Power-Sharing and Postconflict Peace Periods

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Abstract
Compared to the vast literature on the relationship between political regime and the probability of civil war, relatively little research has addressed the relationship between political regime and rebuilding after civil war. Also, different political institutions have received little attention. My proposition is that postconflict societies need a certain type of political institutions to avoid resuming violence. The main institutions of the consociational, power-sharing democracy are a grand coalition, proportional representation and segmental autonomy. I argue that these institutions are particularly suited to address the challenges of postconflict societies. This paper offers a quantitative approach to the relationship between power-sharing institutions in postconflict societies and peace duration. The paper analyzes the relationship between consociational institutions and peace duration in approximately 125 postconflict societies. The main finding is that the more power-sharing present after conflict, the longer is the peace duration. In particular, grand coalition and segmental autonomy lower the risk of resumed conflict and seem to be highly useful peacebuilding strategies. Power-sharing institutions should be seriously considered as a solution for countries struggling to rebuild after civil war.

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Introduction

Once in a while the news report about terminations of civil wars. Combatants have ended the violence and parties meet to shake hands and plan for a better future. But all too often we later hear that the parties do not cooperate and violence has resumed. Why does this happen? And more important: how can it be avoided? My paper will try to answer the second question.

This paper rests on the theory of a democratic civil peace. The probability of war is lower in democracies and autocracies than in semi-democracies (Hegre et al. 2001). For obvious reasons, democracy is preferable to autocracy. Therefore the best strategy to achieve lasting peace in a post-conflict society would be to establish a democracy. Nonetheless, not all types of democracy are equally suitable. My suggestion is that the type of democracy which is most likely to have a positive effect on lasting peace is consociational, power-sharing, democracy. This proposition leads to my main hypothesis: \textit{Postconflict societies with power-sharing institutions have longer peace durations than postconflict societies without power-sharing institutions}.\footnote{Dahl argues that an \textit{institution} has been settled for a long time, whereas \textit{arrangements} are more provisional and \textit{practices} somewhere in-between (1998: 83f). My paper does not differentiate between long-lasting institutions and newly established arrangements in a postconflict society. “Arrangements” might be more precise. However, I follow the terminology of other researchers who have dealt with the problem of rebuilding postconflict societies, who use the term “institution” (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003).}

A consociational democracy is a type of democracy which emphasizes the importance of power-sharing among different segments in society. This democracy is characterized by four main political institutions: a grand coalition, a mutual veto, a proportional representation and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1969, 1977, 1985). Instead of a power division between government and opposition, most, if not all, groups in a consociational democracy will take part in the decision making.

In the following pages the paper aims at explaining why consociational democracy is the most suitable form of democracy when it comes to establish lasting peace in postconflict societies. First, I elaborate the concept of consociational democracy. I seek to explain why democracy is the best solution for war-shattered states, but also why not all kinds of democracy are equally suitable. Next, the paper introduces the dataset used in the analysis, the operationalizations and codings of the different...
variables and the Cox proportional hazards model, before I present the empirical analyses. Finally I present some conclusions and policy implications and give recommendations for further research.

One of my main findings is that grand coalition governments increase postconflict peace duration, such a government seems to secure groups in society the participation in the decision making process that they feel needed. Decentralized decision-making does also significantly reduce the risk of peace failure. Although proportional representation does not have any influence on risk of resumed conflict, power-sharing matters. The more power-sharing institutions that are present in a postconflict society, the lower is the risk of resumed internal armed conflict. Thus, power-sharing democracy appears to be a wise peace-building strategy for a postconflict society.

Consociationalism: Theory and Hypotheses

Before I present the details of the consociational institutions and why these are especially suitable for postconflict societies, I will give a brief explanation of the peculiar challenges after civil war, and how the postconflict society resembles Lijphart’s plural society. A short introduction to the relationship between democracy per se and peace is also necessary to fully understand the positive influence of consociational power-sharing institutions in postconflict societies.

The Challenge after Civil War

Following a civil war the combatants have to live together within the same political unit. However, a long-lasting war exacerbates hatred and mutual suspicion, which makes peaceful cooperation difficult. The characteristics of postconflict societies are in many ways similar to the plural society, which provided the starting point for the theory of consociational democracy. It can be useful to look more closely at the plural society and its resemblance to the postconflict society to understand the challenges such societies must cope with.

The Postconflict Society

Lijphart’s description of a plural society is useful in order to understand the characteristics of a post-conflict society. A society having experienced civil war is likely to retain strong contradictions between the parties. Even though the civil war itself has not been ethnic or over identity issues, a society plagued by violence between contesting groups will be facing the same type of challenges as a plural
society. By plural society Lijphart refers to a society characterized by sharp religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial and/or ethnic segmental cleavages. In such a society the members will direct their loyalty on all or most aspects to one particular group or segment (Lijphart 1977: 3f). By contrast, in societies with crosscutting cleavages and overlapping memberships, individual cross-pres- sures lead citizens to moderate attitudes and a cooperative political culture (Lijphart 1969: 208). In a plural society there will be no such cross-pressure, attitudes will be fragmented and there will be little room for compromise.

Paris (1997) points out that the competitive aspect of democracy, and how this stimulates political conflict, can have negative consequences. According to Lijphart it is exactly this competitive political process that should be avoided in plural societies. This because ‘Political contests in severely fragmented societies are indeed not likely to be ‘good games’.’ (Lijphart 1969: 215). He further argues that ‘... the anxieties and hostilities attending the political process may be countered by removing its competitive features as much as possible’ (ibid. 216). Hence, the political system which increases post-conflict peace duration the most, is consociational democracy.

The Security Dilemma in Postconflict Societies

Previous research on the relationship between power-sharing and civil strife has focused on the reasons why lasting peace is so difficult. This obstacle has mainly been explained with the challenges and the security dilemma the belligerents face in the postconflict period (Hartzell 1999, Hoddie and Hartzell 2001, Snyder and Jervis 1999, Walter 1997, 1999, 2002). A security dilemma is defined by Snyder as ‘a situation in which each party’s efforts to increase its own security reduce the security of others’ (Snyder and Jervis 1999:15). This explains why circles of violence are so common and disarmament so difficult.

A complete seizure of illegal weapons is essential to reinstall security and cooperation in a country plagued by civil war. Cooperation will be extremely difficult if the cooperation partner has an army hidden behind its back, an army previously gathered to eliminate its opponent. If a country is to survive as an entity it can not have more than one army, the state need to have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Hartzell 1999: 5). Even though the majority of weapons are handed over, a small implacable group which resists disarmament can cause a peace process to halt.

The great task is therefore to design a layout of the future which ‘convinces the combatants to shed their partisan armies and surrender conquered territory even though such steps will increase
their vulnerability and limit their ability to enforce the treaty’s other terms’ (Walter 1999: 129). The best layout of the future involves a restructuring of the central state authority, and addressing the security concerns of the contending parties (Hartzell 1999: 4). Both Hartzell and Walter believe that these security concerns are best ensured within a power-sharing arrangement where antagonists are guaranteed positions within the postconflict state.

Democracy and Peace

Very few doubt the connection between dyadic democracy and international peace. While the relationship between democracy and intrastate peace is not as simple as for interstate peace, there is still substantial evidence that a democratic state has a low probability of experiencing domestic violence (Hegre et al. 2001). The relationship between political regime and domestic war is parabolic; both very autocratic and very democratic regimes have low probabilities of civil war, while intermediate, semi-democratic regimes have a higher probability of internal war. However, for various other reasons autocracy is not a widely recommended political regime type. While an autocratic regime might control domestic violence, it will be negatively correlated with e.g. human rights, freedom of expression, political participation and other liberties highly valued in contemporary politics.2

With regards to a political regime recommendation for a post-conflict society, democracy is unrivaled. Both because democracy is the political system that best guarantees its inhabitants highly valued rights, but also because it will reduce the likelihood of domestic violence. I assume that a political system that has a low probability of outbreak of civil war, also has a low risk of renewed civil war.

The emphasis on political institutions in postconflict societies has also been expressed within the international community, in particular through the United Nations. During the 1990s we saw a great effort to democratize countries which had experienced civil strife, as the United Nations transitional authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) following the peace agreement signed in 1991 (United Nations 2003). And the different United Nations missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the cease-fire and the implementation of the Dayton agreement of 1995.

Democracy, rule by the people, is today the ‘dominant political philosophy of the multilateral community’ (Barnes 2001: 86). Democracy has some benefits related to participation and human rights that are not found in any alternative political system (Dahl 1998: 45ff). However, the failure of the democratization process seen in some war-torn countries throughout the world challenges this

2. See for example Rummel (1995) on the correlation between political regime and democide.
dominating belief. The planning of democracy and multiparty elections in Rwanda, agreed upon in the Arusha Declaration of 1993, led to one of the worst genocides in recent history (Paris 1997: 71). Although democracy is a suitable political system in postconflict societies, maybe not all kinds of democracy are equally suitable. A liberal and competitive ‘winner-takes-all’ democracy might not fit well into the political environment in war-shattered countries. In 1969 Arend Lijphart introduced the concept of *consociational democracy* as a kind of political system that would better fit fragmented societies (1969, 1977). This democracy focuses on power-sharing arrangements that enable all segments in the country to have their voices heard and opinions respected.3

Lijphart saw the democratic success of plural countries like Lebanon (1943–75) and Malaysia (1955–69) as a result of the countries’ consociational features (Lijphart 1977). He also strongly recommended consociationalism as a solution for post-apartheid South Africa (Lijphart 1985). Others have argued in favor of power-sharing as well; McGarry (2002) finds consociationalism to be the best answer to Northern Ireland’s challenges, and Schneckener (2002) looks at Bosnia and Herzegovina as an example of power-sharing. In numerous publications Hartzell (1999, Hartzell et al. 2001, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) and Walter (1997, 2002) have concluded that for a peace agreement to be implemented, it must include power-sharing.

**Consociational Democracy**

One of the most common typologies of democracy is Lijphart’s division of political systems into two polar types: the majoritarian and the consensus democracy.4 These are separated on the executive-parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension (Lijphart 1999). However, in the writings of Lijphart the majoritarian system also has another polar opposite, namely the consociational democracy, which does not completely equal the consensus system (Lijphart 1969, 1977, Bogaards 2000).

Lijphart (1999) and Hoddie and Hartzell (2001) observe that majoritarian democracy, with its winner-takes-all electoral system, is viewed by many as a superior kind of democracy. It was also viewed as the best choice for most of the former British colonies after independence (Lijphart 1999: 10). Critics of a majoritarian system argue that such a winner-takes-all system will not foster stability in

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3. The term ‘consociational’ equals the term ‘power-sharing’. However, while ‘consociational’ was a clear enough concept in academic discussions, Lijphart found it ‘... too esoteric and polysyllabic’ when discussing with policy-makers (2000: 427). In my paper I will mostly use the term consociational, but for variation the synonym power-sharing will also be used.

4. See Bogaards (2000: 397) on the difference between theoretical (ideal and polar) and empirical types.
fragmented postconflict societies. This both because in war-torn countries the people will seldom trust the government and because majoritarian democracy do not meet the security concerns of the parties (Dahl 1998: 194, Hoodie and Hartzell 2001: 3–4). According to Paris (1997), the post-Cold War effort to install market democracy in war-shattered states has been guided by the paradigm of ‘pacification through political and economic liberalization’ (1997: 56). He argues that this effort has failed and illustrates it with examples from Cambodia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia.\(^5\)

According to Lijphart, a society characterized by sharp cleavages and with few overlapping memberships needs a radically different political system than societies with crosscutting cleavages and overlapping loyalty. A postconflict society with high levels of distrust and suspicion between the parties, and extensive security challenges, can reach a stable peace if its political institutions are shaped as in the consociational democracy.

This type of democracy has four characteristics, the first and most important of them being a grand coalition with representatives from all the significant groups in the society. The other three characteristics are mutual veto, proportional representation and some kind of segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 25).\(^6\)

**Grand Coalition**

In the grand coalition leaders of all significant segments rule together, searching compromise and consensus. The importance of a grand coalition government reflects the thoughts of Rousseau that important and serious questions should be solved with near-unanimity (Lijphart 1977: 28). In a deeply divided society, or a postconflict society, almost all questions discussed in government will be of importance for the segments and the stakes will usually be high. Parties to a civil war will be especially concerned with executive power. In a newly established democracy there will most likely be few constraints on the executive, and instead of being overruled by their rival in a competitive government the factions will prefer guaranteed positions in a power-sharing government (Walter 2002: 30). The grand coalition, or power-sharing executive, may take different forms:

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5. Stedman (2002) claims that Paris’ definition of peacebuilding success is too strict. He further argues that El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique should be regarded as successes, not failures (ibid. 19).
6. It has not been possible to find data on mutual veto, this characteristic is therefore excluded from both the theory and the analyses.
such as that of a grand coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems, a grand coalition of a president and other top office holders in presidential systems, and broadly inclusive councils or committees with important advisory and coordinating functions (Lijphart 1985: 7).

Few countries have installed a pure consociational democracy or a pure grand coalition with all segments represented. Usually, some segments or parties are excluded. However, the idea of a grand coalition is that policy choices shall not only have majority support, based on a minimum winning coalition, but rather the support from an overwhelming majority. A strong opposition, which is the common feature of majoritarian democracy, is avoided. Because of the lack of trust between the segments after civil war, it is better to be in government together with your counterpart, than to trust him to govern in favour of your interests while you are in opposition (Lijphart 1977: 31).7

I assume that if a post-civil war country has a grand coalition, the probability of renewed warfare is less than if the postconflict country does not have such an institution. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Postconflict societies with grand coalitions have longer peace durations than postconflict societies without grand coalitions, ceteris paribus.

Proportional Representation

Consociational democracy is based on a proportional distribution of influence (Lijphart 1977: 40). The most common use of the proportionality principle is as an instrument to distribute seats in the legislature. But it is also a means to allocate civil service and judicial appointments, financial resources and assure an adequate representation within the army and state-owned companies (Lijphart 1977: 38f, Schneckener 2002: 205). Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) and Walter (2002) both express the necessity of an equal or proportional representation in a new national army following a civil war, where the rebel combatants are included in the regular forces.8

7. The grand coalition does not have to be a cabinet in a parliamentary system, which was the solution in Cambodia following the 1998 election, where the coalition cabinet consisted of CPP and FUNCINPEC, receiving 41 and 32 per cent respectively of the votes (Roberts 2001). It can have different shapes as well, such as the three-member rotating presidency in Bosnia after the peace agreement in 1995 (Schneckener 2002). Power-sharing can also take the form as it did in Sierra Leone in 1999, where one party got the presidency, while the other party was assigned the majority of the cabinet positions (Walter 2002: 30).

8. Such proportional representation was included in the peace agreement in Mozambique in 1992 where the parties decided to create a new national army consisting of 15000 soldiers from both RENAMO and FRELIMO (Walter 1999: 148).
Reynolds (1999) asserts that the electoral system in a divided society should reach the ensuing normative goals: representativeness, accessibility, providing incentives for conciliatory behavior, accountability, encouraging cross-cutting parties and stability of government (1999: 92). Following his analysis of political systems in Southern Africa, Reynolds postulates that with respect to these criteria a proportional representation system is clearly better than other systems. In line with the arguments in favour of the grand coalition, civil war antagonists will prefer a proportionality-based allocation of parliamentary seats, assuring that each party is represented.

I expect that a proportional influence allocation system will be the most suitable when concerned with stability in war-torn countries, and my second hypothesis is as follows:

_Hypothesis 2: Postconflict societies with proportional representation have longer peace durations than postconflict societies without such representation, ceteris paribus._

**Segmental Autonomy**

In plural societies it can be wise to leave as many decisions as possible concerning the different segments to themselves (Lijphart 1977). Issues of the minorities exclusive concern include, among others, questions about religion, language and education. Such a segmental autonomy can be based on either a personal self-identification or a territorial principle, depending on the demographic distribution of the people. Where the regional cleavages correspond to the segmental cleavages this might take the form of federalism. Based on a personality principle, the Croatian constitution of 1990 guarantees the equality of nationalities and there is widespread cultural autonomy.\(^9\)

Demands for greater self-administration or secession are often expressed in civil wars over identity issues (Toft 2001, 2003). The government will seldom grant independence to secessionists, but often the only solution to a protracted civil war is increased autonomy and maybe some sort of federalism. Eritrea’s long lasting war of independence ended in 1993, when Eritrea was granted sovereignty. Following this secession, Ethiopia’s new constitution of 1994 established a federal government where the regions were allowed not only autonomy, but also the right to secede.\(^10\)

In an analysis of 26 negotiated settlements between 1945 and 1999 Rothchild and Hartzell (1999) found that the granting of territorial autonomy had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of settlement stability. Although various kinds of autonomy, as federalism, confederalism,

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regional autonomy and cantonization, have been promoted as conflict resolution approaches (Rothchild and Hartzell 1999: 260), Mozaffar and Scarritt (1999) argue that the success of territorial autonomy depends on some favorable conditions. These conditions are not present in Africa, and they further argue that the case of Ethiopia is not a success story, rather, Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism might exacerbate conflict.

It seems to be necessary to have some kind of autonomy when a postconflict society is to be rebuilt, in particular if the war has been over identity issues. My third hypothesis regarding the consociational elements in a war-torn country expresses this:

**Hypothesis 3:** Postconflict societies with segmental autonomy have longer peace durations than postconflict societies without segmental autonomy, ceteris paribus.

I assume that the more power-sharing which take place in a post-civil war country the lower is the risk of resumed conflict. This relationship was also found by Hartzell and Hoddie (2003). Therefore I include a hypothesis expressing this:

**Hypothesis 4:** The more power-sharing institutions in a postconflict society, the longer is the peace duration, ceteris paribus.

**Criticism of Consociational Democracy**

In 1977 Lijphart mentioned some of the main criticisms of consociational democracy. These were basically on two dimensions: consociational democracy is not democratic enough, and consociational democracy is not enough to achieve efficient and stable government (1977: 47).

Consociational democracy is viewed as a weak democracy because it does not have a strong opposition, but Lijphart argues that if opposition is supposed to be a part of the definition of democracy a regular government transition is required. This might not be the case in plural societies and the result can be that one minority will be permanently excluded from government.

In 1977 Lijphart also mentioned that consociational democracy did not provide efficient and politically stable government. Decision-making is slow in a grand coalition, and mutual veto might cause immobilism. Further, to follow a proportionality principle might lead to positions distributed according to membership and not individual competence. Finally, segmental autonomy is an expensive kind of political system. Twenty years later van den Berghe still finds consociational democracy ‘a clumsy, inflexible, conservative model that benefits mostly the ruling elites.’ (2002: 437). Lijphart agreed that in a short-term perspective an adversarial system might be better at economic develop-
ment and stability. However, in the long run such a system most likely will break down, while a consociational democracy will reach stability and effective policy decisions (Lijphart 1977: 51ff).

Horowitz (1985, 1991) has been critical of Lijphart’s democratic solution for plural societies. He argues that the heterogeneous countries in Europe are not easily comparable with the deeply divided African and Asian countries. It is difficult to adapt the western consociational democracy in these countries, because the hostility toward members of other groups are much more intense than in the European countries (1985: 572). Horowitz is also particularly critical to the grand coalition. Although he agrees that ‘Coalition should be the centerpiece of accommodative arrangements.’ (Horowitz 1991: 175), he emphasizes that ‘... not any coalition will do, only a coalition likely to produce compromise rather than perpetuate conflict’ (Ibid.). The grand coalition in Lijphart’s consociationalism neglects intragroup differences, and such coalitions will also generate more intragroup difference and competition. Horowitz further argues that the proportional representation system does not create compromise or moderate attitudes, it rather strengthens differences.

Consociationalism as a peacebuilding strategy for postconflict societies has been questioned by different scholars. For Spears (2002), power sharing in a post-civil war environment is to make a ‘deal with the devil’ (2002: 127). It is not about cooperation with a political opponent, but with an enemy. Therefore, it is most likely to fail and, ironically, works best where least needed (ibid. 132). According to Kaufmann (1996) it is not possible to end an ethnic civil war unless ‘... the opposing groups are demographically separated into defensible enclaves’ (1996: 137).

Lijphart has worked with the concept of consociational democracy for more than three decades, and he admits that his writings might seem contradictory and cause confusion among readers. In an article in 2000 he emphasizes that where there is a difference, it is his latest formulation that is valid (Lijphart 2000: 425). In spite of flaws and criticism, consociational theory is still valid, and, in different approaches, has been widely used as a reasonable path when concerned with peacebuilding. Therefore my argument is that in order to achieve stability and lasting peace in a postconflict society, it would be wise to have political institutions in accordance with the idea of a consociational democracy. If valid, this would provide a viable policy for peacebuilding, and also add a war termination dimension to democratic civil peace theory hitherto supported only by evidence regarding war onset and war

11. Kaufmann (1996) has also criticized the power-sharing system for not being able to handle grave contradictions. It might perhaps prevent potential ethnic conflict and dampen mild conflicts, but falls short on bringing peace in situations with intense violence.
Research Design and Data

To analyze the duration of postconflict peace I use a Cox proportional hazards model. The data for this analysis are structured as multiple-record events with censoring. Given that internal armed conflicts frequently occur in the same country at different points in time, and indeed with the PRIO-Uppsala data, more than one civil conflict can occur at the same time, I must also account for a separate peace period after the termination of conflict between belligerents. To account for obvious non-independence of peace events I calculate robust standard errors. The basis of the dataset is the PRIO-Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset 1946–2003 Version 3.0 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). In the Armed Conflict Dataset an armed conflict is defined as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’ (Strand et al. 2004: 3).12

To allow for time-varying covariates the dataset is disaggregated into ‘peace years’ for each individual postconflict period. The first ‘peace year’ for each subject starts the first day of peace after conflict and ends 31st December the same year. Next ‘peace year’ starts 1st January the following year and ends 31st December, or the date the conflict resumes (failure). The subject enters the dataset again the first day of peace after (if) the resumed conflict ends. Postconflict peace periods that did not fail (no resumed conflict) before the last day of observation in the dataset (31 December 2003) are right-censored, whereas peace periods that came at risk before the observation period started are left-truncated.13 Begin and end dates of the conflicts and peace transition periods are based on Gates and Strand’s (2004) event dataset. Following Gates and Strand (2004: 10), ‘Our initial coding criteria only includes the periods from when a conflict reaches 25 fatalities to the last fatality in the last year of recorded conflict.’ However, a conflict period must have been followed by at least two years without observation of violence in order to be defined terminated. A conflict is not reported to have terminated if there is only one year without observation of violence between two years of violence – this is

12. The PRIO-Uppsala armed conflict database separates between four types of conflict: extra-state, interstate, internal and internationalized internal. Since my concern is intrastate wars, the interstate conflicts are not included in the dataset.
13. Information on the independent variables have only been available for the time period 1975–2000, the observation period under investigation is therefore shorter than the period the original PRIO-Uppsala data cover.
one continuous conflict period. The final analyses include 126 postconflict societies with 509212 days at risk of failure (1435 ‘peace years’). 37 failures occur.

**Operationalization of Variables**

To be able to investigate postconflict peace duration, two conflict-related variables were added to the existing dataset: A duration variable measuring the length of the postconflict peace period. This variable is measured in days, and represents the number of days from the first day of peace to the first day when the conflict again crosses the 25 battle-related deaths threshold. If the conflict does not re-occur the end date is set to December 31st, 2003, which is the last date in the dataset. An additional event variable (censor) indicates whether or not the ‘peace year’ ends in another conflict. The censoring variable is coded 1 if the ‘peace year’ ends in resumed conflict (failure) and zero if it did not.

**Independent Variables: Power-Sharing Institutions**

I seek to test four hypotheses about the correlation between consociational characteristics and lasting peace in post-civil war societies. The four defining elements of the consociational democracy are a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional representation and segmental autonomy. The independent variables should reflect these elements, if they were present in the postconflict period.

A **grand coalition** should gather the leaders of all significant segments to govern together (Lijphart 1977: 25). Defining ‘grand enough’ is not easy. The measurement used in the analyses is constructed based on three variables from the Beck et al. (2002, Keefer 2002) database of political institutions. I computed the fraction of the second largest party in government relative to the governing coalition based on the Beck et al. variables 2GOVSEATS (the number of government seats held by the second largest party of the government) and NUMGOV (the total number of house seats held by the government). In addition, I used the variables NUMOPP (the total number of house seats held

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14. My theory concerns civil wars, while the Armed Conflict Dataset includes both low-scale fighting as well as intense wars. I use the concepts ‘civil war’ and ‘conflict’ randomly, even though some of the observations can not be defined as war.
15. Due to missing data quite a few ‘peace years’ are missing. The time period under investigation consists of 2261 ‘peace years’ in total.
16. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Appendix 1. The dataset will be available upon publication.
17. Due to difficulties in finding reliable information on mutual veto, this characteristic is excluded from the analyses.
by the opposition) and NUMUL (the total number of house seats held by representatives with unknown allegiance) to calculate the total number of seats in parliament. The grand coalition variable used in the analyses is a dichotomous variable, with the value 1 if there is a grand coalition and 0 if not. In order to be recorded as a grand coalition, the fraction of the second largest party in government had to be at least 30%, and the government fraction of house seats had to be at least 50%.18

The proportionality principle in consociational democracy is supposed to decide the influence allocation in society. The proportionality variable is a dichotomous variable with the value 1 if there were proportional representation in the legislature and the value 0 if not. The proportionality variable is Beck et al.'s (2002) HOUSESYS, which reports what type of electoral system that governs the majority of the House seats (Keefer 2002: 17).

To avoid that the government in a postconflict society takes decisions which contradicts the interests of the different groups it is wise to leave as many decisions as possible to the groups themselves. The segmental autonomy variable is a dichotomous variable with the value 1 if there is segmental autonomy and the value 0 if not. The coding is based on the CENT variable (measuring geographic concentration of decision-making authority) from the Polity3 project (Jaggers and Gurr 1996) and Beck et al.’s (2002) AUTON variable (a dummy variable measuring whether there are contiguous autonomous regions). Unfortunately, the subsequent polity versions have not included a variable measuring centralization of state authority. To avoid missing data after 1994 the years 1995-2000 have the same CENT values as 1990-1994. In addition I cross-checked with the CIA world factbook to make sure the level of centralization had not changed since 1994.

All three variables have quite a few missing values, to avoid losing much information in the analyses all missing values are set to zero. Further, since I believe power-sharing has the greatest effect in the early postconflict years, all consociational variables are set to zero after ten years (3650 days after first day of peace).

In line with Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) I have made a variable which adds up the three independent variables, reflecting the assumption that the more power-sharing, the better. It is simply made by adding the values of the three independent variables, and has the value 0 if there are no consociational features at all, the value 1 of there is one, 2 if there are two, and 3 if all of the three consocia-

18. I also computed eight other coalition variables, with different thresholds for the second largest party and the government fraction of house seats. However, based on Cox regressions with all measurements, the chosen one (30% second largest party and 50% government seats in the Legislature) seemed most appropriate. See Appendix 2 for the Cox regressions.
tional features are present.

**Control Variables**

In addition to the independent variables some control variables are needed. These will reflect conditions other researchers have expected to influence the probability of lasting peace in postconflict societies.

One of Lijphart’s favorable conditions regarding the success of a consociational democracy is a **small size**. I use population data from Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2002) as a measurement of country size. The variable is in 1000s and ln-transformed.

The literature on **incompatibility** of civil war focus on two different types of incompatibility. Whether a conflict is over territory or over government, and whether the conflict is an ethnic or a non-ethnic conflict. The probability of conflict is greater in multi-ethnic countries than in homogeneous countries (Ellingsen 2000, Lake and Rothchild 1996, Reynal-Querol 2002), domestic conflicts over identity issues are also assumed to be harder to solve than conflicts over non-identity issues (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, Kaufmann 1996, Licklider 1995). Being in control over territory is for many groups essential and territorial conflicts might be harder to solve than governmental conflicts. Even though ethnic conflicts often coincide with territorial goals, this might not always be the case, and the incompatibility variable in the Armed Conflict Dataset do not reflect the division between ethnic and non-ethnic wars, the incompatibility variable included in the analyses therefore only distinguishes between civil wars over government and over territory. The variable **territorial conflict** has the value 1 for territorial conflicts and the value 0 for governmental conflicts.

The **costs of war** have often been viewed as influential when it comes to the probability of achieving lasting peace in a post-civil war country. It is assumed that the higher the costs, the higher the likelihood of lasting peace. The costs can be expressed in numerous ways, but usually it is expressed as the duration of conflict, or the intensity of the conflict. The **conflict duration** variable express the number of days the conflict lasted. The variable is ln-transformed. The intensity level of a civil war might influence the postconflict peace duration. My intensity variable is the best estimate of battle deaths from Lacina & Gleditsch (2005). This variable is also ln-transformed to reduce skewness.

**Political regime** probably has an effect on the peace duration, we already know that democracies are less likely to experience outbreak of conflict, therefore I assume that democracies also are less likely to experience failed peace periods. The measure of political regime most often used within
peace research is taken from the Polity Project’s Dataset (Marshall 2003). The control variable used in my dataset is the Polity2 variable, a democracy-autocracy scale where a country’s autocracy score is subtracted from its democracy score, it ranges from -10, perfectly autocratic, to +10, fully democratic.19

Most civil wars occur in less developed countries (Collier et al. 2003). It is also assumed that countries which are less developed economically have more trouble when trying to rebuild after war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000:785). I use GDP per capita and GDP growth from the World Bank Indicators (World Bank 2005). The GDP per capita variable is ln-transformed.

In addition, how a conflict ended is probably also related to the postconflict peace duration. I therefore also run the analyses with variables measuring whether the conflicts ended with victory for side A (the government), victory for side B (the opposition) or if there was a negotiated settlement. Other and unclear terminations constitute the reference category. Conflicts that ended with independence for side B are excluded from the analyses. Granting independence can be seen as an extreme form of segmental autonomy and therefore a sort of postconflict consociational feature, however, the other characteristics, coalition and proportionality, will have less meaning in those particular postconflict situations. The variables are from a not-yet-published dataset on postconflict justice (Binningsbø et al. 2005).

**Statistical Method: Cox Proportional Hazards Model**

In order to consider how consociational institutions influence postconflict peace duration I employ event history modeling. Even though it is likely that the risk of failure (resumed violence) decreases over time, I use the Cox proportional hazards model because it is more flexible and leaves the distributional form of duration unspecified (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The coefficients derived from Cox proportional hazards model relate to the hazard rate. Therefore, positive coefficients in the analyses imply shorter peace duration, while negative coefficients imply longer peace durations (Ibid. 59). In order to handle ties (two or more peace periods fail at the same time) I use the Breslow Method (Ibid. 54).

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19. The Polity2 variable uses standardized authority codes. The original polity variable reports the values ‘interruption’ (-66), ‘interregnum’ (-77) and ‘transition’ (-88). These values reflect in various ways unclear situations, and they are hard to interpret. In the Polity2 variable these values have been converted in the following manner (Marshall 2002): -66: system missing, -77: neutral polity score of 0, and -88: protracted across the span of the transition.
Empirical Analysis

In the following I test my hypotheses over different multivariate models. First I present how the variables perform in multivariate Cox regressions, with and without controlling for termination type (Table 1). Then I show how the additive composite measure performs, and how it seems that in order for power-sharing to have a positive impact on peace duration, it is sufficient with at least one consociational feature compared to none (Table 2).

Table 1 shows the consociational features, first without termination (Model 1) and then including the control for how conflicts end (Model 2), and how these relate to postconflict peace duration. Proportional representation is not significant in any of the models and in the model without termination the sign is even positive. Proportionality thus seems to have no influence on the risk of peace failure at all. However, both grand coalition and segmental autonomy have negative and significant effect on the risk of resumed conflict. Even when the model also controls for termination type the strong negative effect of coalition and autonomy holds.

The coefficient for grand coalition is extremely high in both models, thus indicating that almost none of the postconflict societies with grand coalition in the dataset experience a resumed conflict.20 Substantively, based on model 1 the risk of failure (resumed internal armed conflict) is 55% lower for postconflict societies with autonomy, compared to postconflict societies where the state authority is not decentralized, holding all other variables constant (at any time, given that it has not yet failed). When including termination type in the model (2), the risk of failure is even larger, with a 62% lower risk for postconflict societies with autonomy compared to no autonomy. Both hypotheses 1 and 3 are therefore supported, while hypothesis 2 can not be said to be supported by the analyses in table 1.

Among the control variables, not too many reach statistically significant levels. The coefficients for the different variables do not change much when termination type is included, thus strengthening the impression of the direction of effects. Type of conflict is never significant, and the coefficient also changes from positive in model 1 to negative in model 2. Among the variables expressing costs of war, conflict duration is not significant. However, in model 1 the p-value is not too far from a 0.1 threshold (0.136), it might seem that longer conflicts have a higher risk of resuming than shorter ones. In model 2 the negative effect is far from significant. In research by Doyle and

20. A closer look at the data reveals that among the ‘peace years’ with grand coalition only Philippines experience a failed peace when the conflict over Mindanao resumes January 1, 1994.
Sambanis (2000) the relationship between duration of conflict and peace-building success is only modestly supported, while Hoddie and Hartzell (2001) do not get significant results for their duration variable and its influence on lasting peace. Battle-deaths are negative and significant in model 1, and the p-value is 0.165 in model 2, thus indicating a longer peace survival time the larger the larger the number of people killed in battle. Interestingly though, the two costs of war variables show opposite influences.

Postconflict population is significant in both models, and countries with large populations have a higher risk of experiencing peace failure than smaller countries. This finding corresponds to the war outbreak literature, which finds that conflict is more likely in countries with large populations compared to small (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003). Political regime is far from significant, and the coefficient shifts from negative in model 1 to positive in model 2. Postconflict GDP per capita is not significant either, however, in the model with control for termination type (Model 2) the p-value for GDP is 0.122, not too far from the 10% level threshold. GDP growth, however, is significant when including termination. The higher growth, the lower is the risk of failure. Both GDP support the findings from conflict outbreak literature, that conflicts occur more often in less developed countries than more developed ones. Regarding type of termination (Model 2), victory for the government clearly reduce the risk of resumed conflict. A negotiated settlement also reduces the risk of failure (p-value is 0.105), although the effect is not as strong as for victory for side A.

With both grand coalition and segmental autonomy having negative and significant coefficients, one must assume that postconflict power-sharing has a substantial effect in increasing peace survival.

**Composite Consociational Features and Peace Duration**

When looking only at negotiated peace agreements Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) found that the more power-sharing institutions the longer was the postconflict peace. This might be true for my cases as well. Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 shows a Cox regression analysis with the composite consociational features variable as independent variable. The coefficient is negative and significant, supporting the hypothesis that the more power-sharing institutions, the longer is the postconflict peace duration. The effect gets even stronger when controlling for termination type as well. Substantively, going from the minimum value of consociational features (zero feature) to the maximum value (all three features) reduces the risk of failure by 78% in model 1 and by 87% in model 2. Controls perform similarly to
Table 1, but now also negotiated settlement has a negative and significant effect on risk of failure.

Increasing the number of power-sharing institutions significantly increase the postconflict peace duration. Models 3 and 4 shows that at least one feature is sufficient for a significant reduction in the risk of failure (resumed conflict), although only significant when termination type is included in the analysis (model 4). Substantively, based on model 2 the risk of resumed conflict is 58% lower when a postconflict society has at least one consociational feature compared to none.

The difference is clear. The more power-sharing features in postconflict societies, the longer is the peace survival.

Conclusion

Within peace studies most focus has been directed towards factors that influence the initial risk of outbreak of (internal) violent conflict. Less focus has been on how to end violent conflict. Recently, however, peace agreements and the role of the international community has received increasing interest (Hartzell et al. 2001, Stedman et al. 2002, Walter 1997, 2002). This research tends to conclude that power-sharing is a feasible solution for postconflict societies, and peace negotiations with such arrangements are less likely to break down and see renewed civil war.

Inspired by the consociational democracy formulated by Lijphart for plural societies (1969, 1977, 1985), and the findings from research on successful implementation of peace agreements (Hartzell 1999, Hartzell et al. 2001, Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, Walter 2002), I postulated that power-sharing democracy is the best approach to achieve sustainable peace in all postconflict societies, regardless of how the conflicts end. My findings show that there is a positive relationship between consociationalism and peace duration in postconflict societies. In particular grand coalition and segmental autonomy reduces the risk of resumed conflict (failure). Further, my analyses show that the more comprehensive the postconflict power-sharing, the longer is the postconflict peace survival. I have demonstrated that institutions matter and postconflict societies should look to the institutions of the consociational democracy in order to enhance postconflict peace.

As far as I know, no other research has explored quantitatively the relationship between consociational democracy, in fact any type of democracy, and peace duration in postconflict societies. Whereas researchers associated with the World Bank have emphasized economic factors and their influence on lasting peace, the Bank has given less attention to various political institutions (Bigombe et al. 2000, Collier et al. 2001, 2003, Doyle and Sambanis 2000). The positive impact of power-sharing
institutions on lasting peace has been discussed by Hartzell and her associates (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003), Stedman et al. (2002) and Walter (2002), but their focus has been on civil wars ending in peace agreements rather than on all civil wars. My study contributes with findings regarding postconflict institutions for all civil wars.

To get a better understanding of the relationship between political institutions and civil war termination different approaches should be taken. Theoretically, a closer investigation of what kind of democratic institutions that lead to a democratic civil peace theory is needed. Empirically, better and more detailed data are required. Data on state level, regarding electoral systems, governments and autonomy arrangements are available, but these are flawed by large number of missing, in particular for the countries of interest for peace research. Data on group level, regarding both (ethnic) groups in a country and the groups that are parties to war is also needed. Analytically, better knowledge on the relationship between type of democracy, political institutions, and peace duration can be achieved by using a variety of statistical methods.

Nonetheless, what is most important within peace research is the policy implications the results lead to. People in war-torn countries do not necessarily demand more research, but ask for action. My paper provides even more support to the already emphasized positive relationship between power-sharing and sustainable peace.

References


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Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten (2002): Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP).


California Press.


mond: Curzon Press.
### Appendix 1 Summary statistics, 1975-2000.

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<th>Std. Dev.</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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*# Coalition with second largest party at least 30% of government seat and coalition at least 50% of seats in legislature.*

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Robust p values statistics in parentheses

1435 'peace years'

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 1. Cox proportional hazard estimates with various individual consociational features, 1975-2000.

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^h Coalition with second largest party at least 30% of government seat and coalition at least 50% og seats in legislature.
1435 ‘peace years’

Robust p values statistics in parentheses

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2. Cox proportional hazards estimates with additive consociational features, 1975-2000.

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<th>(1) Peace duration</th>
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Robust p values statistics in parentheses
1435 ‘peace years’
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%