



RESEARCH PAPER

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Research Paper

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Editorial

Ten years after the approval of a way forward for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) at the NATO Berlin ministerial meeting in 1996, an international conference was held in Rome on 4 December 2006 to assess the status of NATO-EU relations concerning security and defense issues and to advance understanding of their future, notably in light of NATO's Riga Summit.

Four concepts in the NATO-EU relationship were highlighted:

Symmetry

NATO and the EU must both manage an internal tension between:

- a strong bureaucracy based on solid multinational expertise and devoted to permanent optimization; and
- nations coping with numerous constraints (i.e., interests, finances, forces and public opinion), and taking decisions to guide and limit interactions between structures and organizations.

Asymmetry

NATO's real partner consists of the second pillar EU bodies dedicated to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). ESDP is one of the various common policies of the EU and one of the newest, smallest, and least funded. The two organizations therefore present strong differences, in seniority, size, constraints, obligations, memberships, objectives and traditions, as well as in basic points, such as threat awareness and risk perceptions. The expertise involved in the two organizations is tremendously different, and this creates daily difficulties and frustrations.

Interests

NATO and the EU both confront a rapid and in-depth revolution in security affairs. Here all nations and structures have a big challenge to consider, and this is the main reason to develop a strong NATO/ESDP channel of common interests, so the two organizations can together explore scenarios and concepts, conduct exercises, and pursue standardization, normalization and interoperability. The main area of cooperation is much more on the operational side than on the political and technological aspects, which remain in the hands of nations, their priorities and budgets.

Flexibility

NATO and the ESDP offer the nations concerned a number of operational possibilities and strategic options to build coalitions and engage their forces in support of common interests and in the name of the international community. Flexibility is a key element for future crisis management in order to address effectively the challenges of the 21st century.

The following two papers, which were presented among others at the conference, take distinctive approaches to this topic. Leo Michel's focus is on operations; the conclusion is that, considering their overlapping interests, neither organization can afford to fail, or afford to see the other fail. Otherwise "the oft-used rhetorical references to their strategic partnership will ring hollow". In contrast, Andrea Grazioso focuses attention on the ESDP and NATO capability generation process, and his conclusion is that this process is obsolete and should be fundamentally revised if Western militaries intend to retain their battlefield superiority.

Jean DUFOURCQ, Chief, Academic Research Branch

NB: The views expressed in these papers are the responsibility of the authors and should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Les opinions exprimées dans ces articles sont celles de leurs auteurs et ne peuvent être attribuées ni au Collège de Défense de l'OTAN ni à l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.

NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations

Leo MICHEL¹

During a March, 2006, workshop at National Defense University, European, Canadian, and U.S. officials and military officers held an animated discussion on the subject of Darfur. Nearly one year earlier, NATO and the EU had received appeals from then UN Secretary General Annan and Chairman of the African Union (AU) Konaré to assist the 7,000 AU monitors in Darfur. However, by late May 2005, widespread media reports spoke of a “beauty contest” between NATO and the EU that threatened to slow down the delivery of needed help. Workshop participants confirmed that key nations and officials within NATO and EU headquarters initially differed substantially on their respective roles in assisting the AU. In the end, however, the participants agreed that the public squabbling was a disservice to all parties, and they expressed relief that relevant military authorities were able to work around the institutional problems, albeit with some inefficiencies and duplication of efforts. To paraphrase one participant’s conclusion: Darfur is an example why NATO and the EU should talk more about what they could do for one another instead of what they cannot.²

His observation was prescient. To date, NATO has provided airlift for over 16,000 AU troops and police, plus logistical and training support. Furthermore, NATO agreed in December, 2006, to extend its support for another six months. The EU, for its part, has provided airlift for over 2000 personnel, plus training and financial support to the AU effort. Indeed, EU High Representative Solana praised NATO-EU cooperation on Darfur as “very efficient” in remarks to EU Defense Ministers in October, 2006. Still, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur has deteriorated further in recent months, and the future of the AU operation is unclear. If, however, the UN assumes a peacekeeping role there—possibly as a hybrid force with the AU—it is reasonable to assume that NATO and the EU will be receiving additional requests for logistical, planning, and training assistance.

The Darfur case, where there was no model for NATO-EU cooperation, demonstrates that NATO and the EU leadership must adopt pragmatic rather than theological approaches to their cooperation in operations. But it also underscores another point: pragmatism does not mean near-total reliance on *ad hoc* solutions. Cooperation on advanced planning and capabilities, combined with well-understood and flexible structures for smooth communications, are in the long-term interests of both organizations and their respective member states. The reason for this is clear: experience has shown that it is difficult to predict where, how, and in what political context NATO-EU cooperation might be necessary.

A brief look back

Consider how NATO first approached possible cooperation with a separate defense organization, the Western European Union (WEU), whose membership also overlapped with that of the Alliance. At NATO’s Berlin Ministerial in June, 1996, NATO agreed to support WEU-led crisis-management operations as part of the development of a “European Security and Defense Identity” *within* NATO. Before then, NATO and the WEU had limited experience together—for example, in the combined Adriatic task force set up in 1992 to enforce the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. At Berlin, NATO committed itself to work out arrangements covering its military planning and exercise support for eventual WEU-led missions, the release of NATO assets and capabilities for such missions, and the provision of headquarters and information-sharing to the WEU. The term of art devised for this relationship was “separable but not separate” forces, meaning European Allies would continue to develop their capabilities within, not outside, NATO structures, but could undertake operations under WEU leadership. Exactly what kind of WEU-led operations were envisaged was left a bit vague, but most Allies probably had in mind the low-intensity spectrum of Petersberg Tasks; indeed, in 1997 the WEU deployed a police element within a European-led Multinational Protection Force to help restore law and order in Albania.

By NATO’s April, 1999, Washington Summit, previous assumptions regarding cooperation had changed significantly. The EU in effect had absorbed the WEU, and France and the UK had made their famous St. Malo declaration, which set the stage for the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). As a result, the Washington Summit decided to develop the “Berlin Plus” principles to address EU access to NATO operational planning, capabilities and common assets, command options, and adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system. In December, 1999, the EU declared its ESDP “Headline Goal”—that is, the ability to deploy some 60,000 military personnel within 60 days and sustain that force for at least one year for the full range of Petersberg Tasks, ranging from humanitarian tasks up to the separation of warring parties. Theoretically, at least, the EU aimed to develop capabilities eventually to handle operations on the scale of Bosnia in 1995 or even Kosovo in 1999—either with or without recourse to NATO, depending on the specific circumstances.

It is worth recalling that most American defense and military planners—and, I believe, most of their European and

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² A summary of the workshop—“NATO and the European Union: Improving Practical Cooperation”—organized by INSS in partnership with the Ministry of Defense of Finland, is accessible at: www.ndu.edu/inss

Canadian counterparts—assumed in 1999 (and possibly as late as 2002) that NATO and EU military forces and/or other capabilities would not be involved simultaneously in the same mission. Nor were many thinking of how NATO operations might transition to EU leadership.

A quick survey of subsequent developments indicates that those assumptions were less than prophetic:

- In March 2003, a relatively small NATO crisis management operation in Macedonia, begun in August 2001, transitioned to EU leadership. In this first implementation experience for Berlin Plus, a small NATO headquarters remained in Skopje, including a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative, to assist Macedonian authorities in the development of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards.
- In December 2004, NATO terminated its 9-year old IFOR/SFOR operation, which had decreased over the years from some 50,000 to 7,000 personnel, and the EU started Operation Althea. This transition also took place with recourse to Berlin Plus arrangements; as in Macedonia, DSACEUR was named Operational Commander, acting under political guidance and direction of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). NATO maintained a modest headquarters in Sarajevo to assist Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities with defense reform, handle certain operational tasks involving counterterrorism and detention of persons indicted for war crimes, and intelligence coordination with the EU Force.
- As suggested earlier, NATO and the EU began coordinating efforts in Darfur in mid-2005 without recourse to Berlin Plus arrangements.

Looking ahead, new models of NATO-EU cooperation are likely to emerge, beginning with Kosovo. While Bosnia no doubt provides some important “lessons learned,” the Bosnian model cannot simply be replicated in Kosovo.³ It is premature to specify what UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari will propose this spring, but one option could involve the deployment of a significant ESDP civilian mission (of approximately 1,000 personnel), with an important police component, that would complement NATO's KFOR during a transitional period as Kosovo becomes a sovereign state. If this were to occur, KFOR might shift its emphasis to assisting Kosovar authorities in setting up modest defense structures, training a territorial security force, and preparing for PFP membership.

Increased NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan is likely, as well. In November, 2006, the EU Commission approved some 10.6 million Euros to support the delivery of services and improved governance under the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Moreover, the EU Council's General Secretariat reportedly is evaluating a possible ESDP civilian

mission, involving assistance to Afghanistan in the areas of rule of law and police training. As the EU's profile increases there, it would be prudent to coordinate with NATO-ISAF, for example, on security and logistical arrangements for EU personnel and programs.

Pillars for future cooperation

Looking at the range of operations where NATO and the EU are, or might be, involved, one sees four broad challenges for intensified cooperation between the two.

First, both organizations need to pay attention to the practical prerequisites for success. These include working to ensure that their military capabilities are mutually reinforcing, that their procedures are very much in tune, if not identical, and that their training is coherent. Each of the 23 EU member states that is either a NATO Ally or Partner has one set of military forces and, equally important, one defense budget, and these must serve national missions as well as those that might become obligated under NATO, EU, UN or “coalition of the willing” leadership. Given the current and projected state of most European defense budgets and the constant and growing demand for European forces to serve in crisis management or peacekeeping operations, there is no room for wasteful and unnecessary duplication. And when it comes to doctrine, training, and equipment interoperability, European military commanders understand that inconsistent practices could increase the inherent risk of military operations.

Fortunately, there is some encouraging news here. For example, several nations, including those Partners involved in the Nordic Battle Group, have expressed their commitment to follow NATO standards in certifying their forces for the EU's rapid reaction capability. But effective NATO-EU cooperation on capabilities development, according to several informed accounts, is still lagging. “Informal” contacts below the NATO-EU Capability Group do not suffice, but some nations have blocked the formation of NATO-EU subgroups of technical experts who could actually coordinate on, or propose joint solutions to, specific capabilities development tasks. For example, NATO's Defense Against Terrorism initiatives, such as countering improvised explosive devices and protecting helicopters against rocket-propelled grenades, could usefully be shared with EU. Similarly, a regular NATO-EU exchange of operational “lessons learned” would be beneficial to a number of member states of both organizations.

Second, both organizations need to cooperate better in planning and integrating the application of civilian and military capabilities to deal with the complex crisis management and stabilization operations that we face today and certainly will continue to face in the future. Recent declarations by some European leaders to the effect that NATO is and must remain an exclusively “military organization” are off the mark. Indeed, they do not conform to the more complex reality of how NATO

³ Ibid.

operations have been conducted in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In truth, there is little appetite among NATO members, including the United States, to transform NATO into a civilian relief or reconstruction agency. Yet it seems self-evident that if those who provide security and those who provide development and governance assistance are not working together, neither will succeed. In a positive move, the November, 2006, Riga Summit Declaration recognizes this problem, albeit in very diplomatic phraseology. It remains to be seen if the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which has now been charged by heads of state and government to come up with pragmatic proposals by next spring on improving the civil-military interface, will really get the support it needs from all the key nations.

In this context, two additional observations seem relevant. In candid moments, some knowledgeable Europeans allow that cooperation within EU structures—in particular, between the Council Secretariat and the Commission—has been at least as problematic as NATO-EU links. If the EU is able to work out better relations between the Council and Commission to deal with the future ESDP civilian mission in Kosovo, this presumably would translate into a more effective EU effort and better NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan. But Kosovo also could create another precedent, as one sees signs of U.S. interest in participating in the prospective ESDP civilian mission. Washington understandably would be very attentive to the security needs of American personnel attached to an ESDP mission and, therefore, seek clearly defined authorities and procedures for the NATO commander to act, if necessary, to safeguard those personnel. Reliance on *ad hoc* arrangements between NATO and the EU in this sensitive area clearly would not suffice.

A third challenge is to develop meaningful NATO-EU political consultations to deal with the broad and pressing agenda that faces both organizations. Due to well-known political blockages restricting the NAC-PSC formal agenda, informal sessions likely will be the best vehicle for such consultations for some time to come. Still, the current practice of holding “at 32” discussions should not be limited to occasional lunches and dinners among foreign ministers. Consultations among NATO and EU member states and the top leadership of each organization should take place more frequently and involve many other levels, too. By now, the meaning and importance of military interoperability—including doctrine, planning, technology, equipment, and training—are well understood. Such interoperability does not imply abandonment of sovereignty; it will always be up to political authorities to decide if military forces will be committed in a specific instance. But interoperability is an essential pre-condition to cooperate effectively if a political decision is made to do so. A mature NATO-EU relationship will need to accept, at least implicitly, the notion of political interoperability.

Consider this modest proposal: As a potential crisis develops, senior representatives of member states of NATO and EU,

plus the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative and senior military representatives of both organizations, should gather—if need be, on “informal” basis—for a *tour de table* to air and discuss initial assessments and hear from each other what capabilities might be available to formulate a comprehensive crisis management response. The member state representatives would then take information back to capitals to deliberate on an appropriate response. The initial NATO-EU meeting would not be “joint decision making”—everyone understands this is a bridge too far—but it would serve the purpose of getting key parties to put their cards on the table, allowing all member states and NATO and EU officials to make better informed decisions. Some NATO-EU tensions likely are inevitable, as the organizations are different and national political calculations will come into play in any specific case. But with better tools in place to cooperate, the chances of an effective response will increase if and when the political will exists to do so.

A final challenge is to accept that operational surprises can occur, and that military and political transparency regarding ongoing and potential future operations is a requirement, not a luxury. Even when the EU undertakes an “autonomous” mission—that is, without recourse to Berlin Plus—greater transparency with regard to the planning and conduct of such missions would be prudent. After all, a notional 1500-person EU Battlegroup might include approximately 450 “trigger pullers” in its combat element, of whom some 150 might be tactically deployed—i.e., “on the street”—at any time. If European forces engaged in an ESDP operation were to encounter unforeseen circumstances, especially if those forces were put at serious risk, it is reasonable to assume that their longstanding Allies would be inclined to help.

Similarly, the problems with “caveats” experienced in NATO operations could serve as a harbinger of similar issues in EU operations; indeed, according to some reports, the recent ESDP operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo was obliged to cope with restrictions that, in NATO parlance, amount to “caveats.”⁴ NATO military leaders—such as Chairman of the Military Committee, General (CAN) Henault, the former SACEUR, General (USMC) Jones, his successor, General (USA) Craddock, and NATO-ISAF Commander, General (UK) Richards—have made clear their concerns with the effects of caveats. But so, too, has the new Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General (FR) Bentegeat, who told the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Paris in May, 2006: “The many caveats imposed by nations hobble commanders on the ground and increase the risk to their forces.”

In sum, NATO and the EU likely will be joined at the hip in a range of future operations, and the practical result of their overlapping interests is that neither organization can afford to fail, or afford to see the other fail, in operations. If this is not sufficient incentive to get serious about effective cooperation between the two, the oft-used rhetorical references to their “strategic partnership” will ring hollow.

⁴ For a discussion of “caveats”, see the commentary “NATO’s War?” by Leo Michel, published by *Le Soir* (Brussels) and *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw) shortly before the Riga Summit. Accessible at: www.ndu.edu/inss

ESDP and NATO Capability Generation: The Latest Case of Mirror Imaging?

Andrea GRAZIOSO¹

“Traditionally, war and politics were practised sequentially – and war involved largely unconstrained violence directed towards destroying opposing conventional forces. Today and tomorrow, force will be intimately interwoven with political (and media) developments – and will typically be applied in opaque circumstances against an obscure enemy under tight rules of engagement and 24/7 media scrutiny.”

*An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs,
3 October 2006, European Defence Agency – www.eda.europa.eu*

This essay aims to evaluate the patterns of capability generation in European Union countries, in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy, and in NATO countries. It also assesses the progress made in acquiring new capabilities in the light of the emerging requirements of the War on Terror in the post-9/11 strategic framework.

The Balkan Wars of the Nineties: the “hour of Europe”

European countries were beginning to enjoy the long-awaited peace dividends expected after the end of the Cold War when a wave of political and inter-ethnic violence disrupted Yugoslavia’s fragile political alchemy and undermined hopes of a prosperous and peaceful era in a reunified Europe. European leaders, shaped by decades of confrontation with external and internal enemies, enthusiastically announced that the “hour of Europe” had come: the historical moment when Europeans would finally be able to address and solve the security issues arising on their own continent.

But this wave of optimism ended abruptly when the technical shortcomings of European militaries, coupled with the erratic attitude of foreign ministries, prevented any effective solution from being found for the war-torn region. The United States finally stepped in, and, in the more robust framework of NATO, Europeans, Canadians and Americans successfully imposed ceasefires and separated the opposing factions in Bosnia (1995) and in the Kosovo conflict (1999). At that time NATO was hailed as an effective political-military tool for managing the rising threats of regional conflicts, because of its unmatched organization and integration of political and military structures.

However, the actual employment of many different militaries in the short but highly integrated air campaign over Kosovo and the rest of Serbia clearly showed the imbalance between the military capabilities of the United States and those of its European allies. The United States accounted for over 80% of the total operational outcome. Moreover, several European air forces were relegated to secondary roles, because of their lack of interoperability with US forces.

There was growing concern about lack of interoperability in the land warfare context as well, even though it had never been tested in previous campaigns. While the US Army was committed to a revolutionary approach to air-ground operations, with the emphasis on digitisation of the battlefield, most Europeans were still struggling to adopt professional-manned armies and abandon Napoleonic-style mass conscript armies.

Shortly afterwards, a comprehensive programme was launched both in NATO and in the context of the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy, in order to reduce the risk of having the two sides of the Atlantic unable to operate jointly. This process was developed through successive steps: the Defence Capabilities Initiative (1999) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002) for NATO; and in the case of ESDP, the June 1999 Cologne Declaration – which generated the December 1999 Helsinki Headline Goals – followed by the European Security Strategy in 2003 and the revised and updated Headline Goals 2010. The two processes moved forward in parallel, competing to some extent for the scarce resources available.

Both NATO and the EU stressed the importance of rapid reaction in the event of a crisis, namely the ability to project forces and to support them far from homelands. The NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups, although not identical, draw on the same limited pool of combat-ready forces available in Europe. Moreover, the emphasis was placed on the ability to operate jointly with all the other allies, including the most technologically advanced, and to sustain the prolonged commitments required by post-conflict stabilisation operations, thanks to a large pool of forces available for out-of-area deployments.

Today, eight years after the Kosovo war, we can try to make a non-ideological assessment of the practical outcomes of this multi-pronged effort of modernisation of Western militaries. The events of 9/11 were totally unpredicted and, what is much worse, their consequences were not taken into account in the planning of coherent military responses.

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The ensuing Operation Enduring Freedom started without any contingency plan. An unprecedented unconventional and unorthodox campaign was hurriedly arranged, which proved to be effective in disrupting and then bringing down the Taliban regime. But a comprehensive effort for state-building was soon to be launched, in conjunction with prolonged anti-guerrilla warfare.

In the case of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it would be hard to invoke a lack of contingency plans for waging war in Iraq. The operation actually started as a classic combined-arms offensive with an emphasis on manoeuvre warfare, to the extent of having some Army units earmarked for the operation still in the United States when the land offensive was about to start. But again the rather quick conventional manoeuvre had to be followed by a prolonged and harsh anti-guerrilla campaign, in which “boots-on-the-ground” were more essential than any technological advanced resource. Many elements of the modernisation effort that started in the Nineties proved useful and effective, although many military capabilities used in the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts were also in existence during the Cold War.

But it should also be acknowledged that, five years after 9/11, Western military forces are in an uncomfortable situation. We must recognise the substantial failure of US military operations in Iraq; the increasing difficulties faced by NATO forces in Afghanistan; and the substantial neglect of other emerging threats, including those in the horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea. In other words, the process of capability build-up, both in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and within the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy, seems to be delivering less than optimal results.

Many analysts and the large majority of defense experts blame political leaders for the poor level of funding for our militaries. However, the lack of financial resources cannot explain the apparent inability to field the appropriate level of capabilities. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is chronically short of helicopters, while each year NATO member countries spend millions of dollars for the acquisition of new helicopters. In the case of Iraq, the huge defence budget of the United States is almost completely devoted to the procurement and maintenance of a high-technology war machine, and yet increasing attention is devoted to its difficulties in managing the current crisis.

There seems to be a growing inconsistency between the capability-generation process, mostly managed at the technical level, and the evolution of political requirements, as far as defence and security issues are concerned. Both the EU and NATO seem perfectly aware of the unpredictability of future threats. Officially, we recognise our limitations in penetrating the fog of the future. But in

reality, the planning process and capability development seem to follow independent paths.

Looking at the current major procurement programmes, we can easily identify the risk of future militaries being unfit for actual requirements. The Franco-Italian new-generation frigate construction programme, for example, started in 2006 and will run until 2020, according to the present schedule. If we include the service life of the ships, this will take us to 2050. In other words, we can now predict the characteristics these navies will have over the next 40 years. But what kind of maritime threat will we encounter during the next four decades?

The same principle is true of air and land procurement programmes, and this is not a completely new trend. The Royal Air Force introduced the Tornado in 1981, and plans to retain the aircraft in service until 2025, for a total of 44 years. What if that major air force had had the same aircraft as a primary asset for the whole period between the Berlin crisis of 1948 and the Gulf War of 1991? Obviously, the strategic framework could change several times during four decades; thus political requirements for the use of military instruments would change accordingly. But the militaries would probably offer the same set of capabilities conceived several decades before.

There are rational reasons for this approach to military procurement. Technological and financial constraints force the procurement processes to be extended over long periods. But while this solution was effective in a Cold War scenario, today we have no technologically advanced competitor.

Today priority is given to the management of security threats with potential implications for national defence. We should be able to react to unpredicted threats by generating the capabilities required for such emergencies. The main problem, therefore, seems to be the rapid generation of new kinds of forces, while the largest portion of defence resources is devoted to programmes running for decades.

Many Western countries are confronted by the problem of ageing military personnel, due to the adoption of “all-volunteer” recruitment in a framework in which national legislation and welfare regulations prevent the turnover of military personnel who are over the age of thirty. The problem of ageing personnel and the lengthy procedures for procurement cycles prevent the adoption of military doctrines adapted to current and foreseeable requirements.

Western militaries should begin a thorough revision of their capability generation processes in order to retain their battlefield superiority. Otherwise, they risk losing the leading role in defending national and collective interests to warriors more responsive to the changing context.

November 2006 - January 2007 NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Departures

Capt. Serguei SMIRNOV (Russia)
Col. Iliya MOLOKOV (Russia)
Dr. Mizrohid RAHIMOV (Uzbekistan)
Ms Pamela PAGLIA (Italy)

Internships

Ms Nicasia PICCIANO, Italy
(November 2006-February 2007))
Mr Massimo GAUDIANO, Italy
(January-April 2007)

INTERNAL ACTIVITIES

1st - 6 November 2006

Research Talks with Israel, led by Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP, Carlo MASALA and Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH.

6 November 2006

"NATO: Its History, Structure, and Relationship to the United Nations", Lecture by David YOST, Modular Short Course 109-4, NDC, Rome.

22 November 2006

Internal Debate on *"Cooperation between NATO and NGOs: Meeting with the Comunità di Sant'Egidio"*, by Claudio BETTI, NDC, Rome.

27 November 2006

Seminar on: *"Mediterranean Dialogue: Cultural Challenges in Military Operations"*, NDC, Rome.

4-5 December 2006

Seminar on: *"Ten Years after Berlin: NATO-EU Relation"*, in cooperation with Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD), NDC, Rome.

7 November 2006

"NATO's Partnerships: Principals and Instruments", Lecture by Carlo MASALA, GFOAC, NDC, Rome.

18 December 2006

Seminar on: *"NATO's Riga Summit. A First Assessment and Outlook"*, Seminar, NDC, Rome.

12 January 2007

Lecture on *"Regional Security in the Persian Gulf"*, by Carlo MASALA, Modular Short Course, NDC, Rome.

FELLOW PRESENTATIONS

19 December 2006

Capt. Serguey SMIRNOV (Russia):
"Enhancing Interaction and Interoperability between NATO and Russia in the Pacific Region"

Col. Iliya MOLOKOV

 (Russia):

"Methodology of Management for Military Training, Using Information Computer Systems"

Dr. Mizrohid RAHIMOV (Uzbekistan): *"Regionalism and Power: Towards Regional Integration in Central Asia"*

24 January 2007

Dr. Rachid EL-HOUDAIGUI (Morocco):
"Le cadre juridique et politique de l'Opération Active Endeavour"

EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

Laure BORGOMANO-LOUP

Lecture on *"La Méditerranée stratégique"*, The Mediterranean Forum, Lugano, 23-24 November 2006, Lugano, Switzerland.

Course on: *Modern conflicts. Transformation of the strategic actors*; University of Paris South, Master of Diplomacy, 11 December 2006, France.

"Théorie des Alliances, transformation de l'Alliance Atlantique", lecture, Master of Diplomacy, Faculté Jean Monnet, Université de Paris Sud, 8 January 2007, France.

Lecture on *"Mediterranean Identity, Imaginary Representations, Security Perceptions"*, UCLA meeting on *"Middle East regional Security Dilemmas"*, 25-28 January 2007, Athens, Greece.

Attending Wilton Park Conference on *"Responding to Disasters. The Use of Military Assets in Disaster Relief"*, 29 January/1st February, Wilton Park, UK.

Jean DUFOURCQ

Lecture on *"Euro-Atlantic issues"*, Chinese University of Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2006, Beijing, China.

Lecture on *"Le système du monde"*, colloque CADMOS-CFAU on *Un monde en mutation: comprendre une France en mutation*, 3 November 2006, Beijing China.

«L'organisation du monde» 2 lectures, Master of Diplomacy, Faculté Jean Monnet, Université de Paris Sud, 27 November 2006, France

«Le monde qui vient», 2 lectures, Master of Diplomacy, Faculté Jean Monnet, Université de Paris Sud, 15 January 2007, France

Carlo MASALA

“Is there a window of opportunity for Peace in the Middle East?” Lecture at Birzeit University, 2 November 2006, Palestinian Territories.

“Does the Revolution in Military Affairs lead to Military Revolutions?”, Lecture at the Military Academy of the Federal University Zurich, 9 November 2006, Switzerland.

“NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: An example of successful North-South Cooperation”, Lecture at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 16 November 2006, Berlin, Germany.

Participant at the 1st Leadership Training Seminar organized by allied Command Transformation and the U.K Defence Academy, 19-24 November 2006, Shrivenham, U.K.

Meetings at NDU, Atlantic Council, Brookings, 7-11 January 2007, Washington, USA.

Lecture on “NATO’s Riga Summit”, Wilton Park, 16-19 January 2007, UK.

Lecture on “New Threats and NATO’s Responses”, Roundtable on NATO 2007, 22-17 January 2007, New Delhi, India.

Andrew MONAGHAN

Lectures on “European Energy Security” and “EU energy security and Russia”, in Clingendael Centre, 6-7 November 2006, The Hague, Holland.

Lecture on “How Russia Really Works”, Seminar at Chatham House, 15 January 2007, London, UK.

Attendance at “Future of Russia: Putin and Beyond”, CSRC/ARAG, 17 January 2007, London, UK.

David YOST

Presentation on “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy in a Transatlantic Perspective”, Workshop on Adjusting Nuclear Policies: A Transatlantic Seminar, Centre d’Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI), 24 November 2006, Paris, France.

Presentation on “Determinants of Strategic Stability”, at the workshop *Proliferation and Deterrence*, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), 19 December 2006, Paris, France.

Presentation on “NATO’s Strategic Future”, at the conference *NATO Partners and Future Members: Aiming for Global Reach?*, Wilton Park, 16 January 2007, Steyning, UK.

EXTERNAL PUBLICATIONS

Jean DUFOURCQ & Peter FABER «Dialogue transatlantique», in *Défense Nationale*, Paris, November 2006.

Jean DUFOURCQ

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