Institutional Attitudes:
EU, NATO, OSCE and Beyond

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Key Points

* The EU, NATO and the OSCE are all renewing themselves, but their communication strategy is still sending the wrong signals to neighbours and non-members, who are not treated as equal partners in a constructive dialogue.

* They thus risk alienating even those who share their democratic ideals and leave the field open for anti-western propaganda.

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The three big western European organisations are not the only components of the alphabet soup in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. They are competing for attention with homegrown ones (BSEC, GUUAM, CSTO, BLACKSEAFOR, etc); charitable/humanitarian ones: e.g. UNDP, WFP, IOM; and financial and commercial interests: e.g. BP, CPC, WTO, EBRD, to name but a few.[1] What distinguishes a successful international institution of this kind? Are the three in my title successful? Is the plethora in the Black Sea region a sign of failure or success? Does it matter at all? Their memberships overlap, sometimes very markedly. Though their professed functions may differ, these overlaps must mean at the very least that certain policies or national interests are reflected in more than one organisation's programme of activities, and one may therefore wonder whether they are all serving a useful purpose or whose agenda they are following.

In writing about these organisations I do not intend to answer the questions above. I am merely posing them to focus attention on something beyond the simple existence of the organisations in question. There are in any case no right answers.

It used to be argued that these three international institutions had different needs and priorities in their relationships with each of the regions, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. But since the recent refocusing of the international security debate away from defence and military security towards a more inclusive concept, this is no longer the case. Security, however construed and constructed, is recognised by all three institutions as well as more generally to be something that does not lend itself to an 'us and them' approach, which separates members from non-members and treats their interests differently. All three institutions are going through a process of readjustment, not occasioned specifically by this, but certainly in part responding to it. Much of the detail that follows, therefore, relates to past events and priorities, and criticisms are meant to be constructive, coming from a supportive observer who aims to reflect the views of those who would otherwise not find a voice. Let us look at each of the institutions in turn.

The EU's priority before the new millennium was economic cooperation within its membership. Extramural trade, internal security cooperation, external security problems and the EU's potential for contributing to solving them came very low down the list of priorities at both administrative and political gatherings. External relations naturally prioritised those countries wishing to become members of the EU, and the *acquis communautaire* was the main, even the single focus of the often one-sided dialogue. Those who did not wish to apply for membership were fed a spasmodic diet of platitudes and some targeted aid and activities, arguably designed to relieve individual member countries' own pressure points. Partnership and cooperation agreements [PCA] were normally restricted to matters that could broadly be classed as economic.

The Mediterranean countries, as a source of immigration and trade links, had a long track record in their individual relationships with the EU, but it was only in 1994 that these were put onto a regional and programme basis. The Black Sea

region as such does not appear to be recognised by the EU. Given its belated realisation in 2003/4 that it needs a neighbourhood policy, the EU is catching up fast in this regard.

But the EU has not yet developed an identity that carries credibility in the military-security area. In fact, it may never do so, having moved further away from consensus on the subject since the Iraq War. All the more important, then, that it should be seen to be an agent for enhancing security in a wider sense – creating a community of interests and working to eliminate some of the issues that lead to a sense of insecurity both within and outside its borders. These could be things like economic and forced migration, all kinds of trafficking, energy security, and inequitable international relationships and so on. Here too, unfortunately, the EU's efforts have been less than successful (the case of Cyprus springs to mind) or so low-profile as to be virtually invisible to the man in the street.

In some cases they are so belated as to be embarrassing: it was only in spring 2005 that the EU appointed a special representative for Moldova – a country on the EU's doorstep, the poorest in Europe, around half of whose population had been to work, temporarily and illegally, in the EU since 1992, and which had been seeking help in settling a separatist dispute with the rogue, criminalised and proliferating regime in Transnistria for more than a decade.[2] Following adoption of an Action Plan within the European Neighbourhood Policy, Moldova from June 2005 now merits an EU delegation office of its own in Chisinau and the EU will in October 2005 belatedly become an observer at the 'five-sided' talks on Transistria's status.

A serious relationship with Russia was also slow to develop. Ignorance and stereotypes continue to characterise public attitudes, though institutional ones are slowly taking shape. The 'four common spaces' agreed in May 2003 - economic; freedom, security and justice; external security cooperation; research, education and culture – provide a useful framework on to which worthwhile activities can be glued to conceal the lack of fundamental consensus.[3]

The geopolitical issue of Kaliningrad was given much attention in the recent EU enlargement. It was recognised and widely publicised by both sides that the EU wished to strengthen its external borders and thus would spend some €13mn on improving Kaliningrad's border security. Yet the €23.3mn assigned to Kaliningrad for economic and environmental support is much less well known, both inside Russia and inside the EU.[4]

In its relationship with Ukraine, again 'embarrassing' was the most appropriate adjective until the Orange Revolution and the new EU members provided a spur. The PCA signed in 1994 did not come into force until four years later, in 1998.[5] The EU did not recognise Ukraine as a market economy until 2000, though it had done the same for Russia in 1997. This lack of encouragement for Westernising trends in Ukraine arguably set up a negative dynamic in what little popular perception there was, despite the nearly €1bn spent by the EU in Ukraine between 1998 and 2004.[6]

In a similar fashion, the EU has shown little enthusiasm for supporting democracy building in the Mediterranean region which extends into the Arab world. The rights and wrongs of the American focus on the interventionist aspect of its foreign policy have recently been widely debated, as have the divergence of European and American practice and experience in this regard. The EU Commission's Democracy Initiative, 'the only EU aid programme able to act without a host country's consent'[7] is ending, despite a call from Arab reformers in Venice in July 2005 for more

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'…civil-society activities to support democracy'.[8]   Irrespective of whether intervention without a host country's consent can be a positive factor in external relations (one thinks of the Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenko's alarmed responses to the supposed foreign engineering of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, for example), there is no doubt that there is a demand outside the EU for activities which would cement civil society networks even in countries which would not welcome more overt political relationships. Whether the EU or, for example, the Council of Europe or bilateral activities would be the most appropriate vehicle for fostering the international development of civil society, such activities can be designed to be non-controversial and should be encouraged. In the case of EU-funded programmes, however, the impetus has to come from the other side. What, then, is to be done if the non-EU country does not ask?

However, the EU has certainly been extending its interest from economic security into other areas, including NATO's traditional preserve of military security. The question of duplication and demarcation between the EU's putative military forces and military operational planning and those of NATO is too well documented to be of interest if repeated in this paper. However, a non-NATO member country seeking to participate in the EU's international task force, as the EU is said to wish to encourage, at present finds the question far from academic – procedures, clearances, decision matrices and even room layouts are likely to prove impenetrable obstacles to cooperation.

NATO was a little quicker than the EU to see the advantages in real partnership outside its borders; but the Black Sea states again ran a poor second to Central and Eastern Europe, where the attention was concentrated on the first wave of enlargement. And the Mediterranean Dialogue, though of long standing, was again restricted to polite conversation. As with the EU, programmes of activities were largely designed for those who aspired to membership. PfP [Partnership for Peace], despite having as active members several countries with no desire to join NATO, such as Russia, Switzerland and the Central Asian states, was hijacked by the mid 1990s to consolidate aspirants' membership action plans. Now that the big waves of enlargement are out of the way, maybe NATO will devote more effort of its admittedly already stretched international staff to helping national delegations to build more programmes of activities to meet NATO's commitments as a security organisation rather than a military alliance. The NATO Security through Science programme and other confidence-building activities - such as the NATO Trust Fund's sterling work in disarmament - should form the cornerstone of its more inclusive approach to security, but NATO as an institution suffers from a very small budget. Most activities are funded by individual members, and this naturally complicates the implementation of an effective strategy at the NATO level.

The Alliance's orientation remains hostage to its history. Relationships and activities within its sphere are still primarily aimed at and supported by the military. Even here, it has many unmet demands for cooperative training, since they also must be funded by national governments and juggled with many other competing calls on national armed forces. Yet NATO's primary focus on military solutions to security problems encourages its staffers and delegations to believe that in transforming military capability they have transformed the Alliance. The NATO Response Force is certainly designed to be a flexible, usable instrument, but it will not build a secure environment on its own. Among the various transformation agendas on NATO's work table, the military one is by far the simplest on which to make progress, and attention has been focussed on it to the detriment of progress on the more difficult, philosophical and political questions of what, fighting aside, should be NATO's unique selling point as a security organisation. NATO has not

yet achieved the same level of confidence or credibility as an organisation devoted to security building as it had as a military alliance in the Cold War days.[9]

The OSCE, the first institution to be actively concerned with security building after the end of the Cold War (predating NATO's outreach initiatives by several years), played a very valuable role in freezing the conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Nagornyy Karabakh in the early 1990s. As an organisation based on consensus and cooperation rather than confrontation, its strategy was one of dialogue and mediation. Successful mediation has however itself been frozen in all these conflicts for a decade or so, despite ongoing activity. This is a symptom of the weakness of these large multinational organisations in conflict settlement. Once a crisis becomes a process its success depends on the energy and initiative of all those involved, not just the mediators. The work of the OSCE's Commissioner on (NB not 'for') national minorities has an enviable record in this regard, in the Baltic states as well as in the areas under review.

It is unfortunate that the OSCE's actions in Georgia and Moldova appear to most observers to be partisan. In the last year its Georgia Border Monitoring Mission has been forced to close, to the detriment of both the OSCE's already low reputation and Georgia's security. Its flagship treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, provided the cornerstone of détente in the late 1980s, and yet Russia has been able to delay with impunity implementation of the adapted treaty and of commitments given at the 2001 Istanbul summit in 1999.

Because of its emphasis on non-coercive instruments, and despite having as members the most militarily capable countries in Europe, the OSCE has little real muscle and has arguably now been equalled, if not overtaken, by the other two on the security field in terms of public awareness of concrete programmes and achievements. Its website lists 18 main activity areas, all of which are fundamental to human security.[10] All have substantial commitments devoted to praiseworthy activities. Why, then, is there a perception that the OSCE is at best a talking-shop, or an ineffectual international monitor of national political processes whose activities are liable to be hijacked by one country or a special interest group?

At 55 states, its plenary membership is a cumbersome instrument for all but the blandest political cooperation. The worthy efforts of its commissioners, programme managers and their 'permanent' staffs have been hamstrung by a catalogue of institutional weaknesses that are typical of many multinational institutions, both at headquarters level and in their 'field presences'. The OSCE has, to its credit, seen the need for reform and has commissioned and published some hard-hitting critiques of its structure, staffing and priorities. These would repay study by other multinational institutions.[11] Suffice it to note here that they include giving the Secretary-General the powers of speech; improving staffing, timely and transparent decision making, and greater financial accountability. Most telling, however, is a recognition that

> 'Structural reforms are certainly needed, but the essential problem lies elsewhere...Participating States... need to commit resilience, will and resources in politically revitalising the organisation before they undertake the structural reform'.[12]

In other words, 'We don't even take ourselves seriously, so why should anyone else?'

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Common Values

All of these institutions share an aspiration to building security, even if their focus on the two regions under discussion is at times questionable. Though this is not the place to debate the meaning of 'security', as they all use the term, in this broad aspect they acknowledge that they now share largely the same turf. The debate over whether they are competing or should be cooperating does feature in some analyses of their roles. The OSCE in particular has given this problem a quasi-official recognition. Under a heading 'Increased cooperation with other international organizations', its June 2005 colloquium on reform noted:

> 'The OSCE should further develop its network capabilities which are currently too dependent on personal individual contacts. Permanent channels of communications must be opened and strategic cooperation with the EU, NATO, and the UN must be established through the creation of liaison offices in Brussels and New York City.'[13]

This might sound like a justification for yet more bureaucratic tourism, but it is certainly a case worth arguing.

Most importantly for our purposes, however, all three institutions share a common vision of the need to promote European values – 'Western' ones really; to that extent there is no Transatlantic rift, but perhaps states differ over how to achieve it. Whilst their efforts within this broad area depend on the organisation's specialisation, from 'outside' they can be lumped together as embodying 'The West' and all it stands for.

In the Black Sea region and round the Mediterranean people recognise these institutions as sharing core values, and in many if not most cases would agree that they too share a similar commitment to democracy (however defined locally) and to building international security on an equitable basis. Yet the locals in the markets and bazaars do not necessarily see the internationals' work in their own country as a good thing. Amongst the 'reforming' countries in these regions, both elite and popular opinions are polarised. On the one hand, there is a recognition that they also share (or at least aspire to) our core values, and on the other, 'the West' is seen as a hegemonic behemoth, imposing its will on, patronising or ignoring altogether those who come into contact with it. The NATO diversion of PfP to become a training school for aspirant members is a case in point. The training agendas were largely driven by 'interoperability' – a good thing in any partnership – but also were seen as giving too much prominence to every state's assimilation of STANAGS (Standardisation Agreements), appropriate only for NATO aspirants. The process of formulating and promulgating the EU's new Neighbourhood Policy also appeared one-sided to those on the receiving end - at least it did to Georgia and Moldova[14] – when they compared notes, it also looked rather 'one size benefits all in the EU but not me' in what it offered.

To understand the effect of the dichotomy between an aspiration to share values and a burgeoning sense of 'other' one has to bear in mind that, even for the populations of the developed countries of the Mediterranean (one might be tempted to say, to say nothing of those in their member countries), the international institutions we are dealing with have been for a long time remote and of little relevance to people's daily lives. That is, if they are aware of their existence at all. Ignorance is a key factor, compounded by media stereotypes and the legacy of the deliberate cultivation of apathy in closed societies.

And what are the international institutions doing to counteract those perceptions and the ignorance? Very little, it has to be said. Their machinery for public relations is very well developed, but it is run with the home market firmly in mind. It is generally managed at 'field' level by a tiny staff, and is aimed in non-member countries almost exclusively at the educated elites. And for them, the approach is piecemeal, rhetorical almost, and depends very much on the abilities and interests of the local representation. Parliamentarians are very active in bridge-building, but have too many other calls on their time to be able to devote sustained attention to any region or subject. Real interaction at a local level is concentrated largely in the diplomatic, governmental and NGO institutional arenas, and not in raising public awareness of the large amounts of money that international programmes are spending to improve the lives of the population at large, particularly outside the capital city and other conurbations. (The NATO programmes of military activities are also the province of a closed circle in this respect.)

Popular ignorance can easily be manipulated and exploited by partisan propaganda against the West and its supposed values and agendas, which is why this problem should be highlighted and the balance redressed. Recent coverage of the EU's failed constitution has certainly raised awareness abroad, but it has also served to highlight the perceived differences between the political and value systems of Western Europe and those in the Black Sea and Mediterranean. 'Crisis?' say locals, 'If only our politicians and bureaucrats would pay even lip service to our views!'

The danger is, though, that mesmerised as all three institutions are by internal reform, they will spare less time rather than more for dealing with outsiders, even if they are spending a high proportion of their institutional budgets on laudable 'outreach' projects. The goodwill that non-members bear towards them as role-models risks turning to frustration, and their disappointed hopes eventually to desperation. There are signs that this might already be happening, at least in the case of Georgia and Moldova, where the *diktats* emanating from Brussels and Vienna about the countries' internal regulation and their relationships with the international organisations have sometimes been seen as unbalanced, inappropriate and formulaic, aimed at achieving conformity for junior partners, rather than a serious political and cultural dialogue which takes account of the priorities of both interlocutors. Both countries acknowledge the gap between their aspirations to join 'Europe' and their current political, fiscal and judicial systems, to name but three, but they would prefer to be treated as individual states capable of setting and implementing their own reform agendas with assistance, rather than as trainee democracies who need to be given a prescriptive model to copy slavishly in all areas. This applies even more in the case of the Mediterranean countries, which almost all have well-developed political systems of long standing, albeit ones which may not tally with 'Western' ideas.

At least it can be said of the European institutions that currently they are perceived locally in the two regions as doing little harm. But this is faint praise. Are their efforts seen as conferring any benefits on the regions? Have alternative, local initiatives evolved *faute de mieux* or do the regional structures like BSEC, GUAM and the CSTO serve different needs?

Without going into much detail, I would argue that at least round the Black Sea the answer is a mixture of both. All of the countries in the region share recent experience of political upheavals, and to some extent are still finding their feet as single players in the international arena. They naturally find it comforting to share developments and activities with others from a similar background, even if their long term aspirations diverge or they find themselves in competition in certain

areas. And in the face of a decade or more of relative lack of interest from western Europe, at least as personified in NATO and the EU, such regional groupings have done much to bolster confidence and to establish or re-establish trade and other linkages of benefit to all.

BLACKSEAFOR, the regional naval grouping, is slowly building real cooperation and capacities in maritime search and rescue and other exercises. In August 2005, Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian ships participated in a large exercise, ending up in a Turkish port. There are few other forums in which these countries cooperate as equals. This kind of confidence building activity could usefully be extended to the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, where various bureaucratic obstacles and a similar legacy of historical antagonism have prevented cooperation and sharing of experience.

BSEC is a notable success story and could be a useful focus for further activity. In 2002 BSEC celebrated its 10th anniversary as an economic cooperation forum with a summit which took on a new role for the organisation in fostering regional security and stability, emphasising the fight against international terrorism and other unconventional threats. 'The fact that the BSEC region is one of the most politically heterogeneous in Europe... should be seen as an asset rather than a liability...'[15]

Turkey in particular, it must be noted, has long-term experience of managing several cultural dichotomies within a single state space: the Black Sea and the Mediterranean; the Muslim and the secular; the urbanised and the hinterland; the Turk and the Kurd, the military and the political. This is not the place to expatiate on either its successes or its ongoing challenges. Suffice it to say that its presence and continued engagement at all these crossovers should provide an encouraging example for those who need to find their own pathways and develop networks of relationships between the various realms. The country's desire for increasing engagement with the European continent is being watched with huge interest by others, primarily in the Muslim world. In my opinion, and irrespective of the arguments surrounding its EU membership application, Turkey has shown commitment to dialogue, change and compromise which have not been matched by the European side.

Naturally, some homegrown regional organisations have proved more successful than others. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for instance, was born out of expediency; it has fragmented into several sub-regional groupings dealing with different aspects of cooperation, with different degrees of integration and varying levels of success. Economically, old relationships have largely persisted to the north and east of the Black Sea, because of the lack of other market opportunities for the goods on offer. Even so, in the political and security arenas, paths have been diverging with increasing speed. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, originally the security arm of the CIS, lost members in 1999 at the first opportunity for renewal of its original Tashkent Treaty, and has now been sidelined by increasing activity in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Those who did not renew were mainly round the Black Sea, and the informal network of GU(U)AM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (which joined later and has since left) and Moldova – was inevitably but erroneously seen as an alternative structure set up in opposition to Russia's influence. The loose association was, however, given fresh impetus by the series of 'colour revolutions' in 2004.

The 12 August 2005 'Borjomi Declaration' by Presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine called on leaders of all countries within

the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian region to create a Community of Democratic Choice, sharing a vision of European and Euro-Atlantic integration across the whole area.[16] The Community's founding summit is due to take place in autumn 2005. Significantly, Russia has been invited to attend as an observer, whilst the USA has not. One might be tempted to see in it a parallel to the Visegrad Four in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, where joint aspirations to Euro-Atlantic membership provided an early impetus to cooperation, tempered with a recognition both of elements of competition in that aspiration, and (most importantly) of a common heritage which left a legacy of similar problems. Another, albeit more informal, association came in the run up to the second expansion of NATO in 2002: the seven aspirant members formed the Vilnius Group to coordinate their accession process.[17] Whatever the parallels, it behoves the Euro-Atlantic members to take these aspirations to community of interests seriously.

What is to be Done?

Again, let us concentrate on the three European institutions in the title of this paper. Until recently they all showed four common features, some of which persist to this day:

1. Externality of action. They all acted as external forces upon a target region, country or problem (despite the fact that most Black Sea countries are also members of the OSCE, its documents speak of 'field presences' in those countries, but rarely in Western Europe).[18] Delegations flew in, relationships always fed back to headquarters in western Europe.

2. Reliance on 'pull' mechanisms not 'push' in planning and prioritising activities. Whilst this is a counter-argument to my statement above that the institutions impose rather than ask, in the case of most 'recipient' countries, in fact it has an unhelpful consequence. The locals, even at government level, often did not know what to ask for, and baulked at the loss of face and national pride involved in asking for advice which would enable them to find out. Or else they did not wish to reveal their inadequacies to a third party, even to the extent of acknowledging that they knew there was room for improvement.

3. Bureaucratic inefficiency or indifference at headquarters level. They appear impenetrable to those outside the magic circle, especially to those who are not government employees, and who do not have access to the Internet and well developed research skills. This translates into:

4. Lack of local popular awareness in target regions. They lack popular media or information campaigns, and what is worse, appear to have no strategies which identifies the need for them. Honourable initiatives do not sell these institutions by themselves, to the extent that the woeful ignorance in both regions has in several places been allowed to be diverted by extremist political or religious rabble-rousers into positive antagonism to a perceived 'alien' 'Western' culture. This may not be evident at the governmental level at which the institutions operate, but this message from the bazaars is certainly audible back in the West. Even 'at home', the OSCE noted sadly that it '…is not attractive for the media and will never be, unless it regains political credibility and is perceived as a relevant security actor'.[19] Although all three international institutions actively publicise their purpose and activities, the media set and respond to their own, often critical or inappropriate agendas. And yet it is a tool which is hardly being exploited at all in countries

where the institutions wish to build a popular consensus which shares their core values.

Better project coordination is certainly worth pursuing. The big institutions' funding comes from the same basic pot – provided by taxpayers and then dedicated to the institutions by national governments. High-level priorities are normally set by national delegates and officials, not by the international secretariats acting alone, so there should be scope at the national levels for avoiding duplication. In reality, however, detailed activity planning and funding allocations take place in institutional 'silos', not national ones, so the suspicion could be formed that whilst the activities themselves might not overlap, the justifications often do, and coordinated spending programmes might achieve more than those planned in isolation.

In practice, however, the international secretariats and officials in local offices are aware of each other's programmes, and no doubt share wry smiles as inappropriate proposals are touted round from one to another. One can sympathise with the outsider, however, who finds it difficult to penetrate the opacity of programme funding application processes and to understand what each will fund, when and why. Many programmes seem to them to be designed to finance foreign consultancies rather than to develop real local expertise or to respond to locals' ideas of what their needs are. The EU's TACIS [technical assistance to the commonwealth of independent states] programme was notorious in this regard in the early 1990s, but it has now improved substantially. It will be superseded by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) from 2007.

Again, the problem comes down to the lack of a public relations strategy for outreach and a serious local presence. Many worthwhile activities are producing real benefits for Black Sea and Mediterranean countries, but much of the public relations effort is preaching to the converted inside Europe, not to the ignorant recipients. The bottom line is that the three institutions are not actually competing in the 'external security' field, even though their interests overlap. But as ambassadors of their common 'European' values they have all been more or less woeful failures at a popular level.

Money spent on projects has not translated into goodwill, and without a more active strategy for engagement and education at the popular level by all three institutions more money will not change that picture significantly. So more local offices and more practical programmes please! These do generate local publicity and with it should come awareness and, one hopes, goodwill. Within the security envelope, there have been repeated calls for e.g. search and rescue and peace support operations experience sharing, joint border control training and other activities. There is therefore still a large unmet demand in these 'hard' aspects of security relationship building.

At a 'softer' level, even where countries are wary of each other, there is still a great deal of scope for facilitating less controversial activities such as sports and other exchanges. BSEC has recently launched its Project Development Fund, to cover the startup costs of developing multinational activities between BSEC partners. Whilst this is a very positive step, one cannot help but feel that if Western organisations had a simpler application process for smallish projects there would have been no need for BSEC's initiative.

In conclusion, let me look back to the big picture. In case I have taken it for granted that there should be more engagement by these institutions in the

Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, perhaps I should remind readers that some of the obvious dangers lurking round their shores have already impinged on European security: illegal migration and other forms of trafficking; proliferation of small arms and other weapons; security of long term energy supplies; more recently radical Islam and other forms of extremism quietly fermenting within Europe's boundaries but using leaven from outside. Isolationism is simply not an option. More positively, the potential for trade growth in the region from Morocco to Kazakhstan is enormous, and Europe would not wish to be left behind as the momentum gathers.

Finally, one might be tempted to ask, why is the criticism of poor public relations relevant for security? Because people who share our values or have common interests with us are less likely to export their own difficulties to Western Europe. If they know us well they are less likely to make bogeymen out of us. Listening as well as speaking, making the dialogue a real two-way process, treating people from the Black Sea and Mediterranean as serious interlocutors with ideas to offer and not beggars or supplicants will go a long way towards creating an identity of purpose. That in turn will contribute to the security of all of us.

Endnotes

[1] Respectively the European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Black Sea Economic Cooperation; an informal association of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova; the Collective Security Treaty Organisation; the Black Sea naval task Force; United Nations Development Programme; International Organisation for Migration; British Petroleum; Caspian Pipeline Consortium; World Trade Organisation; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
[2] Admittedly, individual member states were no better. The UK did not open an embassy in Chisinau until 2002.
[3] For more detail see Dr Andrew Monaghan, 'Russian Perspectives of EU-Russia Security Relations', Conflict Studies Research Centre 05/38, August 2005.
[4] Data compiled from
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/north_dim/kalin/index.htm, which see for more detail.
[5] For more detail see James Sherr, 'A Failing Partnership: Ukraine & the West', Conflict Studies Research Centre G89, January 2001.
[6] http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm
[7] MEP Edward McMillan-Scott, Letter to *The Economist*, 20 August 2005.
[8] Quoted in Ibid.
[9] For several useful discussions of this process, its progress and purposes, see the Spring 2005 special issue of NATO Review ' Examining NATO's transformation'.
[10] Http://www.osce.org/activities. They are: anti-trafficking, arms control, border management, combating terrorism, conflict prevention, democratisation, economic activities, education, elections, environmental activities, gender equality, human rights, media freedom, military reform, minority rights, policing, rule of law, and tolerance and non-discrimination.
[11] They can be found on the OSCE's homepage at http://www.osce.org/.
[12] 'Report of the Colloquium on the future of the OSCE by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Swiss Institute for World Affairs, Washington, 5-6 June 2005', (hereafter 'Report...'), available at http://www.osce.org/. See also 'Common Purpose: Towards a more Effective OSCE', Final Report and Recommendations by a Panel of Eminent Persons on strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE, 27 June 2005, at the same address.
[13] 'Report...'

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[14] Author's observation, confirmed in remarks by Tedo Japaridze at Kings College London seminar, June 2005.

[15] Sergiu Celac, 'Five reasons why the West should become more involved in the Black Sea Region', presentation to the round table on 'Challenges and opportunities in the Black Sea region. Contribution of international organisations to enhancing regional stability', Bucharest, 12 November 2004.

[16] For more detail see, for example, Vladimir Socor in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 15 August 2005, http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2370147

[17] For an academic treatment of the case for this cooperation see Terriff, Terry, Croft, Stuart, Krahmann, Elke, Webber, Mark & Howorth, Jolyon, 'One in, all in?' NATO's next enlargement. *International Affairs* 78 (4), 2002, pp713-729. For detail of the activities see for example the Latvian Foreign Ministry Web site http://www.am.gov.lv/en/nato/4494/4509/4510/

[18] 'Report...', for example.

[19] Ibid.

Want to Know More ...?

See: 'Common Purpose: Towards a more Effective OSCE' at
http://www.osce.org

'Examining NATO's Transformation', Spring 2005 special edition of NATO Review.

Dr Andrew Monaghan, 'Russian Perspectives of EU-Russia Security Relations', CSRC paper 05/38, August 2005.

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