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RUSSIA AFTER THE DUMA ELECTIONS

■ OPINION		
	Sufficient Legitimation for a “Shadow President”?	2
	By Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen/Berlin	
■ ANALYSIS		
	The Consequences of the State Duma Elections for Russia’s Electoral System	5
	By Nikolai Petrov, Moscow	
■ TABLES AND GRAPHS		
	The Results of the Duma Elections	9
■ OPINION POLL		
	To What Extent Will the Duma Elections be Honest?	19
■ OPINION POLL		
	The Run-Up to the Presidential Elections of 2 March 2008	20
	Putin’s Future after the Elections of 2008	23

Opinion

Sufficient Legitimation for a “Shadow President”?

By Hans-Henning Schröder, Bremen/Berlin

Abstract

The results of the Duma election came as no surprise. After a very one-sided campaign, the United Russia party supported by Putin won 64 percent of the vote. In the Fifth Duma, as before, it will command a two-thirds majority. This result has allowed the presidential administration to consolidate a party system that is dominated by “administrative parties.” However, since these parties are not viable in the long run without support “from above,” the outcome does not mean that the system has now been stabilized. Neither has the Duma election resolved the problem of succession. As the main candidate of “United Russia,” Putin had attempted to achieve long-term legitimacy as a political authority through a quasi-referendum. In a number of regions, however, the election results were unsatisfactory from Putin’s point of view. Even the nomination of Dmitry Medvedev as the Kremlin’s candidate in the presidential election does not make clear what role Putin will play in the new system.

No Surprise...

Nobody was particularly surprised by the results of the Duma elections on 2 December 2007. As expected, the United Russia party, with President Vladimir Putin as its front-runner and a massive media presence, won a two-thirds parliamentary majority. With 64 percent of votes cast, United Russia left its competitors far behind. The Communist Party (CPRF) received less than 12 percent, which was its worst result since the end of the Soviet Union, while Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) at 8 percent remained well below its result in the 2003 polls. Fair Russia, the left-of-center counterpart of United Russia, struggled to overcome the 7 percent barrier and just managed to do so.

These are the four parties that will enter the Duma, where the Communists, as the only real opposition to the regime, hold 57 seats, and will face the presidential party with 315 seats. Fair Russia, with 38, and the LDPR, with 40, will reinforce the phalanx of deputies who support the system – they are not expected to present a challenge to the president or the government.

Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, the parties whose stance adhered most closely to the principles of a parliamentary democracy, did not manage to win parliamentary representation. At 0.96 per cent and 1.07 per cent respectively, their results this time were even worse than their performance in the disastrous 2003 Duma elections. Political liberalism in Russia has thus reached a historic nadir. Such an outcome is certainly also a result of the official propaganda during the election campaign – Putin’s xenophobic attacks on “jackals” scavenging for carrion outside foreign embassies was all too clearly directed against them. But the fail-

ure of Russian liberalism is also a result of the inability to join forces in the face of the dominance of the presidential administration and to offer an alternative for urban, educated voters by opposing the social-patriotic and xenophobic discourse with topics such as modernization and political self-determination.

A Little Bit of Vote-Rigging?

Russian election observer organizations, such as the Golos non-governmental organization, which receives US and European funding, as well as foreign monitors, such as the representatives of the European Council and the OSCE parliamentary assembly, criticized Russia’s conduct of the electoral process. Lilia Shibanova of Golos condemned the obstruction of election monitors, illegally displayed election advertising inside polling stations, and the violation of election secrecy. Luc van den Brande, the head of the European Council’s election monitoring group, called the vote a “managed election.”

Certainly, the outcome is due mainly to the extensive media campaign that created a clear advantage for United Russia. The regional election results also reflect the massive deployment of “administrative resources” aimed at persuading voters to cast their ballot for the president’s party. In the republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Mordovia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Dagestan, Bashkortostan, and Tatarstan, the local administrations were apparently happy to oblige: In these regions, not only was turnout 80–90 percent, far above the average of 64 percent, but support for United Russia also reached record levels of 81–99 percent. It is hard to believe that these results were achieved fairly. The only question is really

whether those responsible went to the trouble of physically stuffing the ballot boxes, or simply and ruthlessly forging the results.

On the other hand, the results in Moscow, St Petersburg, Volgograd, Nizhny Novgorod and many other Russian cities were so noticeably far below the national average that they can hardly have been in line with the expectations of the Putin administration. It is therefore probable that in these places, the election was conducted in a technically proper style. In fact, Luc van den Brande described the polls as “technically good.” This judgment would also be in line with the experience in earlier Duma and presidential elections, which were held properly in the majority of Russian regions. Nevertheless, the poll results in the approximately 20 territorial constituencies with turnouts of 80 percent or more cast a dubious light on the overall process – and on Russian election officials, who are making no attempts to follow up on such suspicions.

Trends in the Development of the Party System

Looking beyond the current events and taking into account the results of Duma elections since 1993, it becomes clear that the presidential administration has made progress in its control of elections. While Boris Yeltsin’s advisors were taken completely by surprise in the December 1993 elections by the poor performance of the much-touted liberal parties and the fact that Zhirinovskiy’s LDPR managed to become the strongest party, and while Viktor Chernomyrdin’s Our Home is Russia in 1995 was unable to win more than 10 percent, the situation in the December 1999 polls was already a very different one. This election, which anticipated the presidential polls and Yeltsin’s succession in 2000, was of crucial political importance. The groundwork was therefore prepared by the creation of the Unity party, which was close to Yeltsin and whose foundation was notably supported by the financial tycoon Boris Beresovsky. On the other hand, the “Fatherland-All Russia” party was formed as a political power base by two Yeltsin rivals, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and then-prime minister Yevgeny Primakov. While the CPRF won 24 per cent in 1999, becoming the strongest party, the two newly founded “administrative parties” (or “parties of power”) managed to win a respectable 23 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively.

Following the handover from Yeltsin to Putin, the presidential administration – where Deputy Chief Vladislav Surkov has emerged since 1999 as a key figure in Russian domestic politics – managed to unite the two competing movements under the single heading of “United Russia.” In the subsequent 2003 elections, the new party won more than 37 percent of the vote and

achieved a two-thirds majority in the Duma due to the fragmented opposition and the integration of individual independent deputies. In 2007, it was able to consolidate this success through a party reform and changes to the electoral law. The “party of power” monopolized administrative and media resources and was able in this way to marginalize all other political forces.

However, the question remains whether United Russia will remain viable without administrative support or will fall apart as soon as the presidential administration and the regional governments withdraw their support. It is therefore questionable whether the party itself is a politically relevant factor or whether it is merely a puppet of the administration. Fears of a one-party system being reintroduced to Russia are so far unfounded. For the time being, Russia has no functioning parties apart from the CPRF.

Was the Real Purpose of the Duma Polls Missed?

The election of parliament was, however, only a secondary goal in the 2 December polls. Primarily, this election aimed at securing legitimacy for departing president Putin’s future career as a political leader. For Western observers, the process itself seems puzzling: Why would a president who has enjoyed two successful periods in office require further legitimation through an electoral process?

The reason is the unresolved issue of his succession. The Kremlin announced on December 10 that First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev would be its candidate for the presidency. The election of a new president is scheduled for March 2, 2008 and there is no doubt that Medvedev will win. Putin does, however, intend to continue to play a role beyond the end of his incumbency, but it remains unclear what this role will be.

A president accompanied and constrained by a political authority figure, such as a national leader, is not envisaged by the constitution of 1993, however. After the conflict between the president and the Supreme Soviet, which ended in October 1993 with the siege of the Russian parliament, the authors of the constitution had taken care to exclude any possibility of the emergence of a new power center in addition to the president. The president therefore has all instruments of power directly at his disposal. The minister of defense, the minister of the interior, and the heads of the intelligence services are directly subordinated to him. The government is responsible to him, not to the parliament; he appoints and dismisses ministers, and the consent of parliament is only required when it comes to the appointment of the prime minister. There is no institution that controls the president, and apart from the – extremely complex

– impeachment process, there is no instrument for limiting the power of the president.

It is puzzling where in this construct Putin thinks there is room for the role of a “national leader” or a strong former president. Nevertheless, that seems to be the role he is striving for, and his candidacy as the front-runner of United Russia has to be regarded as an attempt to reaffirm his political authority by way of referendum.

From this perspective, however, the Putin group cannot be too pleased with the outcome of the election. While voter turnout was fairly high for a Duma election (the only poll at which more voters cast their ballots was the 1995 election) and the result was only slightly lower than at the presidential election of 2004, the vote in favor of Putin himself at the latter election was almost 8 per cent higher than the number of votes cast for United Russia in 2007. If the “Soviet-style” results in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, and other Northern Caucasus republics are left out of the equation, the result is certainly not encouraging across the board.

In Moscow and St Petersburg, only 50 percent of eligible voters participated, much less than in 2004. Votes for United Russia made up between 49 and 55 percent of ballots cast. In 2004, 68 percent of Muscovites and 75 percent of St Petersburg residents had voted for Putin. The situation was similar in Samara, Nizhniy Novgorod, and some other regions. Apparently, in these areas, the “party of power” did not manage to mobilize the population. Therefore, the results of the December 2 election, despite returning a clear victory for Putin, can at best be considered a limited success. The question remains whether the election outcome is good enough to impart political legitimacy to Putin beyond the end of his presidential career.

The Future of Putin and the Future of the Regime

Although Medvedev’s candidacy has the backing of four parties, United Russia, Fair Russia, the Agrarian Party and Civil Power, it leaves open the question of how power will be organized. The day after President Putin announced his support for Medvedev, Medvedev returned the favor and declared that he would make Putin prime minister, should the Russians elect him. De-

spite this move, however, one cannot exclude other possible scenarios. One of these would be for Putin to assume the rather vague role of a “national leader”. In any case, however, the assumption is that Putin will be able to retain his current authority beyond the end date of his tenure as president. His political clout is currently derived from three sources:

The office of the presidency, which endows him with near-unchecked authority over the armed forces, intelligence services, state apparatus, and state-controlled companies, as well as the media controlled by them. The constitution is the source of this power.

The broad support he enjoys among the population, which trusts only Putin, but not the other politicians and certainly not the institutions of the Russian state. This power is derived from the plebiscitary acclamation of the population.

His close link with elite groups that view the president as a guarantor of the status quo, and accept him as the arbitrator and holder of political power.

However, once Putin gives up the presidency, it is far from certain that he will be able to retain his popular support, or that the elite groups will continue to align themselves with him. The leeway that the former president will retain depends largely on his successor, who should in principle be interested in securing the above-mentioned power resources for himself and his entourage. In this respect, by not clearly stating what his role will be after the election of the next president, Putin is playing a dangerous game, and the observer may occasionally gain the impression that the incumbent president is already a lame duck. Conflicts between the domestic intelligence agency FSB and the counter-narcotics law enforcement agency, the arrest of Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak despite the vocal protest of the latter’s superior, Aleksei Kudrin, and the intrigue of financial wheeler-dealer Oleg Shvartsman, who disclosed the financial and political plans of leading *silovik* and Putin-follower Igor Sechin in a newspaper interview indicate that the elite factions surrounding the president are no longer counting on Putin’s continued presence. It will be interesting to see in which way the candidacy of Medvedev and his proposal to make Putin prime minister will affect these conflicts

Translated from German by Christopher Findlay

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Analysis

The Consequences of the State Duma Elections for Russia's Electoral System

By Nikolai Petrov, Moscow

Abstract

Russia's new electoral system gives the Kremlin much greater control over the electoral process than it had in the past. In reforming the system after the 2003 elections, the authorities often did the opposite of what was recommended by OSCE representatives. The provisions of the new legislation significantly reduced the number of parties and their ties with specific Russian regions. The official results from the December 2 elections are likely greatly inflated, with turnout figures probably 10 percent less than claimed. Overall, United Russia's victory extended through out the country, with few inter- or intra-regional differences.

The New Electoral System

Analyzing the results of the December 2 State Duma elections shows that the entire electoral system has evolved along with the political system in general. Russian lawmakers have introduced numerous changes into the Russia electoral law since the December 2003 State Duma elections. The transition from a mixed system, in which half of the 450 seats are elected on the basis of single-member districts and half on party lists, to one in which all the seats are elected on the basis of party lists resulted in serious technical and political consequences. Overall, the elections have been drained of content – they are no longer contests between people and ideas, but party images and brands. Without the campaigns in the single-member districts, the elections lost their connection to concrete local issues and many teams of campaign advisers lost the opportunity to sell their services in a once thriving market. The candidates increased their loyalty to the federal party leadership in favor of their former dual ties to the regional governors and party functionaries.

Each party list was divided into federal and regional components. The regional lists included many outsiders, combining members of the regional political elite with titans of the Moscow party leadership. The fact that the lists were divided into regional blocs distinguished them in a favorable way from their Ukrainian and Kazakh counterparts. However, many of the regional lists were led by so-called “locomotives,” famous politicians who never planned to enter the Duma, but whose sole task was to win as many votes as possible for other members of the United Russia party, who frequently were unknown to the rank-and-file voters. The use of such locomotives was most characteristic for United Russia – one third of its candidates, including 64 governors, declined to accept a mandate to serve in the Duma. However, according to an amendment adopted this spring, politicians who refuse to accept a seat

in the Duma after the election can claim a spot later if the party is willing to make space for them.

With the new provisions of the electoral law, Moscow greatly increased its political, financial and organizational control of the elections. Under the new electoral system, the price of entry into the political process is much higher and the number of players has dropped considerably. Parties can no longer form blocs with other parties and cannot include non-party members on their lists. Most citizens' passive electoral rights were significantly limited. Party forces were atomized, while the Kremlin's administrative resources were unusually consolidated. These resources included not only various levels of the executive branch, from the president to the municipalities, but also the electoral commissions, courts, and investigative agencies. Collecting such power in one fist made it possible to help some parties and hinder others. Thanks to the electoral legislation and recent amendments to the laws on political parties and extremism, the authorities had the legal basis to remove any political group they desired from the elections.

The Kremlin did not use the repressive potential of the new legislation to its fullest extent. In this sense, the electoral system that currently exists in Russia is actually much worse than what one observes in actual elections. While it is still too soon to draw firm conclusions, the new electoral system and the transition to a purely proportional system has ripped the elections from their connection to local issues and the representation of regional interests in the federal parliament has significantly declined. The ordinary voter will have little understanding of the current electoral system.

The Failure to Implement OSCE Recommendations

Following the 2003 State Duma elections, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe recommended strengthening the party system and giving

regional and minority interests the right to set up their own parties. The Kremlin has done the exact opposite. With the new amendments to the law on political parties and the increased demands (including the requirement that they have 50,000 members), it has become extremely difficult to set up new parties and even maintain old ones without the support of state institutions. The result was the significant drop in the number of parties to a half of their previous number. But, in fact, the situation is even worse than it seems. Of the 11 parties that competed in the elections, barely half really have 50,000 members. And of the remaining parties, only the Communists would be able to prove their membership under intense administrative pressure.

The new electoral law has produced a Duma in which United Russia preserved its constitutional (two-thirds) majority and benefits from the presence of two partner parties in Just Russia and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and an extremely loyal left opposition in the form of the Communists. The liberal parties which lost the election now will also have to forfeit the 60 million ruble deposit they paid to get on the ballot and must pay for the air time provided them by the state. As a result, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) are effectively bankrupt. The authorities intended this outcome. Yabloko had to get on the ballot by paying a deposit since its experience in Petersburg showed that any party's attempt to collect signatures to get on the ballot could be overruled if the court found that more than 5 percent of the signatures were not authentic. In this election, SPS, Yabloko, Just Russia, and Patriots of Russia earned their spots on the ballot by paying a deposit.

Before the election, the OSCE had recommended reducing the financial burden for parties. In particular, the international human rights organization recommended removing the provision that parties that did not win 2 percent of the vote would then have to pay the state for the free advertising that they had received during the campaign. Instead the minimum level required to avoid such payment was raised to 3 percent.

Among the other recommendations of the OSCE that were not implemented was the suggestion to allow the representation of all parties in the electoral commissions of various levels and reducing the number of bureaucrats in these commissions. Instead, according to the new law, representation of such bureaucrats rose from one-third to one-half. The elections were organized, as in the past, by the executive branch, and the members of the electoral commissions tended to be public sector employees, such as teachers and doctors, who worked under the potential threat of losing the government subsidies required to pay their salaries and support their workplaces.

The authorities also did not implement the OSCE recommendation to allow observers from social organizations to monitor the elections. Only political parties could play this role. All the parties that were prevented from running in the elections, from the moderate Republican Party to the more radical National-Bolshevik Party (both were not even registered as political parties), could not take part in the observation process. Only the Communists had the resources to monitor the elections and they were lucky to have people at half of the 96,000 polling places.

Ultimately, the only OSCE recommendation that Russia fully implemented was removing the line "against all" from the ballot. In the past, voters who were not happy with the authorities' candidates would choose this one. Accordingly, the Russian electoral system is now much less in line with OSCE standards than in the past. This is true of the system's design, to say nothing of the way it operates in practice.

Political Parties

Of the 11 parties that participated in the 2007 elections, several have been around since the first Duma election in 1993: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Agrarian Party of Russia, Yabloko, LDPR, and the Russia's Choice successor, SPS. The Kremlin took the famous brand of the Democratic Party of Russia from former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who was trying to use it. This was the second round of elections for United Russia, which was established after the 1999–2000 election cycle. Just Russia appeared as the result of a merger of three parties: the electorally successful Rodina and Party of Pensioners and the little-known Party of Life founded by Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov. The Patriots of Russia was a reincarnation of former Communist sponsor Gennady Semigin and former Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev, who were trying to steal votes from the Communists. The Civic Force, formed six months ago by the presidential envoy to highest courts Mikhail Barshchevsky with Kremlin support, sought to win votes away from the democrats. An additional party seeking to take votes on the left was Aleksei Podberezkin's Party of Social Justice.

One of the main results of the elections was a significant reconfiguration of the political party spectrum in Russia, representing a new approach of the Kremlin. Earlier the Kremlin worked with the completely loyal leaders of the democratic parties SPS and Yabloko, who still managed to preserve some independence. After these parties did not win representation in the 2003 Duma, the Kremlin decided that it would be easier to get by without them. To gain support on this side of the spectrum, the Kremlin was satisfied with the new-

ly created Civic Force and the resurrected Democratic Party of Russia. Putin's decision to lead the United Russia party list meant that many of the old parties lost their key constituents.

Does the Russian political system even need parties? If they are needed, the results for SPS and Yabloko are not just an alarming warning, but evidence of the crash of the party system in the form that it existed since the beginning of the 1990s. This crash is the result of several causes. Among the objective causes are economic growth, and as a result, the increased well being of the citizens and their satisfaction with the authorities. During bad times, it was necessary to think of a new "party of power" before each election and the opposition parties always made advances. Now the situation has changed fundamentally.

Another important cause is the Kremlin's decision to exert greater control over the parties. The authorities have decided that it is easier to work with parties of their own creation, merging and dividing them according to whim, than it is to work with loyal politicians, who seek to maintain some autonomy. Another problem is the absence of a realistic role for political parties in the political system. The voters have a dim view of the parties and their leaders and therefore support for them is declining. If the parties don't break out of this closed circle, it will be necessary to constantly think of new party projects, attractive because of their newness and not tied down by past promises, or to find effective showmen like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

Many professional politicians who were completely loyal to the Kremlin, and even capable of working with it, have now been excluded from the Duma and public life in general. If the regime does not want to work with some politicians, that is its business. However, if there is a constant dearth of qualified politicians in the system and it can't find a place for dozens of qualified politicians, then this is a serious failure of the system itself. If the regime is about to adopt new reforms which will likely summon mass social protests onto the streets as a result, then forcing unwanted politicians out of the system is a serious mistake.

There is no point in idealizing the opposition or demonizing the politicians who support the authorities. Both are people with weaknesses and ambitions. A renewal of the party leadership in several parties is long overdue and could be useful. These elections should provide an impetus for such changes.

There is always a silver lining behind these clouds. Putin's decision to participate in the elections at the top of the United Russia party list changed the entire political landscape. At first it seemed like his decision spelled the end of the Just Russia party, which could strengthen the public political competition inside the

ruling elite. This, however, did not happen and the party, despite the departure of numerous regional elites who considered themselves "true supporters of the president," somehow managed to cross the seven percent barrier. After these elections and the upcoming presidential elections, Just Russia has good prospects. If United Russia has been able to successfully compete with Just Russia on the basis of populism, then after the presidential elections, the role for populism in the government will greatly decrease. Such conditions will give the party the upper hand in attracting votes.

The transformation of the "above the fray" president into the leader of a party list, even if it is the biggest party, not only marked his own personal evolution into a party politician, but a transformation of all party forces and the polarization of the political landscape in general. Until now many supporters of any party in Russia were Putin backers. Putin has now brought many of these people to United Russia, radicalizing, and freeing the other parties from their former "political schizophrenia." This was particularly helpful for SPS, which no longer suffers from its previous tendency to provide "conditional support for the president" while coming under great pressure in the elections.

Falsifications of the Elections

In the absence of real social monitoring and court cases, it is nearly impossible to discuss the question of falsifications. It is possible, however, to speak of serious deviations from "normal" electoral behavior and the significant likelihood of the manipulation of the elections.

The political logic for such manipulations in these elections is understandable: the Kremlin had turned the elections into a vote of confidence for the president and the executive branch in general and the governors were placed at the top of the United Russia regional lists. Where there is a motive, there is also a mechanism: traditionally an administrative machine organizes the elections in Russia. In this case the machine was highly consolidated and controlled from above. A key component of these elections was the hierarchy of electoral commissions, which one and a half years ago came under the control of V. Churov, a physicist from St. Petersburg long known to Putin. Specifically for him, the law was changed so that holding the position no longer required a legal education.

There are many signs of falsifications in these elections: participation rates in several regions of more than 95 percent of the population, exceeding physical possibilities; the doubling of permits to vote in a place where one does not live; stories of voters going to vote in numerous polling places; extensive absentee voting; the small number, or absence altogether, of invalid ballots, and the incomplete lines in the result protocols. One

example is Chechnya, where 99.5 percent of the people voted and 99.4 percent backed United Russia. Another indicator is that there is a 0.9 correlation between high turnout and votes for United Russia. One more indicator is the decline in the share of invalid ballots with turnout growth, which suggests that somebody added ballots in favor of a certain party without also adding a reasonable number of protest votes and ballots filled out incorrectly. For example, the Khabez territorial election commission reported that all of its 18,000 registered voters came to the polls (100% turnout) and all of them voted for United Russia.

Nevertheless, the results almost completely agreed with the prognoses of pollsters. Even the predictions of the Levada Center, a respected independent polling agency, correspond with the results of the Central Electoral Commission, except that the number of people participating in the voting was 10 percent higher than expected. When there are massive deviations from normal behavior, connected to the use of administrative resources, surveys and the prognoses made on their basis might not be precise since they only capture the preferences of the voters before the massive use of administrative resources in the final stage of the elections. If the predictions are correct, then either the pollsters learned how to take the use of administrative resources into account or the administrative system works according to the predictions, which thereby play a normative role.

According to the opinion of experts, the real levels of participation in the elections in the country overall were 10 percent less than the official figures and in several cases were significantly less. One example is Ingushetia, where according to eyewitness accounts the population practically did not vote, but according to the official figures 98.35 percent participated. The results for United Russia were likewise inflated by 12–15 percent across the country and in various regions. The totals for the Communists were reduced 2–5 percent. The results of Just Russia, which did not conduct a campaign in many regions and was semi-paralyzed by Putin's decision to lead the United Russia party list, were appar-

ently significantly increased. By the same token, the results of SPS and Yabloko were apparently reduced by a factor of 2 or 3. While there is no reason to believe that these parties crossed the 7 percent barrier, they probably did win enough votes to cross the 3–4 percent barrier entitling them to the return of their deposits and freeing them from having to pay for their state-provided media time. The Civic Force party seemed to benefit particularly from falsifications since it often received more votes than SPS in places where SPS had strong organizations.

The scale of the fraud was bigger this time than ever before, it was more widespread, including the countryside and large urban centers, and the authorities worked almost openly, not even trying to hide it.

Regional Differentiation: The End of Geography?

According to the published results, there was very little difference in electoral preferences between regions and within them. There was great uniformity in terms of the party winners: parties that did not win representation in the Duma did not win in a single region. The only exception was the Agrarian Party, which won in the Ust-Orda Buryatia Autonomous Okrug (voting for the last time separately before it is merged with Irkutsk Oblast). Such an outcome is unprecedented.

Several regions essentially have one party systems, where United Russia rules uncontested, including Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkesia, Mordovia, Tatarstan, Tyva, and the Agin-Buryatia Autonomous Okrug.

Several more regions boast a two-party system, including the remaining republics in the North Caucasus and Rostov Oblast, Belgorod and Penza oblasts, and Bashkortostan, where the Communists did well. All these regions favor United Russia, but also supported the Communists. Additionally, the northern and eastern protest regions of Tyumen, Yamal-Nenets, Chukotka, and Kamchatka favored both United Russia and the LDPR. The Communists did not break the 7 percent barrier in 12 regions.


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Tables and Graphs


The Results of the Duma Elections

The Official End Result (As of 8 December 2007)



Source: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&ivd=100100021960186&vm=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=242, 10. December 2007

Distribution of Seats in the New Duma



Source: <http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/elections2007/>

Official End Result of the Duma Elections (December 8, 2007)

	in absolute figures	in %
Persons eligible to vote	109,145,517	
Valid votes	68,777,136	
Invalid votes	759,929	1.09%
Agrarian Party	1,600,234	2.30%
Civic Force	733,604	1.05%
Democratic Party of Russia	89,780	0.13%
KPRF	8,046,886	11.57%
Union of Right Forces	669,444	0.96%
Party of Social Justice	154,083	0.22%
LDPR	5,660,823	8.14%
Just Russia	5,383,639	7.74%
Patriots of Russia	615,417	0.89%
United Russia	44,714,241	64.30%
Yabloko	1,108,985	1.59%

Nach: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrn=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=242, 10. December 2007

Comparison of Election Result Forecasts

	Official End Result	Forecasts		
		Levada	VTsIOM	FOM
United Russia	64.30%	62.8%	62.1%	66.0%
KPRF	11.57%	11.2%	12.2%	10.2%
LDPR	8.14%	8.7%	8.0%	9.6%
Just Russia	7.74%	7.6%	7.0%	8.0%
Agrarian Party	2.30%	1.4%	2.4%	2.3%
Yabloko	1.59%	2.6%	2.4%	1.1%
Civic Force	1.05%	0.6%	1.2%	0.8%
Union of Right Forces	0.96%	1.0%	1.8%	0.8%
Patriots of Russia	0.89%	1.4%	1.5%	0.5%
Party of Social Justice	0.22%	0.2%	0.7%	0.1%
Democratic Party of Russia	0.13%	0.5%	0.8%	0.1%
Invalid votes	1.09%			0.4%
Total	100.00%	98.0%	100.1%	99.9%
Turnout	63.71%	53.4%	53.6%	57.9%

Sources: <http://www.levada.ru/press/2007120301.html>; <http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/9240.html>; http://bd.fom.ru/zip/oslon_prognoz_261107.zip; http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrn=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=233.

Official End Result of the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007 by Regions

	Agrarian Party	Civic Force	Democratic Party of Russia	KPRF	Union of Right Forces	Partei of Social Justice	LDPR	Just Russia	Patriots of Russia	United Russia	Yabloko	Electoral turnout
Russian Federation	2.30%	1.05%	0.13%	11.57%	0.96%	0.22%	8.14%	7.74%	0.89%	64.30%	1.59%	63.71%
Republic of Adygeya	1.53%	0.57%	0.11%	12.22%	0.27%	0.15%	5.86%	5.23%	1.00%	70.97%	0.79%	60.94%
Altai Republic	2.90%	0.37%	0.16%	7.99%	0.71%	0.15%	6.45%	9.45%	0.98%	69.46%	0.52%	68.33%
Republic of Bashkortostan	0.74%	0.17%	0.06%	4.55%	0.14%	0.08%	1.66%	1.78%	0.31%	89.44%	0.23%	94.36%
	0.74%	0.18%	0.06%	8.81%	0.16%	0.08%	1.85%	2.70%	0.25%	84.26%	0.22%	89.64%
	0.51%	0.14%	0.05%	5.61%	0.20%	0.07%	1.52%	5.67%	0.26%	85.19%	0.20%	91.62%
Republic of Buryatiya	0.90%	0.67%	0.15%	10.93%	0.71%	0.24%	3.82%	6.60%	0.61%	73.56%	1.09%	83.83%
	1.31%	0.39%	0.13%	10.67%	0.54%	0.16%	6.90%	10.29%	0.56%	65.59%	0.91%	58.65%
Republic of Dagestan	0.13%	0.02%	0.01%	8.37%	0.03%	0.01%	0.87%	1.09%	0.24%	88.90%	0.05%	91.64%
	0.20%	0.03%	0.01%	9.00%	0.03%	0.03%	0.40%	0.34%	0.09%	89.47%	0.04%	91.83%
Republic of Ingushetiya	0.08%	0.06%	0.04%	0.14%	0.04%	0.04%	0.28%	0.35%	0.04%	98.72%	0.14%	98.35%
Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya	0.12%	0.03%	0.01%	1.72%	0.02%	0.02%	0.41%	1.28%	0.11%	96.12%	0.06%	96.68%
Republic of Kalmykiya	2.90%	0.46%	0.61%	11.72%	0.63%	0.11%	3.37%	5.70%	0.73%	72.43%	0.53%	66.79%
Republic of Karachayev-Cherkessiya	0.16%	0.05%	0.03%	3.66%	0.04%	0.08%	1.90%	0.29%	0.60%	92.90%	0.09%	92.44%
Republic of Kareliya	1.73%	1.42%	0.13%	10.75%	0.72%	0.29%	10.38%	11.24%	1.06%	57.28%	3.98%	54.90%
Komi Republic	2.99%	1.04%	0.13%	9.53%	0.89%	0.21%	11.42%	8.41%	0.76%	62.06%	1.32%	65.11%
Republic Mari El	3.49%	0.81%	0.13%	10.59%	0.63%	0.23%	7.52%	6.40%	0.81%	67.54%	0.87%	78.53%
Republic of Mordvinia	0.18%	0.10%	0.03%	3.73%	0.09%	0.03%	0.95%	0.71%	0.14%	93.41%	0.12%	94.49%
Republic Sakha (Yakutiya)	1.80%	0.51%	0.11%	9.48%	2.13%	0.25%	6.26%	13.19%	0.53%	63.99%	0.73%	70.33%
Republic of North Ossetiya	2.36%	0.47%	0.19%	10.88%	0.91%	0.34%	2.81%	6.51%	0.84%	71.60%	0.46%	60.12%
Republic of Tatarstan	0.64%	0.36%	0.09%	4.68%	0.58%	0.12%	3.48%	3.15%	0.27%	85.08%	0.73%	88.00%
	0.83%	0.40%	0.12%	8.14%	0.40%	0.18%	3.23%	5.59%	0.25%	79.66%	0.55%	84.82%
	0.79%	0.33%	0.11%	8.04%	0.35%	0.18%	2.57%	4.25%	0.26%	81.69%	0.44%	89.71%
	0.72%	0.72%	0.19%	5.76%	1.12%	0.25%	6.60%	4.16%	0.52%	77.55%	1.57%	78.94%

Official End Result of the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007 by Regions

	Agrarian Party	Civic Force	Democratic Party of Russia	KPRF	Union of Right Forces	Partei of Social Justice	LDPR	Just Russia	Patriots of Russia	United Russia	Yabloko	Electorat turnout
Republic of Tuva	0.59%	0.18%	0.06%	2.99%	0.12%	0.20%	2.09%	2.55%	0.76%	89.21%	0.20%	80.85%
Republic of Udmurtiya	2.07%	0.99%	0.15%	10.61%	0.74%	0.24%	10.97%	8.62%	2.54%	60.57%	0.94%	61.26%
Republic of Khakassiya	2.69%	0.86%	0.14%	12.88%	0.65%	0.21%	11.32%	5.32%	4.51%	59.53%	0.93%	54.88%
Republic of Chechnya	0.04%	0.03%	0.03%	0.13%	0.08%	0.03%	0.06%	0.06%	0.04%	99.36%	0.05%	99.46%
Republic of Chuvashiya	1.50%	0.63%	0.13%	12.64%	0.39%	0.20%	8.49%	10.32%	1.26%	62.27%	0.75%	70.64%
Altai Region	3.29%	1.14%	0.15%	16.46%	1.92%	0.24%	11.53%	9.88%	1.32%	51.11%	1.93%	60.32%
	4.04%	0.47%	0.12%	17.25%	0.78%	0.18%	10.29%	8.30%	0.75%	56.00%	0.84%	60.15%
	4.99%	0.38%	0.10%	16.93%	0.82%	0.15%	9.50%	8.02%	0.66%	56.93%	0.59%	62.27%
	2.26%	0.50%	0.13%	13.94%	0.31%	0.14%	7.39%	7.95%	0.64%	64.44%	0.53%	67.80%
Krasnodar Region	2.01%	1.52%	0.18%	17.47%	0.78%	0.25%	8.54%	7.30%	1.25%	56.83%	2.00%	60.86%
	1.91%	0.63%	0.16%	15.15%	0.46%	0.17%	7.33%	8.88%	0.86%	61.84%	0.78%	65.75%
	1.77%	1.06%	0.17%	11.57%	0.78%	0.18%	8.66%	8.64%	0.81%	63.09%	1.42%	62.08%
Krasnoyarsk Region	1.99%	0.60%	0.15%	14.13%	0.50%	0.18%	8.25%	6.96%	0.74%	63.76%	0.84%	67.34%
	2.77%	0.60%	0.14%	13.51%	1.01%	0.19%	10.89%	7.13%	0.88%	60.97%	0.72%	63.45%
Primorskiy Region	2.49%	1.18%	0.15%	12.68%	1.92%	0.25%	9.58%	10.16%	0.99%	57.58%	1.68%	52.88%
	2.32%	0.73%	0.12%	11.95%	1.06%	0.23%	11.10%	6.70%	0.66%	63.09%	0.80%	62.58%
	2.99%	0.71%	0.13%	12.08%	0.55%	0.25%	13.12%	8.93%	0.88%	58.24%	0.95%	61.33%
Stavropol Region	2.24%	1.42%	0.19%	11.73%	1.16%	0.33%	13.80%	11.33%	2.06%	51.53%	2.44%	53.10%
	1.75%	0.66%	0.10%	11.46%	0.65%	0.15%	6.45%	13.74%	0.65%	62.39%	1.00%	54.33%
Khabarovsk Region	2.02%	0.70%	0.09%	10.74%	0.86%	0.16%	7.33%	13.16%	0.77%	62.02%	1.15%	56.77%
	1.80%	1.03%	0.19%	10.98%	0.93%	0.27%	13.39%	6.81%	1.08%	60.68%	1.65%	61.39%
Amur Oblast	1.60%	0.54%	0.11%	10.16%	1.44%	0.18%	10.13%	3.93%	0.63%	69.75%	0.67%	67.85%
Archangel'sk Oblast	3.97%	1.36%	0.14%	11.16%	0.94%	0.35%	10.62%	11.03%	0.89%	56.72%	2.12%	54.27%
Astrachan Oblast	1.12%	0.60%	0.11%	9.70%	0.41%	0.17%	6.75%	20.17%	0.85%	58.00%	0.75%	62.35%
Belgorod Oblast	1.81%	0.68%	0.11%	15.65%	0.37%	0.18%	6.44%	6.51%	0.72%	65.39%	0.97%	74.17%

Official End Result of the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007 by Regions

		Agrarian Party	Civic Force	Democratic Party of Russia	KPRF	Union of Right Forces	Partei of Social Justice	LDPR	Just Russia	Patriots of Russia	United Russia	Yabloko	Electoral turnout
Bryansk Oblast		2.24%	0.78%	0.10%	17.09%	0.39%	0.20%	6.53%	8.40%	0.83%	61.77%	0.76%	56.80%
Vladimir Oblast		3.50%	1.03%	0.13%	14.40%	0.75%	0.31%	10.09%	9.21%	1.22%	56.75%	1.33%	60.02%
Volograd Oblast	Vologradskaya	2.77%	1.27%	0.12%	15.50%	0.74%	0.21%	9.90%	11.56%	0.94%	53.93%	2.22%	50.44%
	Volzhszkaya	3.95%	0.80%	0.10%	15.66%	0.43%	0.20%	8.55%	9.62%	0.67%	58.02%	1.15%	55.97%
	Mikhailovskaya	6.34%	0.45%	0.10%	15.96%	0.25%	0.15%	8.73%	5.45%	0.61%	60.71%	0.52%	64.35%
Vologda Oblast		5.41%	1.19%	0.11%	9.28%	0.74%	0.21%	11.00%	8.81%	0.80%	60.47%	1.13%	64.42%
Voronezh Oblast		2.47%	1.49%	0.16%	21.83%	0.80%	0.22%	12.25%	8.67%	0.83%	48.16%	1.99%	58.28%
Ivanovo Oblast	Pavlovskaya	2.71%	0.41%	0.10%	12.08%	0.20%	0.14%	8.52%	9.54%	0.64%	64.18%	0.45%	74.80%
		4.16%	1.18%	0.11%	10.94%	0.92%	0.27%	10.38%	8.13%	1.00%	60.76%	1.27%	55.03%
Irkutsk Oblast	Bratskaya	3.34%	0.54%	0.14%	9.93%	0.97%	0.21%	11.60%	8.40%	0.79%	62.01%	0.96%	61.10%
	Irkutskaya	3.94%	1.03%	0.17%	11.65%	2.02%	0.31%	11.39%	10.01%	0.93%	55.30%	1.97%	57.26%
Kaliningrad Oblast		1.94%	1.80%	0.16%	13.80%	0.77%	0.24%	10.17%	8.17%	2.20%	57.38%	2.21%	57.11%
Kaluga Oblast		3.03%	1.10%	0.13%	13.42%	0.82%	0.22%	8.23%	7.64%	1.26%	61.65%	1.60%	55.95%
Kemerovo Oblast		1.25%	0.74%	0.11%	7.18%	0.59%	0.18%	7.49%	3.36%	0.49%	76.82%	0.91%	77.99%
Kirov Oblast		6.70%	1.03%	0.14%	11.65%	0.75%	0.34%	12.07%	8.16%	1.37%	55.38%	1.28%	71.09%
Kostroma Oblast		4.33%	0.86%	0.11%	13.26%	0.76%	0.23%	10.44%	11.12%	0.79%	56.36%	1.06%	61.56%
Kurgan Oblast		3.95%	0.69%	0.11%	11.34%	0.52%	0.20%	10.50%	5.82%	0.92%	64.43%	0.79%	65.06%
Kursk Oblast		1.79%	0.62%	0.17%	11.54%	0.45%	0.18%	8.76%	10.87%	0.80%	62.74%	0.87%	63.20%
Leningrad Oblast		2.73%	1.18%	0.10%	10.78%	1.09%	0.21%	8.64%	12.68%	0.84%	59.23%	1.69%	53.60%
Lipetsk Oblast		2.00%	0.79%	0.12%	13.03%	0.45%	0.19%	9.65%	8.06%	1.30%	62.30%	0.93%	65.14%
Magadan Oblast		1.94%	1.80%	0.16%	11.68%	0.73%	0.31%	15.41%	8.69%	1.53%	55.31%	1.39%	60.30%
	Dmitrovskaya	2.90%	1.56%	0.14%	15.15%	1.57%	0.31%	7.23%	6.73%	1.38%	59.06%	2.69%	59.33%
Istrinskaya		2.73%	1.34%	0.14%	13.18%	1.23%	0.28%	7.84%	7.41%	1.28%	61.32%	2.00%	64.13%
	Kolomenskaya	2.75%	0.96%	0.14%	14.49%	0.87%	0.25%	7.92%	7.89%	1.02%	60.98%	1.44%	57.48%
Lyubertsckaya		2.77%	1.79%	0.16%	14.48%	1.67%	0.37%	7.65%	6.42%	1.38%	59.06%	2.97%	58.88%
Noginskaya		2.76%	1.34%	0.13%	14.18%	1.27%	0.27%	8.03%	6.60%	1.21%	60.57%	2.28%	63.79%
	Podolskaya	2.68%	1.41%	0.14%	12.54%	1.21%	0.29%	7.88%	6.34%	1.29%	62.73%	2.19%	64.23%
Serpukhovskaya		2.82%	1.30%	0.13%	14.50%	1.16%	0.25%	7.91%	7.62%	1.11%	59.82%	2.01%	62.85%
	Khiminskaya	3.08%	1.64%	0.15%	13.39%	1.57%	0.31%	8.02%	8.12%	1.27%	58.33%	2.69%	61.27%
Moscow Oblast													

Official End Result of the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007 by Regions

		Agrarian Party	Civic Force	Democratic Party of Russia	KPRF	Union of Right Forces	Partei of Social Justice	LDPR	Just Russia	Patriots of Russia	United Russia	Yabloko	Electorat turnout
Murmansk Oblast		2.13%	1.61%	0.14%	11.14%	0.68%	0.29%	12.96%	11.71%	1.16%	55.11%	1.97%	58.10%
	Arzmasskaya	2.34%	0.68%	0.10%	12.05%	0.34%	0.19%	9.05%	7.92%	0.70%	65.01%	0.68%	65.85%
Nizhni Novgorod Oblast	Kstovskaya	2.30%	0.99%	0.13%	13.71%	1.08%	0.21%	7.94%	10.89%	0.66%	59.73%	1.38%	54.47%
	Nizhegorodskaya	2.29%	1.61%	0.15%	13.67%	2.26%	0.27%	7.63%	13.37%	0.84%	54.51%	2.20%	51.91%
Novgorod Oblast	Semenovskaya	2.53%	0.77%	0.09%	10.97%	0.63%	0.21%	9.73%	10.62%	0.58%	62.18%	0.86%	56.94%
		2.56%	1.00%	0.15%	10.83%	0.46%	0.23%	9.55%	8.28%	1.73%	63.13%	1.29%	63.62%
Novosibirsk Oblast	Zayel'tsovskaya	2.40%	1.25%	0.14%	17.41%	1.33%	0.25%	8.60%	7.02%	0.98%	57.60%	2.00%	56.52%
	Iskitimskaya	3.69%	0.38%	0.11%	13.41%	0.46%	0.15%	9.25%	6.70%	0.61%	63.73%	0.47%	62.72%
	Novosibirskaya	2.20%	1.54%	0.16%	18.25%	1.57%	0.29%	8.27%	7.96%	0.96%	55.25%	2.47%	54.67%
Omsk Oblast	Omskaya	2.66%	0.54%	0.20%	12.70%	0.81%	0.19%	8.53%	5.00%	0.74%	66.50%	0.71%	72.42%
	Tsentral'naya	2.64%	1.48%	0.21%	17.69%	2.21%	0.30%	10.68%	8.03%	1.21%	51.44%	2.76%	55.71%
Orenburg Oblast	Novotroitskaya	3.08%	0.54%	0.13%	12.66%	0.63%	0.18%	9.10%	9.35%	0.91%	61.88%	0.62%	57.84%
	Orenburgskaya	2.86%	0.80%	0.13%	13.93%	1.05%	0.22%	9.33%	9.17%	1.59%	58.64%	1.33%	55.19%
Oryol Oblast		1.77%	1.11%	0.15%	17.58%	0.67%	0.20%	8.21%	7.26%	1.05%	59.85%	0.82%	71.01%
Pensa Oblast		1.42%	0.59%	0.11%	13.09%	0.32%	0.16%	5.86%	5.00%	0.73%	70.31%	0.99%	69.72%
Pskov Oblast		3.12%	1.08%	0.15%	14.33%	0.49%	0.22%	9.20%	11.14%	1.01%	56.73%	1.72%	65.44%
	Volgodonskaya	1.81%	0.36%	0.06%	8.53%	0.21%	0.14%	4.75%	5.63%	0.43%	76.96%	0.51%	72.66%
	Kamenskaya	1.90%	0.33%	0.08%	9.40%	0.21%	0.15%	6.08%	6.58%	0.49%	73.81%	0.44%	68.69%
Rostov Oblast	Novocherkasskaya	1.64%	0.48%	0.08%	9.98%	0.46%	0.16%	5.47%	6.38%	0.47%	73.60%	0.70%	66.25%
	Rostovskaya	1.26%	1.14%	0.13%	11.88%	1.02%	0.27%	4.90%	7.00%	0.69%	68.57%	2.46%	67.03%
	Taganrogskaya	1.49%	0.92%	0.13%	13.21%	0.89%	0.22%	5.66%	7.93%	0.68%	65.87%	2.14%	63.10%
Ryasan Oblast		2.49%	0.98%	0.13%	15.60%	0.62%	0.29%	9.97%	8.78%	1.10%	57.10%	1.90%	57.25%
	Volzhskaya	1.99%	0.78%	0.12%	14.30%	1.05%	0.17%	9.50%	9.12%	0.64%	60.43%	0.73%	57.93%
Samara Oblast	Samarskaya	2.20%	2.01%	0.13%	19.14%	1.88%	0.22%	8.62%	10.27%	0.86%	51.36%	2.40%	44.63%
	To'lyattinskaya	2.45%	1.88%	0.13%	17.72%	1.25%	0.20%	9.86%	7.94%	0.65%	55.49%	1.38%	54.15%
	Balakovskaya	1.86%	0.39%	0.11%	10.25%	0.18%	0.16%	5.16%	8.32%	0.65%	70.32%	0.85%	65.28%
	Balashovskaya	1.76%	0.47%	0.12%	11.19%	0.25%	0.15%	6.28%	8.20%	0.50%	68.34%	0.86%	65.94%
Saratov Oblast	Saratovskaya	2.32%	1.32%	0.16%	16.19%	1.05%	0.26%	7.39%	11.41%	0.81%	54.08%	3.41%	54.02%

Official End Result of the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007 by Regions


		Agrarian Party	Civic Force	Democratic Party of Russia	KPRF	Union of Right Forces	Partei of Social Justice	LDPR	Just Russia	Patriots of Russia	United Russia	Yabloko	Electoral turnout
Sakhalin Oblast		1.09%	0.95%	0.14%	14.55%	0.50%	0.21%	10.07%	5.99%	0.96%	62.96%	1.36%	54.39%
	Kamensk-Uralskaya	2.22%	3.32%	0.10%	8.18%	0.93%	0.27%	11.08%	6.19%	0.69%	64.77%	1.27%	61.02%
	Nizhnetagil'skaya	2.12%	2.87%	0.13%	7.46%	1.27%	0.32%	11.95%	7.97%	0.71%	62.46%	1.59%	64.15%
Sverdlovsk Oblast	Pervoural'skaya	2.29%	4.01%	0.14%	7.74%	1.94%	0.31%	10.26%	8.38%	0.75%	60.92%	2.25%	57.09%
	Serovskaya	2.20%	1.94%	0.11%	6.86%	1.05%	0.27%	12.35%	6.25%	0.68%	66.47%	0.92%	61.67%
	Tsentral'naya	2.08%	5.97%	0.19%	8.05%	3.37%	0.39%	9.50%	8.61%	0.83%	55.74%	4.13%	59.07%
Smolensk Oblast		2.63%	0.89%	0.15%	15.35%	0.67%	0.19%	12.00%	9.77%	1.24%	53.92%	1.43%	54.83%
Tambov Oblast		3.15%	0.67%	0.12%	19.17%	0.46%	0.17%	7.68%	5.89%	0.73%	59.79%	1.17%	61.54%
Tver Oblast		3.56%	1.00%	0.10%	13.43%	0.71%	0.21%	9.71%	8.41%	0.86%	59.71%	1.53%	57.46%
Tomsk Oblast		1.53%	1.40%	0.17%	10.84%	1.95%	0.27%	13.20%	7.71%	1.14%	58.41%	1.99%	59.18%
	Novomoskovskaya	2.22%	0.64%	0.13%	13.61%	0.62%	0.19%	6.99%	9.55%	0.93%	63.14%	1.04%	58.10%
Tula Oblast	Tul'skaya	2.16%	1.20%	0.16%	13.15%	0.94%	0.28%	7.27%	10.01%	1.13%	60.25%	2.46%	55.71%
		1.45%	0.70%	0.12%	6.74%	0.67%	0.18%	9.62%	4.16%	0.83%	73.57%	0.82%	80.41%
Tyumen Oblast		2.13%	0.81%	0.10%	11.35%	0.43%	0.17%	7.96%	8.25%	0.85%	66.24%	0.82%	63.90%
Ulyanovsk Oblast	Zlatoustovskaya	2.19%	0.94%	0.12%	13.07%	0.89%	0.25%	9.07%	9.70%	0.88%	59.37%	2.32%	64.70%
	Kalinskaya	2.33%	1.46%	0.14%	12.49%	1.25%	0.34%	9.96%	10.03%	0.95%	56.50%	3.22%	68.22%
Chelyabinsk Oblast	Kyshtymskaya	2.16%	0.84%	0.12%	10.22%	0.67%	0.26%	9.30%	9.47%	0.91%	63.53%	1.26%	65.62%
	Magnitogorskaya	1.88%	0.66%	0.14%	8.33%	0.56%	0.22%	9.47%	10.49%	0.86%	65.14%	1.02%	70.38%
Chita Oblast		2.91%	0.45%	0.13%	8.74%	0.39%	0.18%	15.03%	7.04%	0.78%	62.75%	0.52%	66.21%
Yaroslavl Oblast		4.12%	1.55%	0.11%	11.61%	0.81%	0.30%	13.13%	12.07%	0.69%	53.17%	1.58%	62.32%
	Vostochnaya	3.10%	2.58%	0.20%	13.81%	2.67%	0.42%	7.71%	8.63%	1.48%	51.75%	6.11%	54.38%
	Donskaya	2.82%	2.52%	0.21%	13.56%	2.69%	0.41%	7.28%	7.54%	1.35%	54.88%	5.28%	56.29%
	Kuntsevskaya	3.13%	2.75%	0.24%	15.16%	3.31%	0.42%	7.61%	8.22%	1.52%	49.83%	6.30%	52.63%
	Lyublinskaya	2.65%	2.16%	0.18%	11.70%	1.91%	0.40%	7.28%	7.33%	1.28%	59.61%	4.18%	58.71%
	Medvedkovskaya	2.96%	2.33%	0.22%	12.86%	2.32%	0.43%	7.61%	8.05%	1.44%	54.92%	5.25%	54.57%
City of Moscow	Tushinskaya	3.20%	2.82%	0.22%	14.37%	2.87%	0.47%	7.90%	8.36%	1.39%	51.36%	5.66%	52.29%
	Tsaritsynskaya	2.33%	1.74%	0.20%	11.94%	1.69%	0.39%	6.59%	6.65%	1.17%	62.64%	3.38%	57.68%
	Tsentral'naya	2.20%	2.30%	0.20%	14.37%	3.78%	0.52%	5.38%	6.16%	1.14%	55.68%	6.74%	61.10%
	Chereushkinskaya	3.00%	2.93%	0.21%	14.80%	3.76%	0.47%	6.97%	7.87%	1.64%	49.83%	7.01%	52.09%
	Sheremet'evskaya	3.12%	2.75%	0.21%	15.41%	3.53%	0.41%	7.45%	8.40%	1.50%	49.09%	6.53%	51.42%

Official End Result of the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007 by Regions

		Agrarian Party	Civic Force	Democratic Party of Russia	KPRF	Union of Right Forces	Partei of Social Justice	LDPR	Just Russia	Patriots of Russia	United Russia	Yabloko	Electoral turnout
City of St Petersburg	Vostochnaya	2.43%	1.97%	0.12%	12.11%	2.02%	0.23%	7.86%	14.90%	0.96%	52.45%	4.15%	50.49%
	Zapadnaya	2.47%	2.08%	0.15%	12.50%	2.31%	0.25%	7.80%	13.82%	0.96%	52.26%	4.47%	51.99%
	Severnaya	2.33%	2.43%	0.15%	12.62%	2.80%	0.26%	7.46%	14.80%	1.13%	49.67%	5.46%	51.58%
	Tsentr'al'naya	2.25%	2.35%	0.15%	12.38%	3.24%	0.25%	7.07%	16.23%	1.01%	47.89%	6.20%	51.38%
Jewish Autonomous Oblast	Yuzhnaya	2.56%	2.23%	0.14%	12.69%	2.64%	0.24%	7.19%	16.00%	0.98%	49.17%	5.27%	51.92%
		1.36%	0.66%	0.19%	14.09%	0.94%	0.23%	8.50%	4.63%	0.58%	66.22%	0.83%	64.55%
Autonomous District of the Buryats of Aginsk		2.08%	0.20%	0.05%	4.50%	0.19%	0.11%	6.07%	2.37%	0.29%	83.24%	0.34%	86.42%
Nenets Autonomous District		4.43%	1.90%	0.18%	12.38%	1.10%	0.42%	13.03%	10.03%	4.28%	48.78%	1.62%	52.48%
Autonomous District of the Buryats of Ust-Ordinsk		9.62%	0.25%	0.10%	5.74%	0.32%	0.16%	4.65%	4.98%	1.32%	71.73%	0.37%	75.40%
Khanty-Mansiyskiy Autonomous District	Yugra	1.91%	1.12%	0.14%	7.07%	0.54%	0.24%	13.18%	6.29%	1.19%	65.96%	1.15%	67.08%
Chukchi Autonomous District		1.20%	0.88%	0.11%	3.05%	0.30%	0.20%	7.44%	2.77%	0.49%	78.13%	0.94%	78.66%
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District		0.75%	0.69%	0.11%	4.15%	0.37%	0.16%	7.72%	4.69%	0.38%	79.35%	0.58%	84.87%
Perm Oblast	Severnaya	2.71%	0.65%	0.13%	6.50%	1.29%	0.16%	12.33%	5.71%	0.90%	67.60%	1.02%	55.08%
	Tsentr'al'naya	2.86%	2.49%	0.20%	11.73%	3.60%	0.26%	12.20%	7.16%	1.13%	54.07%	2.89%	51.72%
	Yuzhnaya	3.39%	0.84%	0.13%	8.93%	1.26%	0.19%	12.83%	5.99%	0.85%	63.56%	1.00%	57.67%
Kamchatka Oblast		2.11%	1.39%	0.21%	8.06%	0.52%	0.26%	11.45%	6.14%	2.12%	63.67%	1.47%	56.95%
City of Baikonur (Kazakhstan)		1.58%	1.11%	0.10%	6.65%	0.94%	0.20%	8.44%	4.00%	0.68%	74.01%	1.43%	78.44%
Polling stations outside of the territory of the Russian Federation		0.60%	0.89%	0.12%	6.11%	1.91%	0.16%	4.20%	3.53%	0.62%	78.24%	2.83%	71.93%


Source: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrm=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&privet=0&ronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=233, 10 December 2007

Results Attained by “United Russia” in the Duma Elections of 2 December 2007



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Results of the Duma Elections 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007
 (According to Party Lists; “Administrative Parties” are Hatched)



Sources: *Kommersant*, 21/12/1999, p. 1; http://www.fci.ru/gd99/vb99_int/default.htm of 23/12/1999; *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoj Federatsii*, 1994, No. 1 (12), pp. 34-80; http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom_protokols/sx/page/protokol2_9/12/2003; http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrn=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=233,3/12/2007.


Comparison of the Duma Elections of 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007

Parties and Electoral Organizations									
1993	1995	1999	2003	2007	1993	1995	1999	2003	2007
Agrarian Party			Agrarian Party		7.99%	3.78%	--	3.64%	2.31%
	Our House Russia				--	10.13%	1.20%	--	--
Yabloko					7.86%	6.89%	5.93%	4.30%	1.59%
Russia's Choice	Democratic Choice – United Democrats	Union of Right Forces (SPS)			15.51%	3.86%	8.52%	3.97%	0.96%
Democratic Party of Russia					5.52%	--	--	--	--
KPRF					12.40%	22.30%	24.29%	12.61%	11.59%
LDPR (1999: Block Zhirinovski)					22.92%	11.18%	5.98%	11.45%	8.15%
PRES					6.73%	--	--	--	--
Women of Russia					8.13%	4.61%	2.05%	--	--
		Fatherland-All Russia			--	--	13.33%	--	--
		Unity ("Bear")	United Russia		--	--	23.32%	37.57%	64.26%
			Motherland		--	--	--	9.02%	--
				Just Russia	--	--	--	--	7.76%
Against all / other parties	Against all lists				--	2.77%	3.30%	4.70%	--
	Other parties				12.94%	34.48%	12.07%	12.73%	2.29%
Turnout					54.37%	64.38%	60.43%	55.60%	63.66%
Parties below the 5-percent and the 7-percent-hurdle, respectively					12.94%	49.50%	18.62%	29.34%	8.25%
Yabloko+SPS					23.37%	10.75%	14.45%	8.28%	2.56%

Sources: *Kommersant*. 21/12/1999. p. 1; http://www.fci.ru/gd99/vb99_int/default.htm of 23/12/1999; *Byulleten' Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoj Federatsii*. 1994. No. 1 (12). pp. 34-80; http://www.izbirkom.ru/izbirkom_protokols/sx/page/protokol2_9/12/2003; http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrn=100100021960181®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&prnetvd=null&vibi d=100100021960186&type=233. 3/12/2007.

Opinion Poll

To What Extent Will the Duma Elections be Honest?



To what extent is the work of the mass media under the control of Vladimir Putin and his associates?

Totally / to a significant extent	50%
Hardly / not at all	27%
Not at all	24%

Have you or your relatives been confronted with the fact that representatives of local administration, management at your workplace, officials of electoral commissions or other official persons forced you to vote by threats or bribes?

Yes	17%
No	76%
No answer	7%

Should representatives of local administration, management at your workplace, officials of electoral commissions or other official persons be punished, if they force people to vote by threats or bribes?


Yes, they should be punished, as they violate citizens' right to free speech	78%
They should not be punished, as they merely help people to fulfill their civic duty	11%
No answer	11%

Source: Opinion polls by the Levada Center on 20-23/11/2007 <http://www.levada.ru./press/2007120405.html>

Opinion Poll


The Run-Up to the Presidential Elections of 2 March 2008

In Which Politicians Do You Have Confidence?
 (Popularity Ratings March 2000 – April 2008 in Opinion Polls of the Levada Center)



Source: www.levada.ru

If Presidential Elections Were to Take Place Next Sunday, Which Candidate Would You Vote For? (Opinion Poll by the Levada Center)



Source: <http://www.levada.ru/vybory2008.html>

The Opinion Poll of the “Public Opinion Fund” ...

If the next presidential elections were to take place this Sunday, for which politician would you cast your vote?

	Insgesamt	Männer	Frauen	18 - 35 Jahre	36 - 54 Jahre	über 55 Jahre	keine Mittelschule	Mittelschule	Fachschule	Hochschule	bis 2.500 Rubel	2.501-4.500 Rubel	über 4.500 Rubel	Moskau	Megapolis	Großstadt	Kleinstadt	Dorf	Internet-Nutzer
V. Putin	57%	51%	62%	58%	54%	59%	59%	60%	56%	50%	60%	60%	56%	45%	50%	58%	58%	62%	49%
V. Zhirinovski	4%	5%	3%	5%	5%	1%	3%	7%	3%	2%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%
G. Zyuganov	3%	5%	3%	1%	3%	8%	7%	3%	3%	3%	3%	5%	3%	2%	1%	3%	3%	6%	2%
D. Medvedev	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	2%	1%	2%	3%	4%	2%	2%	3%	5%	4%	3%	2%	2%	5%
S. Shoigu	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	2%	1%	2%	4%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%
S. Ivanov	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	2%
S. Mironov	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%
W. Zubkov	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%
B. Gryslor	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%
For another politician	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%	1%	0%	2%	2%	4%	1%	2%	2%	3%	2%	4%	1%	1%	4%
I would not vote	10%	11%	8%	11%	11%	6%	9%	8%	11%	11%	10%	6%	11%	16%	12%	9%	10%	7%	11%
No answer	16%	17%	16%	17%	15%	17%	17%	15%	16%	19%	17%	15%	14%	17%	21%	12%	17%	16%	17%

Source: Opinion polls by the “Public Opinion Fund” (FOM) on 24-25/11/2007 <http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dom0748/d074802>

... And the Poll of VTsIOM

If presidential elections were to be held next Sunday, for which politician would you vote?


	6-7/10/2007	13-14/10/2007	20-21/10/2007	27-28/10/2007	3-4/11/2007	10-11/11/2007	17-18/11/2007	24-25/11/2007
Glasyev, Sergei	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%
Gryslor, Boris	0.4%	0.2%	0.7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.7%	0.4%	0.1%
Zhirinowski, Vladimir	2.9%	2.6%	2.8%	2.8%	2.7%	2.8%	2.5%	3.3%
Zubkov, Viktor	1.4%	2.1%	2.9%	2.8%	1.8%	1.8%	1.4%	1.8%
Lukashenko, Aleksandr	0.6%	0.8%	0.6%	0.4%	0.8%	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%
Zyuganov, Gennadi	2.1%	2.7%	2.6%	2.3%	2.7%	3.4%	2.8%	2.8%
Ivanov, Sergei	0.9%	2.2%	2.1%	1.5%	2.2%	2.1%	1.1%	2.0%
Kasparov, Garry	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	-	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Kasyanov, Mikhail	0.2%	-	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Kozak, Dmitri	0.1%	-	0.3%	0.1%	-	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Luzhkov, Yuri	0.4%	0.6%	0.2%	0.6%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.5%
Matviyenko, Valentina	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.1%	0.3%
Medvedev, Dmitri	3.8%	3.3%	2.9%	2.8%	2.3%	2.4%	2.3%	2.5%
Mironov, Sergei	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.6%	0.9%	1.4%
Putin, Vladimir	66.4%	63.9%	63.0%	64.3%	65.4%	64.4%	65.8%	63.5%
Rogosin, Dmitri	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	-	0.2%	0.1%
Ryzhkov, Vladimir	0.1%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	-	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Sobyanin, Sergei	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	0.5%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%
Semigin, Gennadi	-	0.1%	-	-	0.1%	-	0.2%	-
Khakamada, Irina	0.1%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%	0.3%
Khodorkowski, Mikhail	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	-	-	-	0.3%	-
Chubais, Anatoli	-	-	-	-	0.1%	-	0.3%	-
Shoigu, Sergei	0.9%	1.1%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	0.7%	0.6%
Fradkov, Mikhail	-	-	0.3%	0.2%	-	0.1%	0.1%	-
Tuleyev, Aman	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%
Yavlinski, Grigori	0.2%	0.3%	0.2%	0.6%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	0.1%
Other	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.2%	0.3%	0.4%	0.6%
I would not take part in the elections	6.9%	10.3%	7.6%	6.6%	7.3%	5.9%	5.8%	5.4%
No answer	9.1%	5.8%	9.5%	10.3%	10.3%	11.4%	11.7%	12.2%

Source: Opinion polls of VTsIOM. <http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/9280/html>


Putin's Future after the Elections of 2008

Source: Opinion polls by the Levada Center, 9–13/11/2007 <http://www.levada.ru./press/2007112803.html>


Do You Share the View that in Russia there is No Candidate Apart from Putin Who is Worthy of the Office of President?



Is Putin Being Properly Informed by his Associates about the Situation in the Country?



What is Your Attitude to Putin Staying on as President, even though this is Against the Constitution?



Putin's Future after the Elections of 2008

Is the Procedure of the President Presently in Office Choosing His Successor Legal and Legitimate, or is it Undemocratic and Unconstitutional?

It is a completely legal and legitimate procedure	43%
It is an undemocratic and unconstitutional procedure	29%
No answer	28%

Which of the Persons Listed on this Card Would you Vote for if the Presidential Elections Were to Take Place Next Sunday, or Would You not Vote at All?

	October 2007	November 2007
S. Ivanov	14%	16%
D. Medvedyev	14%	13%
V. Zubkov	10%	11%
G. Zyuganov	7%	9%
V. Zhirinovski	7%	6%
S. Glasyev	2%	2%
G. Yavlinski	1%	2%
I would not vote	11%	10%
I don't know for whom I would vote	7%	22%
I don't know if I would vote	26%	9%

What Will Putin Do from 2008 to 2012?

He will find a way to remain President of Russia	16%
He will hold office as the Prime Minister of Russia	13%
He will hold another office	15%
He will be chairman of "United Russia"	22%
He will leave politics	5%
Other	1%
No answer	27%

Do You Support the Idea of Making Putin Prime Minister of Russia after the End of his Term in Office as President?

Yes, very much so	28%
On the whole yes	35%
On the whole no	13%
Not at all	8%
No answer	16%

Who Should Hold the Highest Authority in Russia: the President, the Government, or the Federal Assembly (State Duma and Federal Council)?

The President	61%
The government	11%
The Federal Assembly	6%
Nobody should hold the highest authority, the principle of the separation of powers should be in force	9%
No answer	14%

Will Vladimir Putin Retain his Influence on Political Life in Russia after Leaving Office in 2008?

He will retain practically complete influence	20%
He will retain influence to a significant extent	40%
He will retain influence to some extent	23%
He will have practically no influence	4%
No answer	13%

Source: *Opinion polls of the Levada Center on 9–13/11/2007* <http://www.levada.ru./press/2007112803.html>

About the Russian Analytical Digest

The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle-uni-bremen.de) and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich). It is supported by the Otto Wolff Foundation and the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language *Russlandanalysen* (www.russlandanalysen.de), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia's role in international relations.

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Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen

Founded in 1982 and led by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Eichwede, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the former socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist societies, since January 2007 a group of international research institutes is participating in a collaborative project on the theme "The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in culture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history", which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.

In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU governance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular email service with nearly 15,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.

With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from Russia alone, which are available in the institute's library. News reports as well as academic literature is systematically processed and analyzed in data bases.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich

The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the general public.

The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center's research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy.

In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces.

The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network.

Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.

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