplines.

The triple aims are to question some commonly held assumptions; to identify various lacunae in our knowledge about the various causal links; and to suggest ways of filling these, with a view to offering, among other things, some policy guidance. However, the paper is not intended as an argument in favour of using aid for terror prevention and certainly not of redirecting aid – neither from poverty alleviation and similar “traditional” ODA (Official Development Assistance) objectives to counter-terrorism, nor from traditional recipient countries to such as might be breeding grounds for terrorism. In fact, the author has previously argued against this, as have other authors, and he continues to regard it as unwise and ethically unjustifiable.² Nevertheless, if some reorientation take place, (and this seems to be happening), it is surely preferable that it is done on a well-informed basis, so that decision-makers may escape the trap of politics as highlighted by Groucho Marx: “*Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies.*”³

2. Development Aid: Helping Others or Ourselves?

Development aid from the various donor countries of the global North to the developing countries of the South, has evolved over time, mainly by adding supplementary layers of objectives, as illustrated in Fig. 1.⁴

Fig. 1: The Expanding Development Agenda

+ Terror prevention					
+ Security					
+ Good governance					
+ Sustainability					
+ Poverty alleviation					
Economic Growth					
1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2001 - date

According to most accounts, the origins of the very idea of development aid can be traced back to US foreign policy thinking in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, especially to the famous “point four” in the inaugural address of President Truman in January 1949.⁵ This was, however, mainly intended for delivery to the war-ravaged countries of Europe, by means of the Marshall Plan.⁶

The very idea though, that rich countries should assist poorer ones, is of an even older vintage. Even though the motives for colonialism were surely predominantly selfish,⁷ altruistic rationales were nevertheless brought into play by the colonial powers as a justification of their imperialistic ventures. Just think of Rudyard Kipling’s notion of the “white man’s burden”⁸ or the French “*mission civilisatrice*.”⁹ It was even the case in the notorious “scramble for Africa” in the late 19th Century,¹⁰ in which the most perverse instance was the quest by the Belgian King Leopold for the control and subsequent (absolutely ruthless) exploitation of the Congo. This was “justified” with references to a civilising (and evangelising) mission which was also intended to grant protection to the natives from Arab slave raiders.¹¹

Development objectives were also included in the mandates granted by the League of Nations to the victors of the First World War (especially Britain and France), who were tasked by the League, with administering the colonial territories of the

vanquished (mainly Germany and the Ottoman Empire). In most respects they treated these mandate territories as colonies, but they were obliged to report to the League's Mandate Commission on the progress they were making with readying the territories for independence at an indeterminate date in the (presumably rather distant) future.¹²

However, development aid as we know it today (ODA: Official Development Assistance), only came of age in the fifties and sixties, as a response to the achievement of independence by most of the former colonies, mainly in Africa, in an international setting dominated by the Cold War. Hence, one of the objectives of the early modernisation theorists (or development aid strategists) such as Walt Rostow was to halt the perceived spread of communism to the newly independent states. The suggested method was to facilitate a speedy transition from traditional society to the "stage of mass consumption." The central stage in this envisaged evolution was that of "take-off." To accomplish this, the would-be developing countries would need a boost in the form of a transfer of capital, mainly in the form of loans. These would presumably be rather short-term, as the economies were expected to quickly develop an inherent dynamic, based on the strength of the market economy, and reflected in a rapid growth of their GDPs (gross domestic products).¹³

Little attention was initially paid to the distributional aspects of economic growth, and it soon became apparent that the poor did not automatically benefit from economic growth rates, which were frequently lower than expected. This resulted in additional objective of poverty alleviation.¹⁴ In part, this provided an alternative concept to the "Afro-socialism," which was at that time viewed as a serious challenge, e.g. in countries such as Tanzania.¹⁵

By the mid-eighties, it was increasingly acknowledged that the development aims had to be sustainable, e.g. in environmental terms, lest the present generation mortgage the wealth of their countries at the expense of future generations.¹⁶ At around the same time, the demand for "good governance" was increasingly included among the criteria for the granting of aid,¹⁷ as among other things, poor (e.g. corrupt and/or undemocratic) governance was viewed as a hindrance in the quest for "pro-poor development." Elements in this quest for better governance included attempts to strengthen civil society,¹⁸ as well as to reduce (what were seen as) bloated state structures via privatisation, as envisaged under the neo-liberal "Washington consensus."¹⁹

By around the mid-nineties, development agencies which had formerly shied away from anything related to military matters, were coming to realise that armed conflicts were an obstacle to development, and that something needed to be done to prevent, manage or resolve them. Hence, conflict issues – e.g. conflict prevention or post-conflict peacebuilding – were included in the ODA agendas and portfolios of the main donors countries.²⁰ As a consequence and reflection of this reorientation, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also began devoting considerable attention to conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security sector reform and, for example, established a DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC). Even more importantly, it has endorsed making contributions to peace and conflict-related initiatives allowing i.e. member states to include them under their ODA contributions, which are continually recorded by DAC in its statistics.²¹

The Bretton Woods organisations (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, IMF) have also initiated programmes related to peace and security, including a Post-Conflict Fund²² and a research unit, which in 2003 published a major report on the links between development and peace.²³ The United Nations Development Program, UNDP, has also contributed to linking development, conflict and security, by forging (in the 1993 edition of its *Human Development Reports*) the concept of “human security.”

The concept of security must change—from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (*Human Development Report 1993*)²⁴

Since then, the UNDP has sought to “mainstream” conflict and security issues in development programmes, for example, by institutionalising “conflict-related development analyses.”²⁵

The latest addition to the list of development aid objectives is terror prevention.²⁶ This has been taken up by both the OECD-DAC and individual development agencies.²⁷ Even though it bears a superficial resemblance to the “security and conflict agenda,” there may be less similarities than initially meets the eye. In fact, the terror agenda may (if taken at face value) represent quite a radical break with former development thinking and practice, or at least, a return to

something resembling the former anti-communist agenda of some of the donor countries.

What all of the previous ODA rationales had in common was the shared normative premise that what really mattered was to assist countries and populations in need. Less altruistic motives such as the geopolitical interests of governments and the economic interests of private actors also played a role, although, it would be hard to make the case that these were the primary rationales for the granting of ODA. The new rationale, explicitly promotes the security of the donors (mainly the West), in the face of the perceived threat from international terrorism. It is thus based on a selfish normative premise.

Table 1: Total Net ODA Flows from OECD Countries (US\$ million)²⁸

Country	1988-89 avr.	1993-94 avr.	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Australia	2,565	2,109	1,961	1,290	834	3,010	2,466
Austria	227	680	1,135	836	1,910	1,445	1,352
Belgium	1,623	1,457	2,281	304	1,337	1,221	816
Canada	2,849	5,460	6,483	1,538	2,044	4,949	5,986
Denmark	816	1,358	2,176	2,645	1,577	1,896	2,634
Finland	848	444	1,087	1,334	- 180	- 44	..
France	5,337	11,810	5,557	16,327	4,729	6,936	12,599
Germany	11,979	19,657	12,331	6,345	7,207	5,224	11,830
Greece	229	202	322	403	472
Ireland	81	163	740	735	1,469	2,334	3,851
Italy	5,419	2,899	10,846	- 189	1,399	4,218	3,239
Japan	20,457	22,182	11,423	13,714	4,659	6,335	11,351
Luxembourg	20	59	129	144	148	201	242
Netherlands	2,567	5,108	6,947	-3,432	-1,487	15,196	14,106
New Zealand	121	119	142	139	164	208	271
Norway	904	1,350	1,437	1,485	2,279	3,306	2,785
Portugal	108	255	4,622	1,775	175	1,145	676
Spain	494	2,453	23,471	11,523	8,171	6,667	12,762
Sweden	2,341	2,427	3,952	3,077	2,232	1,255	2,954
Switzerland	1,629	1,833	2,054	- 158	2,234	3,684	- 949
UK	6,879	9,651	10,230	9,627	7,634	18,561	26,922
United States	16,944	58,987	25,252	38,618	24,410	37,860	32,283
TOTAL	84,208	150,461	134,485	107,880	73,267	126,009	148,646

What may make this reorientation more palatable for the recipients, is that it has been accompanied by a rise in otherwise shrinking total ODA flows, which had by 2004 almost reached the level of ten years ago (see Table 1). Whether this is a mere correlation, or there is a causal link between the reorientation and the total amount for ODA is, however, impossible to ascertain on the basis of the aggregate figures alone, and several interpretations of the figures are possible.

It may be the case, that “traditional ODA” has remained constant while additional terror-related items have been added, and thus accounting for the rise. To the author’s knowledge, there exist no ODA figures which disaggregate total ODA into budget items such as “terror prevention,” and most of what may be intended as terror prevention initiatives, may well be granted as support for civil society, good governance and the like – which may or may not actually help preventing terrorism. It may also be the case that certain countries have been selected and others abandoned as recipients of ODA, based on terror prevention considerations, perhaps leaving total ODA disbursement more or less constant – any actual increase being due to other factors. Finally, it is entirely conceivable that ODA programmes are simply being re-labelled, i.e. that the development aid bureaucracies in the donor countries simply pay lip-service to the new priorities of their political masters by labelling programmes “terror prevention,” which they would, in any case, have supported for other reasons. *Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.*

Regardless of its rationales, ODA is a rather blunt instrument. It would probably be far too optimistic to expect to be able to affect major changes in government policies (to say nothing of actual regime change) by means of development aid. At best, it can affect policy changes at the margins and usually only as the result of a long-term engagement, whereas it tends to have quite insignificant short-term effects, especially with regard to “high politics,” particularly when governments see their power or the national interest as being at stake. Moreover, the impact will usually be predominantly “structural.”

Therefore, it is thus not even plausible that development aid could be a particularly effective instrument for terror prevention. To the extent that it may be instrumentalised at all, it seems most likely that it could succeed at the macro level, i.e. general environment and the presumed terrorist constituencies. It seems more questionable whether it can affect changes at the micro- or meso-levels of the individuals themselves, or the movements and groups to which they belong. As

a prelude to the analysis of these issues, however, we need to look further at the question of what is known about terrorism and its causes.

3. Epistemology and Methodology

As this paper is devoted to mapping what we know and do not know about the relationship between terrorism and development aid, it seems appropriate to commence with a few clarifying observations about the very concept of knowledge.

3.1 What is Knowledge?

We may take as our point of departure some observations on knowledge by (now former) US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, drawn from a website devoted to his “poetry.”

As we know, there are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns.
That is to say we know there are some things we do not know
But there are also unknown unknowns,
the ones we don't know we don't know.²⁹

Without spending too much time on epistemological and other philosophical questions, it seems appropriate to clarify and expand the concepts a little further, while retaining Rumsfeld's terminology.³⁰

- “Known knowns” refers to that which is demonstrably true and realised to be so, regardless of whether this knowledge is derived from logical reasoning, empirical observation or any combination thereof. It must, however, be acknowledged that all non-logical (e.g. empirical or what Kant called “synthetic”³¹) knowledge is conditional, i.e. in principle, liable to falsification by future observations.³² It seems reasonable, nevertheless, to count many empirical statements as knowledge, if they are supported by sufficient empirical evidence; accepted by the acknowledged authorities in the respective field; and neither empirically falsified (yet), nor demonstrated to be logically flawed. At the very least, such a common sense approach³³ seems to be *sine qua non* of doing anything, which is often inevitable. That the sun is going to rise tomorrow as it did today, or even, that the weather forecast will prove reasonably accurate, are possible examples of such an approach.
- “Known unknowns” refers to various acknowledged lacunae in knowledge, with regard to which it is fairly obvious what *kinds* of insights might fill them,

and how such insights might be acquired, regardless of whether this has actually been done, or is practically possible. Whether there is life on a specified celestial body might be a case in point.

- “Unknown unknowns” is best conceived of as a residual category, comprising the answers to those questions which nobody has yet thought of asking. For rather obvious reasons, this category defies further elaboration, and the best an analyst can do may be to follow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s advice: “*Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.*”³⁴

It seems appropriate to expand Rumsfeld’s taxonomy with two additional categories.

- “Hidden knowns” are similar to the kind of insights pursued by Socrates, (in addition to his making a determined effort to reveal false knowns)³⁵ by means of his dialectical method, recorded in Plato’s dialogues, he endeavoured i.e. to derive viable insights from knowledge already possessed. For instance, if two phenomena (A and B) share many, but not all, characteristics, one can reasonably draw some inferences from what is known about A to help explain B, presupposing that the characteristics which they do share appear to be more significant and relevant than those they do not, and that these inferences are acknowledged as conditional and subject to testing. Such hidden “knowns” may have a heuristic value as they can help the analyst formulate plausible hypotheses for empirical testing, as in the so-called “abductive” method.³⁶ An example might be that if it is known that running is a good remedy against obesity, cycling might also be so.
- “False knowns” seems an apt term for commonly held assumptions which just happen to be wrong, regardless of whether they have yet been exposed as such. Although the “flat earth theory” was once universally believed to be accurate, (a “known known”) it was surely wrong, (and thus a false known) even before the first circumnavigators of the globe actually proved it so. By implication, some of what is now held to belong to the category of known knowns may, in due course, be revealed as a false known. This was, ironically, the fate that befell Donald Rumsfeld’s allegations about the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

False knowns are arguably more harmful than known, or even unknown unknowns, if only because they may produce actions that are counter-productive, as eloquently put by Mark Twain in the quote on the front page. Ignorance is usually

an eminent justification for doing nothing, which is often preferable to doing the wrong thing. As persuasively argued by Socrates, more than two thousand years ago, it may be more prudent to acknowledge one's ignorance, than to pretend to know what one does not:

(...) I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed to him (...) When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself (...). So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is – for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him.³⁷

In our specific field of inquiry, i.e. the links between terrorism and (lack of) development, there unfortunately seem to be very few genuine known knowns, i.e. solid, empirical findings based on the links between the two. By mid-2006, literature covering this aspect of terrorism and development available in the public domain, consisted of a report prepared for Danida; a rather thin RAND report; (covering only three countries); and an OECD document.³⁸ There were also a number of regional or country case studies, as well as, a wealth of studies dealing with selected aspects of the theme, but these do not automatically add up to any full picture.


However, there are, several potential candidates for relegation into the false knowns category, either because what are taken to be obvious truths are demonstrably wrong, or because they do not constitute actual knowledge, but amount to mere guesswork, often based on very flimsy evidence, logical fallacies, or both. A case in point is the widespread assumption that failed states are breeding grounds, favourite hiding places or operations areas for terrorists, to which we shall return in due course.

Moreover, there are some likely “hidden knowns,” as terrorism has a number of affinities with phenomena such as civil war and organised crime, where accumulated knowledge does indeed exist. Even though the insights thus derived from such disciplines as demography, sociology, anthropology, economics and psychology (usually lumped together as parts of general conflict theory) may not quite meet the standards of knowledge, they might well qualify as “reasonable assumptions.”

These are usually what are accepted as sufficient to guide practitioners of the field, as well as most people in their daily lives.

3.2 Promises and Pitfalls of Analogical Reasoning

As mentioned above, there may be some “hidden knowns” in other fields of study, pertaining to phenomena which either have certain characteristics in common with terrorism, and/or which are often directly linked with it, either in the sense of one accompanying or supporting the other, or of the same actors switching between one and the other. In particular, those of rebellion (civil war or liberation struggles) and (organised) crime (see Fig. 2).



As far as the direct links are concerned, the movement (as illustrated by the arrows), of individuals and organisations from rebellion or terrorism to criminal activities is usually a one-way street, whereas organisations often switch back and forth between rebellion and terrorism according to their strategic calculations. Both rebellion and terrorism frequently resort to crime as a means to an end, i.e. as a way to finance their struggle.

What all three have in common is, of course, their illegality in violating the law of the land – even though certain forms of rebellion (e.g. wars of national liberation,

but not terrorism) may be permissible according to international law.³⁹ Among the commonalities between terrorism and rebellion are the goals pursued, both on the part of individual actors and organisations,, i.e. their respective motives and strategies – as well as the use of violence as such, even though it tends to be different forms of violence which are employed. Commonalities between terrorism and crime include the various instruments and tactics, e.g. the use of assassinations, kidnappings and similar forms of violence. There are, however, at least as many differences as similarities between the three. For instance, crime is usually conducted for selfish reasons, whereas both rebellion and terrorism are usually “altruistic” in the sense of being viewed by the actors themselves as serving some common good – however perverse this view may appear to others.

We shall return to all the various links and commonalities in due course. The question is whether and how to take advantage of them, e.g. via “analogical reasoning.” It is always tempting to use analogies in this way, as is often done by journalists and politicians – e.g. the analogy between Saddam Hussein and Hitler.⁴⁰ This may even be perfectly legitimate for illustrative purposes, just as thinking analogically may have heuristic value, as mentioned above. When used for scholarly purposes, however, great circumspection is called for.⁴¹

For instance, whereas observations of so different creatures of the air as bumblebees, bats and birds may legitimately be used as evidence in support of hypotheses about aerodynamics, one cannot deduce anything about the mating habits of bats from observations of sparrows or bees, or vice versa. Likewise, just because both criminals, rebels and terrorists are non-state actors using weapons one cannot automatically assume that they all do so for the same reasons. Nor can one automatically conclude from finding a significant correlation between, say, a country’s demographic profile and its propensity for armed conflict, that the same country will also have a high incidence of crime or terrorism. The best one can do is to formulate and test hypotheses to this effect.

The use of analogy may, in fact, mainly be negative in the sense of providing a shortcut to dismissing hypotheses as implausible and not worth testing – as it is impossible to test all conceivable correlations. Whereas one cannot conclude much about C from the significance of a correlation between A and B, it may sometimes be possible to deduce something, at least tentatively, from the demonstrated absence of any significant correlation. For instance, if it were to turn out that there is no correlation between poverty and armed conflict, one might

(tentatively) dismiss the hypothesis that there should be one between poverty and terrorism. A “structural” feature such as poverty is surely more likely to impact significantly on large groups of people, such as insurgent movements, than on small ones such as terrorist organisations.

3.3 The Need for Interdisciplinarity – with a Caveat

It is counter-intuitive that a complex phenomenon such as terrorism should lend itself to study from the vantage point of a single academic discipline. Just like, for instance, peace and conflict research,⁴² research on terrorism should be able to draw on a number of different disciplines, each of which may illuminate aspects of the phenomenon:

- Strategic studies may shed light on the strategic calculations of the terrorist groups and leaders as well as on the strategic interaction between terrorists and counter-terrorist agencies;⁴³
- Political science should be able to analyse terrorists as political actors, seeking to affect “the authoritative allocation of values for a society,”⁴⁴ (the “who gets what, when and how” question); and it should be able to say something on the propensity of different political systems to foster terrorism as well as their vulnerability to terrorist attack and the effects of terrorism on political freedoms;
- International relations should have something to say on the links between terrorism (and the “war on terrorism”); the configuration of the international system; and on the role of international organisations in countering terrorism;⁴⁵
- Economics should both be able to analyse terrorists as economic actors, e.g. in the form of cost-benefit analyses; and to illuminate the economic aspects (“the money trail”) of terrorism;⁴⁶
- Sociology should allow for the analysis of the propensities of different societies to breed terrorism, as well as the “career paths” of terrorists and their typical social features, just as it should be able to explain the dynamics of small(ish) groups such as terrorist organisations and their relations with their respective constituencies and environments;
- Psychology is the obvious discipline for the study of the motivation of the individual terrorists, including possible psychopathologies, but it should also allow for the analysis of the effects of terrorism on the “public mood,” i.e. the terror which terrorism intends to create;
- Religious studies (including, but not limited to theology) is the obvious dis-

- disciplinary vantage point for studying the motivational factors underlying (Islamic and other) religious terrorism;
- Culture studies could elaborate on cultural factors prompting or impeding terrorism, and it may allow for an understanding of terrorism as “communicative action”⁴⁷ And finally
 - Area studies (which are themselves profoundly interdisciplinary) needed for studying the specifics of terrorist groups and environments, as an antidote against unwarranted generalisations.

There is an obvious need for a multidisciplinary approach. However, this is not without its own problems, most prominently the risk of amateurism. The age of polyhistorians such as Aristotle or Da Vinci is over, and it is today impossible for even the most brilliant minds to master the totality of science. Hence the need to draw on the specialists of the respective fields, e.g. by going to the academic and professional journals, and to publish new findings for wider scrutiny and analysis. This presents further methodological challenges which we discuss below.

3.4 The Epistemology of Espionage: A Cautionary Note on Secrecy

Quite a few of the claims to knowledge come out of (or at least originate in) the intelligence agencies of the major powers, such as, in the US, the CIA, FBI, or their counterparts in other countries.⁴⁸ It is inherently plausible that some of these claims are at least, partly well-founded and that they thus satisfy at least some of the criteria of constituting knowledge. At the very least, they may be accurate in the same sense that a victim’s account of a rape may well be accurate, even if unsubstantiated by other witnesses. A secret agent who has been successfully infiltrated into a clandestine (terrorist or other) organisation, may, for instance, come to know quite a lot about this organisation and the mindsets of its members and leaders. Indeed, s/he may even be privy to details about planned actions, even though s/he may be unable to prove this independently. Those relying on the warnings of such agents, often have to accept them without any corroborating evidence, i.e. simply on the basis of an assessment of the credibility of the informant.

There are, however, a number of important caveats pertaining to both the gathering of such information and to its interpretation, both of which are likely to be affected by psychological/cognitive as well as organisational factors which may produce serious biases and misperceptions.⁴⁹ Quite a lot has been written on such matters pertaining to the Cold War confrontation, particularly by US scholars,⁵⁰

and the general problems highlighted seem to apply equally to intelligence related to counter-terrorism.

As far as HUMINT (“human intelligence,” in the professional jargon)⁵¹ i.e. the gathering of information by individual spies and other agents, is concerned, it is likely to be influenced by both economic and psychological factors. Firstly, the agents are likely to be influenced by the need to offer something useful to their employers, in order to justify their continued employment. Agents with nothing to report are likely to soon find themselves without a job, which may mean that they may feel tempted to report either trivia or incorrect facts. This seems to have been a significant factor in one of history’s most extensive networks of domestic espionage, the notorious Stasi (*Staatssicherheitsdienst*) of East Germany,⁵² but it probably applies to other agencies as well. Reports are likely to reflect, at least to some extent, what the agents expect that their superiors (or clients, in the case of freelance agents) would like to hear. The more so, the lesser the “job security” of the agent in question.

Secondly, there is no such thing as a completely objective gathering of information. It inevitably involves elements of interpretation, if only with regard to the significance of the intelligence data gathered and choices about where to look for what, whom to ask, and whom to trust. Here, well-documented cognitive mechanisms such as the quest for cognitive consonance and avoidance of dissonance are likely to play a role. It follows that it is more likely that “the usual suspects” will be subjected to above-average levels of scrutiny and that observations of their behaviour and discourse will be interpreted in the light of preconceived views.⁵³ The mechanism of “groupthink” may also operate on the level of the individual agents (who form part of a loose “community” of field agents, which may even include freelancers). However, the effects of groupthink are probably stronger at an organisational level, where it may have the effect of making more believable pieces of information which correspond to what the group expects.⁵⁴

Groupthink definitely operates in organisational settings, including the individual intelligence services and, even more so, in Byzantine structures such as the US intelligence community. Here, its effects are likely to be amplified by bureaucratic politics, i.e. the effect of institutional interests on attitudes and beliefs, particularly those relating to budgetary shares and autonomy.⁵⁵ All the information gathered by field agents is filtered through the various layers of “the system” all the way to the decision-makers, and this filtering process is subject to all the aforementioned

cognitive impediments. Sometimes, such inevitable biases in the interpretation of the available intelligence data is taken to extremes, as with Rumsfeld's "hypothesis-based intelligence," as applied both to the missile threat and to Iraq. According to a recent critical analysis, this boils down to "construct[ing] an hypothesis-based analysis, starting with a preconceived idea and seeing if there was any information that might support it."⁵⁶

All of the above problems would be severe enough even in the absence of a strategic and calculating adversary (be that a state or a terrorist group), but the problems are inevitably exacerbated by the fact that intelligence is an integral part of the strategic interaction, in which deception and misinformation play a central role. According to the Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu, deception is the central element in military strategy,⁵⁷ and the same could surely be said about counter-terrorism.⁵⁸ The terrorist will, of course, play a role similar to that of Descartes' "evil genius," (*genius malignus*) in his attempts to fool the intelligence agent or agency, leaving the analysts doubting everything excepting their doubts and the existence of their own doubting minds.⁵⁹ However philosophically satisfactory such a position may be, it is hardly what a government wants from its intelligence services.

Paradoxically, such misinformation can either take the shape of concealment or the exact opposite. In the former what matters is, as so aptly formulated by "Sir Humphrey" in the BBC's *Yes Minister* series, to "keep it a secret that one has a secret to keep,"⁶⁰ which may of course, be very difficult. If the existence of a secret is known (a "known unknown"), the veil of secrecy is usually penetrated sooner or later. At least as effective as concealing something, is flooding the other side's information processing system with false warnings (i.e. changing the "signal-to-noise ratio").⁶¹ Rather than no warning signs at all, the intelligence community will be forced to deal with an unmanageable number, without the ability to determine which to take seriously or which to ignore. A failure to do so, may well have been the best explanation of the US failure to predict the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, which was preceded by plenty of warning signs,⁶² and the exploitation of this problem even seems to have been a Soviet strategem during the Cold War.⁶³ Terrorists may be using the same strategy. The 9/11 attacks were in fact, preceded by warnings which were simply disregarded as not credible, even though they were subsequently proven all too accurate. The report of the official US "9/11 Commission," stated that "the system was blinking red" during the summer of 2001.⁶⁴ The highest degrees of vigilance cannot possibly be maintained indefinitely. Communicating risk effectively and encouraging the people to "be

vigilant,” particularly against the diffuse risks associated with terrorism is difficult.⁶⁵ Hence, whatever safeguards and precautions are adopted under a “high alert” will eventually have to be relaxed,⁶⁶ which will in turn create a “window of opportunity” for the other side.

Planting and maintaining a “mole” (i.e. a secret double agent) in the other side’s intelligence service may be useful. Having one’s moles unmasked may serve the same purpose, as it may generate scepticism about the trustworthiness of even truthful and reliable agents. Not only does such misinformation (including “double bluffs”) hamper risk assessment, but it may also produce crises, during which cognitive processes tend to undergo several changes, none of which really help in making the right decisions.⁶⁷ It should thus come as no surprise that the list of failures is quite long. Even the best resourced intelligence agencies fail to predict major events, or get it wrong in other respects, as with the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.⁶⁸

The normative implications of all these observations about espionage and secrecy for academic analysts are fairly obvious. There are greater differences between scholarly research and intelligence than one might think, and the insights provided by the latter tend to be inferior. Eva Horn illustrates this brilliantly in an article on “the epistemology of secret intelligence”

The secrecy and the closed nature of the intelligence services precludes any competition, and thus correction, of the gained results. Whereas the crowning achievement of scholarly research is publication, which opens the possibility for contradiction, intelligence is blind. It is created, circulated, and eventually discarded in an imaginary space that quite possibly is nothing more than one’s own interior but which is experienced as “external.” (...) [A]s nobody else is equipped to share the knowledge thus classified, nobody will correct an aberrant hypothesis, nobody will contribute contradicting information. This is why, in their lucidity as well as their blindness, the intelligence services tend to be very stubborn about their hypotheses and very reluctant about dialogue and exchange.⁶⁹

By implication, it is probably wise to refrain from mixing the two. Intelligence agencies have to provide information on the basis of which politicians can make decisions. Scholars, on the other hand, should provide reliable insights, regardless of their immediate (political or other) utility. If they do so, their find-


ings should be of value to the intelligence services, as a form of “Open Source Information”(OSINF), which is becoming increasingly important.⁷⁰ This will usually be more useful for the long-term (“strategic”) analysis than for short-term (“tactical” or “operational”) plans, and the role of scholars will usually be to question prevailing assumptions and ask the appropriate questions rather than to provide answers. In order to serve this role, however, scholars must uphold the academic standards of using only open sources so as to ensure that their findings are replicable and falsifiable. This norm will be followed in this analysis, and the following chapter clarifies the terminology.

4. Conceptualisation and Taxonomy

One of the most basic problems is to find a workable definition of terrorism, terrorists and all the other related terms belonging to the same “family.” Preferably, it should be precise enough to logically distinguish between what should and what should not be labelled; operational in the sense of actually allowing for a reasonably exact and consistent labelling of observed phenomena or entities; and consensual in the sense of not departing too much from the common usage of the term. In addition, it should also ideally be able to muster a political consensus.

4.1 Phenomena, Concepts and Terms

Leaving aside the gargantuan problems in agreeing on a political definition, finding one that is logically consistent is more complicated than one might expect. It may not really work to just search for the lowest common denominator of all references to “terrorism,” even when referring back to a group of phenomena which are similar in the relevant respects, we cannot automatically assume that the term is always used to signify the same concept, (see Fig. 3) – and even less so, the further back into history we go.⁷¹



In one way, there is quite a big difference between, the terror caused by what we today (usually) label as terrorist groups and, in another way, the other side, the *terreur* deliberately created by the Jacobin *Comité de Salut Publique* of the French Revolution (1793-94),⁷² the “red terror” decreed by Lenin after the Russian Revolution⁷³ or, more recently, by the *Dergue* in revolutionary Ethiopia (1974-1991).⁷⁴ What they have in common may merely be the psychological effects of the use of violence, but it is far from self-evident that this should be the defining feature of terrorism. A lot of other occurrences may cause fear (earthquakes, for instance) which it would seem bizarre to label as terrorism.

It is also debatable whether, for instance, “tyrannicides” really belong to what we would today call terrorism, considering that even Cicero called it “the noblest of all noble deeds.”⁷⁵ Few would today pin the terrorist label on Brutus and his accomplices for their assassination of Julius Caesar; the Thermidoreans who instigated the execution of the aforementioned Robespierre and his accomplices; or on Colonel Stauffenberg and the other German officers plotting to assassinate Adolf Hitler.⁷⁶ On the other hand, the Russian *Narodnya Volja* group is often reckoned to be among the first of modern terrorists, by virtue of their plotting to assassinate the Czar of Russia,⁷⁷ and there is near unanimity on labelling the assassination of Anvar Sadat as terrorism.⁷⁸ It may also be questioned whether, for instance, sabotage without human casualties should be counted as terrorism.

4.2 Definitions of Terrorism

Unfortunately, there is no authoritative definition of terrorism, neither within academia⁷⁹ nor within the international community. Even though the United Nations has, for instance, passed several resolutions and conventions about terrorism, it has for some time, grappled in vain with agreeing on a definition.⁸⁰ Indeed, between and within states, there is not always unanimity about the proper definition, as different agencies within the same government may apply different definitions. Even the United States’ government uses at least four different definitions, which differ both with regard to the targets and motives, even though they largely agree on focusing on these two aspects in their definitions (see Table 2⁸¹ and Table 5 in Chapter 6).

The EU has a more convoluted definition, which refers both to intentions (“seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously

Table 2: US Definitions of Terrorism

State Department	Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	Department of Defense
premeditated, <i>politically motivated</i> violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience	the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of <i>political or social objectives</i>	any activity that involves an act that: is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (...) must also appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping	the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally <i>political, religious, or ideological objectives</i>

destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation”) and to a range of concrete actions is accompanied by a list of terrorists, terrorist groupings and “entities,” which is being continuously revised.⁸²

What most proposed definitions seem to have in common, however, is their identification of terror as *organised violence directed mainly (or deliberately) against civilians and perpetrated by actors other than states for non-selfish reasons* – which I shall adopt as a tentative definition. The motivational element has been included in order to distinguish what is usually called terror from crime and personal vendettas, but deliberately kept vague and all-encompassing, rather than limiting the it for instance, to politics or religion.


Even though there may be a gradual meeting of minds among the powers of the West, it is far from obvious that this emerging consensus is shared by the rest of the world. Here, neither states nor populations may want to accept a definition which logically rules out that the actions of states (e.g. the USA or Israel), can be labelled as terror;⁸³ Nor is there likely to be agreement on whom to call terrorists, as the same groups the West regard as terrorists may be widely admired elsewhere as “freedom fighters.”⁸⁴ As we shall see in chapter 6, there is a partial,

but far from complete unanimity – at least in the West, i.e. the EU and the United States – about which groups to label as terrorists.

4.3 A Family of Concepts

Even if the international community were to reach a generally acceptable definition of terrorism, the very relationship between the various terms derived from this (see Fig. 4) is less obvious than one might think, e.g. between the terms terror, terrorist acts, terrorism, terrorist, terrorist groups and terrorist constituencies.⁸⁵

Fig. 4: Terrorism: Conceptual Family




If we take as our point of departure, a minimalistic definition of a *terrorist act* as an instance of “organised violence against civilians perpetrated by non-state actors for non-selfish reasons” (perhaps in order to cause *terror* as a state of mind in the general population), then we might define *terrorism* either (neutrally) as the general occurrence of such acts, or (in agency terms) as the promotion of them; and a *terrorist* as the actual perpetrator of such a terrorist act.

The latter does, however, have rather odd implications, as terrorism is (usually) not a profession. In this sense “a terrorist” is more like a murderer (i.e. one who has once committed a murder) than a contract killer, understood as one who habitually kills people for money. Of course some terrorists, like the infamous Carlos, are “habitual terrorists” (see below), but most are not, and some cannot even logically be so. The dreaded suicide bombers, for instance, can logically be terrorists (in this narrow sense) only once, upon which they will be dead! A possible solution to this problem might be to expand the definition of terrorists to not only encompass those who actually conduct them, and also those who plan and intend to perpetrate terrorist acts – or even enlarge the group to include both the direct perpetrators and the *terrorist leaders*, the latter promoting terrorism by organising terrorist actions without ever personally perpetrating one.

Terrorist groups, however, are more problematic, as quite a few are involved in other activities besides terrorism. Not all their members will be terrorists in any meaningful sense of the term. This is, for instance, the case for groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, both of which are also political parties with either full government powers or at least a share of them, as well as even broader movements, such as Shin Fein in Northern Ireland.⁸⁶

In some cases it may be possible to subdivide such movements and distinguish between the small circle of actual terrorists, those who are directly organising their terrorist actions, the broader political movement or party and its even broader support structure, as illustrated in Fig 5. We shall return to this issue in sections 6.3 and 6.4. In other cases, however, the borders between the various categories may be so blurred as to defy any distinction. It would make very little sense to automatically label all those who somehow support these groups (e.g. by voting for Hamas candidates in Palestinian elections) as *terrorist constituencies*, as they may well support the group mainly because of its non-terrorist activities.

Fig. 5: Terrorists and their Environment




Another way of conceptualising terrorist constituencies is to define them as those on whose behalf the terrorists activities are undertaken. This may be rather straightforward in the case of most Palestinian groups, but the constituency is much less obvious for predominantly religious groups who see themselves as obeying God’s commands. It may also make sense to distinguish between constituencies and “environments,” i.e. the settings in which the terrorist operate, which may or may not be the same as their constituencies, (see below). As far as constituencies such as the global Islamic *Umma*, for instance, are concerned, it is not.⁸⁷

4.4 Terrorism: Genus and Species

There is also diversity of opinion on the appropriate subdivision of the genus terrorism (if there is one), into distinct species. Several criteria seem to recommend themselves for such a taxonomy (see Fig 6).

We might, for instance, distinguish between national and international terrorism, but how to operationalise this is far from obvious. Should terrorism be labelled “international” merely because it crosses borders, as when a terrorist group is granted refuge and perhaps base rights in a neighbouring country against which its operations are directed – as the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army was by Sudan.⁸⁸ Or, should it be narrowed down to actions directed against the West by groups



in the Third World? Should it include attacks against foreign nationals, as in the Luxor or Bali bombings?⁸⁹ Should members of a diaspora be counted as parts of their countries of residence/origin, as when an expatriate Arab in Europe or the United States is recruited by an Arab or global terrorist group for attacks against western targets in the West?⁹⁰

Another common subdivision of terrorism is according to the goals and ideological orientation of the various groupings, where one might distinguish between left and right-wing political terrorism, religious (or fundamentalist) terrorism, nationalist (often separatist) and “identity-based” (e.g. white supremacy) terrorism. However, the distinctions may be more blurred than expected, e.g. because nationalism or right-wing (sometimes even left-wing) political views often find expression in religion,⁹¹ and because goals and motives may not be uniform within a movement. For instance, it is not automatically the same factors that drive leaders to embark on terrorism as make young people join a group and/or commit terrorist activities, so it is entirely possible that the same group may look differently upon individual members within that group.

4.5 Levels of Analysis

In the following, we shall take as our point of departure the distinction between individual terrorist, terrorist groups and leaders, and terrorist constituencies or environments. These levels of analysis might be labelled either unit, group and system or micro, meso and macro, respectively (see Table 3).

In analogy with Kenneth Waltz's admonitions against "reductionism",⁹² the assumption is that we shall need different (lumps of) theory to explain (and by implication, predict, in order to prevent) the relevant factors at the three levels. Whereas something may speak in favour of heuristically assuming and then testing (rather than taking for granted) a certain isomorphism between entities at the same level of analysis (different organisations, for instance),⁹³ to assume such an isomorphism between entities at different levels of analysis (such as organisations and their members) is definitely not permissible, in fact would be tantamount to confusing the whole with the sum of its parts.⁹⁴

Table 3: Terrorism: Three Levels of Analysis

Level	Subject of Investigation	Main Questions	Main Disciplines
Micro	Terrorists	Profile Motives	Psychology Theology
Meso	Terrorist Groups and Leaders	Strategies Structure Resources	Strategic Studies, Group Psychology, Sociology, Organisational Theory
Macro	Terrorist constituencies and environments	Support structures, Attitudes, Structural factors: economic, demographic, cultural, political etc.	Political Science, International Relations, Economics, Sociology, Anthropology

In the following chapters we shall nevertheless look into the problem of terrorism and its prevention at the first two levels of analysis, mainly as a prelude to that at the third level, where it seems most likely that ODA may play a role. At all three levels the ambition is simply to identify what is known and what is not, and what might qualify as "reasonable assumptions." In all three chapters, the religious factor will be included in the analysis.

5. The Micro-level: Individual Terrorists

Based on the above (tentative) definition we know that a terrorist is a person conducting or intending to conduct a terrorist action, i.e. an organised attack against civilians on behalf of a non-state group for some kind of “altruistic” reason. This raises the obvious question why anybody would want to do such a thing.

5.1 Methodological Problems

Ideally, one should be able to identify potential terrorists in advance, so as to apprehend them before committing the act, just as it would be attractive to do so with would-be mass or serial killers, – as in the science fiction movie *Minority Report*. However, not only would doing so violate a host of legal norms such as the “presumption of innocence,”⁹⁵ it would also be extremely difficult to do with any degree of certainty for the simple reason that much less is known of terrorists than of (other) criminals. There are a number of methodological obstacles to psychologically profiling “the typical terrorist.”

First of all, it is questionable if there is such a creature as a “typical (or generic) terrorist.” There is a huge difference between hostage takers and suicide bombers, between political and religious terrorists, between snipers and arsonists, etc.⁹⁶ For the profiling endeavour to make any sense it would probably have to operate with quite an elaborate typology of terrorist profiles – the creation of which would also run into methodological problems, such as whether one should assume a correspondence between the goals pursued by terrorism and the mental characteristics of the perpetrator, or between the latter and the form of attack. It would undoubtedly require a very large “N” to avoid circularities, such as defining suicide bombers as suicidal, religious terrorists as religious, or the like.

Secondly, with some notable exceptions, it seems that most terrorists are “one-time offenders,” i.e. they commit the crime only once in a lifetime. This is a logical inevitability in the case of suicide bombers and an empirical fact in the case of others – with the exception of the rare professional or habitual terrorists, who appear not to be in any way representative of the rest. Combined with the fact that terrorism is (fortunately) a much less frequent phenomenon than, say, murder, the analyst or profiler would have a much smaller sample on which to build his theories – and these would usually have to be retrospective in the sense that the life story of the terrorist in question would have to be based on self-narrated


autobiographies, or on interviews with whoever knew the terrorist in question. Thirdly, and perhaps most problematically, the “null hypothesis” may well be correct, i.e. that terrorists are psychologically completely normal, however disturbing this may appear – as when the culprit for the Oklahoma City bombing, Timothy McVeigh, turned out to be just like “the boy next door.”⁹⁷ According to the “grand old lady” of terrorist research, Martha Crenshaw, “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.”⁹⁸ If this is true, there may be absolutely nothing to learn from profiling, as this would simply place most of the population in the “potentially dangerous” category.

In any case, the available empirical material is very limited and none of it lends itself easily, or at all, to any generalisation. Some interviews are available in the public domain – with 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Fatah and PFLP,⁹⁹ an Abu Nidal skyjacker,¹⁰⁰ one of the defendants in the embassy bombing in Addis Ababa in 1998,¹⁰¹ and a couple of books, each based on interviews with a score or so of terrorist leaders of different religious denominations.¹⁰² In addition, there are various second-hand interviews which may presumably shed some light on the mindsets of terrorists – with the mothers of Palestinian suicide terrorists,¹⁰³ surviving victims of a major hostage-taking in Moscow in October 2002 perpetrated by Chechen terrorists,¹⁰⁴ and with relatives and acquaintances of two Palestinian suicide terrorists.¹⁰⁵ There may well be more than this, but not a lot more (at least in the public domain), which satisfies the criteria of being based on interviews either with the individual terrorist or with people who actually know him or her fairly intimately.

What else is published is very speculative and often based on conjecture, as when “psychological autopsies” of suicide bombers are attempted, among other things, by extrapolations from the single case of Timothy McVeigh – who was not even a suicide attacker.¹⁰⁶ Alternatively, it is purely deductive, i.e. based on the interpretation of recorded events on the basis of psychological theories. It is thus difficult to dispute the assessment of Martha Crenshaw that

The study of terrorism still lacks the foundation of extensive primary data based on interviews and life histories of individuals engaged in terrorism. Far too often, psychological hypotheses are based on speculation or are derived from such a small number of cases that the findings cannot be considered reliable.¹⁰⁷

Nevertheless, in the following we shall record some of the prevalent theories of the psychology of terrorism.¹⁰⁸ As it is likely ideological and, perhaps even more so, religious beliefs play a significant role, we shall treat these as intervening variables.



As illustrated in Fig. 7 there are several possible paths from the mind of a prospective terrorist to his or her terrorist act. The terrorist mind, is here subdivided into reason and emotions with values serving as a sort of intermediating variable, i.e. as something stemming from the emotions but impacting on reason. Beliefs play a somewhat similar role, as they may derive from either reason or emotions and, in turn, impact on emotive urges such as aggression – as when a person loves somebody or something and believes, perhaps erroneously, that the objects of this love are being endangered or hurt by somebody, against who s/he then develops aggression.

By implication, a perfectly normal, sane and reasonable person may choose to commit a terrorist act as a consequence of a rational choice, among the premises for which may or may not be religious or other beliefs. The “emotive” aspects of the mind may control him or her, e.g. in the form of “normal” urges such as ag-

gression or lust or of various psychopathologies. Again, these may or may not be influenced by religious or other beliefs. As many ODA projects are concerned with education, we might expect them to have an impact here, e.g. by strengthening the rational over the emotive side of the mind, thereby making it less likely that anybody would commit terrorist acts for emotional reasons. On the other hand, there is also a perfectly rational motivational path to terrorism, and improved education is less likely to make a difference in these cases – except for facilitating the terrorist calculations, i.e. enhancing their skills.

5.2 Terrorism as Rational Choice

Even though the typical popular image of the terrorist, at least in the West, is that of a crazed and wild-eyed (usually Muslim) fanatic, empirical studies do not generally support this image. If terrorists are, indeed, normal, it seems tempting to seek explanations of their behaviour not in psychological dysfunctions, but to assume that they are acting rationally as stipulated in “rational choice theory.” This is not really a psychological theory, but rather an economic one, focusing on the proverbial *homo economicus* weighing up the pros and cons (i.e. costs and gains), of various courses of action, based on personal preferences, as well as on an instrumental rationality, under conditions of more or less adequate information.

The question then is whether a member of this particular species of *homo economicus* might under certain circumstances rationally opt for becoming a terrorist.¹⁰⁹ This will depend on the preferences (i.e. values) of the actor (about which rational choice theory has nothing to say, as they can neither be logically deduced nor empirically derived);¹¹⁰ on the range of options or strategies available for achieving the goals, i.e. meeting the preferences of the actor; on the available information; the expected likelihood of succeeding for each option; the expected comparative costs of the terrorist and alternative options; and the positive and negative “externalities” of the various strategies, i.e. their side-effects.

This may even be couched in mathematical terms, as rational choice theorists habitually do, either as a game theoretical matrix, as a “decision tree,” or in terms of a formula describing the expected utility of a terrorist act, thus presumably allowing for predicting whether it will take place or not. Alternatively, these methods may, in principle at least, be able to predict which of several forms of terrorist action will be selected. As the present author is neither convinced of the value of this exercise – considering the lack of data to serve as “flesh” on the “skeleton” of mathematical formulae – nor in possession of the requisite skills,

he shall prudently refrain from this and instead opt for some common-sense observations about the pros and cons of terrorism, viewed from the perspective of a prospective perpetrator.

If we leave aside, for the moment, suicide terrorists (more on whom below) there may certainly be benefits to be derived from a “career” in terrorism. In some cases, terrorists are actually paid for their services, allowing them to lead the luxurious lives of cosmopolitan playboys (as was, for instance, the case of the infamous “Carlos,” better known as “the Jackal”).¹¹¹ In such cases the terrorist “profession” is not much different from that of mercenaries or contract killers, who also kill people for money.¹¹² Indeed, the nucleus of the present *Al Qaeda* seems to consist of former “Afghan Arabs”, i.e. young Arab men who let themselves be recruited (in what seems to have been a joint venture between Arab volunteers such bin Laden and the CIA, with the Pakistani intelligence service ISI acting as an intermediary) as mercenaries for the resistance against the USSR in Afghanistan. Some subsequently turned up in the wars and violent struggles in, e.g. Algeria, Egypt and even Bosnia.¹¹³

The remuneration for such “jobs” is usually quite generous, in addition to which it offers opportunities for lucrative activities such as looting or smuggling, as well as the excitement, including the sexual pleasures that some men derive from raping, torturing or killing civilians. Indeed, in the eyes of some there may even be something “sexy” about terrorists. The female lawyer of the aforementioned “Jackal” thus ended up marrying her client.¹¹⁴ Finally, the prospects of one’s career being portrayed by a superstar like Bruce Willis in a Hollywood blockbuster, may also appeal to quite a few youngsters.¹¹⁵ At the very least, they can hope for some of the same kind of heroic “fame” as the notorious Herostratus achieved in 356 BC by burning down the temple of Artemis in Ephesus.¹¹⁶ It is thus entirely possible to conceive of terrorism as a reflection of rational choice, e.g. as a career choice comparable to that of the (semi-authentic) gangster Henry Hill in Martin Scorsese’s film *Goodfellas*, whose opening line is “All my life I wanted to be a gangster,” as this provides a number of gains, such as being allowed to drink in bars without paying and, perhaps even more importantly, the gratification of being “somebody in a neighbourhood (...) full of nobodies.”¹¹⁷ This would qualify as a positive externality of a “career.”

Whether terrorism will appear as a rational career choice depends, of course, on the available alternatives. In societies with few educational and/or job opportuni-

ties, the “job” as a terrorist may thus recommend itself as rational, at least in the sense of a lesser evil than the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” life as a member of a lumpen proletariat.¹¹⁸ It also depends on parameters such as the risk of being apprehended, the expected sentence, etc., all of which are consequences of the strategic (counter-terrorist) moves by the other side, usually the government in question. This means that we are dealing with a “strategic game” which may lend itself to analysis by means of game theory. Moreover, external actors such as donor countries can have an impact on the parameters, e.g. by increasing the risks of being caught by supporting the security services; by reducing the relative attractiveness of terrorism by improving other career opportunities via various job-creation schemes; by opening up other avenues for addressing grievances via support for democratisation and human rights, etc. This seems at least plausible, even though there are no empirical data available to test such a hypothesis.

5.3 Terrorism as Pathology

It is, of course, also possible to explain terrorist motives as more emotional than rational – and it is entirely possible to combine the two approaches, e.g. by using psychology to identify “irrational” urges and ends, and rational choice theory to reconstruct and understand how the terrorist selects targets, tactics and instruments to meet these ends. It is also entirely conceivable that some terrorists are more rational than others.

5.3.1 *Terrorism as Evil*

The least illuminating approach to understanding the motivations of terrorist is probably to label them “evil,” which is not so much a psychological diagnosis as a rather crude moral judgement. It is also one that militates against even attempting a diagnosis as this might be construed as seeking to understand and explain, and *ipso facto* perhaps excuse or even condone the terrorist acts.¹¹⁹ As persuasively argued by Terry Eagleton, this even logically entails some bizarre implications such a letting the terrorists off the hook:

In the so-called war against terror, “evil” is used to foreclose the possibility of historical explanation. (...) In the disparagement of rational analysis which it suggests, it reflects something of the fundamentalism it confronts. Explanation is thought to be exculpation. Reasons become excuses. Terrorism is just a surreal sort of madness (...) The truth is that unless you act for a reason, your action is irrational and you are probably absolved of blame for it. A being who was truly independent of all conditioning would not

be able to act purposefully at all, any more than an angel could mow the lawn. (...) It is inadvisable to caricature your enemy as crazy or spurred on by bestial passion, since morally speaking this lets him off the hook. You must decide whether you are going to see him as evil or mad. (...) Reasons may be morally repugnant, but actions without them cannot be.¹²⁰

There is, of course, such a thing as a fascination with evil as such, at least in the literature where some of the writings of Marquis de Sade (1740-1814),¹²¹ Count de Lautreamont (1846-1870) or even Charles Baudelaire (1821-1867) may come quite close.¹²² Much more often, however, what is commonly held to be evil (perhaps even labelled “evil” by the culprit himself) could be seen as a protest against something believed to be evil, e.g. to the perennial “theodicy problem.”¹²³ If God has created the world with evil in it, then He must be evil, and his adversary, the Devil or Satan, therefore good, and to disobey the commands of God is therefore either good or at least morally neutral.¹²⁴ What is ostensibly an advocacy of evil may thus represent an attempt at a Nietzschean “*Umwertung aller Werte*” (revaluation of all values),¹²⁵ rather than actual nihilism, i.e. denial of values as such.¹²⁶ Indeed, the Russian terrorists of the late 19th Century, who were immortalised in the novels of Turgeniev and Dostojevsky and often labelled “nihilists,” were actually not philosophical nihilists, but merely reformers or rebels, rejecting the authority of the powers that be. As formulated by Arkady in Turgeniev’s *Fathers and Sons*, “A Nihilist is a man who does not bow before any authority whatever, who does not accept a single principle on faith, with whatever respect that principle may be envired.”¹²⁷

The only possible examples of an advocacy or practice of terrorism in the name of evil as such thus seems to be the French anarchist Proudhon’s invocation of Satan¹²⁸ and the Indian “Thugs” – an obscure cult of worshippers of the Hindu goddess of death and destruction, Kali, who perpetrated numerous acts of ritual strangulation from the 7th Century BC until colonial times.¹²⁹ One could certainly also find modern examples of terrorism combined with (what seems to be) outright sadism: the perpetrator taking pleasure in the suffering of his (or her) victims. The late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, may in fact, be a case in point.¹³⁰

There are even psychological (or rather psychoanalytical) theories to explain similar forms of “evil” in (some) human minds – what is sometimes referred to as “daimonic” traits.¹³¹ C.G. Jung, for instance, envisioned life as a perennial struggle between man and his “shadow,” the latter comprising a mixture of the personal and

(as an archetype) the collective unconscious.¹³² Reminiscent of this, but more in line with instrumental rationality, is Robert J. Lifton's concept of "doubling," i.e. the (more or less conscious and deliberate) creation of another self, capable of "heroic cruelty," i.e. atrocities that the real self is not – which Jessica Stern has hypothesised may play a certain role in terrorism.¹³³ The use of masks, cross-dressing and the instrumentalisation of spirit possession and witchcraft beliefs in certain African civil wars may be interpreted in analogous ways of creating personalities capable of unspeakable cruelty without remorse.¹³⁴

Most terrorists seem to take no particular pleasure in inflicting pain as such, and their occasional jubilation seems to be motivated more by the expectation of future rewards (in the afterlife) than by the "evil" deed as such. One could, however, easily find examples of terrorists characterised by what we may call "Arendtian" or "banal evil," i.e. a psychopathological indifference to other people's suffering.¹³⁵ In such cases, however, it seems more appropriate to interpret the "evil" behaviour as simply an extreme case of rational choice. One can also find psychopathological (and other) paths to acts that observers would describe as evil, even though the perpetrators do not regard them as such.¹³⁶ Among them is aggression, to which we shall now turn.

5.3.2 *Terrorism as Aggression*

One might intuitively label terrorist actions as being motivated by aggression. There is a large body of theories about human aggressiveness, which refers to both biological and psychological factors.

As in other species, aggression in human beings is sometimes taken to be a biological instinct, that may even serve the purpose of preservation.¹³⁷ In such cases, the aggressive instinct is usually taken to be related directly to the male gender,¹³⁸ perhaps even to the male hormone testosterone.¹³⁹ "War is men's business," as the heroine of Aristophanes' play *Lysistrata* put it, as early as 410 BC,¹⁴⁰ and the same may be the case for terrorism, the perpetrators of which are indeed predominantly (albeit not exclusively) male.¹⁴¹

However, there seems to be little empirical evidence to substantiate such a general thesis, and it seems to be contradicted by the well-documented aversion of human beings, irrespective of gender, to kill their fellow humans.¹⁴² Distance between the killer and his victim, however, may help overcome this aversion as it is easier to kill with a sword or a lance than with a knife, even easier to do so with a bow or a

gun than with “weapons of direct contact” and much easier to do so with “out of sight weaponry” such as long-range artillery or air-dropped weapons.¹⁴³ What may help overcome this barrier, is the establishment of a psychological distance, e.g. by dehumanising the target.¹⁴⁴ Killing in groups is also easier than doing so in isolation, hence the importance of group cohesion and/or discipline.¹⁴⁵ In either case, the grim reality of the individual taking another human being’s life is concealed, either by the denial that the victim is in fact a human being or by transforming killing into a group activity, in which the individual is merely “a small wheel in a large machine,” notably, the almost universal preference of execution squads to that of individual executioners. There are also social mechanisms which may be brought into play, to which we shall return in the next chapter on terrorist groups.

Aggression is also often attributed to frustration as in the famous “frustration-aggression” (also known as the Dollard-Dobb) hypothesis,¹⁴⁶ according to which aggression is caused by frustrated expectations. As far as the individual is concerned, such frustrations might arise from the experience of unemployment after graduation or by the prospects of not being able to finish an education. It also seems plausible that frustration and anger might be aroused among underprivileged youngsters in the Third World by being confronted, via the mass media, with images of young people of the same age (e.g. in Beverly Hills) enjoying very different living conditions. Such anger may be a side-effect of the globalisation which makes the comparison possible.¹⁴⁷ One might also explain aggression as a reaction to “structural violence,” in the terminology of Johan Galtung, conceived of as (what Ted Gurr calls) “relative deprivation”¹⁴⁸ – often underpinned by “cultural violence”¹⁴⁹ or to a “rank disequilibrium” as when people of merit (at least in their self-perception) are excluded from power and/or privilege.¹⁵⁰ We shall return to these factors in the following chapters.

It is also possible to explain aggression with reference to alienation¹⁵¹ and feelings of marginalisation, perhaps even to a Kierkegaardian existential *Angst*.¹⁵² Even though the concept of alienation has been slightly blurred ever since its promulgation by Hegel and Marx,¹⁵³ most would probably agree with Melvin Seeman’s identification of it with six states of mind,¹⁵⁴ namely: feelings of powerlessness; meaninglessness (similar to the existentialist “nausea” described by Sartre and others);¹⁵⁵ normlessness; cultural estrangement;¹⁵⁶ self-estrangement and social isolation (similar to the sentiments of “the stranger” described by Camus).¹⁵⁷ Similar sentiments were described by Frantz Fanon in his *Black Skin, White Masks* as the creation of colonialism, which imparted in its native subjects a profound sense of

inferiority and self-estrangement. As argued in the same author's main work, *The Wretched of the Earth*, one way of overcoming such alienation was through violence, which, regardless of its success or failure, had an emancipatory effect.¹⁵⁸

There seems to be some, albeit largely anecdotal, evidence in support of hypotheses such as the above. The "typical" rank-and-file terrorist (as opposed to the leaders) of today is thus a young male, and the average recruitment age even seems to have dropped from the early twenties to the late teens. Moreover, most terrorists are unmarried, come from middle-class backgrounds, and they are often well-educated but unemployed, or employed in jobs below their educational level. As noted in a CIA-commissioned study from 1999

Terrorists are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance or regard themselves as victims of an injustice. Many are drop-outs. (...) They are people with cunning, skill, and initiative, as well as ruthlessness.¹⁵⁹

However, they are also people who feel marginalised and disempowered and for whom violence, e.g. in the form of terrorism, may serve "the empowerment of marginalized men", as aptly put by Mark Juergensmeyer, who also points to the importance of "symbolic violence":

To those undertaking [terrorist acts], there may be something exhilarating, perhaps even rewarding, about the struggle itself. This sense of empowerment may make the effort seem worthwhile. (...) [S]ymbolic expressions of violence (...) are empowering in a special way, for they do not lead to conquests of territory or personnel in the traditional definition of military success. For most of these quixotic fighters, their great success was simply in waging the struggle – the heady confidence they received by being soldiers for a great cause, even if the battles were not won, or were even winnable, in ordinary military terms.¹⁶⁰

However reliable all of the above findings may be, they are not necessarily relevant. Not all terrorists are personally aggressive in any emotional sense, even though their acts may technically deserve an aggressive label. There is also some evidence that terrorist groups tend to prefer that they are not seen as aggressive, in the same way that militaries prefer sane, rational and disciplined troops to aggressive and savage ones.¹⁶¹ Even though aggressive individuals may thus want to become ter-

rorists, they may not get the opportunity, except for those rare solitary terrorists, operating on their own, without any group affiliation.

5.4 Terrorism and Belief Systems

As illustrated in Fig. 7 above, beliefs constitute an intermediary variable in both the rational and psychopathological motivational paths to terrorism – both in the sense of ordinary beliefs about causal relations (“if I do A, B will follow”) and in the sense of more elaborate (secular or religious) ideologies and belief systems. In the latter context, beliefs may also contain implicit value premises for action, such as “God has ordained A” or “Communism will result from A,” both pointing towards A as the right course of action – as seen from the terrorist’s vantage point.

5.4.1 Radicalism and/or Fanaticism

Both political and religious beliefs have played central roles as motivational factors in terrorism, usually leading the terrorists to believe that they are doing “the right thing,” as defined by their respective belief system, thereby also allowing them to overcome some of the above inhibitions against killing.

It is, however, important to juxtapose two parameters of such beliefs which do not always correlate, even though they are often confused with each other – radicalism (or extremism) and fanaticism. We may define radicalism/extremism in terms of the distance from the consensual opinions prevailing in the society in question, and fanaticism in terms of the intensity with which such divergent beliefs are held. Hence, one should not only expect to find fanatical radicals, but also both non-radical fanatics and non-fanatical radicals. For all of these categories there are real-life examples, as set out in Table 4. For instance, there is nothing particularly radical about animal rights, anti-abortion or similar causes, where most people in most countries would certainly resent cruelty to animals and see abortion as a deplorable last resort. Nevertheless, members of organisations devoted to such causes are occasionally so fanatical in their beliefs as to resort to terrorist acts.¹⁶² At the other end of the spectrum we find the Menonite/Anabaptist sect known as the Amish, the members of which hold quite a radical (and fundamentalist) view of religion and arrange their entire lives in accordance with this, i.e. in a manner very different from the rest of society. However, the Amish are profoundly pacifist and have yet to foster a single terrorist, whereas they have frequently found themselves as the victims of hate crimes.¹⁶³ As it is almost always fanaticism rather than radicalism, which motivates terrorism and other forms of violence, it is advisable to keep the distinction between the two in mind.

Goals Intensity	Moderate	Radical
Moderate	Ordinary political parties	Amish sect
Fanatical	Animal rights Anti-abortion	<i>Al Qaeda</i>

All the major religions as well as many secular political ideologies have fostered terrorists, implying that all of them must logically contain elements which may be amplified and/or twisted to serve as motivation and justification for the deliberate killing of civilians. None of them, however, seem to point directly and unambiguously in this direction – with the possible exception of the aforementioned Kali worshippers. The kind of belief system thus seems to matter less than its intensity and radicalism, as almost all belief systems have fostered terrorists, but none are exclusively terrorist.

What matters for the individual perpetrators of terrorism, is the certainty about the cause and the resultant firm and unwavering belief in doing the right thing - to the exclusion of alternative views – and to which are usually added elements of group dynamics. We shall discuss this further in the next chapter. An especially terrorism-prone variety, however, seems to be the combination of religion and politics, which is found in several varieties, but in all of which some divine or transcendental sanction is found for political views which, by their very nature, impact on society as a whole, including on the lives of non-believers.

Most of the following discussion of various belief systems for their proneness to terrorism, might just as well have been relegated to the following chapter on terrorist groups, as they are usually also constituted around a belief system shared by their members and adherents, including the individual terrorists. In most cases, however, the latter are “consumers” of beliefs, whereas the “producers,” i.e. the ideologues or religious leaders, rarely personally engage in such activities.

5.4.2 *Political Terrorism: Anarchist, Socialist, Fascist, Nationalist*

Both left and right-wing political ideologies have on occasion led to terrorism, as has, to perhaps an even greater extent, nationalism.

At the left end of the political spectrum we have both anarchist and socialist/Marxist groupings, none of which are, exclusively oriented towards terrorism. Anarchists in particular, however, have in many instances explicitly endorsed terrorism, albeit mainly what has been called “individual terrorism,” including the aforementioned tyrannicide.¹⁶⁴ Such terrorist acts have been described as a form of “propaganda by deed” (as formulated by Paul Brousse of the Jura Federation, Errico Malatesta and others), envisaged to undermine the political structures of the State and lead to a popular uprising.¹⁶⁵

One of the most outspoken was the German anarchist Johann Most (1846-1906) who advocated to “rescue mankind through blood, iron, poison and dynamite” and published instructions in “revolutionary chemistry,” including a pamphlet with the grisly title *Science of Revolutionary Warfare: A Manual of Instructions in the Use and Preparation of Nitroglycerine, Dynamite, Gun-Cotton, Fulminating Mercury, Bombs, Fuses, Poisons, etc., etc.* It even seems that one of his followers in the United States was responsible for the assassination of President McKinley in 1901.¹⁶⁶ Less outspoken, but still inclined to using terrorism as one of several strategies (albeit to be resorted to “more in sorrow than in anger”), were the main ideologues of anarchism such as Bakunin and Kropotkin,¹⁶⁷ whereas writers such as Malatesta, Emma Goldman and Georges Sorel were seemingly more infatuated with revolutionary violence.¹⁶⁸

Even though most of them also envisaged a violent revolution, most of the classical socialist thinkers, including Marx, Engels and Lenin, distanced themselves from terrorism, regarding it as too individualistic and preferring a more organised mass struggle.¹⁶⁹ Minor groups and parties, e.g. in Russia, however, occasionally followed the example of the *Narodnya Volya* (which might both be categorized as anarchist and socialist), by resorting to sabotage and assassination attempts, as was the case for the Socialist Revolutionary Party. One of its followers, Dmitrii Bogrov, in 1911 assassinated the head of the Czarist secret police, Stolypin. According to one of his biographers

Bogrov, like many young men of his generation, was a revolutionary with a romantic and introspective cast of mind. A complex figure, his

endeavour seems to have been to find above all a resting place, a cause or a deed in which he could gain acceptance, at all costs. Thus Stolypin, the major figure involved, died not in the name of a revolutionary imperative, but at the hands of a man who was trying to extricate himself from his own inner struggle with the system. (...) In Bogrov we see a forerunner of the lonely, tortured Van der Lubbe and of Oswald, who were impelled toward a megalomaniac resolution of their individual and ideological problems.¹⁷⁰

In these respects, he may also resemble some of the members and ideologues of more modern socialist groups, who have resorted to terrorism. This was, for instance, the case for European movements such as the Italian *Brigate Rosse*,¹⁷¹ the West German Baader-Meinhof group and its successor, the *Rote Armee Fraktion*, RAF;¹⁷² or the Japanese Red Army Faction, *Sekigunha*;¹⁷³ as well as the *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru,¹⁷⁴ to mention just a few examples.


In quite a few cases, left-wing ideologies have been mixed with nationalism and a quest for national liberation, making it well nigh impossible to determine what has mattered most. Indeed, this may well vary even within groups, where some members may feel attracted to the socio-political features of the “brave new world” after liberation-*cum*-revolution, whereas others may view the “anti-imperialist struggle” as merely a pragmatic strategem in the struggle for national liberation. Examples of such mixtures include the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and other Palestinian groups,¹⁷⁵ as well as the FNL (*Front de Libération Nationale*) in Algeria before and during the war against the French colonial power.¹⁷⁶

In other cases, however, nationalism or patriotism pure and simple is what drives a movement and its members to terrorist activities. There is such a thing as “love of country,” which may be so deeply felt as to bring forth tears in the eyes of otherwise rational people upon watching the hoisting of the national flag or hearing the national anthem, but which may also impel them to radical, and even violent, action. This was already the case of the Italian *Carbonari* of the 19th Century, a secret society struggling against the foreign domination of Napoleonic France.¹⁷⁷ It has also been the case of, for instance, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka; the Irish Republic Army of Northern Ireland; the ETA (*Euskadi ta Askatasuna*) of the Basque province of Spain;¹⁷⁸ and of various Palestinian groups, such as the dominant group within the PLO, *Fatah*.¹⁷⁹

On the right end of the ideological spectrum we have ideologies of white supremacy which have on several occasions spurred terrorists into action, not least in the United States, where a number of militias are in existence.¹⁸⁰ Their extremist political views have often been based on fanciful conspiracy theories and “spiced up” with Christian fundamentalist and millennialist religious tenets, including beliefs in constituting a “chosen” people or race fighting a rearguard battle against perceived inferior peoples, such as blacks, Jews or even Catholics, who were sometimes referred to as “mud people.”¹⁸¹ On more than one occasion, such beliefs have been partly based on the very same “Hamitic myth,” which also played a central role in the Rwandan genocide of 1994.¹⁸² Almost all these elements are, for instance, found in the infamous *Turner Diaries*, sold by Timothy McVeigh, and a copy of which he carried with him during the Oklahoma City bombing.¹⁸³ The book features, among other outrageous accounts, a description of “heroic” nuclear terrorism leading to a global nuclear conflagration resembling the Armageddon, but resulting in the eventual global domination of the white race, having effectively exterminated the rest of mankind, including moderate elements of the white race. This is perhaps the most obnoxious and potentially dangerous instance of a combination of politics with religion. However, there is also such a thing as predominantly religious terrorism, to which we shall now turn. ”

5.4.3 Religious Terrorism

Religion is a multi-faceted phenomenon, comprising at least four interlinked elements, as set out in Fig. 8.



Not only do all religions contain beliefs in “something supranatural” – or, as aptly formulated by Stephen Ellis and Gerrie ter Haar, “an invisible world.”¹⁸⁴ They also feature norms, practices and institutions, and it is important to keep in mind that some members or followers may rather be attracted to the religion in question by the other angles of the quadrangle, i.e. they may practice the religion with all its rites, belong to its institutions and abide by (some or all) of its norms without necessarily being particularly knowledgeable about the underlying religious tenets.


Among the beliefs, one may distinguish between the epistemological and the ontological, although they are often curiously intertwined. First, there is the ontological belief that there is a God who is transcendent, but not quite so much as to abstain completely from any relationship with his creation, including humankind. Hence, God is believed to have revealed Himself (at least partially) to man, in revelations to prophets, or even, as in Christianity, to have become human himself. Such beliefs provide the premise for the accompanying epistemology according to which His revelations are true, including those on which the certainty about His existence is based. Notwithstanding the obvious circularity of this argument (if so it is)¹⁸⁵ this is what is held to be true and unquestionable by the believers. There is, however, disagreement in all religions about the permissible scope for interpretation of what has been revealed. In Islam, for instance, in the debate about whether the “gates of *ijtihad* [independent reasoning, BM] have been closed” after the death of the Prophet and the four rightly-guided *Khalifs*, or whether they remain open to the present day.¹⁸⁶

From such revelations, norms may also be derived, either general and abstract, such as, the admonition to love one’s neighbour (*Leviticus*, 19:18) or the “golden rule” to “do to others what you would have them do to you,” best known from the New Testament (*Matthew* 7.12), but with counterparts in most other religions.¹⁸⁷ More specific, concrete norms include examples of dietary prescriptions,¹⁸⁸ rules about performing various acts (e.g. prayer or pilgrimage) under specific circumstances, and even rules about states of mind such as the prohibition against envying the donkeys (or other possessions) of one’s neighbour, found in the Old Testament (*Exodus* 20).

Even though the real (e.g. social) origins of such prescriptions and prohibitions may be non-religious, the very fact that they are integrated into a religious belief system usually lends them a more binding character. Further, ontological beliefs may

entail the prospects of divine retribution for violations and rewards for compliance – as illustrated by Gustave Doré in his illustrations for the *Inferno* and *Paradiso* books of Dante’s *Divina Commedia* (see Fig. 9). If given a choice between these two depicted options for an ever-lasting afterlife it is pretty obvious what to choose! Hinduism has a functional equivalent of these reward-punishment schemes in the form of its belief in perpetual reincarnation to a life of suffering combined with a possible escape route into the desirable state of *Nirvana*, which may persuade its believers to adhere to its dictums.¹⁸⁹

Fig. 9: Heaven and Hell According to Dante¹⁹⁰



All the major religions seems to provide some scope for terrorism and other forms of violence, not in the sense that the religion as such condones it, but that there have been particular versions or sects, which have done so.

- Judaism thus inspired the Zealots-Sicarii, who struggled against the Roman occupants as well as the Greek occupants of the Holy Land, with methods that would today have been classified as terrorist.¹⁹¹ In modern times the Jewish religion has given rise to Jewish or Zionist organisations, to some extent inspired by the extremist ideology of Rabbi Kook, such as *Irgun* and *Lehi* (also known as “the Stern gang”), which operated in Palestine during the British mandate rule up to, and even after, the founding of the state of Israel. They are held to be responsible, for instance, for the assassination of Folke Bernadotte and the Deir Yasin massacre – but nevertheless two of their leaders (Itzakh Shamir and Menachim Begin) subsequently became Prime Ministers of Israel. One might also mention the *Gush Emunim* movement and Baruch Goldstein who massacred Palestinian worshippers in a mosque in Hebron in 1994.¹⁹²
- Christianity has been (ab)used by some of the aforementioned right-wing militias as well as by anti-abortion groups. In Uganda it (or rather a very syncretic version of it) has been used by the aforementioned LRA, one of the most ferocious armed groups in all of Africa.
- Islam at an early stage gave rise to the “Assassins,” a radical Shi’ite sect known for their alleged eating of hashish (i.e. marijuana) – hence the name of the sect (*hashashin*), known for committing murder of individuals held to be either infidels or apostates. Their reign of terror lasted for two entire centuries, and they even managed to establish state-like power structures.¹⁹³ In the modern era, Islam has also seen the emergence of “reformist” sects, such as the *Salafiyya* (also known as Wahhabism) and the Deobandi as well as organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan*), which have advocated “fundamentalism” and/or the use of violence to establish a *Kaliphate*,¹⁹⁴ and inspired by writers such as Sayed Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb,¹⁹⁵ and even their predecessor of the thirteenth century, Ibn Taymiyya.¹⁹⁶ Some of their followers have in recent years engaged in what is perhaps best called “Jihadism,” i.e. the resort to terrorism labelled holy war.¹⁹⁷
- From Hinduism we have already mentioned the Thugs, but one might also mention the *Rajneeshees* – an obscure sect which was also influenced by the writings of Nietzsche (*sic!*), and members of which attempted a major biolog-

ical attack against the inhabitants of a small town in Oregon, United States, in 1984.¹⁹⁸

- Sikhism has fostered several terrorists, including those with responsibility for assassinating Indian prime minister Indira Ghandi, apparently primarily motivated by Punjabi nationalism, but also drawing on an ancient Sikh tradition of martyrdom.¹⁹⁹
- However pacific “mainstream Buddhism” may be, the obscure sect founded by Shoko Asahara, the *Aum Shinrikyō* was among the first to attempt what has been called “apocalyptic terrorism.” Having experimented with various other forms of weaponry, in 1995 they launched a chemical (sarin) attack against civilians in the subway of Tokyo.²⁰⁰

No religion thus holds a monopoly on fostering terrorism, but all contain both moderate and extremist versions, the beliefs of which may be held so fanatically as to spur individuals to engage in terrorism. There seems to be a consensus that such extremist ideologies exert a special appeal to young men,²⁰¹ which may help explain why most terrorists are quite young. Extremism may also be a precondition for the most radical (from the point of view of the perpetrator) form of terrorism to which we shall now turn – suicide terrorism.

5.5 The Enigma of Suicide Terrorists

Suicide terrorism has quite a long history, not merely in the Islamic civilisation.²⁰² In recent years it has, for instance, been used by the (secular and even anti-religious) Tamils in Sri Lanka, especially the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan) and its “Black Tiger” units.²⁰³ Besides international terrorist groups such as *Al Qaeda*, it has also been used extensively (albeit for a rather shorter period) by the Kurds in Turkey, by Chechen rebels in the Russian Federation,²⁰⁴ and, even more so, by the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel.²⁰⁵

Several authors have attempted to sketch profiles of the “typical” suicide terrorist, but such research is up against some rather formidable obstacles – particularly the fact that successful suicide terrorists are, by definition, dead, which rules out exploratory interviews. Moreover, suicide is, by definition, something a person can only commit successfully once. No one is thus a suicide bomber prior to the act, and after the act s/he is beyond reach of any interviewer. Any insights into motivational factors thus have to be obtained indirectly, e.g. through posthumous psychological or sociological “autopsies” of suicide bombers, whose biographies it might, in principle, be possible to reconstruct – e.g. on the basis of their farewell

messages, either written or recorded. However, no such autopsies seem to have been undertaken, and one article claiming to be able to draw such a profile, even based most of its findings on a single (and very atypical) case of the aforementioned Timothy McVeigh.²⁰⁶

Even though suicide attacks are not “normal” suicides (if there is indeed such a thing) one might nevertheless hope that some insights might be drawn from suicidology and its various psychological and sociological theories, which deal respectively with individual motives and societal dispositions for suicide.²⁰⁷ One might, for instance, hypothesise that suicide attacks are typically committed by suicidal persons who were going to take their own lives in any case, sooner or later. Psychoanalysts following Sigmund Freud see suicide as a result of a primordial “death wish” (*Thanatos*), complementing and partly struggling against the Libido (*Eros*); and they have seen homicide as an extroverted version of the *Thanatos*.²⁰⁸ As argued by the aforementioned Terry Eagleton, “the death drive is crafty, implacable, vindictive, and bottomlessly malevolent, rejoicing in the sight of gauged eye sockets and the bleeding stumps of limbs. It does not simply endorse such destruction, but actively revels in it.”²⁰⁹ The rival psychoanalytical theories of C.G. Jung may also prove relevant with the notion of the “shadow,”²¹⁰ as may Erich Fromm’s theory of alienation finding its outlet in violence against Self as well as Other.²¹¹ However, most of these are theories quite speculative to begin with, and their application to terrorists, whom no psychiatrist has ever actually analysed, takes us deep into the nebulous realm of speculation.

More positivist and behaviouralist psychologists have attempted to uncover correlations between suicide (either in general terms or with a focus on young men) and various factors such as childhood trauma, recent life events (e.g. post-traumatic stress syndromes) and the like – or even of physiological or chemical factors.²¹² In principle, their findings might offer some insights into the “suicide element” in suicide terrorism, but they are also up against the insurmountable barrier to scientific investigation represented by the unavailability of data on successful suicides.

There are at least two problems with extrapolating from what is known about suicide to suicide terrorism. First of all, the occurrence of the two phenomena do not seem to correlate at all, as the countries in which suicide terrorism has been most widespread – both in the sense of location for the attacks and nationality of the perpetrator – do not have a high suicide rate. There does not even seem to

be any temporal correlation between the two phenomena, e.g. in the sense that a wave of suicide attacks (which tend to come in waves or campaigns), is accompanied by a wave of ordinary suicides. Sri Lanka might be a partial exception, but even here the rather high prevalence of suicide might well be caused by the hardships of the civil war, rather than the other way around.²¹³

Secondly, there seems to be a huge difference between, on the one hand, the solitary suicide committed by means of an overdose of sleeping tablets in the privacy of a person's own home and, on the other hand, the very public act of blowing oneself up in a public place, thereby deliberately causing death to numerous others. Moreover, the deaths of others usually represent "collateral damage" in ordinary suicides, where the main objective is the perpetrator's own death. In suicide terrorism it seems to be mainly intended as (mass) murder, where the perpetrator's own death is collateral. This was also the case of the Japanese *kamikaze* attack during World War II – hence the suggestion to label the actions of Islamic suicide bombers as "*islamikaze* attacks."²¹⁴

It is also conceivable that suicide terrorism might resemble, in some respects, the occasional mass suicides, not only because they are both co-ordinated, but also because the latter have usually also included some deliberate killing of others or enforced suicides – to say nothing of the religious element in both, to which we shall return shortly. Contrary to suicide waves ("suicide by imitation") such as the famous one allegedly following the publication of Goethe's tragedy *Werther*,²¹⁵ genuine mass suicides have almost without exception been related to religious cults. One might include the almost suicidal behaviour of the Zealots-Sicarii at Masada, where the besieged rebels deliberately destroyed their own food supplies.²¹⁶ In recent years the phenomenon has been exclusively related to various obscure doomsday cults and sects such as the Branch-Davidians, the Order of the Solar Temple, Heaven's Gate, The Movement for Restoration of the Ten Commandment of God, etc.²¹⁷

Perhaps paradoxically, the social structure of some of these groups may resemble certain terrorist groups (e.g. the aforementioned *Aum Shinrikyo*), but they do not at all resemble the groups responsible for most of the suicide terrorism, such as the LTTE, Hizbollah or Hamas – all of which are well integrated into the surrounding society. Even though suicide terrorism is a team activity, the practical division of labour within the suicide squads also differs from the mass hysteria and simultaneity characterising mass suicides.

The most befitting characterisation of the psychology of what we today call suicide attacks, may in fact come from the classical sociological work on suicide by Emile Durkheim. He distinguished four types of suicide: egoistic, anomic, fatalistic and altruistic. However absurd others may find the term, his “altruistic suicide” may in fact be an appropriate label for that of the suicide bombers, apparently believing that they are sacrificing themselves for the common good, and thereby reflecting a high degree of societal integration – contrary to the other categories of suicide.²¹⁸ Related terms include “social”, “ecstatic” and “heroic” suicides, each of which may capture relevant aspects of the phenomenon of suicide terrorism.²¹⁹

As quite a few suicide terrorists seem to be religious, it is likely that the attitudes to suicide of the various religions matter. Unfortunately, however, these seem to be more ambivalent than it might appear at first glance. Whereas suicide as such is condemned (as a sin) by both Judaism, Christianity and Islam, all three religions venerate heroes or saints for what we might well categorise as heroic or altruistic suicide, i.e. self-sacrifice for a higher good and/or on God’s command.²²⁰ Indeed, this is arguably even the case of Jesus himself – and even more so if one were to accept the “new” Gospel of Judas, according to which, Jesus tells Judas that “you will sacrifice the man that clothes me.”²²¹ Shi’ites arguably have a particularly strong tradition of martyrdom, based on the tragic fate of the Prophet’s grandson, Hussein. This has traditionally been used as a religious admonition to quietism, but which has (since Khomeiny) been turned around to an example for emulation, e.g. in the form of suicide attacks.²²²

Even though a wide range of religious beliefs allow for, and occasionally even demand, “the ultimate sacrifice,” the widespread assumption that suicide terrorism is primarily a religious phenomenon is probably wrong. It is strongly contradicted by Robert A. Pape, whose findings (based on an extensive database of all recorded suicide attacks, but nevertheless questioned by other analysts) show the primary motivation to be nationalism, albeit sometimes mixed with religion: “In fact, every suicide campaign from 1980 to 2003 has had as a major objective – or as its central objective – coercing a foreign government that has military forces in what they see as their homeland to take those forces out.”²²³

We shall return to this problem in the following chapter, devoted to terrorist groups.

5.6 Conclusion: Potential Effect of Development Aid?

Not only does the above account point to very little actual knowledge about the motives for terrorism at the individual level, as opposed to some more or less plausible hypotheses which have not (yet) been falsified. It also does not seem to open up many opportunities for development aid to make much of a difference.

At best, succesful ODA projects creating jobs may help dissuade “rational choice (suicide or ordinary) terrorists” by making their individual prospects for the future appear more promising, thus making blowing themselves and others up appear less cost-effective. For obvious reasons, educational or job creation schemes cannot be targeted to specific “individuals of concern,” but might be focused on those specific age cohorts to which most terrorists belong, i.e. youths and adolescents. No matter how succesful such projects might be, one should probably not expect them to represent total solutions, as there is likely to remain a residual recruitment pool for terrorism, which in itself, does not usually require large numbers.

It may also be possible to support religious and other institutions condemning, rather than applauding and encouraging terrorism, which might also serve to dissuade (suicide and other) terrorism. The problem is, to identify such institutions and then find ways to support them so discretely as not to tarnish their public image in communities where the benevolence of the West is not automatically taken for granted. Materially supporting “good” instiutitions may thus inadvertently weaken their perceived legitimacy and public appeal.

Missionary (Christian) activities such as those previously supported on a large scale are likely to have even more negative consequences, as they may simply reinforce impressions that non-Western religions are not accepted or respected, thereby making their adherents even more anti-Western and, by implication, perhaps pro-terrorist.

6. The Meso-Level: Terrorist Groups and Leaders

Even though there are examples of terrorists operating on their own as “lone wolf avengers,” this is extremely rare.²²⁴ Most terrorism takes place in groups, where the individual terrorists belong to a group that more or less decides on their actions.

We need therefore, to move to a totally different level of analysis, as it is not plausible to draw inferences from the individual to the group level – and very doubtful whether we shall be able to generalise from one category of terrorists to another, e.g. from leaders to rank-and-file and from political to religious terrorists. In this chapter, we shall look at terrorist groups as strategic as well as economic actors, basically applying a rational choice analysis to their activities. We shall also look at the structure of these groups, which may, in some cases, help to account for some of their seemingly irrational behaviour on occasions, by analysing them as (parts of) social movements and as organisations.

6.1 Terrorist Groups: The Problem of Identification

As a prelude to this analysis it seems appropriate to identify which groups are commonly held to be terrorists. In Table 5, the EU and US designations have been compared, showing a substantial agreement, yet also some remaining disagreement. The list prepared by the United Nations’ 1267 Committee has also been included for comparison, even though its scope is limited to groups (allegedly) associated with the Taliban or *Al Qaeda*. There may be some inadvertant overlap, as many of these entities have several aliases, each of which may be transcribed into English in several different ways.

Even a cursory look at the list reveals these groups to be quite diverse, with regard to ideological or religious orientation, typical *modus operandi* and the degree to which they have attracted media attention. Some are clearly political, or at least secular, whereas others are profoundly religious. Some typically operate within a narrow geographical area and against a well-defined set of targets, while others are global, both with regard to operations and targets. Whereas some (e.g. *Al Qaeda*, Hezbollah or Hamas) are quite well known from the media, quite a few of the others are virtually unknown outside the expert communities. It should therefore come as no surprise if these groups should turn out to have little in common apart from their being designated (rightly or wrongly) as terrorists.

Table 5: Terrorist Groups and Organisations

EU List (December 2005) ²²⁵	US : Foreign Terrorist Organizations ²²⁶ or (with*) ²²⁷ Other Groups of Concern	United Nations (1267 Committee) ²²⁸
	*ABB: Alex Boncayao Brigade	
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade		
Al-Aqsa e.V.		
	*AIAI: Al-Ittihad al-Islami	
AJ: Al Jihad		
*al-Badr: Al-Badr Mujahedin		
	*ALIR: Army for the Liberation of Rwanda	
Al-Takfir and Al-Hijra		
ANO: Abu Nidal Organisation		
		Ansar Al-Islam
AQ: Al-Qaida		
	AQI: Al-Qaida in Iraq ²²⁹	
	ASG: Abu Sayyaf Group	
	AS: Ansar al-Sunna	
	Asbat al-Ansar	
AUC: United Self-Defense Forces (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)		
AUM: Aum Shinrikyo		
Babbar Khalsa		
	*BR/PCC: New Red Brigades/ Communist Combatant Party	
	*CFF: Cambodian Freedom Fighters	
	CIRA: Continuity Irish Republican Army	
	*Communist Party of India (Maoist)	
	*Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)/ United People's Front)	
CPP/NPA: Communist Party of Philippines/New People's Army		
Dev Sol: Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)		
DHKP/C: Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front/Party		
		DHDS: Djamat Houmat Daawa Salafia
ELN: National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)		
	ETA: Basque Fatherland and Liberty	
	*ETIM: East Turkistan Islamic Movement	
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia		

Table 5: (continued)

EU List (December 2005) ²²⁵	US : Foreign Terrorist Organizations ²²⁶ or (with*) & Other Groups of Concern ²²⁷	United Nations (1267 Committee) ²²⁸
	*FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda	
	GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat	
IBDA-C: Great Islamic Eastern Warriors Front		
	IG: Gama'a al-Islamiyya	
	GIA: Armed Islamic Group	
	GICM: Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group	
	*GRAPO: First of October Antifascist Resistance Group	
	Hamas	
	*HIG: Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin	
	Hizballah	
	*HM: Hizbul-Mujahedin	
HM: Hizbul Mujahideen		
	*HUJI: Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami	
	*HUJI-B: Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/ Bangladesh	
	HUM: Harakat ul-Mujahedin	
Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development		
	*IAA: Islamic Army of Aden	
	*IBDA-C: Islamic Great East Raiders– Front	
	*IIPB: Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade	
	IJU: Islamic Jihad Group	
	IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	
	*INLA: Irish National Liberation Army	
	*IRA: Irish Republican Army	
ISYF: International Sikh Youth Federation		
	JEM: Jaish-e-Mohammed	
	JI: Jamaah Islamiya Organization	
	*JMB: Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh	
	*JRA: Japanese Red Army	
	*JUM: Jamiat ul-Mujahedin	
	Kach: Kahane Chai	

Table 5: (continued)

EU List (December 2005) ²²⁵	US : Foreign Terrorist Organizations ²²⁶ or (with*) Other Groups of Concern ²²⁷	United Nations (1267 Committee) ²²⁸
	*KMM: Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia	
KZF: Khalistan Zindabad Force		
	LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group	
	LJ: Lashkar i Jhangvi	
	*LRA: Lord's Resistance Army	
	LT: Lashkar e-Tayyiba	
	LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	
	*LVF: Loyalist Volunteer Force	
MEK: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organisation, minus the NCRI	MEK: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization	
	*MRTA: Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement	
	*NIPR: Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei	
	*NTA: Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei	
	*PAGAD: People Against Gangsterism and Drugs	
	PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party a.k.a. Kongra-Gel (KGK)	
	PLF: Palestine Liberation Front	
	PIJ: Palestinian Islamic Jihad	
	PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	
	PFLP-GC: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command	
	Revolutionary Organization 17 November	
	*RHD: Red Hand Defenders	
	RIRA: Real IRA	
	RN: Revolutionary Nuclei	
	*RS: Revolutionary Struggle	
	*RSM: Rajah Solaiman Movement	
	*RSRSBCM: Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	
	SL: Sendero Luminoso	
	*SPIR: Special Purpose Islamic Regiment	
	*SSP: Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan	
Stichting Al Aqsa		
	*TCG: Tunisian Combatant Group	
	*Turkish Hizballah	

6.2 Terrorist Groups as Strategic Actors

Most known terrorist groups can be analysed as strategic actors. Even though we cannot automatically assume that they are unitary actors any more than states are, we shall nevertheless commence the analysis with this assumption.

6.2.1 Politics, Strategy, Doctrine and Tactics

Just as the United States has proclaimed a “war against terrorism,” terrorist groups and leaders usually see themselves as fighting a war, be that a traditional war against a tangible enemy such as a state or a “cosmic” war against “forces of evil.”²³⁰ An obvious analytical approach is to seek to understand their behaviour as reflecting strategic choices, using some of the general works on military strategy.²³¹ Just as war is, according to Carl von Clausewitz, a “continuation of politics by other means,”²³² the same may be the case of terrorism.

A good point of departure for the analysis of how this “continuation” takes place – i.e. how (military) means are assigned to (political) ends – may be the well-known hierarchy of levels of strategic action. This may be envisioned as a “decision tree,” featuring questions on the upper levels, the answers to which give rise to questions at the lower levels, etc.²³³ The relevant levels are usually labelled politics, grand (or political) strategy, military strategy and tactics – occasionally with an intermediate level of doctrine (or “operational art”) between strategy and tactics, as set out in Table 6.²³⁴

“Old” Western Terminology	Soviet Terminology	New Western Terminology
Politics	Politics	Politics
n.a.	Doctrine	Grand Strategy
Strategy	Strategy	Strategy
“Doctrine”	Operational Art	Operational Art
Tactics	Tactics	Tactics

- *Politics* falls beyond military science, but defines the purpose of the latter, for instance, in terms of the “national interest.” This was, until rather recently taken for granted, and therefore not analysed by scholars, but it has recently come under increasing scrutiny.²³⁵
- *Grand Strategy* is more or less synonymous with security policy, i.e. it defines the ends of the State and the relative importance of military and other means to these ends, depending on various assumptions, e.g. on the likelihood and nature of future confrontations.²³⁶ Such grand strategies may or may not define terrorism as a security problem, in which case one may also talk about a grand strategy of counter-terrorism.²³⁷
- *Strategy* is about fighting and winning wars. It was defined rather narrowly by Clausewitz as “the use of engagements for the objectives of war.” His successors have tended to define the subject in somewhat broader terms, e.g. as “the distribution and application of military means to fulfil the ends of politics” (Basil Liddell Hart), or “the art of applying force in order to attain the ends of politics” (André Beaufre),²³⁸ both of which also encompass the “use” of military force for deterrence and threat diplomacy.
- *Operational Art* might be tentatively defined as the art of fighting and winning campaigns in a large theatre of war.²³⁹ It is more or less synonymous with what Antoine de Jomini called “grand tactics,” whereas he used the term “strategy” for what we would today call operational art.²⁴⁰
- *Tactics* is about fighting engagements and battles, i.e. about “the use of armed forces in combat,” according to Clausewitz.²⁴¹

In addition to these concepts we have the so-called “principles of war,” forming a set of truisms about how to fight battles, campaigns and wars, which were first referred to by Jomini and subsequently codified by J.F.C. Fuller.²⁴² In a more modern version, formulated by Trevor Dupuy, there are nine such principles:

1. *Objective*: Every military operation must be directed toward a decisive, obtainable objective
2. *Offensive*: Only offensive action achieves decisive results.
3. *Simplicity*: Simplicity must be the keynote of military operations.
4. *Unity of Command*: The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command.
5. *Mass*: Maximum available combat power must be applied at the point of decision.


6. *Economy of Force*: Minimum essential means must be employed at points other than that of decision.
7. *Maneuver*: Maneuver must be used to alter the relative combat power of military forces.
8. *Surprise*: Surprise may decisively shift the balance of combat power in favor of the commander who achieves it.
9. *Security*: Security is essential to the application of the other principles of war.²⁴³

Most authors assume these principles of war to apply to all levels of military science, albeit with differing connotations at each level. Presumably they should then also apply, to both terrorism and counter-terrorism.²⁴⁴ It has even been attempted, albeit with rather bizarre results, to apply “order of battle” analysis to a terrorist group such as *Al Qaeda*, by looking at its composition, disposition, strength figures, tactics, training, logistics, combat effectiveness and efficiency, electronic technical data and other miscellaneous data.²⁴⁵

A hypothetical “decision tree” applied to a fictitious terrorist group is illustrated in Fig. 10, describing how the would-be terrorist group would first need to decide what goals to pursue. Depending on the expected gains and costs of the available range of alternatives, it would then have to make a choice between peaceful and violent routes to the goal, or any combination thereof. If it opts for the use of violence, it faces a choice between, or a combination of, conventional war, guerilla warfare and terrorism. In each case, it would then have to decide in general terms whom to fight and where, e.g. whether to attack only military personnel and state officials, or also to target civilians, and whether to fight at home or “take war to the enemy.” Depending on these general choices, it will then have to determine the individual engagements or “battles” (such as the 9/11 attack), for which it will then also have to select the appropriate human and material instruments, i.e. both personnel and weaponry plus “logistics.” All of these choices have to be made as part of a strategic game of moves and counter-moves, in which counter-terrorism efforts would also have to continuously be taken into account.

Presumably all this could be done – and probably is done – in a rational manner, which is not the same as assuming that mistakes and miscalculations would not occur, just as they do in regular wars.²⁴⁶ By implication, it should also be possible to reconstruct both the grand and the military strategy, as well as the doctrine and tactics of terrorist groups, which is exactly what will be attempted on the

following pages, where the terrorists (both real and hypothetical) will throughout be compared to traditional military planners. The expectation is that there may well be more similarities than differences between the two, or at least that the differences will be matters of degree and emphasis rather than qualitative.



6.2.2 Terrorist Goals and Grand Strategies

As we saw in the previous chapters, individual terrorists have many different goals, ranging from those of saving unborn children or endangered animal species to more grandiose schemes of re-establishing the caliphate, or ridding the earth of “mud people.” Equally, these goals can apply to the terrorist groups who promulgate the views in which the individual terrorists believe, and thus spurring the individual on to action.

For all their diversity, what most of these goals have in common, is that they are seen as defensive, however bizarre this may appear to others.²⁴⁷ Identity Christians believe that ZOG (the Zionist Occupation Government) is plotting against the Aryans to establish a world government controlled by Jews or blacks, and many Muslims believe that the “war on terrorism” is simply a cover for a new crusade

by the infidels against Islam,²⁴⁸ etc. Such misconceptions (some of which may, of course, contain grains of truth) are quite similar to the ones uncovered by Robert Jervis and others by means of “attribution theory” pertaining to the misperception by states of the behaviour of other states.²⁴⁹ Just as these misconceptions form an important ingredient in the well-known “security dilemma” in international relations, terrorists and counter-terrorists may face a similar security dilemma of reinforcing, the enemy images of the other, etc. in a vicious circle. Even if the West did not initially have any hidden anti-Muslim agenda, Islamist terrorism may well make the West increasingly anti-Muslim, thereby seemingly supporting Muslim enemy images of the West and perhaps even “justifying” terrorism.²⁵⁰

The same may hold true for what Robert Pape convincingly argues is by far the most common goal of suicide terrorists, (and presumably also of other species of the terrorist genus) that of national liberation. What virtually all movements engaged in (suicide and other) terrorism – including seemingly purely religious ones such as *Al Qaeda* – have in common is that they are fighting against what they see as a foreign occupation of their (real or imagined) homeland. This perception is, however, much more likely to produce terrorism if the occupants belong to a different religion. Suicide bombers thus see themselves as fighting a legitimate war of national liberation.²⁵¹

Whatever the goals pursued by potential terrorists may be, they need a grand strategy, however under-researched this topic is.²⁵² This will be determined, among other things, by their assessment of the range of opportunities for achieving their goals by non-violent means, say by forming a political party – which is often where terrorist groups start and occasionally where they end.²⁵³ All other things being equal, democracies should open better opportunities for achieving political goals (see the following chapter), but, unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Some groups may be predestined to permanent defeat in even the most democratic elections, say, if they define themselves in ethnic or religious terms, but are in a minority. It may still be possible for them to fight politically for a satisfactory measure of influence, either in the form of autonomy (if they are geographically clustered) or via consociational arrangements.²⁵⁴ This may not appear realistic, in which case, resorting to violence may be contemplated. In non-democracies, this choice may be simpler, as there may be no political avenues open at all. Another grand strategic choice is that of potential allies, either domestic or foreign.²⁵⁵ A group may, for instance, hope for foreign pressure on the government they are opposing and looking for ways of making this happen.

It is even possible for groups which are democratically inclined in principle (in the sense of wanting majority rule), to dismiss ordinary political means as unlikely to succeed.²⁵⁶ Anarchists or socialists may, for instance, hold that the masses are deceived by the ruling elite or class, say, in the form of “false consciousness.”²⁵⁷ Hence, they may want to “awaken” the popular masses and believe the use of violence to be the only promising means to this end – as in the anarchist notion of “propaganda by deed.” Others may deliberately seek to provoke retaliation by the regime, which would reveal the “true nature,” of the regime, thereby inciting the masses to rebel e.g. the Baader-Meinhof group. Still others may even subscribe to a bizarre “chaos theory,” where dislodging the incumbent regime is paramount, even if it is democratic. Chaos will ensue which may persuade the masses of the need for either a strong leader or the exact opposite, i.e. the abolition of the state in favour of local authorities or self-government, as envisioned by right-wing militias or anarchists.²⁵⁸

Even radical religious goals may point towards different grand strategies. Some Muslim fundamentalists, for instance, want to institute a caliphate with rigorous sharia laws, but still believe that this can only come about through the peaceful conversion of the mass of the population via *dawa*. This has been the case for various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, even the present Hamas, until the outbreak of the first *Intifada* in 1987.²⁵⁹ Others, however, may believe that a violent overthrow of the incumbent rulers (labelled as apostates) is indispensable in order to install a rightly-guided Islamic regime.²⁶⁰

The time perspective also matters for the choice of grand strategy in other respects. For instance, millenarian cults, which are found in most religions, envision a final battle on a particular (and pre-determined) date,²⁶¹ creating a sense of urgency that may appear to rule out the use of peaceful means. Others have the impression that “unborn babies are being killed as we speak,” calling for immediate (and therefore often violent) rescue missions.²⁶²

6.2.3 *Terrorist Strategies and “Operational Art”*

Should potential terrorists reach the conclusion that violence is necessary and justifiable, they face a strategic choice between several forms of violence – or any combination of these with non-violent strategic means:

- Conventional forms of warfare are rarely an option, if only because the groups in question are almost always inferior. They may, however, envision rath-

er conventional forms of struggle in the “end game,” as have several of the prominent strategists of guerilla warfare;

- Guerilla warfare is usually the second-best option, but it requires a certain critical mass to be effective. The guerilla has to remain elusive and avoid pitched battles which it would stand to lose and rather opt for a hit-and-run strategy. This would allow them to wage a protracted war of attrition against their adversaries, gradually undermining the morale of the enemy troops and the political will of the adversary to continue the war. History seems to show that such a strategy has a reasonably good record of success,²⁶³ and there are several prominent strategists from whom to learn such as T.E. Lawrence (“of Arabia”), Mao Zedong, Ernesto Che Guevarra and Vo Nguyen Giap;²⁶⁴
- Terrorism is rarely the preferred strategy for groups with other options, but may represent either the initial stage in a struggle, or a fall-back option.

Guerilla warfare and terrorism have much in common, not only because several groups have alternated between one and the other strategy, but also because of some terminological confusion caused by the term “urban guerilla” promulgated by Carlos Marighella and others.²⁶⁵ There are, however, also important differences between the two forms of struggle, as set out in Table 7.

Viewed as a strategic choice, terrorism may presumably recommend itself as the rational option to terrorist groups and leaders under particular circumstances, e.g. because of cost-benefit calculations.²⁷¹ Having opted for terrorism as a strategy, terrorists still face choices with regard to their “doctrine” as well as tactics.²⁷² They have, among other things, to decide where to fight and against whom, with a more or less concrete objective throughout. Should they, for instance, attack only enemy military troops and installations, official representatives of the state, or also “genuine civilians;” and should they confine their combat operations to their own home ground or “go global” and, for instance, target the enemy’s own homeland and/or its “expatriates,” including tourists whenever they happen to be within reach?

In favour of exclusively targeting state officials – primarily, but not exclusively its military – raises questions of legality, legitimacy and popular support. As it is arguably legal to fight against an occupying force, and if the potential terrorists limit themselves strictly to this, they may not even be seen as genuine terrorists, and could claim to be freedom fighters, with the ensuing protection (for what it is worth) of the Geneva Conventions.²⁷³ It would also be seen, both at home and

abroad, as more legitimate, at least if the number of collateral civilian victims was limited. As we shall see below, there is a consistent difference in views amongst the Palestinians of support for terrorist attacks against Israeli military targets, the Israeli civilians in the Occupied Territories, and civilians in Israel itself. This implies a graduated scale of legitimacy, even in the eyes of those on whose behalf the struggle is waged.

Table 7: Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Some Similarities and Differences²⁶⁶

Parameters	Guerrilla Warfare	Terrorism
Similarities		
Relationship with population	Collaboration ("Fish in water") ²⁶⁷	
Strategy	"Fabian strategy" of battle avoidance ²⁶⁸	
	Protracted war of attrition	
Differences		
Tactics	Commando raids	Sabotage, kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, suicide attack, etc.
Size of units	Platoon – battalion	Individuals – platoon
Modus operandi	Dispersal-concentration-dispersal	Individual attacks or "swarming" ²⁶⁹
Organisation	Hierarchical or cell	Cell or network
Territorial control	Liberated areas	No control of territory ²⁷⁰
War zone	Home country/area	Home country or global
Uniform	Usually some form	No uniform
Legal Status	Some recognition in international law	Illegal
Targets	Mainly military	Mainly civilian
Preferred weapons	Conventional small arms/light weapons	Daggers, explosives, "non-weapons" Weapons of mass destruction?
Intended impact	Military destruction/undermining morale	Psychological coercion ("terror")

There are drawbacks (besides, of course, ethical problems) to targeting civilians, but there may also be advantages. “Ordinary” military strategies have in several instances considered (and actually conducted) strategic terror bombardments with a view to “breaking the will” of their respective enemies, e.g. during the Second World War.²⁷⁴ They have further envisioned the use of nuclear weapons against civilians as the appropriate means to deter their respective adversaries from (nuclear or other) attack.²⁷⁵ It should come as no surprise that terrorists may also have reached the conclusion that going after civilian targets is likely to pay off – perhaps especially so, when they are fighting a democratic state, whose leaders are presumably more influenced by the opinions of its citizens. Exacting a substantial death toll from the latter may thus force the enemy government to make concessions.

Terrorists may also decide that economic targets are promising as a means to enforce concessions by impacting on the economic cost-benefit calculations of their adversaries. This is quite similar to the reasoning which has in the past, made warring states opt for siege warfare and/or economic blockades,²⁷⁶ and it even resembles the logic behind the use of economic sanctions as a tool for coercion, as implemented by the United Nations and individual states.²⁷⁷ Terrorists have in the past frequently attacked economic targets such as factories or banks, but globalisation may have created even more options. Whereas the skyjackings of the past were surprisingly ineffective in dissuading travellers from flying,²⁷⁸ an attack such as 9/11 that used aircraft had severe economic repercussions. By increasing insurance premiums and thereby airfares, this has caused (via an even longer causal chain) the closure of major airlines.²⁷⁹ By the same logic it may also be favourable to target tourists or private company employees as a means of damaging the tourist industry or dissuading foreign investment at home, as has happened in Egypt, Indonesia or elsewhere.²⁸⁰

In both cases, the would-be terrorists also face the choice between one (or a few) main attacks, or a series of smaller ones. They have to keep in mind that the expectation by the adversary of more or even worse damage in the future is likely to have an even greater coercive effect in terms of concessions. Not that states have always been mindful of this, as when the United States dropped its last remaining nuclear bomb over Nagasaki in August 1945. This choice is analogous to the choice faced in real war, between a decisive battle and a gradual war of attrition.²⁸¹ Until now, however, most known terrorist groups (with *Al Qaeda* as a partial exception) seem to have opted for protracted campaigns, rather than single, spectacular and/or very destructive attacks.

There are also indirect objectives, such as enforcing the release of incarcerated members of the group in question. This has in fact motivated quite a few terrorist acts through the ages.²⁸² Moreover, the group has to ensure its own survival, e.g. through its ability to replenish its ranks and they may have to ensure funds for future attacks and campaigns. We shall return to both below.

Table 8: Terrorist Tactics and Instruments

Type of attack	Personnel	Weapons	Other requirements	Costs
Assassination	Individuals/small squads	Daggers, firearms, poison, etc.	None	Low
Kidnapping/ Hostage-taking	Small squads	Anything	Hiding place, food, communications, etc.	Medium-High
Economic sabotage	Individuals/small squads	Explosives, inflammable materials	“Factory” Transportation	Low-medium
Hijacking of airplanes	Individuals/small squads	Small arms	Place to land	Low
Bomb attacks	Individuals/small squads	Explosives or anything	Belts, trucks, or ...	Low-medium
Catastrophic attack	??	??	??	??

6.2.4 Terrorist Tactics and Instruments

Having decided on the strategy, terrorists face the choice of tactics. This in turn determines selection of the requisite instruments: human resources (i.e. individual terrorists and “support staff”), weaponry and logistics. A wide range of tactics have been employed through the ages, some of which are listed in Table 8, along with a rough estimate of the main requirements and comparative costs. The latter, suicide attacks excepted, very much depend on one parameter, i.e. the need to get away with the deed without being killed

- Assassinations have been undertaken using virtually all weapons imaginable, from the daggers and strangulation cords used by the Sicarii and Assassins mentioned above, to poison, regular firearms and bombs. Depending on the

size of the weapon used – usually man-portable and easily concealed – they can be undertaken by individuals, and the costs are therefore very modest.

- Kidnappings are, by their very nature, more demanding, as the hostages have to be kept alive and well hidden for a protracted period. There is also a need to communicate more or less continuously with the outside world, i.e. to make demands, negotiate and eventually to agree on the release of the hostages, perhaps in exchange for money, or as a quid pro quo for the release of imprisoned terrorists.
- Economic sabotage usually involves the use of either inflammables or explosives. As the most effective are usually not available “off the shelf,” quite a few terrorist groups have manufactured them in secure, clandestine “factories” or laboratories. As the least effective of them are often also quite bulky, and require transport, this can raise the costs of operations.
- “Skyjackings” tend to be quite cheap, as it is (or at least used to be) simply a matter of holding the crew at gunpoint and forcing them to change destination – usually to places such as Cuba, Algeria or Libya. A single person or a small group manned with guns could easily accomplish this – and have done so on numerous occasions.
- In the case of bomb attacks against individuals, there seems to be a direct correlation between the number of people one wants to kill, the amount of explosives required, and the costs involved, both monetary and in terms of personnel.

Even though, most terrorist groups have preferred the protracted campaigns of consecutive terrorist attacks, the (near) simultaneous attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of 9/11, just might be the harbinger of a new form of terrorism, emphasising the “big bang” over the volley of minor shots. This is sometimes labelled “strategic” terrorism, an analogy with strategic nuclear war and nuclear weapons.²⁸³ Various utterances by the *Al Qaeda*, warning of “still worse to come” might certainly be taken as evidence in favour of such nightmare scenarios of “catastrophic” or even “apocalyptic” terrorism.

Even though 9/11 clearly demonstrated that catastrophic terrorism was possible with the use of as primitive weapons such as boxcutters, quite a lot has been written on horror scenarios featuring terrorists such as the *Al Qaeda* in possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).²⁸⁴ However, this term seems to be rather misleading. Whereas terrorist groups such as the Japanese *Aum Shinriki*²⁸⁵ have used chemical weapons on a couple of occasions, the effects have been rather

trivial in comparison to the destruction other terrorists have inflicted by means of non-WMDs, e.g. by an innovative use of conventional or unconventional instruments.²⁸⁶

Closer analysis also shows nuclear terrorism to be potentially very destructive, but quite unlikely,²⁸⁷ whereas the use of radiological weapons (in fact a special case of chemical weapons using radioactive material) may be more likely, but much less destructive,²⁸⁸ as is the case with ordinary chemical or biological weapons.²⁸⁹ There seems to be an inverse relationship between the destructiveness and the likelihood of the terrorist use of so-called WMDs (see Table 9), implying that the attention paid to this problem may well be exaggerated – certainly in comparison to the much more likely risk of mass destruction caused by all too conventional means.

Table 9: Risk and Destructive Effects of Terrorist Weapons

		Likelihood		
		High	Moderate	Low
Destruction	High	Unconventional		Nuclear
	Moderate	Conventional	Chemical Radiological Biological	
	Low	Conventional		

6.2.5 The Use of Suicide Terrorism by Terrorist Groups

From the point of view of the terrorist organisation, the use of “human bombers” is a strategic choice, which may be perfectly rational, if only because the leaders are not the ones getting killed. Suicide terrorism is a manpower-intensive form of warfare which may recommend itself to those with no alternative and in settings where manpower is plentiful. In Palestine, the unemployment rate among the youth (15-24 years) is around forty per cent (see Table 10), and according to some accounts, much higher.²⁹⁰

Suicide terrorism is effective, at least if measured by the death toll. Since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, more than 1,100 Israelis have been killed, mainly by suicide bombers.²⁹¹ It is virtually impossible to deter the “instruments” and difficult to defend against them, even by means of the so-called “anti-terrorist fence.”²⁹² Strategies directed against the groups themselves, such

as the assassination of leaders (namely, Israel's murder of Sheik Yassin and other Hamas leaders and operatives),²⁹³ have proven rather ineffective. Besides being unlawful, such actions are likely to provoke international protests.

Five main groups have used suicide bombings against Israel: *Hizbollah* (mainly operating in Lebanon), Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, special units of Fatah's *Tanzim*²⁹⁴ and, finally, the Marxist PFLP. Whereas Hizbollah has also relied on more conventional warfare against Israel and has only used suicide and other terrorism as a method of choice under special circumstances,²⁹⁵ the last four seem to be competing for support among the population by means of conspicuous acts, such as suicide terrorism.²⁹⁶ The first Intifada (circa 1987-1993) was predominantly non-violent,²⁹⁷ but its present-day successor, according to some analyses, has become much bloodier, in part due to the large number of the perpetrators of violence in Intifada-II being the traumatised victims of Israeli reprisals in Intifada-I.²⁹⁸

Table 10: Palestinian Unemployment (%)

Age cohorts	Male	Female	West Bank	Gaza	Total
15-19	42.4	28.4	37.6	51.7	41.7
20-24	37.9	45.6	32.5	53.5	39.4
25-29	27.6	22.6	23.0	33.8	26.5
Total	27.0	19.7	21.4	35.2	25.7

6.3 Terrorist Groups as Social Movements

Neither states nor their military establishments are “merely” strategic actors embroiled in conflicts against their adversaries. They are also pursuing other interests, which may help explain occasional divergences from the behaviour that rational choice theory would predict, as argued by Graham Allison and others.²⁹⁹ The same may well be true of terrorist groups.

Ian Lustick has coined the somewhat awkward term “solipsistic terrorism” for terrorist activities intended for “introverted” purposes, i.e. either to boost group cohesion or to strengthen the group compared with its competitors.³⁰⁰ Even though other adjectives, carrying less philosophical baggage,³⁰¹ such as egocentric, self-centered or inward-looking, might be more appropriate, the point made is important, if only to correct the strategic/rational choice approach. Not all activities undertaken by

a terrorist group (or any other social actor for that matter) are intended as direct means to the ultimate end, e.g. the defeat of the adversary in question, but many are rather means to other means to the end. (etc. *ad infinitum*). For instance, social or political actors that do not survive are obviously unable to achieve their ultimate objectives. They are more likely to do so, the more they grow, remain cohesive, and command greater resources to allocate to the chosen ends. nAll of this may necessitate “solipsistic” endeavours to strengthen them in these respects.

The fact that terrorism (with the rare exception of the aforementioned “lone avengers”³⁰²) is a group activity, means that we may also analyse terrorist groups as social movements and/or as organisations. There are quite voluminous bodies of scientific and scholarly literature dealing with these phenomena, with the potential therefore, to shed some further light on terrorism. Even though nobody would suggest that groups such as *Al Qaeda* or Hizbollah are similar to firms like Microsoft, or NGOs such as Amnesty International, or social movements such as the trade unions, they may still share certain features with all of them. Drawing on organisational and management theory, as well as theories on social movements, may help to illuminate some of the dynamics of terrorist entities.

Terrorist groups have often originated within social movements – including religious ones – and very often they retain elements of their former identities, by having both a political (or religious) and a military wing. Furthermore, the links between the two are rarely completely severed. Hence, there should be something to learn from social movement theory,³⁰³ with the caveat that there is quite a difference between, say, handing out “Save the Whales” leaflets in front of a suburban supermarket and joining a clandestine and illegal terrorist group in order to perform illegal actions at considerable peril to oneself. Moreover, the kinds of social movements related to terrorism may also be so different that there may well be no “one size fits all” formula for the relationship between movement and its terrorist arm.

Social movements differ widely, both with regard to their objectives and their structure. Even though one may often use the term “movement” for the underlying organisational structures (however loose and amorphous those may be), most analysts use it to refer to the activities themselves. These may or may not be associated with any organisation-like structure.³⁰⁴ Whereas such activities are sometimes referred to as “activism,” for them to count as movements, there has to be a degree of cohesiveness and a sense of collective identity to the actions and the people undertaking them. According to some theories, however, this may almost

automatically be generated within the movement itself, e.g. via “bootstrapped self-designation.”³⁰⁵ One may, for instance, talk of “Islamic activism,” understood as “the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes,”³⁰⁶ and an Islamist movement (if there is one) as the self-designated group of activists., understanding each other as such.

The activism underlying such a movement usually springs from discontent within a segment of a population, either in the form of grievances over material matters or a more diffuse sense of alienation.³⁰⁷ Other theories belonging to the same tradition, have pointed to structural features such as political oppression and neopatrimonialism as likely to foster oppositional social activism and movements. Still others have highlighted the way mobilisation for such movements takes place, pointing to the role of ideology (as the stable background) as well as the “framing” of issues in central and support-winning terms as an important mobilisation device.³⁰⁸

All social movements, terrorist or peaceful, have to recruit as well as retain members, the latter often entailing the need to ensure continuing identification with the movement and making them willing to sacrifice something for the common cause – and the more so, the further we move from the weekly leaflet distribution end of the spectrum towards the ultimate and irreversible sacrifice by the members of their own lives, as in suicide bombing. To this end, secular and, even more so, religious ideologies tend to be employed,³⁰⁹ sometimes combined with the creation of an environment conducive to persuasion and “brainwashing,” e.g. seclusion which tends to promote groupthink.

Besides these psychological and cognitive instruments, however, there is also often a need for a promising “career path” for the initiates, offering prospects of promotion within the movement, albeit not necessarily formally. The rewards of movement membership are not necessarily material, but often symbolic, in the sense that the movement enhances the self-esteem of members by granting them recognition for their activities – some of which may be frowned upon as “deviant” by society at large, but nevertheless correspond to the specific value system of the group.³¹⁰ Terrorism in general, and suicide terrorism in particular, may be cases in point.

For the forging of such group identities so indispensable for group cohesion,³¹¹ the well-known ingroup-outgroup dynamics usually play a role. Identification with

the ingroup is simply more solid, the more it compares itself with a (preferably hostile) outgroup. The more hostile and threatening the outgroup is believed to be, the greater sacrifices the members of the ingroup are usually prepared to make.³¹²

As far as recruitment and retention are concerned, social movements operate in a competitive environment. It is also possible to analyse them according to the rules and dynamics of the “market,” just as sociologists of religion have analysed “the religious marketplace” as one where religious organisations have to compete with each other just like commercial companies, advertising the low costs and/or superior qualities of their “commodities.”³¹³ From this competition springs the need for publicity, which may require spectacular activities, drawing media attention;³¹⁴ but also, the need to have something to offer that is generally viewed as useful, as when terrorist groups (just as other social movements) combine their violent activities with social work.

As pointed out by Charles Tilly, the movement must convey the message (both to their own supporters and to potential recruits) that they are “WUNC,” i.e. worthy, unified, numerous and committed. Unfortunately, however, these four components of “wuncness” do not always go together, as the need for numbers may entail the need to admit members who are neither worthy nor committed to the same extent as the original members, and because expansion may increase heterogeneity and thus risk splitting the movement. Conveying the image of “wuncness” may thus require “mystification.”³¹⁵ As far as the “operational wing” of a social movement, including the actual terrorists, is concerned, however, most known groups seem to have rather rigid screening procedures, emphasising worthiness, commitment and adherence to group identity.³¹⁶

Groups also need to mobilise social resources, to which end they can benefit from what Aldon Morris has called “agency-laden institutions,” defined as

(...) those institutions, often long-standing, developed by potentially challenging groups that house cultural and organizational resources that can be mobilized to launch collective action. Such institutions are configurations of cultural beliefs and practices that permeate and shape their social networks. Their cultural materials are constitutive in that they produce and solidify the trust, contacts, solidarity, rituals, meaning systems, and options of members embedded in their social networks. Endemic to some

agency-laden institutions is a transcendent and coherent belief system that shapes its actors' moral and political views.³¹⁷

Such institutions may also help mobilising cultural resources, as when a group manages to be accepted as representing some widely held values.³¹⁸ nMosque networks may be cases in point.³¹⁹ Another way for a social movement to enhance its resources is to form alliances with other movements, sometimes requiring a re-framing of issues, and occasionally leading to its gradual transformation, with regard to goals, strategies and composition.³²⁰ This may also, sometimes inadvertently, set in motion larger waves of social activism which may in turn, create niches for other (and even competing) movements.³²¹


Corresponding to the focus of their activities – traditional social movements being mainly sociopolitical, “new” ones tending to be more sociocultural in their orientation³²² – there is often a significant difference between their structures. Many of the “old” ones display rather traditional, hierarchical structures, while the new ones are often more amorphous, featuring informal and networked structures corresponding to their “anti-institutional ideologies,”³²³ with the Mexican Zapatista movement as almost a paradigmatic example.³²⁴ For such movements, communications is of the utmost importance. New opportunities are available today in the form of the internet which is used extensively by both social movements and terrorist groups.³²⁵

6.4 Terrorist Groups as Organisations

Even though several terrorist groups may resemble new social movements, some also resemble organisations, thereby lending themselves to organisational analysis. In viewing (at least some) terrorist groups as organisations, one might thus hypothesise that they are comparable in certain respects to, for instance, private firms or NGOs, etc.³²⁶ The analyst may draw on these hypothesised similarities to analyse the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances, institutional learning ability, collective memory, etc., as has been attempted in a couple of recent reports from the RAND Corporation.³²⁷ Indeed, one might even analyse the “managerial style” of terrorist groups.³²⁸ Unfortunately, however, not much seems to have been written on these matters, probably reflecting a lack of solid knowledge about the internal workings of terrorist organisations.

There is some case-specific supportive evidence that terrorist groups must have some internal division of labour, including the categories listed below, some of

which may, of course, be performed by the same person. First of all, there are the “foot soldiers” undertaking the actual attacks, i.e. the “light brigade” to whom Alfred Lord Tennyson’s description applies, that “theirs is not to reason why, theirs is but to do and die,” as they venture “into the valley of death (...) Into the jaws of death, into the mouth of hell.”³²⁹ Besides them, however – and besides geographically defined branches and chains of command – terrorist groups and organisations also need to fill a number of functional roles,³³⁰ which are sometimes arranged in a hierarchical fashion resembling any (other) organisation. Hizbollah as a good example (see Fig. 11).³³¹



The relevant roles include the following:

- Ideologues or religious leaders, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri of *Al Qaeda*, the late Sheik Ahmed Yassin (Hamas), Shoko Asahara (Aum Shinrikyo) or Abimael Gusman (Sendero Luminoso);
- Managers of the “organisation” deciding on chains of command, promotion or demotion and similar issues;
- Security (or “counter-intelligence”) officers, protecting the group against infiltration and often dealing with (would-be or actual) defectors;

- Fund-raisers, responsible for raising funds from supporters such as (Islamic and other) charities, the constituency of the group or foreign sponsors;
- Accountants and auditors to keep track of incomes and expenditures;
- Public relations officers issuing press statements and generally in charge of propaganda;
- Recruiters, charged with spotting potential members and (usually subtly and slowly), recruiting them into the movement and group;
- Teachers and trainers, the former in charge of the ideological and mental preparation of the recruits, the latter tasked with the actual training for the envisaged (combat or other) roles;
- Liaison officers taking care of relations with other groups and movements, as well as, in some cases, state sponsors;
- Communication staff, in charge of internal communications within the group, e.g. via mobile 'phones, the internet or couriers;
- Intelligence officers, tasked with identifying and keeping track of targets and the like;
- Logisticians, such as bomb-makers, providers of vehicles, safe-houses, etc;
- Operational commanders, planning and often also commanding the actual attacks;
- Support staff of various sorts.

In most cases, the above tasks are not salaried. Even if they are not, a status hierarchy is likely to develop within the organisation, which in turn, is likely to hold out the prospects of a “career path” for members, who can hope to be promoted (or risk being demoted) within the organisation. This may, in turn, be important for individual commitment, and additionally, for group cohesion.

It seems likely that the same kind of “turf battles” may develop within terrorists organisations as in other organisations, that something akin to bureaucratic politics may play a certain role, and that Miles’ Law will apply, namely “where you stand depends on where you sit.”³³² We should expect the security staff to emphasise security, the fund-raisers to prefer cheap and/or lucrative activities, etc. Unfortunately, however, there seem to be no empirical studies to support these assumptions.

We should also expect a certain organisational inertia, as organisations are notoriously prone to stick to their “standard operating procedures,” at least until they experience dramatic failure.³³³ Hence the need for mechanisms for organisational

learning, which could promote the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. This should, in turn, be based on organisational memory which needs to be gathered, preserved, disseminated, interpreted and applied to the changing environment with its new challenges and opportunities.³³⁴ This is, in principle, no different from learning in other organisations, but the clandestine and criminal nature of terrorist groups entails a need for secrecy and a priority of security above all else, which may well hamper organisational learning.³³⁵ There are examples of written handbooks, some even available online, including (what was to become) *Al Qaeda's* multi-volume *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*.³³⁶ In other cases, however, oral transmission of “lessons learned” will be preferred, if only for security reasons.

6.5 Terrorist Groups as Economic Actors

Even though terrorism is usually cheap, money nevertheless tends to come into the picture. For instance, terrorist groups need to raise, keep and transfer funds for weapons and logistics for future attacks; they sometimes need to be able to grant “pensions” to the families of suicide bombers; and they may need funds to sustain operatives who are unable to maintain day jobs. Obviously, while they do need (the functional equivalents of) fundraisers, bankers, accountants, auditors and couriers, they also need actual funds.

A large proportion of these funds have traditionally been provided by state sponsors such as Iran, Libya or Saudi Arabia, just as, during the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union sponsored groups that each state individually referred to as freedom fighters, but which the other usually labelled as terrorists.³³⁷ In some cases, groups have even moved back and forth between the two categories, as was the case of the Albanian/Kosovar/Macedonian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, also known as UCK: *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*), whom the United States first labelled as terrorists, then “promoted” to freedom fighters and subsequently “demoted” to terrorists, when they acted as “spoilers” in Macedonia.³³⁸

Invariably, however, such state sponsorship has come with strings attached, making it attractive for terrorist groups to diversify their funding as a means of ensuring their autonomy. This has in several cases effected quite a profound transformation of the groups, and perhaps especially the top echelons of their leadership, as argued by Loretta Napoleoni:

While sponsored by a state, armed groups had simply been the recipients of funds and therefore had had the luxury of focusing exclusively on fighting.

Under the self-financing scheme, however, their first priority lay in finding ways to support themselves. The new entrepreneurial tasks changed the structure of armed groups and revolutionized the natural selections of its [*sic*] leaders. Heads of armed organizations were now required to display managerial and entrepreneurial skills; financial acumen became more valued than military genius. Business mavericks appeared on the scene. (...) The search for economic independence turned the armed struggle into a multi-million dollar business and freedom fighters into entrepreneurs.³³⁹

In some cases, terrorist groups have been able to raise substantial funds via membership fees and voluntary contributions from their members (usually members of the broader social movements in which the terrorist groups are embedded) and supporters. Some such funds have then been lucratively invested in legal businesses such as transport or the IT industry, as was (at least partly) the case of the IRA and *Aum Shinrikyo*, respectively.³⁴⁰ It was also, at least initially, the case of (what was to become) *Al Qaeda*, where the personal funds of Osama bin Laden were initially invested in legal business ventures in both Sudan, Saudi Arabia and even the United States.³⁴¹ Such legal activities have also been used for the laundering of money deriving from other, illegal economic ventures.³⁴²

Funds are also raised by Islamist groups from Islamic charities, into which the *zakat* (Islamic tax) is usually channelled, and which have thus been able to accumulate huge capital stocks, some of which have seemingly been used for the financing of terrorism, partly in collaboration with various mosques.³⁴³ Funds for terrorism also seem to have come from (or to have been concealed amidst) perfectly legal remittances from various diasporas such as the Irish, the Somali or the Tamil populations around the world. Even though it is actually an ancient Chinese invention,³⁴⁴ the *hawala* system of money transfers is usually associated with Muslims, and it does indeed seem to have been used for siphoning off funds to finance terrorist activities. It is ideally suited for such a purpose, as there is no "paper trail" for the counter-terrorist agencies to follow.³⁴⁵

Some terrorist financing comes from legal sources, however, various terrorist groups have relied on criminal activities to finance their activities.³⁴⁶ Some may even be inadvertently pushed in this direction by counter-terrorism efforts to sever the financial links of international terrorism.³⁴⁷ The preferred criminal activities of terrorist groups have included drugs or arms smuggling, extortion, bank robberies, and the like. There is evidence of *Al Qaeda* (and to some extent Hizbollah),


involvement in the trade in precious stones in Africa, commencing with Tanzanite in Kenya and Tanzania and proceeding to diamonds in Sierra Leone, Liberia and, to some extent, the DR Congo and Angola – linking it up with rebel movements of particularly ill repute such as RUF (Revolutionary United Front) and UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*).³⁴⁸ Likewise, both *Sendero Luminoso* and FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*) have been deeply involved in the drug (mainly cocaine) “industry” in Peru and Columbia, respectively, as has, according to some accounts, Hizbollah.³⁴⁹ Another criminal activity that certain terrorist groups have been involved in, is the leasing out of their services to other terrorist (or simply rebel) groups as mercenaries, i.e. conducting terrorist attacks for money, as has, according to some accounts, been the case of the Abu Nidal Organisation.³⁵⁰

It seems to raise the distinct possibility that terrorist groups (or at least certain members of them) may develop an appetite for money, which may gradually take precedence over whatever political or religious goals the group may originally have been based on – a phenomenon well-known from civil wars. From the civil wars literature, there are a number of theories and theoretical controversies about the economic agendas driving the actors, both rebel groups and governments – the “greed or grievance debate.”³⁵¹ According to representatives of the “greed side” of this controversy, many groups ostensibly pursuing political ends are in fact propelled by a quest for personal enrichment, i.e. greed, at least as far as their leadership is concerned. This phenomenon has, among other things, been documented for the civil wars in Liberia,³⁵² Sierra Leone,³⁵³ the Congo,³⁵⁴ Angola³⁵⁵ and Sudan³⁵⁶ and hypothesised even for Uganda.³⁵⁷

However, greed appears at different levels and has different manifestations, as well as consequences. It makes sense to distinguish between the rank-and-file and the leaders making the big decisions about war or peace, i.e. between the motives and dynamics of “bottom-up” and “top-down” violence, respectively.³⁵⁸ As far as leaders are concerned, the simplest manifestation of greed is, of course, the quest for something valuable, e.g. the control of state power or pieces of territory containing oil fields, diamond mines or the like. In this case, the use of armed force is merely an indirect means to achieving (partial or complete) victory, the spoils of which is control. This is the usual picture of “resource wars.”³⁵⁹

In other cases, however, the very act of violence becomes almost an end in itself, as it provides a favourable climate for all sorts of surreptitious economic activities

such as smuggling, drug trafficking, etc. It makes the “protection,” which armed groups can provide worth paying for, even though they may be the ones causing the violence in the first place (See Fig. 12). Contrary to the “traditional” form of resource warfare – which tends to benefit only the leaders – the creation and reproduction of a war economy will benefit both leaders and the rank-and file.



As argued by David Keen,

Conflict can create war economies (...). Under these circumstances, ending civil wars becomes difficult. Winning may not be desirable: the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes.³⁶⁰

The same author has even made quite a convincing case for an isomorphism between, on the one hand, the mutually constitutive antagonistic pairs of insurgency and counter-insurgency and, on the other hand, terrorism and counter-terrorism – both creating war economies, in which the two sides develop a perverted mutual dependency, each feeding off, but also needing, the other.³⁶¹

Such a war or terror economy may resemble warlordism, as warlords also tend to thrive in such a violent environment, where their “protection” is needed by the civilian population, whereas they would lose control if the struggle were to end – even with their own victory.³⁶² This has been described by William Reno, who also uses the term “shadow states,” which seems to be almost synonymous with the concept of “shell states,” suggested by Loretta Napoloni in her analysis of terrorist economies.³⁶³

6.6 Conclusion: Potential Effect of Development Aid

If only because we are at this level of analysis dealing with human collectives as opposed to individuals, it is even more plausible that development aid (as a rather blunt instrument) has a potential role to play in dissuading groups from resorting to terrorism.

The fact that terrorist groups are, at least partly, behaving as strategic, rationally calculating actors, means that it may be possible to influence their decisions by changing the costs and benefits which they are presumably weighing against each other. By promoting democracy, political and civil rights donors may make it less likely that minority sections of society and dissident groups reach the conclusion that a resort to violence is the only way. ODA might also be allocated to more moderate and non-violent movements and groups in order to strengthen them in competition with the radicals – even though this entails risks. First of all, it may make peaceful strategies even less promising for the radicals, thereby making it more likely that the latter resort to violence. Secondly, foreign support may tarnish the image of the moderates by making them appear as foreign agents.

As far as terrorist groups are also economic actors, ODA might, in principle at least, weaken them by making superfluous the services that they occasionally (mostly via broader social movements or institutions) provide to societies or the particularly disadvantaged. This might be accomplished via support to state or civil society-organised social, educational or health schemes, not unlike those that development agencies have tended to support for other reasons. Undoubtedly,

however, it will take quite substantial and sustained aid programmes to address all the societal problems exploited by terrorist groups and the social movements within which they are embedded.

To the extent that aid does not have all-inclusive beneficial effects, but merely improves the lot for certain segments within society, it risks exacerbating the problems, as those excluded from the benefits may feel even more discriminated against. For donors and development agencies to “blacklist” entire societies, in the attempt to sever the money links to terrorism – as has happened with the freezing of funds to Palestine and the crackdown on *hawala* institutions in Somalia and elsewhere – is even more likely to backfire, as it may simply add to the grievances of the societies in question, thus allowing the terrorists to masquerade as their spokesmen, avangardes and heroes, and to accuse (not without some justification) donors of holding entire populations hostage.

7. The Macro-Level: Constituencies and Environments

Having thus far found little support at the micro or meso-levels of analyses for the hypothesis that development aid might be instrumentalised as a tool for counter-terrorism or terror prevention, we are now ready to embark on the analysis at the level where it seems *prima facie* most plausible that this might be possible – the macro-level of entire societies, where we may expect to find both terrorist constituencies and environments conducive to terrorism.

As listed in the introductory chapter, development aid has been intended by the donors to further a number of objectives such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, sustainability, good governance, education and the like, all of which just might have an impact on the propensity of the recipient countries for terrorism. Some of the objectives of ODA and at least one of the consequences of “development” might be termed “modernisation,” and one might, indeed, theorise about the links between modernity and terrorism, the latter representing a kind of backlash against a modernisation which is uprooting people, unsettling social relations and institutions and severing “organic” links between material conditions and mindsets. However mesmerizing and potentially illuminating such an analysis might be, this will be attempted.

Fortunately for societies, but unfortunately for analysts, however, terrorism is not really a mass phenomenon, that lend itself easily to statistical analysis. Two mass phenomena with some resemblance (as well as direct links) to terrorism do, on the other hand, have a “mass character” which makes them more amenable to such analysis – civil war and (organised) crime, about both of which quite extensive bodies of literature are available. Some of the following analysis thus deals with correlations (and hypothetical causal links) between various economic, social, demographic, cultural and political factors, as independent variables, and taking civil war as the dependent variable. The empirically supported findings pertaining to this phenomenon may just also be applicable to terrorism – or they may not. Organised crime has not, however, been taken into account, even though it might be relevant, as it is too far removed from the author’s field of expertise.

There is a pitfall in this kind of analysis based on data aggregated at the country level, as it might well be the case that a phenomenon such as terrorism may be

related to specific segments or strata of the population, such as the urban youth, the religious minorities, etc. Some attention will be paid to this, albeit mainly in the form of caveats against unwarranted conclusions, as disaggregated data do not seem to be available. In any case, it needs recapitulating that the objective is not so much to uncover new insights as to critically question commonly held assumptions.

7.1 Terrorists, Constituencies and Environments

Even though there is often a considerable overlap between what we may call the terrorist constituency and the environment of terrorism, it still seems sensible to distinguish analytically between the two, as argued above. Terrorist constituency usually means those on whose behalf the terrorists claim to be acting (usually as self-appointed “representatives” or “vanguards”), whereas a terrorist environment may be conceptualised as the setting of terrorist actions, usually defined geographically or in terms of an otherwise circumscribed population.

In the case of nationalist terrorism, the two largely overlap, as the terrorist group tends to see itself as the vanguard of a people inhabiting the territory where most of its activities also take place. Therefore, it is usually dependent on some support from the constituency, even though the latter often also includes a diaspora.³⁶⁴ As far as religiously motivated terrorism is concerned, the overlap is less obvious, as terrorists and groups may see themselves as acting on behalf of either transcendental authorities (such as God) or broader communities of believers such as the *Umma*³⁶⁵ or Christendom. As these are not territorially circumscribed, the groups are usually not directly dependent on the moral support of any specific groups or environments.

From the point of view of counter-terrorism, it is fortunate that today, most terrorist groups belong to the former rather than to the latter category. This means that they usually do have more tangible constituencies than that of, say, *Al Qaeda*. By implication, it is likely to matter whether local constituencies support them, at least in the sense of condoning their activities and tolerating their presence, and often more actively lending their support, e.g. by economically sponsoring the terrorist organisations or providing the terrorists with refuge and shelter. It is also important, that quite a few terrorist organisations are simultaneously political parties, highly dependent on popular sympathy for their actions.

A fairly obvious link between terrorist groups and their constituencies or environments is that the latter may serve as recruitment pools, with the supporters or sympathisers serving as an “outer ring” of the terrorist core whence terrorists may be “headhunted.” (see Fig. 5 above). In some cases, religious institutions such as mosques or *madrasas* seem to serve this purpose, as they have in Pakistan, albeit less so for the struggle against India over Kashmir, than for the Islamist militancy related to *Al Qaeda* and the Taliban.³⁶⁶ In other cases the recruitment function is assumed by the political arm of the movement or by various charities, as is allegedly the case in various African countries.³⁶⁷

However, there does not seem to be any universal formula for the relationship between terrorists and terrorist groups on the one hand and their constituencies/ environments on the other. In some cases, constituencies serve as recruitment pools for actual terrorists, but that does not mean that we can safely assume that the terrorists constitute a representative sample of those constituencies. In fact, they are usually far from representative, even though it varies from case to case whether they are typically more or less advantaged than average.

In the case of Palestine, there is a fairly clear correspondence between constituency and environment, as even the religious movements such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are also nationalist groups, vying for the support of the Palestinian population and electorate – the former even winning a landslide victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006.³⁶⁸ Popular support has also been (deliberately) cultivated by the welfare programmes run by Hamas in Palestine and by Hizbollah in Lebanon (for all Shi’ites as well as Palestinians). Such (partly) terrorist organisations may be seen as either predominantly militants who merely employ terrorism as one of several instruments in their struggle – or as terrorist groups using the political wing as a smokescreen.

There seems to be general support among the general population for the use of violent means, including terrorism and even suicide attacks.³⁶⁹ However, opinion polls show this support to both fluctuate with political developments and to be quite discriminatory with regard to targets, if not as far as instruments are concerned (see Table 11).³⁷⁰ There is thus considerably higher support for the use of violence against military targets (which, strictly speaking is not terrorism) as against civilians, and for attacks in the occupied Palestinian lands (against Israeli settlers), as against civilians in Israel proper.

Table 11: Palestinian Attitudes to Armed Attacks (per cent)

Poll undertaken	In general		In West Bank and Gaza				In Israel	
			Military		Settlers		Civilians	
	For	Agst.	For	Agst	For	Agst	For	Agst
July 2000	51.6	42.7	91.7	6.6	na	na	58.1	39.0
July 2001	85.9	11.3	na	na	na	na	na	na
Dec 2001	81.8	15.7	92.3	6.5	92.1	6.6	58.2	39.8
May 2002	na	na	91.6	6.9	89.3	9	52.0	46.9
Nov. 2002	na	na	91.0	6.1	89.1	7.8	53.2	43.2
April 2003	na	na	92.8	5.0	91.2	7	57.3	40.0
Oct. 2003	na	na	90.1	8.0	89.3	8.7	54.4	43.2
Dec. 2003	na	na	86.9	10.3	86.2	10.2	47.5	49.5
March 2004	na	na	87.4	11.0	85.8	12.5	53.1	45.4
June 2004	na	na	86.0	11.6	82.8	14.6	50.1	47.2
Sept 2004	na	na	92.2	6.3	90.1	8.3	53.8	44.3
Dec 2004	na	na	84.0	13.4	83.1	14.1	49.4	47.8
March 2005	na	na	na	na	na	na	37.5	59.0

Post-invasion Iraq seems to provide a similarly permissive environment for (what the Americans call) terrorism, especially for attacks against foreign troops. An opinion poll published in September 2006 showed a clear majority of 61 per cent of the population supporting such attacks (up from 47 per cent in January 2006), with the Kurds being alone in consistently disapproving of them (only 15 per cent approval rate), whereas 62 per cent of the Shi'ites and 92 per cent of the Sunni Muslims were in favour (up from 41 and 88 per cent, respectively). These unfavourable attitudes to the occupation of the country seem to be based mainly on nationalism, as they are not accompanied by any sympathy or support for the *Al Qaeda*, alleged by the Bush Administration to be masterminding the attacks. On the contrary, 82 per cent of the population had "very unfavourable and 12 per cent "somewhat unfavourable" views of *Al Qaeda* – and even among the Sunnis only 23 per cent held a favourable opinion.³⁷¹

It is probably inappropriate to generalise from the examples of Palestine or Iraq, as both are far too unlikely to be representative of other terrorist environments. In order to arrive at insights of universal validity, we have to proceed from case studies to global statistics in order to ascertain whether any links exist between societal factors and terrorism. This is the focus of the following sections, looking at economic, demographic, religious and political factors as the independent variables and terrorism as the dependent one. As in the previous chapters, the objective is to question prevalent assumptions and established truth in the Cartesian spirit of doubting everything – “*de omnibus dubitandum est*”.³⁷²

A caveat may be in order here, namely that most of the statistics leave quite a lot to be desired, either because they are unreliable, or because they only cover a short period. Moreover, they are merely used to ascertain whether there is any correlation between the dependent variable terrorism and the various independent variables. Even if there is one, it may well be spurious, not reflecting any causal link. If there is no significant correlation, it does not, strictly speaking, rule out that there may indeed be a causal link – hidden behind the figures, but it does make the hypothesised causality very questionable. If even the poor statistics available do not support the prevailing views, there is all the more reason to adopt an agnostic stance.

7.2 Economics, Civil War and Terrorism

Several authors have hypothesised a causal link between poverty and terrorism – a view that was, for instance, promulgated at a gathering of most Nobel Peace Laureates in November 2004.³⁷³ However much as one may agree (as does the present author) with the operational implications of this view, i.e. that poverty reduction should be a high-priority goal, there is almost certainly no such direct causal link between poverty and terrorism such that would make poverty-reducing ODA an obvious tool for terror prevention.

Neither are the “typical” terrorists recruited among the natives of, or residents in, poor countries, nor do they usually belong to the poorest strata of their respective societies. Poor countries do not seem to experience more terrorism than more affluent ones. Hence, as rightly argued by the former President of the World Bank, Poverty in itself does not immediately and directly lead to conflict, let alone to terrorism. Rather than responding to deprivation by lashing out at others, the vast majority of poor people worldwide devote their energy to the day-in, day-out struggle to secure income, food and opportunities for their children.³⁷⁴

There may, however, be indirect links. One might, for instance, substitute Ted Gurr's concept of "relative deprivation" or Johan Galtung's of "structural violence" for poverty as the independent variable and "armed conflict" for terrorism, which does produce some significant correlations – both at the international and national levels.³⁷⁵

A simple look at the location of armed conflicts also seems to confirm (or is at least, compatible with) these findings. At the international level, it is indisputable that most major armed conflicts take place in the Third World, as set out in Table 12.³⁷⁶

	Africa	Asia	Middle East	Americas	Europe
1990	8	8	4	5	0
1991	9	8	4	4	1
1992	6	9	4	3	2
1993	6	8	4	3	3
1994	7	8	5	3	3
1995	6	8	4	3	2
1996	4	9	4	3	1
1997	5	8	4	2	0
1998	11	8	4	2	1
1999	11	7	3	2	2
2000	9	6	4	2	1
2001	8	6	3	3	1
2002	7	6	2	3	1
2003	5	6	3	3	1
2004	5	5	3	3	1
2005	3	6	3	3	1

Also, the general picture of relative deprivation of most of the "Third World" is fairly clear and indisputable. It was aptly summed up in the opening words of the United Nations' *2001 Report on the World Social Situation*: "Disparities in income and wealth are growing in many countries, and the distance between richer and

poorer countries is also widening.³⁷⁷ The annual reports of the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) present a very similar picture with regard to all indicators of “human development,” of a growing gap between the haves and the have nots, both within and between countries. According to the 2005 issue of the *Human Development Report*, the richest twenty per cent of the world’s people receive three-quarters of the world’s income, whereas the poorest twenty per cent have only five per cent at their disposal.³⁷⁸ In the high-income OECD countries, the average per capita income was US\$30,101, as compared with US\$1,856 in sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. sixteen times higher.

This inequality is not merely a question of income. For instance, life expectancy at birth in rich countries is 78.9 years, but that of Sub-Saharan Africa is 46.1 years.³⁷⁹ Life in the Third World is thus indeed “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”³⁸⁰ This is especially so for the unfortunate poor, whereas the wealthy part of the population tends to be quite well off, even by European standards. It is entirely conceivable that this misery-*cum*-inequality may foment discontent, out of which may spring revolt and even terrorism. Globalisation may further exacerbate these problems, as it tends to widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots, within and between countries, and also because it makes the gap more obvious to the have-nots, among other things because of growing access to the media.³⁸¹

Inequalities within developing countries are usually much more dramatic than in the typical OECD countries. In countries such as Burkina Faso, the richest ten per cent of the population have more than twenty-five times as much wealth at their disposal as the poorest ten per cent. In comparison, the distribution in the “egalitarian” Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) is much more even, with the richest ten per cent having only 5-6 times as much as the poorest ten per cent. Even the much less egalitarian United States has a more even income distribution, especially when measured in “20/20” figures, which compares the richest twenty percent to the poorest twenty per cent of the population.³⁸²

Relative deprivation theory thus seems partly able to explain the incidence of civil war. A more complex and sophisticated model on the links between, on the one side, economic and other factors and, on the other, conflict propensity has been suggested by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. In the most recent version of their theory (or model) they combine measures of grievances (i.e. motives for rebellion) and of opportunities for waging civil war, both in the form of (more or less appropriate) proxy variables, as summarised in Table 13.³⁸³

Table 13: The Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War Onset: Summary		
Variable	Proxy	Significance
Opportunity		
Natural resources	Primary commodity exports/GDP	High
Finance from hostile governments	Cold War context	Low
Finance from diasporas	Emigrants in the USA	Low
Foregone income	a) Mean income p.c.; b) Male secondary schooling; c) Economic growth	High
Price of military equipment	Time since last war	High
Social cohesion: a) Ethnic diversity b) Religious diversity	a) Linguistic diversity; b) No proxy	Medium
Weak government/strong rebels	a) Forested or mountaneous terrain; b) Geographical dispersion; c) Urbanisation	Medium
Grievance		
Economic inequality	Ratio top/bottom income quintiles	Low
Ethnic hatred	Ethnic polarisation	Low
Religious hatred	Religious polarisation	Low
Political repression	Polity dataset	High
Political exclusion	Ethnic dominance	High

The table above lists the relative significance of the variables according to the findings of the research team, yet deliberately omits the four-decimal-point measures found in the original work, judging them to be instances of unwarranted precision. It also omits the various combinations of variables, such as the finding that financing from a diaspora is only highly significant in the case of repetitive wars (i.e. a low value for the proxy variable “time since the last war”).

The value of the model as it stands may be somewhat dubious, perhaps mainly because of an unfortunate selection of proxies. To the credit of the authors and their intellectual integrity, however, they accepted those case studies which seemed to falsify their own hypotheses, and published them alongside their own findings in a two-volume work, which recorded a large-scale testing of their theory. This test took the form of “retrospective prediction,” assessing whether the wars and

other conflicts which actually did occur would have been foreseen by their model. Some would not, e.g. the protracted civil war-*cum*-genocide in Burundi, perhaps mainly because ethnicity in this country had nothing to do with language, as Tutsis and Hutus share the same language.³⁸⁴

To the extent that the above theories about societal propensities for civil war hold true, they may or may not be applicable to the phenomenon of terrorism. Testable hypotheses about this might thus be formulated, tested, revised and subjected to further tests, attempting to falsify them, until these attempts would no longer succeed. Unfortunately, however, nobody seems to have embarked on such a venture, nor shall this be done in the present report.

7.3 Demography and Civil War

Demographic factors also seem to impact on the propensity of societies for armed conflict. Indeed, we may presently be witnessing the birth of a new (sub)discipline which has been called “security demographics,” which is also the title of a recent report by an NGO called Population Action International (PAI).³⁸⁵


That population pressure, should lead to war is neither likely nor supported by empirical evidence,³⁸⁶ even though there seems to be substantial evidence to support the thesis that youth numbers play a role. Jack Goldstone thus found that “shifts in the age distribution that create relatively large youth cohorts, a rapid increase in educated youths aspiring to elite position (...) do increase the risks of violent internal political and ethnic conflicts.”³⁸⁷ Paul Collier of the World Bank has also drawn attention to one of the possible causal links between the number of youths and violent conflict

The greater the number of young men, the easier it would be to recruit rebels. Relatedly, the willingness of young men to join a rebellion might be influenced by their other income-earning opportunities. If young men face only the option of poverty, they might be more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities.³⁸⁸

His host institution, the World Bank, in its major analysis of conflicts in the Third World, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, also found that

[T]he people who join rebel groups are overwhelmingly young, uneducated males. For this group objectively observed grievances might count for

Fig. 13: Demographic Stress (Young adults (aged 15-29) as proportion of all adults (aged 15 and older)



relatively little. Rather, they may be disproportionately drawn from those easily manipulated by propaganda and who find the power that comes from the possession and use of a gun alluring. Social psychologists find that around 3 per cent of the population has psychopathic tendencies and actually enjoys violence against others, and this is more than is needed to equip a rebel group with recruits.³⁸⁹

As mentioned in chapter 5, however, this description of young rebels does not really seem to apply to terrorists.


In Fig. 13 the countries of the world are categorised according to demographic stress, and the resultant picture seems to correspond reasonably closely with the incidence of violent conflict.³⁹⁰ A country seems to have an above-average likelihood of experiencing civil war if its population is characterised by a “youth bulge”, i.e. an extraordinarily large share of youths to the total adult population, and/or if it contains a “male surplus,”³⁹¹ for whatever reason.

Even though the latter connection has only been demonstrated for total populations, it seems plausible to assume that local male surpluses may have the same consequences, say if rural-to-urban migration (e.g. caused by an agrarian crisis) primarily affects men, producing an urban male surplus. This was explained as follows by Cincotta, *et al.*

Why are youth bulges so often volatile? The short answer is: too many young men with not enough to do. When a population as a whole is growing, ever larger numbers of young males come of age each year, ready for work, in search of respect from their male peers and elders. Typically, they are eager to achieve an identity, assert their independence and impress young females. While unemployment rates tend to be high in developing countries, unemployment among young adult males is usually from three to five times as high as adult rates, with lengthy periods between the end of schooling and first placement in a job. Are young males more prone to violence than older men, or than women? The preponderance of social research suggests that they are. Men account for about 90 per cent of arrests for homicide in almost all countries surveyed. All over the world, young men (in this case, defined as aged 15 to 34) are responsible for more than three-quarters of violent crimes.³⁹²

It is also possible to link such theories about demographic stress to the environment. True to the Malthusian legacy,³⁹³ environmental security expert Thomas Homer-Dixon has focused on the causal links between population growth, over-exploitation of natural resources, urbanisation and conflict. Environmental problems in the rural areas may spur on migration to the cities and thus enlarge urban youth bulges (also indirectly by changing the age distribution in the cities and thereby increasing their fertility level). This produces “young urban populations, especially unemployed young men [who] are easier to mobilize for radical political ends (...).”³⁹⁴

Fig. 14: Demographics and Conflict: Illustrative Casual Path



“Malthusian squeezes” thus produce issues which may result in conflict, and they also create the most prominent combatants for such conflicts. The above demographic factors have been summed up in Fig. 14, Which illustrates some of the several possible causal paths.

The existence of diasporas in rich countries also seems to increase the risk of civil war in their countries of origin, e.g. because such diasporas have typically contributed to radicalising positions and financing armed conflict, as explained by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler:

[T]he reason for migration was often partly related to a group grievance. Once detached from the home society and living in a highly absorptive multi-cultural society, the cultural incentive for the diaspora is to preserve prominent aspects of its identity, and extremist political allegiance is an inexpensive means of asserting continued identity. Diasporas do not suffer from the violence that they support, and so face lower costs than the home population. (...) Further, detachment means that the diaspora never has to find a *modus vivendi* with the group that it opposes, whereas those who remain behind face a real need, and are presented with real opportunities, to move on from violence³⁹⁵

Other analysts have, however, argued (and presented supportive evidence to the effect) that diasporas may occasionally play an opposing role, by bringing about peace and preventing both armed conflict, and also terrorism.³⁹⁶

All of the above should amount to a reasonable explanation of how armed conflicts might result from the interplay of economic, environmental, social and demographic factors. Additionally it should also provide some clues as to how development aid might be instrumentalised to prevent violent conflict, e.g. by strengthening the “absorption capacity” of rural areas, creating jobs in the cities, or even affecting a demographic transtion to lower birth rates via education as well as contraception, etc. Unfortunately, we cannot automatically assume that any of this will help prevent terrorism, if only because the latter requires much smaller numbers of actual combatants and supporters than does civil war. It does, however, allow for a formulation of statistically testable hypotheses, and a few of the independent variables highlighted above will in fact be tested (however tentatively) for their possible correlation with terrorism, in section 7.6 below.

7.4 Culture and Religion

It seems obvious that prevailing attitudes in both constituencies and environments may matter in the sense of creating permissive environments and/or providing recruitment pools for terrorist groups. These attitudes are partly determined by such factors as culture, ideology and religion.

Even though, as we have seen, suicide attacks do not usually amount to suicides in the motivational sense, in another sense they are, of course, just that. Just as Durkheim demonstrated varying societal attitudes to suicide, different societies may also have different degrees of acceptance of suicide terrorism, among other things, depending (as for Durkheim) on the prevailing religion. Views on suicide attack are divided in the Muslim world,³⁹⁷ which means that different terrorist groups contemplating the tactical use of suicide attacks, will usually have to “frame” them as something else, such as martyrdom or *jihad*. The same is the case of, at least, both Judaism and Christianity, both of which also condemn suicide.³⁹⁸

As mentioned in the section on individual terrorists, no religion seems to clearly rule out (what others would call) terrorism, and none explicitly and unequivocally endorses it, but all the major religions have given rise to terrorism and been able to find some religious rationale for it. Various studies have been published seeking to identify significant correlations between religion and conflict and/or terrorism, usually based on datasets such as those of the “Correlates of War” or “Minorities at Risk” projects.³⁹⁹ Some of the main findings are that:

- Contrary to what Samuel Huntington argues, conflicts are at least as likely within, as between civilisations, understood as consisting of states sharing a religion;⁴⁰⁰
- Islam has a higher propensity for violence in intrastate wars than Christianity, but not higher than the average for other religions;⁴⁰¹
- A significant (but not particularly strong) correlation between religious difference and conflict propensity;⁴⁰²
- The number of religious conflicts in the Third World is declining, whereas in the developed countries (including the former eastern bloc) it is on the rise;⁴⁰³
- Religion in combination with ethnic separatism, makes for particularly violent conflicts;⁴⁰⁴
- Foreign intervention in ethnic conflicts is more likely when religion is in-

volved, and other states are most likely to intervene in favour of minorities with whom they have religious affinity; and⁴⁰⁵

- Religious legitimacy (proxy variable: that the state has an official religion) facilitates the formation of non-religious grievances when religion is not an issue, but hampers it when it is an important factor.⁴⁰⁶

In Table 14, the actual numbers of recorded terrorist incidents and fatalities in the years 2004-05 have been compared with the numbers that were to be expected statistically, had terrorism had been evenly spread among countries in proportion to their share of world population. As a first cut countries have been grouped along religious lines, i.e. according to their majority religion, if there is one. It must be emphasised, however, that the data on religion are even less reliable than most other statistics. In some cases, none are available, whereas in others they are very dated. The figures for terrorism are drawn from a new database established by the US National Counter-terrorism Center, unfortunately only covering a two year period.⁴⁰⁷

Table 14: Terrorism and Dominant Religions

Country	Religion								Terr. 2004-05		Pop	Expected		Per cent	
	Chr	Isl	Jud	Hin	Bud	Trd	Oth	Non	Inc	Fat	Mil	Inc	Fat	Inc	Fat
Christian Majority															
Angola	53	0				47			4	14	11.8	26	41	15	34
Argentina	94	0	2				4		10	1	39.5	88	138	11	1
Armenia	99	0					1		0	0	3.0	7	10	0	0
Australia	67	2			2		14	15	0	0	20.1	45	70	0	0
Austria	78	4					6	12	1	0	8.2	18	29	5	0
Bahamas	96	0					4		0	0	0.3	1	1	0	0
Barbados	71	0					12	17	0	0	0.3	1	1	0	0
Belarus	80	0					20		1	0	10.3	23	36	4	0
Belgium	100	0							0	0	10.4	23	36	0	0
Belize	77	0					14	9	2	1	0.3	1	1	320	102
Bolivia	100	0							6	0	8.9	20	31	30	0
Botswana	72	0					8	21	0	0	1.6	4	6	0	0
Brazil	89	0					4	7	2	1	186.1	414	648	0	0
Bulgaria	84	12					4		2	0	7.5	17	26	12	0
Burundi	67	10				23			50	284	7.8	17	27	288	1047
Canada	70	2					12	16	2	0	32.8	73	114	3	0
Chile	100	0							5	0	16.0	36	56	14	0
Columbia	90	0					10		831	935	43.0	96	150	869	625
Costa R.	92	0					5	3	0	0	4.0	9	14	0	0
Croatia	93	1					1	5	9	0	4.5	10	16	90	0
Cuba	85	0					15	0	0	0	11.3	25	40	0	0
Cyprus	78	18					4		11	0	0.8	2	3	633	0
Czech R.	29	0					71		0	0	10.2	23	36	0	0
Denmark	98	2							1	0	5.4	12	19	8	0
Dominica	92	0					6	2	0	0	0.1	0	0	0	0
Dom. Rep.	95	0					5		0	0	9.0	20	32	0	0
DRC	80	10					10		30	196	60.8	135	212	22	93
East Timor	93	4		1			3		1	0	1.0	2	4	43	0
Ecuador	95	0					5		9	1	13.4	30	47	30	2
El Salvador	83	0					17		1	0	6.7	15	23	7	0
Estonia	28	0					66	6	4	2	1.3	3	5	135	43
Fiji	52	8		38			2		0	0	0.9	2	3	0	0
Finland	86	0					0	14	0	0	5.2	12	18	0	0
France	88	8	1				4		115	0	60.7	135	211	85	0
Georgia	89	10					1	1	25	8	4.7	10	16	240	49
Germany	68	4					28		2	0	82.4	184	287	1	0
Ghana	63	16				21			0	0	21.9	49	76	0	0
Greece	98	1					1		60	1	10.7	24	37	253	3
Grenada	100	0							0	0	0.1	0	0	0	0
Haiti	96	0					3	1	10	2	8.1	18	28	55	7
Honduras	100	0							8	33	7.2	16	25	50	132
Hungary	74	0					26		2	0	10.0	22	35	9	0
Iceland	94	0					6		0	0	0.3	0	1	0	0
Ireland	93	0					4	4	8	0	4.0	9	14	90	0
Jamaica	65	0					35		1	1	2.7	6	10	16	11
Kenya	78	10				10			15	38	33.8	75	118	20	32
Lesotho	80	0				20			0	0	2.0	5	7	0	0
Lithuania	85	0					6	10	0	0	3.6	8	13	0	0
Luxemb.	87	0					13		0	0	0.5	1	2	0	0
Malawi	80	13					3	4	0	0	12.7	28	44	0	0
Malta	98	0					2		0	0	0.4	1	1	0	0

Table 14: (continued)

Country	Religion								Terr. 2004-05		Pop.	Expected		Percent	
	Chr	Isl	Jud	Hin	Bud	Trd	Oth	Non	Inc	Fat	Mil	Inc	Fat	Inc	Fat
<i>Christian Majority (continued)</i>															
Mexico	95	0					5		14	14	106.2	236	370	6	4
Moldova	99	0	2						2	0	4.5	10	16	20	0
Namibia	85	0				15			0	0	2.0	5	7	0	0
Netherlands	51	6					3	41	7	1	16.4	37	57	19	2
New Zeal.	54	0					21	26	0	0	4.0	9	14	0	0
Nicaragua	90	0					2	9	0	0	5.5	12	19	0	0
Norway	90	2					8		0	0	4.6	10	16	0	0
Panama	100	0							1	1	3.1	7	11	14	9
Papua-NG	66	0				34			1	0	5.5	12	19	8	0
Paraguay	100	0							1	1	6.3	14	22	7	5
Peru	83	0					1	16	7	11	27.9	62	97	11	11
Philippin.	93	5					2	0	196	389	87.9	196	306	100	127
Poland	91	0					9		0	0	38.6	86	134	0	0
Portugal	100	0							3	2	10.6	24	37	13	5
Romania	99	0					1	0	0	0	22.3	50	78	0	0
Rwanda	94	5				0		2	0	0	8.4	19	29	0	0
Samoa	97	0					3		0	0	0.2	0	1	0	0
Sao Tom-P	78	0					3	19	0	0	0.2	0	1	0	0
Serbia	70	19					11		71	13	10.8	24	38	295	34
Seychch.	93	1		2			3	1	1	0	0.1	0.2	0.3	553	0
Slovakia	84	0					3	13	3	0	5.4	12	19	25	0
Slovenia	61	2					27	10	2	2	2.0	5	7	45	29
Solom. Isl.	97	0					3	0	0	0	0.5	1	2	0	0
South Afr.	78	2					4	15	2	3	44.3	99	154	2	2
Spain	94	0					6		111	192	40.3	90	140	124	137
Swazil	60	10					30		6	0	1.1	3	4	237	0
Sweden	87	0					13		3	0	9.0	20	31	15	0
Switzerland	79	4					5	11	1	0	7.5	17	26	6	0
Trin & Tob.	58	6		23			12	2	7	0	1.1	2	4	293	0
Uganda	66	16				18			42	492	27.3	61	95	69	518
Ukraine	52	0.0					10	38	18	3	47.0	105	164	17	2
UK	72	3		1			2	23	117	54	60.4	135	210	87	26
USA	78	1	1				10	10	14	0	295.7	658	1,029	2	0
Uruguay	68	0	1					31	5	0	3.4	8	12	66	0
Vanuatu	83	0				6	11	1	0	0	0.2	1	1	0	0
Venezuela	98	0					2		23	11	25.4	57	88	41	12
Zambia	63	0				1	37		0	0	11.3	25	39	0	0
Zimbabwe	25	0				24	51		1	1	12.2	27	42	4	2
No Majority 1: Christianity Largest															
Benin	30	20				50			1	0	7.6	17	27	6	0
Bosnia	46	40					14		22	0	4.4	10	15	223	0
Cameroun	40	20				40			1	0	17.0	38	59	3	0
CAR	50	15				35			1	0	4.2	9	15	11	0
Congo	50	2				48			1	13	3.6	8	13	12	104
Guyana	50	10		35			5		1	2	0.8	2	3	59	75
Macedonia	33	17					51		10	0	2.0	5	7	220	0
Liberia	40	20				40			2	0	2.9	7	10	31	0
Mauritius	32	17		48			3	0	0	0	1.2	3	4	0	0
Mozamb.	41	18					18	23	0	0	19.4	43	68	0	0
Suriname	48	20		27		5			0	0	0.4	1	2	0	0
Togo	29	20				51			1	0	5.4	12	19	8	0

Table 14: (continued)

Country	Religion								Terr. 2004-05		Pop.		Expected		Per cent	
	Chr	Isl	Jud	Hin	Bud	Trd	Oth	Non	Inc	Fat	Mil.	Inc	Fat	Inc	Fat	
Muslim Majority																
Afghanist.	0.0	99					1		636	958	29.9	67	104	955	920	
Albania	30	70							15	4	3.6	8	12	189	32	
Algeria	0	99					1		104	179	32.5	72	113	144	158	
Azerbaij.	5	93					2		5	3	7.9	18	28	28	11	
Bahrain	9	81						10	0	0	0.7	2	2	0	0	
Bangladesh	0	83		16			1		140	111	144.3	321	502	44	22	
Brunei	10	67			13			10	0	0	0.4	1	1	0	0	
Chad	35	51				7	7		5	109	9.7	22	34	23	324	
Comoros	2	98							0	0	0.7	2	2	0	0	
Djibouti	6	94							0	0	0.5	1	2	0	0	
Egypt	6	94							12	131	77.5	173	270	7	49	
Gambia	9	90					1		2	1	1.6	4	6	56	18	
Guinea	8	85						7	1	0	9.5	21	33	5	0	
Indonesia	8	88		2	1		1		78	128	242.0	539	842	14	15	
Iran	0	98					2		15	23	68.0	151	237	10	10	
Iraq	0	97					3		4,405	11,220	26.1	58	91	7,590	12,362	
Jordan	6	92					2		3	64	5.8	13	20	23	319	
Kuwait	0	85					15		0	0	2.3	5	8	0	0	
Kyrgys.	20	75					5		2	0	5.1	12	18	17	0	
Lebanon	39	60					1		23	38	3.8	9	13	270	285	
Libya	0	97					3		0	0	5.8	13	20	0	0	
Mali	1	90						9	1	0	11.4	25	40	4	0	
Mauritania	0	100							2	0	3.1	7	11	29	0	
Morocco	1	99	0						0	0	32.7	73	114	0	0	
Niger	0	80					20		0	0	12.2	27	42	0	0	
Palestine	5	84	11						639	73	3.8	8	13	7,631	558	
Pakistan	0	97					3		589	613	162.4	362	565	163	108	
Qatar	0	95					5		1	1	0.9	2	3	52	33	
Saudi Arab.	0	100							24	56	26.4	59	92	41	61	
Senegal	5	94				1			5	4	11.7	26	41	19	10	
Sierra Leone	10	60					30		0	0	5.9	13	20	0	0	
Sudan	5	70					25		38	271	40.2	90	140	42	194	
Syria	10	90							3	2	18.4	41	64	7	3	
Tajikistan	0	90					10		2	0	7.2	16	25	13	0	
Tunesia	1	98					1		0	0	10.1	22	35	0	0	
Turkey	0	100					0		181	88	69.7	155	243	117	36	
Turkmen.	9	89					2		0	0	5.0	11	17	0	0	
UAE	0	96					4		0	0	2.6	6	9	0	0	
Uzbekist.	9	88					3		11	19	26.9	60	94	18	20	
Yemen	0	0							16	23	20.7	46	72	35	32	

Table 14: (continued)

Country	Religion								Terr. 2004-05		Pop.	Expected		Per cent	
	Chr	Isl	Jud	His	Bud	Trd	Oth	Non	Inc	Fat	Mil.	Inc	Fat	Inc	Fat
No Majority 2: Islam Largest															
Burkina F.	10	50				40			0	0	13.5	30	47	0	0
Cote d'Iv.	25	38				38			15	65	17.3	39	60	39	108
Ethiopia	38	48				12	3		12	12	73.1	163	254	7	5
Guin-Bis.	5	45				50			1	2	1.4	3	5	32	41
Nigeria	40	50				10			26	686	128.8	287	448	9	153
Tanzania	30	35				35			6	3	36.8	82	128	7	2
Judaic Majority															
Israel	2	16	77				6		178	86	6.3	14	22	1,274	394
Hindu Majority															
India	2	13		81			4		1,728	1,901	1,080.3	2,405	3,760	72	51
Nepal	0	4		81	11		5		1,653	760	27.7	62	96	2,683	789
Buddhist Majority															
Bhutan	0	0		25	75				1	0	2.2	5	8	20	0
Burma	4	4			89	1	2		16	44	47.0	105	164	15	27
Cambodia	0	0			95		5		3	1	13.6	30	48	10	2
Japan	1	0			84		15		6	0	127.4	284	444	2	0
Laos	0	0			60		40		10	2	6.2	14	22	72	9
Sri Lanka	6	8		7	69		10		280	152	20.1	45	70	627	218
Thailand	1	5			95		0		946	596	64.2	143	223	662	267
No Majority 3: Buddhism Largest															
Singapore	15	15		4	43		9	15	0	0	4.4	10	15	0	0
Mongolia	0	4			50		6	40	0	0	2.8	6	10	0	0
Traditional Religion Majority															
Madagasc	41	7				52			11	0	18.0	40	63	27	0
Mixed															
China	4	2					95		13	25	1,306.3	2,908	4,547	0	1
Kazakhst.	46	47					7		3	0	15.2	34	53	9	0
Korea, S.	26	0			26		2	46	0	0	48.6	108	169	0	0
Vietnam	7	0			9		3	81	1	0	83.5	186	291	1	0
No data on Religion															
Cape Verde, Eq. Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guatemala, Italy, N. Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Maldives, Oman, Russia, Somalia, Tonga, Western Sahara									479 1,142		282	628 982		na	na
Legend: Chr: Christianity; Isl: Islam; Jud: Judaism; Hin: Hindusm; Bud: Buddhism; Trd: Traditional religions; Oth: Other religions; Non: No religion; Terr.: Terrorism; Inc: Incidents; Fat: Fatalities; Pop.: Population; "Expected Inc/Fat": Country share of world population * global number of terrorist incidents/fatalities; Per cent Inc/Fat: Actual number of incidents/fatalities as percentage of expected; Boldface: Higher than expected. Discrepancies may be due to rounding															

The table allows us to identify “problem countries” with respect to terrorism, characterised by higher than expected numbers of terrorist incidents and/or fatalities, based on the size of their population. Their religious composition is summarised in Table 15.

Table 15: “Problem Countries” and Groups					
Group/Countries	Share of group's		Group/Countries	Share of group's	
	Countries	Countries		Countries	Countries
Christianity 1: Majority			Islam 1: Majority		
Belize, Burundi, Columbia, Cyprus, Uganda	4.5%	4.5%	Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Chad, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey	25.0%	33.2%
Christianity 2: Largest					
Bosnia, Congo, Macedonia	25.0%	14.6%			
Judaism Majority					
Israel	100.0%	100.0%			
Hinduism Majority			Islam 2: Largest		
Nepal	50.0%	2.5%	Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria	33.3%	53.9%
Buddhism Majority					
Sri Lanka, Thailand	28.6%	30.0%			

There does, seem to be an over-representation of Islam in this groups of “problematic” countries – even though it would be premature to conclude that they are problematic because of their religious orientation. The correlation between Islam and terrorism may well be (at least partly) spurious, in the sense of reflecting other causal factors such as economic development, social cleavage, or history. It is also worth noting that a number of Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia, (in fact, the largest of them all), experience less terrorism than was statistically expected.

There are, on the other hand, widespread – but only partially well-documented – concerns about the spread of particular varieties of Islam that may be particu-

larly “terrorism-friendly” in both the Arab world, Central and Southeast Asia, as well as parts of Africa. The primary “suspects” in this respect are the two main branches of Salafism – Wahhabism, mainly in the Arab world and parts of Africa and Deobandism in parts of Asia such as Pakistan,⁴⁰⁸ Afghanistan⁴⁰⁹ Central Asia,⁴¹⁰ the Phillipines,⁴¹¹ Indonesia⁴¹² and other parts of Southeast Asia.⁴¹³ These forms of radical Islamism have been spread mainly via *dawa*, i.e. missionary activities, aided by the generous funds made available (through Islamic charities and aid organisations) from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (and at least partly associated with Wahhabism). Should such radical and “Jihadist” forms of Islam spread further, there may be cause for concern, even though the historical experience seem to point towards “waves” of Islamic radicalisation rather than to any persistent trend.⁴¹⁴

Whereas development can obviously do nothing to change religious beliefs, it is conceivable that it may help promote moderation or even secularisation, e.g. by furthering education and by providing substitutes for the aid granted by countries and charities with a radical agenda. Just how effective it may be in these respects, is impossible to determine in advance.

7.5 The Political Sphere

As terrorism is usually a political activity – at least in the broad sense of the term – it is inherently plausible that a country’s propensity for experiencing it will have something to do with its political system.

As we saw in the chapter on terrorist groups, in many cases terrorism is a choice of last resort for political groups and social movements to voice grievances and demands, or to influence their own situation. By implication, political systems provide better opportunities for this, and would presumably, be less likely to foster terrorism.⁴¹⁵ Several interlinked parameters would seem likely to matter in these respects, mainly the degree of centralisation, democracy and state capacity. The more centralised a state, and the greater its governing capacity, the more important it will obviously be to have a say on the policies pursued – and the greater the incentive for resorting to whatever means toward this end, including that of terrorism.⁴¹⁶

7.5.1 Minorities, Centralisation, Autonomy and Terrorism

We have seen that many armed movements, including terrorist ones, are in reality nationalist ones, even when they couch their nationalist agendas in religious rhetoric.

“Nationalism,” in this connection is often tantamount to separatism, when an ethnic or other minority demands autonomy or even secession, from the “mother state.” Sometimes it is combined with demands for a merger with a more ethnically congenial neighbouring state – as has been the case of the insurgents in Indian Kashmir or the KLA in Kosovo. It would therefore seem likely that the degree of autonomy granted to such national and ethnic groups by the mother state is important, i.e. that substantial autonomy should help mitigate separatist demands, thus making it less likely that they would lead to terrorism or armed rebellion. Such autonomy may take many forms.⁴¹⁷

In the case of geographically clustered ethnic minorities, forms of federalism seem the natural choice, especially in cases where the minority constitutes a local majority, as is often the case. Self-rule under a federal scheme would thus allow the minority/local majority to manage its own affairs, even though the exact division of power between federal and local authorities would always be a matter of contention and renegotiation.⁴¹⁸ It may even be possible to create such circumstances by changing administrative borders, as when the Indian government decided to subdivide the Punjab into two states, in order to ensure a (slim and fragile) Sikh majority in one – yet without managing to quell Sikh unrest.⁴¹⁹

We might thus hypothesise that federalism should be inversely correlated with terrorism. In order to test this hypothesis, federal forms of government have in Table 16 been correlated with the numbers of terrorist incidents and fatalities in 2004-05. Both Tanzania and Israel have been added to the list of federations listed in the source. Zanzibar joined mainland Tanzania in 1964 in a political union, but retained substantial autonomy, partly as a way of maintaining religious autonomy for the overwhelming majority of Zanzibaris who are Muslim.⁴²⁰ Israel has been counted as a federation (of sorts) considering that it occupies Palestinian territories which are, largely self-governing. One might also have included Somalia, both in view of the special situation of Somaliland which has been de facto independent since its unilateral and not internationally recognised secession in 1991, and in view of the new political dispensation with a Transitional Federal Government at the apex of formal power, albeit without any actual control of the country, at least until it was instated in Mogadishu in December 2006 by Ethiopia.⁴²¹ Measures of self-determination movements and discrimination have been added, based on the assessments of the Minorities at Risk project.⁴²²

Table 16: Terrorism and Federalism 1: Correlations

Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Government	Minorities	
	Incidents	Fatalities		Selfdet. Conf.	Discrim.
Afghanistan	636	958	U	2	1
Albania	15	4	U	0	0
Algeria	104	179	U	2	3
Angola	4	14	U	3	2
Argentina	10	1	F	0	0
Armenia	0	0	U	0	0
Australia	0	0	F	1	0
Austria	1	0	F	0	0
Azerbaijan	5	3	U	2	0
Bahrain	0	0	U	0	1
Bangladesh	140	111	U	1	3
Barbados	0	0	U	0	0
Belarus	1	0	U	0	0
Belgium	0	0	F	1	0
Benin	1	0	U	0	0
Bhutan	1	0	U	2	3
Bolivia	6	0	U	2	1
Bosnia	22	0	F	2	0
Botswana	0	0	U	0	0
Brazil	2	1	F	2	2
Bulgaria	2	0	U	0	2
Burkina F.	0	0	U	0	0
Burma	16	44	U	3	3
Burundi	50	284	U	0	2
Cambodia	3	1	U	0	0
Cameroon	1	0	U	2	3
Canada	2	0	F	1	1
CAR	1	0	U	0	0
Chad	5	109	U	1	1
Chile	5	0	U	2	0
China	13	25	U	2	0
Columbia	831	935	U	1	0
Comoros	0	0	F	1	0
Congo	1	13	U	0	3
Costa Rica	0	0	U	0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	15	65	U	0	0
Croatia	9	0	U	2	0
Cuba	0	0	U	0	0
Cyprus	11	0	U	2	0
Czech R.	0	0	U	0	0
Denmark	1	0	U	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	U	1	2

Table 16: (continued)

Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Government	Minorities	
	Incidents	Fatalities		Selfdet. Conf.	Discrim.
Dom.Rep.	0	0	U	0	3
DRC	30	196	U	1	0
East Timor	1	0	U	0	0
Ecuador	9	1	U	2	3
Egypt	12	131	U	0	0
El Salvador	1	0	U	0	0
Eq. Guinea	0	0	U	2	0
Eritrea	2	8	U	0	1
Estonia	4	2	U	0	1
Ethiopia	12	12	F	3	1
Fiji	0	0	U	0	2
Finland	0	0	U	1	0
France	115	0	U	2	0
Gabon	0	0	U	0	0
Gambia	2	1	U	0	0
Georgia	25	8	U	2	0
Germany	2	0	F	0	0
Ghana	0	0	U	0	0
Greece	60	1	U	0	0
Guatemala	1	1	U	0	2
Guinea	1	0	U	0	2
Guinea-Bissau	1	2	U	0	0
Guyana	1	2	U	0	3
Haiti	10	2	U	0	0
Honduras	8	33	U	0	0
Hungary	2	0	U	0	1
India	1,728	1,901	F	2	2
Indonesia	78	128	U	3	0
Iran	15	23	U	2	3
Iraq	4,405	11,220	F	2	1
Ireland	8	0	U	0	0
Israel	817	159	F	3	3
Italy	30	2	U	1	0
Jamaica	1	1	U	0	0
Japan	6	0	U	0	0
Jordan	3	64	U	0	2
Kazakhstan	3	0	U	1	2
Kenya	15	38	U	0	1
Korea, DPR	0	0	U	0	0
Korea, Rep. of	0	0	U	0	0
Kuwait	0	0	U	0	0
Kyrgyzstan	2	0	U	1	2
Laos	10	2	U	3	0

Table 16: (continued)

Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Government	Minorities	
	Incidents	Fatalities		Selfdet. Conf.	Discrim.
Latvia	0	0	U	0	2
Lebanon	23	38	U	2	3
Lesotho	0	0	U	0	0
Liberia	2	0	U	0	0
Libya	0	0	U	0	0
Lithuania	0	0	U	0	0
Macedonia	10	0	U	1	2
Madagascar	11	0	U	0	0
Malawi	0	0	U	0	0
Malaysia	4	0	F	0	2
Mali	1	0	U	1	1
Mauritania	2	0	U	0	3
Mauritius	0	0	U	0	0
Mexico	14	14	F	2	0
Moldova	2	0	U	2	0
Mongolia	0	0	U	0	0
Morocco	0	0	U	2	0
Mozambique	0	0	U	0	0
Namibia	0	0	U	2	0
Nepal	1,653	760	U	0	0
Netherlands	7	1	U	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	U	0	1
Nicaragua	0	0	U	1	0
Niger	0	0	U	1	0
Nigeria	26	686	F	3	2
Norway	0	0	U	1	0
Oman	0	0	U	0	0
Pakistan	589	613	F	3	2
Panama	1	1	U	0	2
Pap-New G	1	0	U	1	0
Paraguay	1	1	U	0	0
Peru	7	11	U	2	2
Philippines	196	389	U	2	1
Poland	0	0	U	0	0
Portugal	3	2	U	0	0
Qatar	1	1	U	0	0
Romania	0	0	U	1	1
Russia	416	1068	F	2	0
Rwanda	0	0	U	0	2
Saudi Arabia	24	56	U	0	3
Senegal	5	4	U	1	0
Serbia	71	13	U	2	0

Table 16: (continued)

Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Government	Minorities	
	Incidents	Fatalities		Selfdet. Conf.	Discrim.
Sierra Leone	0	0	U	0	1
Singapore	0	0	U	0	2
Slovakia	3	0	U	1	0
Slovenia	2	2	U	0	0
Solom. Isl	0	0	U	0	0
Somalia	26	63	U	2	0
South Africa	2	3	U	1	1
Spain	111	192	U	2	0
Sri Lanka	280	152	U	2	3
Sudan	38	271	F	2	3
Swaziland	6	0	U	0	0
Sweden	3	0	U	1	0
Switzerland	1	0	F	1	3
Syria	3	2	U	0	0
Taiwan	2	0	U	1	0
Tajikistan	2	0	U	0	2
Tanzania	6	3	F	1	0
Thailand	946	596	U	3	0
Togo	1	0	U	0	0
Trin & Tob	7	0	U	1	0
Tunisia	0	0	U	0	0
Turkey	181	88	U	3	3
Turkmenistan	0	0	U	0	0
Uganda	42	492	U	0	0
Ukraine	18	3	U	2	0
UAE	0	0	F	0	0
UK	117	54	U	1	1
USA	14	0	F	1	1
Uruguay	5	0	U	0	0
Uzbekistan	11	19	U	1	2
Venezuela	23	11	F	0	2
Vietnam	1	0	U	2	0
Yemen	16	23	U	0	0
Zambia	0	0	U	2	0
Zimbabwe	1	1	U	1	1
Correlations (Pearson r)	Terrorist incidents/Federalism		0.254752		
	Terrorist fatalities/Federalism		0.243639		
Legend: Government: Unitary State: U, Federation: F; Self-determination: No self-determination movements: 0; Successful accommodation of movements: 1; Either non-violent movements or violent ones, with track record of accommodation: 2; Violent self-determination conflict: 3; Discrimination: No discrimination: 0; Little discrimination and anti-discrimination policies: 1; Social discrimination: 2; Active government discrimination policy: 3					

The statistical correlation between federalism and terrorism is clearly insignificant, thus invalidating the hypothesis. This finding is confirmed by Table 17, by looking exclusively at the 23 federal states to see how they compare with the global averages for “per capita terrorism.”

Table 17: Terrorism and Federalism 2: Averages

Federations	Actual terrorism		Population (mil.)	Expected terrorism		Actual/Expected	
	Incidents	Fatalities		Incidents	Fatalities	Incidents	Fatalities
Argentina	10	1	39.5	88	138	11%	1%
Australia	0	0	20.1	45	70	0%	0%
Austria	1	0	8.2	18	29	6%	0%
Belgium	0	0	10.4	23	36	0%	0%
Bosnia	22	0	4.4	10	15	220%	0%
Brazil	2	1	186.1	414	648	0%	0%
Canada	2	0	32.8	73	114	3%	0%
Comoros	0	0	0.7	2	2	0%	0%
Ethiopia	12	12	73.1	163	254	7%	5%
Germany	2	0	82.4	184	287	1%	0%
India	1,728	1,901	1,080.3	2,405	3,760	72%	51%
Iraq	4,405	11,220	26.1	58	91	7,595%	12,330%
Israel	817	159	10.1	22	35	3,714%	454%
Malaysia	4	0	23.9	52	82	8%	0%
Mexico	14	14	106.2	236	370	6%	4%
Nigeria	26	686	128.8	287	448	9%	153%
Pakistan	589	613	162.4	362	565	163%	108%
Russia	416	1,068	143.4	314	490	132%	218%
Sudan	38	271	40.2	90	140	42%	194%
Switzerland	1	0	7.5	17	26	6%	0%
Tanzania	6	3	36.8	82	128	7%	2%
UAE	0	0	2.6	6	9	0%	0%
USA	14	0	295.7	658	1,029	2%	0%
Venezuela	23	11	25.4	57	88	40%	13%
Total Fed.	8,126	15,957	2,510.3	5,584	8,726	146%	183%
World	14,275	22,319	6,525.2	14,275	22,319	100%	100%

Contrary to the hypothesis, the table clearly shows federations to have an above-average number of terrorist incidents and fatalities. However, it also shows a wide variation, and it does not, of course, give any hints as to the direction of the “arrow of causality.” if there is any. We therefore cannot know for sure whether these states experience more terrorism because of their being federations, or whether they have opted for a federal form of government as a hedge against

terrorism (and civil war). Even though it is obviously insufficient for this, we cannot conclude that it is useless, as the listed states might have experienced even more unrest under a unitary form of government.

It is inherently plausible that the two parameters relating to minorities may be important. The treatment of minorities, because discrimination and exclusion may give the affected segments of the populations reason to revolt, and the existence of self-determination movements, because these would seem to be among the most likely to resort to terrorism. In Table 18, the most problematic of the world's countries in these respects – defined as such by either having violent self-determination movements on their territory or official discrimination policies, according to the Minorities at Risk project – have been subject to further scrutiny.

Once again, there seems to be absolutely no sense in which federations fare any better than unitary states. Again, even though this lack of correlation may well be spurious, we are forced to conclude that the hypothesis of federalism as a hedge against terrorism has been falsified. However, there may well be a number of other reasons for countries with significant and geographically concentrated minorities to opt for a federal form of government.

Obtaining autonomy is more complicated for minorities which do not cluster geographically as, for instance, the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi or religious minorities in many countries, including most of Europe. While local self-rule would do absolutely nothing to meet their demands, what Arend Lijphart called “consociationalism”⁴²³ may, in principle at least, be an appropriate formula for such cases. This basically boils down to “policy area-specific self-determination,” as when Muslims in several countries (e.g. in Kenya) have their own *sharia* courts, which are, in some respects, subject to a different jurisdiction than the rest of the population.⁴²⁴

Such arrangements may even be combined with issue-specific, veto powers granted to “significant minorities,” as well as special compositions of the institutions of the state, e.g. a secured number of votes in Parliament and/or seats in the Cabinet. This may, but not necessarily, be enshrined in the Constitution. Persistent practices may also suffice, but in both cases the degree of consociationalism will almost inevitably be a matter of contention and continuous (re)negotiation.

Country	Minorities		Actual terror		Popula- tion	Expected terror		Actual/Expected	
	Conflict	Disc	Inc	Fat		Inc	Fat	Inc	Fat
Federations									
Ethiopia	3	1	12	12	73.1	163	254	7%	5%
Israel	3	3	817	159	10.1	22	35	3,714%	454%
Nigeria	3	2	26	686	128.8	287	448	9%	153%
Pakistan	3	2	589	613	162.4	362	565	163%	108%
Sudan	2	3	38	271	40.2	90	140	42%	194%
Switzerland	1	3	1	0	7.5	17	26	6%	0%
Subtotal			1,483	1,741	422.1	923	1,444	161%	121%
Unitary States									
Algeria	2	3	104	179	32.5	72	113	144%	158%
Angola	3	2	4	14	11.8	26	41	15%	34%
Bangladesh	1	3	140	111	144.3	321	502	44%	22%
Bhutan	2	3	1	0	2.2	5	8	20%	0%
Burma	3	3	16	44	47.0	105	164	15%	27%
Cameroon	2	3	1	0	17.0	38	59	3%	0%
Congo	0	3	1	13	3.6	8	13	13%	100%
Dom. Rep.	0	3	0	0	9.0	20	32	0%	0%
Ecuador	2	3	9	1	13.4	30	47	30%	2%
Guyana	0	3	1	2	0.8	2	3	50%	67%
Indonesia	3	0	78	128	242	539	842	14%	15%
Iran	2	3	15	23	68	151	237	10%	10%
Laos	3	0	10	2	6.2	14	22	71%	9%
Lebanon	2	3	23	38	3.8	9	13	256%	292%
Mauritania	0	3	2	0	3.1	7	11	29%	0%
Saudi Arabia	0	3	24	56	26.4	59	92	41%	61%
Sri Lanka	2	3	280	152	20.1	45	70	622%	217%
Thailand	3	0	946	596	64.2	143	223	662%	267%
Turkey	3	3	181	88	69.7	155	243	117%	36%
Subtotal			1,836	1,447	785.1	1,718	22,319	107%	6%
Problem States Total			3,319	3,188	1,207.2	2,641	23,763	126%	13%
World Total			14,275	22,319	6,525.2	14,275	22,319	100%	100%

It seems plausible that such autonomy might help prevent or contain both civil war and terrorism, but the hypothesis does not seem to ever have been tested – nor shall such a test be attempted here. One obstacle to such testing would be the very small number of states with political dispensations based on consociationalist principles, and the great diversity required for their implementation.⁴²⁵

7.5.2 *Democracy and Terrorism*

Democracy is held, especially by International Relations liberalists, to be a powerful hedge against war – see, for example, the famous “democratic peace” theorem,⁴²⁶ which comes in different versions.⁴²⁷ At present, the most fashionable version is the “dual democracy” thesis, according to which war between democracies never (or, in more moderate versions, very rarely) takes place. While most analysts have focused on relations between states, others have transposed the theory to the level of domestic politics, arguing that democracy makes states well nigh immune to civil war.⁴²⁸

Whilst granting the inherent plausibility of this thesis, however, others have pointed to the significant differences between, on the one hand, mature and stable democracies and, on the other hand, newly democratising states, to which neither version of the democratic peace theorem may really apply. Indeed, the democratisation phase may be more prone to violence than both stable authoritarianism and stable democracy.⁴²⁹ What democratising states lack may be the underpinnings of polyarchy referred to by Robert Dahl:

What we ordinarily describe as democratic “politics” is merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society. (...) Without such a consensus no democratic system would long survive the endless irritations and frustrations of elections and party competition. With such a consensus the disputes over policy alternatives are nearly always disputes over a set of alternatives that have already been winnowed down to those within a broad area of basis agreement.⁴³⁰

It is also inherently plausible that conflict and terrorism propensity will depend on the particular version of democracy,⁴³¹ as some afford better opportunities for minorities to obtain a share of influence than others. Presidential systems tend to favour the majority, as the minority is excluded from ever winning the presidency; proportional representation systems are better than winner-takes-all (also known as first-past-the -post) electoral systems, as they ensure that even scattered minorities get represented, etc.⁴³²

However, federalism, consociationalism and the various versions of democracy, understood as formal political arrangements, are up against the powerful

factor of informality, as actual rather than formal discrimination, exclusion, etc. are often what foment the discontent needed for civil war and terrorism in most Third World countries. Here, the state institutions usually take the form of neo-patrimonialism, i.e. it is based on personal ties in a top-down fashion (as in a Weberian patrimonial regime),⁴³³ yet not built on traditional authority, but on power, manifested in a pyramidal scheme of patron-client relations.⁴³⁴

All of this amounts to a catalogue of potential problems with political systems, which may in turn, give rise to plausible hypotheses about the political causality of terrorism such as “the more democratic a political system is, the less likely is it to experience terrorism within its borders.” In principle, it would be quite easy to do a regression analysis, comparing degrees of democracy with the frequency of terrorist acts, either synchronically (i.e. between different countries at the same time) or diachronically, comparing the same country over time for the two variables. Moreover, this could all be disaggregated to the level of subcategories to test hypotheses such as “political systems of type A under conditions B have a higher-than-average propensity for terrorism of type C,” etc. Unfortunately, however, only very few such studies exist, and all seem to suffer from either severe weaknesses of their datasets or from logical flaws or inconsistencies, or indeed both. A very tentative correlation analysis is nevertheless ventured in Table 19, comparing Freedom House scores for the electoral process and political pluralism and participation with the number of terrorist incidents in the years 2004-05.

Table 19: Democracy/Political Freedom and Terrorism (2004-05)

Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Democracy		Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Democracy	
	Inc	Fat	Elect	Plur		Inc	Fat	Elect	Plur
Afghanistan	636	958	6	7	Dom.Rep.	0	0	11	13
Albania	15	4	8	11	DRC	30	196	1	5
Algeria	104	179	5	3	East Timor	1	0	11	10
Angola	4	14	2	5	Ecuador	9	1	8	15
Argentina	10	1	11	15	Egypt	12	131	2	4
Armenia	0	0	4	5	El Salvador	1	0	12	13
Australia	0	0	12	15	Eq. Guinea	0	0	0	1
Austria	1	0	12	16	Eritrea	2	8	0	1
Azerbaijan	5	3	3	4	Estonia	4	2	12	15
Bahamas	0	0	12	16	Ethiopia	12	12	5	6
Bahrain	0	0	3	6	Fiji	0	0	6	8
Bangladesh	140	111	8	10	Finland	0	0	12	16
Barbados	0	0	12	16	France	115	0	12	15
Belarus	1	0	1	3	Gabon	0	0	2	5
Belgium	0	0	12	15	Gambia	2	1	6	7
Belize	2	1	12	14	Georgia	25	8	9	9
Benin	1	0	8	14	Germany	2	0	12	15
Bhutan	1	0	2	1	Ghana	0	0	12	15
Bolivia	6	0	10	13	Greece	60	1	12	15
Bosnia	22	0	7	11	Grenada	0	0	12	16
Botswana	0	0	11	11	Guatemala	1	1	9	8
Brazil	2	1	11	14	Guinea	1	0	2	5
Brunei	0	0	0	3	Guinea-B.	1	2	9	10
Bulgaria	2	0	12	15	Guyana	1	2	10	12
Burkina F.	0	0	5	8	Haiti	10	2	0	5
Burma	16	44	0	1	Honduras	8	33	9	11
Burundi	50	284	9	11	Hungary	2	0	12	15
Cambodia	3	1	3	5	Iceland	0	0	12	16
Cameroon	1	0	3	5	India	1,728	1,901	11	14
Canada	2	0	12	16	Indonesia	78	128	11	13
Cape Verde	0	0	12	15	Iran	15	23	3	3
CAR	1	0	7	7	Iraq	4,405	11,220	3	4
Chad	5	109	3	2	Ireland	8	0	12	16
Chile	5	0	12	15	Israel	178	86	12	15
China	13	25	0	1	Italy	30	2	12	16
Columbia	831	935	9	8	Jamaica	1	1	10	13
Comoros	0	0	7	8	Japan	6	0	12	15
Congo	1	13	3	5	Jordan	3	64	4	7
Costa Rica	0	0	12	15	Kazakhstan	3	0	3	4
Cote d'Ivoire	15	65	2	2	Kenya	15	38	9	11
Croatia	9	0	12	14	Korea, N.	0	0	0	0
Cuba	0	0	0	0	Korea, S.	0	0	11	15
Cyprus	11	0	11	16	Kuwait	0	0	4	8
Czech R.	0	0	12	15	Kyrgyzstan	2	0	5	7
Denmark	1	0	12	16	Laos	10	2	0	1
Djibouti	0	0	4	5	Latvia	0	0	12	15
Dominica	0	0	12	16	Lebanon	23	38	4	8

Table 19: (continued)

Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Democracy		Country	Terrorism 2004-5		Elect	Plur
	Inc	Fat	Elect	Plur		Inc	Fat		
Lesotho	0	0	10	12	Saudi Arabia	24	56	0	0
Liberia	2	0	9	10	Senegal	5	4	12	12
Libya	0	0	0	1	Serbia	71	13	9	13
Lithuania	0	0	12	15	Seychelles	1	0	8	11
Luxembourg	0	0	12	16	Sierra Leone	0	0	9	10
Macedonia	10	0	8	10	Singapore	0	0	4	6
Madagascar	11	0	8	9	Slovakia	3	0	12	15
Malawi	0	0	7	10	Slovenia	2	2	12	15
Malaysia	4	0	6	7	Solomon Islands	0	0	7	10
Maldives	0	0	3	2	Somalia	26	63	0	4
Mali	1	0	9	12	South Africa	2	3	12	14
Malta	0	0	12	16	Spain	111	192	12	14
Mauritania	2	0	2	6	Sri Lanka	280	152	8	9
Mauritius	0	0	12	15	Sudan	38	271	0	4
Mexico	14	14	12	14	Suriname	0	0	12	13
Moldova	2	0	9	8	Swaziland	6	0	0	1
Mongolia	0	0	9	15	Sweden	3	0	12	16
Morocco	0	0	4	7	Switzerland	1	0	12	16
Mozambique	0	0	7	11	Syria	3	2	0	0
Namibia	0	0	10	12	Taiwan	2	0	11	15
Nepal	1,653	760	1	6	Tajikistan	2	0	2	4
Netherlands	7	1	12	16	Tanzania	6	3	6	10
New Zealand	0	0	12	15	Thailand	946	596	9	12
Nicaragua	0	0	9	11	Togo	1	0	2	3
Niger	0	0	10	10	Tonga	0	0	3	9
Nigeria	26	686	7	8	Trinidad & Tobago	7	0	9	11
Norway	0	0	12	16	Tunisia	0	0	1	3
Palestine	639	73			Turkey	181	88	9	12
Oman	0	0	2	2	Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0
Pakistan	589	613	2	6	Uganda	42	492	3	6
Panama	1	1	12	15	Ukraine	18	3	8	12
Papua-NG	1	0	9	11	UAE	0	0	0	1
Paraguay	1	1	11	11	UK	117	54	12	15
Peru	7	11	11	14	USA	14	0	10	16
Philippines	196	389	7	14	Uruguay	5	0	12	16
Poland	0	0	12	16	Uzbekistan	11	19	0	0
Portugal	3	2	12	16	Vanuatu	0	0	9	15
Qatar	1	1	2	1	Venezuela	23	11	10	8
Romania	0	0	10	13	Vietnam	1	0	0	1
Russia	416	1,068	3	5	Western Sahara	0	0		
Rwanda	0	0	3	3	Yemen	16	23	4	6
Samoa	0	0	9	13	Zambia	0	0	5	11
Sao Tome-Principe	0	0	11	14	Zimbabwe	1	1	1	4

Correlations (Pearson r)		
Democracy	Elections	Pluralism
Terrorism Incidents	0.0804	0.08684
Terrorism Fatalities	0.0908	0.0973

Legend: Inc: Terrorist Incidents; Fat: Terrorist fatalities; Elect: Electoral process (highest: most free and fair); Plur: Pluralism and participation (highest is best)⁴³⁵

There does not seem to be much empirical support in these figures for the hypothesis that democracy prevents terrorism. In fact, the opposite may well be the case, mainly because democracy may place so many constraints on the executive and the security sector that it becomes less effective in its counter-terrorism endeavours.⁴³⁶ As pointed out by several authors, there may be a rather clear inverse causal relationship, namely that terrorism may tend to undermine democracy. Terrorism easily becomes “securitised” (to use the terminology of Ole Wæver), i.e. discursively constituted as an existential and urgent threat, thus justifying a resort to “extraordinary measures.”⁴³⁷ Some of these may well tend to undermine both democracy as such and the rule of law on which it must rest.⁴³⁸

The most important parameter of all, however, may be whether the political system enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects or citizens, for which Seymour M. Lipset’s definition is as good as any: “Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate for the society.”⁴³⁹ This legitimacy often is, but need not be, based on a regime coming to power via free and fair elections or by other legal avenues (“procedural legitimacy”) but may, at least in principle, also be “earned” by delivering what the population demands, giving it “performance legitimacy.”⁴⁴⁰ Whereas either form of legitimacy in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the population should make a country less likely to experience civil war – which almost logically presupposes that a sizable part of the population experiences the government as illegitimate – it is less obvious that this would also make it immune to terrorism, where even a minuscule minority may suffice for creating a major terrorist problem.

The inability or unwillingness of a government or regime to adequately perform the functions usually associated with statehood brings us directly to the next section, devoted to state weakness or failure.

7.5.3 Weak and Failed States as Breeding Grounds for Terrorism?

We have already mentioned the widespread assumption that so-called “failed states” serve as breeding grounds, operations or transit areas, or safe havens for terrorists. This view seems to be held by several renowned academics,⁴⁴¹ and also by just about everyone in the political sphere as demonstrated by the following quotations:

- [W]hen governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror (US President George W. Bush);
- Poverty and instability leads to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals (British Prime Minister Tony Blair); and
- Today's weak states can easily turn into tomorrow's failed states. They impoverish their people. But they nourish and enrich terrorists and organised crime. No wonder they attract them, like flies around a carcass. (External Relations Commissioner of the EU, Chris Patten).⁴⁴²

Status notwithstanding, it is almost taken-for-granted that there are a number of problems with the thesis of a link between state failure and terrorism, as far as both the independent and dependent variables are concerned.

First of all, there is a terminological confusion, as several international agencies employ different terms for what seems to be almost (but perhaps not exactly) the same phenomenon. The OECD's DAC thus uses the term "fragile states" as a close synonym of what the World Bank labels LICUS ("low income countries under stress"),⁴⁴³ but both terms seem somewhat broader than the terms "failed" or "collapsed states," yet narrower than the term "weak states." The term "states of concern" is even more problematic, as it begs the questions who is (or should be) concerned and why. It is almost synonymous with "states mistrusted by the USA" for whatever reason, and encompasses the so-called "rogue states," which need not be weak in any meaningful sense.⁴⁴⁴ If rogueness is defined, amongst other things in terms of sponsorship of terrorism, any testing of possible causal links between state failure and terrorism becomes impossible because of circularity.

Secondly, there is a problem of definition and thus also of which criteria to apply in order to identify failed states.⁴⁴⁵ The suggested criteria tend to fall into two different categories, reflecting two sets of parameters of state failure or weakness – ability and willingness to perform the functions of statehood, which in turn, give rise to problems in the two respects highlighted by Lipset, of legitimacy and effectiveness.⁴⁴⁶ Either the state lacks the capacity (effectiveness) to provide for its citizens or it simply does not care enough about them to even try, thus losing legitimacy. Even though it is, of course, entirely possible for states to fail in both respects simultaneously, it is still useful to distinguish analytically between the two – and it seems unhelpful to count the absence of will as an element of weakness. Some of the worst states in history (e.g. Nazi

Germany, the Soviet Union, North Korea or Rwanda prior to 1994) have been administratively quite strong, and able to inflict even greater suffering on their unfortunate citizens.

Thirdly, comes the problem of assigning values to the various variables and how to make these operational – if needs be by means of proxy variables – and where to locate the relevant thresholds between “weak,” “failing” and “failed,” if that is the preferred terminology. This may not merely be a matter of degrees, but also of the parameters themselves. What degree of weakness should a state, for instance, exhibit in order to qualify as “failed”? Should a state with a fair degree of control over parts, perhaps even most, of its territory count as failed, simply because there are areas where it has virtually no control? There seem to be rather obvious differences between, on the one hand, a country such as Sudan (prior to the peace treaty of 2005) with reasonable control over most of its sovereign domain, but none over South Sudan – and, on the other hand, a country such as Somalia where the government has no control over any parts of the national territory.

Fourthly, comes the identification of the hypothesised dependent variable. Should we expect failed states to “breed” terrorists, in the sense that an above average number of terrorists would come from such states? If so, does this refer to the countries of origin or of residence of the terrorists? Should we expect particularly high incidences of terrorism within failed states? Or merely expect such state territories to be used by terrorists of foreign origins for terrorist purposes, thus serving as bases, training camps, or transit areas?

We begin with a critical scrutiny of some anecdotal evidence often used in support of the thesis such as the movements and whereabouts of “Terrorist Enemy Number One,” Osama bin Laden and his organisation (or network), the *Al Qaeda*, which are well known. Having been involved in the (US supported) *jihād* against the USSR in Afghanistan for several years, after a brief stay in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden resided in Sudan for several years (1991-1996) and subsequently relocated to Afghanistan. Both of these countries are often referred to as failed. What is frequently overlooked, however, is when and where these two locations were selected.

- In Sudan, the regime led by Brigadier Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir was based on the National Islamic Front, NIF. This party had been founded

by the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leader Hassan al-Turabi – the *éminence grise* of Sudanese Islamist politics – who seems to have played a central role in the military coup in 1989 which had brought NIF into power, and who ensured that it pursued a policy of strict islamisation.⁴⁴⁷ Not only did the Islamist terrorists thus chose the opportune moment when the government was most sympathetic to their cause, but the *Al Qaeda* also opted for the government-controlled areas around Khartoum, where the regime was anything but weak, over the Christian/Animist south of the country, where the regime had virtually no control.

- Subsequently, the network relocated to Afghanistan at a time when the country had come under the firm control of the Islamist Taliban regime led by Mullah Omar. This regime more congenial to the ideology of the terrorists, and its control over the country was much firmer than that of virtually any other government in Afghanistan's recent history.⁴⁴⁸

Rather than supporting the hypothesis of state weakness or collapse attracting terrorists, these pieces of evidence seem to point to almost the exact opposite, i.e. that terrorist groups seek the protection of friendly governments, and preferably ones that are not too weak. This may also help explain why a truly failed state such as Somalia seems to have appeared far less attractive as a safe haven, simply because the requirements of a terrorist organisation are not satisfied by what such a failed state has to offer.⁴⁴⁹ There have been allegations that this was about to change with the progressive establishment of control by the Union of Islamic Courts from the summer of 2006, until the Ethiopian intervention on behalf of the otherwise moribund Transitional Federal Government in December 2006.⁴⁵⁰ If so, this would also support the alternative hypothesis.

What complicates the analysis of the causal links between terrorism and state weakness or failure is that there is no unanimity about which states to categorise as failed. The World Bank publishes annual estimates of various governance parametres on a negative scale (see Table 20), allowing at least for a ranking of states in terms of governance strength or weakness.

Table 20: Governance Indicators (World Bank)⁴⁵¹

Country	Average		Voice/Ac-countab.		Political Stability		Gov. Effectiveness		Regulatory Quality		Rule of Law		Control Corrupt.	
	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000
Somalia	-1.78	-1.62	-1.89	-1.43	-2.51	-1.82	-2.21	-2.34	-2.35	-2.46	-2.36	-1.78	-1.74	-1.68
Iraq	-1.47	-1.81	-1.47	-2.24	-2.82	-2.26	-1.64	-1.65	-1.61	-3.47	-1.81	-1.55	-1.27	-1.25
DRC	-1.45	-1.84	-1.64	-1.95	-2.40	-2.93	-1.64	-1.91	-1.66	-2.70	-1.76	-1.94	-1.34	-1.56
Burma	-1.40	-1.35	-2.16	-2.24	-1.00	-1.71	-1.61	-1.38	-2.19	-1.46	-1.56	-1.25	-1.44	-1.30
Zimbabwe	-1.35	-1.08	-1.65	-1.24	-1.58	-1.50	-1.42	-1.10	-2.20	-1.67	-1.47	-0.79	-1.24	-0.97
Sudan	-1.31	-1.34	-1.84	-1.88	-2.05	-2.53	-1.30	-1.56	-1.29	-0.90	-1.48	-1.19	-1.40	-1.15
Uzbekistan	-1.27	-1.01	-1.76	-1.51	-1.91	-1.24	-1.20	-0.98	-1.71	-1.46	-1.31	-1.03	-1.07	-0.87
Korea, N.	-1.27	-1.22	-2.06	-2.11	-0.12	-1.07	-1.82	-1.39	-2.31	-1.75	-1.15	-1.18	-1.32	-1.01
Afghan	-1.27	-1.87	-1.28	-1.86	-2.12	-2.68	-1.20	-1.34	-1.63	-3.69	-1.68	-2.37	-1.37	-1.64
Cote d'Iv	-1.26	-0.72	-1.50	-1.35	-2.49	-1.02	-1.38	-0.86	-0.95	-0.39	-1.47	-0.68	-1.23	-0.68
Haiti	-1.22	-0.97	-1.41	-0.87	-1.91	-0.90	-1.39	-1.74	-1.17	-1.21	-1.62	-1.53	-1.45	-1.07
Turkm.	-1.18	-1.11	-1.95	-1.70	-0.34	-0.10	-1.57	-1.42	-1.95	-2.23	-1.41	-1.22	-1.30	-1.19
Liberia	-1.09	-1.25	-0.92	-1.24	-1.45	-1.80	-1.36	-1.68	-1.70	-1.42	-1.60	-1.60	-1.08	-1.36
Pal. (WB)	-1.04	0.02	-1.22	-0.97	-1.69	-0.67	-1.13	0.44	-1.14	0.58	-0.52	0.23	-1.09	0.72
Burundi	-1.04	-1.22	-1.15	-1.72	-1.65	-2.06	-1.34	-1.28	-1.22	-0.92	-1.17	-1.01	-0.86	-1.35
Car	-1.01	-0.62	-1.15	-0.60	-1.13	-0.20	-1.47	-1.11	-1.23	-0.71	-1.29	-0.74	-1.08	-1.10
Eq. Guinea	-1.00	-1.46	-1.71	-1.55	0.21	-	-1.42	-2.25	-1.31	-1.37	-1.33	-1.58	-1.79	-2.13
Chad	-0.98	-0.58	-1.25	-0.97	-1.34	-1.08	-1.13	-0.43	-0.94	-0.35	-1.23	-0.89	-1.22	-0.65
Nepal	-0.97	-0.54	-1.19	-0.18	-2.36	-1.33	-0.97	-0.63	-0.59	-0.46	-0.81	-0.44	-0.71	-0.63
Eritrea	-0.96	-0.44	-1.83	-1.51	-0.72	-0.29	-0.98	-0.37	-1.84	-0.47	-0.81	-0.17	-0.37	0.01
Tajikistan	-0.95	-1.07	-1.17	-1.02	-1.35	-1.63	-1.06	-1.26	-1.05	-1.39	-0.99	-1.38	-1.08	-1.12
Nigeria	-0.93	-0.81	-0.69	-0.61	-1.77	-1.64	-0.92	-1.00	-1.01	-0.45	-1.38	-1.10	-1.22	-1.16
Syria	-0.93	-0.84	-1.67	-1.76	-0.91	-0.66	-1.23	-1.01	-1.22	-0.85	-0.42	-0.48	-0.59	-0.79
Congo	-0.91	-1.22	-0.71	-1.55	-1.24	-1.85	-1.31	-1.80	-1.20	-1.09	-1.42	-1.26	-1.01	-1.05
Ethiopia	-0.90	-0.58	-1.10	-1.06	-1.48	-1.27	-0.97	-0.46	-1.09	-0.69	-0.77	-0.47	-0.79	-0.01

Using somewhat broader indicators, the Fund for Peace has identified more or less the same countries as failed or at least failing, as set out in Table 21.

Table 21: Failed States Index 2006 (Fund for Peace)⁴⁵²

Indicator State	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Total
Sudan	9.6	9.7	9.7	9.1	9.2	7.5	9.5	9.5	9.8	9.8	9.1	9.8	112.3
DRC	9.5	9.5	9.1	8.0	9.0	8.1	9.0	9.0	9.5	9.8	9.6	10.0	110.1
Cote d'Iv	8.8	7.6	9.8	8.5	8.0	9.0	10.0	8.5	9.4	9.8	9.8	10.0	109.2
Iraq	8.9	8.3	9.8	9.1	8.7	8.2	8.5	8.3	9.7	9.8	9.7	10.0	109.0
Zimbabwe	9.7	8.9	8.5	9.0	9.2	9.8	8.9	9.5	9.5	9.4	8.5	8.0	108.9
Chad	9.0	9.0	8.5	8.0	9.0	7.9	9.5	9.0	9.1	9.4	9.5	8.0	105.9
Somalia	9.0	8.1	8.0	7.0	7.5	8.5	10.0	10.0	9.5	10.0	9.8	8.5	105.9
Haiti	8.8	5.0	8.8	8.0	8.3	8.4	9.4	9.3	9.6	9.4	9.6	10.0	104.6
Pakistan	9.3	9.3	8.6	8.1	8.9	7.0	8.5	7.5	8.5	9.1	9.1	9.2	103.1
Afghan	7.9	9.6	9.1	7.0	8.0	7.5	8.3	8.0	8.2	8.2	8.0	10.0	99.8
Guinea	7.5	7.2	8.1	8.4	8.0	8.0	9.1	9.0	8.1	8.1	9.0	8.5	99.0
Liberia	8.0	9.3	7.0	7.1	8.6	8.9	7.8	9.0	7.2	7.3	8.8	10.0	99.0
CAR	9.0	7.7	8.8	5.5	8.5	8.1	9.0	8.0	7.5	8.9	8.0	8.5	97.5
N. Korea	8.0	6.0	7.2	5.0	9.0	9.5	9.8	9.5	9.5	8.3	8.0	7.5	97.3
Burundi	9.0	9.1	7.0	6.7	8.8	7.8	7.2	8.5	7.5	7.3	7.8	10.0	96.7
Yemen	7.8	6.7	7.0	8.2	9.0	7.8	8.8	8.2	7.2	9.0	9.4	7.5	96.6
Sierra L	8.5	7.9	7.1	8.9	8.7	9.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.7	8.8	96.6
Burma	8.9	8.8	9.0	6.0	9.0	7.1	9.2	8.2	9.8	9.0	8.0	3.5	96.5
Banglad.	9.0	5.8	9.5	8.5	9.0	7.0	9.0	7.5	7.8	8.3	8.9	6.0	96.3
Nepal	8.5	4.8	9.2	6.0	9.2	8.5	9.2	6.2	9.1	9.0	9.0	6.7	95.4
Uganda	8.0	9.2	7.8	5.7	8.4	7.5	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.5	7.9	7.5	94.5
Nigeria	8.0	5.9	9.1	8.5	9.0	5.4	9.0	8.3	7.1	9.2	9.0	5.9	94.4
Uzbek	7.7	5.8	7.5	7.5	8.1	7.0	9.3	7.0	9.3	9.1	9.1	7.0	94.4
Rwanda	9.5	7.0	9.0	8.2	7.2	8.0	8.7	6.9	7.7	5.0	8.9	6.8	92.9
Sri Lanka	8.0	8.2	9.1	6.7	8.0	5.7	8.6	7.0	7.2	8.5	8.9	6.5	92.4
Indicators	<p>1. Mounting demographic pressures</p> <p>2. Massive movement of refugees and IDPs</p> <p>3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance</p> <p>4. Chronic and sustained human flight</p> <p>5. Uneven economic development along group lines</p> <p>6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline</p> <p>7. Criminalization or delegitimization of the state</p> <p>8. Progressive deterioration of public services</p> <p>9. Widespread violation of human rights</p> <p>10. Security apparatus as "state within a state"</p> <p>11. Rise of factionalized elites</p> <p>12. Intervention of other states or external actors</p>												

As the two indexes agree on placing eighteen countries among the world's twenty-five most problematic ones with regard to "failedness," it seems reasonable to accept the following as at least a reasonable sample of failed states: Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Iraq, North Korea, Liberia, Nepal, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. The question is then whether they show a particular propensity for terrorism, either in the sense of experiencing it, of breeding terrorists or serving as transit areas for terrorism.

Table 22: Failed States as Arenas of Terrorism?

Country	Terrorist Incidents		Terrorist Fatalities		Population	
	Number	Global share	Number	Global share	Millions	Global share
Afghan.	636	4.5%	958	4.3%	31,057	0.5%
Burma	16	0.1%	44	0.2%	47,383	0.7%
Burundi	50	0.4%	284	1.3%	8,090	0.1%
CAR	1	0.0%	0	0.0%	4,303	0.1%
Chad	5	0.0%	109	0.5%	9,944	0.2%
Congo	1	0.0%	13	0.1%	3,702	0.1%
Cote d'Iv.	15	0.1%	65	0.3%	17,655	0.3%
DRC	30	0.2%	196	0.9%	62,661	1.0%
Haiti	10	0.1%	2	0.0%	8,309	0.1%
Iraq	4,405	30.9%	11,220	50.3%	26,783	0.4%
Korea, N.	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	23,113	0.4%
Liberia	2	0.0%	0	0.0%	3,042	0.0%
Nepal	1,653	11.6%	760	3.4%	28,287	0.4%
Nigeria	26	0.2%	686	3.1%	131,860	2.0%
Somalia	26	0.2%	63	0.3%	8,863	0.1%
Sudan	38	0.3%	271	1.2%	41,236	0.6%
Uzbek.	11	0.1%	19	0.1%	27,307	0.4%
Zimbabwe	1	0.0%	1	0.0%	12,237	0.2%
Total	6,926	48.5%	14,691	65.8%	495,832	7.6%
World Total	14,275	100.0%	22,319	100.0%	6,525,170	100%

Legend: **Boldface**: Higher than to be expected; *Italics*: Lower than to be expected. Population figures taken from the CIA World Factbook 2006; data on terrorism from the National Counterterrorism Center: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System <http://wits.nctc.gov/>.

Table 22 does not seem to confirm the hypothesis that failed states are favourite arenas for terrorism. Only four countries (Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal and Somalia) have higher scores than one should expect from their share of world population (i.e. higher per capita terrorist scores) both with regard to the number of incidents and their severity (measured in the number of fatalities) and six actually have lower scores on both accounts. Iraq and Afghanistan seem to be in a league of their own, but they are not “normal” failed states (if there is such a thing), as they have not so much failed as been deliberately destroyed by US-led invasions.⁴⁵³

However, it might still be the case that failed states such as the above could serve as breeding grounds for terrorists and/or that their territory might be used as transit havens for international terrorists – two hypotheses which we shall now proceed to test. As there seems to be no global data on the nationality (country of origin or

residence) of terrorists, we shall have to use much cruder proxies, two of which seem most obvious. The first one is the list released by the Pentagon on 19 April 2006, of names and nationalities of the detainees at the Guantanamo base, who had gone through a CSRT (Combatant Status Review Tribunal) proceedings.⁴⁵⁴ In Table 23, this list has been compared to the above group of eighteen failed states.

Table 23: Failed/Failing States as Terrorist Breeding Grounds

Failed or Failing States		Other states			
State	GD	State	GD	State	GD
Afghanistan	125	Algeria	25	Libya	11
Burma	0	Australia	2	Maldives	1
Burundi	0	Azerbaijan	1	Mauritania	3
CAR	0	Bahrain	6	Morocco	9
Chad	1	Bangladesh	1	Pakistan	13
Congo	0	Belgium	2	Qatar	1
Cote d'Iv.	0	Bosnia	1	Russia	1
DRC	0	Canada	1	Saudi Arabia	132
Haiti	0	China	22	Syria	9
Iraq	6	Egypt	4	Tajikistan	6
Korea, N.	0	Ethiopia	1	Tunisia	11
Liberia	0	France	3	Turkey	2
Nepal	0	Iran	2	UAE	2
Nigeria	0	Jordan	5	Uganda	1
Somalia	2	Kazakhstan	3	UK	4
Sudan	9	Kuwait	12	West Bank	3
Uzbekistan	7	Lebanon	1	Yemen	107
Zimbabwe	0	Total others			408
Total	150	Grand Total			558
Share of Total	27%	Minus Afgh.			6%

Legend: GD: Guantanamo Detainees

The total of 150 detainees (27 per cent) being nationals of states identified as failed might, at first glance, seem to confirm the hypothesis. However, if we exclude Afghanistan from the list, the failed states' share shrinks to six per cent. This may be reasonable, as it seems likely that at least most of the Afghan detainees are Talibanis, rather than (suspected) *Al Qaeda* members. The only failed states with more citizens on the list other than obviously strong states such as the UK and France, are thus Sudan and Uzbekistan.

The second, and even cruder, proxy is the list declassified and released by the US authorities on 6 September 2006, of the biographies of fourteen “high-value detainees.” It includes two Baluchi, one Tanzanian, one Indonesian, two Saudis, two Malaysians, one Pakistani, one Libyan, one Palestinian, two Yemenites and one Somali. This does not provide much support for the hypothesis either.⁴⁵⁵

Finally, we have the UN’s 1267 Committee’s list of persons suspected of being linked to *Al Qaeda*. In Table 24, the countries of origin, nationality and country of residence of the altogether 217 named persons have been listed and sorted.⁴⁵⁶

Country	POB	Nat.	Res	Country	POB	Nat.	Res
Failed states				<i>Other states (continued)</i>			
Afghanistan	2	2	1	Kuwait	2	1	1
Iraq	12	7	0	Lebanon	1	0	0
Somalia	2	2	0	Libya	12	4	2
Sudan	1	0	0	Malaysia	9	10	10
<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>1</i>	Morocco	10	4	2
Other states				Pakistan	0	4	3
Algeria	20	8	0	Palestine	1	1	0
Belgium	1	2	3	Philippines	6	3	0
Canada	0	2	0	Russia	2	2	1
Comoros	1	1	0	Saudi Arabia	5	4	1
Egypt	25	14	1	Singapore	1	0	0
Ethiopia	2	0	0	Switzerland	0	1	1
France	1	0	0	Syria	3	2	1
Germany	2	1	14	Tanzania	1	1	0
India	1	1	0	Tunisia	41	38	3
Indonesia	15	13	0	UAE	0	0	2
Italy	0	3	60	UK	1	3	11
Jordan	2	4	0	USA	2	1	0
Kenya	2	2	0	Yemen	4	4	2
Kosovo	1	0	0	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>174</i>	<i>134</i>	<i>2</i>
No Information	26	72	98	<i>Grand Total</i>	<i>217</i>	<i>217</i>	<i>217</i>
Failed states/total	7.8%	5.1%	0.5%				
Legend: POB: Place of Birth; Nat: Nationality; Res: Country of residence							

It is obvious that this list provides no support for the thesis either. It is, of course, possible that the large figures for “no information” actually conceal large numbers of persons born or residing in, or otherwise taking their nationality from, failed states – but this is pure guesswork.

As far as the “transit point hypothesis” is concerned, land borders seems a reasonable proxy, as it is only possible to transit by land from country A to B, if they share a common border. It is, of course, possible to transit by air or sea from just about anywhere in the world *en route* to any conceivable destination, but this does not really allow for statistical testing, and would require detailed information on

Table 25: Failed States as Transit Points (1): Africa

Failed State Neighbour	Burun	CAR	Chad	Congo	C d'Iv.	DRC	Liber	Nigeria	Somal	Sudan	Zimb	Terrorism 2004-05 ⁴⁵⁷	
												Inc.	Fat
Angola				X		X						4	14
Benin								X				2	1
Botswana											X	0	0
Burkina F					X							0	0
Burundi						X						na	na
C d'Ivoire							X					na	na
Cameroon		X	X	X				X				1	0
CAR			X	X		X				X		1	0
Chad		X						X		X		na	na
Congo		X				X						na	na
Djibouti									X			0	0
DRC	X	X		X						X		na	na
Egypt										X		12	131
Eritrea										X		2	8
Ethiopia								X		X		12	12
Gabon				X								0	0
Ghana					X							0	0
Guinea					X		X					1	0
Kenya									X	X		15	38
Liberia					X							2	0
Libya			X							X		na	na
Mali					X							1	0
Mozamb.			X					X				0	0
Niger			X									0	0
Nigeria												na	na
Rwanda	X					X						0	0
Sierra Leone							X					0	0
South Afr,												2	3
Sudan		X	X			X						na	na
Tanzania	X					X						na	na
Uganda						X				X		42	492
Zambia						X					X	0	0
Total												97	699

the itineraries of each and every individual terrorist – which is not likely to be available. On the basis of land borders, we may, however, test whether countries immediately adjacent to a failed state experience higher levels of terrorism than one should otherwise expect. Some failed states do, however, border each other, in which case it seems reasonable to presume that terrorist incidents are rather caused by their own failure as states, than by that of their neighbours. Such cases have been discounted in tables 25 and 26, covering Africa and Asia, respectively. The only failed state not captured by this categorisation is Haiti, whose only neighbour, the Dominican Republic, experienced no terrorist incidents whatsoever in the two consecutive years, 2004 and 2005.

At first glance these figures would appear to support the hypothesis. However, a closer look at them shows that almost all fatalities are caused by one particular terrorist organisation, namely the LRA, which has mainly operated out of Sudan. However, this is not due to any failure of the Sudanese state. On the contrary, it was Khartoum which supported the LRA as a deliberate policy choice, mainly in

Table 26: Failed States as Transit Points (2): Asia

Failed State Neighbour	Afgh	Burma	Iraq	N Kor	Nepal	Uzbek	Terrorism 2004-05 ⁴⁵⁹	
							Inc.	Fat.
Afghanistan						X	636	958
Bangladesh		X					140	111
China	X	X		X	X		13	25
India		X			X		1,728	1,901
Iran	X		X				15	23
Jordan			X				3	64
Kazakhstan						X	3	0
Korea, S.				X			0	0
Kyrgyzstan						X	2	0
Laos		X					10	2
Pakistan	X						589	613
Russia				X			416	1,068
Saudi A.			X				24	56
Syria			X				3	2
Tajikistan	X					X	2	0
Thailand		X					946	596
Turkey			X				181	88
Turkmenistan	X					X	0	0
Uzbekistan	X						11	19
Total							4,075	4,549

retaliation for Ugandan support for the SPLA.⁴⁵⁸ Moreover, the high figure for Egypt was mainly due to one large attack with a death toll of 88 on the 23rd of July 2005. The only remaining African country for which the hypothesis seems to be at least partly supported is Kenya.

The figures for Asia in Table 26 provide somewhat more support for the hypothesis, even though it may be less than initially meets the eye. For instance, the high figures for Russia were almost exclusively caused by Chechen terrorists, which have much more to do with Central Asia than with Russia's only failed state neighbour of North Korea. Furthermore, even though the high figures for Pakistan may be partly related to its sharing a border with Afghanistan, the long-standing rivalry and territorial dispute with its non-failed neighbour India is surely also significant – and the higher numbers in India surely have less to do with what happens in Burma and Nepal than in Pakistan? Even though there does thus seem to be a correlation, a lot of it appears spurious.

Notwithstanding its plausibility, the almost universal acceptance of the assumption that failed states are particularly problematic with regard to terrorism, seems to have very little, if any, empirical support. Whereas terror prevention is a very dubious rationale for attempting state reconstruction, there are plenty of other and better reasons to seek to build viable and legitimate state structures where the existing ones have collapsed – just as the finding that democracy is no hedge against terrorism (perhaps the exact opposite) is not a strong argument against democratic (the best) form of government.

7.6 The Big (Statistical) Picture(s)

We shall now take another look at some of the available statistics in search of evidence to support or falsify some of the various causal hypotheses referred to above. We commence with a global overview and then “zoom in” on the “top twenty league,” i.e. those countries which have been most affected by terrorism, followed by a somewhat more detailed analysis of a particular part of the globe which has attracted considerable attention by virtue of its presumed propensity for terrorism – the Horn of Africa.

7.6.1 Global Correlations?

As shown above, quite a few economic and political variables have been suggested by various authors as likely determinants of terrorism. Unfortunately, however, most of the hypotheses advanced about the reasons for a state's propensity for

terrorism are either not supported by available empirical evidence, or even contradicted by it.

In Table 27 below, a rather crude correlation analysis is offered of the links between terrorism as the dependent variable and some of the suggested independent variables. However incomplete the datasets may be, they still represent more or less “state-of-the-art” within each category. The terrorist incidents data are those provided by the US National Counterterrorism Center (unfortunately only available for two consecutive years). Those for income, inequality and human development are taken from the United Nations Development Programme, and those for political and civil liberties from the Freedom House annual report for 2006.

Table 27: Terrorism: Independent and Dependent Variables

Country (Micro-states excluded)	Terrorism 2004-5		In- come	Ine- quality	Human Develop- ment		Political and Civil Liberties									
	Inc	Fat	GDP pc	Gini Index	HDI	R	PR	CL	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Afghan.	636	958	5	5	2	6	7	3	5	5	4	5
Albania	15	4	1,933	28.2	0.78	72	3	3	2	8	11	6	11	8	10	9
Algeria	104	179	2,090	35.3	0.722	103	6	5	1	5	3	3	8	6	4	7
Angola	4	14	975	..	0.445	160	6	5	1	2	5	1	8	6	4	3
Argent.	10	1	3,524	52.2	0.863	34	2	2	3	11	15	8	15	11	11	13
Armenia	0	0	918	37.9	0.759	83	5	4	2	4	5	4	8	5	6	9
Australia	0	0	26,275	35.2	0.955	3	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	12	14	15
Austria	1	0	31,289	30.0	0.936	17	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	15	15
Azerb.	5	3	867	36.5	0.729	101	6	5	1	3	4	3	7	3	5	8
Bahamas	0	0	16,571	..	0.832	50	1	1	3	12	16	10	16	12	15	15
Bahrain	0	0	0.846	43	5	5	2	3	6	5	8	5	4	5
Banglad.	140	111	376	31.8	0.52	139	4	4	2	8	10	4	8	8	6	9
Barbados	0	0	9,708	..	0.878	30	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	16	15
Belarus	1	0	1770	30.4	0.786	67	7	6	1	1	3	1	3	0	2	5
Belgium	0	0	29,096	25.0	0.945	9	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	12	15	15
Belize	2	1	3,612	..	0.753	91	1	2	3	12	14	10	15	11	13	13
Benin	1	0	517	..	0.431	162	2	2	3	8	14	8	15	11	12	10
Bhutan	1	0	797	..	0.536	134	6	5	1	2	1	5	6	2	4	8
Bolivia	6	0	892	44.7	0.687	113	3	3	2	10	13	5	15	11	8	9
Bosnia	22	0	1,684	26.2	0.786	68	4	3	2	7	11	5	11	8	10	10
Botswana	0	0	4,372	63.0	0.565	131	2	2	3	11	11	9	14	10	13	10
Brazil	2	1	2,788	59.3	0.792	63	2	2	3	11	14	7	15	10	8	12
Brunei	0	0	0.866	33	6	5	1	0	3	2	6	3	6	8
Bulgaria	2	0	2,539	31.9	0.808	55	1	2	3	12	15	9	14	11	13	13
Burk. F.	0	0	345	48.2	0.317	175	5	3	2	5	8	4	13	9	6	8
Burma	16	44	0.578	129	7	7	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	4
Burundi	50	284	83	33.3	0.378	169	3	5	2	9	11	5	9	5	4	6
Camb.	3	1	315	40.4	0.571	130	6	5	1	3	5	3	9	6	2	7
Camer.	1	0	776	44.6	0.497	148	6	6	1	3	5	3	7	3	2	4
Canada	2	0	27,079	33.1	0.949	5	1	1	3	12	16	11	16	12	15	16
Cape V.	0	0	1,698	..	0.721	105	1	1	3	12	15	10	15	11	14	13
CAR	1	0	309	61.3	0.355	171	5	4	2	7	7	3	10	9	3	5
Chad	5	109	304	..	0.341	173	6	5	1	3	2	3	7	6	2	3
Chile	5	0	4,591	57.1	0.854	37	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	12	15	14
China	13	25	1,100	44.7	0.755	85	7	6	1	0	1	1	4	2	2	7
Columb.	831	935	1,764	57.6	0.785	69	3	3	2	9	8	7	12	7	7	10
Comoros	0	0	538	..	0.547	132	4	4	2	7	8	3	10	6	8	6
Congo	1	13	949	..	0.512	142	5	5	2	3	5	4	9	8	2	6
Costa R.	0	0	4,352	46.5	0.838	47	1	1	3	12	15	11	16	11	14	13
Cote d'Iv.	15	65	816	44.6	0.420	163	6	6	1	2	2	2	5	3	3	4
Croatia	9	0	6,479	29.0	0.841	45	2	2	3	12	14	9	14	12	10	13
Cuba	0	0	0.817	52	7	7	1	0	0	1	2	2	1	2
Cyprus	11	0	14,786	..	0.891	29	1	1	3	11	16	11	15	12	15	15
Czech R.	0	0	8,794	25.4	0.874	31	1	1	3	12	15	10	16	12	13	14
Denmark	1	0	39,332	24.7	0.941	14	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	15	15
Djibouti	0	0	886	..	0.495	150	5	5	2	4	5	3	7	5	5	6
Dominica	0	0	3,639	..	0.783	70	1	1	3	12	16	10	16	12	13	13

Table 27: (continued)

Country (Micro-states excluded)	Terrorism 2004-5		In- come	Ine- quality	Human Develop- ment		Political and Civil Liberties									
	Inc	Fat	GDP pc	Gini Index	HDI	R	PR	CL	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Dom. R.	0	0	1,893	47.4	0.749	95	2	2	3	11	13	8	15	11	9	11
DRC	30	196	107	..	0.385	167	6	6	1	1	5	2	6	5	0	1
East T.	1	0	389	..	0.513	140	3	3	2	11	10	8	13	8	8	9
Ecuador	9	1	2,091	43.7	0.759	82	3	3	2	8	15	4	15	11	5	10
Egypt	12	131	1,220	34.4	0.659	119	6	5	1	2	4	2	7	3	5	7
El Salv.	1	0	2,277	53.2	0.722	104	2	3	3	12	13	7	15	10	8	10
Eq. Guin.	0	0	5,900	..	0.655	121	7	6	1	0	1	0	5	0	1	3
Eritrea	2	8	171	..	0.444	161	7	6	1	0	1	2	2	0	3	6
Estonia	4	2	6,713	37.2	0.853	38	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	12	14	14
Ethiopia	12	12	97	30.0	0.367	170	5	5	2	5	6	4	7	3	5	6
Fiji	0	0	2,438	..	0.752	92	4	3	2	6	8	6	12	9	11	10
Finland	0	0	31,058	26.9	0.941	13	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	16	16
France	115	0	29,410	32.7	0.938	16	1	1	3	12	15	11	15	12	13	15
Gabon	0	0	4,505	..	0.635	123	6	4	2	2	5	3	11	6	7	6
Gambia	2	1	278	47.5	0.470	155	5	4	2	6	7	4	10	6	8	8
Georgia	25	8	778	36.9	0.732	100	3	3	2	9	9	6	11	8	8	10
Germany	2	0	29,115	28.3	0.930	20	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	12	15	15
Ghana	0	0	369	40.8	0.520	138	1	2	3	12	15	10	14	11	12	10
Greece	60	1	15,608	35.4	0.912	24	1	2	3	12	15	10	15	10	13	13
Grenada	0	0	4,199	..	0.787	66	1	2	3	12	16	9	15	9	12	14
Guatem.	1	1	2,009	59.9	0.663	117	4	4	2	9	8	5	12	8	5	8
Guinea	1	0	459	40.3	0.466	156	6	5	1	2	5	2	8	5	4	6
Guinea-B.	1	2	160	47.0	0.348	172	3	4	2	9	10	6	12	8	8	6
Guyana	1	2	965	..	0.720	107	3	3	2	10	12	7	15	10	7	9
Haiti	10	2	346	..	0.475	153	7	6	1	0	5	0	8	3	0	5
Honduras	8	33	1,001	55.0	0.667	116	3	3	2	9	11	6	14	9	8	9
Hungary	2	0	8,169	26.9	0.862	35	1	1	3	12	15	10	16	12	14	14
Iceland	0	0	36,377	..	0.956	2	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	16	16
India	1,728	1,901	564	32.5	0.602	127	2	3	3	11	14	9	13	10	9	10
Indon.	78	128	970	34.3	0.697	110	2	3	3	11	13	6	11	8	7	9
Iran	15	23	2,066	43.0	0.736	99	6	6	1	3	3	5	3	3	3	4
Iraq	4,405	11,220	6	5	1	3	4	2	6	5	2	6
Ireland	8	0	38,487	35.9	0.946	8	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	15	15
Israel	178	86	16,481	35.5	0.915	23	1	2	3	12	15	10	14	11	10	11
Italy	30	2	25,471	36.0	0.934	18	1	1	3	12	16	11	14	12	12	15
Jamaica	1	1	3,083	37.9	0.738	98	2	3	3	10	13	8	15	9	8	11
Japan	6	0	33,713	24.9	0.943	11	1	2	3	12	15	10	13	10	15	13
Jordan	3	64	1,858	36.4	0.753	90	5	4	2	4	7	4	8	5	7	7
Kazakhs.	3	0	2,000	32.3	0.761	80	6	5	1	3	4	3	7	4	4	7
Kenya	15	38	450	42.5	0.474	154	3	3	2	9	11	6	14	9	8	9
Korea, N.	0	0	7	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Korea, S.	0	0	12,634	31.6	0.901	28	1	2	3	11	15	10	14	12	12	11
Kuwait	0	0	17,421	..	0.844	44	4	5	2	4	8	6	9	5	7	4
Kyrgyzs.	2	0	378	34.8	0.702	109	5	4	2	5	7	4	11	8	5	7
Laos	10	2	375	37.0	0.545	133	7	6	3	0	1	0	4	1	2	5
Latvia	0	0	4,771	33.6	0.836	48	1	1	3	12	15	9	16	12	12	13
Lebanon	23	38	4,224	..	0.759	81	5	4	2	4	8	4	11	7	5	7
Lesotho	0	0	635	63.2	0.497	149	2	3	3	10	12	9	15	8	11	9

Table 27: (continued)

Country (Micro-states excluded)	Terrorism 2004-5		In- come	Ine- quality	Human Develop- ment		Political and Civil Liberties									
	Inc	Fat	GDP pc	Gini Index	HDI	R	PR	CL	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Liberia	2	0			4	4	2	9	10	4	11	7	7	8
Libya	0	0	0.799	58	7	7	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	5
Lithuania	0	0	5,274	31.9	0.852	39	1	1	3	12	15	9	16	11	14	13
Luxemb.	0	0	59,143	..	0.949	4	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	16	16
Maced.	10	0	2,277	28.2	0.797	59	3	3	2	8	10	7	11	7	8	10
Madag.	11	0	324	47.5	0.499	146	3	3	2	8	9	7	10	8	9	9
Malawi	0	0	156	50.3	0.404	165	4	4	2	7	10	6	11	8	8	7
Malaysia	4	0	4,187	49.2	0.796	61	4	4	2	6	7	6	10	6	6	9
Maldives	0	0	2,441	..	0.745	96	6	5	1	3	2	4	6	3	6	7
Mali	1	0	371	50.5	0.333	174	2	2	3	9	12	9	15	9	11	9
Malta	0	0	12,157	..	0.867	32	1	1	3	12	16	11	16	12	16	15
Mauritan	2	0	384	39.0	0.477	152	6	4	2	2	6	3	10	6	6	5
Mauritius	0	0	4,274	..	0.791	65	1	1	3	12	15	11	15	12	14	12
Mexico	14	14	6,121	54.6	0.814	53	2	2	3	12	14	9	15	10	8	12
Moldova	2	0	463	36.9	0.671	115	3	4	2	9	8	7	10	6	8	9
Mongolia	0	0	514	30.3	0.679	114	2	2	3	9	15	10	15	10	12	12
Morocco	0	0	1,452	39.5	0.631	124	5	4	2	4	7	6	8	6	4	8
Mozamb.	0	0	230	39.6	0.379	168	3	4	2	7	11	7	10	7	6	8
Namibia	0	0	2,120	70.7	0.627	125	2	2	3	10	12	9	15	12	10	9
Nepal	1,653	760	237	36.7	0.526	136	6	5	1	1	6	2	6	3	4	6
Netherl.	7	1	31,532	30.9	0.943	12	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	15	16
New Z.	0	0	19,847	36.2	0.933	19	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	11	15	15
Nicarag.	0	0	745	43.1	0.690	112	3	3	2	9	11	5	13	8	7	10
Niger	0	0	232	50.5	0.281	177	3	3	2	10	10	7	11	7	10	7
Nigeria	26	686	428	50.6	0.453	158	4	4	2	7	8	6	11	7	4	6
Norway	0	0	48,412	25.8	0.963	1	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	16	16
Palestine	639	73	1,026	..	0.729	102										
Oman	0	0	0.781	71	6	5	1	2	2	2	6	4	3	5
Pakistan	589	613	555	33.0	0.527	135	6	5	1	2	6	3	8	6	4	6
Panama	1	1	4,319	56.4	0.804	56	1	2	3	12	15	9	15	11	9	12
Pap-NG	1	0	578	50.9	0.523	137	3	3	2	9	11	6	12	9	9	8
Paraguay	1	1	1,069	57.8	0.755	88	3	3	2	11	11	3	13	8	7	10
Peru	7	11	2,231	49.8	0.762	79	2	3	3	11	14	7	15	10	8	9
Philip.	196	389	989	46.1	0.758	84	3	3	2	7	14	8	15	9	9	10
Poland	0	0	5,487	34.1	0.858	36	1	1	3	12	16	10	16	12	13	13
Portugal	3	2	14,161	38.5	0.904	27	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	15	14
Qatar	1	1	0.849	40	6	5	1	2	1	3	8	2	4	4
Romania	0	0	2,619	30.3	0.792	64	2	2	3	10	13	7	13	10	11	11
Russia	416	1,068	3,018	31.0	0.795	62	6	5	1	3	5	3	8	6	4	6
Rwanda	0	0	195	28.9	0.45	159	6	5	1	3	3	5	7	3	6	5
Samoa	0	0	1,505	..	0.776	74	2	2	3	9	13	10	14	10	13	12
Sao T-P	0	0	378	..	0.604	126	2	2	3	11	14	8	15	10	12	10
Saudi A.	24	56	9,532	..	0.772	77	7	6	1	0	0	1	4	0	2	2
Senegal	5	4	634	41.3	0.458	157	2	3	3	12	12	9	15	9	10	9
Serbia	71	13					3	2	3	9	13	7	14	11	9	13
Seych.	1	0	8,610	..	0.821	51	3	3	2	8	11	7	11	9	11	11
Sierra L.	0	0	149	62.9	0.298	176	4	3	2	9	10	4	12	8	8	9

Table 27: (continued)

Country (Micro-states excluded)	Terrorism 2004-5		In- come	Ine- quality	Human Develop- ment		Political and Civil Liberties									
	Inc	Fat	GDP pc	Gini Index	HDI	R	PR	CL	S	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Singapore	0	0	21,492	42.5	0.907	25	5	4	2	4	6	7	9	4	8	12
Slovakia	3	0	6,033	25.8	0.849	42	1	1	3	12	15	10	16	12	12	14
Slovenia	2	2	13,909	28.4	0.904	26	1	1	3	12	15	11	16	12	14	12
Sol. Isl.	0	0	553	..	0.594	128	3	3	2	7	10	7	13	9	8	12
Somalia	26	63					6	7	1	0	4	4	3	1	3	0
South A.	2	3	3,489	57.8	0.658	120	1	2	3	12	14	10	15	12	13	12
Spain	111	192	20,404	32.5	0.928	21	1	1	3	12	14	12	16	12	14	15
Sri Lanka	280	152	948	33.2	0.751	93	3	3	2	8	9	7	9	9	7	10
Sudan	38	271	530	..	0.512	141	7	7	1	0	4	1	4	1	0	1
Suriname	0	0	2,635	..	0.755	86	2	2	3	12	13	8	15	11	9	10
Swazil.	6	0	1,669	60.9	0.498	147	7	5	1	0	1	0	8	3	4	5
Sweden	3	0	33,676	25.0	0.949	6	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	16	16
Switzerl.	1	0	43,553	33.1	0.947	7	1	1	3	12	16	12	16	12	15	16
Syria	3	2	1,237	..	0.721	106	7	7	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	4
Taiwan	2	0					1	1	3	11	15	10	16	11	15	13
Tajikistan	2	0	246	32.6	0.652	122	6	5	1	2	4	3	7	4	4	6
Tanzania	6	3	287	38.2	0.418	164	4	3	2	6	10	6	11	7	10	8
Thailand	946	596	2,305	43.2	0.778	73	3	3	2	9	12	8	11	8	8	11
Togo	1	0	362	..	0.512	143	6	5	1	2	3	2	7	3	1	7
Tonga	0	0	1,603	..	0.81	54	5	3	2	3	9	3	12	7	12	11
Trin&T.	7	0	8,007	40.3	0.801	57	3	2	3	9	11	8	14	11	10	11
Tunisia	0	0	2,530	39.8	0.753	89	6	5	1	1	3	2	4	2	4	8
Turkey	181	88	3,399	40.0	0.75	94	3	3	2	9	12	7	12	7	8	10
Turkm.	0	0	1,275	40.8	0.738	97	7	7	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Uganda	42	492	249	43.0	0.508	144	5	4	2	3	6	5	11	6	7	7
Ukraine	18	3	1,024	29.0	0.766	78	3	2	3	8	12	7	13	10	11	11
UAE	0	0	0.849	41	6	6	1	0	1	2	6	1	4	4
UK	117	54	30,253	36.0	0.939	15	1	1	3	12	15	12	16	12	14	15
USA	14	0	37,648	40.8	0.944	10	1	1	3	10	16	11	16	11	14	15
Uruguay	5	0	3,308	44.6	0.84	46	1	1	3	12	16	11	16	12	15	15
Uzbek.	11	19	389	26.8	0.694	111	7	7	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	2
Vanuatu	0	0	1,348	..	0.659	118	2	2	3	9	15	8	16	11	10	11
Venez.	23	11	3,326	49.1	0.772	75	4	4	2	10	8	5	11	7	5	8
Vietnam	1	0	482	37.0	0.704	108	7	5	1	0	1	1	3	2	4	8
Yemen	16	23	565	33.4	0.489	151	5	5	2	4	6	3	7	3	3	5
Zambia	0	0	417	52.6	0.394	166	4	4	2	5	11	6	11	8	8	7
Zimb.	1	1	..	56.8	0.505	145	7	6	1	1	4	0	5	3	1	1

Legend: Inc: Incidents; Fat: Fatalities; GDP pc: Gross Domestic Product per capita; Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or consumption) among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. (0: perfect equality--100: perfect inequality; HDI: Human Development Index: A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. S: Status (1: Not free, 2: Partly free, 3: Free); PR: Political Rights and CL: Civil Liberties (1: best, 7: worst); A: Electoral Process B: Political Pluralism and Participation; C: Functioning of Government; D: Freedom of Expression and Belief; E: Associational and Organizational Rights; F: Rule of Law; G: Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (highest is best)

Sources: Terrorism figures from National Counterterrorism Center: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System <http://wits.nctc.gov/>; GDP, Gini Index and HDI scores from UNDP: Human Development Report 2005, at (<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators.cfm?alpha=yes>); PR, CL, S, and A-G scores from Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2006: Country Subscores (www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/SubScoresFIW2006.xls)

The various figures in Table 26 have been correlated, using the standard Pearson formula, r , measuring their correlation (ranging from -1 to 1), as set out in Table 28.

Dependent Variable Independent Variable	Incidents	Significant at the 5% level? ⁴⁶⁰	Fatalities	Significant at the 5% level?
Income	-0.1298	No	-0.0958	No
Inequality	0.0848	No	0.0786	No
HDI	0.0061	No	0.1064	No
HDI Rank	0.1139	No	0.0579	No
Political Rights	0.1089	No	0.0972	No
Civil Liberties	0.1003	No	0.0929	No
Degree of Freedom	-0.1338	No	-0.1301	No
Elections	-0.0908	No	-0.0804	No
Pluralism/Participation	-0.0973	No	-0.0756	No
Government	-0.1070	No	-0.0952	No
Freedom of Expression	-0.1142	No	-0.1163	No
Freedom of Organisation	-0.0722	No	-0.0694	No
Rule of Law	-0.1367	No	-0.1321	No
Personal Autonomy	-0.0922	No	-0.0768	No

There seems to be absolutely no significant correlation between the variables, however plausible the causal links between them may appear. One explanation may, of course, be limitations in the datasets, for instance the lack of economic and social data for two of the countries most ridden with terrorism, i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq, but one certainly cannot rule out the possible conclusion that the causal hypotheses are simply wrong.

7.6.2 Zooming In: The Top Twenty League

A cursory look at the “Top Twenty” countries in Table 29, as identified by the highest scores for terrorism (measured in terms of fatalities), all have fatality levels above 100 and together account for 95 per cent of all fatalities (21,262 out of 22,319), seems to support the “null hypothesis” that there are no causal links, as the twenty countries seem to differ in many respects.

Table 29: The Terrorism “Top Twenty”

Country			Fatalities							
Rank	Name	Popula- tion (000)	2004- 05	Largest	Date	Rest	Ann. Av.	Ann. fat. per mil.	Ann. attack	Fat. ratio
1.	Iraq	26,783	11,220	125	28.02.05	11,095	5,548	207.1	2,203	5.0
2.	India	1,095,352	1,901	62	29.10.05	1,839	920	0.8	864	0.0
3.	Russia	142,894	1,068	331	01.09.04	737	369	2.6	208	3.5
4.	Afghan.	31,057	958	21	06.01.05	937	469	15.1	318	2.9
5.	Columbia	43,593	935	34	15.06.04	901	451	10.3	416	2.2
6.	Nepal	28,287	760	38	06.06.05	722	361	12.8	827	0.9
7.	Nigeria	131,860	686	630	02.05.04	56	28	0.2	13	4.3
8.	Pakistan	165,804	613	50	19.03.05	563	282	1.7	295	1.9
9.	Thailand	64,632	596	9	16.11.05	587	294	4.5	473	1.2
10.	Uganda	28,196	492	192	21.02.04	300	150	5.3	21	14.3
11.	Philip.	89,469	389	132	27.02.04	257	129	1.4	98	2.6
12.	Burundi	8,090	284	180	13.08.04	104	52	6.4	25	4.2
13.	Sudan	41,236	271	41	08.06.04	230	115	2.8	19	12.1
14.	DRC	62,661	196	30	17.02.04	166	83	1.3	15	11.1
15.	Spain	40,398	192	191	11.03.04	1	1	0.0	56	0.0
16.	Algeria	32,930	179	16	22.10.04	163	82	2.5	52	3.1
17.	Sri Lanka	20,222	152	6	05.03.05	146	73	3.6	140	1.0
18.	Egypt	78,887	131	88	23.07.05	43	22	0.3	6	7.2
19.	Indonesia	245,453	128	26	01.10.05	102	51	0.2	39	2.6
20.	Banglad.	146,365	111	20	21.08.04	91	46	0.3	70	1.3

Legend/Sources: Population (in thousands) from the *CIA World Factbook 2006*; data on terrorism from the US National Counterterrorism Center: *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System* <http://wits.nctc.gov/>; **Largest:** Highest fatality figure 2004-05; **Rest:** 2004-05 minus “Largest”; **Ann. Av.:** Annual Average (“Rest”/2); **Ann. Fat. per mil.:** “Rest”/2/“Population”*1000; **Ann. Attack:** “Incidents” (from Table #)/2; **Fat. ratio:** “Rest” / “Ann. attack”

Moreover, the high scores of the Top Twenty may be due to very parochial factors, such as the presence of one particularly nasty terrorist group on their territory (e.g. the LRA in Uganda and Sudan or the LTTE in Sri Lanka). Indeed, some of the high scores do not even seem to reflect any general patterns or trends, but are rather due to single events – as seems to appear from the “rest” (i.e. all minus the largest) of the figures calculated in Table 29. In four of the twenty countries, the largest attack thus accounts for more than half of all fatalities over the two years. Other observations which spring to mind are the following:

- Even among the members of the top twenty, the statistical risk of perishing as a result of terrorism is almost negligible, with at most fifteen out of every million inhabitants being killed this way every year – Iraq being the only exception;
- The ratio of fatalities to attacks (“incidents”) varies widely from 14.3 fatalities per attack in Uganda, to figures very close to zero in countries like India;
- The large numbers of attacks in countries such as India or Nepal might be taken as evidence of sustained campaigns, whereas the low numbers in, for instance, Nigeria or Egypt seem to indicate the opposite. One should, however, be careful about jumping to such conclusions, as a country such as Spain is indeed subject to such a campaign (by the ETA), even though the single event which brought it into the top twenty league was in fact, caused by another terrorist group;
- Iraq is in a league of its own measured by almost any yardstick. It has experienced more terrorist attacks than any other country, with a total number of casualties in an order of magnitude higher than anywhere else. There is a significantly higher statistical risk of perishing in a terrorist attack, yet with an “average lethality,” which is about the average of the top twenty, each attack killing an average of five people.

7.6.3 Case Study: East Africa⁴⁶¹

It seems to be a rather widespread view that East Africa is a potential “hotspot” of Islamic terrorism.⁴⁶² For instance, in 2003 the United States launched a special East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), intended to help the states in the region to prevent, contain or defeat terrorism in their respective societies, based on the assumption that terror constitutes a serious problem.⁴⁶³

However, the available statistical data do not seem to really support the alarmist view of the threat. Table 30 below is compiled as a complete listing of all the

terrorists incidents in the region, based on the incident records in the “Terrorism Knowledge Base.”⁴⁶⁴ This seems as good as any other database and one that is unlikely to underestimate the threat, as it is referred to as the authoritative database by the very same US Counterterrorism Office which has placed the spotlight on East Africa.

Table 30: Terrorist Incidents in East Africa, 1998-2005

Country	Year	Date	Inc.	Inj.	Fat.	Perp.	Nature	Targ.
Djibouti	2004	18/01	B	6	0	?	?	Train
Eritrea	2003	10/08	As	1	2	EIJM	Isl	Car
	2004	01/03	B	12	3	EIJM	Isl	Hotel
	2004	24/05	B	50	3	?	?	Gov.
Ethiopia	1999	03/04	K	0	0	ONLF	Pol	Aid
	1999	13/11	B	1	2	?	?	Train
	2000	22/03	LM	1	14	OLF	Pol	Kenyans
	2000	17/08	R	0	6	?	?	El. mon.
	2002	23/07	B	?	?	OLF	Pol	Vehicle
	2002	11/09	B	38	1	?	?	Hotel
	2003	19/01	M	1	0	?	?	?
	2003	20/03	B	12	0	?	?	Hotel
	2003	10/09	AA	?	1	?	?	Aid
	2003	26/09	B	9	2	?	?	Train
	2004	04/01	B	0	0	?	?	Vehicle
	2004	05/04	AA	0	0	OLF	Pol	Education
2004	02/05	AA	3	1	OLF	Pol	Business	
2004	24/06	B	?	?	OLF	Pol	Gov.	
Kenya	1998	07/08	B/S	5,000	291	AQ	Isl	US Emb.
	2002	28/11	R	0	0	AQ	Isl	Aircraft
	2002	28/11	B/S	80	13	AQ	Isl	Hotel
	2002	18/12	B	0	0	?	?	Discotec
	2002	20/12	Ar	0	0	?	?	Discotec
2003	08/03	B	0	0	?	?	Mosque	
Somalia	1998	15/04	K	?	?	?	?	Aid
	1999	19/09	B	0	0	ULA	Isl	Oil pipeline
	2001	16/11	AA	9	18	?	?	Quran School
	2003	28/07	B	0	0	?	?	Hotel
	2004	20/06	K	?	?	?	?	NGO
	2004	04/10	As	0	1	?	?	Aid worker
	2005	09/02	As	0	1	AI	Isl	Journ.
	2005	17/02	B	6	2	?	?	Hotel
	2005	03/05	B	38	15	?	?	Gov.
2005	11/07	AA	?	1	?	?	NGO	
2005	06/11	AA	?	5	?	?	Gov. target	
Sudan	1998	02/07	B	?	?	?	?	Airport
	1998	02/07	B	?	?	?	?	Power plant
	1999	18/02	K	0	4	SPLA	Pol	NGO
	2001	23/01	B	0	0	SPLA	Pol	Oil pipeline
	2001	05/08	?	?	?	SPLA	Pol	Oil pipeline
	2002	26/04	AA	0	60	LRA	Chr	Funeral Party
	2002	15/10	H	?	?	?	?	Saudi aircraft
	2005	05/7	AA	0	5	LRA	Chr	Vehicle
	2005	05/7	AA	11	6	LRA	Chr	NGO
2005	05/11	AA	1	1	LRA	Chr	Air worker	
Tanzania	1998	07/08	B/S	77	10	AQ	Isl	US Emb.
Tanzania (Zanzibar)	1999	23/12	B	0	0	?	?	Beer depot
	2004	20/03	B	0	0	?	?	Restaurant
	2004	20/03	B	0	0	?	?	Gov.
	2000	12/11	B	1	0	?	?	Gov.

Table 30: (continued)

Country	Year	Date	Inc.	Inj.	Fat.	Perp.	Nature	Targ.	
Uganda	1998	04/04	B	2	0	?	?	Hotel	
	1998	04/04	B	5	2	?	?	Hotel	
	1998	12/07	B	3	1	?	?	Restaurant	
	1998	18/07	B	?	?	?	?	Civilians	
	1998	25/08	B	6	30	NALU	Pol	Bus	
	1998	27/11	AA	17	16	LRA	Chr	Aid	
	1999	01/03	B	4	0	?	?	Restaurant	
	1999	01/03	K	0	8	IH	Pol	Tourists	
	1999	10/04	B	4	0	?	?	Taxi park	
	1999	11/04	B	13	2	?	?	Taxi park	
	1999	14/04	B	35	4	?	?	Restaurant	
	1999	24/04	B	16	5	?	?	Stadium	
	1999	06/05	B	1	0	?	?	Civilians	
	1999	07/05	B	10	1	?	?	Civilians	
	1999	30/05	B	12	2	AMM	Isl	Restaurant	
	2000	04/05	K	0	0	LRA	Chr	Rel.	
	2000	01/10	As	?	1	LRA	Chr	Rel.	
	2000	09/10	B	60	9	LRA	Chr	Disco	
	2001	14/03	B	3	2	?	?	Civilians	
	2001	16/03	B	4	1	?	?	Civilians	
	2001	07/07	B	13	1	?	?	Civilians	
	2002	24/07	K	?	?	LRA	Chr	Gov.	
	2003	01/09	Am	?	?	22	LRA	Chr	Vehicle
	2003	13/10	AA	20	22	LRA	Chr	Restaurant	
	2003	18/11	AA	?	12	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2004	01/02	AA	?	8	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2004	21/02	B	60	239	LRA	Chr	Refugees	
	2004	05/02	AA	50	47	LRA	Chr	Refugees	
	2004	14/04	AA	8	13	LRA	Chr	Vehicle	
	2004	18/04	K	0	0	LRA	Chr	Rel.	
	2004	17/05	AA	10	7	LRA	Chr	Vehicles	
	2004	20/12	AA	1	2	LRA	Chr	Vehicle	
	2005	19/01	As	0	1	LRA	Chr	MP	
	2005	23/02	AA	7	1	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2005	26/02	Ae	8	1	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2005	09/03	AA	16	6	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2005	15/03	AA	7	2	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2005	26/03	K	13	?	LRA	Chr	Civilians	
	2005	05/05	AA	?	4	LRA	Chr	Vehicle	
	2005	05/05	AA	14	10	LRA	Chr	IDPs	
2005	10/07	AA	?	14	LRA	Chr	Civilians		
2005	18/11	AA	?	5	LRA	Chr	Vehicle		
2005	21/11	AA	5	12	LRA	Chr	Vehicle		
2005	13/12	AA	?	8	LRA	Chr	Vehicle		

Legend: AA: Armed Attack; AI: Al-Islah; Am: Ambush; AMM: Ahmadiya Muslim Mission; AQ: *Al Qaeda*; Ar: Arson; As: Assass; B: Bomb; C: Christian; EIJM: Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement; H: Hijacking; I: Islamist; IH: Interahamwe; K: Kidnapping; LM: Land Mine; LRA: Lord's Resistance Army; M: Mortar; NALU: National Army for the Liberation of Uganda; OLF: Oromo Liberation Front; ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front; P: Political; R: Rocket; S: Suicide attack; SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army; Tanz(Z): Tanzania (Zanzibar); ULA: Ummah Liberation Army

The above table has taken 1998 as the starting year, for the simple reason that this was the first year with data for both international and domestic terrorism. However, 1998 was special because of two almost simultaneous incidents, i.e. the attacks on the USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on the 7th of August. These account for about one-third of the total fatalities for the entire period and almost ninety per cent of the total recorded injuries. The analytical tables 31-33 have therefore also included totals without the 1998 figures, i.e. totals for 1999-2005. All the categorisations are based on the present author's interpretation of the "raw" incidents and group descriptions in the database.

The first observation is that neither the total number of terrorist incidents in the region, nor the numbers of deaths or injuries from terrorist attacks seem particularly alarming. Around eleven incidents on average per year with an annual death toll of less than hundred people (See Table 31). If compared with the death tolls of, for instance, the periodic famines, natural disasters or the HIV-AIDS pandemic, the statistical risk of being killed by terrorists is clearly negligible.

Year	Inc.	Inj.	Fat.
1998	11	5,110	350
1999	14	96	28
2000	6	62	30
2001	6	29	22
2002	9	118	74
2003	10	43	61
2004	18	200	324
2005	20	126	100
Av. 1998-2005	11.8	723.0	123.7
Av. 1999-2005	11.9	96.3	91.3
Legend: Inc: Incidents; Inj: Injuries; Fat: Fatalities; Av: Annual Average			

Table 32: Terrorism by Motivation

Motive	Inc.	Inj.	Fat.
Unknown	43	284	76
Political	11	10	57
Christian	32	308	534
Islam	8	105	21
Emb. attacks	2	5,077	301

Secondly, as is apparent from Table 32, with the exception of the two incidents on the 7th of August 1998, most terrorism has been politically, rather than religiously motivated. Moreover, when religion has been the driving force, it has usually not been Islam but Christianity which has spurred the terrorists into action, albeit the particularly perverted and sectarian form of Christianity represented by the aforementioned LRA. Twenty times as many people have thus perished in terrorist attacks perpetrated by “Christians” than in ones launched by the dreaded Islamist terrorists of the *Al Qaeda* type.

Thirdly, the terrorist risk seems to vary from country to country as set out in Table 33. Uganda clearly comes out as the most terrorist-ridden of the eight, at least if the two embassy attacks are excluded. The table also reveals mainland Tanzania as a very secure country, as all the (small-scale) terrorist incidents have taken place on Zanzibar.

Table 33: Terrorism by Country

Country	Inc.	Inj.	Fat.
Dibouti	1	6	0
Eritrea	3	63	8
Ethiopia	15	191	43
Kenya (A)	6	5,080	304
Kenya (B)	5	80	13
Somalia	11	53	43
Sudan	10	12	76
Tanzania (A)	5	78	10
Tanzania (B)	4	1	0
Tanzania (C)	0	0	0
Tanzania (D)	4	1	0
Uganda	44	427	521

Legend: Inc: Incidents; Inj: Injuries; Fat: Fatalities; (Kenya and Tanzania)
A: Total; B): without embassy bombings; (Tanzania) C: Mainland; D: only Zanzibar

It thus seems that the threat from (what the West calls) terrorism, and even more so that of Islamic terrorism, is blown completely out of proportion as far as East Africa is concerned. This may not be a fault of the West alone, as it may also be in the interest of governments in East Africa to exaggerate the threat. First of all, positioning themselves as the allies of the United States in its global “war on terror” is likely to gain them some much needed goodwill. Secondly, it also makes them eligible for support from the EACTI pool, e.g. for military or police upgrading programmes. Thirdly, and more problematically, it may allow governments to label their opponents terrorists, thereby allowing them to resort to “extraordinary measures” to defeat them, as is entailed by a “securitisation move,” regardless of whether this remains pure rhetoric, i.e. a simple “speech act.”⁴⁶⁵

On the other hand, even though international terrorists may not be a genuine problem in East Africa, armed conflict certainly is a serious problem for most countries. Some of the parties to such conflicts may actually deserve being labelled as terrorists – and some of them are undoubtedly motivated, at least in part, by religious beliefs, which might make their categorisation as religious terrorists quite appropriate.

7.7 Conclusion: Potential Effect of Development Aid

As is apparent from the above analysis, there seems to be little that we actually know about what economic, demographic, societal, cultural, religious or political conditions make terrorism more or less likely – i.e. what are sometimes described as the “root causes” of terrorism.⁴⁶⁶ None of the commonly accepted “truths” really seem to stand up to closer scrutiny. Neither the assumption that poverty somehow causes terrorism, nor that decentralisation, democratisation or the reconstruction of failed states would really help in this respect, even presupposing that we would know (which we do not) how to accomplish this. The only correlation which has proven really significant has been that between religion and terrorism, in the sense that countries with predominantly Muslim populations seem to have a higher statistical propensity for terrorism than others. This may, on the other hand, be a spurious correlation, i.e. reflecting another (perhaps higher-order) causal link.

If we assume that terrorism is caused (largely or at least partly) by the same factors as civil war, we know a bit more, e.g. that there seems to be a correlation between civil war (as the dependent variable) and independent variables such as steep declines in living conditions and/or increases of inequalities, youth bulges and male

surpluses. However, some of these apparent correlations may also be spurious, and the hypothesised similarity between civil war and terrorism may simply turn out to be either completely wrong or much weaker than assumed.

Some of the potential independent variables might be susceptible to modification by means of development aid – e.g. poverty alleviation, good governance, etc. This just might help to address the problem(s) of civil war and terrorism, but we can by no means be sure.

8. Conclusion and Recommendations: Do No Harm!

We have seen that neither the vivid interest in, nor the huge amount of writings about, terrorism are matched by solid, logical, theoretically sound and empirically founded knowledge. Quite a few of the assumed truths, which are often taken for granted to the extent that they are almost impervious to questioning, reveal themselves on closer scrutiny as logically flawed and/or based on very weak empirical foundations, if any at all. Some simply appear to be wrong.

Whereas an inherently plausible case can be made for drawing on the actual knowledge accumulated on phenomena with a resemblance to terrorism, such as, civil war or organised crime, it is much less clear to what extent, inferences from one to the other are valid. Although the three phenomena are similar in some respects, it does not follow that they are so in those respects which matter. With regard to prevention, they may in fact be so different that nothing can be learned.

This situation is by no means unique, as there are many other serious problems where the requisite knowledge for remedial action is lacking. The mysteries of cancer, HIV-AIDS (or the common cold, for that matter) are examples where medical science has not yet been able to come up with actual cures, even though it has found ways to mitigate the problems.

There are many problems in life where “doing something” seems imperative, even though there is not guarantee that this something will solve the problem. Terrorism may well be a case in point, as it seems inconceivable that politicians entrusted by their voters with the fate of the nation, would simply admit to not having a clue as to what to do and then doing absolutely nothing. Some may speak in favour of doing something in a trial-and-error fashion, i.e. of proceeding down avenues which seem promising, in the hope that this will yield results even in the absence of any scientifically grounded certainty. It just might work, and it might even yield some unexpected windfall gains, as when the medieval alchemists made several valuable discoveries in their futile quest for making gold.

Externalities have to be considered, i.e. the unintended side-effects of the actions undertaken. Not all externalities are positive and some may even be very negative. Whereas eating plenty of vegetables will surely not cure aids, it is unlikely

to do any harm and it even seems to help prevent other illnesses, i.e. it has positive externalities. On the other hand, besides not curing AIDS, amputations have very negative externalities and are therefore not suitable for any trial-and-error strategy. Hence the medical profession's Hippocratic norm *primum non nocere* ("first of all, do not cause harm").⁴⁶⁷

If we apply these commonsensical rules-of-thumb to terror prevention, they seem to be in favour of trying various remedial strategies, if only as they possess an inherent plausibility, but keeping in mind the unintended negative repercussions. Providing support for human rights and/or women's organisations may or may not help prevent terrorism, but it strains the imagination to envisage it causing any major damage. Fighting poverty, providing education and health services or promoting (by peaceful means) democracy and human rights may not have much effect on terrorism, but even so, such initiatives will help many people in other ways. However, disrupting the *hawala* money chains in the (perhaps vain) hope of depriving prospective terrorists of the funds allowing them to perpetrate acts of terror, is much more problematic, as this will have severe negative effects for innocent civilians who are critically dependent for their livelihood (or even survival) on the receipt of remittances from relatives abroad via these networks. Invading other countries (erronously) believed to shelter terrorists is also an option decision-makers had better think over several times in advance, as the negative repercussions may be of the utmost severity, as illustrated by the present quagmire in Iraq.

9. Endnotes

¹ Quoted from www.famouspoetsandpoems.com/poets/mark_twain/quotes.

² Møller, Bjørn: "Bistand mod terrorisme?," *Den Ny Verden*, vol. 36, no. 1 (September 2003), pp. 27-39; idem: "Aid against Terrorism," *Working Papers*, no. 124 (Aalborg: Research Center for Development and International Relations, 2003). See also Abrahamsen, Rita: "A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa and Britain's 'War on Terrorism'," *Review of African Political Economy*, vol. 31, no. 102 (2004), pp. 677-684; Woods, Ngaire: "The Shifting Politics of Foreign Aid," *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 2 (2005), pp. 393-409.

³ Quoted by the President of the International Crisis Group, Gareth Evans in a speech on "Where Are We in the War on Terrorism?," 30 March 2004, available at www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=2556&l=1.

⁴ Rist, Gilbert: *The History of Development. From Western Origins to Global Faith*, 2nd ed. (London: Zed Books, 2002), *passim*; Thorbecke, Erik: "The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign Aid, 1950-2000," in Finn Tarp (ed.): *Foreign Aid and Development. Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 17-47; Hjertholm, Peter & Howard White: "Foreign Aid in Historical Perspective: Background and Trends," *ibid.*, pp. 80-102; Degnbol-Martinussen & Poul Engberg-Pedersen: *Bistand: Udvikling eller afvikling. En analyse af internationalt bistandssamarbejde* (Copenhagen: Mellemløkkeligt Samvirke, 1999), pp. 66-87 & *passim*.

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- ³⁰ The unsurpassed analysis of what constitutes knowledge remains Plato's "Theaetetus," included, with a running commentary, in F.M. Cornford: *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 15-163. See also Russell, Bertrand: *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 45-50; and Ayer, A.J.: *The Problem of Knowledge* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1956), *passim*.
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- ³⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig: *Tractatus Logioco-Philosophicus* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), p. 115 (proposition 7). The preceding proposition 6.522 should not be forgotten, however, according to which the unspeakable "exists" ("Es gibt Unausprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische"). See also McGuinness, B.F.: "The Mysticism of the Tractatus," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 75, no. 3 (1966), pp. 305-328.
- ³⁵ Socrates is, for instance, credited with the assertion that "People imagine that they know about the nature of things, when they don't know about them, and, not having come to an understanding at first because

they think that they know, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves.” See Plato: *Phaedrus*, available online at www.public.iastate.edu/~honey1/411/pdf/phaedrus.pdf, p. 12.

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³⁷ Quote from Plato: *Apology*, at <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/apology.html>.

³⁸ Kivimäki, Timo (ed.): *Development Cooperation as an Instrument in the Prevention of Terrorism*. Research Report (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003); Cragin, Kim & Peter Chalk: *Terrorism and Development. Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003); Anon.: *op. cit.* (note 27).

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⁵² See Childs, David & Richard Poppelwell: *The Stasi: The East German Intelligence Security Service* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), *passim*.

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⁵⁸ See, for instance, Abrahms, Max: "Al Qaeda's Miscommunication War: The Terrorism Paradox," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 17, no. 4 (2005), pp. 529-549; Jesse, Devin D.: "Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda's Use of Denial and Deception," *ibid.*, vol. 18, no. 3 (2006), pp. 367-388.

⁵⁹ Descartes, René: *Meditations de prima philosophia/Méditations Métaphysiques* (1641) (Paris: Librairie Philosophique de J. Vrin, 1970), Meditation 1, para 12: "Supponam igitur non optimum Deum, fontem veritatis, sed genium aliquem malignum, eundemque summe potentem & callidum, omnem suam industriam in eo posuisse, ut me falleret" (p. 23). The same argument, without reference to the evil genie is found in idem: *Discours de la Méthode* (1637), at www.gutenberg.org/files/13846/13846-h/13846-h.htm. See also "Descartes' Epistemology," in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/>; and Bouwsma, O.K.: "Descartes' Evil Genius," *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 58, no. 2 (1949), pp. 141-151; Kennington, Richard: "The Finitude of Descartes' Evil Genius," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 32, no. 3 (1971), pp. 441-446.

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⁶³ See Vigor, Peter: *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

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⁶⁷ Holsti, Ole R.: "Crisis Management," in Betty Glad (ed.): *Psychological Dimensions of War* (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 116-142.

⁶⁸ For an analysis to the effect that this was not a case of an intelligence failure, but of a political abuse of the intelligence services see Hastedt, Glenn: "Public Intelligence: Leaks as Policy Instruments – the Case of the Iraq War," *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 20, no. 3 (2005), pp. 419-439. For an argument almost to the contrary, blaming the academic community for not having predicted 9/11, see Czwarno, Monica: "Misjudging Islamic Terrorism: The Academic Community's Failure to Predict 9/11," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 29, no. 7 (2006), pp. 657-678.

⁶⁹ Horn, Eva: "Knowing the Enemy: The Epistemology of Secret Intelligence," *Grey Room*, no. 11 (2003), pp. 55-85, quote from p. 66.

⁷⁰ See Rathmell, Andrew: "Towards Postmodern Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security*, vol. 17, no. 3 (2002), pp. 87-104.

⁷¹ For an overview of the changing signification see Hoffman, Bruce: *Inside Terrorism*. 2nd Ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 3-20.

⁷² A clear formulation of the rationale for the terror was that of its main architect, Maximillian Robespierre: "Il faut étouffer les ennemis intérieurs et extérieurs de la République, ou périr avec elle; or, dans cette situation, la première maxime de votre politique doit être qu'on conduit le peuple par la raison, et les ennemis du peuple par la terreur. Si le ressort du gouvernement populaire dans la paix est la vertu, le ressort du gouvernement populaire en révolution est à la fois la vertu et la terreur; la vertu, sans laquelle la terreur est funeste; la terreur sans laquelle la vertu est impuissante. La terreur n'est autre chose que la justice prompte, sévère, inflexible; elle est donc une émanation de la vertu." See his "Sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention Nationale dans l'administration intérieure de la République" (5 february 1794), in idem: *Textes choisis*, vol. III (Paris: éditions sociales, 1974), pp. 110-131 (quote from p. 118). See also Walter, Gérard: *Histoire de la Terreur, 1793-1794* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1937), *passim*; Lefebvre, Georges: *La Révolution Française* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), pp. 401-409; Soboul, Albert: *Précis d'histoire de la Révolution Française* (Paris: éditions sociales, 1975), pp. 319-322; Loomis, Stanley: *Paris in the Terror, June 1793-July 1794* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964), *passim*; Bouleoisseau, Marc: *La République jacobine, 10 août 1792-9 thermidor an II*. Nouvelle Histoire de la France contemporaine, vol. 2 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972), pp. 106-113 On the mentality of the leading Jacobins see Cobb, Richard: "Quelques aspects de la mentalité révolutionnaire (Avril 1793-Thermidor An II)," in idem: *Terreur et subsistances, 1793-1795* (Paris: Librairie Clavreuil, 1965), pp. 3-53.

⁷³ He is, for instance, quoted for the assertion that "Der Partisanenkrieg, der *Massenterror*, der jetzt nach dem Dezember überall in Russland fast pausenlos ausgeübt wird, wird zweifellos helfen, die Massen zu lehren, im Augenblick des Aufstands die richtige Taktik anzuwenden. Die Sozialdemokratie muss diesen *Massenterror* billigen und zum Bestandteil ihrer Taktik machen (...)." See Lenin, W.I.: "Die Lehren des Moskauer Aufstands," in idem: *op. cit.* (note 7). vol. I, pp. 657-664 (quote from p. 663, italics by the author). On the 5th of September 1918 the secret police, the *Cheka*, issued a decree on "Red Terror." See Carr, Edward Hallett: *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 176-177; Dobrin, S.: "Some Questions of Early Soviet Legal History," *Soviet Studies*, vol. 7, no. 4 (1956), pp. 353-372, especially pp. 366-371; Solomon, Peter H. Jr.: "Soviet Penal Policy, 1917-1934: A Reinterpretation," *Slavic Review*, vol. 39, no. 2 (1980), pp. 195-217.

⁷⁴ See, for instance, Keller, Edmond J.: "State, Party, and Revolution in Ethiopia," *African Studies Review*, vol. 28, no. 1 (1985), pp. 1-17; Tiruneh, Andargachev: *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987. A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 173-226; Halliday, Fred & Maxine Molineux: *The Ethiopian Revolution* (London: Verso, 1981), pp. 122-155.

⁷⁵ Cicero: "No Fellowship with Tyrants," excerpt from *De Officiis* in Walter Laqueur (ed.): *Voices of Terror. Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), p. 18. See also the other excerpts on tyrannicide, *ibid.*, pp. 8-47; George, David: "Distinguishing Classical Tyrannicide from Modern Terrorism," *The Review of Politics*, vol. 50, no. 3 (1988), pp. 390-419; Iviansky, Ze'ev: "Individual Terror: Concept and Typology," *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 12, no. 1 (1977), pp. 43-63.

⁷⁶ On the assassination of Caesar see Miola, Robert S.: "Julius Caesar and the Tyrannicide Debate," *Renaissance Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 2 (1985), pp. 271-289; Sedley, David: "The Ethics of Brutus and Cassius," *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 87 (1997), pp. 41-53; Africa, Thomas W.: "The Mask of an Assassin: A Psychohistorical Study of M. Junius Brutus," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol. 8, no. 4 (1978), pp. 599-626. On Thermidor (which was not, strictly speaking, an assassination, but rather a *coup d'état*) see Biennu, Richard: *The Ninth of Thermidor. The Fall of Robespierre* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), *passim*. On the assassination attempt at Hitler see Lockenour, Jay: "'The Rift in Our Ranks': The German Officer Corps, the Twentieth of July, and the Path to Democracy," *German Studies Review*, vol. 21, no. 3 (1998), pp. 469-506; Mommsen, Hans: "The German Resistance against Hitler and the Restoration of Politics," *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 64, Supplement: Resistance Against the Third Reich (1992), pp. S112-S127; Hoffmann, Peter: "Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg in the German Resistance to Hitler: Between East and West," *The Historical Journal*, vol. 31, no. 3 (1988), pp. 629-650; Peifer, Douglas: "Commemoration of Mutiny, Rebellion, and Resistance in Postwar Germany: Public Memory, History, and the Formation of 'Memory Beacons,'" *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 65, no. 4 (2001), pp. 1013-1052; DeWeerd, Harvey A.: "The German Officer Corps Versus Hitler," *Military Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 4 (1949), pp. 199-208; Ford, Franklin L.: "The Twentieth of July in the History of the German Resistance," *The American Historical Review*, vol. 51, no. 4 (1946), pp. 609-626; Bulloch, Alan: *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), pp. 737-752.

⁷⁷ Novak, D.: "Anarchism and Individual Terrorism," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1954), pp. 176-184; Pomper, Philip: "Russian Revolutionary Terrorism," in Martha Crenshaw (ed.): *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 63-101.

⁷⁸ Heikal, Mohamed: *Autumn of Fury. The Assassination of Sadat* (New York: Random House, 1983), *passim*. See also Jansen, J. J. G.: "The Creed of Sadat's Assassins. The Contents of 'The Forgotten Duty' Analysed," *Die Welt des Islams*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1985), pp. 1-30. For an interesting Weberian perspective see Goldberg, Ellis: "Smashing Idols and the State: The Protestant Ethic and Egyptian Sunni Radicalism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 33, no. 1 (1991), pp. 3-35.

⁷⁹ For a survey of the use of various definitional elements see Weinberg, Leonard, Ami Pedahzur & Sivan Hirsch-Hoeffler. "The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 16, no. 4 (2004), pp. 777-794.

⁸⁰ See, for instance, Hafner, Gerhard: "The Definition of the Crime of Terrorism," in Nesi (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 45), pp. 33-43; Gioia, Andrea: "The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism," *ibid.*, pp. 3-23.

⁸¹ Cited from Hoffman: *op. cit.* (note 71), p. 31.

⁸² "Council Common Position on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism" (27 December 2001), in Rutten, Maartje (ed.): "From Nice to Laeken. European Defence: Core Documents. Volume II," *Chaillot Paper*, no. 51 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2002), pp. 196-198; and (for the list) Council of the European Union: "Combating terrorism – Restrictive measures against certain persons and entities," *Document 6199/05* (Brussels, 16 March 2005), at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/84234.pdf. See also "EU Solidarity Programme on the Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks (1 December 2004)," at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/15480EU_Solidarity_Programme.pdf; "EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism–Update (14 December 2004)," at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUplan16090.pdf>; and "Conceptual Framework on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Dimension of the Fight against Terrorism" (18 November 2004), at http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/14797Conceptual_Framework_ESDP.pdf. See further Gärtner, Heinz: "European Security after September 11," *International Politics*, vol. 40, no. 1 (2003), pp. 59-73; Delpech, Thérèse: "International Terrorism and Europe," *Chaillot Paper*, no. 56 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004); Müller,

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- ¹⁰⁸ An excellent overview is Victoroff, Jeff: "The Mind of the Terrorist. A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 1 (2005), pp. 3-42.
- ¹⁰⁹ For an interesting analysis along these lines see Enders & Sandler: *op. cit.* (note 46), pp. 112-126. See also idem & idem: *loc. cit.* (note 46); Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley: *The Economics of Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 321-334.
- ¹¹⁰ To assume that one could rationally (i.e. logically or empirically) determine values would be tantamount to committing the "naturalistic fallacy," according to Moore, G.E.: *Principia Ethica* (1903, reprint Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), *passim*. On Moore's philosophy see also Warnock, Mary: *Ethics since 1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 11-38. See also Ayer, A., J.: *Language, Truth and Logic* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 136-158. A precursor is a work from 1739, i.e. Hume: *op. cit.* 1969 (note 32), pp. 527-521, especially p. 520. For a critique see Geerts, Clifford; "Ethos, World View, and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols," in idem: *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 126-141. He argues that "Like bees who fly despite theories of aeronautics which deny them the right to do so, probably the overwhelming majority of mankind are continually drawing normative conclusions from factual premises (and factual conclusions from normative premises, for the relation between ethos and world view is circular) despite refined, and in their own terms impeccable, reflections by professional philosophers on the 'naturalistic fallacy'." (p. 141).
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¹¹⁴ Her name is Isabelle Coutant-Peyre and she has written an autobiography about this: *Epouser Carlos: Un amour sous haute tension* (Paris: Éditions de l’Archipel, 2004).

¹¹⁵ Caton-Jones, Michael (Director): *The Jackal* (1997), starring Bruce Willis in the title role. Details available at www.imdb.com/title/tt0119395/combined.

¹¹⁶ See “Temple of Artemis” in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (www.britannica.com/eb/article?tocId=9009680).

¹¹⁷ On the website devoted to the film (www.filmsite.org/goodf.html), the quote is rendered as “As far back as I can remember, I always wanted to be a gangster,” and the character’s explanation is recorded: “Even before I first wandered into the cabstand for an after-school job, I knew I wanted to be a part of them. It was there that I knew that I belonged. To me, it meant being somebody in a neighborhood that was full of nobodies. They weren’t like anybody else. I mean, they did whatever they wanted.”

¹¹⁸ The quote is from Hobbes, Thomas: *Leviathan* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 186. On the concept of “lumpen proletariat” see Marx, Karl: “Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte,” in *Marx-Engels-Werke*, vol. 8 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1975), pp. 111-208, especially pp. 161, 201-202; idem: *Das Kapital*, vol. 1 (*ibid.*, vol. 23), pp. 673-674. See also Thoburn, Nicholas: “Difference in Marx: the Lumpenproletariat and the Proletarian Unnamable,” *Economy and Society*, vol. 31, no. 3 (2002), pp. 434-460; Buchanan, Paul G.: “That the Lumpen Should Rule: Vulgar Capitalism in the Post-Industrial Age,” *Journal of American & Comparative Cultures*, vol. 23, no. 4 (2000), pp. 1-14; Vitanza, Victor J.: “The Hermeneutics of Abandonment,” *Parallax*, vol. 4, no. 4 (1998), pp. 123-139.

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¹²⁰ Eagleton: *op. cit.* (note 47), p. 116-117.

¹²¹ The character Durcet is thus quoted for the confession that “often enough I have acted not to gain, but purely to undo, at the behest of a certain wickedness which almost always awakens the organs of lubricity in me; my prick positively jumps when I do evil, in evil I discover precisely what is needed to stimulate in me all of pleasure’s sensations, and I perform evil for that reason, for that alone, without any ulterior motive.” See De Sade, Marquis: *120 Days of Sodom*, at the Marquis de Sade e-library, http://supervert.com/elibrary/zips/sade_120_days_pdf.zip, p. 139. See also Klossowski, Pierre: “A Destructive Philosophy,” *Yale French Studies*, no. 35 (1965), pp. 61-80; or Russell, Jeffrey B.: *The Prince of Darkness. Radical Evil and the Power of Good in History* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1989), pp. 211-212.

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¹²³ The classical work on this is Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: *Essais de Théodicée. Sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal* (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1969). The author’s attempt at reconciling

the implications of the benevolence and omnipotence of God was subjected to the satire of Voltaire in the latter's novel *Candide, ou l'Optimisme* (online version at <http://perso.wanadoo.fr/dboudin/VOLTAIRE/Candide.htm>). On the theodicy problem in general see Russel: *op. cit.* (note 121), *passim*.

¹²⁴ This was even one of the arguments by Marquis de Sade: "Supposing [God] to exist as religions portray him to us, this would be the most detestable of creatures, since it would be God who permits evil to be on earth while his omnipotence could prevent it." See idem: *Philosophy in the Bedroom* (http://supervert.com/elibrary/zips/sade_philobed_pdf.zip), p. 22.

¹²⁵ Nietzsche, Friedrich: *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 9, München: Goldmann Verlag, no year), *passim*; idem: *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 8, München: Goldmann Verlag, no year), *passim*. See also Leiter, Brian: "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics." *Ethics*, vol. 107, no. 2 (1997), pp. 250-285.

¹²⁶ See the entry on "Nihilism" in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, at www.iep.utm.edu/n/nihilism.htm See also McHoskey, John W., Terri Betris, William Worzel, Chris Szyarto, Kristen Kelly, Tammy Eggert, Jenny Miley, Travis Suggs, Adam Tesler, Nikki Gainey & Harmony Anderson: "Relativism, Nihilism, and Quest," *Journal of Social Behavior & Personality*, vol. 14, no. 3 (1999), pp. 445-463.

¹²⁷ Quoted from "Turgenief's definition of Nihilism, as presented in the Novel, *Fathers and Sons*, excerpted from James Harvey Robinson and Charles Beard (eds.): *Readings in Modern European History* (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1908), vol. 2, pp. 353-354," at www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/Nihil.html. See also Pomper: *loc. cit.* (note 77) pp. 68-75

¹²⁸ He is quoted in Russell: *op. cit.* (note 121), p. 234 for the following: "Come, Satan, you who have been defamed by priests and kings, that I may kiss you and hold you against my breast." On Proudhon's (and other anarchists') advocacy of terrorism see Jensen, Richard Bach: "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 16, no. 1 (2004), pp. 116-153.

¹²⁹ Rapoport, David C.: "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 78, no. 3 (1984), pp. 658-677; Kinsley, David: "Freedom from Death in the Worship of Kali," *Numen*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1975), pp. 183-207; Woerkens, Martine Van: *The Strangled Traveler: Colonial Imaginings and the Thugs of India* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), *passim*; Rushby, Kevin: *Children of Kali: Through India in Search of Bandits, the Thug Cult, and the British Raj* (Walker, 2003).

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¹³¹ On the daimonic see Diamond, Stephen A: *Anger, Madness, and the Daimonic: The Psychological Genesis of Violence, Evil, and Creativity* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 87-110 & *passim*. See also Wiener, Jan: "Under the Volcano: Varieties of Anger and Their Transformation," *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 43, no. 4 (1998), pp. 493-508; Kalsched, Donald E.: "Daimonic Elements in Early Trauma," *ibid.*, vol. 48, no. 2 (2003), pp. 145-169; West, Marcus: "Identity, Narcissism and the Emotional Core," *ibid.*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2004), pp. 521-551.

¹³² On the shadow see Jung, Carl Gustav: "Über die Archetypen des kollektiven Unbewußten," in idem: *Bewußtes und Unbewußtes. Beiträge zur Psychologie* (Frankfurt: Fischer Bücherei, 1957), pp. 11-53, especially pp. 29-32. See also idem: *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* (London: Routledge, 1991), *passim*; Casement, Ann: "Encountering the Shadow in Rites of Passage: a Study in Activations," *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, vol. 48, no. 1 (2003), pp. 29-46; Mizen, Richard: "A Contribution towards an Analytical Theory of Violence," *ibid.*, no. 3, pp. 285-305; Montagnon, Rosemary Gordon: "'Do Be My Enemy for Friendship's Sake' (Blake)," *ibid.*, vol. 50, no. 1 (2005), pp. 27-34; Earl, Mary: "Shadow and Spirituality," *International Journal of Children's Spirituality*, vol. 6, no. 3 (2001), pp. 277-289; Bingaman, Kirk A.: "Christianity and the Shadow Side of Human Experience," *Pastoral Psychology*, vol. 49, no. 3 (2001), pp. 167-179; Zehnder, Sean M. & Sandra L. Calver: "Between the Hero and the Shadow: Developmental Differences in Adolescents' Perceptions and Understanding of Mythic Themes in Films," *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, vol. 28, no. 2 (2004), pp. 122-137; Maruna, Shadd, Amanda Matravers & Anna King: "Disowning Our Shadow: A Psychoanalytical Approach to Understanding Punitive Public Attitudes," *Deviant Behavior*, vol. 25,

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¹⁷⁶ See Crenshaw, Matha: "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in idem (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 77), pp. 473-513, in which the author also highlights the terrorist activities of the *pieds noirs* and the OAS. See also Horne, Alastair: *A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), *passim*.

¹⁷⁷ See Miller: *loc. cit.* (note 164), pp. 32-34. There is a link back to socialism, however, personified in one of the leading members and ideologues, Filippo Buonarrotti, who had been the collaborator (or co-conspirator) as well as biographer of Gracchus Babeuf, founder of the socialist/communist *Conspiration des Égaux* (on whom the present author, incidentally, wrote his MA thesis in History, back in 1979). See Buonarrotti, Filippo: *Le conspiration pour l'égalité dite de Babeuf* (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1957), vols. I-II; and Dommanget, Maurice: *Sur Babeuf et la conjuration des égaux* (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1970).

¹⁷⁸ On the LTTE and IRA see notes 84, 86 and 141 above. On the ETA see Shabad, Goldie & Francisco José Llera Ramo: "Political Violence in a Democratic State: Basque Terrorism in Spain," in Crenshaw (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 77), pp. 410-469; Reinares, Fernando: "Who Are the Terrorists? Analyzing Changes in the

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¹⁷⁹ See Sayigh: *op. cit.* (note 175), pp. 87-92, 217-218, 283-284 & *passim*.

¹⁸⁰ Laqueur, Walter: *The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (London: Phoenix Press, 1999), pp. 105-126; Cameron, Gavin: "Freedom, Hate, and Violence on the American Right," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 23, no. 3 (2000), pp. 197-204; Blazak, Randy: "White Boys to Terrorist Men. Target Recruitment of Nazi Skinheads," *American Behaviouralist Scientist*, vol. 44, no. 6 (2001), pp. 982-1000; Levin, Brian: "The Patriot Movement," in Harvey W. Kushner (ed.): *The Future of Terrorism. Violence in the New Millennium* (London: Sage), pp. 97-131 (on McVeigh pp. 117-122); Smith, Brent L. & Kelly R. Damphouse: "Two Decades of Terror: Characteristics, Trends, and Prospects for the Future of Terrorism in America," *ibid.*, pp. 132-154; Gallaher, Carolyn: "Global Change, Local Angst: Class and the American Patriot Movement," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, vol. 18, no. 6 (2000), pp. 667-691; ida: "On the Fault Line: Race, Class and the US Patriot Movement," *Cultural Studies*, vol. 16, no. 5 (2002), pp. 673-703; O'Brien, Sean P. & Donald P. Haider-Markel: "Fueling the Fire: Social and Political Correlates of Citizen Militia Activity," *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 79, no.2 (1998), pp. 456-465; Durham, Martin: "Preparing for Armageddon: Citizen Militias, the Patriot Movement and the Oklahoma City Bombing," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1996), pp. 65-79; Bessant, Judith: "Political Crime and the Case of Young Neo-Nazis: A Question of Methodology," *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 4 (1995), pp. 94-116; Cotter, John M.: "Sounds of Hate: White Power Rock and Roll and the Neo-Nazi Skinhead Subculture," *ibid.*, vol. 11, no. 2 (1999), pp. 111-140; Kaplan, Jeffrey: "Right Wing Violence in North America," *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1995), pp. 44-95; Wilkinson, Paul: "Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right," *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 4 (1995), pp. 82-93; Whitsel, Brad: "Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains," *ibid.*, pp. 117-129; Mariani, Mack: "The Michigan Militia: Political Engagement or Political Alienation?" *ibid.*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1998), pp. 122-148; Sprinzak, Ehud: "Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization," *ibid.*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1995), pp. 17-33; Weinberg, Leonard: "On Responding to Right-wing Terrorism," *ibid.*, vol. 8, no.1 (1996), pp. 80-92; Kelly, Michaleen & Kate Villaire: "The Michigan Militia and Emerson's Ideal of Self-Reliance," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2002), pp. 282-296; Haider-Markel, Donald P. & Sean P. O'Brien: "Creating a 'Well-Regulated Militia': Policy Responses to Paramilitary Groups in the American States," *Political Research Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 3 (1997), pp. 551-565; Pitcavage, Mark: "Camouflage and Conspiracy: The Militia Movement from Ruby Ridge to Y2K," *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 44, no. 6 (2001), pp. 957-981; Van Dyke, Nella & Soule, Sarah A.: "Structural Social Change and the Mobilizing Effect of Threat: Explaining Levels of Patriot and Militia Organizing in the United States," *Social Problems*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2002), pp. 497-520; Freilich, Joshua D., Jeremy A. Pienik & Gregory J. Howard: "Toward Comparative Studies of the U.S. Militia Movement," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, vol. 42, no. 1 (2001), pp. 163-210.

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¹⁸² It is based on a passage from the Old Testament (*Genesis* 9:21-27) describing Noah cursing one of his sons, Ham and his son Canaan, and the latter's condemnation to be "the lowest of slaves." On the use of the myth in Nazi Germany see Spöttel, Michael: "German Ethnology and Antisemitism: The Hamitic Hypothesis," *Dialectical Anthropology*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1998), pp. 131-150. On its use in Rwanda

see Eltringham, Nigel: *Accounting for Horror. Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 16-22; Gatwa, Tharcisse: "Mission and Belgian Colonial Anthropology in Rwanda. Why the Churches Stood Accused in the 1994 Tragedy? What Next?" *Studies in World Christianity*, vol. 6, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1-20; Bjornlund, Matthias, Eric Markussen, Peter Steenbergh & Rafiki Ubando: "The Christian Churches and the Construction of a Genocidal Mentality in Rwanda," in Carol Rittner, John K. Roth & Wende Whitworth (eds.): *Genocide in Rwanda. Complicity of the Churches* (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2004), pp. 141-167; Taylor, Christopher C.: *Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1999), pp. 55-97; Twagilimana, Aimable: *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide* (Lanham, NJ: University Press of America, 2003); Pottier, Johan: *Re-Imagining Rwanda* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 120-121; Mamdani. Mahmood: *When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), pp. 34-35, 79-89

¹⁸³ The work is Macdonald, Andrew (pseudonym for William Pierce): *The Turner Diaries* (Hillsboro, West Virginia: National Vanguard Books, 1978), available online at www.solargeneral.com/library/TurnerDiaries.pdf. On the significance of the book see, for instance, the FBI's report *Project Megiddo* (1999), which used to be, but is no longer available from the FBI website, but has been published in "Project Megiddo," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 14, no. 1 (2002), pp. 27-52. See also Whitsel, Brad: "The Turner Diaries and Cosmotheism: William Pierce's Theology of Revolution," *Nova Religio*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1998), at www.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/usanazis/cosmotheism.html; and Michael, George: "The Revolutionary Model of Dr William L. Pierce," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2003), pp. 62-80.

¹⁸⁴ Ellis, Stephen & Gerrie ter Haar: "Religion and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2 (1998), pp. 175-201; idem & idem: *Worlds of Power. Religious Thought and Political Practice in Africa* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2004), *passim*.

¹⁸⁵ For a rather unconvincing explanation of the links see Griffiths, Paul J.: "How Epistemology Matters to Theology," *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 79, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1-18.

¹⁸⁶ See, for instance, Armstrong, Karen: *A History of God* (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 297 & *passim*. See also Hallaq, Wael B.: "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1 (1984), pp. 3-41; idem: "On the Origins of the Controversy about the Existence of Mujtahids and the Gate of Ijtihad," *Studia Islamica*, no. 63 (1986), pp. 129-141; Weiss, Bernard: "Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad," *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1978), pp. 199-212; Ali-Karamali, Shaista P. & Fiona Dunne: "The Ijtihad Controversy," *Arab Law Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 3 (1994), pp. 238-257; Kamali, Mohammad Hashim: "Methodological Issues in Islamic Jurisprudence," *ibid.*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1996), pp. 3-33. See also the chapter on "Islamic Epistemology" in Bennett, Clinton: *Muslims and Modernity. An Introduction to the Issues and Debates* (London: Continuum, 2005), pp. 107-128.

¹⁸⁷ The entry on "Ethics of Reciprocity" in *Wikipedia* (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethic_of_reciprocity) thus quotes almost identical statements in scriptures from ancient Egypt and classical Greece, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Jainism, Judaism, Christianity and the Bahai Faith.

¹⁸⁸ See, for instance, Douglas, Mary: "Land Animals, Pure and Impure," (from idem: *Leviticus as Literature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), excerpted in Michael Lambek (ed.): *A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 194-209.

¹⁸⁹ Dhand, Arti: "The Dharma of Ethics, the Ethics of Dharma: Quizzing the Ideals of Hinduism," *Journal of Religious Ethics*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2002), pp. 347-372; Sharma, Arvind: "On the Distinction between Karma and Rebirth in Hinduism," *Asian Philosophy*, vol. 6, no. 1 (1996), pp. 29-35; Kaufman, Whitley R. P.: "Karma, Rebirth, and the Problem of Evil," *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 55, no. 1 (2005), pp. 15-32; Brahmaprana, Pravrajika: "Vedanta: Death and the Art of Dying," *Cross Currents*, vol. 51, no. 3 (2001), pp. 337-346. A partial analogy is the thesis of "eternal repetition," promulgated by Nietzsche, Friedrich: *Also sprach Zarathustra. Ein Buch für alle und keinen* (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1969), pp. 244-245 (III Part: "Der Genesende"); and pp. 253-261 (III Part: "Die sieben Siegel, Oder: das Ja- und Amen-Lied."

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¹⁹² On Rabbi Kook see Armstrong, Karen: *The Battle for God. Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), pp. 260-266, 283-286, 344-346; Kaplan, Eran: “A Rebel with a Cause: Hillel Kook, Begin and Jabotinsky’s Ideological Legacy,” *Israel Studies*, vol. 10, no. 3 (2005), pp. 87-103. On Gush Emunim see Newman, David: “From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut: The Impact of *Gush Emunim* and the Settlement Movement on Israeli Politics and Society,” *ibid.*, pp. 192-224; Pedahzur, Ami & Arie Perlinger: “The Causes of Vigilante Political Violence: The Case of Jewish Settlers,” *Civil Wars*, vol. 6, no. 3 (2003), pp. 9-30; and, for an interesting comparison with Islamic fundamentalism, Kiener, Ronald C.: “Gushist and Qutbian Approaches to Government: A Comparative Analysis of Religious Assassination,” *Numen*, vol. 44, no. 3 (1997), pp. 229-241. See also Sprinzak, Ehud: “Extremism and Violence in Israel: The Crisis of Messianic Politics,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 555 (1998), pp. 114-126; idem: “The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right,” *Comparative Politics*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1989), pp. 171-192; idem: “From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground,” in Rapoport (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 174), pp. 194-216; Lustick, Ian S.: “Israel’s Dangerous Fundamentalists,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 68 (1987), pp. 118-139; Waxman, Chaim I.: “Messianism, Zionism, and the State of Israel,” *Modern Judaism*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1987), pp. 175-192; Nazzal, Nafez Abdullah: “The Zionist Occupation of Western Galilee, 1948,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1974), pp. 58-76; Brenner, Lenni: “Zionist-Revisionism: The Years of Fascism and Terror,” *ibid.*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1983), pp. 66-92; Friedman, Robert I.: “Inside the Jewish Terrorist Underground,” *ibid.*, vol. 15, no. 2 (1986), pp. 190-201; Krystall, Nathan: “The De-Arabization of West Jerusalem 1947-50,” *ibid.*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1998), pp. 5-22; Paine, Robert: “Behind the Hebron Massacre, 1994,” *Anthropology Today*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1995), pp. 8-15.

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²⁰⁸ On the libido see Freud, Sigmund: *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2004). On the combination with Thanatos see idem: *On Sexuality: Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991); idem: *On Metapsychology – The Theory of Psychoanalysis: "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," "Ego and the Id" and Other Works* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991)

²⁰⁹ Eagleton: *op. cit.* (note 47), pp. 17-18.

²¹⁰ See note 132 above.

²¹¹ Fromm, Erich: *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (New York: Pimlico, 1997). See also idem: *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1994); idem: *The Fear of Freedom* (London: Routledge, 2001); idem: *Man for Himself: An Enquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* (London: Routledge, 2003). For a comparison of his own with Marx's concept of alienation see idem: *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Continuum, 2004). On Fromm's concept of alienation see also Grey, Alan: "Society as Destiny: Fromm's Concept of Social Character," *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* vol. 28, no. 2 (1992), pp. 344-363; Silva-García, Jorge: "Erich Fromm's Humanism and the Stranger," *Yearbook of the International Erich Fromm Society*, vol. 5: *Vom Umgang mit dem Fremden-Dealing with the Alien* (Münster: LIT-Verlag 1994), pp. 31-44; Biancoli, Romano: "Psychoanalyst's Values and Countertransference," *International Forum of Psychoanalysis*, vol. 11, no. 1 (2002), pp. 10-1887; idem: "The Dream between 'Here-and-Now' and 'There-and-Then,'" *ibid.*, vol. 12, no. 4 (2003), pp. 234-244; Wilde, Lawrence: "A 'Radical Humanist' Approach to the Concept of Solidarity," *Political Studies*, vol. 52, no. 1 (2004), pp. 162-178; Brookfield Stephen: "Overcoming Alienation as the Practice of Adult Education: The Contribution of Erich Fromm to a Critical Theory of Adult Learning and Education," *Adult Education Quarterly*, vol. 52, no. 2 (2002), pp. 96-111; Schabracq, Marc & Cary Cooper: "To Be Me or Not to Be Me: About Alienation," *Counselling Psychology Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2003), pp. 53-79.

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²¹³ See Pape, Robert: *Dying to Win. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 2006), pp. 178-183 and 193-195. For additional data see also Lester, David & Bijou Yang: "Regional and Time-Series Studies of Suicide in Nations of the World," *Archives of Suicide Research*, vol. 9, no. 2 (2005), pp. 123-133.

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²¹⁹ See Maltsberger, John T.: "Ecstatic Suicide," *Archives of Suicide Research*, vol. 3 (1997), pp. 283-301; Maris, Ronald W.: "Social Suicide," *Suicide and Life-Threatening Behaviour*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1997), pp. 41-50; Riemer, Jeffrey W.: "Durkheim's 'Heroic Suicide' in Military Combat," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 25, no. 1 (1998), pp. 103-121.

²²⁰ On Judaism see Shepkaru, Shmuel: "From After Death to Afterlife," *AJS Review*, vol. 24, no. 1 (1999), pp. 1-44. On Catholicism's attitude see Hassatt, Maurice M.: "Martyr," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, at www.newadvent.org/cathen/09736b.htm. See also Lester, David: "Suicide and Islam," *Archives of Suicide Research*, vol. 10, no. 1 (2006), pp. 77-98; Abdel-Khalek, Ahmed: "Neither Altruistic Suicide, nor Terrorism, but Martyrdom: a Muslim Perspective," *ibid.*, vol. 8, no. 1 (2004), pp. 99-114.

²²¹ See *The Lost Gospel of Judas*, p. 56, at www.nationalgeographic.com/lostgospel/document.html.

²²² Esposito: *op. cit.* (note 195), p. 69. See also Dorraj, Manochehr: "Symbolic and Utilitarian Political Value of a Tradition: Martyrdom in the Iranian Political Culture," *The Review of Politics*, vol. 59, no. 3 (1997), pp. 489-521; Swenson, Jill Diane: "Martyrdom: Mytho-Cathexis and the Mobilization of the Masses in the Iranian Revolution," *Ethos*, vol. 13, no. 2 (1985), pp. 121-149.

²²³ Pape: *op. cit.* (note 213), p. 42. For a critique see Hafez, Mohammed M.: "Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 29, no. 2 (2006), pp. 165-185; Moghadam, Assaf: "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of *Dying to Win*," *ibid.* no. 8 (2006), pp. 707-729.

²²⁴ For examples see Stern: *op. cit.* (note 102), pp. 172-187; idem: "Larry Wayne Harris (1998)," in Tucker (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 181), pp. 227-246; Simon, Jeffrey D.: "The Alphabet Bomber (1974)," *ibid.*, pp. 71-94; Hoffman: *op. cit.* (note 71), pp. 194-195 (on the "Unabomber," on whom also the following); Amador, Xavier F. & Paul-Odouard Reshmi: "Defending the Unabomber: Anosognosia in Schizophrenia," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, vol. 71, no. 4 (2000), pp. 363-371; Zuk, Gerald H. & Carmen Veiga Zuk: "Negation Theory as a Cause of Delusion: The Case of the Unabomber," *Contemporary Family Therapy: An International Journal*, vol. 22, no. 3 (2000), pp. 329-337.

²²⁵ "Council Decision of 21 December 2005 implementing Article 2(3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and repealing Decision 2005/848/EC," *EU Documents*, no. 2005/930/EC.

²²⁶ United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism: *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (revised version, april 2006), pp. 183-184 (description of organisations on pp. 184-228).

²²⁷ From *ibid.*, pp. 229-230 (description of organisations on pp. 230-262). The distinction between these groups and those designated terrorist groups is explained as follows: "The following groups of concern have not been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under 8 USC Section 1189, although many have been designated under other U.S. Government counterterrorism authorities."

²²⁸ Taken from the list of "entities belonging to or associated with the Al-Qaida organisation," in "The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to or Associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida Organisation as Established and Maintained by the 1267 Committee," at www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm, accessed 13 October 2006. Financial and similar entites have been omitted.

²²⁹ Referred to by the 1267 Committee as *Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad* (JTJ).

- ²³⁰ On the latter see Juergensmeyer: *op. cit.* (note 102), *passim*.
- ²³¹ See, for instance, Gray: *op. cit.* (note 43), pp. 294-296; Prins: *op. cit.* (note 43), pp. 63-94; Posen: *loc. cit.* (note 43), pp. 39-55. For a rather unpersuasive argument that terrorism does not qualify as war because of the disregard of the laws of war see Schmid, Alex P.: "Frameworks for Conceptualising Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 16, no. 2 (2004), pp. 197-221.
- ²³² Clausewitz, Carl Von: *Vom Kriege* (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein Verlag, 1980), p. 34 (Book I, chapter 1.24): "Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln. So sehen wir also, daß der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführung desselben mit anderen Mitteln." On the political goal see *ibid.* p. 25 (Book I, Chapter 1.11): "So wird der politische Zweck als das ursprüngliche Motiv des Krieges das Maß sein, sowohl für das Ziel, welches durch den kriegerischen Akt erreicht werden muß, als für die Anstrengungen, die erforderlich sind."
- ²³³ See, for instance, Enders & Sandler: *op. cit.* (note 46), pp. 112-116 & *passim*.
- ²³⁴ On the Soviet terminology see Lider, Julian: "Die sowjetische Militärwissenschaft. Beschreibung und kritische Bestandaufnahme," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, vol. 21, no. 2 (1983), pp. 143-153.
- ²³⁵ See, for instance Weldes, Jutta: "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 275-318; Chafetz, Glenn, Michael Spirtas & Benjamin Frankel (eds.): *Origins of National Interests* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), *passim*.
- ²³⁶ On grand strategy see Hart, Basil Liddell: *Strategy. The Indirect Approach*, 2nd edition (New York: Signet Books, 1974), pp. 320-321. The term is largely synonymous with the "total strategy," in Beaufre, André: *Introduction à la Stratégie* (Paris: Librairie Armand Collin, 1963), pp. 24-25. See also Luttwak, Edward N.: *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1976); *idem: The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). The term has experienced a renaissance after the Cold War. See, for instance, Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.): *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Rosecrance, Richard & Arthur Stein (eds.): *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Platias, Athanassios G. & Constantinos Koliopoulos: "Grand Strategies Clashing: Athenian and Spartan Strategies in Thucydides' 'History of the Peloponnesian War'," *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 21, no. 5 (2002), pp. 377-399; Lantis, Jeffrey S.: "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *International Studies Review*, vol. 4, no. 3 (2002), pp. 87-113; Howard, Michael: "Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century," *Defence Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2001), pp. 1-10; Freedman, Lawrence: "Grand Strategy in the Twenty-First Century," *ibid.*, pp. 11-20; Chipman, John: "The Future of Strategic Studies: Beyond Even Grand Strategy," *Round Table*, vol. 322, no. 1 (1992), pp. 135-154.
- ²³⁷ On grand strategies of counter-terrorism see Arreguin-Toft, Ivan: "Tunnel at the End of the Light: A Critique of US Counter-terrorist Grand Strategy," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 3 (2002), pp. 549-563; Drezner, Daniel W.: "Values, Interests, and American Grand Strategy," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 29 Issue 3 (2005), pp. 429-432; Miller, Steven E.: "Terrifying Thoughts: Power, Order, and Terror After 9/11," *Global Governance*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2005), pp. 247-271; Gaddis, John Lewis: "Grand Strategy in the Second Term," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 1 (2005), pp. 2-15; Ikenberry, G. John: "America's Imperial Ambition – the Lures of Preemption," *ibid.*, vol. 81, no. 5 (2002), pp. 44-60; Boggs, Carl: "US Grand Strategy and its Contradictions," *New Political Science*, vol. 26, no. 3 (2004), pp. 271-291; Haley, P. Edward: "A Defensive Grand Strategy for the United States," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2004), pp. 461-48; Schwenninger, Sherle R.: "Revamping American Grand Strategy," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 20, no. 3 (2003), pp. 25-44; Berger, Thomas U.: "Germany, Japan and the War on Terror," *Society*, vol. 39, no. 5 (2002), pp. 22-28; Trager, Robert F. & P. Dessislava Zagorcheva: "Deterring Terrorism. It Can Be Done," *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 3 (2005), pp. 87-123; Cronin, Audrey Kurth: "How Al Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *ibid.*, vol. 31, no. 1 (2006), pp. 7-48; Byman, Daniel L.: "Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism," *ibid.*, no. 2 (2006), 79-115.
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²⁴⁰ Jomini, Antoine de: "The Art of War," quoted in Michael I. Handel: *Masters of War. Classical Strategic Thought*. 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 37-38.

²⁴¹ Clausewitz: *op. cit.* (note 232), p. 84 (Book 2, Chapter 1): "Die Lehre vom Gebrauch der Streitkräfte im Gefecht."

²⁴² Jomini, Antoine-Henri de: *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Magimel., 1811), vol. 4, pp. 275-286; Fuller, J.F.C.: *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchinson, 1926); cf. Reid, Brian Holden: *Studies in British Military Thought. Debates with Fuller and Liddell Hart* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). See also Napoleon's "Maxims of War," in T.R. Phillips (ed.): *Roots of Strategy. The 5 Greatest Military Classics of All Time* (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 1985), pp. 401-441. For a comparison of the various versions see Bellamy, Christopher: *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 13-15.

²⁴³ Dupuy, Trevor N.: *Understanding Defeat. How to Recover from Loss in Battle to Gain Victory in War* (New York: Paragon, 1990), pp. 250-253. For an attempted reformulation see Leonhard, Robert R.: *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2000).

²⁴⁴ There is, at least, one article which comes close to doing this, namely Bunker, Robert J. & Matt Begert: "Operational Combat Analysis of the Al Qaeda Network," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, vol. 11, no. 2-3 (2002), pp. 316-339.

²⁴⁵ Campbell, Lisa J.: "Applying Order-of-Battle to Al Qaeda Operations," *ibid.*, pp. 299-315.

²⁴⁶ Similar attempts include Merari: *loc. cit.* (note 43); Harmon: *loc. cit.* (note 43); Kydd, Andrew H. & Barbara F. Walter: "Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 1 (2006), pp. 49-80. See also Wheeler: *loc. cit.* (note 43).

²⁴⁷ Juergensmeyer: *op. cit.* (note 102), *passim*.

²⁴⁸ For a Muslim view of the crusades see Maalouf, Amin: *Les croisades vues par les Arabes. La barbarie franque en Terre sainte* (Paris: Éditions j'ai lu, 2000), *passim*. See also Partner, Peter: *God of Battles. Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Armstrong, Karen: *Holy War. The Crusades and their Impact on the Modern World* (London: Macmillan, 1991); Wheatcroft, Andrew: *Infidels. A History of the Conflict between Christendom and Islam*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 155-204.

²⁴⁹ Jervis: *op. cit.* (note 49), pp. 35-48; Larson, Deborah Welch: *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 34-42.

²⁵⁰ On the security dilemma see Herz, John M.: *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), *passim*; idem: "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Jervis: *op. cit.* (note 49), pp. 58-93; idem: "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan, Barry: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 294-327; Collins, Alan: *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War* (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997); Glaser, Charles L.: "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *World Politics*, vol. 50, no. 1 (1997), pp. 171-201.

²⁵¹ Pape: *op. cit.* (note 213), *passim*.

²⁵² A partial exception is Karsh, Efraim: "Arafat's Grand Strategy," *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2004), pp. 1-9.

²⁵³ See Weinberg, Leonard: "Turning to Terror: The Conditions under which Political Parties Turn to Terrorist Activities," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 23, no. 4 (1991), pp. 423-438.

²⁵⁴ On the concept see Lijphart, Arend: *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1977), *passim*. For a comparison of various forms of autonomy see Lapidoth, Ruth: *Autonomy. Flexible Solutions to Intrastate Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

²⁵⁵ See, for instance, Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau & David Brannan: *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), *passim*.

²⁵⁶ See Harmon: *loc. cit.* (note 43).

²⁵⁷ A classic in this respect is Marx & Engels: *op. cit.* (note 153), pp. 46-50. See also Lichtheim, George: "The Concept of Ideology," *History and Theory*, vol. 4, no. 2 (1965), pp. 164-195; Sloterdijk, Peter, Michael Eldred & Leslie A. Adelson: "Cynicism: The Twilight of False Consciousness," *New German Critique*, no. 33 (1984), pp. 190-206; Wolin, Richard: "Critical Theory and the Dialectic of Rationalism," *ibid.*, no. 41 (1987), pp. 23-52; Israel, Joachim: "Epistemology and Sociology of Knowledge: An Hegelian Undertaking," *Sociological Perspectives*, vol. 33, no. 1 (1990), pp. 111-128; Rosenberg, Morris: "Perceptual Obstacles to Class Consciousness," *Social Forces*, vol. 32, no. 1 (1953), pp. 22-27; Rich, Harvey: "Marxism as Dogma, Ideology, and Theory in Contemporary Political Sociology," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 9, no. 4 (1976), pp. 654-667. See also Marcuse, Herbert: "The Relevance of Reality," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, vol. 42 (1968-1969), pp. 39-50; Munshi, Surendra: "Marcuse Philosophy about the Working Class in Advanced Capitalism," *Social Scientist*, vol. 5, no. 9 (1977), pp. 21-32; Wolff, Robert Paul: "Marcuse's Theory of Toleration," *Polity*, vol. 6, no. 4 (1974), pp. 469-479.

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²⁵⁹ On the Intifada see McDowall, David: *Palestine and Israel. The Uprising and Beyond* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989); Lockman, Zachary & Jopel Beinim (eds.): *Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990); Hunter, F. Robert: *The Palestinian Uprising. A War by other Means* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); Tessler, Mark: *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 677-752; Smith, Charles D.: *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 291-308; Sayigh: *op. cit.* (note 175), pp. 607-638; Robinson, Glenn E.: *Building a Palestinian State. The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 132-173.

²⁶⁰ On *Takfir* and Qutb's equivocation about this (using the slightly less conclusive term *jahiliyya*) see Kepel: *op. cit.* (note 113), pp. 31-32; Habeck: *op. cit.* (note 195), pp. 64-68

²⁶¹ See Rapoport, David C.: "Messianic Sanctions for Terror," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1988), pp.195-213. See also Wojcik, Daniel: "Embracing Doomsday: Faith, Fatalism, and Apocalyptic Beliefs in the Nuclear Age," *Western Folklore*, vol. 55, no. 4 (1996), pp. 297-330; Barkun, Michael: "Millenarianism in the Modern World," *Theory and Society*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1974), pp. 117-146. On millenarian cults in the various major religions see Sharot, Stephen: "Jewish Millenarianism: A Comparison of Medieval Communities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 22, no. 3 (1980), pp. 394-415; Cross, George: "Millenarianism in Christian History," *The Biblical World*, vol. 46, no. 1 (1915), pp. 3-8; Brown, Ira V.: "Watchers for the Second Coming: The Millenarian Tradition in America," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, vol. 39, no. 3 (1952), pp. 441-458; Porter, J. M.: "Luther and Political Millenarianism: The Case of the Peasants' War," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 42, no. 3 (1981), pp. 389-406; Ownby, David: "Chinese Millenarian Traditions: The Formative Age," *The American Historical Review*, vol. 104, no. 5 (1999), pp. 1513-1530; Roscoe, Paul B.: "The Far Side of Huron: The Management of Melanesian Millenarian Movements," *American Ethnologist*, vol. 15, no. 3 (1988), pp. 515-529; Stern, Theodore: "Ariya and the Golden Book: A Millenarian Buddhist Sect Among the Karen," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1968), pp. 297-328; McLeod, W. H.: "Sikh Fundamentalism," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 118, no. 1 (1998), pp. 15-27.

²⁶² On the anti-abortion terrorists see Stern: *op. cit.* (note 102), pp. 147-171. See also note 162 above.

²⁶³ On the Spanish guerilla war against Napoleon see Gates, David: *The Spanish Ulcer. A History of the Peninsular War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986); Jones, Archer: *The Art of War in the Western World* (London: Harrap, 1988), pp. 358-366. On Vietnam see Gibson, James William: *The Perfect War. The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did* (New York: Vintage Books, 1988).

²⁶⁴ Lawrence, Thomas Edward: *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph* (London: Cape, 1935); Mao Tse-Tung: "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign

Languages Press, 1975), vol. 1, pp. 179-254; idem: "On Protracted War," *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 113-194; idem: "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan," *ibid.*, pp. 79-112; idem: "Problems of War and Strategy," *ibid.* pp. 219-235; Guevarra, Ernesto Che "La guerre de guerrilla: une methode," in idem: *Oeuvres I: Textes Militaires* (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1976), pp. 147-165; Giap, Vo Nguyen: *The Military Art of People's War. Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970). See also Walter Laqueur (ed.): *The Guerilla Reader. A Historical Anthology* (London: Wildwood, 1978); and Beaufre, André *La guerre révolutionnaire. Les nouvelles formes de la guerre* (Paris: Fayard, 1972).

²⁶⁵ See extracts from Marighella, Carlos: "Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla" in Laqueur (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 75), pp. 370-376; and Guillen, Abraham: "Urban Guerilla Strategy," *ibid.*, pp. 377-383; Price, H. Edward, Jr.: "The Strategy and Tactics of Revolutionary Terrorism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1977), pp. 52-66. For an overview of the literature see also Russell, Charles A., James A. Miller & Robert E. Hildner: "The Urban Guerrilla in Latin America: A Select Bibliography," *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 9, no. 1 (1974), pp. 37-79.

²⁶⁶ Inspired by, but different from the table in Merari: *loc. cit.* (note 43), p. 227.

²⁶⁷ The formulation is "Many people think it impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to the water, the latter to the fish that inhabits it." See Mao Zedong: "On Guerilla Warfare" (1937), which is not included in the *Selected Works* (*op. cit.*, note 264), but available online at www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch06.htm.

²⁶⁸ The term refers to the strategy of Quintus Fabius Maximus, nicknamed "Cunctator" ("The Hesitant") in the war against Hannibal. See Polybius: *Histories* (online at www.perseus.tufts.edu/) Book III, 86.9-10, 87.1-2; Jones: *op. cit.* (note 263), pp. 65-70; Strauss, Barry S. & Josiah Ober: *The Anatomy of Error. Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 146-161; Clausen, Wendell: "The Scorched Earth Policy, Ancient and Modern," *The Classical Journal*, vol. 40, no. 5 (1945), pp. 298-299.

²⁶⁹ On "swarming" see Ronfeldt, David & John Arquilla: "What Next for Networks and Netwars?" in John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt (eds.): *Networks and Netwars. The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 311-361; Arquilla, John & David Ronfeldt: "Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Conflict," in idem & idem (eds.): *In Athena's Camp. Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1997), pp. 439-501; idem & idem: *Swarming and the Future of Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), *passim*; idem, idem & Michele Zanini: "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in Lesser, Ian O., Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, Brian Michael Jenkins: *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), pp. 39-84.

²⁷⁰ There are a few partial and temporary exceptions such as Hizbollah (in southern Lebanon), FARC (in Bolivia) and Al Qaeda, both during the Taliban rule and (more tenuously) in parts of the border region with Pakistan until the present day. Another possible exception is that of the LTTE, apparently building state-like control over "liberated areas." See Stokke, Kristian: "Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 6 (2006), pp. 1021-1040.

²⁷¹ For a, not totally convincing, analysis along these lines, focusing on the economic aspects of the calculus, see Blomberg, S. Brock, Gregory D. Hess & Akila Weerapana: "Economic Conditions and Terrorism," *European Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 20, no. 2 (2004), pp. 463-478. For an analysis of Al Qaeda's persistent failures in strategic terms see Abrahms, Max: "Al Qaeda's Scorecard: A Progress Report on Al Qaeda's Objectives," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 29, no. 5 (2006), pp. 509-529; idem: "Why terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 2 (2006), pp. 42-78.

²⁷² For an analytical case study of the strategic choices of Hamas see Dolnik & Bhattacharjee: *loc. cit.* (note 86); Karmon, Ely: "Hamas' Terrorism Strategy: Operational Limitations and Political Constraints," *MERIA Journal*, vol. 4, no. 1 (March 2000), at <http://meria.idc.il/journal/2000/issue1/jv4n1a7.html>.

²⁷³ According to Geneva Convention III: "Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" (1949) guerillas are, for instance, entitled to treatment as prisoners of war, provided that they are (1) commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (3) carry their arms openly and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, the latter as

specified in article 3 of Convention I: "For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field" (1949). Protocol I "Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts" (1977) relaxed the requirements somewhat by stipulating that 2 and 3 only apply "while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack." (art. 44, sec. 3). All the texts are available at www.genevaconventions.org/. See also Roling, Bert V. A.: "The Legal Status of Rebels and Rebellion," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 13, no. 2 (1976), pp. 149-163; Durr, Olivier: "Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Problems of Applicability," *ibid.*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1987), pp. 263-273; Forsythe, David P.: "Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts," *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 72, no. 2 (1978), pp. 272-295; O'Brien, William V.: "The Rule of Law in Small Wars," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 541 (1995), pp. 36-46.

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²⁸⁵ See note 200 above.

²⁸⁶ For an almost exhaustive account of known attempts to use as well as actual use of WMD by terrorists see Tucker (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 181), *passim*. On "mass casualties attacks" by other means see Quillen, Chris: "A Historical Analysis of Mass Casualty Bombers," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 25, no. 5 (2002), pp. 279-292; idem: "Mass Casualty Bombings Chronology," *ibid.*, pp. 293-302.

²⁸⁷ Kamp, Karl-Heinz: "Nuclear Terrorism Is Not the Core Problem," *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 168-170; Spinzak, Ehud: "The Great Superterrorism Scare," *Foreign Policy*, vol. 112 (1998), pp. 110-124; Claridge, David: "Exploding the Myths of Superterrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 11, no. 4 (1999), pp. 133-148. Regardless of the actual risks, however, the fear seems to be real and the media attention considerable. A Google search conducted on the 25th of October 2006 thus gave no less than 791,000 hits for "nuclear terrorism."

²⁸⁸ Examples of inflated risk assessment (based on a confusion of nuclear with radiological weapons) is Frost, Robin: "Nuclear Terrorism Post-9/11: Assessing the Risks," *Global Society*, vol. 18, no. 4 (2004), pp. 397-422.

²⁸⁹ Thränert, Oliver: "Bio-Terrorismus: Gefahren und Antworten," *Europäische Sicherheit*, vol. 48, no. 6 (June 1999), pp. 10-12; Tucker, Jonathan B.: "Bioterrorism: Threats and Responses," in Joshua Lederberg (ed.): *Biological Weapons. Limiting the Threat* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 283-320.

²⁹⁰ The table is based on figures from Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics: *Labour Force Survey (October-December 2004) Round* (24 January 2005), at www.pcbs.org/press_r/labour_q4e.pdf. The organisation Islamic Relief in its "Palestine Appeal" mentions the figure of seventy percent (www.islamic-relief.com/submenu/Appeal/palestine.htm).

²⁹¹ See Jewish Virtual Library: "Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993-29 January 2007)," at www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/victims.html, accessed on 8 February 2007.

²⁹² The IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) have a more optimistic assessment, claiming to have thwarted 431 (suicide and other) terrorist attacks from September 2000 to November 2004, compared to 135 successful attacks. See IDF: "Successful vs. Unsuccessful (Thwarted) Terrorist Attacks," at www1.idf.il/SIP_STORAGE/DOVER/files/6/31646.doc. See also Gunawardena, Arjuna: "Suicide Terrorism," in Rohan Gunaratna (ed.): *Combating Terrorism* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), pp. 124-150. On the fence/wall see Brom, Shlomo & Yiftah S. Shapir: "Erecting a Separation Fence," *Tel Aviv Notes*, no. 42 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic

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²⁹³ See Seitz, Charmaine: "A New Kind of Killing," *Middle East Reports Online* (Washington, DC: Middle East Research and Information Project, MERIP, 30 March 2004), at www.merip.org/mero/mero033004.html; Chris Toensing and Ian Urbina: "Israel, the US and 'Targeted Killings,'" *ibid.*, 17 February 2003, at www.merip.org/mero/mero021703.html. See also Hroub: *loc. cit.* (note 86).

²⁹⁴ On the background of the *tanzim* see, inter alia, Usher, Graham: "Fatah's Tanzim: Origins and Politics," *Middle East Report*, no. 217 (Washington, DC: MERIP, Winter 2000), at www.merip.org/mer/mer217/217_usher.html.

²⁹⁵ See the list of the equipment of *Hizbullah*, including artillery rockets, armoured personnel carriers, etc., in Feldman, Shai & Yiftah Shapir (eds.): *The Middle East Military Balance 2002-2001* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 212. On the threat to Israel see *ibid.*, pp. 43-46. For an update see Kurtz, Anat: "Hizbullah at the Crossroads," *Strategic Assessment*, vol. 30, no. 1 (June 2000) at www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sal/v3n1p5.html; Zisser, Eyal: "Hizbullah Attacks: Motives and Implications," *Tel Aviv Notes*, no. 30 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, January 2002). On the holistic strategy of *Hizbullah* see Harb, Mona & Reinoud Leenders: "Know Thy Anemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 26, no. 1 (2005), pp. 173-197; ICG: *op. cit.* 2003 (note 86). On its use of the media see Dallal, Jenine Abboushi: "Hizbullah's Virtual Civil Society," *Television and New Media*, vol. 2, no. 4 (2001), pp. 367-372. For a background see Hamzeh, A. Nizar: "Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 14, no. 2 (1993), pp. 321-337.

²⁹⁶ Bloom, Mia: "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 119, no. 1 (2004), pp. 61-89. See also Hroub: *loc. cit.* (note 86).

²⁹⁷ On the first Intifada see note 259 above.

²⁹⁸ On the traumas and their effects see Barber, Brian K.: "Political Violence, Social Integration, and Youth Functioning: Palestinian Youth from the Intifada," *Journal of Community Psychology*, vol. 29, no. 3 (2001), pp. 259-280.

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³⁰⁴ Tilly, Charles: "Models and Realities of Popular Collective Action," *Social Research*, vol. 52, no. 4 (1985), pp. 717-747, especially pp. 735-737. For an argument to the effect that (new) social movements are, by their very nature, anti-institutional, see Traugott, Mark: "Reconceiving Social Movements," *Social Problems*, vol. 26, no. 1 (1978), pp. 38-49. See also D'Anieri, Paul, Claire Ernst & Elizabeth Kier: "New Social Movements In Historical Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 22, no. 4 (1990), pp. 445-458.

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2000). See also Roger Finke & idem: "Religious Choice and Competition," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 63, no. 5 (1998), pp. 761-766; idem: "Catholic Contexts: Competition, Commitment and Innovation," *Review of Religious Research*, vol. 39, no. 3 (1998), pp. 197-208; idem & Roger Finke: "Catholic Religious Vocations: Decline and Revival," *ibid.*, vol. 42, no. 2 (2000), pp. 125-145; idem: "Micro-Foundations of Religion: A Revised Theory," *Sociological Theory*, vol. 17, no. 3 (1999), pp. 264-289. See also Berger, Peter L.: *The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990); Roof, Wade Clark: *Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 77-110 & *passim*; Sherkat, Darren E. & John Wilson: "Preferences, Constraints, and Choices in Religious Markets: An Examination of Religious Switching and Apostasy," *Social Forces*, vol. 73, no. 3 (1995), pp. 993-1026

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³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34; Parachini, John: "Aum Shinrikyo," in Jackson & al.: *op. cit.*, vol. 2 (note 162), pp. 11-35.

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pp. 113-173. The work was intended as a critique of Descartes's method. On the latter see idem: *op. cit.* (note 59), *passim*; and idem: *Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la verité dans les sciences*, available online at perso.orange.fr/minerva/DM/Page_accueil_DM.htm.

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⁴⁵⁷ Data on terrorism from the *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System* (note 407).

⁴⁵⁸ See Prunier: *loc. cit.* (note 88).

⁴⁵⁹ Data on terrorism from the *Worldwide Incidents Tracking System* (note 407).

⁴⁶⁰ See Downie, N.M. & R.W. Heath: *Basic Statistical Methods*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 318, 86-102 and 230-234.

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