

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**



**Police Reform in Serbia:  
Five Years Later**

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## **Key Points**

- \* Police reform is now a prerequisite of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic polity. This is especially the case in post-Milošević Serbia.
- \* Police reform was slow, as neither of the post-Milošević administrations had an overall reform strategy, which led to lack of internal capacity and precise time-frames. If the results are to be sustained a long-term home affairs strategy needs to be in place.
- \* Pending the new Serbian constitution, the police service will remain a centralised authority, reflecting the structure of the centralised state. This will also influence the development of a community safety concept.
- \* Although the recently adopted law on police has made a nominal division between political and operational components, political influence is still overly present at all levels and the Minister of Interior is still seen as the top operational police officer.
- \* The lack of legal instruments compatible with the international standards and best practices hinders reform. The slow pace of implementation of new legislation is a huge problem in many areas and police reform is no exception.
- \* With regard to accountability, the internal affairs unit has been established only a few years ago and still needs to earn respect in the service and in public. Parliamentary oversight is at a rudimentary stage, primarily due to the inertia and incompetence of MPs.

\* Enhancing the fight against organised crime on the Balkan Route - one of the main illegal trafficking routes - depends on further development of the national criminal intelligence system, forensics and border policing.

\* Demilitarisation of the state border started in 2005, and so far police have taken over securing borders with Hungary and Romania. Introduction of Integrated Border Management is one of the main preconditions for future EU accession.

\* Human resources are primarily tackled through the reform of police education. The most important change will be in the area of basic police training, in late 2006. However, personnel management remains the Achilles' heel of the system.

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# **Police Reform in Serbia: Five Years Later**

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## **Introduction**

Police reform, as an integral part of security sector reform, is one of the main prerequisites of the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic polity. This is especially the case in Serbia, where the police were an oppressive force of Slobodan Milošević's<sup>1</sup> regime and its policies in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

When Milošević took power in Serbia in the late 1980s, the whole state system started to centralise, and the police system was no exception. The authorities of two Autonomous Provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo lost control over police in their territory and the centralisation of power in Belgrade affected the functioning of local police districts throughout the country. Decision-making was centralised to such an extent that it constantly impeded efficient policing. Loyalty was ensured by direct appointments of politically obedient people to top positions. Open competition for managerial posts completely vanished.

Milošević never completely trusted the Yugoslav military and therefore militarised the Serbian police service in an attempt to create his own praetorian paramilitary, symbolically reflected in the introduction of a military ranking system for police in 1995. The main purpose of the police service was the fierce suppression of democratic movements and participation in the Yugoslav War,<sup>2</sup> while crime fighting and community policing were largely neglected.

The Milošević-era economic system was characterised by a war economy marked by state-driven hyperinflation, state-sponsored smuggling, and state-backed pyramidal schemes. In that period Serbia suffered from an enormous increase in organised crime and deepening of corruption, which became the norm in the country's economic, social and political life. Not only was crime considered 'normal', it was also actively encouraged to the extent that it became the regime's unofficial arm. The UN embargo significantly contributed to the country's isolation and economic deterioration.

The situation culminated with the 1998-99 Kosovo crisis and the subsequent NATO military intervention.<sup>3</sup> Hundreds of police officers lost their lives.<sup>4</sup> Material damage was extremely high, and at the end of the intervention more than 100 police facilities were destroyed, damage estimated to amount to USD 781,248,000.<sup>5</sup>

One of the biggest challenges Serbia faced after the overthrow of Milošević on 5 October 2000 and the subsequent democratic shift was the reform of the police force and its transformation into a service accountable to the citizens. Although it can be said that the police are no longer seen as the force, they are still not perceived as an accountable citizens' service.

This paper aims at giving a historical account of what has been achieved in the field of police reform from October 2000 until early 2006, since significant historical

symbolism is associated with these two landmarks in time. The first being the toppling of Milošević, although it may not have produced a collapse of all of his regime's policies and practices; the second being the commencement of Serbia and Montenegro's negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU.

### **The Overarching Challenges of Police Reform in Serbia**

Several cornerstone challenges for police reform in Serbia were politically articulated following the overthrow of Milošević. They are marked as the four "Ds" – de-politicisation, de-centralisation, de-criminalisation and de-militarisation.

The "Ds" were often publicly declared by both administrations since 2000, but they were not systematically developed as government policy. Neither of the post-Milošević governments adopted any overall strategy for the implementation of police reform.<sup>6</sup> The lack of policy and a clear implementation strategy, although the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the government presented The Vision Document for the reform of the police service in April 2003, led to lack of internal capacity and precise time-frames for steering towards the proclaimed goals.

Reform has been ongoing with varying intensity. However, due to the legacy of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, internal political instability and the present regional security challenges (i.e. the unresolved status of Kosovo), the MoI remains the executive branch of the highest political importance. Thus, political influence is still overly present at all levels and the Minister of Interior is still seen as the top operational police officer. The recently adopted Law on Police has made a division between political and operational components, which is the practice in most European countries, but the Minister still has the final say on many issues that are usually under the competence of the chief of police, who will be selected as a civil servant for the first time in mid-2006.

Furthermore, political instability<sup>7</sup> led to indecision instead of timely action and change management. Sustainable development of the service cannot be guaranteed when police officials are unwilling to apply for senior posts due to the possibility of being demoted for purely political reasons. In addition, operational independence has to be supplemented with effective and efficient internal and external oversight, which is still declaratory but not fully practised.

The Serbian police still have a long way to go in effecting de-criminalisation and the fight against corruption. The internal affairs unit has been established only a few years ago, and lacks capacity and support. Further development will depend heavily on the process of de-politicisation, as well as public and media interest.

External parliamentary oversight is still at a rudimentary stage. The Parliamentary Committee for Defence and Security – in charge of police oversight *inter alia* – is only formally performing its role, without showing interest in deeper involvement. Its members mainly do not possess sufficient knowledge of the area, and the Committee does not have sufficient professional expertise at its disposal. The idea of establishing an independent external oversight body has not been pursued, which is still a missing link in the police oversight structure.

The lack of legal instruments compatible with European standards and best practices hinders the reform process as well. The slow pace of implementing newly-adopted



system-reforming laws is a huge problem in many areas, and police reform is no exception.

Pending the issue of the new constitution, the police service will remain a centralised authority, reflecting the structure of the highly-centralised state. Furthermore, centralised management of the budget and short-term planning<sup>8</sup> impede the delegation of decisions. Police at the local level have little room for manoeuvre in addressing specific local issues and working more closely with communities.

Police culture and values need to evolve to accommodate to the changing social values of a society in transition, striving towards the EU. Although the vast majority of high-ranking Milošević-era police officers, who were involved in paramilitary operations, were sent to retirement, Serbia's police service still needs a long and serious rehabilitation, primarily through a thorough reform of education and training. Specific importance should be given to the modernisation and institutionalisation of training since it is the foundation of ongoing professional development and advancement.

### **The Period of Provisional Technical Government**

The toppling of Milošević created a new political reality. It took three weeks of negotiation, between the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) and the previous regime, to reconstruct the Serbian government and appoint a provisional technical government. The key ministries were divided among three political groups – the Socialist Party of Serbia<sup>9</sup> (SPS), Serbian Renewal Movement<sup>10</sup> (SPO) and DOS. All decisions in the executive branch were at that time based on trilateral consensus.

As in the other key ministries, the MoI was headed by a trilateral representation and three interim co-Ministers were appointed.<sup>11</sup> At that time the MoI had two main organisational components – the Public Security Sector (i.e. police service) and the State Security Sector (i.e. the secret police).<sup>12</sup>

Apart from some personnel changes, the MoI in the following couple of months was almost at a standstill due to a fragile and unstable situation that drew the focus away from the beginning of the police reform process. On the one hand, two serious destabilising events, the insurgency of the ethnic Albanian militants in the south of Serbia and the simultaneous mutinies in prisons across the country<sup>13</sup> demanded immediate police attention. On the other hand, it was very difficult to manage the three-headed MoI and start any substantive changes since all decisions had to be based on consensus and Milošević's SPS was still in the government.<sup>14</sup>

The armed insurgency of the ethnic Albanians emerged from the legacy of poor inter-ethnic relations following the Kosovo crisis and subsequent NATO military intervention. The conflict culminated in late 2000 and early 2001. The insurgency spread in the south of Serbia, on the administrative line<sup>15</sup> towards the UN-administered Autonomous Province of Kosovo, in the municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja.<sup>16</sup> The attempt to react to the insurgency in a manner different to the previous regime faced the trilateral MoI leadership with the weakness of the Serbian police counter-insurgency capacities. The Special Police Units (PJP – *Posebne jedinice policije*<sup>17</sup>) deployed in the south of the country had a relatively small number of police officers specifically trained for operating in a low-intensity armed conflict. The majority of its 6,500 staff<sup>18</sup> were regular uniformed police officers who were brought in and out on a shift basis.

In an effort to manage this new crisis differently, the transitional government decided to create the 'Co-ordination Body for the Municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja' in December 2000, and adopted the 'Programme on the Peaceful Solution to the Crisis'. The Programme envisaged concrete steps to integrate the ethnic Albanian population into the police structures through the creation of a representative local police, i.e. Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE). In addition, the Programme envisaged international police officers training the police serving in multiethnic communities.<sup>19</sup> The implementation of this Programme, in parallel to the transformation of PJP into a new organisational unit – the Gendarmerie (a standing paramilitary police unit) was continued by the new Serbian government in 2001.

As one of the primary steps in dealing with the old regime's police, the lustration<sup>20</sup> of the police service was proclaimed and nine out of 13 generals and hundreds of senior police officers were retired.<sup>21</sup> The process of de-criminalisation and a resolute fight against organised crime were also seen as an absolute priority in this transition period. Its importance can be easily illustrated through the well-known statement by Zoran Djindjić, the first Serbian Prime Minister following the overthrow of Milošević that 'every state has its mafia, but only in Serbia mafia has its own state'.

In line with this priority, the transitional government in November 2000 formed the Special Unit for Fight against Corruption and Organised Crime (called by the media 'POSKOK' – *Posebni odred za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala i korupcije*).<sup>22</sup> The unit had 15 experienced police officers and its 'aim was to analyse criminal structures in Serbia and to fight against organised crime'.<sup>23</sup>

POSKOK produced the White Book that mapped out 123 organised criminal groups with 844 members<sup>24</sup> as well as the persons responsible for some of the most serious criminal acts – mainly politically motivated assassinations prior to October 2000. Those acts were allegedly committed by members of organised crime groups who were a part of and acted on behalf of the headship of the State Security Sector<sup>25</sup> and Milošević's regime.

Having scanned the underground to the best of its abilities at the time, POSKOK was disbanded in April 2001. According to some interpretations, it was disbanded after establishing the involvement of the Special Operations Unit (JSO – *Jedinica za specijalne operacije*), which was a part of the MoI's State Security Sector, in the assassinations.<sup>26</sup> Other interpretations are that POSKOK was just transformed into the core of the newly formed organisational unit of the MoI – the Organised Crime Directorate (UBPOK – *Uprava za borbu protiv organizovanog kriminala*).<sup>27</sup> The importance of the list of organised crime groups and their links with the JSO will be fully grasped following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić, since the persons who are at present being tried for the assassination were part of the JSO and linked to the leading organised crime groups in Serbia.

As a result of an apparent political agreement, the State Security Sector was left to be tackled by the new Serbian government. Accordingly, in this four-month period of transitional government there were no changes or any start of reform process in that Sector. Although some leaders of DOS were asking for the dismissal<sup>28</sup> of Radomir Marković, the then Assistant Minister of Interior and the Head of State Security Sector, the trilateral provisional government did not make that decision. It is indicative that the first act of the new government was not to accept his offer of resignation but to dismiss Marković from duty.

### **The Initial Period of Djindjić's Government (2001 – 2002)**

The new Serbian government was elected in January 2001. At the time, the Republic of Serbia was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). One of the remaining structures at the federal level was the Federal MoI, which did not have a substantial portfolio.<sup>29</sup> The real police powers lay in the republican (Serbia and Montenegro) MoIs.

Following the appointment of the new Serbian Minister of Interior Dušan Mihajlović,<sup>30</sup> the reform process was declared by the government and the following priorities were highlighted:

- reform of police practice (enhancing efficiency)
- reform of legislation (drafting of laws and other regulations)
- long-term vision of the development of home affairs (strategic planning).<sup>31</sup>

In addition, the four 'Ds' were highlighted as a major precondition for transforming the police force into a service. In his public appearances, Minister Mihajlović claimed that the MoI was close to de-criminalisation and de-politicisation through major personnel changes. In the initial period, 2,500<sup>32</sup> police officers were either reallocated or dismissed, 396 from key management positions.<sup>33</sup> Such a high turnover of personnel deep into the management chain must have made a noticeable trace; it is questionable, however, to what extent it could be perceived as de-politicisation. And in spite of the declared police reform goals, the situation in the south of Serbia required continued active management.

### **The Creation of the Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE)**

The Djindjić government followed up the Programme on the Peaceful Solution to the Crisis in the south of Serbia and the need to create the MEPE with the assistance of the international community in April 2001. The Co-ordination Body, the OSCE Mission to FRY and the local politicians from Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja formed the tri-partite Working Group that would facilitate the co-ordination of activities related to its creation. The Working Group developed Agreed Principles for MEPE and the MoI became one of the first state authorities to exercise minority inclusion.

In addition, the government wanted to avoid massive military (Yugoslav Army) presence in the area and to underline that this conflict was primarily an internal security matter. It was therefore decided in mid-2001 to organise a standing paramilitary police unit – the Gendarmerie. The task was given to the then PJP commander police General Goran Radosavljević Guri.

The core of the new unit came from the PJP, although a number of newcomers were recruited from outside the police service. The Gendarmerie “was deployed immediately on the boundary (with Kosovo) or just behind it, performing a different kind of law enforcement activity and providing local police assistance only when required”.<sup>34</sup> Apart from counter-insurgency, the Gendarmerie is tasked with performing anti-terrorist activities, riot control in demonstrations and big sport events, and assisting the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and uniformed police in high-risk arrests of dangerous criminals.

The training of MEPE officers, and its inclusion in the local uniformed police, lasted more than a year, and the whole process was done in three phases.<sup>35</sup> The training courses were conducted jointly by national and OSCE's international police trainers in the police training centre in Mitrovo Polje (central Serbia). The most substantial phase

was four consecutive 12-week cycles of basic police training for new cadets. In total, 375 MEPE cadets,<sup>36</sup> including 28 females, were trained. The basic training was followed up by 15 weeks “on-the-job” training with the international police officers as mentors. At the end of 2002, the project was officially finalised, but the OSCE and the MoI continued to monitor their work.

The newly trained MEPE officers were deployed in the three municipalities – mainly as patrol officers. They were stationed in low-standard container facilities, some of which were in remote villages. The working conditions were extremely challenging, since they were working in four-day to 15-day shifts.

As a short-term confidence building measure, MEPE proved a success. Their work contributed a lot to stabilising the fragile security environment. However, the fact that MEPE officers were insufficiently trained, equipped and structured to provide sustainable policing to the community was, from the very beginning, recognised by the local population, MoI and the international community. Yet, it took them longer than expected to constructively address this issue. Although the OSCE and MoI jointly followed up and assessed MEPE realities, the pace of their actual involvement and activities in furthering the work of MEPE was slow.

### **Sustaining the Minority Inclusion in the South of Serbia (2003-2005)**

In late 2003, the MoI and the OSCE launched community policing as a new initiative in the three municipalities. They became community policing pilot sites. The focus was put on solving local problems and engaging the representatives of the local communities in taking both initiative and responsibility for the safety of their communities.

Given the good experiences of the MEPE Working Group, a new body – the South Serbia Working Group<sup>37</sup> was established in 2004. The Group was supposed to maintain permanent dialogue and assist in making informed decisions as regards furthering MEPE’s work. The Group was to take a lead in the community policing initiatives and provide advice on consolidation of the MEPE container facilities, thus enhancing their working conditions.

The long-term achievements of the three community policing pilot sites in the south of Serbia is yet to be evaluated; evidence of its success so far is still scarce.

As a result of the community policing initiative, the local police supported by the OSCE organised numerous Citizen Advisory Groups,<sup>38</sup> creating fora for raising local concerns. Furthermore, the three Municipal Assemblies established Municipal Safety Councils,<sup>39</sup> where representatives of local authorities are supposed to address the issues and try to resolve them in partnership with the police and other local government bodies.

Also, aiming at enhancing the skills and knowledge of the local police, the MoI has been conducting cycles of in-service training for the local police in south Serbia since mid-2005. A positive step is that the training was conducted by OSCE-certified national police trainers.

Aiming at reaching the local population and using its own resources, the MoI has reallocated and consolidated the MEPE container facilities and turned them into the smallest MoI organisational units – police detachments (i.e. sub-stations). There is an

urgent need to refurbish them and provide them with adequate equipment, as well as with all-terrain vehicles.

Local Albanian political leaders still raise the issue of omnipresent under-representation of ethnic Albanians. The assessment given by mayor of Preševo Riza Halimi in 2005 suggests that “the project of multiethnic police, which contributed to significant inclusion of Albanians in the local police, was successfully completed. However, there were no subsequent projects that would provide for further adequate inclusion of Albanians in all state institutions, at all levels.”<sup>40</sup>

The attempt at minority inclusion and crisis management in the south of Serbia has laid foundations for more substantial efforts in the future, especially in terms of attracting interest from minority groups throughout Serbia to apply for vacancies in the police service. The sustainability of reform efforts will depend on constant MoI and government focus, by being sensitive and responsive to the local needs, as well as boosting the economic development of that region.

### **Defining Police Reform Priorities**

The much needed review of the state of affairs and the assessment of the direction for the beginning of police reform in Serbia was not initially done ‘in-house’, but was given to the international community. Two reports were made by senior international police experts: “A Study on Policing in the FRY” by Richard Monk (“The Monk Report”), on behalf of the OSCE, and “Council of Europe and OSCE Final Joint Report on Police Accountability in Serbia”, by John Slater on behalf of the Council of Europe (CoE) and Harm Trip on behalf of the OSCE (“The Slater Report”). The reports made more than a hundred recommendations on what needed to be done to start the transformation. The reports also indicated that the OSCE would be seen as the main partner of the MoI in instituting the reform.

#### **The Vision Document of the MoI (2001-2003)**

One of the most serious efforts aimed at defining, prioritising and managing police reform was the development of the Vision Document. It was in line with one of the Monk Report’s recommendations ‘that in support of police reform a “Vision of Policing” be created and a formalised planning process be introduced to manage the changes necessary to achieve it’.<sup>41</sup> In addition, ‘further funding is to be provided to sustain the long term planning process begun in the Serbian MoI by the Danish Centre for Human Rights (DCHR)’.<sup>42</sup> The DCHR’s main objective was to adopt a strategic approach to the reform of the overall legal sector.

The MoI in co-operation with the DCHR and the League for Experts (LEX)<sup>43</sup> established a Think Tank for the reform in September 2001. The Think Tank gathered experts from the police, human rights NGOs, judiciary and legislature aiming at “carrying out an extensive survey of reform issues and producing a document defining long term strategy and a reform framework”.<sup>44</sup> On its initiative, Minister of Interior Dušan Mihajlović established working groups for 14 reform areas<sup>45</sup> reflecting the then organisational units of the MoI.

The work of the groups on the development and compilation of the Vision Document took more than a year and a half (2001-2003). In April 2003, during the State of Emergency,<sup>46</sup> the Vision was officially presented to the Serbian government and

international community. In parallel, the Minister issued an 'Instruction on Establishing the Steering Committee for the Programme of the MoI Reform'.

### **The Outcome of the Vision Document**

The development of the almost 600-pages-long Vision Document was an enormous and commendable endeavour. Each of the 14 working groups developed chapters offering analysis on the current situation, main obstacles and suggested measures to overcome them. The document also gave an overview of services provided by MoI organisational units and deficiencies in the prevailing legal framework. Mid and long-term objectives were outlined, as well as the key success criteria and indicators. Furthermore, the Document was proof that there was awareness of the gravity of challenges that the reform process was facing.<sup>47</sup>

As an accessory to the Document, the MoI developed the Police Reform Projects Catalogue consisting of 174 projects. However, the projects were just outlined and no prioritisation was made. Only overall goals were given in a few sentences. Neither a budget nor realistic implementation plans were included. The catalogue was more of a 'wish-list' than a realistic plan.

The 'Steering Committee' for the reform process, chaired by the Minister, was supposed to "co-ordinate the completion of the Vision Document of the reform and elaborate a long-term reform strategy".<sup>48</sup> However, this body has never met.<sup>49</sup> Neither did the new administration that came into power in early 2004 breathe life into the Committee. What happened was the high turnover of police top management at both national and local level.<sup>50</sup> The only government body in charge of police reform exists only on paper.

The Vision Document was not developed further in terms of "detailed plans, timelines, specific milestones, realistic goals and practical steps to realise the vision of a new police service"<sup>51</sup> nor used as starting point for a new revised document. The whole process did not result in a deeper mental shift towards strategic planning. The Catalogue of Projects, done according to DCHR methodology, is a poor, unfinished paper, as if the only thing left to be done was to raise (international donors') money for implementation.

The fact that the Vision Document exercise was not followed up is a prime example of the weaknesses and deficiencies of public administration in transition countries, leading to the "one step forward two steps back" practice which occurs with every political change, and at the same time highlights the lack of de-politicisation as one of the principal obstacles to the sustainability of reforms. Furthermore, this exercise also epitomised the inability of the international community agencies to look beyond their own short and mid term goals and reporting to their governments. High expectations were raised on the recipient side, but no long-term partnership was established to root the know-how.

The positive momentum created through this exercise was irrevocably lost. With the passing of time, the Vision Document became just another paper on a shelf.

### **Police Reform Priorities of the Djindjić Government (2001-2003)**

Work on the Vision Document was done separately from other international organisations that were recognised by the MoI as partners in police reform. Due to the

absence of any co-ordinating body, reform initiatives based on international assistance lived their own separate lives. One of the major international partners in this process was the OSCE. Apart from its engagement in the creation of MEPE, “the Serbian Minister of Interior formally requested the OSCE’s Law Enforcement Department to assist as the lead organisation for co-ordinating the police reform process”.<sup>52</sup> Even before publishing the Vision Document, the Ministry and the OSCE, in its proclaimed lead co-ordinator’s role, organised a Police Reform Donor’s Conference in June 2002. Apart from raising 4.5 million Euros for different projects, the conference was important since for the first time the MoI put forward six priority areas of police reform, based on the Monk Report:

- Police Education and Development
- Accountability (internal and external oversight)
- Organised Crime
- Forensics
- Border Policing
- Community Policing.<sup>53</sup>

These were declared the nucleus of reform activities. However, many changes in these priority areas awaited the adoption of the new Law on Police that was looked upon as a panacea precondition for all reform activities. It was true, however, that the 1995 Law on Interior regulating law enforcement was obsolete.<sup>54</sup> Several drafts of a Law on Police were made during the DOS rule, two most important drafted by MoI and LEX, with expertise provided by the CoE and OSCE. Nevertheless, the DOS government did not forward any of the drafts to parliament.

One of the most important structural changes from this period happened with the adoption of the Law on Security Information Agency (BIA)<sup>55</sup> in 2002. It was extracted from the MoI structure, and put under the direct control of the government. Božo Prelević, at that time Minister Mihajlović’s advisor for police reform, resigned following this development, saying that “he did not know who might need such an agency without developed parliamentary and internal oversight”.<sup>56</sup>

### **Police Reform Priorities of the Koštunica Government (2004-2005)**

The government of the Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica was elected in March 2004. The new Minister of Interior was Dragan Jočić. In his first address as minister, Jočić underlined the priorities of the MoI as the fight against organised crime, border demilitarisation and resolving of high-profile assassinations from the past. High on the agenda were the adoption of the Law on Police and Law on Police Education as well as co-operation with the ICTY.<sup>57</sup>

In June 2004, Minister Jočić presented a longer list of police reform priorities to the international community. He said that the previous government “worked more on the modernisation rather than on the essence of police reform, although the international community had put forward three clear aims – de-politicisation, de-criminalisation and de-militarisation”.<sup>58</sup> He also announced that according to the new draft Law on Police, that was to be adopted by the end of 2004, all operational units would be under the Chief of Police<sup>59</sup> (alluding to the Organised Crime Directorate being directly responsible to the Minister of Interior, thus opening the possibilities for politicisation). In that address, the six priority areas were re-confirmed and two new were added:

- War Crimes, and
- Strategic Planning and Development.

The eight police reform priorities were formally acknowledged in November 2004 in a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the MoI and the OSCE stipulating that they will jointly have a lead role in co-ordinating international assistance within the defined priorities.

One of the main organisational changes that emerged in late 2004 was the addition of a Sector for Financial, Personnel, Common and Technical Affairs, administratively on the same level as the Public Security Sector – police service (see Annex D). Both Sectors are headed by police generals who also have the rank of assistant ministers. The reorganisation was supposed to provide better logistic and administrative support. The novelty was that the new Sector had under its umbrella all elements of human resources planning and management, including education and training.

The modernisation of the MoI resources management is part of the wider public administration reform. International assistance is provided in the area of improved budget and performance management.<sup>60</sup> Some of the basic laws covering this area were enacted in late 2005. How they will be implemented remains to be seen. Likely obstacles relate to the deficiencies of competent staff and regulatory environment, as in other social sectors.

The pledged urgent adoption of the Law on Police took place only in November 2005. Generally, the adoption of the new Law on Police, described as a step towards transforming the police into a public service, was welcomed by the public.<sup>61</sup> In addition, it makes a step towards demilitarisation through the abolition of military ranks in police service, which is deemed important in influencing police culture.

One of the main organisational innovations introduced by the new law is that the Serbian police will be organised in a Police Directorate (instead of the Public Security Sector) headed by the Director General of Police who is appointed for a term of five years.<sup>62</sup> The fact that the Director General will no longer be Assistant Minister and that his/her five-year term is longer than the term of any government (based on a four-year electoral cycle) was described as a cure against politicisation of police. In line with the Law on Civil Servants which comes into effect in mid-2006, the vacancy for the first Director General of Serbian police will be published in June 2006. The law also envisages that the Police Director General will be operationally independent, heading a police service which will be separated from the MoI.

However, the issue whether police will be really de-politicised still lurks, since a lot of power remains in the minister's hands; "the minister, in consultation with the Director General of Police, appoints and dismisses regional police chiefs".<sup>63</sup> In addition, "in a public debate held before delivering the bill to the legislature for adoption, the most disputed article was the one related to the right to access information. The public also criticised the fact that the new law does not envisage the decentralisation of the police."<sup>64</sup>

Currently, the MoI is adjusting its structure according to the new Law. The reorganisation needs to be finalised by November 2006. In addition, fine-tuning through secondary legislation, of matters such as the use of the means of coercion, transparency of policing and administrative procedures, will be in the public eye in 2006.



## **Reform within the Declared Priority Areas**

### **Reform of Police Education and Training**

Reform of police education and training was one of the least disputable long-term reform priority areas from the very beginning. However, the complexity of the structure of the education institutions inherited from socialist times, and the lack of a modern police training system contribute to the fact that key milestones are yet to be instigated. The system remains the same as prior to 2000. The main institutions are: (1) Police High School, (2) Police College and (3) Police Academy. In addition, there are several training facilities across Serbia, primarily used for basic police training courses.<sup>65</sup>

The Police High School<sup>66</sup> is an institution of secondary education which is administratively part of the MoI. It is a boarding school that exclusively enrolls 14 year old male students who graduate and start working as constables at the age of 18. Apart from the police related curricula, the students also learn general and military courses. Studying and boarding is free of charge.

The Police College<sup>67</sup> was established by a special law in 1972 as an independent post-secondary educational institution. In 1992 it became an organisational unit of the MoI, but is also part of the wider educational system. The curriculum covers higher education, vocational and specialised training for the needs of the MoI. Courses last for three years – six semesters and both male and female students may apply.

As an integral part of the MoI, the Police High School and Police College until recently reported directly at ministerial level (see Annex C). Since late 2004, they have been under the Sector for Financial, Personnel, Common and Technical Affairs (see Annex D).

The university-level Police Academy was established by a special law in 1993, following the model of a Military Academy.<sup>68</sup> Formally, the Academy is an independent institution but in practice through financing the MoI influences all aspects of its work. An important handicap is that the Academy is outside the university system, although it abides by university laws.

National and international assessments<sup>69</sup> conducted in 2001 and 2002 mainly underlined the same weaknesses which related to lack of relevant legislation and related by-laws. There was no vision of education and training as well as no job task analysis leading to incompatibility between job descriptions and education profiles, which was an obvious result of the lack of any strategic approach. All educational institutions functioned independently and there were no mechanisms for the common use of resources, which led to high cost inefficiency. Although MoI had three education institutions at its disposal, there was a lack of institutionalised police training. Teaching methodology was obsolete and “teacher-centred”. Moreover, curricula were outdated and militarised. The Police High School and Police Academy had semi-military regimes of boarding and study and there was an evident lack of female and minority candidates and students.

These weaknesses demanded a strategic approach and an action plan that would deal with the issues of organisation (structures and legislation), development of current and future personnel, curriculum and the ministry’s assets. In late 2001, the MoI established a post of an Assistant Minister responsible for police education and

training. To a certain extent, the post acknowledged the importance of reforming this area, since these reforms were seen as the main precondition for changing police culture and investing in future generations.

A lot of time was spent in the course of 2002 on the development of the Vision Document, which was seen at the time as developing a strategic approach. The Document proposed that the education and training system should comprise “one four-year high school programme, one university level institution with a research branch, a centre for professional development (training centre) and common logistics department”.<sup>70</sup> Apart from the organisational changes, the need for redefinition of curricula and professional development were highlighted. In conclusion, the Vision Document stated that there was no regulated system of police education and that development of a law on police education was mandatory. Regrettably, the final product of the Vision Document’s chapter covering police education/training was closer to a stock taking exercise than to a clear definition of a needed change. Consequently, the exercise did not lead to development of the needed strategy and action plans.

While Minister Mihajlović was in office, due to the lack of in-service training, the MoI opened up to the flood of training offers coming from different international organisations and individual donor countries. In the presentation on the occasion of 1,000 days of the DOS Government, Minister Mihajlović stated that 10,000 police officers attended more than 50 different courses and seminars. They lasted from a couple of days to couple of weeks, covering topics such as human rights, ethics, modern policing standards, use of force, community policing, etc. However, the training offered on a bilateral basis was arranged directly with different MoI organisational units, and there was no systematic central record keeping.

The link that connected all those courses was the obvious lack of sustainability. Only in 2003 did the OSCE offer a more sustainable training package. A bottom-up capacity building Trainer Development Programme<sup>71</sup> has been initiated. The aim was to start producing sustainable internal MoI capacity for modernising in-service training, especially in terms of advancing teaching methodology and redesigning curricula.

The biggest positive innovation in terms of human resources development and creating a representative police service was the inclusion of female uniformed police officers. Starting from only 29 female uniformed police officers,<sup>72</sup> the MoI organised three basic police courses for female cadets which resulted in the increase of female uniformed police officers to 1,110 by the end of 2003.<sup>73</sup>

At the end of 2003, the Ministry’s perception of the structural reforms somewhat changed compared to guidelines in the Vision Document. The MoI’s plans in terms of mid- and long-term structural/organisational changes in practice meant:

- phased transformation of the Police High School into the entry-level Basic Police Training Centre and the standardisation of basic police training,
- amalgamation of the Police College and Police Academy into a Police Faculty,
- the development of regional Training Centres.<sup>74</sup>

The short- and mid-term goals were focused on:

- further inclusion of female and minority recruits,
- modernisation of curricula and teaching methodology,
- developing capacity for in-service training, as well as
- developing the necessary legislation.

With the change of administration in early 2004, the swift personnel changes across the MoI affected the pace of education and training reform, and the role of the Assistant Minister in charge of police education slowly diminished, to be terminated in early 2005. Furthermore, that year was marked with personnel changes across the education institutions, which led to a relative standstill in reform.

At the end of 2004 a new organisational unit – the Directorate for Police Education, Professional Development and Science (DPEPDS) – was established within the new Sector for Financial, Personnel, Common and Technical Affairs. Education and training institutions no longer reported to a minister. The new administration kept the reform of the police education and training as one of its priorities.<sup>75</sup> DPEPDS was given the role of steering the reform process and co-ordinating all education and training activities across the service.

At the joint MoI-OSCE Roundtable on Police Education Reform in Serbia held in December 2004, a draft strategy was discussed. The reform goals in the final *communiqué* mainly relate to establishing an independent Police Faculty (by merging the Police College and Police Academy) that would join Belgrade University while maintaining relations with the MoI. Standardising basic vocational training in a Basic Police Training Centre and developing a system of ongoing professional development were highlighted as an absolute priority.

However, in the beginning DPEPDS was not given the necessary authority or enough resources to tackle these goals, especially structural reforms. Its lack of authority was reflected in its inability to transform the Police High School into a Basic Police Training Centre. When in early 2005 the MoI made the decision to enrol a new class of 14-year-olds in the academic year 2005/2006, it was obvious that the transformation would be postponed for at least a year.

However, in February 2005 the DPEPDS picked up the draft strategy presented at the Roundtable, and developed it further. Subsequently, the MoI adopted the Strategy for Development of Police Training and Education in December 2005.<sup>76</sup>

In parallel, the MoI with the assistance of the OSCE prepared for the transformation of the Police High School into a basic entry-level training facility. The MoI and OSCE initiated re-training of the teaching staff and development of a new curriculum. Initial assessment for the transformation of the School's infrastructure was completed. Late 2005 saw the first signs of progress in this area, it is expected that 2006 will be the key year for the High School transformation process.

A further look in the years to come will have to be given to specialised, in-service and advanced training, entailing creating new or transforming existing Training Centres to cover the whole of Serbia. According to the Strategy, the MoI needs to re-define the curricula for specialised training by October 2007. Capacity for delivering in-service training has been partially developed through the Trainer Development Programme. There is a growing understanding of the importance of that internal MoI training capacity. However, the MoI will need to start using the existing network of national trainers.

The adoption of the new Law on Police in November 2005 opened the door for drafting secondary legislation that would more closely regulate police education and training, which is still pending. The Law on Police defines generic issues related to vocational

training and professional development. Defining job descriptions and educational profiles is at a rudimentary stage.

No significant progress has been made in restructuring post-secondary institutions of police education, i.e. merging the Police College and Police Academy into a Police Faculty. Both continue to function separately, although the Strategy envisages the merger in October 2006. Apart from very strong cost-efficiency arguments, it is expected that the College and Academy will be also required to transform in accordance with the Bologna Process<sup>77</sup> and will have to submit requests for accreditation in the course of 2006 in order to remain within the reform process.

The change of police culture and values in Serbia is immensely dependent on the improvement of the quality of education and training. Each of the structural changes will entail significant social and financial implications beyond the capacity of the MoI. Sustainable basic police training reform has just begun. It will need substantial international assistance in terms of providing advice on best practices and investment in infrastructure. And that is just the first step. International expertise and support will be needed in the process of institutionalising specialised and advanced in-service training, especially regarding re-defining and modernising curricula. Creation of the Police Faculty is still just at the level of concept. The whole area of human resources policy planning will remain in focus as a priority in the years to come.

### **Community Policing**

The social values of the 1990s were reflected in the public image of a police officer as an untouchable figure in semi-military combat uniform. Breaking that image both within the police and among the citizens, and making steps towards a police officer accountable to the citizens he/she serves was proclaimed as the vision of the new Serbian police service.

Fairly early in the reform, the concept of community policing was seen as the new philosophy of policing aimed at reaching out to the citizens. Community-based policing needs to be seen as part of the wider concept called community safety,<sup>78</sup> focused on fostering police-community partnership relations.

Although the idea has been promoted by the international community as the new philosophy of policing, the Serbian police always underlined that a similar model of working closely with the public existed in the form of sector policing in socialist Yugoslavia. Territorial policing was developed in line with the socialist Yugoslav concept of People's Defence and Social Self-Protection and was part of the relatively decentralised society of that time. In an effort to restore the best practices from the past, in mid-2001 the MoI reinitiated sector policing and reinstated the 825 security sectors with 1,456 beats. Accordingly, one could start seeing in the street patrol officers not wearing combat uniforms.

The reasons behind the introduction of the new concept were:

- it would initiate the process of recycling the largest police population, i.e. the regular uniformed police whose personnel were sometimes part of the PJP that were rotated and sent to Kosovo in the 1990s;
- it would initiate the revival of preventive (pro active) policing instead of the repressive one;
- working closer with the population was seen as an essential confidence building measure that promotes police as a service;

- it would alleviate the process of de-centralisation through the delegation of authority, as well as giving other social institutions a share of responsibility for community safety.

Thus, in June 2002 the ministry took on the bottom-up approach and adopted the pilot community policing project in co-operation with several international organisations and agencies<sup>79</sup> and selected several pilot sites<sup>80</sup> across Serbia. The plan was that the pilot project would last from three to five years, and that MoI move towards the creation of a community policing model suitable for national roll-out was preceded by the creation of the national strategy.

As one of the important initial steps, public and police opinion surveys in the pilot sites were conducted in late 2002.<sup>81</sup> “Maybe for the first time somebody asked the citizens about their trust in the police, the quality of police work and the level of crime,”<sup>82</sup> the then MoI co-ordinator of community policing project Colonel Miloš Vojinović wrote. The surveys were used as the important initial assessment that would be used for the subsequent evaluation.

The implementation of the pilot project lasted with varying intensity until the end of 2004 in all pilot sites apart from those in south Serbia (Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja). The project there is still the focus of the OSCE as an ongoing confidence building measure.

In late 2004, the results were published in the Joint Evaluation Report conducted by the Serbian MoI and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).<sup>83</sup> In conclusion the report states that “a great deal has been achieved, and the implementation (of community policing) thus far must be regarded as a success [...] the piloting process has provided a strong foundation for further development and expansion to other parts of Serbia”.<sup>84</sup> However, the recommendations in the Report show how much more needs to be done in order to move towards a sustainable concept.

Community safety is an overarching concept that firstly requires policy decisions at the government level. Since the police service is only one of the actors in the process of establishing partnerships among various institutions, there is a need for consensus in society as a whole on the formation of the National Safety Council.<sup>85</sup> Subsequently, a National Community Safety Strategy on how to engage relevant authorities at the national, regional and local levels needs to be developed.<sup>86</sup> Only then could the police tackle many aspects of community safety.

The Joint Report outlined the most important steps to be taken, such as development of relevant legislation and procedures, establishment of the Community Policing Department to steer and oversee the process, an internal and external communication strategy in order to inform all stakeholders, education and training across the police service, especially at the senior management level and creation of an organisation able to accommodate the new demands.

What has been done since the Joint Report? In 2004, the MoI established the Crime Prevention and Community Policing Department within the Uniformed Police Directorate.<sup>87</sup> The Department is in charge of following up the pilot sites, compiling lessons learned and working on preventive and problem-oriented policing. The Department is seen as an important link in the impending top-down national roll-out of community policing.

Another positive development was that the MoI launched the project Safe Communities for the whole Autonomous Province of Vojvodina<sup>88</sup> in December 2004. The project was supported by the Norwegian government in terms of building up the capacities for problem-oriented policing and strategic crime analysis and planning.<sup>89</sup>

The conclusion of the pilot-sites phase made it apparent that the police should not be seen as the sole bearers of community safety. The primary driving force should be society's demand and interest in raising the level of safety. In 2005, the community policing concept was mentioned in Serbia's National Strategy for EU integration as a means of co-operation between the MoI and the local government. Furthermore, the Strategy recommends that the "work on decentralisation of the MoI and development of the 'community policing' concept should continue".<sup>90</sup> Hence, the executive branch needs to work on developing co-ordination among all stakeholders (such as the Ministry of Education and Sports, the Ministry of Science and Environmental Protection, the Ministry for Public Administration and Local Government, the Ministry of Health, etc.) and on developing the National Community Safety Strategy. The Strategy is still a major missing link.

Meanwhile, the police are instigating some initial preconditions, especially in the south of Serbia and Vojvodina, for the change that is yet to occur. The MoI will have to exercise sustainable top management support to police at local level and to further internal co-ordination and ensure that the work of the whole service is in line with the future National Community Safety Strategy. But, the impetus also needs to come from the Serbian government and local authorities with the maturing political sense of readiness to take pro-active initiatives in the interest of the whole community and share the responsibility of building partnership especially in ethnically mixed areas. Unless wider social support is provided, the police will not be able to succeed even if their internal functioning is perfect.

### **Accountability - Internal and External Oversight**

The lack of police oversight mechanisms maintained the possibility that the Serbian police in the 1990s acted as an oppressive hand of the ruling Milošević regime. Following the political changes in 2000, insufficient political will to push for it stalled reform within all state authorities responsible for the police oversight.

Oversight must not only be the responsibility of police service. In a democratic society committed to anti-corruption and transparency of public administration, the issue of an accountable police service revolves around the social values of democratic policing. Values such as "moral consensus, integrity, fairness, sensitivity and accountability are all underpinned by trust, which needs to be checked regularly".<sup>91</sup>

In order to have mechanisms to regularly check the trust the citizens have in the police, it is important to clearly discern the facets of accountability and properly link them to oversight mechanisms. If simplified, it can be said that there is *horizontal accountability* which means that the police act in accordance with the law when applying powers and adhere to professional standards (e.g. Discipline Code and the Code of Ethics). An Internal Affairs Unit of the police service is a mechanism for overseeing this aspect of accountability. In addition, assuring the legality of police performance lies with line managers and the judicial branch.

There is also *vertical accountability* towards the democratically elected representatives of the citizens. In this respect, the police and its Internal Affairs Unit are to be

overseen through external mechanisms, primarily through the relevant parliamentary committee (in Serbia that is the Security and Defence Committee) and an independent External Oversight Body. Vertical accountability needs to be permanently complemented by the wider social interest exercised through various community groups and the media.

In March 2001, nine months after the fall of Milošević, Minister Mihajlović established an internal affairs unit - the Inspector General Office (IGO) of the Public Security Sector (i.e. police service) with an internal act of the MoI. In the organisational sense, the IGO is part of the MoI (see Annex C), but the Inspector General (IG) is appointed by the government of Serbia. IG is also an Assistant Minister of Interior and reports directly to the Minister of Interior and the government. IGO's scope of work was to oversee the police, to ensure they acted in accordance with the law and to investigate citizens' complaints against the police. However, the first IG was appointed only two years later. In the meantime, the Office existed only on paper.

In the vacuum created by the belated appointment of an IG, the CoE and the OSCE produced a Joint Report on Police Accountability in Serbia.<sup>92</sup> Based on this, the OSCE proposed Strategy on Police Accountability in the Republic of Serbia in March 2003. Almost at the same time, the MoI presented its Vision Document, covering the internal affairs (IGO) portion as well. Basically, the recommendations in these documents relate to the all-encompassing process of building up the capacities for an effective and efficient accountability programme. The programme entailed enhancing the capacities and procedures of the Serbian parliamentary Security and Defence Committee in its external oversight function. They recommend an independent external oversight body that would be accountable to that Committee.

In addition "there needs to be an internal police unit [...] its role is to investigate allegations of crime, corruption and inappropriate behaviour by police".<sup>93</sup> All these mechanisms need to be constantly supported by adequate basic and in-service training of police on human rights, code of conduct and ethics. The documents strongly advise enhancing relations between the police and media through relevant policies and practices as the crucial support mechanism.

Sustainability of the recommendations was feasible only through enhancing and institutionalising the dialogue with local communities. Another crucial precondition was the de-politicisation of the post of the national Chief of Police i.e. Head of Public Security Sector.<sup>94</sup>

The assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić in March 2003 and the subsequent declaration of the State of Emergency and launching of the police operation *Sabre* against organised crime linked to the assassination were the tragic wake-up call for Serbian society, underlining the urgent need for oversight of police. The only oversight exercised during the period was at the two Security and Defence Committee sessions where the Minister and the Chief of Police informed the members of parliament on operation *Sabre*.

A positive development from this period was the adoption of the Directive on Police Ethics.<sup>95</sup> "Adoption of [...] the 'Directive on the Police Ethics and Policing', reflects the achievements of the European Code of Police Ethics.<sup>96</sup> Although it will take a long time for the real effects of this Directive to be felt in practice, there is no doubt that this is the most important reform document elaborated so far."<sup>97</sup>

The Directive stipulated that its provisions would become a compulsory part of the curricula within police education institutions from 2003/2004, and a part of mandatory in-service training programs.

### **Inspector General Office (Internal Oversight)**

Only in June 2003 did the government of Serbia appoint the first Inspector General Srbslav Randjelović,<sup>98</sup> even though the Act on IGO was adopted in 2001. The first IG assumed the Office without personnel, without office space, without any other resources. The IGO literally began its work from scratch.

Staffing of the IGO was gradual, due to the nature of the internal affairs tasks and a need for the careful selection of experienced personnel. Providing office space and other resources also took time.

Following the change of administration in early 2004, the new Serbian Government appointed the second IG Vladimir Božović<sup>99</sup> in April 2004. When the new IG assumed his post, the Office had 31 of an envisaged 59 posts staffed. Even though more than a year since the establishment of the IGO had passed, office space and equipment were still a prominent problem. The office covered the whole of Serbia.

The appointment of Inspector General Božović was more a matter of political bargaining within the Koštunica government than a matter of professional competence. The political controversies regarding the new IG underpinned the fragility of the reporting lines and the place of the IGO within the MoI structure. The model of IGO chosen by the Serbian authorities was a hybrid of internal and external oversight, which in the current political constellation and due to the lack of an external oversight body led to the end of any communication between the Minister of Interior and the IG.<sup>100</sup>

Slow establishment of the IGO coincided with the slow influx of international assistance aimed at IGO capacity building. The OSCE facilitated provision of expert advice, some specialised training, 'stand alone' IT and technical equipment for the Office in mid-2004.<sup>101</sup>

Regardless of these impediments, the IGO in 2004/2005 received its own offices, continued with the staffing and outreach to the public. Progress is gradual, but noticeable. The Office has filed 107 criminal charges against 152 police officers for 200 criminal offences. They have received more than 6,000 complaints and processed approximately 89%.<sup>102</sup>

The MoI in 2005 established the Commission for the Follow-up of the Implementation of the CoE Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. An IGO staff member is the Chair of the Commission. The Commission inspected detention facilities across Serbia and it is expected that it will issue a report on its findings in 2006. Based on the work of the Commission presented to the media, the state of detention in some facilities in Serbia is deplorable.<sup>103</sup> Serious investment will have to be made to upgrade conditions, for which external donor funding might be a prerequisite.

With the enactment of the new Law on Police in November 2005, internal police oversight is regulated for the first time by law. The Law establishes the Division of Internal Affairs which "monitors the legality of police work, especially with regards to



respect and protection of human rights. The Division is managed by the Division Head who regularly reports to the Minister of Interior. At the request of the government and the parliament, the minister submits a report on the work of the Division. Also it is within the minister's remit to prescribe more closely forms and methods of internal oversight."<sup>104</sup>

Internal oversight of the police service still has a long way to go. The gradual building up of the Division's capacities will require more specialised training and equipment for the growing personnel. Furthermore, development of internal procedures in accordance with EU professional standards needs to be high on the agenda. There are plans for boosting the work of the regional internal affairs departments that will need substantial support.

### **External Oversight**

Although there were ideas to establish an External Oversight Commission<sup>105</sup> back in 2001, that concept has not yet materialised. There were several proposals on how to tackle the issue. The Downes Report proposes that a future Ombudsman's office needs to have a deputy in charge of overseeing the police.<sup>106</sup> The administration seems to favour another solution.

In November 2004, Minister of Interior Jočić announced before the parliamentary Security and Defence Committee<sup>107</sup> that the MoI would put forward a draft Law on the Parliamentary Oversight of Police that would establish a parliamentary Commission for the Oversight of Police. The draft law did not enter parliament yet. However, the recently adopted Law on Police opens up such prospects.<sup>108</sup>

The lack of effective external oversight is still the most important missing link and can not be overstated. The parliamentary Committee does not seem to be very interested in using its powers. "The issue now, on one hand is that the members of the parliamentary Committees are inert, apathetic, indecisive about asking for information, and on the other hand the police, military and security services do not have developed habits to deliver the requested documents," the then Head of the OSCE Mission Mauricio Massari noted.<sup>109</sup>

There is a strong need for the parliamentary Security and Defence Committee to promote the establishment of an external oversight body. International advice and assistance would significantly contribute to this process. External oversight remains a great reform challenge for both the Serbian parliament and the government.

### **The Fight against Organised Crime**

The heavy politicisation, militarisation and criminalisation of the police forces led to neglect of crime fighting. Uniformed and paramilitary police components were heavily favoured over the CID and many professionals left it. The level of police professionalism, developed during 45 years of peace in socialist Yugoslavia, rapidly decreased.

Organised crime in former Yugoslavia existed much before the 1990s, but its flourishing and development to the current scale was a direct consequence of the Yugoslav War. The economic stagnation in the 1960s forced Tito's regime to vent the rising unemployment and social tensions by opening borders and allowing people to look for jobs abroad. Criminals also migrated to Western Europe. Many were recruited

by the Yugoslav federal and republican secret services to infiltrate the networks of political émigrés and even to assassinate some prominent figures within them. The state gave them certain concessions, allowing them to use Yugoslavia as the basis of their activities aimed at Western Europe. This boomeranged in the 1990s. With the breakout of war, criminals immediately offered ‘patriotic services’ to their respective republics. Some became paramilitary commanders, even ‘national heroes’, gaining further concessions to operate freely on Yugoslav soil. Active participation in the war opened enormous possibilities for profit.

The economic crisis of the 1990s—generated by war, dissolution of Yugoslavia and UN economic embargo—immensely contributed to the evolution of organised crime. Milošević’s regime took chances in the emergence of a large grey economic sector by sponsoring the smuggling of various goods, involving security structures in that, while law enforcement and fiscal control were deliberately undermined. The regime was kept on a pyramid of client-patron relationships that encompassed and enslaved the whole society. The whole system engaged thousands. Milošević sat on top of an oligarchy of tycoons running a variety of large state-owned and private businesses. Managers of many small- and medium-sized enterprises were in the next layer. Numerous smugglers and black marketeers were at the bottom. Throughout the whole pyramid, SPS and JUL<sup>110</sup> party structures were reflected, and elements of police and secret services also participated – sometimes by directly or indirectly backing certain criminals.<sup>111</sup>

This crime pyramid was severely damaged and fragmented by the overthrow of Milošević. However, many of its elements remained untouched. The DOS governing coalition was heterogeneous with strong internal rivalries which weakened the democratic momentum. Many of the pyramid’s parts used this to try, often successfully, to shift their loyalties to certain elements of DOS. The democratisation and transition processes in Serbia still depend a lot on purging the remnants of this organised crime system.

The provisional government’s first response to organised crime has been explained above. POSKOK produced initial results by conducting a comprehensive crime mapping for the White Book. However, its disbanding in early 2001 impeded operationalising its findings. Instead of POSKOK, Minister Mihajlović founded the Organised Crime Directorate (UBPOK). It was a stable structure out of the police service (Public Security Sector) that reported directly to him, as the only operational police unit reporting directly at the political level. The intention was to recruit some of the best and most experienced Serbian investigators to UBPOK. The newly created unit attracted a lot of international attention and received donations of equipment and training.

Another important step in 2001 was the readmission of FRY into Interpol, after it was excluded in 1992. It laid the grounds for the renewal of Serbia’s international co-operation in the fight against trans-national organised crime. The Central National Bureau was placed within the Federal MoI’s CID, to be shifted into the Serbian MoI’s CID after the constitutional transformation of the FRY into Serbia-Montenegro.

One of the most serious blows organised crime inflicted on the state was the June 2002 assassination of Serbia’s Assistant Chief of Police Boško Buha. It was a clear signal that organised crime was very much alive and powerful. The government and Minister Mihajlović acknowledged again that organised crime is Serbia’s biggest problem and tried to convince the public they could cope, but although suspects were arrested, the overall measures taken did not give major systematic results. After the

assassination, two highly reputable Serbian journalists investigating crime and security issues, Miloš Vasić and Jovan Dulović of *Vreme* weekly magazine, prophetically warned the Government that it must immediately deal with organised crime or it would pay dearly:

For this government to solve this problem—once and for all—it must first brutally and without sentimentality deal with all elements in the ruling coalition parties that cannot provide good answers to questions like: Whose jeep are you driving? Who are the people in your close protection, why is there so many of them and who pays them? What are you doing in certain places in company of people known to law enforcement, known to be living out of lack of evidence? What do you have to talk about with [them], without immediately informing UBPOK about it? How did, among all the people, your mate get such a lucrative contract with the state?<sup>112</sup>

UBPOK was in 2003 also tasked with investigating war crimes, due to connections of certain war criminals with organised crime and war profiteering.<sup>113</sup> The role of the War Crimes Department is especially important and sensitive having in mind the connections of certain police elements with war crimes.<sup>114</sup> Milošević's Police Chief during the armed conflicts in Kosovo, Vlastimir Djordjević, has been indicted by the ICTY. They have also indicted Sreten Lukić, the chief of police forces in Kosovo at that time, and later the national Chief of Police during Minister Mihajlović's mandate.<sup>115</sup> A number of lower ranking police officers have been indicted by the Serbian courts. Some have been processed and convicted. A mass grave of 980 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo was discovered in 2001 on the police service's Special Antiterrorist Unit (SAJ) premises in a Belgrade suburb. Establishing war crimes investigation capacities also has a political significance in the light of Serbia's intention to try war crimes in domestic courts. For this purpose the Special War Crimes Prosecutor's Office and the Special War Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court have been established. A quite small police unit, however, it did not achieve impressive results so far, very much due to the scarce resources at its disposal.<sup>116</sup>

The most serious blow that organised crime inflicted on Serbia was the 12 March 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić that shook Serbia and shocked the world. What differed this assassination from other political terrorism is that it was a direct consequence of the pyramid which connected parts of the security structures with organised crime. The person charged with pulling the trigger, JSO Deputy Commander Zvezdan Jovanović, held an official police badge when the assassination happened. Prime suspects for organising the assassination are the former JSO Commander Milorad Luković and two main figures of the notorious Zemun Gang. The latter were killed by the SAJ several days after the assassination, while Luković surrendered to the gendarmerie a year later. Some of Djindjić's close associates claim he was murdered only days before a massive counter-organised crime operation was to be launched. The assassination was a major failure of Serbia's security and criminal justice apparatus, especially having in mind that Djindjić's motorcade avoided an attempted assassination by a lorry in February 2003.<sup>117</sup>

The state immediately responded by proclaiming a State of Emergency that lasted 40 days. The MoI launched the massive police operation *Sabre*. JSO was disbanded and its commanding tier arrested, while the majority of its members were reassigned to gendarmerie, SAJ or Close Protection Directorate. Police detention during the state of emergency was not limited and more than 11,000 people were arrested throughout Serbia. Operation *Sabre* was a severe blow to organised crime, a shock it has never fully recovered from. However, post-*Sabre* calmness lasted some two years, the period

in which Serbian organised crime was licking its wounds. Nowadays Serbia faces a serious revitalisation of organised crime and consolidation of gangs.

In 2005, UBPOK was integrated into the CID and renamed the Organised Crime Service (*Služba za organizovani kriminal – SOK*).<sup>118</sup> Its internal structure did not change very much from UBPOK's, with the exception of the War Crimes Department which has been taken out to become the Service for War Crimes Investigation, hierarchically on the same footing as SOK. It has also been reinforced with its own SWAT team (which POSKOK had at its disposal). The aim of such reorganisation was the rationalisation and consolidation of the Serbian crime fighting capacities, but also de-politicisation by putting all police units within the police service, out of direct political control.

It has been realised that introducing new methods is critical for fighting organised crime. In this regard, witness protection has been established in Serbian legislation and the special Unit for the Protection of the Participants in Criminal Proceedings was established within the police service in 2005. Witness protection is quite costly for a relatively small country and largely depends on international co-operation. More than 11 million euros were committed to it from the 2006 budget.<sup>119</sup> The US and OSCE have supported this unit by sharing experience and providing donations. This also has significance for the government's intention to have certain war crimes cases transferred from the ICTY to national judiciary.

Enhancing the fight against organised crime immeasurably depends on developing a comprehensive national criminal intelligence system, forensics and border policing. Such a system did not exist in Yugoslavia even before the CID deterioration in the 1990s, so the Serbian police service heavily depends on international experiences and support in establishing it. After a long search for an appropriate model, Serbia decided to build its national criminal intelligence system on Scandinavian lines. Towards this goal, in 2005 the MoI concluded a three-year co-operation agreement with the Swedish National Police Board.

UBPOK has achieved some impressive results, but it could not have always met the high expectations of the public. That was definitely not because its members did not do their job properly, but for several other reasons – mainly due to lack of resources, UBPOK's special status, and the lack of proper co-operation within the criminal justice sector. These factors inevitably hampered the effectiveness of the fight against organised crime. UBPOK's good operational police work was often in vain because of inefficiency in the prosecution and judiciary. According to police estimates,<sup>120</sup> only 16% of criminal charges submitted by the police service end up with a court verdict and half of those are suspended sentences.

Due to lack of office space after the NATO bombing, UBPOK has never been housed properly. Most of UBPOK was in a rather small and inadequate building.<sup>121</sup> When it comes to human resources, an illustrative example is that only 22 detectives are in charge of investigating organised financial crime in the whole of Serbia. Without much technical and infrastructural resources, they cannot be very effective in a number of big investigations.<sup>122</sup>

As for the status issues, the fact that the unit was reporting directly to the minister and that salaries in UBPOK were twice those of their colleagues with the same rank and working experience caused certain friction with the much larger, yet often neglected CID.<sup>123</sup> Also, there was no strict division of labour between UBPOK and CID.

It yet remains to be seen and evaluated whether the restructuring will increase the police service's effectiveness in combating organised crime.

### **Forensics**

For more than a decade, the development of forensics and crime scene management capacities had been marginalised. The Serbian police were using obsolete and inadequate equipment and techniques, thus being unable to produce good quality evidence to be used in court. Enhancing these capacities was seen from the very beginning of the reform as a direct investment in the overall strengthening of the rule of law in Serbia.

Much has been achieved in upgrading the criminal-technical service within the CID since 2000. Assistance from the international community was crucial.

Aiming at providing preconditions for the unbroken chain of material evidence from a crime scene to the laboratory environment the main focus has been on:

- developing a quality management system for processing evidence and crime scene investigation policy,
- creating a national centralised criminal-technical service,
- developing a regional network of forensic laboratories,
- implementing the Automated Fingerprints Identification System (AFIS) and Face Identification System (FIS),
- building a national DNA laboratory,
- enhancing the skills and knowledge of the MoI staff.<sup>124</sup>

The Serbian CID is in the final stages of integrating its criminal-technical service in Belgrade, which is supported by regional forensic laboratories in Nis and Novi Sad.<sup>125</sup> A major step forward will be the functional DNA laboratory,<sup>126</sup> to be finalised in 2006. The MoI is using its own capacities in the implementation of the AFIS and FIS. In addition, there is on-going training of all crime scene investigators and developing a quality management system for an unbroken chain of evidence.<sup>127</sup>

With the upgrading of the police capacities for securing and producing good quality evidence, a challenge remains in the area of co-operation between the pillars of the criminal justice system. Clarification of procedures needs to be ensured among those in charge of evidence gathering, investigation and prosecution. There is a huge need for improvement in co-operation between the police service, Investigative Magistrate in charge of pre-trial proceedings, and the State Prosecutor's Office.

### **Border Demilitarisation: Creation of the Border Police Service**

The dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and the emerging of new countries created new borders. In 2000, FRY Army and Navy were securing the FRY green and blue borders,<sup>128</sup> while the republican MoIs were tasked with controlling border crossing points.

Also, in 2000/2001 the Federal MoI "intended to create a Border Police Service (BPS) in order to transfer responsibility for the task of border security from the military to the police".<sup>129</sup> However, Montenegro has not been acknowledging the federal institutions since July 2000. In addition, the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002 announced re-structuring of the FRY into a state union of Serbia and Montenegro. In such a political constellation the federal BPS was never created.

However, in 2001 and 2002 the Serbian MoI within its Directorate for Border Police, Aliens and Administrative Affairs (see Annex B) initiated some strategic documents with the assistance of DCAF, OSCE, EAR and the Stability Pact which included analysis of human resources and technical/infrastructure equipment at border crossings, as well as the Action Plan for Taking Over and Securing Green and Blue Borders from the military.<sup>130</sup>

The FRY Supreme Defence Council at its session in November 2002 “considered transferring authority concerning state border security and concluded that this can be realised after the adoption of the ‘Law on the State Border’”.<sup>131</sup>

In February 2003, the FRY was transformed into the state union Serbia and Montenegro (SaM), and the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro was enacted. Consequently, the Federal MoI ceased to exist. The SaM Ministry of Defence and its military remained one of a few institutions governed from the state union level. Hence, the security of the Serbian international borders<sup>132</sup> remained under the two-level responsibility of the SaM military and the Serbian police service.

The issue of the demilitarisation of Serbian borders also needs to be seen from a wider prospective of overall security sector reform and the impending accession of the Western Balkans<sup>133</sup> to EU,<sup>134</sup> where border protection is not seen as an issue of defence, but rather of home affairs. The whole process demanded both commitment and support not just from the Western Balkan countries themselves, but also from the international community. Bearing that in mind, in early 2003, “following a NATO initiative, the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the Stability Pact worked jointly to develop a coherent and concerted approach to the border security and management issue in the region”.<sup>135</sup> The international community’s interest in border protection reform also lay in the fact that Serbia is located on the infamous Balkan Route – one of the main roads of illegal trafficking of human beings, weapons, drugs and other hazardous substances to Western Europe. The Balkan Route is also an important road for terrorists, connecting Middle East and Central Asia with Europe. The only survivor suspect of the Madrid 11 March 2004 bombing was arrested on a train in Serbia when he was travelling towards the Middle East.

The initiative resulted in the Ohrid Process on Border Security within which the countries and international organisations agreed on a way forward regarding all crucial aspects of the process at a conference held in May 2003. Its long-term overarching goal was to develop Integrated Border Management (IBM) in the Western Balkans.<sup>136</sup>

The demilitarisation of the state border and introduction of the IBM system in line with the EU and Schengen standards<sup>137</sup> was an enormous challenge in a complex state structure such as SaM, especially since the adoption of the Law on the State Border, a precondition for the start of demilitarisation, is still pending. On top of this, the IBM is particularly challenging in relation to the unresolved issue of border delineation with the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

The conditions at 71 border crossing points, of which 60 are international, were and still are very poor. “Infrastructure at border crossings on borders with former Yugoslav republics is not satisfactory, and on a number of them there is no infrastructure at all, no electricity or a telephone line, no water or sewage.”<sup>138</sup>

Regardless of all the obstacles and in addition to the initial strategic documents, the MoI has been putting effort into creating preconditions for the transfer. In 2003 the upgrading of the MoI's BPS started with building up human resources capacity and the MoI organised several basic courses for border police officers as well as adopting new curricula for Border Police Training in 2004.<sup>139</sup> It is envisaged that the BPS will have 6,000 border police officers. BPS will be partially manned from the SaM military, and partially from new recruits. But, irrespective of the number of BPS staff, unless modern monitoring equipment is in place, the BPS can not be fully successful.

In parallel, the MoI worked on the restructuring of the Directorate for Border Police, Aliens and Administrative Affairs into a Border Police Directorate (BPD) with regional centres and police stations. The BPD has undergone substantial reorganisation aiming at "performing all duties related to control of crossings and securing the state border while suppressing illegal immigration, trafficking of human beings, smuggling of drugs and weapons as well as all other duties regarding suppression of cross-border crime".<sup>140</sup> Recently, administrative affairs were extracted from the BPD, and moved into a newly-restructured Administrative Affairs Directorate (see Annex D).

The National Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking of Human Beings, and the current Head of BPD, Dušan Zlokas has played a pivotal role in this area since 2001. The international community acknowledged the efforts made by the government in establishing a legal framework and setting up a unique Inter-Agency Co-ordination Body tasked with the effective combating of trafficking. According to the OSCE, "the police in Serbia have demonstrated the biggest development and leap forward. The MoI has also adopted necessary regulations [...] putting the country in line with modern standards."<sup>141</sup>

With the strengthening of the possibilities for the EU processes, the Serbian government adopted a decision on establishing a Commission for the development of the national 'IBM Strategy' in October 2004.

In an effort to overcome the lack of a Law on State Border, in January 2005 the SaM Council of Ministers made Decision: "Until a 'Law on State Border' is brought, the SaM military is temporarily transferring the duties of securing the state border of the territory of the Republic of Serbia to the MoI of Republic of Serbia."<sup>142</sup> Based on that Decision, the SaM MoD and the Serbian government signed An Agreement of Transferring the Duties of Securing the State Border in February 2005.

In line with the commitments stemming from the Ohrid Process and pursuant to the above documents, the MoI developed a Dynamic Plan for the take-over which envisaged the clock-wise transfer starting with the take-over of the border towards Hungary, as the only EU border, in early 2005. Through the EU-funded programme Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS), refurbishment of three border crossing points is being finalised on the borders towards Hungary, Macedonia and Croatia. However, further refurbishment of border crossings will require substantial infrastructural investment beyond the country's current capacities.<sup>143</sup>

CARDS funds are also being used for the project of building up the digital radio network to TETRA standards.<sup>144</sup> Since 2003, the MoI is using its own resources for introducing the new ID card system.<sup>145</sup> Setting up an integrated IT system is in the pipeline as well. However, integrating all those systems into a functional network still

has a way to go, considering the poor conditions at a substantial number of border crossing points.

In early 2006, the MoI took over the Romanian border, which entails securing the 230 km-long blue border on the Danube. The MoI lacks patrol vessels and monitoring equipment for that task.

Although belatedly, the Serbian government adopted the 'IBM Strategy' in January 2006, which represents a tangible break-through with regard to possibilities for further planning the demilitarisation process and enhancing inter-agency co-operation.

Serbia has become "the outer border of the European Union."<sup>146</sup> Taking into consideration its important geo-political position, and the fact that the country is at the crossroads of major trans-national organised crime routes, even the smallest international investment in building up the overall capacities of the new BPS contributes significantly to more efficient and effective fight against organised crime in Europe. A lot of time has been lost due to unclear competencies in the unique state of SaM. The political elite has finally opened up the possibilities for laying initial foundations, such as the IBM Strategy, however major capital investments are needed in reconstruction of the border crossing points, which will be a focus in the years to come.

### **Strategic Planning**

The issue of strategic planning and development may serve as concluding point when assessing the whole process of police reform in Serbia. All of the reform activities covered above sustain the argument that only recently have a few operational strategies been developed, mostly after realising that the fragmented approach led to fragmented and unsustainable developments. The factor of international pressure should not be overlooked either.

There were a couple of international and MoI efforts in the area of strategic planning, especially in the beginning of the police reform process. Most notable was the work with DCHR that led to the Vision Document. The second one was within the framework of the regional association Southeast European Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA)<sup>147</sup>, which was assisted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP facilitated several workshops on strategic planning which were supposed to result in an environmental scan and the overall MoI strategic plan.<sup>148</sup> The aim was too ambitious for the RCMP mandate and the allotted budget. RCMP pulled out without fulfilling its overall goal of assisting SEPCA police services in developing strategic plans, although some individual capacities for strategic planning, especially in the MoI's Analytics Directorate, remained.

It should be reiterated that there was not enough vigilance back in 2003 to make the leap towards a deeper mentality shift and acknowledgment of strategic planning initially as a tool for reform and subsequently for managing the police service. One has to be fair, and take into consideration the moment when the leap was expected to be made – exactly at the time when the Prime Minister was assassinated, and the flywheel strength was exhausted in operation *Sabre*. Then, there was a change of administration in 2004, and many of those who participated in the workshops on strategic planning were no longer occupying high-level managerial posts. Personnel discontinuity also affected possibilities for sustainable building on achievements.



The overall social turbulence which culminated with the assassination has settled, and attention needs to be focused on the times to come. The Vision Document can still be used as a starting point for evaluating what has been achieved so far, and possibly using some of its material for developing other operational strategies. Special attention needs to be paid to tangent issues between operational strategies towards defining common issues.

A need still remains for the strategic planning units at both the MoI and police service levels. The MoI organisational chart (Annex D) displays the Bureau for Strategic Planning and Analytical Reporting within the minister's cabinet. However, there is no information on whether the Bureau for Strategic Planning is operational.

If the MoI wants to sustain the reform results attained and accelerate the change management, then a long-term overall home affairs strategy needs to be in place. Those who believe that finalisation of the reform is just around the corner, even if that corner be as far away as EU accession, have to think again. Police reform is an ongoing change management cycle in all developed police services.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Slobodan Milošević was President of the Republic of Serbia (1989-1997) and President of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 1997-2000. In 1999, he was indicted by the United Nations International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for having allegedly committed war crimes. He was arrested in March 2001 and extradited to the ICTY in June 2001. He died in ICTY detention in March 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Yugoslav War is a generic term for all secession wars, civil wars, armed rebellions, external military interventions, and other forms of armed conflict in former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Following NATO's military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, in line with the 'Kumanovo Agreement', all Yugoslav Army and Serbian police forces withdrew from Kosovo.

<sup>4</sup> According to *Collateral Oblivion* in NIN, a thousand police officers and soldiers lost their lives during the intervention.

<http://www.nin.co.yu/index.php?s=free&a=2882&rid=3&id=5868>

<sup>5</sup> Đorđević, Ivan "Pregled procesa reforme Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije", in: Janković, Pavle (ed.) *Druga škola reforma sektora bezbednosti: zbornik predavanja* (G17 Institute: Belgrade, 2003) p.175

<sup>6</sup> Milosavljević, Bogoljub "Reform of the police and security services in Serbia and Montenegro: attained results or betrayed expectations", in Fluri, Philipp and Miroslav Hadžić (eds.) *Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform*, Geneva and Belgrade: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Centre for Civil-Military Relations, p.253.

<sup>7</sup> Following the fall of Milošević, the first government was led by DOS – a wide democratic opposition bloc of 18 parties; in its course the Serbian Prime Minister was assassinated and the country placed in a State of Emergency; the second government is a minority government backed in parliament by Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia.

<sup>8</sup> MoI operates under one-year plans – lack of strategic planning.

<sup>9</sup> Party leader Slobodan Milošević.

<sup>10</sup> Party leader Vuk Drašković.

<sup>11</sup> Co-ministers were: Božidar Prelević (DOS), Stevan Nikčević (SPO) and Slobodan Tomović (SPS)

<sup>12</sup> See Annex B.

<sup>13</sup> Both events are covered in news – November 2000, Archive [www.b92.net](http://www.b92.net)

<sup>14</sup> Statement by the then Co-minister of Interior Božo Prelević on the obstructions by the socialist Co-minister Tomović:

[www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2000&mm=11&dd=15&nav\\_id=16050](http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2000&mm=11&dd=15&nav_id=16050)

<sup>15</sup> The term administrative line refers to delineation between Serbia and Kosovo, since the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted following the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, says “Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region as set out in the Helsinki Final Act...”

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>16</sup> Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja are the three municipalities in the south of Serbia that are located on the administrative boundary with the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Kosovo). Preševo is predominantly populated by Albanians (98%), Bujanovac is 50% Albanian, 45% Serbian, 5% Roma; Medvedja 15% Albanian and the rest Serbian.

<sup>17</sup> Special Police Units were used during the armed conflicts in Kosovo in the late '90s.

<http://www.hrw.org/serbian/kosovo2001/summary.pdf>

<sup>18</sup> Interview by Gendarmerie commander Goran Radosavljević to Glas Javnosti on 15 November 2001, [www.glas-javnosti.co.yu](http://www.glas-javnosti.co.yu)

<sup>19</sup> The international community, embodied by the OSCE, was invited as a guarantor of the process. The OSCE was involved in the implementation of this programme, bearing in mind its political nature as well as its possibility to engage in police training through its field Mission established in FRY in March 2001.

<sup>20</sup> The Serbian Law on the Accountability for Human Rights Violations (the “Lustration Law”), was an important step in dealing with the past, as it provides a basis for screening candidates for top positions in all branches of the administration and judiciary regarding potential human rights violations committed from 1976. However, it has not been enforced. The deadlock, allegedly for procedural reasons, in fact reflects a lack of political consensus on lustration.’

[http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/sam\\_feasibility\\_report\\_staff\\_working\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/pdf/sam_feasibility_report_staff_working_paper_en.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> Stated by Božo Prelević in February 2006, “*Utisak Nedelje*” TV B92,

[http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/utisak\\_nedelje.php?nav\\_id=188521&yyyy=2006&mm=02](http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/utisak_nedelje.php?nav_id=188521&yyyy=2006&mm=02)

<sup>22</sup> In Serbian, POSKOK means *viper*.

<sup>23</sup> “Report on management, organisation and functioning of the system of close protection of the Prime Minister of the Government of Republic of Serbia Zoran Djindjić, with recommendations”, p.19.

<sup>24</sup> Djordjević, Ivan OP. CIT., p. 182

<sup>25</sup> The then Head of the State Security Sector was Radomir Marković, recently sentenced to 15 years in prison for taking part in the murder of former president of the Republic of Serbia Ivan Stambolić who disappeared in August 2000, as well as the attempted assassination of the SPO party leader Vuk Drašković in Budva, Montenegro in June 2000.

<sup>26</sup> POSKOK operational team leader Ljubiša Milanović gave a statement in November 2005 on the presence of two JSO members at the site where journalist Slavko Ćuruvija was assassinated in 1999; following his statement Božo Prelević stated that POSKOK was disbanded because it reached intelligence on who assassinated Slavko Ćuruvija

[http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/u\\_fokusu.php?id=9&nav\\_id=181760&start=15](http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/u_fokusu.php?id=9&nav_id=181760&start=15)

<sup>27</sup> Boris Tadić, the current President of Serbia and the then Vice President of Democratic Party said in 2001 that POSKOK “was disbanded in order to form a new police unit [...] and that the less efficient units need to be substituted by more efficient ones” <http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2001/04/16/srpski/I01041302.shtml>

<sup>28</sup> B92 news Archive (6 November 2000) *Nebojša Čović, Božo Prelević asking for dismissal of Radomir Marković* [www.b92.net](http://www.b92.net)

<sup>29</sup> Its principal tasks were to protect federal and foreign VIPs, guard diplomatic premises, set up the National Central Bureau in anticipation of FRY being re-admitted to Interpol in Sept 2001 and create a Border Police Service (the Monk Report, page 5).

<sup>30</sup> Dušan Mihajlović was the leader of the party Liberals of Serbia, a small member of DOS

<sup>31</sup> [www.mup.sr.gov.yu/domino/02arh.nsf/5e2a05a384a84a4dc1256c3e0052e9de/\\$FILE/ReformaMUPa.doc](http://www.mup.sr.gov.yu/domino/02arh.nsf/5e2a05a384a84a4dc1256c3e0052e9de/$FILE/ReformaMUPa.doc)

<sup>32</sup> Weekly ‘*Ekonomist*’ No. 107,

<http://www.ekonomist.co.yu/magazin/em107/med/m3.htm>

<sup>33</sup> [http://www.blic.co.yu/arhiva/2002-04-06/strane/najnovije\\_vesti.htm](http://www.blic.co.yu/arhiva/2002-04-06/strane/najnovije_vesti.htm)

<sup>34</sup> Watkins, Dr. Amadeo, “Terrorists and traffickers test the patience of Serb border forces”, [www.janes.com](http://www.janes.com), 6 September 2004.

<sup>35</sup> The first phase consisted of a five-day refresher and update course for former police officers (officers who left the police during the Milošević regime), the second was the initial five-week accelerated training package for former police officers and new recruits. The third phase, which began on 6 August 2001, was a twelve-week basic police training programme for new Serbian, Albanian and Roma recruits in four consecutive cycles.

<sup>36</sup> Of the 375 trained MEPE officers, 245 were Albanians, 125 Serbs, four Roma and one Yugoslav; Minister Mihajlović's presentation on the occasion of "1,000 Tough Days".

<sup>37</sup> The South Serbia Working Group brought together the mayors of the three municipalities, the three local police chiefs and their supervisors, high-ranking Ministry officials, the government's Co-ordination Body and the OSCE;

[http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2005/07/15504\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2005/07/15504_en.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> Citizens Advisory Groups are meetings between the local population and local police where citizens may raise safety concerns and in a dialogue with police see if resolving a particular concern is under the competency of the local police. If the police are capable of resolving the problem it's the police's responsibility to follow up.

<sup>39</sup> Municipal Safety Councils are bodies of the local assemblies in the municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja.

<sup>40</sup> Riza Halimi was a mayor of Preševo in the period covered by this report. This statement was given on 23 January 2005, B92 Archive news

[http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/pregled\\_stampe.php?yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=23&nav\\_category=41&nav\\_id=160588](http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/pregled_stampe.php?yyyy=2005&mm=01&dd=23&nav_category=41&nav_id=160588)

<sup>41</sup> The Monk Report, Recommendation 8, p.104

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p.34, published in July 2001, [www.osce.org/item/17633.html](http://www.osce.org/item/17633.html)

<sup>43</sup> League of Experts (LEX) is an independent think tank. Experts gathered under the LEX umbrella represent a group of civil society leaders ([www.lex.org.yu](http://www.lex.org.yu)).

<sup>44</sup> The Vision Document of the Serbian MoI, Introduction.

<sup>45</sup> Cabinet of the Minister; Operational Centre; Control and Oversight; the Police, including subgroups: (a) Fight against Crime, (b) Public Peace and Order, (c) Traffic Safety, (d) Protection of VIPs and Facilities and (e) Community Policing; Organised Crime; Special Units consists of: (a) Gendarmerie and (b) Special Antiterrorist Unit; Migration and State Border Control; Emergency Preparedness; Administrative Proceedings; Human Resources and Education; Information and Telecommunication Systems and Technologies; on Financial-Administrative Matters and Technical Support; Analytics; and Helicopter Unit.

<sup>46</sup> Declared following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjić – see Chronology (Annex A)

<sup>47</sup> Many issues were highlighted such as links between the state and MoI officials with organised crime, outdated legislation, centralisation, militarised system, politicisation, non-existence of parliamentary and internal oversight, lack of professional attitude, lack of talented managers, obsolete selection of recruits, unrepresentative police service, etc.

<sup>48</sup> Milosavljević, Bogoljub "Reform of the police and security services in Serbia and Montenegro: attained results or betrayed expectations", in Fluri, Philipp and Miroslav Hadžić (eds.) OP. CIT. p.257

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> With the change of government, 700 police managers were reallocated or dismissed.

<http://pretraga.krstarica.com/index-lat.cache?cs=utf-8&q=internet&ch=http:%2F%2Fwww.svedok.co.yu%2Findex.asp%3Fshow=44204&fm=off>

<sup>51</sup> Downes, Dr Mark *Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the creation of a modern and accountable police service*, Belgrade, 2004: Law Enforcement Department, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, p. 45

<sup>52</sup> "Assisting Police Reform in FRY – Ensuring a Coordinated Approach", p. 2, [www.osce.org/item/324.html](http://www.osce.org/item/324.html)

<sup>53</sup> Djordjević, Ivan, OP. CIT. p.178

<sup>54</sup> "[...] the basic legal act governing the police in Serbia [The Law on Internal Affairs] was adopted in 1991 and is actually a slightly revised legislation of communist times [...] the law still represents the legal framework for the organisation and activity of the police, although outmoded and in contravention of reform efforts. The situation has meanwhile been partly improved to the extent that the most important police authorities for crime repression were regulated in a more appropriate way by the new laws on criminal procedure passed in Serbia in 2001." Milosavljević, Bogoljub "Reform of the police and security services in Serbia and

Montenegro: attained results or betrayed expectations”, Fluri, Phillipp and Miroslav Hadžić (eds.) OP. CIT. p.251

<sup>55</sup> Bezbednosno-informativna agencija (BIA) replaced the State Security Sector as Serbia’s civilian intelligence agency.

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.danas.co.yu/20021012/vikend3.htm>

<sup>57</sup> ‘Dnevnik’, <http://www.dnevnik.co.yu/arhiva/16-04-2004/Strane/spec.htm>

<sup>58</sup> <http://www.mail-archive.com/sim@antic.org/msg18043.html>

<sup>59</sup> Statement of Minister Jočić on 17 June 2004;

<http://www.mail-archive.com/sim@antic.org/msg18043.html>

<sup>60</sup> “Making Justice Sector Reform Affordable and Effective”, Newsletter of the Law Enforcement Department, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, p.9

[http://www.osce.org/publications/fry/2005/05/18200\\_541\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/publications/fry/2005/05/18200_541_en.pdf)

<sup>61</sup> ‘VIP’ Daily New Report 15 November 2005; ‘Danas’ idem page 5; ‘Politika’ idem page 7

<sup>62</sup> “The Director General of Police is appointed by the government for a term of five years on recommendation of the Minister, following a call for applications and in accordance with Ministry fair-hiring practices.” Article 21 of the Serbian Law on Police

[http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/akta/akta\\_detalji.asp?Id=296&t=Z](http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/cir/akta/akta_detalji.asp?Id=296&t=Z)

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, Article 24

<sup>64</sup> BETA News and Press Review, 15 November 2005, p. 4

<sup>65</sup> There are a number of training facilities for the basic police course, which lasts six months, as well as some specialist courses; however the training is not conducted in a systematic manner.

<sup>66</sup> The Vision Document of the MoI.

<sup>67</sup> [www.vsup.edu.yu](http://www.vsup.edu.yu)

<sup>68</sup> Until recently, students used to spend their time in uniform on campus (boarding). The Academy is free of charge and all students receive a salary that equals to the salary of a police apprentice. In addition to other subjects, they have also military subjects and military practical training. Until 2001, the Academy did not enrol female students. The Vision Document.

<sup>69</sup> The Monk Report; The MoI Vision Document.

<sup>70</sup> The MoI Vision Document, p.461

<sup>71</sup> The OSCE Trainer Development Programme consists of four components: Trainer Development Course (6 week generic training-of-trainers course), Curriculum Development Course, Training Evaluation Course and Advanced Trainer Development Course. The whole package is a long-term programme for creating internal capacity for delivering modernised basic and specialised in-service training.

<sup>72</sup> The Monk Report, page 43

<sup>73</sup> Djordjević, Ivan, OP. CIT. p.176

<sup>74</sup> Downes, Dr. Mark OP. CIT.

<sup>75</sup> In the Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 2004 between the MoI and the OSCE, the reform of police education and training system was included as one of eight priority areas.

<sup>76</sup> [http://prezentacije.mup.sr.gov.yu/upravazaobrazovanje/strategija/Strategija%20razvoja%20sistema%20obuke%20i%20obrazovanja\\_221205-.htm](http://prezentacije.mup.sr.gov.yu/upravazaobrazovanje/strategija/Strategija%20razvoja%20sistema%20obuke%20i%20obrazovanja_221205-.htm)

<sup>77</sup> The purpose of the Bologna Process is to create a European higher education area by harmonising academic degree standards and quality assurance standards throughout Europe for each faculty and its development.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bologna\\_process](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bologna_process)

<sup>78</sup> Community safety is the partnership process undertaken by the community including the police in order to achieve safer communities, reduce social disorder and prevent crime. (*Joint Evaluation Report on Community Safety and Community Policing in Serbia*, Serbian MoI and DFID Balkans Security, Safety and Access to Justice Programme)

<sup>79</sup> The OSCE Mission in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the UK Department for International Development Balkans Safety, Security and Access to Justice Programme (SSAJP), the Norwegian National Police Directorate and Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC); the OSCE and the MoI attempted to coordinate the stakeholders.

<sup>80</sup> In February 2003, DFID launched the initiative in four pilot sites – Novi Bečej (Vojvodina), Vrnjačka Banja and Kragujevac (central Serbia) and Zvezdara (an urban municipality in Belgrade); in 2003 Norwegian National Police Directorate launched a police assistance project

with some community policing elements (mainly problem oriented policing) in Bačka Palanka (Vojvodina), and a similar project was conducted in 2004 in Novi Sad (capital of Vojvodina); in late 2003 the OSCE launched a community policing project in Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja; in early 2004 SDC launched the police assistance project in Požega (west Serbia).

<sup>81</sup> The MoI conducted the surveys in co-operation with the OSCE. The Downes Report summarises some of the main findings: [http://www.osce.org/sam/item\\_11\\_18262.html](http://www.osce.org/sam/item_11_18262.html)

<sup>82</sup> Vojinović, Miloš “Community Policing”, in *Security*, Belgrade: MoI of the Republic of Serbia, 3/2004, p.431

<sup>83</sup> ‘*Joint Evaluation Report on Community Safety and Community Policing in Serbia*’, Serbian MoI and DFID SSAJP, December 2004: Hereinafter referred to as the MoI/DFID Report

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. Recommendation 15

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, Recommendation 5

<sup>87</sup> <http://prezentacije.mup.sr.gov.yu/upravapolicije/index.htm>

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> *JUNO III Status Report*, Overview of the Pilot Project on Problem Oriented Policing and Analytics, Serbian MoI & Norwegian National Police Directorate, 2005

<sup>90</sup> “National strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and Montenegro’s accession to the European Union”, p.186, [www.seio.sr.gov.yu](http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu)

<sup>91</sup> “*Council of Europe and OSCE Final Joint Report on Police Accountability in Serbia*”, by John Slater on behalf of the Council of Europe (CoE) and Harm Trip on behalf of the OSCE, September 2002, page 4

<sup>92</sup> Ibid

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, page 5

<sup>94</sup> Head of Public Security Sector of the Serbian MoI is an Assistant Minister of Interior.

<sup>95</sup> *Instruction on Police Ethics*, adopted by Minister of Interior on 15 April 2003, published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 44/91, 79/91, 54/96, 25/2000 & 8/2001.

<sup>96</sup> Adopted by the CoE Council of Ministers on September 19, 2001

<sup>97</sup> Milosavljević, Bogoljub, OP. CIT p.257

<sup>98</sup> Srbislav Randjelovic is an experienced and respected police officer; prior to the appointment he was the Head of the national Criminal Investigation Directorate.

<sup>99</sup> The minority government appointed the new Inspector General pursuant to the ruling coalition agreement. Vladimir Božović graduated from the Police College and Faculty of Law, and prior to appointment worked as a lawyer. He has been proposed for the IG post as an SPO cadre.

<http://prezentacije.mup.sr.gov.yu/sgi/generalni.htm>

<sup>100</sup> “According to information obtained by the daily Danas, the last time Božović and Jočić met was in June 2005”, Danas, 3 March 2006, page 1

<sup>101</sup> <http://www.osce.org/item/8439.html>

<sup>102</sup> Presentation of the 2005 Annual Report of the IGO, MoI February 2006

<sup>103</sup> Based on Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> The Serbian ‘Police Law’, Articles covering internal oversight 171-181; [www.parlament.sr.gov.yu](http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu)

<sup>105</sup> The Monk Report, p.9.

<sup>106</sup> Downes, Dr Mark, OP. CIT. p.55.

<sup>107</sup> <http://www.danas.co.yu/20041118/dijalog1.html>

<sup>108</sup> Article 170 of the Serbian Law on Police, [www.parlament.sr.gov.yu](http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu)

<sup>109</sup> [http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=02&nav\\_id=177714](http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=02&nav_id=177714)

<sup>110</sup> JUL – Yugoslav Left, a small but very powerful party headed by Milošević’s wife Mira Marković.

<sup>111</sup> Brunhart, Reto and Novak Gajić *Policing the Economic Transition in Serbia: Assessment of the Serbian Police Service’s Capacities to Fight Economic Crime* (Belgrade 2005, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro) pp. 6-8

[http://www.osce.org/sam/item\\_11\\_18263.html](http://www.osce.org/sam/item_11_18263.html)

<sup>112</sup> Vasić, Miloš and Jovan Dulović *Zašto je ubijen general Buha*, Vreme No. 597, 13 June 2002 <http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=315943>

<sup>113</sup> Brunhart and Gajić OP. CIT. p.28

<sup>114</sup> Balkan Investigative Reporting Network: *Net Closes on Alleged Suva Reka Killers*

<http://www.birn.eu.com/investigation01.php>

<sup>115</sup> Djordjević is at large and widely believed to be hiding in Russia, while Lukić surrendered to the ICTY in 2005.

<sup>116</sup> Balkan Investigative Reporting Network: *Net Closes on Alleged Suva Reka Killers*  
<http://www.birn.eu.com/investigation01.php>

<sup>117</sup> The lorry driver, a known member of the Zemun Gang, was released by the court the next day, with the explanation that he is a small travelling merchant who needs to feed his family. The public has never been informed if potential connections of the assassins with the judiciary have ever been thoroughly investigated.

<sup>118</sup> Interview of Milorad Veljović, Head of CID, to *Politika*, 18 October 2005  
[http://www.transparentnost.org.yu/ts\\_mediji/stampa/2005/10OKTOBAR/18102005.html](http://www.transparentnost.org.yu/ts_mediji/stampa/2005/10OKTOBAR/18102005.html)

<sup>119</sup> Marković-Subota, T., *Za zaštitu svedoka 11 miliona evra*, *Blic*, 2 April 2005

<http://www.blic.co.yu/arhiva/2005-04-02/strane/hronika.htm>

<sup>120</sup> Nikolić-Đaković, Tanja, *Svaki tajkun ima svoje poslanike* Interview of Josip Bogić, Head of UBPOK's Organised Financial Crime Department, to *Blic*, 28 October 2005.

<http://www.blic.co.yu/arhiva/2005-10-28/strane/tema.htm>

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.* p.16

<sup>122</sup> Brunhart and Gajić, OP. CIT. p.15

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.* p.22

<sup>124</sup> The Swedish Government has been implementing a project 'Strengthening of Crime Scene Investigation'; <http://www.u4.no/projects/project.cfm?id=663>

<sup>125</sup> Building up of the forensic laboratories in Novi Sad and Niš was supported by the Norwegian Government through JuNo projects; <http://www.osce.org/item/16439.html>

<sup>126</sup> The DNA laboratory is a CARDS funded project;

<http://www.ear.eu.int/publications/main/news-a1c2y3.htm>

<sup>127</sup> The Swedish Government, <http://www.u4.no/projects/project.cfm?id=663>

<sup>128</sup> Green borders are land borders, blue borders are borders at sea, rivers and lakes

<sup>129</sup> The Monk Report, page 27.

<sup>130</sup> "Way Forward Document" Ohrid Regional Conference on Border Security and Management 22/23 May 2003,

<http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/comites/1373/ohrid2.doc>

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> The total length of the state border of Serbia is 2,158 km, of which 174 km are with Hungary, 594 km with Romania, 394 km with Bulgaria, 112 km with Albania, 258 km with Hungary, 391 km with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 280 km with Macedonia.

<sup>133</sup> Western Balkans countries are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro.

<sup>134</sup> At the EU – Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, 'the EU reiterated its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries'.

[http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign\\_policy/eu/EU-WBalkans\\_en.pdf](http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/EU-WBalkans_en.pdf)

<sup>135</sup> [http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030522\\_ohrid/c030522a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2003/030522_ohrid/c030522a.htm)

<sup>136</sup> IBM should provide the right balance between open but secure and controlled borders – open borders for trade, tourism and other forms of legitimate movement of people and goods, but secure and controlled to prevent illegal migration, human trafficking, criminal activities and terrorism.

<http://www.feio.sv.gov.yu/code/navigate.php?Id=173>

<sup>137</sup> In June 1990 the 'Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement' was signed. Its key points relate to measures designed to create, following the abolition of common border checks, a common area of security and justice enhancing free flow of people and goods across borders in Europe.

<sup>138</sup> 'Integrated Border Management Strategy in Republic of Serbia', p. 21

<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=207>

<sup>139</sup> 'Monitoring Tool for the Serbian Government's Action Plan for Meeting the European Partnership Priorities'

<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=177> (Hereafter: 'Monitoring Tool')

<sup>140</sup> 'Strategy on Integrated Border management in Republic of Serbia', p. 11

<http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=207>

<sup>141</sup> <http://www.osce.org/item/14745.html>

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<sup>142</sup> "Official Gazette of SaM", n°4/05

<sup>143</sup> Monitoring Tool.

<sup>144</sup> Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) is a digital trunked mobile radio standard developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute.

<sup>145</sup> 'Report on the work of the MoI of the Republic of Serbia in the period November 2004 – April 2005' [www.mup.sr.gov.yu](http://www.mup.sr.gov.yu)

<sup>146</sup> 'Europe's Leaky Outer Frontier', IWPR,

[http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=156010&apc\\_state=henibcr2004](http://www.iwpr.net/?p=bcr&s=f&o=156010&apc_state=henibcr2004)

<sup>147</sup> Eight police services are SEPCA members: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Srpska, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro

<sup>148</sup> *Izveštaj o radu Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije u 2003*, [www.mup.sr.gov.yu](http://www.mup.sr.gov.yu), Archive.

## Annex A: **Chronology of Events**

- 5 October 2000 Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević defeated at presidential elections. Massive demonstrations in the Serbian capital Belgrade; hundreds of thousands people in the streets overthrow Milošević's SPS regime in the 'democratic revolution'. Police *en masse* refuse to use lethal force against demonstrators, thus not providing for the first time critical support to the regime. Vojislav Koštunica, leader of DSS, and the DOS maverick against Milošević, becomes the new Yugoslav President.
- 24 October 2000 Transitional/provisional government formed. MoI headed by a trilateral leadership; three co-ministers appointed: Božidar Prelević (DOS), Stevan Nikčević (SPO) and Slobodan Tomović (SPS).
- 4 November 2000 New government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia elected; Federal Prime Minister Zoran Žižić (from Montenegro), Federal Minister of Interior Zoran Živković (DOS).
- 10 November 2000 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia readmitted to the OSCE as 55<sup>th</sup> participating state. (In 1992, Yugoslavia was suspended from participation in OSCE – the first and only time the OSCE employed *consensus minus one* mechanism.)
- 21 November 2000 Ethnic Albanian militants begin insurgency in the south of Serbia (municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja) through the so-called Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (UCPBM).
- 6 December 2000 FRY government and the transitional government of Serbia formed the Co-ordination Body for the Municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja; Nebojša Čović (DOS) appointed as its Chairman.
- November-December 2000 Simultaneous mutiny in major prisons across Serbia
- 23 December 2000 Extraordinary parliamentary elections in Serbia, landslide victory of DOS
- 26 January 2001 New Serbian government formed, Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić (leader of DS; and of DOS)
- 6 February 2001 The federal and the Serbian governments developed the Programme on how to overcome the crisis which occurred due to the activities of the ethnic Albanian extremist groups in the south of Serbia.




12 March 2001	Minister of Interior Dušan Mihajlović adopts the internal MoI act on establishing the Office of Inspector General of the Public Security Sector
March 2001	Secret stash of 600kg of heroin found in the MoI Secret Service's safe in a bank in Belgrade
31 March 2001	Milošević arrested
Spring 2001	Organised Crime Directorate (UBPOK) formed
May 2001	Joint security forces (Federal Yugoslav Army and Serbian police) enter Ground Safety Zone – 5km-wide buffer zone on the administrative boundary between Serbia proper and Kosovo (previously under the security control of the NATO-led Kosovo Force – KFOR).
Mid 2001	Gendarmerie formed through consolidation of Special Police Units (PJP); PJP were used by the previous regime in the conflict in Kosovo.
June 2001	Excavation of bodies of Albanians killed during Kosovo conflict, at the Special Antiterrorist Unit's (SAJ) base in Batajnica, near Belgrade
28 June 2001	Milošević extradited to the ICTY; Yugoslav President Koštunica's DSS leaves the DOS Government claiming the extradition was unlawful.
Mid-2001 – end-2002	Multiethnic police training for south Serbia conducted jointly by the MoI and OSCE.
12 November 2001	Rebellion of the Special Operations Unit (JSO), secret service's paramilitary branch. Consequently, JSO was taken out of the State Security Sector and put under direct supervision by the government.
14 March 2002	Representatives of the federal government, the government of Serbia and the government of Montenegro, in the presence of the EU High Representative Javier Solana, signed the Belgrade Agreement, the initial agreement on the constitutional re-arrangement of the FRY into State Union Serbia and Montenegro.
5 June 2002	At the Police Reform Donor Conference, the MoI announces six priority areas of police reform, upon recommendations of the OSCE <i>Monk Report</i> : (1) Police Education and Development, (2) Accountability, (3) Organised Crime, (4) Community Policing, (5) Forensics, and (6) Border Policing.


27 July 2002	The Serbian parliament adopted the 'Law on Security Intelligence Agency' (BIA). The former State Security Sector (i.e. BIA) was extracted from the MoI and put under the control of the Serbian government.
2 August 2002	Federal and Serbian governments establish the Co-ordination Centre for Kosovo and Metochia; the Co-ordination Body for the municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo and Medvedja integrated into it.
4 February 2003	The Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro enacted. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia transformed into the state union Serbia and Montenegro. The Federal MoI ceased to exist.
12 March 2003	Prime Minister Djindjić assassinated. (The then JSO Deputy Commander Milorad Ulemek a.k.a. Milorad Luković Legija is under trial for the assassination.) 40 day State of Emergency proclaimed. MoI proclaims operation 'Sabre', during which more than 11,665 people arrested and 2,697 detained – including a number of senior and mid-level MoI and BIA officials.
25 March 2003	JSO disbanded; the majority of members transferred to Gendarmerie, smaller number to SAJ and VIP Protection Unit, while some leave the service.
3 April 2003	Serbia and Montenegro admitted to the Council of Europe, subsequently in December 2003 the State Union Parliament ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
11 April 2003	MoI Vision Document publicised, stating the priorities of the police reform in Serbia; developed in co-operation with the Danish Centre for Human Rights.
22 April 2003	End of the State of Emergency
July 2003	Government appoints the first Inspector General of the Public Security Sector, institutionalising internal oversight of police
Summer 2003	Law on Co-operation with the ICTY adopted
22 September 2003	The ICTY raises charges against police generals Sreten Lukić, the then MoI Head of the Public Security Sector (Chief of Police) and Vlastimir Djordjević, the Head of Public Security Sector during the conflict in Kosovo for war crimes in Kosovo. Indictment made public on 20 October 2003; the police organise a rally in downtown Belgrade in support of Sreten Lukić.

24 December 2003	Parliamentary elections, DOS loses power
3 March 2004	New minority government formed, Prime Minister Koštunica (leader of the DSS). The government is supported in the parliament by the SPS. New Minister of Interior Dragan Jočić (DSS) appointed.
17 March 2004	Three days of ferocious violence in Kosovo left 28 dead and 600 wounded, while 3,226 Serbs and other non-Albanians – mostly Roma – were forced from their homes. Reactions across Serbia result in torching of mosques in Belgrade and Niš.
2 May 2004	Former JSO Commander Milorad Luković (a.k.a. Milorad Ulemek, Legija), the main suspect for murder of Prime Minister Djindjić, surrenders to Gendarmerie.
17 November 2004	MoI and OSCE sign a memorandum of understanding, reaffirming the six priority areas. Two new areas added: Strategic Planning and Development, and War Crime Investigation.
4 April 2005	Police General Sreten Lukić extradited to the ICTY, while the other indictee Police General Vlastimir Djordjević remains at large (allegedly in Russia).
12 April 2005	European Commission approved the Feasibility Study for Serbia and Montenegro, which opened up the possibility for negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.
10 October 2005	Beginning of SAA negotiations.
14 November 2005	Long awaited Law on Police adopted by the Serbian Parliament.

Annex B: Organisational Structures MoI (2001)




Annex C:  
Organisational  
Chart MoI  
(2004)





# Annex D: Organisational Chart MoI (2005)



## Want to Know More ...?

See:

Monk, Richard, *A Study on Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Vienna: OSCE, 2001 [http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/17633\\_en.pdf.html](http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/17633_en.pdf.html)

*The Vision Document* Belgrade: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, 2003

Milosavljević, Bogoljub “Reform of the police and security services in Serbia and Montenegro: attained results or betrayed expectations” in: Fluri, Philipp and Miroslav Hadžić (eds.) *Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform*, Geneva/Belgrade: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004 [http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/sourcebook\\_ssr.cfm](http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/sourcebook_ssr.cfm)

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*Newsletter of the Law Enforcement Department*, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, [http://www.osce.org/publications/fry/2005/05/18200\\_541\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/publications/fry/2005/05/18200_541_en.pdf)

Brunhart, Reto and Novak Gajic, *Policing the Economic Transition in Serbia: Assessment of the Serbian Police Service's Capacities to Fight Economic Crime*, Belgrade: Law Enforcement Department, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, 2005 [http://www.osce.org/sam/item\\_11\\_18263.html](http://www.osce.org/sam/item_11_18263.html)

*National strategy of Serbia for the Serbia and Montenegro's accession to the European Union* [www.seio.sr.gov.yu](http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu)

*Integrated Border Management Strategy of the Republic of Serbia* [http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/upload/documents/strategy\\_border%20eng.pdf](http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/upload/documents/strategy_border%20eng.pdf)

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