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Non-military security challenges

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Introduction

A certain understanding of security plays a role in every aspect of life.[1] Despite the fact that fear, anxiety, danger and doubt are fundamental social and individual experiences, the scholarly study of security has traditionally been limited to the field of international studies, associated primarily with the status of nation-states in relation to each other. According to this conventional concept, the state is both the object of security and the primary provider of security. Today a burgeoning literature is revisiting the traditional Cold War based notion security (Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2000; Alkire, 2003; Baldwin, 1995, 1997; Booth, 2005; Brown, 1997; Buzan, 1991a, 1991b; Dalby, 1997, 2000; Derian, 1993; Dillon, 1996; Huysmans, 1998; Kaldor, 2000; Lipschutz, 1995; Rothschild, 1995; Tickner, 1995; Ullmann, 1983; Wæver, 1997, 2000; Williams, 1994; Wyn Jones, 1999). This literature is based on a general consensus among both scholars and practitioners that a wide range of security threats, both new and traditional, confronts states, individuals and societies. New forms of nationalism, ethnic conflict and civil war, information technology, biological and chemical warfare, resource conflicts, pandemics, mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and environmental dangers challenge the conventional means of understanding threats and of assuring the security of all regions of the world. The growing awareness of these new threats is challenging the way in which the principles and tasks of security scholarship are presently understood.

Across this wide range of insecurities, two distinct features characterize threats to security: they surpass the boundaries of the nation-state and they are interconnected through processes of globalization. No one state can manage the array of threats to its own security, nor can any one state manage the threats to the security of its neighbours both inside and outside of its region. In the globalised setting, the challenge of maintaining security is no longer limited to the traditional foreign policy and military tools of the nation-state, security and insecurity are no longer considered as conditioned only upon geopolitics and military strength, but also on social, economic, environmental, moral and cultural issues (Tuchman, 1989; Suhrke, 1999).

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The logic of security

This mutation in our understanding of security is not only an empirical one, it is a conceptual one as well. The conceptual logic of security has evolved significantly in the past decades. By conceptual logic, we mean the interacting function of three dimensions of the concept: its object, its subject and its agency. As the present volume documents, the concept has had a relatively short and significantly turbulent history. This is coupled with observable inflation in the use of the concept. Reaching far beyond the scope of traditional national security a new economy of security has formed, identifying, analyzing, re-tooling and voicing a new set of security threats to which it proposes to respond with a set of newly adapted security measures. This economy is a perpetual motion machine: threats we never knew we actually faced appear to be answered by new means of differentiation. This tendency can be characterized through five general observations.

Firstly, security is becoming increasingly commercialized. Security has become merchandise that can be bought or sold on a more or less open security market. Commercial security guards replace public police forces, the number of tasks carried out by contracted security consultants has grown sharply, mercenaries replace national security forces. Security merchandise circulates across borders, social classes, services, organizations, interests and allegiances.

Secondly, providers of security, be they public or private, take increasingly often recourse to technological solutions. If security were ever considered a human enterprise, (a question to which we will return) then it is most certainly less so today. Human beings are less than ever part of the security equation. The security challenges of today are more than ever resolved by investing in the tools of science, in the ambition of developing more certain, more precise, more invisible and more dependable solutions to security threats. Humans, the traditional object of security, increasingly stand in the way of security solutions, reducing their efficiency. The epitome of security today is a tool whose technological qualities makes possible the absence of humans.

Thirdly, the technologization of security has lead to the advanced stages of an industrialization of security, implying a kind of internal 'product' differentiation. According to the well exercised logic of late capitalism, demand thereby does not increase as a function of needs, but rather as a function of supply: the more the supply of commercially available technological security solutions, the more we need them. Security is itself a merchandise: the more it becomes more diversified, localized, tailored to its context to its consumer, and to its user.

Fourthly, security has become globalized. Traditionally linked to the autonomy of the territorial nation-state, linked to the categories, concerns and tools of political and geographical borders, where physical frontiers demarcate friend from foe and war from peace. This territorial attachment, and even predication, of security is gradually being loosened. The image of threat has become more diffuse and more ubiquitous, ambiguous, and invisible. Moreover, we see the rise of the notion of risk in conjunction with the changes in the concept of security. *Risk* replaces *danger* as the object of security concerns. The discourse of risk replaces *real* danger with virtual danger, unspecified but calculable danger.

Finally, the collective effect of these transformations in the notion of security is *production* of insecurity. In other words, insecurity increases proportionally with the accelerated reflection upon security and changing approaches to security. The battle against a variety of forms of threat most often leads to instrumental and technological responses, that leave little space for the human subjects. We fortify walls, erect barriers, develop systems of detection. Yet these technological systems have only a limited effect of rendering us secure. The have the side-effect of rendering us less sure, less confident, more dependent. Less confidence implies less security.

The purpose of this chapter is to take stock of the most prominent challenges to non-military security and evaluate these principles based on this empirical survey. The survey begins with the anchoring point and reference of essentially all non-military security challenges, the notion of human security. The scope and influence of this 15-year-old concept can hardly be underestimated. It links in one way or another to all the other sub-fields of the survey: societal insecurity, migration, climate change, water and resources, energy insecurity, organized crime (narcotics, arms and human trafficking), health insecurity. Each of these challenges corresponds to a literature of its own, and each, in a different way embodies and problematizes the theoretical principles mentioned above.

Human insecurity

Human security has become a canonical concept, with its own origin and distinct history. Most analytical and conceptual considerations of human security take the 1994 United Nations *Human Development Report* as more or less the alpha of human security thinking (UNDP, 1994). Though the report demonstrably does not represent the first use of the concept in general, the force of its impact on global discussion is undeniable. In the wake of the Cold War it has became clear that, for the developing world, 'security' held an entirely different set of priorities than what was held to be the security issues of the period of nationalized super-power 'mutually assured destruction'. The UNDP report takes its point of departure in the problem of the cloak laid over the rest of the globe by the Cold War focus on security on the transcontinental scale. The UNDP report is both provocative, in the sense that it argues that that the long-standing tradition of the using 'security' to refer to geopolitical issues is entirely misguided. reconciliatory in the sense that it proposes human security as a supplement to Cold War

security The crisis and rapid expansion in the concept of international security not only had little relevance for improving conditions, but indeed contributed to their detriment. In the developing world, the important questions of security were not geopolitical, not even related to issues of balance of military powers. Instead, the moments of insecurity arose from disease, hunger, unemployment, social conflicts, crime, political repression, etcetera. Questions of security and insecurity are also to be found on the personal, the sub-group or the interpersonal level.

Analyzing security and insecurity from the point of view of human insecurity requires a re-tooling of security studies, a shift away the analytic tools and observation methods of both military- and nation-state based security thinking. Thus, a clear methodological imperative informs the new non-conventional thinking on security suggesting that the good will of social scientific analysts and politicians will most certainly motivate them to revaluate their premises. At the same time, however, it is impossible to ignore the ideological timber of the notion of human security, which, it is important to note, originates in the UN's Development Programme. Development has been neglected, forgotten and overshadowed by a certain use of the term 'security'.

The concept of human security emerges in a moment of history between what will likely be considered as two momentous eras, between Cold War geopolitics and the geopolitics of trans-national terrorism. It thus not only identifies two different kinds of security and insecurity, grows out of an era dramatically marked by two different orders of fear and by the emergence of an entirely different environment of threat, a new concept of 'war' and a radically different sense of insecurity.

The well-known 1994 UNDP Human Development Report begins with the premise that the large-scale geopolitical conception of security is not adequate. The Cold War model builds upon a fundamental assumption that the wide-ranging threat to the global political order is the most significant threat to the well-being of all individuals. The assumption is not only one of levels, collective versus individual, as is often suggested. It is a greater difference in world-view, one in which the entire world order is threatened, that is, a certain understanding of reality, of the entire constellation of relations between people, society, state and world (UNDP, 1994).

Fear and insecurity are imaginary, based on images of what could happen, what is likely, what is threatening, what is risky, etcetera? The UNDP report suggests that a different scope of imagination is relevant for the two conceptions of security. For the global level, the threat concerns the collapse of an entire way of ordering facts and ideas, peoples and societies. Insecurity in the larger sense is related to the possibility of a general collapse, the possibility of a shift in the conditions for relating to the world at all. By reason of scale, these are always forcibly on a level the cannot be grasped by any one individual. It is supra individual. A consensus on the shared experience of insecurity is difficult at best.

Doubtless, the UNDP report, like its successor, the Commission on Human Security's *Human Security Now*, is a very idealistic document. It sets out the shape of an ideal world, one in which security on an individual level is generalized across all communities in all parts of the world (CHS, 2003). Less often noted in reconstructions of the short history of human security is that the UNDP report also provides the most powerful moral voice for the needs of those subject to human insecurity. In short, the UNDP report locates security and insecurity on the personal level and small group level. The location (or re-location) of the focus of security and insecurity is the foundation of a general ethics of insecurity and for a comprehensive analysis of the nature: in other words, at the level of *ethical judgment*.

Societal insecurity

As discussed in Chapter 3, among the most lively research and policy debates revisited in the wake of the Cold War is that concerning individual and societal dimensions of security (Buzan, 1991b; Buzan et al., 1998; Krause and Williams, 1996; Sorensen, 1996). As we have suggested the Cold War grip on research in security studies and international affairs, which was prolonged for a variety of reasons, found itself opened to re-conceptualizing (Baldwin, 1997; Bilgin, 2003; Tickner, 1995). The principal evolution in theory of security is well rehearsed in this literature: Cold War geopolitics privileged a realist focus on the nation-state as subject and object-referent of security. Security threats originated in a more or less anarchical international arena as confrontations between states, represented by diplomatic positions, and backed up by militaries. In terms of concepts, this constellation builds on the principal formula: state = nation = society.

Nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War it has nearly become a commonplace to underscore that this equivalence not only does not hold, but has essentially never corresponded to the real situation in any given state-nation-society constellation. The direct implication is that the security of the state is not equivalent to the security of the society or societies it encompasses, just at is not equivalent to the security of individuals that reside within its borders. Here too a variety of interpretations has been advanced. The most comprehensive version understands threat to societal security as a threat to the continued longevity of society, leaving what society, how its structure and limits may be constituted (Wæver et al., 1993: 23). This concept of societal security, advanced in the 1990s has been extremely influential in developing new understandings of threat to societal security.

Societal insecurity involves threats to the fundamental make-up of a society. These are aspects such as values, traditions, customs, language, religion, ethnicity, etcetera. These characteristics of a given group are often referred to as identity. When speaking of societal dimensions of security we thus commonly refer to threats to the identity of a group. Understanding social identity, be it in terms of threat or not also raises a number of theoretical issues about what determines identity and it what sense it can be threatened (McSweeney, 1999: 68-78). According to Buzan, Wæver *et al*, threats to societal security can

be understood to fall along two axes, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal threats to societal security refer to identities that compete with one another within a society. The social and cultural practices of the one social group are threatened because of the overriding social and cultural practices of an other group or groups. It is thus the social practices or the identities of other groups that threaten the group in question. These can be all for language priorities, religious practices, work and leisure norms, food and resources use, etcetera. Vertical threats take the form integrating practices from above. An overarching organization, ideology, group, or even state overtakes and assimilates or integrates the social group in question, with the result that social identity in question is weakened to the point of potential disintegration or actually repressed by political forces (Buzan et al., 1998: 121).

Migration and insecurity

Migration encompasses security issues along a number of axes. It includes people who move both within and across national boundaries, internal and international migrants respectively. It refers to people moving out of choice and those who are forced to move, and people moving for political, economic, social and environmental reasons, or a combination of these factors. It also includes people at all stages of the migration cycle – from departure through living and settling abroad to return, as well as their experiences *en route*, for example in transit countries (Koser, 2006).

Like a number of other security challenges, migration-related insecurity increased significantly following the end of the Cold War. And like so many the events of 911 have intensified awareness of and debate about migration (Faist, 2004). The migrant is more easily construed today as a potential national enemy than earlier, and the subsequent securitization of the migrant and migration in general has had enormous consequences for both individuals and states.

Migration and in particular migration from the developing to the developed regions of the world has become a central focus of political discourse (Ceyhan & Tsoukala, 2002). As the global economic gap widens the motivation to migrate in order to obtain better living conditions grows in kind. Variations in vulnerability to economic, political, environmental, health-based shocks or crises create a need to seek security by moving. Migration is thus a clear consequence of insecurity. Moreover, the experience of migration is often filled with insecurities and vulnerabilities of a variety of kinds.

From the point of view of the arrival societies of migrants, be they refugees or other, there is a distinct insecurity created, (Akan, 2003; Faist, 2004; Huysmans, 1995; Kicinger, 2004; Roe, 2004). Host societies experience threats to social stability through problematization of endogenous cultures, itself answered by various forms of xenophobia. Demographic changes and with them economic changes can be perceived as threatened as a function of changes in family and group make-up. Cultural, religious and ethnic identity can be the source of conflict and security. These changes in populations carry with them

changes in the ways that developed state-based societies care for citizens and those who have legal right to care. These changes motivate significant dynamics through the politics of border security, homeland, security, integration, citizenship and cultural pluralism, etcetera.

The relationship between security, insecurity and migration is also linked, to greater or lesser degrees, to human and narcotics trafficking, and associated international criminality. It is safe to say that this 'security-migration nexus' has since 11 September 2001 served political interests more or less unrelated to actual migration flows. Thus, the effects of security responses to the perceived insecurity of demographic changes stemming from migration are often unintended (Faist, 2004: 4-5).

The non-military aspects of migration are however not limited to the real and perceived threats to host societies. Clearly, migration is in the majority of cases already the reflection of one kind or another of insecurity in the migrant's homeland. Populations tend to move because they are in situations of unease, unrest or direct danger. Thus while humanitarian catastrophes of the type that provoke migration are sometimes adequately analyzed and understood as security issues, migration for the migrant is a security issue of another kind altogether, one that is seldom linked to the insecurities generated in 'receiver' societies. Lastly, the experience of migration itself is implies a variety of security threats to the migrant. Migrants on the move generally do not benefit from the security protection offered by authorities or national police (Koser, 2005, 2006). On the contrary, they are most often in a situation of illegality or directly outside the law. In many cases, they are entirely dependent upon a mediator who arranges travel according to terms that leave the migrant little or no assurance of protection against dangers of travel, of fellow migrants or even from the mediator.

Economic explanations dominate migration research. The focus is most commonly on global economic conditions as the key determinants of population movements (Böhning, 1972; Böhning, 1984; Borjas, 1990; Simon, 1999). To this clearly important dimension must also be added the security threats created by international political forces. International population movements are in many cases motivated by political causes that are only marginally related to global economic issues. Moreover, despite the post-national nature of the migration phenomena the immigration policies of nation-states often shape or even determine how migration actually takes place (Weiner, 1992: 96-97).

Climate change and insecurity

Climate change has the distinction of being transformed into a security issue even before it left the scientific laboratories. A highly ideologized debate about what the facts actually are about environmental change has carried on for decades. In December 1997 55 parties signed the Kyoto Protocol an international agreement under the auspices of the United Nations. The Protocol committed signatories to the reduction of the CO2 and other greenhouse gases. The protocol which entered into force in

2005 was famously opposed by the United States partly on the basis that it was mere climatological charlatanism, partly on the argument that it would threaten the American Way of Life. In 1992 the United Nation Conference on Environment and Development, the Rio 'Earth Summit' convened on a consultation basis to review progress. The United States continued to impede bringing an increasingly securitize rhetoric to the sphere of debate. Yet it was not the destruction of the climate that was the a national threat in the eyes of the US. It was rather the spectre of regulations on industrial production and innovation that produced the threat. It was the environmentalists that where securitized, not the environment (Dalby, 1996). Visible changes in environment conditions in the last years have further popularized debate about the threats that may be linked to environmental change.

An important academic literature has evolved linking environmental issues with military conflict, in particular with issues of inter-state conflict, civil war and inter-group conflict. The relation between degradation, scarcity and armed conflict, either in the form of civil war or inter-group violence science research has been documented along a number of axes (Dalby, 2006). A strong thread of research has attempted to show that environmental scarcity is directly correlated with conflict. Scarcity, it is argued, causes despair that in turn leads to conflict. The degree to which the scarcity-violence link should be conditioned and constrained has been the object of wide debate. Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994) and others have drawn significant conclusions about the which environmental conditions can be correlated with inter-state warfare. Others who have argued that other political, economic and social factors condition the degree to which environmental, in particular 'resource' scarcity can be linked to security issues have nuanced this research (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

The particular version of the development-security nexus concerning security transforms environmental issues to directly non-military mode. Environmental insecurity is dependent on the resilience of individuals and societies to environment shocks. This includes on the one hand possessing the economic robustness necessary to understand economic downturns relative to agricultural production, transport of goods or production loss caused by environmental damage. Environmental insecurity on the personal level is caused by environmental destruction of home, neighbourhood, or local infrastructure. Disease and malnourishment are also results of economic catastrophe. In addition, the vulnerability of states and local civil governments to crises brought about by environmental change often have immediate consequences for local groups and individuals through the loss of services or life- and health-giving infrastructures. This 'political ecology' re-visits the premises of security and development economy in a way that leaves military geopolitics relatively irrelevant.

In this way the north-south dimension and a series of difficult development questions are increasingly linked to the climate-security nexus, and must in turn be associated with the question of technology (Dalby, 2002). The affluent developed world is here regarded as the primary culprit in terms of

provoking environment destruction to which the developing world is particularly exposed, and therefore insecure. This version of post-national security links it directly to the rise of human insecurity. More complex is the horizon of re-nationalization which implied by the north-south tension. The developing world's climate generated insecurity has recently shown signs of reversing its flow. On the one hand it is closely related to the expanding migration flows toward from developing to developed societies. Migration issues thus fall back onto the mechanisms of border security, more or less adapted to addressing them (Allenby, 2000).

Water and resource conflicts

Scholarship on water resources has long been a standard component in scholarship on geopolitics (Sprout and Sprout, 1965). However the link between water and security has emerged only in the post-Cold War scholarly debate about the scope of the security concept itself (Tuchman, 1989; Baldwin, 1997). In conformity with the classical understanding of security as geopolitics, it emerges first and foremost out of interest for *national* strategic issues, and, least initially, those most relevant for U.S. foreign policy (Allison and Treverton, 1992; Romm, 1993), then extended to scholarship on the scope of international security, finally joining the ongoing debate about the scope and reach of the 'new security concept' (Ullman, 1983; Gleick, 1990; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Gleick, 1993; Kliot, 1994; Tickner, 1995; Wolf, 1995; Chaturvedi, 1998; Giordano, Giordano et al., 2002; Selby, 2005). These valuable studies cover a wide variety of aspects of the security-water nexus. They nonetheless share one common analytic characteristic: They all regard water as a simple and finite object of political action. They presuppose water to be a good that, like other goods, can be taken up into a predetermined calculus of strategic advantage and disadvantage. Water-security analyses of this kind are entirely possible without asking what kind of role water plays outside the sphere of geopolitics, its national, regional, or local or personal specificity.

An illustration of this type of analysis is Gleick's 'Water and Security: Resources and International Security'. The analysis opens with the observation that 'As we approach the twenty-first century, water and water-supply systems are increasingly likely to be both objectives of military action and instruments of war…' (Gleick, 1993). In the age of post-bipolar conflict water as resource slides easily into a discourse of war in which all elements are considered in terms of their contribution to or detraction from the objective aim of the conflict- Thus '[…] even water can fit into this framework if water provides a source of economic or political strength' (1993). By the same token, in an equally important parallel logic of war water is routinely instrumentalized as a simple means to military ends and the use of water and water-resources as 'both offensive and defensive weapons' is not unusual. Damns (Yalu River, Korean War), irrigation water-ways (Syria-Israel in the 1950's), desalination plants (Persian Gulf War,

1990), and sanitation systems (Iraq War) have long been used as means to attain strategic advantage (1993).

Gleick's study, like many others of its kind, is true to its premises and irreproachable as such. More recent approaches to water security underscore how effectively the old geopolitical paradigm oversees the basis for water's strategic value: the function it has as a life-giving source for the individuals than make up the local, regional, national, even global populations. In the logic of geopolitical strategy it is not a question of the conditions under which tensions over water arise or play themselves out between actual people in concrete settings. The general pattern in this literature is that the geopolitics of water brackets entirely the issue of how water comes to be scarce, how its scarcity affects populations, what it means in terms of life from the point of view of groups and individuals who have immediate contact with the resource. Indeed as is the tendency in geopolitical analysis in general, groups and individuals are by and large bracketed from the analysis.

In recent years this geopoliticization of water has led to a stronger, and indeed more alarmist, rendering of the instrumentalization of water. The concept of 'water wars' has emerged (Westing, 1986; Starr, 1991) provoking a new debate about whether such a conflict is likely Others have drawn evidence of impending water wars into question (Wolf, 1999; Alam, 2002; Sinha, 2006). Yet regardless of which side one takes in this debate the discourse of water remains one of the instrumental logic of war, interrogating the geopolitical mechanics and strategic viability of waging war over water. Water remains the means to one end, which is the security of the state.

Alternative approaches seek to underscore the human aspects of water, in both abundance and scarcity, implicitly suggesting that the traditional picture of resource conflict is incomplete. The analytical logic of war takes water as a given, an unproblematic object of contention. Either they have it or we have. The question of its 'actual' value is never posed, only the question of its exchange value in the political economy of conflict. Yet the complete picture of these reasons water cannot be simply assimilated to the growing jargon of 'resource conflict'. It not only has multitude of meanings and values for countless people. These aspects of water, do not emerge in public debate or closed political forums? Why?

Energy insecurity

Few concepts have grown in importance in the field of international affairs as fast as *energy security*. It goes nearly without saying that energy has itself always been a central dimension in the reflection and strategy on security. Its significance has however been traditionally limited to geo-strategic dimensions: The ability to wage war in modern times is closely linked to the ability to produce weapons on an industrial scale, to support energy-driven devices and, to wage war itself. Thus in the classical grammar of war and security, energy, most prominently oil, enters into any and all strategic calculations.

In the late modern era, the notion of energy security has risen in importance for other reasons. It is primarily do to the transformation of the global market into an arena for security politics. The threats stemming from energy are linked to the deep and to a large degree un-regulated integration of the global economy. The world is deeply interdependent, interlinked in ways that exceed both the instrumentality of goal oriented international relations and the democratic systems that A central part of that economy is the global energy market. Through it, the major economic powers of the globe are interlinked less by their shared need for energy, though this is largely a given, but rather by their shared need for *stability*. What happens in the energy market has profound consequences of general economic conditions to be sure, but it has arguably far more threatening consequences for global capital system on which all depend. The classical capitalist principles of credit, investment, distribution and profit depend on stable money markets and stable conditions of production. The correlates to this market-based logic of insecurity can be mapped along three primary themes: the Middle East, peak oil, climate change.

Add to this the fact that both China and India are postured to become world economic powers, easily surpassing the energy production and consumption levels of the U.S. and energy insecurity are raised considerable The energy market will only become tighter in the coming decades and the margin of security correspondingly acute. Stability is the key a large part of the growth in the world energy supply after 2010 will occur in countries in transition: in unstable conditions for production and investment. The 'stability' function of energy security in this points to three fundamental security issues.

Firstly, *peak oil* has become a touchstone for a certain kind of dramatic insecurity. It refers to the notion that we are approaching the point of exhaustion of oil resources, that the global production of energy can no longer be increased. Though new oil fields will doubtless be found, the economics of exploitation will either be preventive or lead to critically high energy prices, multiplying instability and thus energy insecurity

Secondly, global climate change: any lingering doubts about the reality of global warming have disappeared in only the last few years. The demonstrations between climate change and carbon dioxide emission has robust credibility. The practical consequences in terms of individual and human security are clear. Those living in conditions of fragility, be it material or economic, are more exposed to the environmental consequences of global energy consumption. Changes in the global pattern will have direct consequences form them.

Thirdly, the *Middle East*, in which 60% of known oil reserves lie, remains politically unstable The origins are historical and their maintenance ideological. Indeed the instability is such that it in some sense provides a predictive stability that is relevant to the logic of energy security. Oil is to varying degrees used as a tool, not as an objective

This situation is framed by what can be called the 'Energy Security System' (Yergin, 2007). It was created in response to the oil shock of 1973. It encouraged collaboration between the industrialized countries in the event of a disruption in supply and coordination on energy policies in order to avoid scrambling for supplies, and deter use of 'oil weapons.' It was networked with a set of strategic stockpiles of oil, including, and continuously monitored and analyzed of energy markets and policies. (Yergin, 1991). Energy insecurity is among the most pronounced effects of globalization and international connectedness. It is a concretization of the an interconnected global economy and perhaps more importantly the concretization of the interconnectedness of information, the speed and rapidity of market reactions to information, its low threshold for influence, its ability to create and solve crisis. The most noteworthy consequence of energy insecurity is that it cannot be eliminated by direct physical means. Integrating members of the new energy security community, including China and India into a security regime will require tailoring knowledge to individual settings, understanding what individual actors understand by security.

Transnational organised crime

Transnational organized crime operates to a large degree along the models of today's international businesses. Essentially the same structural evolution in the international community that has accompanied the rapid expansion of a global market, global supply and provision and global distribution have not only benefit international criminal organizations but has helped them to evolve in efficient and profitably ways. In short, criminal organizations are international organizations very much like others. Increased mobility, open exchange arrangements and, not least, the overburdening of customs and international control mechanisms have all contributed to an opening of the horizon of international trade (Williams, 1994). Like legal business organizations the lifeblood of illegal international organizations are the flow of money, it invisibility and convertibility. More than ever before illegal organizations are able to transfer money from one place to another and from currency to another with considerable ease (Daams, 2003; Galeotti, 2002; Krause, 1971; Ohmae, 1990; De Ruyver, 2002).

Narcotics trafficking

The most important illegal organized activity surrounds the global distribution of narcotics. The illicit drug trade is among the largest industries in the world with the major Columbian cocaine cartels and the Asian opium cartels dominating activities. A correlation has also been made between the production and trafficking of illicit drugs. The most clear link here is in terms of narcotics as a resource that can be seized through a successfully campaigns (Cornell, 2005). Thus direct support of terrorist activities through means provided by the narcotics industry has also been widely documented (Hardouin & Weichhardt, 2006).

The direct non-military security challenge of illicit narcotics trafficking is clearly its affect on the integrity of societies. For a variety of social and cultural reasons drug trafficking poses a threat to the security of individual well-being and social cohesion. This less because of the direct effects drug use has on individuals than it is because of the intimate link between drugs and violence. This link has a number of levels. First and foremost, organized criminal organized, unlike non-criminal organization are willing to go to considerable violent means to protect their profits. Secondly, the potential for interpersonal violence committed by narcotics users in the pursuit of means to supply their own substances is considerably higher than for others. Lastly, individual drugs are far more exposed to health consequences and interpersonal violence than non-drug users (Williams, 1994: 329-330).

Thus at the organization level security issues arise in conflicts between cartels, states, law enforcement agencies and individuals that should come in the way of economic activities. In a number of cases, particularly with respect to Latin American drug cartels, the illegal organizations are primary geo-political actors, rivalling or even dominating the state. The peripheral role and weakness of the state has clear consequences for social and economic support services provided to society by the state.

Human trafficking

Human trafficking takes a number of forms. By definition, it involves moving men, women and children from one place to another and placing them in conditions of forced labour. Among current practices are domestic labour, agricultural labour, sweatshop, factory or restaurant work and forced prostitution. According to a 2000 US Congressional Research Service report somewhere between 700,000 and 2 million people are trafficked each year across international borders. Of these 35 percent are under the age of 18 (CRS, 2000). Trafficking of women for the purposes of prostitution is bar the most comprehensive both in terms of numbers of individuals and financial exchange, rivalling the global narcotics and arms trades. This multi-billion dollar industry has not ceased to expand in the last decades. Yet compared to the global drug trade, trafficking in women contains lower risks and less danger for perpetrators.

Clearly, the primary object of lost or lowered security are the individuals who are trafficked. To varying degrees, they are removed from state-based systems of social welfare and protection. There existences are often uncharted and undocumented. Since their own activities are often illegal, or semi-legal, they have limited access to police or other public protection. Loss or weakening of security takes place at several levels. Most globally, human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation deprives victims of human security in terms of the violation of human rights and dignity. Furthermore, such trafficking puts its objects in the line of danger in terms of both individual and public health, deprives them of freedom of movement and removes protections from physical, emotional and sexual abuse. Trafficking in persons

is also regarded as at threat to global security in the sense that it is often part of a larger phenomenon of illegal migration and organized crime, thus threatening global governance (Jackson, 2006: 303).

Trafficking of all kinds, but in particular trafficking in women is linked to networks of international crime in general, linked to money laundering, and weapons and drug trafficking. Illicit money made from organized prostitution and other forms of trafficking tends to remain in circulation in illicit activities. Though there are exceptions, profits tend to finance more trafficking or other forms illegal commerce (Hughes, 2000: 10).

Human trafficking can also be read as a consequence of social and economic insecurity. As in the case of migration, individuals most often fall victim to trafficking when their conditions of life are insecure, in some cases desperately insecure. Thus, poor economic conditions are a primary cause of trafficking and thus, like socio-economic insecurity in general, it has knock-on effects in terms of trafficking.

Arms trafficking

The flow of small arms weapons has grown continuously in the last decades to become a worldwide security crisis. Every year millions of weapons are produced and sold on the world arms market. Accordingly, violence caused by or carried by means of small arms, be it in civil wars, inter-group conflicts in the developing world, or domestic violence in Western cities, has not ceased to expand. Small arms have a number of particular attributes that make them well suited to worldwide proliferation. They are relatively inexpensive, they are easy to maintain, and they are portable (Jackson et al., 2005: 10).

Small arms are therefore the weapon of choice in most internal conflicts. This is to a large degree for international-legal reasons. The market for small arms defies the controls and security mechanisms surrounding larger-scale weapons used by national militaries. Thus they fall into the grey zone between the domain of national police protection and military regulations. In addition, a vast variation in national laws makes the possession and even the exchange of a wide variety of weapons legal and particle. The international disparities in control also create difficulties in terms of documenting the movement of arms.

Although men are the primary victims of small arms distributed by illegal trafficking, women and children are particularly vulnerable. In armed conflicts supported by small arms there is a clear correlation between the proliferation of small and sexual violence against women (Hemenway et al., 2002). A similar correlation has been documented between small arms violence and the force flight. Small arms not only contribute to people leaving their homes in conflict environment, but also endanger them in flight and hinder their return. Finally, small arms violence has important knock-on effects on security in terms of health, education and welfare (Jackson et al., 2005: 33-48).

Health insecurity

At the heart of individual security is the notion that a people-centred view of security is not only necessary in ensuring the rights and dignity of the individual, but also in securing national, regional and global stability. In protecting the rights and development of the individual, security can be ensured on a much broader scale. In this respect, health security represents an integral component of individual security and is inextricably linked to the other categories that characterize it – that is, economic, food, environmental, personal, community and political securities.

In an era of globalization threats to health represents a more prominent insecurity than ever. At its most basic, health security entails 'the protection against illness, disability and avoidable death', according to the Commission on Human Security. However, good health encompasses more than just a physical state of being. Health can be defined as 'not just the absence of disease', but as a 'state of complete physical, mental and social well-being'. Health is both objective physical wellness and subjective psychosocial well-being and confidence about the future. It provides one with the capacity to make choices and exercise options (CHS, 2003: 96).

A health approach to insecurity acknowledges both objective and subjective health, subjective insecurity being just as relevant as objective threats, and thus one of the central roles of government and its institutions is to generate public confidence and reduce fear. The degree to which governments succeed in this task is a partial measure of insecurity in society (Chen and Narasimhan, 2002: 12). The securitization of health suggests that health can be prioritized along the same reasoning as defence and military investments are prioritized in the concept of state security. Health security highlights the interrelationship between the concepts of human security and national security in that in some cases the former is not possible without the latter.

Accordingly, a security approach to health entails ensuring that health security is a public good equally accessible to all. It consists of two fundamental components: empowerment and protection. Empowerment constitutes strategies that 'would enhance the capacity of individuals and communities to assume responsibility for their own health', while protection comprises strategies that 'would promote the three institutional pillars of society: to prevent, monitor and anticipate health threats' (Chen, 2004: 12). Implicit in this approach is the involvement of various sectors of society in negotiating threats to health. Health security is connected to and informed by social, behavioural, environmental, political and economic factors. All these factors are interlinked and do not act in isolation, raising the question as to how one is to identify and assess risks to health security.

Interconnecting social, behavioural, environmental, political and economic factors combine to contribute to an inequitable balance of health security in any given region of the world, affecting the physical and psychosocial well-being of individuals disproportionately. Threats to health are generally experienced

disproportionately by the poor and marginalized segments of a population. Lower socio-economic groups experience higher mortality rates – including a higher risk of mortality due to cardiovascular disease, shorter life expectancy, higher self-assessed morbidity rates, a higher prevalence of most chronic conditions, and a higher prevalence of mental health problems and disability (Mackenbach, 2005: 5). Individuals at a financial disadvantage are on average likely to experience more psycho-social stress, which can evolve into different forms of psychological and physical ailments including depression, alienation, suicide, high blood pressure, strokes and heart attacks. Health risks shaped by lifestyle factors, such as obesity and health problems associated with smoking also tend to be higher among individuals of lower income (Ghai, 1997).

What are the major challenges to health security? At what point does a health problem become a security threat? The World Health Organization defines risk as 'a probability of an adverse outcome, or a factor that raises that probability' (WHO, 2002: 9). In addition, the Commission on Human Security identifies four criteria that influence the strength of links between health and human security: (1) the scale of the disease burden in the present and in the future; (2) the urgency for action; (3) the depth and extent of the impact on society; and (4) the interdependencies or 'externalities' that can create ripple effects that extend beyond the particular diseases, persons or locations. From these criteria, the Commission on Human Security identifies three broad health challenges that are closely linked to human security: global infectious diseases, poverty-related threats, and violence and crisis (CHS, 2003: 97). These criteria underscore threats posed by such diseases as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, food-borne illnesses and avian influenza to health security.

First, among the most visible challenges to individual and societal security is the couple HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. While the incidence of HIV/AIDS is not a prerequisite for tuberculosis and vice versa, the two are closely associated, HIV being one of the largest individual risk factor for developing TB. Thus, the segments of the world population at higher risk of contracting either are the same. Secondly, instances of food-borne illness, despite being relatively underreported, have increased over the last twenty years, particularly in the case of illnesses caused by salmonella and campylobacter (WHO, 2002: 6). Thirdly, while the threat of a human influenza pandemic remains largely theoretical at the moment, avian flu remains a formidable risk to health security, particularly from the standpoint of anticipation. Due to the spread of avian influenza and the fact that there have been cases of bird-to-human transmission, the WHO has issued a pandemic alert (Sandell, 2006).

Conclusion

This paradigm-breaking catalogue of 'new security challenges' at first glance lacks theoretical uniformity. Aside from the already strained and tired mantra of the post-Westphalian security concept—detached from territory, dissociated from the state monopole of legitimate violence and security, and 'lowered' to

the level human issues—the talk of a new and non-military concept of security has a distinctly methodological side. If we are to summarize this broad and ungainly field of security concepts it must be simply noting that security is a *practice*. Security is not an idea of the world but an action in the world relative to a certain set of facts about the world, be they understood as threats to the *status quo* social organization, or impending environmental hazards, be they ubiquitous fear of the threats to religious identity, to invisible diseases that seem to put into question the self-evidence of everyday health. loss or Security not as propositional, but rather as taking the form of a question. The so-called security threats to one woman in one part of the world at one given time are simply not always, perhaps never the security threats of another.

For the human and social sciences, this insight transforms security studies into an ethics, and moves the question of method to the centre of the problem of science. La security, science projects a certain comprehension of life onto its object. Science, like security, order objects, links them to subjects, and to other objects. It validates, promotes and prioritizes. The anthropologists of a thousand years from now who uncover the ruins of our time and seek to understand us will learn nothing from the objects we chose to study, and everything from discovering the way we chose them. In other words, security is a kind of ethics, a set of principals and questions about how to choose what to study. It is not about objects, but about attaching values to objects, giving them a place, a position and an order in the universe of objects.

Security is a practice and presupposes an agency which itself cannot be said to be pre-security. It contains an implicit link to what is profoundly human. Or to reverse the formula. the profoundly human, the foundation of human-ness itself, is inseparable from a kind of insecurity the vulnerability or fragility of life (Butler, 2004). Life that is not put into question by the question of its own security, is in the strictest sense, not life at all but rather *persistence*.

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