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NATO Transformation: Problems & Prospects

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**Andrew J. Goodpaster • Introduction
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**A Compendium
April 2004**




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
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Foreword

The phrase “NATO Transformation” encompasses a broad range of concepts. There is the relatively familiar notion of integrating technology more deeply into military doctrine and operations in order to improve battlefield awareness, provide for precision strike capabilities and enhance the survivability and effectiveness of individual soldiers. But there are other important dimensions of transformation, such as the less technical aspects of preparing military establishments for the diverse, and largely unknown, challenges of the future. Such changes are difficult to implement within a national military establishment. For the Alliance, especially as it moves toward substantial enlargement, transformation presents special challenges.

To examine the prospects for NATO transformation – and to identify likely problems – the Atlantic Council joined with the U.S. Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series to present the views of a panel of experts at the October 2003 annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army. This report – the latest in a series of Atlantic Council publications on NATO transformation – contains the texts of the remarks delivered by the panelists, along with an introductory paper by GEN Andrew Goodpaster (USA, Ret.) and an essay prepared afterwards by the event moderator.

The Council and the Eisenhower National Security Series would like to thank VADM Arthur Cebrowski (USN, Ret.) of the Office of Force Transformation, GEN Andrew Goodpaster, ADM Jacques Lanxade (France, Ret.), LTG Michel Maisonneuve (Canada) of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation and GEN Montgomery Meigs (USA, Ret.) for participating in this project and for bringing their impressive experience and expertise to it. The Atlantic Council and the Eisenhower National Security Series take no institutional positions with respect to the ideas or conclusions presented in this compendium.

The Council also wishes to thank the U.S. Army’s Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series and the Association of the United States Army’s Institute of Land Warfare, without whose support this project would not have been possible. Finally, I would like to thank the Director and Assistant Director of the Council’s Program on International Security, Dick Nelson and Jason Purcell, for so ably ensuring the success of this event and the quality of this report.

Christopher J. Makins
President
Atlantic Council of the United States

Pillars from the Past for Building the Future

An introduction by Andrew J. Goodpaster

The substantially changed world security environment of the 21st century demands comparably substantial changes within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These amount to a full-scale transformation to re-align the Alliance to meet new, more uncertain challenges. This transformation, however, is complicated by the lack of common purpose among member nations and deep fractures within NATO. Nevertheless, the continuing value of NATO is incontestable and I trust that sufficient common interests will be found for the members and partners to go forward with the transformation required to reshape the Alliance so that it may act in concert against new risks and dangers.

In approaching the task of transformation, I believe there are some useful parallels with the task of building NATO in its earliest years, particularly the principles that guided the original effort. The specific circumstances of the two eras are, of course, drastically different. The main challenge then was clear and definite: the menace posed by the hostile expansionist communism of the Soviet Union. Now the threats are far more diversified and uncertain, though no less real and demanding.

I. Catalysts for Change

The original process of building NATO was given an unexpected sense of urgency by North Korea's invasion of the South in 1950. Many in the Alliance believed that this signaled the first move of outright aggression instigated by the Soviet Union. The sudden shockwave that reverberated through Europe was magnified by a series of battlefield disasters suffered by U.S. and South Korean forces in the chaotic first months of combat. One of the early consequences of the war was to draw the United States more closely into the defense of Europe. This involved creating the post of Supreme Allied Commander to form and lead a collective force to defend Western Europe. Also, the United States pressed for the creation of a West German military force as part of the Alliance.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 provided a similar catalyst for transforming NATO after the end of the Cold War. The Alliance, lacking a common unifying threat like the Warsaw Pact, had been hollowed-out by sharply reduced defense budgets and a growing gap in the military capabilities of member nations, that threatened the ability of NATO forces to fight together. But the day after September 11th NATO enacted Article 5 – an attack on one member is an attack on all – for the first time in its history. Indeed, the headlines of a leading French newspaper proclaimed, “We are all Americans.” Much of that unity and sense of urgency has since been lost because of the controversy over the war in Iraq. The security agenda for the Alliance, however, is no longer a matter of debate: it is focused on international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

II. NATO's Evolving Purposes

While there is consensus that terrorism is a major security problem, there are important differences regarding appropriate roles for NATO in dealing with it. The discrepancy is over whether terrorism should be considered more of a law enforcement and intelligence problem than one for which traditional military forces are needed, as well as over the differing resource allocations that would follow from these differing views. This dilemma reopens a healthy debate about the purposes of NATO.

General Eisenhower, in his *First Annual Report of SACEUR*, noted that NATO was well on the way to establishing "...an expanding spiral of strength and confidence." It seems to me that NATO transformation is still about expanding the international security sphere. Recently, such efforts have included the addition of new members, further cooperation with partnership countries and establishing new security dialogues.

The success of NATO ultimately is measured by how secure people feel. Eisenhower accepted the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in December 1950 and by April 1951, General Order No. One¹ officially declared the command operational. The change of mood in Europe after the first year was palpable. Despite continuing shortfalls and nagging issues of many kinds, including nuclear weapons, General Eisenhower inspired confidence in the ability of the Alliance to bring security to places where it was badly needed.

One aspect of the recent debate over the purposes of NATO is encouraging – namely that the "out of area" debate has been definitively resolved. NATO is no longer conceived of as narrowly concerned solely with the territorial defense of its members. NATO is about promoting the collective security interests of its members wherever and whenever the North Atlantic Council agrees that these should act.

III. The Modern Applications of NATO's Founding Principles

Several principles guided early Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) efforts and these remained valid some 18 years later when I assumed the post of SACEUR. I believe they likewise remain valid today, although their applications will no doubt vary for the process of transforming future NATO forces. I will briefly outline these principles – deterrence, defense, solidarity, détente and equity – and how they may relate to the current process of transformation.

Deterrence

Deterrence was the primary objective for NATO – deterrence not only of war but also of threats of war and of pressures aimed at forcing concessions contrary to the peace and security of member nations and to the liberties and well-being of their citizens. The central

¹ Editor's note: General Goodpaster, serving on Eisenhower's staff, was the author of NATO General Order No. One and many other key SHAPE staff actions.

idea was to make it clear to any and all that the costs and risks of conflict would outweigh any likely gain for which an aggressor might hope.

Deterrence requires capabilities both to punish potential adversaries and to provide protective and defensive measures to deny or greatly limit the destruction that these might be seeking to inflict. Its credibility rests upon a combination of political will and the capability to act decisively.

Today, there seems little temptation for others – major or lesser nations – to revert to the policies of threat and force that shaped the Cold War, though there are exceptions (like North Korea). NATO must avoid becoming overly oriented toward a single type of threat, such as terrorism.

Deterrence now means denying terrorists easy access to critical infrastructure as well as doing what we can to restrain and dissuade all nations, particularly rogue states, from proliferating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, it means posing a credible threat of action against the threat of genocide and other forms of violence against civilian populations. Deterrence is certain to continue to play a major role in the shaping of Alliance security strategy.

Defense

Defense involves a respectable posture of defensive military strength, and has provided an essential underpinning for deterrence from NATO's earliest times. If deterrence failed, then we were prepared to defend. Then, and even more so now, it was not possible to defend everywhere against every threat. The challenge has always been to marshal available resources in a manner that provides a sound basis for confidence that, if conflict should occur, aggression will ultimately be defeated.

The concept of defense today retains its former meaning but has a larger scope that includes offensive military actions, and even permits acting preemptively, if so directed, to eliminate the danger. The possibility of preemption, or preventive action, is a source of contention within NATO. Given the requirement for unanimous decision-making and the increasing size of the Alliance, it will be difficult to build the necessary political will to act before a major act of aggression has been committed. Yet, regrettably, there is a tendency to respond to egregious acts of inhumanity only after they have crossed some intolerable threshold of violence. It will take the kind of wise, forward-looking statesmanship that gave us NATO in the first place to guide us through these new challenges.

Nuclear weapons played a prominent role in early NATO strategy and planning. Today the problem has been characterized as “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). I believe that this has not been helpful either for the United States or for NATO planning. WMD should be disaggregated because they – nuclear, chemical and biological weapons – constitute quite different threats and demand different responses. By lumping these concerns together, we have greatly confused and complicated the important process of establishing priorities. For example, some might characterize a pharmaceutical laboratory in Cuba in the same league

with thousands of tactical nuclear warheads in Russia. Clearly, these pose vastly different dangers and failing to draw proper distinctions only raises the possibility of inappropriate manipulation of threat perceptions.

Solidarity

Solidarity soon came to be recognized as essential to the Alliance's success, and was expressed in tangible, visible form in the existing collective force. Through that solidarity, the member nations were not isolated and exposed to foreign threats and pressures, nor would they waste their strength in internecine conflicts of the kind that had left them weak and devastated in the past. Eisenhower often spoke of this, declaring that the NATO nations working together could accomplish a result that, if they were acting separately, would be beyond the reach of any or of all.

Solidarity has unfortunately weakened in the absence of the single, focused and massive threat of the Cold War. The recent U.S. preference for unilateral action has further undermined the prospects for Alliance solidarity. I fear that this will prove short-sighted as we become increasingly aware of the broad need for international support in the war on terrorism.

Solidarity still lies at the heart of NATO's strength. Failures must be overcome by more consultative efforts to define future tasks. These efforts should place a high priority on working with the Partnership for Peace countries, especially Russia, to provide the wider circle of deliberation envisaged in the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 4.

Détente

Détente was part of the Alliance's aim from the outset – seeking peaceful change. So doing required efforts to reduce the dangerous military confrontation and lower the levels of tension between the Soviet Union and the West. My approach at NATO was to emphasize reduction in the *causes* of tension – the combination of Soviet expansionist and adversarial policies with a massive military force that far exceeded any needs for defense on the part of the Soviet Union. NATO's lengthy efforts at mutual and balanced force reduction, along with a “war of ideas” that fostered openness (Gorbachev's *glasnost*) eventually bore fruit and the Berlin Wall came down.

The obvious analogue today is to “wage peace” (again in the words of Eisenhower), using NATO's considerable “soft power” as a positive inducement to change threatening behavior. An important part of Alliance transformation should include work to avert violence and ameliorate the causes of conflict by peaceful means, making full use of the many arts and instruments at the disposal of its members and partners as well as more coordinated efforts with the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other organizations.

Equity

Finally, equity was sought, meaning a fair sharing of the risks, burdens and benefits that the overall NATO undertaking involved. We soon learned that the peace and security that formed NATO's central common purpose fell into the category of a "public good", for which no simple allocation or formula could be written. Rather, the sharing formed a major part of the deliberation process that became the hallmark of the NATO commitment.

The Secretary General plays a key role in determining how NATO burdens should be shared equitably. But the strategic commanders are also important in this regard. General Eisenhower, before accepting the post of SACEUR, insisted on access to national military and defense leaders, prime ministers and chiefs of state. This access proved to be essential in developing a sense of equitable sharing, while overcoming the many obstacles interposed by differing national and NATO bureaucracies. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session also provides a top-level forum for deliberation of equity issues.

Burden sharing and risk sharing will undoubtedly be continuing sources of argument and tension within the Alliance, particularly when the difficulties of achieving consensus loom so large. Inevitably, finger-pointing weakens cohesion, but to be realistic we must recognize that it is probably inherent in the functioning of alliances. Responsible and accountable national political leaders must decide "Who pays how much and for what purposes?" We learned early in this process that it is not useful to cast blame.

IV. Determining Priorities & Meeting Challenges

Determining priorities is an important part of the transformation process. It is not possible for the Alliance to defend all of the security interests of all of its members and partners, so priorities need to be established. At the national level, this typically involves developing a set of categories of interests, such as those that are *vital* to preserve the freedom and well-being of citizens; *extremely important* interests that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil freedom and well-being; and *important* interests that would have major negative consequences if not safeguarded.²

In prioritizing the many threats for which NATO might be called upon, the *vital* category holds the greatest potential for causing serious harm to the NATO countries. Direct attacks on NATO members and their armed forces, such as the September 11th strikes on the United States, must be a top priority. This category should also include the possibility, even if presently unlikely, of renewed major power confrontation. This suggests the need to accord a high-level of importance to several relationships: among NATO Allies, with Russia and with China. Nuclear weapons in particular continue to pose a major threat to this category of vital interests, suggesting the need for efforts to prevent their proliferation and rein in existing inventories.

² These categories are based on the report, *America's National Interests* by the Commission on America's National Interests, July 1996.

Extremely important interests involve widespread threats to regional and world order, including many related to terrorism. Failed and failing nations constitute such threats. Conditions of civil strife, instability, breakdown of law and order, and spreading violence in troubled areas can endanger long-term regional security and well-being. It is difficult to gain public recognition that these problems are serious and steps must be taken to deal with them in a timely manner to head off potential crises that would likely later entail much greater costs and a more serious impact on high-priority interests and values. There is considerable room for improvement in dealing with such problems.

Important interests can be threatened by regimes that deny human rights on a widespread basis. Such severely troubled countries are often marked by civil disorder, genocide or flagrant crimes against humanity. They have occasioned further important instances of military intervention, sometimes of limited scope, in U.S. or multinational (often UN) actions. They may require the commitment of troops for peace enforcement or peacekeeping to bring stability to a situation. NATO has gained some valuable experience along these lines in the Balkans. Furthermore, if such operations are undertaken as an Alliance, they have much better prospects for being politically sustainable for the (usually necessary) longer-term than if undertaken by individual countries.

Each NATO member and partner may see priorities differently. It is therefore critical to have an ongoing dialogue to develop consensus on threats, priorities and appropriate responses. In turn, this suggests that the transformation process will have an important role in bridging the gap between continuing challenges and collective responses. The challenges will require NATO to build and sustain political will, develop appropriate policies and direct military actions to safeguard peace and expand security, not just for the member nations themselves, but also in view of more global interests.

Just what NATO's responses should be to emerging or future challenges is unclear, although many of the essential elements are surely in place. What is of key importance is our collective wealth of experience and wisdom, on which NATO's future can confidently be built.

NATO Transformation: Problems & Prospects

Transformation and Its Implications for NATO

Arthur K. Cebrowski³

While transformation has many forms and aspects, there are two aspects I would like to dwell on, and then if I have time, we will talk about the implied issues for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

- The first is the transformation of the role of defense in national security, and
- The second is the transformation of the force itself.

When we started the process of transformation, everyone focused principally on the transformation of the force, thinking we were talking about equipment and technology. But actually that area, as important as it is, follows the former – that is, the profound changes we are seeing in the role of defense in national security.

I. Transforming the Role of Defense in National Security

First there are two errors that frequently surface. One is that the new strategic context has somehow reduced the value of the Alliance, and the other is that the transformation of U.S. and European forces reduces the need for the Alliance. I, of course, take issue with both.

Adjusting Old Institutions to New Realities

All of the – you might say – ‘great globalization issues’ or institutions, which came to life after World War II, are under stress: the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the

³ Edited transcript of the speech delivered on 7 October 2003.

United Nations, the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO. The reason they are under stress is because the reason they came into being was to firewall off our future (at that time) from the unsavory experiences in the run up to World War I and World War II and to contain Soviet expansionism. Those needs have largely gone away, so the institutions are under stress. Accordingly, we need to see these institutions through an adjustment period rather than condemning them to a decrease in value.

The nature of the global competition once viewed as East vs. West has been fundamentally altered to something different, which we have come to understand as the competition between the ‘functioning core of globalization,’ – which includes most of the world, i.e. those nations which are capable of benefiting from and participating in the phenomena of globalization and the information age – on the one hand and on the other hand, that dysfunctional gap – i.e. those nations which are incapable of doing so. Thankfully, most of the nations are either in the core or working towards joining the core. We have a change in our perspective, then, and this indicates a transformation.

The Continuing Relevance of NATO’s Traditional Strengths

Transformation is not new to NATO. As recently as 1990, NATO pursued transformation to cope with the changed strategic context created by the end of the Cold War. Only ten years later, it is coping again with how to project power and purpose into the Middle East and distant areas of the dysfunctional gap.

An analysis of ‘the gap’ reveals that disconnectedness is the leading indicator of danger. One need only look at those nations or those societies which trouble us most to see that they are characterized by disconnectedness. NATO helps create connectedness, and therefore security, through membership, association and increasingly, the export of security itself.

America’s need for NATO is exceeded only by Europe’s. Consider the implications of a politically and militarily weakened NATO, for example, in the context of the global war on terrorism and a growing need for multilateralism along with the sharing of the costs of ensuring stability and security in the world. New models – or modes and methods of warfare – do not therefore alter the fundamental need for the Alliance; rather, they increase it. A broadened threat demands a broadened response and the potential diversity of approaches is one of the Alliance’s greatest assets in a time of broadened risk. So much for the transformation of the role of defense in national security.

II. Transforming the Force

Dominance of the ‘Great Commons’

Now, onto transforming the force: there is a certain strategic imperative in the larger strategic view. Writing recently in *International Security*, Barry Posen noted that the United States – but indeed the larger NATO construct – is in a position of dominance in what one could think of as ‘the Great Commons’ of the world (the sea, space and cyberspace and, militarily speaking, one might have to add the high-altitude structure over land as well).

Strength here contributes to global stability, and dominance tends to be somewhat capital-intensive. This is a position the United States and its allies do not want to give up. It is important; it forms the basis from which we can do so many other things.

On the other hand, a decisive operation, or decisiveness, does not happen in the Great Commons. The Great Commons is not necessarily where people live – they do not live in space, they do not live at sea, and they do not necessarily *live* in cyberspace. They live, instead, up close and personal. It is the close-in area where competitions are resolved; it is a more complex environment, and, under stress, enemies will always retreat to a more complex environment.

Dynamic Assets for Controlling Close-In Theaters

The areas I am specifically talking about here are land areas themselves – the close-in, often-contested littorals.⁴ Dominance here tends to be more labor-intensive, though not exclusively so. But it is here that one has the powerful tools for creating the preconditions for *political* victory. Political victory is not likely to occur in the Great Commons, but rather, tends to occur up close. Actions here allow us to link the tactical with the strategic, and many of us have noted – or indeed witnessed – the convergence of the levels of war. This is also the domain where the military and the civil come together – the lethal and the non-lethal – and where technology merges with humanity. The close-in sphere also links high-intensity combat with stability and reconstruction.

So there are several actions that need to be pursued. As always, in an alliance, it is key to develop and foster collaborative planning tools. Admittedly, some of these are quite technical, involving communications and interoperability, but many also require conceptual development and experience. While one normally uses military intelligence to win in combat, one also has to acquire and employ social intelligence to achieve victory in the political domain. This might lead one to seek a greater depth of local knowledge – and perhaps research into new tools – which will help us get a better understanding of social linkages.

Of course, there is always going to be a vital need for military intelligence, which allows us to penetrate radars; gives us layered, persistent, unmanned coverage from high altitudes down to the surface of the earth (and indeed, the depths of the sea as well); and provides technology to aid human relationship-training for cultures and language, including, for example mobile and real-time language translators. In developing military intelligence, one of the great engines available to us within the Alliance is concept development and experimentation.

⁴ There is a cyberspace element as well, which touches people more personally; the low-altitude structure, militarily.

III. Transforming as an Alliance

National Choices as Part of a Strong Collective Effort

With the last couple of minutes remaining, I will attempt to answer the question: what are some of the key transformation issues for the United States and for NATO? First, ‘how to invest?’ On every issue, one of the things that all members of the Alliance are confronted with is, ‘do I want to attempt a leadership position in this area, or do I want to be a strategic follower?’ Thankfully, we are an *alliance*. Unlike in business – where, having made that choice wrongly, you suffer the loss of your firm – here, if you adopt a position of being a strategic follower, at least you are following an ally instead of a potential competitor.

What kinds of capabilities to develop? Niche capabilities or more broadly layered capabilities? It is a national choice, of course, that each of the nations must make; the United States has elected broadened capabilities, and we have Alliance partners that do that as well. But there is also an undeniable logic for the selection of niche capabilities. The ability to focus, the ability to acquire unique skills, or cultural and historic dispositions toward excellence in a particular area – where focus on that area by one particular nation might not constitute a comprehensive force – could, when taken in the context of the Alliance, become enormously powerful. There is also the issue of how capital-intensive one must be, versus labor-intensive. Here again, there are social and national policies, which make one lean one way or the other – and I have already talked about how inclinations one way or the other might affect choices.

Building on the Existing Agenda

NATO already has a transformation agenda, adopted at the Prague Summit in 2002; it aims at a new NATO response force and capabilities to respond outside of Europe. Of necessity, such efforts tend to be somewhat more capital-intensive. They tend to be at the front end of conflicts, which is where one normally chooses to bring the most capable technologies available. But in the United States now, we are coming to grips with the transformation of stabilization and reconstruction forces. This is an area where NATO Europe has had for a long time – and continues to have – considerable expertise. When viewed together with the NATO response force, this expertise then gives us a more balanced capability.

In the context of a broad transformation agenda already in place, an important question, perhaps the last question, arises: how rapidly should one change? Given that I am the Director of Force Transformation, my answer is you can not do this fast enough. But on a more practical level, one could merely ask the question of how quickly one should want to shed high costs born of inefficient or decreasingly useful structures and the risk of military irrelevance.

There is always (in an alliance, when one pursues transformation) a concern about divergence. I therefore think that the great challenge before us is how we balance diversity – or indeed achieve diversity – without divergence. We have some good tools available to us in concept development and experimentation, training, information sharing and – I would

hope – an increasing degree of openness in an alliance which is already characterized by an historic degree of openness and sharing.

Challenges & Opportunities for NATO Transformation

Michel Maisonneuve⁵

Merci. It is indeed a pleasure, as the new kid on the transformation block, to be seated here today with my co-panelists.

My intent this morning is to cover a little of the background to NATO transformation and outline our progress, plans and priorities. But I have also been asked to touch on opportunities and challenges. I shall close with a thought or two on the implications of NATO transformation for the U.S. Army.

I. How NATO Is Fulfilling Its Prague Summit Mandate

You may recall that the Alliance mandated transformation at the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002. What many people miss is that Prague indicated transatlantic convergence on several issues. The first was the need for a smaller military structure – a move away from a structure that someone recently referred to as “too big, too old and too static”. The second was the necessity for a light but potent multinational and joint force capable of engagement in combat operations on short notice at far greater distances than ever before envisaged in NATO, perhaps even well outside Europe. The third was a commitment to transformation and the establishment of a new Strategic Command, headquartered in the United States and with a presence in Europe, responsible for the continuing transformation of military capabilities and for the promotion of interoperability of Alliance forces. NATO’s assumption of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul this past summer is a concrete example of the ground swell of change that began at Prague last year.

The Alliance, in just a short time, has begun to do what was agreed by our governments and we have been very busy. We are reforming our command structure and setting the foundations for a more efficient, effective and deployable framework. The week of October 13, 2003 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe will formally announce the establishment of the small, potent multinational and joint force. It will be known as the NATO Response Force, or NRF, and should be of major interest in terms of transformation and links to U.S. forces. Moreover, the Alliance has had in place since 19 June 2003, a Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) and a single Headquarters (HQ) that is focused on the promotion of fast, accurate and simultaneous battle winning effect by linking intellectual, cultural and technological innovation.

In short, HQ Supreme Allied Command Transformation will take new and innovative ideas, develop them into operational concepts and capabilities and bring them to a transforming

⁵ Edited text of the speech delivered on 7 October 2003.

NATO force. This joint HQ – and I, as the first ever Army Chief of Staff, am living proof that we are going joint – is co-located in Norfolk with U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), with one dual-hatted Commander, Admiral Ed Giambastiani. This co-location and dual-hatted command relationship offers synergy and opportunities for both Allied Command Transformation and U.S. Joint Forces Command. The HQ formally stood up on 19 June 2003 and its reorganization is nearly complete with Full Operational Capability to be achieved by June 2006. This is a completely new NATO command and a major step for the Alliance.

Our vision is to be a forcing agent for change, leading the continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to advance NATO's global security interests. The target is to turn Alliance military capabilities into a fully integrated joint and combined war fighting force able to utilize knowledge to deliver precision, speed and lethality.

Currently we are focused on delivering training and education packages for the NATO response force; we are analyzing Iraqi lessons learned and linking them into future training, doctrine and materiel packages. We already have a lessons learned team embedded in Afghanistan. Additionally, we have just delivered the first NATO concept development experiments, while, on October 8, 2003, we are delivering, in conjunction with the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense (OSD), an innovative exercise for Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Defense in Colorado Springs. All of this is part of a structured and output-focused continuum of experiments and exercises.

In terms of structure, our core element is in Norfolk, Virginia while we are also establishing a footprint in Europe, a Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway and a Joint Force Training Center in Poland as well as working with Alliance nations looking at the establishment of a series of national Centers of Excellence such as a German Joint Air Power Competence Center and a Turkish Counter-Terrorism Center.

II. New Opportunities

A Focus on Alliance Goals

In terms of opportunities, I will suggest just three at this stage. The first is one of “focus”. The Alliance has never before embraced change in this manner. Change within NATO has thus far been uneven, inconsistent and uncoordinated, slowing our progress towards the coherently joint and combined expeditionary force our Alliance needs now and in the future. NATO has always had several agencies addressing future thinking. All of these have, however, worked to different agendas and authorities with less than optimal synchronization, visibility and focus, which has precluded the necessary environment to deliver. Never before has future planning been driven by a single strategic command working to agreed priorities, budgets and vision. Allied Command Transformation brings this significant focus and already we are seeing the results. The Joint Analysis Lessons Learned Center in Portugal has gained a significant rejuvenation and is right now contributing to the improvement of operational capability with the establishment of a dynamic lessons learned process.

As U.S. JFCOM has shown, dedicated organizations to promote positive change can bring focus to innovation, bringing to bear the resources – both in terms of technological and intellectual advantage – to improve continuously war fighting capability. We must maintain the momentum we have achieved since the Prague summit in order to establish, beyond question, our relevance and absolute necessity for the Alliance. We have two main customers, the Alliance nations and Allied Command Operations. We must deliver results – or as Admiral Giambastiani says, “Product, Product, Product” – to these customers in order to secure our future and establish our credibility.

A Two-Way Street of Transformation Experience, Innovation and Ideas

The second key opportunity is the creation of a transatlantic two-way street; an exchange of experience, innovation and good ideas. We are collaborating closely with, but independently from, U.S. Joint Forces Command and have clearly gained from the experience. We have established significant training, education and doctrinal practices as a result of this close relationship. We used Joint Forces Command’s Joint Warfighting Center in Suffolk, Virginia as the model for our center in Stavanger, leveraging away all the growing pains and dead ends that JFCOM experienced in its development process. Stavanger is potentially the jewel in our transformational crown. It will allow us to train the NRF command elements with global reach capability at an affordable cost, while incorporating innovative concepts from on-going operations. In short, we will undertake repeated mission rehearsals while experimenting with new concepts.

Similarly, European nations and Canada have a great deal to contribute to U.S. transformation. Many of the Scandinavian nations are, for instance, further advanced in network centric thinking than is the United States and several nations have a great deal more experience in peace support operations than others. In order to fortify this transatlantic two-way street from our location in Norfolk, we are promoting Alliance nations establishing *in situ* Liaison Officers who, with dual access to both HQ SACT and U.S. JFCOM, will be able to offer better linkages with those “like minded” national transformation agencies within nations.

Relevant Military Capabilities

The third opportunity arises from the genesis of this transformation – the need to create relevant military capabilities. Transformation in the Alliance, led by ACT in Norfolk, will facilitate a global expeditionary role in which it may find its key instrument – the NRF – operating alongside, or integrated with, a U.S. force that is accelerating in terms of capability. Technology divergence is worrying and the fast implementation of innovative solutions to capability constraints will serve to realign transatlantic thinking and ensure that the Alliance can deliver swift, joint, integrated and relevant military power.

III. Ongoing Challenges

Shortage of Resources

Our challenges are obvious. The first is resources. In ACT we need those who can think out of the box – the best and the brightest – and already nations are contributing. When you think about it, NATO already has “embedded” lateral thinking in place, with multinational staff looking at the issues from many different perspectives. We need the funding which will allow us to tackle properly a transformational program and to deliver true output. Twenty-five percent of the U.S. JFCOM budget is spent on experimentation; in HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation we have just 2 percent allocated. This is clearly wrong and we are working to address it, but in a climate of reducing defense expenditure in Europe this will be a challenge. In Allied Command Operations, or what used to be called “Allied Command Europe” (ACE), resource issues are also taxing, force generation is painful and national commitment at the political level is not always translated to troops on the ground.

Responsiveness in Decision-Making

Linked to this is the issue of our decision-making process. Already the stand-up of the NRF is stimulating debate on a host of pertinent institutional issues. These include, but are not limited to, the readiness of forces, what availability really means and how to force generate within a five-day notice cycle. We are addressing these questions in some of the demanding forthcoming exercises, but fundamentally our decision-making process must become more responsive.

Embracing a Culture of Change

The final, and perhaps most daunting challenge, is one of culture. All of us, working in our areas of expertise, would rather shine working on what we know best. In ACT, we want people who work on the unknown issues. We want to promote a culture that embraces change in order to seek out those issues – be they conceptual or technological – and study them, experiment with them, promote the best of them and then deliver them to the nations and to Allied Command Operations. We must reward “risk taking” as opposed to our generally ingrained military desire to “risk manage”. The need to move away from in-place forces toward expeditionary capability is highly demanding. We must reduce old-fashioned forces and substitute capability for mass wherever and whenever we can.

IV. Implications for the U.S. Army

So let me close by highlighting the implications for the U.S. Army. I have mentioned the establishment of the NRF. It is going to be a small force, equipped and trained to go in harm’s way, in high intensity situations – and to fight decisively when there. It could be used in a variety of ways: as a spearhead capability for a larger NATO deployment; undertaking a crisis response in its own right or as a NATO contribution to a wider coalition. It is in this latter role that I foresee the greatest implication for the U.S. Army. Sooner or later the NRF

will be operating alongside U.S. troops. The benefits of coalition forces are not lost on anyone and, given recent U.S. commitments, burden-sharing and international legitimacy will, I feel, become significant factors in any future deployment. As a Canadian Forces officer, I can assure you that my military is well aware of this need to burden-share as evidenced by our Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) contingent deployed in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom and today in Kabul as one of the major troop contributors in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.

NATO, with the NRF, will have a potent and capable force to bring to the party but, as Air Marshall Burridge (the United Kingdom commander in Iraq during the war) recently commented, there is a minimum force size that can be given its own mission and area of operations. Below that, coalition troops must be integrated into the U.S. force structure in order to operate. This, more than anything else, will require the continuing two-way street that I referred to earlier.

Merci encore une fois.

Imagining a New Alliance

Jacques Lanxade⁶

I. The Alliance in a Changing Strategic Environment

New Threats to Stability and Peace

The Atlantic Alliance was created in 1948 to counter the Soviet military threat to Europe. It successfully carried out its mission, made an essential contribution to the security of the free world and eventually provoked the collapse of the (Soviet and Warsaw Pact) communist system in 1989-1991.

From then on, while some thought that the Alliance was bound to disappear, all Western political leaders reaffirmed their will to keep it alive. However, the Alliance had to be gradually adapted to a completely changed strategic environment. The successful interventions in Bosnia and in Kosovo illustrated this evolution.

Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, we have now become conscious of the considerable changes that have occurred in the world and the gravity of the threats to democratic states. Thus, the time has probably come to go much further and “imagine a new Alliance”.

Our world is particularly dangerous and many of the risks threatening stability and peace are both very diversified and relatively new – which is a *first* major change that we need to consider.

Assessing Major Risks

To simplify, I would say that we must take account of three major risks :

- First, the emergence of fundamentalist (Islamic) movements whose final objective consists of taking power and establishing regimes based on Sharia law. Their most dangerous mode of action is terrorism, which struck at the heart of America. Constantly fighting against terrorism is a priority, but we must at the same time attach great importance to the reduction of all that facilitates the growth of the fundamentalist sphere of influence.
- The second risk is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons. Two new states have now acquired a nuclear capability and others are trying to go in the same direction. At present, North Korea and Iran are our main concern.

⁶ Edited text of the speech delivered on 7 October 2003.

- The third risk is less often mentioned. It is that of an internal destabilization of numerous countries, which may then spread to entire regions as is wont to be the case in Africa, in the Great Lakes area. This instability finds its source in under-development and weak governments. It facilitates arms- and drug-smuggling and is a fertile ground for the growth of terrorism.

Balancing Military and Non-Military Responses

Against these threats, we must be conscious of the fact that there is no standard response and, more particularly, that there cannot be a complete response exclusively based on the use of force. To each unstable area and to each crisis must correspond a set of specific political, economic and military measures.

Keeping or restoring peace, fighting against terrorism or preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction demand the implementation of highly diversified policies. These do not exclude military action. However, resorting to the use of force is only one solution among others and we must be flexible in the way we select both our modes of action and those who will implement them.

Accounting for the Construction of Europe

Transforming the Alliance implies that we should take into account a *second* major factor of change, the construction of Europe. The European Union is not only an economic entity. Since the Maastricht treaty was signed, it has also undertaken to become a major political entity. This evolution is slow – if not difficult – because European countries are old and it is not easy to achieve the necessary transfers of sovereignty, in spite of constantly reaffirmed political will to do so. Still, we must make no mistake. The European Union keeps evolving and the likely adoption of a constitution in the near future will be a major step in that evolution.

The EU wants to have a common foreign policy, implemented by a European Foreign Minister, and to keep building its own defense capability. Paradoxically, the disagreements which appeared within the EU over the Iraq crisis have strengthened (rather than weakened) the determination of the governments to keep going in the same direction while the work being done by the convention in charge of the constitution project was in many ways facilitated. It would therefore be a grave mistake to bet on the interruption of this process. On the contrary, when it comes to transforming the Alliance, NATO will have to take this evolution into account rather than oppose it, so that it eventually benefits the Alliance instead of causing damage.

Today many Europeans sense a strong reluctance on the part of the United States vis-à-vis primary reliance on the Alliance framework, even if this is not part of the official parlance of the U.S. administration. It is important that this climate of reluctance be changed.

Rest assured that Europe is not being built in opposition to the United States. If Europe tries to show its independence, it is only because such an attitude is indispensable to

strengthen its internal cohesion. This should remind you of the history of the creation of the American nation.

Globalization

The *third* major factor of change to be taken into account is globalization. It has been facilitated by the ongoing development of transport and information technologies and it has created a greater interdependence among all parts of the world.

Globalization generated the creation of numerous international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In a more general way, it created the United Nations system which is supposed to represent the international community. We all know that the system is not perfect and that the Security Council is not representative of the entire world. However, until it has been reformed, we must try to make the best possible use of it. We must also continue to try to reach consensus among the world's democracies, which should become one of the missions of the new Alliance.

This new Alliance will have to extend its competence on a world scale and adopt a clear position vis-à-vis the international community and the organizations by which it is represented. NATO must better take into account – and in so doing support – other international organizations, notably the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations, which respectively legitimize action in Europe and in the world. As part of this overall structure of international organizations, the Alliance must, in certain cases, assume the role of military arm, as it did in Kosovo.

A Growing Transatlantic Capabilities Gap

The *fourth and final* factor of change concerns military operations. I do not intend to describe the considerable progress made in the conduct of operations and the development of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); guided weapons; and Network Centric Warfare. This technological revolution proved its import and effectiveness during the Iraq conflict. However, this revolution being the near sole province of the U.S. armed forces, the gap between American and European forces has widened, making cooperation oftentimes difficult. The consequences of this situation are not only of a military order. They can and will also become political as soon as the European Allies become fully conscious of how difficult it is to act alongside U.S. forces on an equal footing. There will be no lasting transformation of the Alliance until this imbalance has been corrected.

It is obvious that the responsibility for correcting the imbalance rests with the Europeans, who have excessively reduced their defense expenditures. However, by opposing technology transfers, the United States has not made matters any easier.

These various factors of change clearly affect the situation of the Alliance and lead us to ask ourselves the question of how we could help it to evolve better.

Transatlantic Perceptions and Attitudes Toward the Alliance

European states are determined to maintain the transatlantic link even if there are disagreements on the precise place that it should occupy vis-à-vis the ongoing construction of Europe. This is particularly true of France, an ally which may occasionally be difficult but which still remains unquestionably loyal.

As for the United States, please allow a friend and ally to point out that U.S. attitudes regarding NATO – and the Alliance generally – are often seen as ambiguous. On the one hand, the United States wants to maintain the Alliance, a symbol of its link with Europe, which, in spite of the growing importance of other regions in the world, does remain a strategic priority. But at the same time, in the case of an armed intervention, there appears to be a certain U.S. reluctance to share operational responsibilities with the other members of NATO. The “coalition of the willing” concept does not fit with the principles of the Alliance in their present state. That is because the *de facto* aim of this concept is to place action outside the framework of the Alliance in order to ensure that operations are carried out by the U.S. chain of command and not by that of NATO. I can personally understand the reluctance of the Pentagon to comply with NATO procedures when it comes to making operational decisions, but this will have to be taken into account in our reflections regarding the transformation of the Alliance.

II. Fundamentals for Transforming NATO

Under these conditions, what proposals can be made to further our debate on the transformation of the Alliance?

There are two options: a gradual adaptation or a deeper, more resolute transformation.

The first option is a gradual transformation in order to adapt the Alliance to the new realities outlined above – and to others not mentioned – in a step-by-step manner. In fact, this would represent the continuation of the process begun after the Prague summit. I do not believe in the chances of success of such a policy, because it seems to me that the gap between the two sides of the Atlantic continues to widen, as shown by the results of many public opinion polls.

If, however, the Alliance still wishes to consider this option, I believe that we should act more vigorously in at least three areas:

Increase European Defense Expenditures

The first area centers on the responsibility of the Europeans themselves, who must imperatively increase their defense budgets in significant proportions. Without such an effort, there will be no hope of bridging the capabilities gap and the Alliance will eventually be seen as simply another international political forum. Certainly, the United Kingdom has maintained strong defense efforts and France, despite its current economic situation, has again begun to increase its own efforts.

Other Europeans, spurred by the United Kingdom and France in the framework of the EU, must quickly define common objectives regarding resource allocation to defense with the eventual goal of attaining necessary capabilities through the European Armaments Agency. In this regard, the coherence between the decisions relating to capabilities made by NATO at the Prague Summit and the tenets of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) must be reinforced.

Improve Interoperability

The second area in need of serious attention is that of forces interoperability, which is gradually deteriorating. Already, in any given theater of operations, the European allies are only capable of participating in the collection of intelligence and the assessment of situations in a marginal way. They can provide certain types of assets but are in fact kept out of the operational decision-making process. Therefore, it becomes ever more difficult for European political leaders to commit national forces alongside U.S. forces in crisis response operations.

The Alliance has become conscious of this and the creation of Allied Command Operations (ACO) as well as the NATO Response Force project, are steps in the right direction. However, I fear that these measures will remain without any effect for lack of a sufficient corresponding financial effort.

Foster the Development of a Truly Transatlantic Defense Industry

The third area that must be considered is that of arms industry. We have not succeeded in creating an arms market which allows Europe to maintain its industrial capabilities against a U.S. industry which enjoys the benefits of relatively large national budget resources. However, there is more behind this phenomenon than just the relatively small size of European defense budgets. There are also the enormous difficulties experienced by European companies in attempting to gain access to the U.S. market, as well as excessive restrictions concerning the transfer of technologies. It is urgent to find ways to improve this situation if we do not want to see the emergence of an inaccessible U.S. fortress which would aggravate the frustration of many in Europe.

Given this analysis, I believe that we should pursue the second option – a much more resolute and profound transformation of our Alliance – if we really want to keep it alive and relevant. Here are a few far-from-perfect ideas to fuel the debate, even if they might find strong opposition.

III. Envisioning a Deeper Transformation of the Alliance

I believe that we should go from an Alliance of 26 theoretically equal members to a strategic partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic, i.e. between three great partners, the United States, the European Union and Russia. Norway, Turkey and Canada would of course find their places in this general plan.

Implementing this partnership could be achieved in two phases:

- First, a “Strategic Partnership Council” with worldwide competence should be created by the United States, the European Union and Russia and it should replace, at a moment to be decided, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Provided with a constant, updated stream of information on worldwide developments, its role would consist of selecting for each specific crisis the adequate political-military mode of action which would then be implemented by NATO, the EU, or an *ad hoc* coalition drawn from other members of the UN. This would provide us with the flexibility required by the complexity of the world environment. In addition, the consensus reached within the Council could then putatively be transferred to the UN Security Council where it would easily prevail. From a military point of view, it would not be necessary at this stage to introduce significant changes, as the existing structures would be sufficient to implement the decisions to be made at the level of the new Council. However, we must pursue and support the work of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, as this structure is an essential asset in improving forces interoperability.
- In the second phase, we could envisage a deeper modification of the command organization. The whole European Command could be placed under the authority of the EU while suppressing strictly European military structures, which would then represent useless duplication. France would reintegrate into this new organization. This done, the Strategic Partnership Council would have a choice between three political-military chains: a U.S. one, a European one and a Russian one. Such an organization would allow each country to associate with an intervention and would provide an institutional basis to the “coalition of the willing” concept, which now seems to be the mode of action preferred by the United States.

Such an evolution would be considerable and would have very significant advantages. I believe that it is, in any event, inescapable.

First, from a political point of view, adapting the Alliance to present realities would guarantee its continuity. It would also allow an improved dialogue between the major political groupings and these would then become convinced that their interests are really being taken into account. Besides, as mentioned earlier, with this type of partnership of numerous democratic countries, reaching an agreement in the UN Security Council to legitimize any interventions could become much easier.

From a military point of view, it is to be hoped that this structure would prompt the European Allies, more clearly faced with their responsibilities, to agree to increase their budgetary commitments. It would also put an end to the costly duplications of structures.

Of course, these are the reflections of a Frenchman who cannot deny his own vantage point, but who is also deeply attached to the link between our two countries and to the broader transatlantic relationship. This relationship may often entail considerable compromises and debate, but such is the price of stability and peace in the world.

Back to Basics: Putting Transformation on a Solid Foundation

Montgomery C. Meigs⁷

I. Clear, Constructive Concepts

We do not need to reinvent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to transform it, especially if, by reinventing it, we undermine its operational viability and political integrity. If we are usefully to transform NATO, we must rather provide for parliaments and prime ministers a concrete set of strategic possibilities that meet their national and collective needs for decision-making and out-of-area capabilities. Transformation should be as much a practical process leading to the achievement of shared goals as a planning exercise aimed at preparing militaries for unclear future threats.

Describing Transformation to National Decision-Makers

In this context, theoretical geopolitical concepts like “disconnectedness” and “connectedness” or “dominating the Great Commons”, while helpful to frame broad strategic planning efforts, are not likely to be particularly salient as the Allies develop options and evaluate trade-offs for transformation, either nationally or collectively. Compounding the potential confusion are ambiguous descriptions of transformation by senior U.S. officials. They have described transformation as “a continuing effort over time” and caution “try to pin [transformation] to a certain place in a certain time [using] a static measure, [and] you will be disappointed.”

Transformation has likewise been described as “a change in culture that is reflected in what we do, how we do it, and the means we choose...it’s about balancing risk.” Such vague language is not the stuff of a strategic concept that would lead to a clear sense of the capabilities needed to persuade parliaments to make tough choices. We must always keep in mind that, ultimately, transformation is a matter of who decides and who pays. Parliaments will not invest scarce national resources and political capital in programs unless the theory makes practical sense and the promise of new capability seems sound.

⁷ General Montgomery Meigs chaired the 7 October 2003 panel, “NATO Transformation: Problems & Prospects”. This paper therefore includes content drawn on his notes from the event as well as his own reflections on this subject.

Better Cooperation with the European Allies

The United States has not yet played a useful role in encouraging a vision for NATO's transformation that is both desirable and feasible from an Alliance-wide perspective. In fact, the U.S. preference for coalitions of the willing in Afghanistan and Iraq has badly undermined confidence in NATO and has left the Alliance without a compelling vision for a future modality of action in difficult or divisive situations.

The war in Iraq typified the increasingly evident difficulties in Alliance decision-making. The problem will not get any easier as NATO expands to 26 members and the European Union develops an independent security and defense identity. Given these developments, it will be essential to get the relationship between NATO and the European Union right. One proposal, offered in Admiral Lanxade's remarks, would consolidate decision-making in the hands of the United States, the EU and Russia, as part of a "Strategic Partnership Council". While this is certainly a provocative idea, I doubt that such an arrangement would prove feasible, particularly for the middle and smaller European powers. Of course much would depend on how the EU will reach decisions on security matters. Attempting to build superstructures that try to finesse the interests of smaller members would only create more friction in the already roiled political arena of NATO.

Moreover, while perhaps emotionally satisfying at the moment, references by senior U.S. officials to "Old Europe" or "chocolate-makers" are unhelpful and detract from the necessary debate about the use of military force to achieve political outcomes. The increasingly common tendency of some U.S. experts to mix serious discussion of transformation with politicized rhetoric, casual commentary and unconstructively theoretical notions discourages European constituencies from being more supportive of U.S. leadership. A clearer and more definitive idea of transformation, divorced from charged political discourse, would help European military leaders justify to their political counterparts why moving forward with the United States is necessary and desirable.

II. Practical Capabilities for Achieving Shared Goals

Defining NATO's Role

The Alliance no longer faces the kinds of threats to national survival posed by the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War and theoretical concepts are no substitute for hard analysis of what needs to be done or, more importantly, "why?". Under these conditions, to keep NATO viable and useful, the United States must advocate a shared sense of strategic interests in the Alliance. It must view – and in public be seen to view – NATO as the primary institution for both protecting the many out-of-area interests of the transatlantic community and for orchestrating the technological innovation needed to transform Allied military establishments and command and control structures.

Transformation through Experimentation

As noted in Lieutenant General Maisonneuve's presentation, Allied Command Transformation offers a useful way of illuminating the operational future of NATO's transformation, mainly through its experimental program. This program can be instrumental in fostering political consensus in member nations' capitals; a consensus that leads to what General Andrew Goodpaster calls "tangible, visible solidarity" and is generated by the Alliance's civilian political leadership. This military-political interface is critical. Unfortunately, however, the experimental program may be insufficient as a concrete vehicle for change.

The main weaknesses in the program seem to lie in funding and emphasis. With only two percent of its funding devoted to experimentation, ACT probably cannot perform adequately the missions of providing focus for change through experimentation and, at the same time, acting as a transatlantic clearing house for technological innovation and new ideas about operational capability.

U.S. Joint Forces Command can and should work hand-in-hand with ACT to help make NATO experiments matter. In the Cold War, NATO war games involved several levels of participants up to and including defense ministers, foreign ministers and permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. This practice continues and provides both an educational function and a forum for hammering out ideas about strategy that have, in the past, found their way into doctrine, planning, organizational changes and revisions of plans. ACT today plays a similar role, one that can emphasize more heavily the straightest path to a NATO future linked to better integration of the military forces of its members and of innovations in the art of operations enabled by rapid advances in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance technologies. But to play that role well, ACT must have adequate resources from its member capitals and a very strong partnership with JFCOM – one that keeps all members abreast of the best thinking and practices and one that, despite the current high U.S. operational tempo, engages U.S. military leaders in the military possibilities of our allies.

The Marketplace of Ideas

We must ensure that ACT does not prove too much of a one-way conduit, disseminating mainly U.S. notions of transformation. European members can and must do more to interject ideas into the transformation process. As it now stands, European members tend to equate transformation with more defense spending, which is a short-sighted misconception held by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. The emphasis of Allied transformation efforts should be on improving our ability to work well together.

A healthy debate about transformation has great value and we ought to pursue that debate in a constructive and cooperative spirit. ACT and others can play key roles in facilitating a marketplace of ideas about the concepts, capabilities, organizations and people that will shape the future of an alliance on which much of the world's security and stability will almost certainly continue to depend.

Annex A: Short Author Biographies

Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Director, Office of Force Transformation, U.S. Department of Defense. Before assuming his current position, Vice Admiral Cebrowski served as the 47th President of the Naval War College. Prior to that, he was Director of Navy Space, Information Warfare, and Command and Control. He has commanded Fighter Squadron 41 and Carrier Air Wing Eight, both embarked aboard *USS Nimitz*. He later commanded the assault ship *USS Guam*. During Operation Desert Storm, he commanded the aircraft carrier *USS Midway*. Following promotion to flag rank, he became Commander, Carrier Group Six and Commander, America Battle Group. In addition to combat deployments to Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, he has deployed in support of United Nations operations in Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia. Vice Admiral Cebrowski holds a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics from Villanova University and a Master of Science Degree in computer systems management from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

General Andrew J. Goodpaster (U.S. Army, Ret.), Senior Fellow, The Eisenhower Institute. General Goodpaster was Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer to President Eisenhower from 1954 until 1961. Born in Granite City, Illinois, he graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1939. He commanded an Engineer Combat Battalion in North Africa and Italy during World War II, and later served in the Operations Division of the War Department and on the Joint War Plans Committee. During 1947-1950 he attended Princeton University, where he received M.S.E., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in International Relations. Subsequently, General Goodpaster served in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; as Commander of a U.S. Division in Germany; Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of the Joint Staff; Commandant of the National War College; Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam; Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He assisted President Nixon in organizing his administration for the conduct of foreign policy and international security affairs. After retiring in 1974, General Goodpaster became a Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, and Assistant to Vice President Rockefeller on the Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. He was recalled to active duty as the 51st Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy in 1977, serving until 1981. He is the author of *For the Common Defense*, published in 1977. He is Chairman Emeritus of the Atlantic Council of the United States and of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

Admiral Jacques Lanxade (France, Ret.), Former Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces. Admiral Lanxade joined the Naval School in Brest in 1952 and went on to attend the Naval War College. Following graduation in 1969, Admiral Lanxade commanded several ships, including *Le Champeñois*, *La Galissonière* and *Dugay-Trouin*. He was promoted to Rear Admiral in 1984, and was subsequently made Operations Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean. Admiral Lanxade served as Principal Private Military Secretary to the French Minister of Defense, prior to his appointment as Chief of the Private Staff of

the President of the Republic. Promoted to Admiral in 1990, Lanxade served as Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces from 1991 to 1995. Retiring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he served as French Ambassador to Tunisia until September 1999. Admiral Lanxade is a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor and holds the Cross for Military Valor.

Lieutenant General Michel Maisonneuve (Canada), Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation Chief of Staff (NATO). After graduation from Canada's Royal Military College, Maisonneuve was posted to the 12th Regiment of the Canadian Army in Québec, subsequently serving in Cyprus and in France. In 1989, as a Lieutenant Colonel, Maisonneuve led his troops back to Cyprus, where he served as Commander of the Canadian Contingent of the United Nations Forces. Colonel Maisonneuve next served in the Headquarters of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia. In 1998, he was promoted to Brigadier-General, assumed the post of Director-General Land Force Readiness, and was seconded to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. As such, he served as Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission Support Unit, was deployed to Kosovo as Head of the First Regional Centre in Prizren and headed the OSCE-KVM Refugee Task Force in Albania. LTG Maisonneuve was promoted to his current rank in March 2003. He subsequently assumed the position of Chief of Staff of NATO's Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia.

General Montgomery C. Meigs (U.S. Army, Ret.), former Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army. General Meigs is the Tom Slick Professor of World Peace at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas. He was formerly Commander of all U.S. Army forces in the European Command – a 91-country area of responsibility. He also served as the Commander of the Multinational Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina until 1999, commanded an armor brigade in Operation Desert Storm and commanded the 3rd Infantry Division. Subsequently, General Meigs returned to Bosnia as Commander of NATO's multinational division. General Meigs has served as Commandant of the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also served for three years on the Joint Staff. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Wisconsin.

Annex B: Acronyms

ACE – Allied Command Europe
ACO – Allied Command Operations
ACT – Allied Command Transformation
C4ISR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance
ECAP – European Capabilities Action Plan
EU – European Union
HQ – Headquarters
ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
JFCOM – (United States) Joint Forces Command
NAC – North Atlantic Council
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF – NATO Response Force
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD – Office of the (United States) Secretary of Defense
PPCLI – Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT – Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SHAPE – Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
UN – United Nations
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

Notes

Notes

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