Counting the Cost of an American Unilateralist Policy: a Superpower at Risk?

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Key Points

*   The current mode of 21st century military intervention presupposes not only the destruction of the enemy but also the reconstruction of the affected/attacked areas or states. This model provided the framework for western interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, but it was largely ignored during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, 2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, 2003).

*   OEF and OIF demonstrated that under the aegis of the Rumsfeld vision, new strategies and methods had successfully been adopted by a military which for the last two decades had relied on using overwhelming force to defeat uniformed adversaries. However, in the post conflict phase the limits of the ongoing process of transformation were also evident.

*   Lack of attention to this phase in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to paradoxical strategies, which seem to have been constructed haphazardly. Rumsfeld's vision for change and the Bush administration as a whole have failed to pay attention to working with allies in operations which require hard assets provided by those allies, as well as the reservoir of international legitimacy attached to such support. This should be one of the core components of a doctrine that has been designed to deal with irregular challenges and uncertainty. America must begin to appreciate the advantages embedded in soft power tools, which include the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion.

Abstract

The scope of the paper is to examine OEF and OIF by assessing the merits and demerits of a process the Bush administration seems to have unequivocally endorsed. The paper will argue that although Rumsfeld's vision for transformation has allowed the military to achieve certain objectives during the destructive phase of war, it has failed to recognise the importance of stretching the effects-based canvas of war to include post conflict stabilisation operations. The paper will conclude by arguing that the unilateralist tendencies of the Bush administration, the spirit of which has been extended to its defence doctrine, unless re-oriented, will undermine the effectiveness of the ability to annihilate conventional and unconventional adversaries.

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In the era of liberal globalization that followed the end of the Cold War, the power of the West was pre-eminent. A significant component of the West's pre-eminence was its military superiority. A combination of US spending power, great advances in military technologies, and associated developments in training and tactics led to what has been called a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).[1] The ability of the US military to support itself in almost any theatre, to observe and understand the battlefield, to co-ordinate its forces, and to strike precisely at targets, has given US forces unrivalled destructive power on the conventional battlefield.

However, it is important to understand that war is not just about destructive power. War is a political act and it is fought for political outcomes. A concentration on the 'supply side' of the RMA – the new technologies, tactics and doctrines of Western forces, reveals part of the transformation that is taking place in the post-Cold War world. It was not just smarter technology that raised the utility of military force for the West, it was the link made between the West's military power and its liberal politics.

The association between Western military power and Western politics manifested itself on a number of levels. At a grand-strategic level, the US and its allies had enormous capacity not only to co-opt support for their interventions, but also to shape the context in which force could legitimately be used. The power of the West was often able to de-legitimize non-Western practices of war while framing its own use of force in terms of empowering international law for the benefit of all. The West promised a world of international institutions that one day might transcend all the stages of true law-making; that is, to accomplish legislation, adjudication and enforcement.

At the operational level, a new model of war was to emerge in something of a journey of discovery throughout the 1990s. This manifestation was created during the course of managing the increasingly fragmented security threats of the 1990s. Following the success of the Gulf War in 1991, a series of smaller and more complex conflicts began to make Western interventions look more haphazard. The West failed to adequately respond to the disasters taking place in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. However, US intervention in Bosnia in 1995 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999 heralded a turning point. The US pioneered a model of limited military intervention that linked a new style of hi-tech campaigning to new techniques in conflict management. US airpower networked to small highly trained forces on the ground, while liaisons with local allies were linked to follow-up forces under the rubric of a multilateral Peace Support Operation (PSO). The PSO phase was integral to the war fighting techniques and could be seen as war by other means. In this way, the familiar terms of impartial UN peacekeeping operations were superseded by a strategy of 'picking winners' and deploying decisive packages of force to achieve

limited political outcomes. The recalcitrant Serbs were forced to the negotiating table and the fighting in Bosnia was brought to an end whilst an umbrella of opposition parties in Serbia (with the covert support of European countries) brought about the fall of Milosevic after the 2000 elections.

In the new model of intervention that emerged from Bosnia and Kosovo, there is a division of labour amongst Western states, with US forces primarily responsible for high-end war fighting and the Europeans more committed to the PSO phases and the subsequent building of 'security communities'[2] including means of integration into NATO and the European Union (EU) and the adoption of democratic political systems.

The current mode of 21st century military intervention presupposes not only the destruction of the enemy but also includes the reconstruction of the affected/attacked areas or states. To this end – as was witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo - a successful military campaign is likely to include the deployment of peacekeeping forces and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), whilst the participation of NATO and mainly the EU provides not only invaluable assistance towards reconstruction, it more importantly signifies an element of legitimacy.

This model provided the framework for western interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the post-9/11 'War on Terrorism', but it was largely ignored during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, 2001) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF, 2003). This can be attributed to acute shortfalls embedded in the current US DOD vision for 'force transformation'.[3] US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's vision[4] for transforming the armed forces was essential to allow the current Bush administration to follow a unilateral path of action that 'took the battle to the enemy'. By mid 2003, the ongoing process of force transformation had been put to the test in two separate theatres of operations.

OEF and OIF were perceived by certain leading figures within the military and in the Bush administration to have attested the Pentagon's transformation of the armed forces. General Tommy Franks, former Commander of US led forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, described OEF as an historic victory[5] and OIF as an exhibition of a revolution in warfare.[6] Donald Rumsfeld claimed that OEF was a remarkable military success[7] while President Bush, on 1 May 2003 aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, congratulated Donald Rumsfeld and General Franks for orchestrating OIF, one of the swiftest advances of heavy arms in history.[8]

This paper examines OEF and OIF in order to assess the merits and demerits of a process the Bush administration seems to have unequivocally endorsed. The paper will argue that although Rumsfeld's vision for transformation has allowed the military to achieve certain objectives during the destructive phase of war, it has failed to recognise the importance of stretching the effects-based canvas of war to include post conflict stabilisation operations. The paper will conclude by arguing that the unilateralist tendencies of the Bush administration, the spirit of which has been extended to its defence doctrine, unless re-oriented, will undermine the effectiveness of the ability to annihilate conventional and unconventional adversaries.

Force Transformation & the Destructive Phase of War:
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom

During OEF, Mr Rumsfeld and General Franks designed a strategy that tested the nuances embedded in the ongoing attempts towards greater 'jointness' and inter-

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service integration,[9] while allowing the US DOD to demonstrate that information age technologies coupled with innovative thinking can play a large role in defeating an adversary without having to deploy an overwhelming number of forces. This seems to have led certain commentators to conclude that OEF was a "cost free success".[10] However, it could be argued that OEF was anything but that. While the US-led coalition forces used precision guided munitions to raze the Afghan landscape and destroy identifiable structures and infrastructure inhabited by the Taliban, they were unable to accomplish two central objectives: to completely destroy Al Qaeda and Taliban training camps and infrastructure within Afghanistan and to capture key Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.[11] In order to provide a balanced analysis, this section will attempt first to identify areas in which transformation proved effective, while highlighting its shortfalls during the destructive stages of war.

In Afghanistan, the adversary was identified as a loose alliance consisting of 45,000 under-prepared Taliban forces which included well trained members of Al Qaeda and voluntary fighters from Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East.[12] Afghanistan represented a theatre that was not wholly unorthodox but at the same time did not provide for pure attritional warfare. The Taliban alliance was expected to use chaos strategy to defeat the 'coalition of the willing'. Rather than attacking directly the brick wall of American military predominance, Taliban fighters wore plain clothes, took shelter in civilian shelters, drove in modified civilian cars, and made unconventional use of conventional weapons. Although they would disperse and resort to guerrilla tactics, they would subsequently regroup and fight in open battle.

Instead of deploying conventional troops, General Tommy Franks, under the constant guidance of Donald Rumsfeld, designed an operational plan that initially used special operation forces (SOF) on the ground. These forces exposed visible and entrenched targets using "laser targeted identification systems"[13] and long-range aircraft to find and annihilate visible targets and air defences, and in particular, 'kill boxes'.[14] On the first day of air strikes (October 7, 2001) more damage was done to visible targets than during Operation Allied Force or Operation Desert Storm.[15] Devastating attacks delivered by precision guided munitions (PGM) destroyed on average two targets per aircraft compared to ten aircraft per target during Desert Storm.[16] The cavalry strength was provided by Afghan proxies belonging to the Northern Alliance and other anti Taliban forces.[17]

While at the strategic level military planners were encouraged to adopt alternative conceptual underpinnings, at the operational level, the transformative aspects of the current process of military change were evident. On 7 October 2001, when air strikes against Afghanistan were first launched, the Northern Alliance controlled only a third of the country's landscape; by 16 November 2001, the Northern Alliance controlled eighty five percent of Afghanistan.[18] It was clear that the use of SOF working alongside local proxies under the protection of PGMs "...turned the tide and routed the Taliban".[19]

During OEF, one of the operational tenets of the Rumsfeld doctrine was tested in action. A lighter, more lethal, manoeuverable and more readily deployable force structure was created to complement the operation. Rather than following conventional procedures whereby an operations base would have had to be established on the ground before air and ground deployments could begin, General Franks used advantages created by Network Centric Warfare and improvements in military hardware to launch a campaign from the sea and the air.

In theatre, the performance of the military was reflective of General Franks' insistence on working as a singular force, rather than separate services engaged in a particular operation. As one commentator noted, during OEF the armed services "saw for the first time integration of forces rather than de-confliction of forces."[20] President Bush declared that during OEF, the combination of real time intelligence, local allied forces, Special Forces and precision air power shattered the Taliban regime. He claimed that the conflict in Afghanistan "has taught us more about the future of our (American) military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think tank symposiums".[21]

OEF also demonstrated that the intellectual transformation currently taking place in the military has allowed it to conceive of new paradigms which do not require the overwhelming use of force. Contrary to the position taken by certain critics of transformation, according to whom the ongoing process of military change is an "elusive"[22] and "self-defeating"[23] concept, the ongoing process of transformation freed the military from certain vulnerabilities, albeit not entirely.

While Paul Wolfowitz stated that PGMs played a decisive role during OEF,[24] they were not as effective in unorthodox theatres as had been claimed. Seymour Hersh argues that their effectiveness during OEF has been overstated. According to Hersh, the camps struck on the first few days were empty and exposed, hence an easy target for even non precision munitions.[25] Stephen Biddle, however, claims that the Taliban alliance could elude detection by adopting simple counter measures such as camouflage and dispersal.[26]

During operations in Kandahar in mid October 2001, at the Tora Bora Mountains in December 2001, and during Operation Anaconda, the last major combat operation launched on 2 March 2002, the limitations in the current process of change were evident. Although dubbed as a successful operation,[27] despite improved 'bunker buster bombs' and GPS guided munitions such as the JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), key Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders escaped from Tora Bora into Pakistan, via Waziristan.[28] During Operation Anaconda in the Shahi-Kot Mountains, portrayed as an unqualified and absolute success, the 10th Mountain Division encountered heavy fire, seventeen US soldiers were killed and two US helicopters were shot down, while remnants of the Taliban coalition escaped for the second time.[29] Hersh also argues that while General Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that SOF had successfully rooted out Taliban fighters in Mullah Omar's complex in Kandahar on 20th October, he failed to mention that in the "tactical firefight…the Taliban had the advantage".[30]

Hence, while Rumsfeld's technique of using fewer troops under the aegis of PGMs allowed the military to achieve its first objective of destroying terrorist training camps and infrastructure, sustaining that objective proved problematic when key Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders were able to flee to Pakistan.

Despite the vulnerabilities in theatre, however, and the shortcomings created by necessary compromises, the US military was able demonstrate its ability to adjust to new warfighting paradigms. Rather than being obsessed with the siren song of technology,[31] or being dismissed as non transformational,[32] the benefits brought to unorthodox theatres by the Rumsfeld doctrine seem undeniable. These benefits were further augmented during America's campaign in Iraq.

While planning for OIF, General Franks claimed that although the campaign would be a largely conventional one, transformative strategies could deliver a low casualty, decisive victory. Rather than using operational plans that were based on Desert Storm era thinking, Rumsfeld and General Franks created new operational realities

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by providing suitable alternatives to the Army's National Training Center's age old focus on open desert battle. In a period of four weeks, between 10 March 2003 and 9 April 2003, the first objective of the mission had been achieved. With fewer than two hundred US casualties, the Iraqi army was defeated and the Baathist regime had been toppled.[33]

The primary tenets of the Rumsfeld doctrine had been once again tested in action. Speed, agility, devastating precision and quick victories became the hallmarks of a twenty-one day campaign. Rumsfeld's request to use a small force and a daring, modern battle plan built on the model of Afghanistan[34] had been successful in defeating a uniformed adversary. According to Dale Herspring, Rumsfeld wanted to bypass the Powell doctrine and demonstrate that the Pentagon's emphasis on using fewer troops could prove effective in conventional theatres as well as unconventional ones. Rumsfeld had ordered Franks to "keep it small, the smallest you can get away with,"[35] while according to General Wesley Clark, Rumsfeld even issued a deployment order to control each unit and move.[36] Rather than deploying 250,000 troops, a number General Eric Shinseki had thought to be appropriate for such a campaign, Rumsfeld initially deployed 125,000 troops.[37] The benefits entrenched in the ongoing process of transformation were evident in this particular operation. General Tommy Franks claimed that OEF was a campaign unlike any other. The dramatic and radical process of transformation spearheaded by Donald Rumsfeld had proven to be lethal yet effective. Contrary to the claims made by certain critics, according to whom transformation is the most expensive white elephant in the history of mankind[38] and that in the post presidential election period in 2001, transformation died a quiet death,[39] America must begin to appreciate the advantages embedded in soft power tools, which include the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion the practical benefits transformation brings to the battlefield were made evident.

In unconventional and largely conventional theatres, OEF and OIF demonstrated that under the aegis of the Rumsfeld vision, new strategies and methods had been adopted by a military which for the last two decades had relied on using overwhelming force to defeat uniformed adversaries. However, in the post conflict phase of OEF and OIF, the limits of the ongoing process of transformation were also evident. While the US strives to modify its force structure to adapt to a myriad of theatres, certain acute shortfalls embedded in the Rumsfeld doctrine may, unless adequately addressed, give credence to the view that they are preparing the military to win only battles and not wars supposedly fought for the future of peace and hope.

A Short Sighted American Vision?

According to Barry Posen, the primary objective of a defence doctrine is to provide the tools required to enable the executive to realise certain tasks that have been envisaged by the governing administration in the area of security.[40] The Rumsfeld doctrine seems to have designed certain tools to accomplish certain tasks, but has not emphasised the importance of other tools that are deemed necessary to complete all of the objectives set out by the Bush administration, that remain at the heart of the administration's long-term strategy to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.[41] These challenges not only include defeating an adversary if deterrence fails, and discouraging military competition, but as mentioned in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review,[42] and noted in the 2005 National Defence Strategy, preparing the military to improve its ability to transform from military to civilian led stability operations while maintaining the peace.

Although the Rumsfeld doctrine seems to have provided the rhetorical basis for change in the post conflict stage of war, little seems to have been done to realise this rhetoric. According to Donald Rumsfeld, the final objective of OIF was to help the Iraqi people create the conditions for a rapid transition to a representative self-government that is committed to ensuring the territorial integrity of that country. On numerous occasions, President Bush has stated that bringing stability and unity to Iraq mattered greatly to the United States. Yet, rather than expanding the effects-based canvas of war to include post conflict stability operations, Rumsfeld's vision for transformation seems to have solely concentrated on better preparing the military for the destructive phase of the war. The result of following this half way approach has been devastating.

On 1 May 2003, President Bush declared the end of major combat operations in Iraq, while on 9 June 2003 Donald Rumsfeld claimed that because of "speed, jointedness, intelligence and precision...most Iraqis are better off today than they were four months ago".[43] While his vision allowed the US military to successfully decimate a majority of its opponents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has not yet been able to stabilise either state. In June 2005, the civilian death toll in the post major combat phase of the war in Iraq increased to 12,000[44] and on average, twenty unarmed civilians were dying per day in Iraq.[45] The situation has not improved significantly since then.

Following the collapse of the Baathist regime, rather than securing key sites and limiting the possibility of wide scale looting, the US-led coalition forces were ordered to refrain from engaging in what might be interpreted as policing roles. Toby Dodge argues that this created a security vacuum and immediately undermined the coalition's legitimacy. In the following months, instead of laying down what Scott Feil claims are the four pillars of post conflict reconstruction, which include i) security, ii) social and economic well being, iii) justice and reconciliation, iv) governance and participation,[46] the Bush administration attempted to fill the security gap by increasing street patrols and undertaking robust policing jobs. The US Department of Defense, which had been given complete authority for all reconstruction efforts,[47] seemed to have initially attempted to find a military solution in a situation that required a political one.[48] Rather than using the military arm to support a civilian architected plan to reconstruct Iraq, it seems to have overused the apparent power of the military to impose restrictions in order to provide increased security.

Dodge argues that the US DOD's inability to initiate a process for reconstruction became even more obvious when key figures within President Bush's inner circle began contradicting each other on policy matters. While on the one hand, Condoleezza Rice, in her capacity as National Security Advisor to President Bush, claimed that the 'concept was that we (America) would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold, everything from ministries to police forces', Rumsfeld encouraged the US military to carry out a de-baathification campaign which involved dissolving a forty thousand strong Iraqi army.[49] As a result an institution that could have assisted in supporting stability operations, and a bureaucracy which was tired of the constraints of Saddam Hussein's dictatorial style of ruling, were unfortunately sidelined.

Not only had the US military and civilian officials failed to absorb the historical lesson that reconstruction is an integral part of war,[50] but the Pentagon also clearly failed to anticipate the level of resistance that would occur on account of what most Iraqis understood to be an invasion. The Bush administration seems to have assumed that the post devastation stage of the war would not last long. Once the Baathist regime had been toppled, it believed the Iraqi state would undergo a

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manageable transition towards democracy. In March 2003, Paul Wolfowitz even claimed that reconstruction would take place as a process of natural progression, because Iraqis, like the people of France in the 1940s, would view Americans as their hoped-for-liberators.[51]

Instead of considering the guidelines detailed in the future of Iraqi project compiled by Colin Powell and the US State Department, which drew on the experience and insights of 75 of the State Department's Arab experts dedicated to working on post conflict scenarios,[52] the US DOD handed the reconstruction efforts to the embryonic Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Kuwait city.[53]

Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk emphasize that the late arrival of US troops to areas in Falluja and Ramadi enabled insurgents to create a robust guerrilla infrastructure.[54] Paul Bremmer, who took over from Jay Garner as the head of the Coalition Provision Authority, claimed that while 90% of the insurgency took place in 5% of the country, the limited number of troops allowed the insurgents to expand their network. Jon Barnett and Michael Webber conclude that the slow restoration of basic services such as water, power and communications (which were destroyed during the US-led bombing campaign) created doubts in the mind of the common man about the future of Iraq, and subsequently, made him a vulnerable recruit for counter-US movements.[55] Hence, clearly, while Rumsfeld's doctrine seems to have prepared the military to annihilate the adversary using faster, agile yet efficient methods, it has done little to address the complexities that arise in the post destructive phase of war.

In Afghanistan, ironically, the US military seemed to have prepared a detailed plan of action to limit humanitarian suffering as a result of the bombing campaign during the first phase of the war without creating a plan for when the bombings would stop. The military organised a Joint Inter-Agency Coordinating Group at General Franks' headquarters in Florida, under the banner of which NGOs and civilian groups could estimate and advise where and when food packages and medical equipment could be dropped by air. However, Bathsheba Crocker claims that in Afghanistan, the US military's efforts in the post-major conflict stage of the war can be described as nation building on the cheap.[56] Like in Iraq, the Rumsfeld doctrine's emphasis on shrinking the number of troops proved ineffective in the post conflict stages. In Afghanistan, the US military initially had 13,000 soldiers on the ground in addition to 6,000 international troops. That is one peace-keeper per 1,000 Afghanis. According to the RAND Corporation, drawing on conclusions from NATO's intervention in the Balkans in the mid 1990s, 20 peacekeepers per 1000 civilians were considered inadequate for the task.[57] In Iraq, the US deployed only 116,000 troops to stabilise a state of 27 million people, the majority of whom were expected to react negatively to the change in the political situation. This was not because they were loyal to the Baathist regime, but because they were employed by the state and had lost their jobs due to de-baathification.[58]

Lack of attention to the post major conflict phase in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to paradoxical strategies, which seem to have been constructed haphazardly.[59] Furthermore, it has also contributed to increasing the level of insurgency in both states, since part of the population view the military as agents of a hyperpower on unilateralist overdrive. In Afghanistan, while the task of reconstruction and stabilization has been handed over to a NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the decision taken by the US to provide security to the capital and not to regions outside of Kabul has, according to the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force,[60] once again helped give rise to the Taliban. In present day Afghanistan, UN agency employees operating out of Kabul claim that the gross

mismanagement of the post-conflict stage of OEF has not only encouraged the resurgence of the Taliban, but also petty crime, the drugs trade and the strengthening of warlordism. Brad Adams, an employee of Human Rights Watch, states that the inability to control the law and order problem has contributed significantly towards strengthening the Taliban's local support base,[61] especially in districts in the south of the country, such as Helmand and Khost, in which Taliban backed insurgents are constantly retaking small villages and towns.

In June 2006, 9,700 additional NATO troops were deployed to Afghanistan. Out of these, 6,000 went to the south of the country where, according to Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Afghan Defence Minister, the Taliban had stepped up the level of violence in order to "take advantage of this time of transition".[62] By the end of 2006, it is expected that the entire ambit of operations in Afghanistan will be orchestrated under the NATO flag. Coalition troops, whose operational commands were separate from the ISAF's operational command, will eventually be amalgamated under the NATO banner. This seems desirable in a state in which the local populace has largely lost faith in the efforts to stabilize a state torn by bitter resentment and armed opposition.

The ISAF have done well to maintain a necessary balance between providing a light security footprint in order to stabilize the state, while encouraging economic progress and political transparency. This approach has been manifested in the ISAF commander's intent, according to which the primary objective of the ISAF in Afghanistan is "to reinforce the people of Afghanistan's belief that long term peace and growing economic prosperity from which everyone can benefit is possible if they continue to give their government, and its international partners, their support and encouragement".[63] Contrary to their American counterparts, who seem to use military means to solve essentially political problems, the ISAF seeks to use softer as well as harder avenues to find peace in an otherwise war torn part of the world.

Diplomatic Initiatives & Allied Support: Essential Imperatives

General Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claims that what the current Bush administration is "doing with our (America's) diplomatic capabilities is criminal". By "slashing them", the US government is forcing itself to solve tasks set by itself through purely military means.[64] General Shelton also states, "The military understands very well that we are the hammer in the toolkit, but not every problem is a nail. There are other instruments."[65] But rather than involving the State Department in the post destructive phase of the war, President Bush decided to hand over the entire responsibility for reconstruction in Iraq to the DOD. This seemed to suggest that the military were better equipped to deal with non-combat tasks. The results, however, were devastating.

By not involving the State Department in tasks that evidently the military is not optimised for fulfilling, the current defence doctrine has cut itself away from insights and expertise that are markedly different to those taught in war college. Rather than merely stating that the State Department receives sufficient funding, the DOD and the administration must attempt to coalesce diplomatic initiatives with the doctrine for combat. In the contemporary military environment, the objective of war is not necessarily to use force to compel the enemy to do our will, but as recent operations have demonstrated, military force is only one of many instruments required to set the conditions for change in societies that have been tormented by insistent war-mongering.

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Rumsfeld's vision for change and the Bush administration as a whole have also failed to pay attention to working with allies in operations which require hard assets provided by America's traditional allies, as well as the reservoir of international legitimacy and consent attached to such support. It seems essential to include these as one of the core components of a doctrine that has been designed to deal with irregular challenges and uncertainty. As part of the intellectual transformation of the US military, the DOD needs to acknowledge the fact that the coalition should define the mission, rather than stating that the "mission...defines the coalition".[66]

In contrast, it is instructive to mention that the British Ministry of Defence prompted by the experiences of the military in the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, decided to develop what it calls a "Comprehensive Approach". This approach argues that in this century the symptoms of crisis will be spawned by a combination of climate change, ideology, greed, ethnic animosity, residual territorial claims, religious fanaticism and competition for resources. Military force is not an answer to these. What is needed is a clearer understanding of the root causes of potential (and actual) conflicts. The concept stresses that there should be more cooperation with OGDs (other government departments), NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and IOs (international organisations).[67]

In the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan, the role played by NATO and other allies provides overwhelming evidence of the value attached to working with allies. While the US passed the Afghan Freedom Support Act in November 2002, contributing a billion dollars towards reconstruction,[68] the EU committed itself to sponsoring $2.5 billion between 2004-2006.[69] German troops under NATO command took on the responsibility of training the national police force and placed five provicial reconstruction teams outside Kabul, in areas which American forces had refused to patrol; while France initiated the process for legal reform. NATO's response force provided additional security during the general elections in 2002.

In Iraq, these advantages were not available to the US. The Bush administration embarked on an uncompromising unilateralist track. While America enjoyed the support of the Vilnius 10 and signatories to the letter of 8, many of its traditional allies opposed the war. Joseph Nye claims that in July 2003, when, during the reconstruction efforts, the US was in dire need of UN expertise and multinational security forces in Iraq, senior officers realised the imperative need to acquire overwhelming international support for operations that had the potential to last for many years.[70] By September 2003, political leaders were also made aware of the difficulties encountered by following a largely unilateralist track. The US sponsored draft resolution that called for UN multinational forces to take over the reconstruction effort was turned down by the Security Council. In 2005, although the UN was involved in training Iraqi election staff to conduct the January elections, neither the UN or NATO committed to deploying much needed peacekeeping forces.

Ilona Teleki argues that without the support of America's traditional allies, the US will not be able to complete its mission objectives. She argues that many of the states belonging to the 'Coalition of the Willing' do not have the capability to provide comprehensive long term assistance,[71] while the moral currency of legitimacy has been lost. Although an elusive concept which is rooted in opinion, legitimacy plays a fundamental role in realizing mission objectives that cannot be achieved by increasing the size of a military arsenal or by building innovative yet lethal instruments for destruction.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations independent task force, if the US had been able to secure a UN Security Council resolution before commencing OEF, it would have been easier to convince the local populace that by attacking and killing members of the Iraqi police service and the newly trained national army as well as political leaders the insurgents disallow the state of Iraq to rebuild itself, economically as well as politically.[72] This point has been taken forward by General John Abizaid, head of the US Central Command. General Abizaid claims that the rise in insurgency is partially connected to the fact that those on the Arab street view the invasion as illegitimate.[73] Without deploying truly multinational forces, and not a hub and spoke arrangement with the US at the centre, can America progress in its seemingly unending battle against an enemy who hides in the shadow of its anti-American convictions?

This paper does not make the claim that if the US enjoyed the support of America's traditional allies, then insurgents influenced by ideology would cease their activities. Nevertheless it does forward the suggestion that by paying greater attention to the role played by America's allies, the cost of intervention under the doctrine of anticipatory attack might perhaps be decreased.

America must begin to appreciate the advantages embedded in soft power tools, which include the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion. This could be applied in the decision to go to war itself or during certain stages of war. Acquiring international legitimacy and the support of allies should be considered as important a task as adopting alternative war fighting paradigms. In the sort of missions the US has embarked upon, it needs the support of allies, and the legitimacy that comes through the collective action of a union of twenty five sovereign states.[74]

Concluding Remarks

This paper has demonstrated that in the destructive phase of war, the advantages embedded in the current process of force transformation are clearly evident. Although the combat phases of the two interventions were certainly not error free, the military has been better prepared to confront conventional and unconventional adversaries. However, in the post major conflict stages of war, acute shortfalls entrenched in the transformation vision have had a devastating impact on the attempt to stabilise and reconstruct Afghanistan and Iraq.

The paper has forwarded what it views as essential submissions if the current process of change is to prove effective in the long run. Involving the US State Department in post major conflict stages, and working with traditional allies and international society as a whole are fundamental for the realization of US objectives.

In order to prove truly transformational, the current defence doctrine must seek to follow a multilateral path of action. Doing so might involve a major shift in posture vis-à-vis unilateralism and the US position of not having to acquire a permission slip to protect America's national security interests. It may even involve the American administration re-evaluating its position with regard to anticipatory attacks, thereby limiting its strategic options.[75] However, if the US cooperates with its traditional allies and the larger body of international society, not only will certain hard assets such as reconstruction teams and greater number of troops trained to maintain the peace become available to America, it may also restore America's waning right to legitimacy.

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If the US continues to engage in theatres in which major conflict stabilisation operations are to be included in the objectives of war, then it seems vital that the vision with regard to transformation and the aftermath of war must expand its tapered conceptualisation of the consequences of conflict, and foster the link between diplomatic initiative, allied support, and military capabilities. While this may perhaps compromise the administration's largely unilateralist approach to international politics, it may also allow the US to better appreciate and deal with the difficulties in rebuilding societies and communities shattered and displaced by the politics of war.

Endnotes

[1] Sloan Elinor C, 2002. *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, London, McGill-Queen's University Press, 25-26. While the US invested in revolutionary technology to offset the quantitative advantage held by the Soviet's, Russian General Nikolai Ogorkov responded by initiating a 'military technical revolution' (MTR). At the end of the Cold War, the Office of Net Assessment at the Pentagon decided that MTR was too narrow a term to describe America's attempts at military change in the post Cold War era, and hence, replaced MTR with a broader term - 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. For an in depth study as to whether or not a current RMA is underway, see Benbow Tim, 2004. *The Magic Bullet: Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs*, London, Brassey's, 77-85. For alternative definitions of an RMA see: (1) Andrew Latham 2002. "Warfare Transformed: A Braudelian Perspective on the Revolution in Military Affairs", *European Journal of International Relations*, Volume 8:2, 231-233 (2) Hundley Richard O, 1999. *"Past Revolutions Future Transformations",* (Acquisition and Technology Policy Centre of the RAND National Defence Research Institute (NDRI). Metz Steven, 1995.*"Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs – From Theory to Practice"*, (*US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute*, June 1995). Available at: www.atic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/rmastrat.pdf p. 3

[2] For more information about security communities see Moustakis Fotios, 2003. *The Greek-Turkish Relations and NATO,* Frank Cass-Routledge, London.

[3] Force transformation has been defined as a *"process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position which helps underpin peace and stability in the world"*. Rumsfeld Donald, Quoted in: Transformation Planning Guidance See – Elements of Defense Transformation, authored by the *US DOD.* Available at: http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_383_ElementsOfTransformation_LR.pdf

[4] The primary objective of transformation, or what the US Department of Defense refers to as 'force transformation', was to design a template for change that would allow the military to adopt new war-fighting paradigms, in order to better protect America's world wide security interests from traditional, irregular, and catastrophic challenges.

[5] General Franks Tommy, 2004. *American Soldier*, New York, Regan Books, 283.

[6] *Ibid* , 319.

[7] Quoted by Rumsfeld Donald, Prepared statement for delivery to the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, (March 24 2003), Available at: http://www.pjstar.com/news/ap_wire/hold/rumsfeld.html

[8] Quoted in Rhem Kathleen T., "President Bush Proclaims End to Major Combat Operations in Iraq", *American Forces Press Service*, Available at : http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/05/iraq-030501-afps04.htm

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[10] Kurtz Stanley, "Finishing the Job", *National Review Online* (February 12 2002). Available at www.nationalreview.com/contributors.Kurtz021202.htm

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[11] According to President George W Bush's September 20th 2001 address to a Joint Session of Congress and Donald Rumsfeld's October 7th DOD news briefing. See – Global Security.Org, Operation Enduring Freedom: Objectives, Available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

[12] Lambeth Benjamin, 2005. *Air Power Against Terror – America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Prepared for United States Central Command Air Forces*, National Defense Research Institute, RAND Cooperation, 76

[13]Chapman Gary, 2003. An *Introduction to the Revolution in Military Affairs*, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas.

[14] Afghanistan was divided into 36 'kill boxes' or areas, which were watched by the air force and naval fighters belonging to each 'kill box'. See, Davis Lynne E and Jeremy Shapiro (Eds), 2003. *The US Army and its New National Security Strategy*, RAND Publication, 144

[15] For a detailed analysis of all targets destroyed or affected refer to Global Security.Org, *"Operation Enduring Freedom"*, Available at: www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring -freedom.htm and Guardian Unlimited, *"Attack on Afghanistan"*, www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,5860,567567,00.html

[16] Global security.org – http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

[17] However it should be noted that General Franks while claiming that 'unorthodox' thinking characterised planning for OEF, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the late 1980s did contribute to the decision of using fewer troops. See – General Franks Tommy, 2004. *American Soldier*, New York, Regan Books, 261.

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www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/assess/ohanlon.html

[19] See Davis Lynne E, & Jeremy Shapiro, 2003. *The US Army and its New National Security Strategy*, RAND Publication,144

[20] Garamane Jim, Joint Operations Key to Military Lessons Learned From Iraq, American Forces Press Service, Washington, July 9 2003. Available at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2003/n07092003_200307095.html

[21] Quoted in Hawkins William R, 2002. "What not to Learn from Afghanistan", *Parameters*, Summer, 26.

[22] According to Alan B Nichols, Donald Rumsfeld has not been able to demonstrate the effectiveness embedded in increased investments in transformation. See – Nichols Alan B, 2003. "Transforming the Military: Maybe Elusive Goal for Rumsfeld", *The Washington Diplomat*, December, Available at: www.washingtondiplomat.com/03-12/93_03_12.htm

[23] US Army Colonel Douglas A MacGregor claims that transformation is 'self defeating' because it focuses only on technological change.

[24] See – Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with CNN Moneyline, (May 9 2002), Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t05092002_t0509cnn.html

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[30] Seymour Hersh, 2001. "Escape and Evasion", *New Yorker*, June 12. Available at:
www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011112fa_FACT

[31] According to Jacob W Kipp and Lt. Colonel (ret) Lester W Grau 'Transformation is a process built around the siren song of technology'. See Chapman Gary, 2003. "An Introduction to the Revolution in Military Affairs", XV Amaldi Conference on Problems in Global Security, Helsinki, Finland, September. *Available at
www.lincei.it/raaporti/amaldi/papers/xv-chapman.pdf* :18

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[32] See Isenberg David & Ivan Eland, 2002."Empty Promises: Why the Bush Administration's Half Hearted Attempts at Defence Reform Have Failed", *Policy Analysis*, No. 442, June 11 2002. Available at www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa442.pdf, 2.

[33] According to Donald Rumsfeld the remaining 7 objectives included (as declared on March 21 2003): (1) Identifying and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (2) Search for, capture and drive out terrorists from the country (3) Collect intelligence connected to terrorist networks (4) Collect information on the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction (5) To end sanctions and provide humanitarian support to displaced persons and to the needy (6) To secure Iraq's oil fields and natural resources, which belong to the Iraqi people (7) To help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government. See – Thomas Donnelly, *Operation Iraqi freedom: A Strategic Assessment*, Washington DC, Published by the American Enterprise Institute, 2003 p. 73.

[34] Quoted by Rumsfeld; See Herspring Dale H*, 2005, The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil Military Relations From FDR to George W Bush,* University Press of Kansas, 400.

[35] *Ibid.* p.399

[36] *Ibid.*

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[49] The Iraqi army was disbanded on 24 May 2003. Details on the implications of this decision can be found in: Barnett Jon, Beth Eggleston, Michael Webber, 2003. "Peace and Development in Post War Iraq", *Middle East Policy* 10, No. 3, Fall (23-27.)

[50] Nadia Schadlow argues that the US military's experience in the Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1986), and Panama (1989), should have at least provided the Pentagon with a precedent that could have been used to better prepare the military for post conflict scenarios. See Schadlow Nadia, 2002. "War and the Art of Governance", *Parameters*, Autumn, 88.

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[58] Dodge, 2005, 5-30.

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[73] See Joseph Nye Jr, *Soft Power*, New York, Public Affairs, 2004, (26-27).

[74] According to Javier Solana, the EU as a whole provides America with a form of legitimacy that cannot be replaced. See Kagan Robert, 2003. *Paradise & Power*, London, Atlantic Books, 130.

[75] By following a largely multilateral path of action the option of pre-emptive and preventive war may not be as acceptable to America's traditional allies; also, while working with international society through the framework of the UN, such strategies may contradict international law. For a detailed analysis See Biddle Stephen D, 2005. "American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment", US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April. Available at: www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/pub603.pdf

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