“The Current Role of International Military Force in Peace Operations”

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**Forward**

The purpose of this review paper is to examine current applications of international military force in peace operations. The paper is, in essence, an attempt to discuss the broader policy challenges of peace operations, based on a review of literature. As such, it overviews an array of academic studies, ‘grey literature’\(^1\), and press reports on the subject and considers their application in concrete conflict situations and unfolding peace processes. The aim is to highlight some of the problematic aspects of the use of international military force so as to be able to better understand the challenges presently faced by the military in peace support operations. Although only an introductory study, the paper will include a preliminary set of policy recommendations to reflect the emerging consensus and indicate areas in which there is a need for further analytical work.

However before addressing the core question, an introduction which defines key concepts, grounds the question in the wider field of changes to the concept security and explains the chosen analytical framework, may prove useful.

**Introduction**

The terminology surrounding military interventions seeking to establish security, whether defined as peacekeeping, peace support operations or peace-enforcement is grounded in a historical context based on our evolving understanding of conflict – both interstate and increasingly, intrastate - and the potential role that international military force may play therein.\(^2\) This report, written at a time in which military interventions in internal conflicts are a persistent political theme - in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Iraq, to note but a few - both contributes to the discussion and is influenced by it. As such, a few words on the changing nature of security might be useful in situating the discussion of international military intervention.\(^3\)

In the Cold War environment of existential threat, discussions on the definition of security were circumscribed to military threats emanating from outside state borders and aimed at the ‘core values’ of the state. Security implied ‘state security’; threat denoted ‘military force’; and the response to the state of international affairs – anarchy – was formulated through ‘the security dilemma’ (Walt, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1995). Most important among these assertions was the centrality of the state as the referent object of security (Buzan, 1991:23). The presentation of these assumptions as ‘facts’ about the nature of the international system presented a particular vision of the world and served to limit discussions of their essentially political nature.

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\(^1\) Grey literature is the term often used to describe semi or not formally published material, for example internal reports.

\(^2\) For a thorough presentation of the historical evolution of intervention including the ethical/normative aspects, see MacFarlane, 2002.

\(^3\) The following two paragraphs on the changing nature of security are based on the introductory chapter to my doctoral dissertation (unpublished) “The Turkish Military Elite: Paths to Descuritisation?”
The end of the Cold War prompted debates about the meaning of security, thereby ‘unravelling’ the concept (Buzan 1991:14, Krause and Williams, 1996: 229). The study of security flourished as political scientists re-examined the concept, revealing its deeply political nature. Appeals were made for a broader definition of security. What does security involve? What does it mean to be secure? From what one is to be secured? (Walker, 1997). Economic, cultural, social and ecological challenges claimed their place in the definition of security (Ibid: 65). The changing nature of threat required a shift in thinking on security. The declining power of the state and definitions of security based solely on external geopolitical threats were palpably inadequate in addressing issues of a trans-national character arising in international relations after the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the state’s diminished ability to provide security from threats of a global nature – ranging from climate change to terrorism - cast doubt upon its sovereignty, given that providing for its own security is an essential definition of state sovereignty. This opened up the debate on the state as the key provider of security.

Further challenging the role of the state was the rise of the human security concept in the early 1990s, particularly following the publication of the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994. The concept of human security refutes the idea of the state as the referent object of security rather than the individual (Suhrke, 1999). Human security holds that a people-centered view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. The replacement of the supremacy of state sovereignty by the concept of ‘human security’, while contested, has led the UN to increasingly endorse the principle of a ‘responsibility to protect’ (Weiss, 2004). This has had an effect on the understanding of peacekeeping operations. Traditional peacekeeping operations relied on the ‘holy trinity of consent, impartiality and the minimum use of force’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2004:3). To a great extent, this was a result of the Cold War understanding of conflict as between states rather than within states and the aforementioned deference to state sovereignty. This was reflected in the British military doctrine of the 1990s, “the Dobbie doctrine”, which outlined a sharp division between peacekeeping and peace enforcement arguing that they required radically different conceptual approaches (Dobbie 1994: 121). However, the current use of military force based on the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle is increasingly erasing the line between the two – an evolution that is apparent in recent peacekeeping operations - such as those in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo - involving ‘robust’ interventions. This paper discusses firstly how the evolution in our understanding of security presently allows for more robust interventions and secondly, what consequences this holds for the military’s understanding of its role.

A useful framework from which to address the current role of the military in peace processes can be borrowed from the political theorist Kenneth Waltz. In his inquiry into the causes of war entitled *Man, the State and War* (1959), Waltz suggests three levels of analysis - referred to as the ‘three images’. According to Waltz, these levels of analysis – or images – each serve to explain a root source of conflict. They consist of human nature, political regimes within states, and finally, the state system. This paper deviates somewhat from the original intent of Waltz’s study – to address the *causes* of war based on a systemic approach. Instead of examining causes, I apply Waltz’s analytical framework, admittedly

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4 This is not to imply that human security is prized higher than state security across the board. The importance of respecting state sovereignty still forms much part of the debate on intervention.
with considerable liberty, to discuss the effects of international military interventions on the military at the individual, state, and systemic level. In so doing, my intention is to problematise the current role of foreign military intervention in peacekeeping operations. Topical examples on the current uses of military force included throughout the report are intended to illustrate the general points found in the literature.

At the first level, the focus will be on the individual – the soldier - and the effect of military intervention in a peacekeeping capacity on traditional military culture. This will be followed by a few thoughts on the transformation of the role of the soldier - necessary if the present trend towards robust interventions continues. The paper then continues by examining military intervention from the perspective of the military’s relationship to the state. In his analysis of the second level, Waltz’ presents a root cause of war as a result of the existence of undemocratic states and more particularly, the rule of despotic leaders. Origins for this line of thought can be found as far back as in Kant’s essay *Project for a Perpetual Peace* (1795) in which he argues that republican forms of government (by their nature representative) will yield more pacific states (although he specifies that this alone will not prevent republican states from fighting one another). In the same tradition, democratic peace theorists go one step further, positing that democracies do not go to war with one another and that thereby the root to eradicating war lies in the democratization of the state. This line of thinking forms much of the basis for present day interventions. Waltz’ third and final image relates to the state system itself and the lack of a world authority to enforce peace and punish those states that violate the norms of the dominant world order. For third image theorists, the road to peace is to be found in either a form of world government which restrains the belligerent tendencies of sovereign states or through the abolishment of the state itself and the development of smaller, less powerful political entities in its place. Of these three images, the second and the third are particularly relevant to the discussion on the unfolding role of foreign military interventions in ‘conflictual peace building’ processes.5

Three elements of traditional military culture corresponding to the three levels outlined above can be singled out as key to this analysis. The use of foreign military intervention in peace operations challenges the traditional military understanding of the following three issues: The first is the role of the professional soldier as distinct from the role of the civilian, which is the hallmark of good civil-military relations. Second is the sanctity of state sovereignty (which has often been protected at the expense of individual rights). And in the third instance, the paper examines the transformation brought about by the shift from the interstate nature of armed conflict, whereby military response has traditionally been legitimized in response to threats to national security, to its involvement in intrastate conflict. Changes to the military’s activities, from its primary responsibility for national security to one in which participation in international operations are of increasing importance, challenges its traditional role on the level of the individual, the state, and the system.

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5 I have borrowed the term ‘conflictual peace building’ from an article by Suhrke, Harpviken and Strand (2002) as it describes accurately the state of the peace processes in which foreign militaries are increasingly asked to intervene.
The individual soldier

There are a number of clear tensions between the role of the soldier in traditional military culture and that of the soldier in peacekeeping operations. Dandeker and Gow (2000) note that some of the changes include the idea of the use of force, the challenge of ideas of neutrality/impartiality, the interaction between military and political as well as non-political actors (NGOs), an uncertain end-state, and a possible requirement for flexibility in the chain of command.

In order to better understand the extent of these changes, it would be beneficial to briefly reflect on the traditional role of the soldier as defined by two key thinkers in military sociology, Clausewitz and Huntington. Although the focus in their work is on war, it provides a basis for our traditional understanding of soldiering. Foremost among military thinkers is Clausewitz who formulated the first theory of war and its professional ethic in 1832. He is particularly noted for emphasizing the ‘dual nature’ of war noting that it should be considered an autonomous science with its own goals and methods yet subordinate in its ultimate purpose to the political sphere. While often considered a proponent of ‘absolute war’ due to his belief that the essence of war is force, Clausewitz believed this only to be so in theory: In practice, war was not an end in itself and so could not be divorced from political goals. Thus, the use of force had to be evaluated against the ends achieved. [Although he did not shy away from the use of force to achieve these ends, stating “Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed” (Clausewitz 1968:345)]. Given that war did not have its own logic and purpose, the soldier must always be subordinate to the statesman in Clausewitz’s view [“…for the political view is the object, War is the means…” (Clausewitz 1968:119)]. War could only ever be the instrument of politics. Furthermore, policy has the legitimacy of deriving from the interests of the whole community. In arguing for the position of statesmen as the formulators of policy and soldiers as its enablers, Clausewitz confirms the politically neutral stance of the soldier and more importantly, develops the first theoretical justification for civilian control of the military.

Similarly, Samuel Huntington in his 1957 book The Soldier and the State contributes to the theory of military professionalism that defines civil-military relations in democracies. Huntington’s work is the centrepiece of the American military’s training on civil-military relations (Feaver, 1996) and as such, provides a useful starting point for a discussion on the evolution in the military’s role as a result of peacekeeping operations. The paper discusses his thoughts on the relationship between the soldier and the state in greater detail below.

Current peace processes and the first image challenge

The robust peacekeeping operations presently undertaken impact the traditional understanding of soldiering. Firstly, the interaction between political and military actors

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6 Based on the theories of Huntington’s (1957), Finer (1962), and Janowitz (1971), states in which national militaries adopt a politically interventionist role are considered undemocratic. This begs the question of whether the interventionary role of the military, imposing values in foreign peace operations, may later affect their professionalism in a national context.
further blurs the civil-military line that is the hallmark of the professional army. Military forces in international operations are automatically placed in a political position. In peacekeeping operations, we are witnessing an obvious transformation in the soldier’s relationship to the use of force and in the question of the military’s impartiality. Soldiers are increasingly asked to fulfill roles as humanitarian actors in the service of peace, but as Pugh (2004) points out, peacekeeping is not value-neutral when it serves to protect the existing international order. The force deployed is not a neutral agent, but rather “authorized and configured to use force to defend its mandate impartially.” Dandeker and Gow (2000:69) point out that the impartial application of the mandate means use of force against one side over other: Force in this instance is used to comply with the terms of mandate set. At other times, the military’s political role is accentuated when military forces intervene to protect one part of the population from assault by the other. Furthermore, soldiers often undertake activities that lend support to the local population. In their capacity as peacemakers, Eli Stamnes (2004) notes that soldiers may play an important part in preventing conflict. However, these accounts are neglected in evaluations of their political role. The traditional distinction of soldiers as ‘takers of life’ and NGO workers as ‘saviours of life’, persists (Dandeker and Gow 2000:73). This perception makes cooperation between the two, while necessary, often conflictual.

Nonetheless, Miller (1999) in a case study of aid workers’ attitudes towards the military in Bosnia (1996) and Haiti (1997) illustrates how the dangerous nature of humanitarian relief work has made aid workers more supportive of military intervention. The presence of the military in these cases facilitated the humanitarian tasks by stabilising the security situation. Other benefits included the quantity and quality of valuable resources (for example, food and medical supplies) that followed the US troops, the military’s capacity to collect information on the ground, and the international media and political attention that follows a military intervention which helps focus on the crises at hand (Miller, 1999:186-189). This being said, the awareness of the military’s historical role makes aid workers suspicious that beneath the new humanitarian cloak lies the old soldier-warrior. U.S. General Krulak (1999) sums up the difficulty of the challenges faced by the soldier when he uses the metaphor of a “three-block war” in which US forces may be in a position where they must simultaneously engage in fighting, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance within a proximity of ‘three blocks’.

**Response to challenge**

The realization on the ground that the role of the soldier is changing and the political nature of peace operations means that one can expect the rise of “alternative professional types: the soldier-scholar, including the attainment of advanced civilian degrees; and the soldier-statesman, the officer skilled in handling the media and adept in

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7 It should be noted, however, that this line became blurred already with the advent of nuclear weapons when the idea of ‘total war’ lost its appeal (Däniker, 1995: 21-25) and closer civilian-military cooperation was required in determining the limits of the threat to use force in politics.

8 In fact, the interview subjects in her study solicit even greater levels of military involvement (1999:181).

9 It goes without saying that this is not the case in all interventions.

10 Moskos (8:2000a) reinforces Miller’s findings stating that the work of non-governmental organisations often gets little coverage in the media despite the fact that NGOs are there “before, during and after” the crisis.
the intricacies of international diplomacy” (Moskos, 2000b:19). This is borne out by the growing literature on the current role of the military in intervention to which a number of soldier-scholars have contributed (Krukak, 1999; Barnett, 2003; Smith, 2005; Nagl, 2005; Petraeus and Mattis, 2006).

A common thread going through their work is the education of the individual soldier. Hoffman (2006:400) goes so far as to state that the ‘centerpiece of the transformation is the individual soldier’ who needs to be able to respond to an adaptive enemy. This implies that the soldier must be able to think with his/her own initiative rather than wait for instruction. In 1999, General Krukak coined the term ‘strategic corporal’ to describe the need for leadership to devolve further down the chain of command in a complex and rapidly evolving mission environment.

In complex peacekeeping operations, the composition of the forces also needs to address issues of gender and culture. There is a growing literature on the role of gender in line with the role women are playing in peacekeeping operations (Whitworth, 2004; Vayrynen, 2004; Mazurana, Raven-Roberts and Parpart, 2005). Beilstein (1995:1-8) notes that in traditional peacekeeping operations undertaken between 1957 and 1989, only 25 of more than 26,000 troops were women. Women military personnel in peacekeeping operations rose to 255 from 1989-1992 but were still only more than 1% of the total number of troops. However, women represented a greater proportion of the UN civilian mission staff in 1995, comprising 34.5% at the grassroots level (though in declining numbers at higher levels).

As regards culture, Dandeker and Gow (2000) make the point that not all military cultures are suited to the task of peacekeeping. Past experiences of imperial policing makes the British or French more adaptable to the challenges of robust peace operations. However, countries such as Sweden, with a national culture traditionally grounded in the concept of neutrality, or Norway, with its ‘peace-nation’ identity may face greater dilemmas with regard to operations of this nature.

The State

The following two sections at the state and the systemic level are in essence closely related. In the section on the state, I reflect on the changing nature of security – the shift from the sanctity of the state to that of the individual as a result of the human security concept– and the questions this raises with regard to the conduct of peace operations, their strategic goals, and the anticipated ‘end state’ of military intervention. The third section, on the systemic level, problematises the question of liberal intervention both from the perspective of the military and the recipient state. The use of military force by the international community in an effort to establish particular forms of statehood links the second and the third levels – that of the state and the system.

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11 Moskos makes the point that while there were certainly soldier-scholars in earlier periods, the promotion of this kind of officer in the military elite is indicative of the change underway. He cites the example of General Wesley K. Clark’s selection for supreme commander of NATO in 1997 noting that he was described as “scholarly” and “diplomatic” and therefore appropriate for the position. Likewise, the choice in the same year of General H. Hugh Shelton as the US Joint Chiefs of Staff was based on his transformation “from a warrior to a diplomat” at the time of the 1994 American military intervention in Haiti (Moskos, 2000b:19). The current leader of the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Richards, is another example.
In military thinking, the state is central to the role of the soldiering. As Huntington states (1957:65) in a chapter entitled “The Military Mind”: “The existence of the military profession depends upon the existence of nation states capable of maintaining a military establishment…The military man consequently tends to assume that the nation state is the ultimate form of political organization.” It therefore follows that national security implies the protection of the state from attack by other belligerent states. Furthermore, in a struggle for national survival the only acceptable outcome is unconditional surrender, strategic goals are military, and overwhelming force is acceptable (Smith 2005). The defense of the state takes priority over that of the individual. Huntington (1957:79) reaffirms this point by stating that the military mind, “…stresses the supremacy of society over the individual”. Therefore, at a fundamental level, the focus on human security is problematic for the military mind, which is trained to place the survival of the group over that of the individual. The defence of the state, whether territorial or ideological, is a concrete objective that provides purpose and legitimacy to the actions of the military. Thus, traditional military culture seeks a clear end state whereby force is only used if one knows in advance what the end state is, by which means to achieve, with a defined timetable to do so (Dandeker and Gow 2000:69).

While the military profession exists to serve the state and obedience to the state’s political direction is requisite, tensions can arise between military obedience and civilian competence. This is particularly the case when the purposes of state policy cannot be met by the means of military force (Huntington, 1957: 69). It then becomes the duty of the military officer to caution against a particular action. However, political leaders often regard the military as the ‘toolbox’ for policy and disregard warnings from the military. Strachen (2006) cites the unwillingness of the U.S. political leadership to heed the military Joint Chiefs of Staff as one of the reasons for the lack of strategy over Iraq. Recent examples of this include the comments of head of the British army General Sir Richard Dannatt who in an interview in October 2006 called for UK troops to be withdrawn from Iraq while in the United States, on 8 November 2006, the lead editorials of military newspapers representing all four branches of US military call for the dismissal of US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld (Sturcke, 2006; Hultgren, 2006). Tensions between military and political leaders seem to be on the rise, as the former criticize the latter for being over-optimistic as to the utility of military force in responses to problem complexes which are essentially political.

Current peace operations and the second image challenge

The military culture described above corresponds well to the fighting of industrial wars but not to the peace enforcement operations that are increasingly the use to which military force is applied. The International Institute of Strategic Studies in 2005 determined the rise in ‘complex irregular warfare’ defined as non-traditional modes of warfare as responsible for the greatest challenge to the existing world order. Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, Lawrence Freedman in 2001 criticized the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) for representing a technocratic approach that was not capable of addressing real strategic threats arising from issues of globalization and suggesting instead its replacement by a ‘Revolution in Strategic Affairs’. Hoffman (2006: 411) echoes his opinion, stating that the next RMA will be in ‘complex irregular warfare’ which in his words is also ‘a mode of warfare that contests America’s overwhelming
conventional military capability’ According to soldier-scholar General Sir Rupert Smith this requires a paradigm shift from fighting industrial war to fighting ‘war among the people’.

The nature of the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, two ‘wars among the people’, can best be described as strategic peacekeeping. They differ from traditional military culture in that there are no hard strategic objectives to attain but rather ‘soft’ complex objectives related to establishing a political condition (Smith, 2005). Because the end state is fluid rather than fixed it is difficult for the military to maintain a sense of purpose (Dandeker and Gow, 2000). Without a feeling of purpose reflected in some momentum on the ground, morale can be lost and the legitimacy of the operation called into question. Strategic peacekeeping also differs from traditional peacekeeping operations in that they (to a greater degree than previously) take place in complex multifunctional environments involving both military and civilian agencies, NGO’s, the media and regional organizations. General Sir Rupert Smith\textsuperscript{12} sums up the developments witnessed by current applications of military force in the following six basic trends:

1. The ends are not hard objectives that decide a political outcome but soft objectives that establish conditions in which an outcome may be decided.
2. The battle is amongst the people, not on the battlefield.
3. Conflicts tend to be lengthy and at times unending.
4. The battle is waged preserving force rather than risking all in pursuit of an objective.
5. New uses are found for old weapons and organizations that are products of industrial war.
6. Sides are non-state actors primarily, with one comprised of as a form of multinational grouping against non-state party or parties.

A table summarizing the different typologies of operations (at the time of intervention) based on Dandeker and Gow’s definitions (2000: 65-66) is found on the next page.

\textsuperscript{12} General Smith’s experiences include his tenure as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR) in NATO, command of the UK Armoured Division in Gulf War and the UN Forces in Bosnia.
### Typology of Peacekeeping operations defined by mission variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Classic Peacekeeping (First generation, traditional peacekeeping)</th>
<th>Strategic Peacekeeping (Second generation, wider peacekeeping)</th>
<th>Peace enforcement (Peace-building)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question of Consent</td>
<td>Consent of hostile parties</td>
<td>Some level of consent</td>
<td>Consent of hostile parties absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic initiative</td>
<td>Strategic initiative for intervention with belligerents</td>
<td>Strategic initiative with intervening power</td>
<td>Strategic initiative with intervening power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End-state status</td>
<td>End-state achieved (between ceasefire and political settlement) determined by hostile parties</td>
<td>End-state fluid, determined <em>primarily</em> by hostile parties</td>
<td>End state determined by intervening powers <em>a priori</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics</td>
<td>Non-coercive tactics</td>
<td>Mixture of coercive and non-coercive tactics</td>
<td>Mixture of coercive and non-coercive tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeepers’ role</td>
<td>Peacekeepers only engage in defensive measures</td>
<td>Peacekeepers engage in defensive and <em>limited</em> offensive measures</td>
<td>Peacekeepers engage in defensive and offensive measures</td>
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<td>Peacekeepers’ role with regard to the political mandate</td>
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<td>Complex and multifunctional environment, need for operational autonomy of force commander</td>
<td>Complex and multifunctional environment, need for operational autonomy of force commander</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Response to Challenge

In the new operations facing the military, the nature of the hostile party has also changed, becoming more versatile, elusive, and protean (Stern, 2003). The military must be able to adapt accordingly. According to Hoffman (2006) deployments should be less direct, more flexible and less intrusive. He is critical of traditional large base structures which, in

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13 It should be noted that often the ambition to rapidly build up local forces is motivated by an instrumental need for a more acceptable ‘face’ on the military operation.
addition to providing fixed targets, can seem insulting to the host country’s culture. Changes have also occurred at the level of force structures in the US military towards the establishment of smaller brigade combat teams to allow for greater flexibility and troop rotation. NATO forces have undergone a similar transformation designed to conduct smaller operations (Fiorenza 2006). More controversially, both Hoffman (2006:401) and Dandeker and Gow (2000: 71) insist that military personnel need greater autonomy in applying initiative to be able to maintain momentum in the fulfilment of their mandate.

An obvious but often neglected point is that political ambition must match military capacity (both in terms of force size, nature, and duration) if it is to be effective. This is a point that has emphasized by the Norwegian military time and again who have indicated that the diminished levels of permanent staff in the Norwegian military is a barrier to the expectations created through political discussions of Norway’s role internationally in peacekeeping operations (Moe, 2006; Mood, 2006). Cheeseman (1998) provides a useful comparative case to the Norwegian, in his chapter on the difficulties experienced by the Australian military in reorganizing their primarily territorially based defence in order to be able to fulfil the political ambition of “seeking every opportunity” (1998:231) to contribute to UN peacekeeping and other multinational operations.

Closely related to this argument is that of ‘great expectations’. Often the danger of high expectations results from international military interventions in peace building. A rhetoric of democracy and human rights leading to better standard of living – a ‘brave new world’ – prevails. However, this raises expectations among some that are bound to be disappointed, while it increases the fear among other segments of the population of a radical societal rehauling which threatens vested interests. Suhrke (2006) discusses this dilemma through the example of Afghanistan as a failure of the international community to live up to its promises. The most important aspect of a successful intervention might therefore be the issue of ‘sequencing’. As Smith (281:2005) notes, the population involved in the conflict is at the first instance more concerned over security and the establishment of order, the ‘freedom from’ issues, rather than democracy and development, the ‘freedom to’ issues. Although, of course, a complicating factor remains that these are in many cases interlinked and one cannot establish durable security without incorporating basic human rights’ precepts.

Equally important is to establish an understanding among the peacekeepers and the general public on the nature of the operation. In a BBC interview (13 September 2006) with Dr. Obaid Younossi of the RAND Coorporation, the interviewer noted that the Australian Prime Minister at the time of the intervention in Afghanistan believed that the engagement would be a peacekeeping mission involving the building of schools and roads, rather than a military mission involving heavy fighting. He was not alone in his (professed) ignorance of the nature of the mission. This is also how the mission was explained to the general public making it difficult for them to understand why it went wrong - given the description of what was to be undertaken at the time of the intervention. Obviously, one is doing policy a disservice in the long run by camouflaging the difficulty of the operation at the outset. A similar confession was made by a Norwegian officer in an interview with the Norwegian evening news who stated that the incident in Meymaneh in which Norwegian troops were attacked was a ‘wake-up call’ (NRK Lordagsrevyen, 14

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14 The US Pentagon’s recent Global Posture Review advocates replacing small number of fixed Cold War bases for set of more flexible arrangements in many countries (Hoffman, 2006:399).
October 2006.) Based on the interviews with the officers, it was clear that there was a lack of understanding for what a peacekeeping operation of this nature could entail.

The System

This final section on changes in international systemic factors addresses the concept of liberal intervention. Returning briefly to Waltz’, in his ‘third image’, he suggests that the absence of a world authority capable of sanctioning states that violate the norms of the dominant world order is a root cause of conflict. However, the prevalence of intrastate over interstate conflict after the Cold War coupled with the shift from state to human security has resulted in an increasing legitimisation of military intervention by Western liberal democracies in the interest of human security. This has been reinforced by a growing interest in questions of ‘just war’, central to the UN’s definition on the legitimacy of the use of force to resolve conflict. As in the cases above at the individual and state level, this evolution in the use of military force has consequences for the impartial role of the military and for the issue of legitimacy. Since the ‘end state’ sought is a political environment defined as stable/democratic by the intervening power(s), the perception of such interventions by the recipient state also has profound effects on the ground for the success of the peacekeeping operation.

The increase in robust peace operations has resulted in an ongoing debate over their use. However, Bellamy and Williams (2004) argue that there has been little critical conceptual discussion on the role of peace operations within global politics. They address the debate by dividing peacekeeping operations into two approaches: Westphalian and post-Westphalian. The former is more in line with traditional approaches to peacekeeping, relying on the consent of the hostile parties. Involvement by peacekeepers in the internal affairs of the state is at the discretion of the host country. The purpose of the peacekeeping operation is to create spaces and institutions allowing hostile states to address their differences. By contrast, those advocating post-Westphalian approaches argue that peacekeepers should be deployed to rebuild states seen to be failing, even without the consent of the host state, in the interest of human security. While supporters of both approaches endorse the democratic peace thesis (which holds that democratic institutions and processes are necessary to the establishment of peace both within and between states), Westphalians believe that liberal democratic states should be created through international diplomacy, not at the expense of the internal integrity and political sovereignty of the state. As presented by Bellamy and Williams, post-Westphalians believe that there can be no stable peace without the construction of liberal democracies.16 As a result, the objective of peace operations is not in merely allowing political spaces where negotiation may take place between states but in “actively

15 Countries such as China, India, and Kenya have been supportive of this approach to peace keeping operations.
16 However, this point is controversial given that the strongest motivation behind intervention might not be the spread of liberal ideas. One example would be the Russian intervention in Chechnya (1994-96) which at the time was defined as a ‘peacekeeping operation’ by the Russian government to protect ethnic Russians. And, of course, the argument can be made that vital interests are a more important motivator than the desire to construct liberal democracies. Cooper (2000) is quite clear that interventions should only occur where vital interests are at risk.
contributing to the construction of liberal polities, economies and societies” (Bellamy & Williams 2004: 4).

Current peace operations and the third image challenge

Post-Westphalian peace operations attempt to create a particular type of international order that is distinctly liberal (Paris 1997; Debrinx 1999; Richmond 2001). As a result, intervention cannot be regarded as value neutral (Pugh, 2004), nor is it necessarily singularly benevolent. Robert Cooper (2000), a former advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair argues the following logic to legitimize the post-Westphalian vision: He divides the world into “pre-modern, modern and post-modern” with European and Nordic states placed securely in the latter category.17 Stating that there are no security threats in the traditional sense in the post-modern world, but that threats from ‘modern and pre-modern’ states with repercussions for the ‘post-modern’ state (in the form of migrations, trafficking, drugs trade) require military involvement. So as to protect the pacific post-modern European state system, Cooper’s declares: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle.” In other words, protecting the Kantian world requires the use of Hobbesian tactics. Robert Kagan (2002) makes the point that this double standard is already in use by the United States “trying to abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilized society while simultaneously employing military force against those who refuse to abide by those rules”. The question then becomes whether intervening powers can build Kantian states through the use of Hobbesian tactics.

A concrete example of the difficulties of intervention due to the recipient state’s animosity towards peace operations is evident in the discussions on Darfur where at least 200 000 people have lost their lives and 2.5 million are internal refugees as a result of the fighting between rebels and government supported militias. Despite persistent efforts to get the government of Sudan to accept a United Nations led peacekeeping force, the Sudanese have resisted. The result has been a delay in getting a force in place and the continuation of atrocities against the local population. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has categorically rejected the force stating that he believes it is an American effort to turn Sudan into a new Iraq. His concerns have been exacerbated by the US efforts at the UN to impose sanctions on Sudan accusing the state of supporting international terrorism. At the beginning of November 2006, President Bush relented and stated that he was reconsidering his position on Darfur. Instead the United Nations will work to support the (meagre) African Union peacekeeping forces now on the ground (Aftenposten, 5 November 2006).

Response to challenge

Pugh (2004) asserts that it is problematic to equate global interests with Western interests without a critical awareness of the framework that is being imposed. Noam Chomsky (1999) popularizes the critical view of post Westphalian approaches found in the academic literature, referring to military operations in the name of liberal values as the ‘new military humanism’. Multilateralism and international consensus for foreign

17 The United States is placed in the modern category.
military interventions are a necessary, if, at times, insufficient, means to alleviate the charge of imperialism. Nonetheless, reflection on the instrumental uses and the problematic aspects of foreign military interventions would go a long way towards understanding why interventions are opposed by those who see it as imperialism. The legitimacy of the intervention and the future success of the state-building enterprise are further called into question when imposing liberal frameworks of governance results in systems becoming dependent on international organisations and NGOs rather than on local actors to assume control (Richmond 2004).

**Preliminary policy suggestions**

Following are some policy reflections that summarise viewpoints from the discussion above:

- In the ‘fight among the people’, the struggle is for hearts and minds which requires an understanding of the local population. As a result, it is important to create a force for peace operations that includes more intelligence, police forces, linguists and anthropologists rather than heavy armour and artillery (Smith, 2004);
- Retraining (awareness training) of militaries necessary for these kind of missions. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on the ‘softer’ aspects of military science – managing resources, civilian control and human rights (Williams, 1998);
- A cadre of civilian officials with peacekeeping experience should be developed in troop contributing countries;
- Better integration of civilian and military forces is key. The reluctance of civilians and non-governmental organisations to engage with the military should be addressed. A regular dialogue is necessary between principal players, military and civilian;
- There is no guarantee that military capabilities can be translated into political results. Imposing values requires time and resources. End states will be unclear not least because military interventions always have unforeseen consequences. This needs to be communicated politically;
- Expectations need to be minimalist not maximalist. ‘Sequencing’ is important: Establishing security takes precedence over political goals;
- Multilateralism and cultural awareness is important to ensure that humanitarian intervention is not interpreted as imperialism. Achieving international consensus prior to intervention is necessary.

**Conclusion**

The unfolding cases of Iraq and Afghanistan will change our understanding of future peacekeeping operations. Much of the present academic literature does not sufficiently address the challenges brought on by the role of the military in these crucial cases. In part, this is because they are ongoing and sufficient time has not passed to absorb the ‘lessons learned’. But there also appears to be a reticence by peacekeeping scholars to address the issue of the military’s role. As a result, it is often those with a
military background – retired officers or defense analysts – who are leading the way. Given their operational background, most of the ensuing analyses focus on problem solving and less of the critical approach to the use of the military in peace operations solicited by Bellamy and Williams (2004).

In closing it might be interesting to note Waltz’s thoughts on the development of liberal intervention. Questioning the validity of the democratic peace thesis, he expresses concern over the rise of liberal interventionism and warns: “Peace, after all, is the noblest cause of war, and if democracies are the one peaceful form of the state, then all means used to cause other states to become democratic are justified” (x: 2001).
Selected Bibliography


