

ASSESSING THE NEXUS OF PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM

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The September 11 terrorist attacks did not change the structure of international relations, but they did usher in an era of newly perceived American vulnerability.¹ A senior Bush administration official observed, “A few years ago, there were great debates about what would be the threats of the post-Cold War world, would it be the rise of another great power, would it be humanitarian needs or ethnic conflicts. And I think we now know: The threats are terrorism and nation states with weapons of mass destruction and the possible union of those two forces.”² The linkage between terrorism and proliferation was reinforced by the fact that the primary countries of proliferation concern (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea) had also been designated state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. Department of State.

Though the “nexus” concept originated in the decade before 9/11, it became a driving force behind U.S. strategy in the shock of the attack’s aftermath. But by misleadingly conflating the terrorism and proliferation agendas, catastrophic or mass-casualty terrorism has become synonymous with WMD terrorism, thereby diverting attention from potential attacks of equal lethality employing more-readily obtainable *conventional* means (such as attacks on vulnerable chemical plants on the outskirts of major U.S. cities). Moreover, the nightmare scenario that has dominated the policy debate derives from the hotly disputed assumption about possible collaboration between “rogue states” and terrorist groups. The *National Security Strategy* report, issued by the White House in September 2002, declared that the threats posed to the United States in the post-9/11 era derived from the very character of these new adversaries. The document asserted that mere possession of WMD capabilities by “rogue states” was unacceptable because their unstable, risk-prone leaders might deliberately transfer weapons from their unconventional arsenals to terrorist groups. That specter was a major element of the Bush administration’s case for a preventive war in Iraq to disarm the Saddam Hussein regime of its

unconventional arsenal. Yet the more likely route by which terrorists might gain access to nuclear or other WMD capabilities would be through non-deliberate *leakage* of dangerous materials and technologies from inadequately secured sites in Russia, Pakistan, and elsewhere.

A prudent comprehensive approach by the United States would establish priorities and allocate resources on the basis of realistic assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and probabilities. The Bush administration's translation of the "nexus" concept into practice has produced an imbalance of resources (even discounting the direct financial costs of the Iraq war). Lower-probability contingencies (actual WMD use by a terrorist group or acquisition through direct transfer from a rogue state) have been accorded greater attention than higher-probability threats (conventional mass-casualty attacks and WMD acquisition through leakage). Hedging against *the worst* is critically necessary but should not be done in lieu of, or at the expense, of preventing *the more likely*. During the Cold War, defense planning was often done on the basis of the concept of "lesser-included contingencies" – the notion that the military capabilities the United States acquired to deter and defend against major contingencies (most notably, a Soviet attack on NATO) would allow it to meet lesser contingencies (such as a regional conflict outside Europe). That problematic planning assumption has affected the counterterrorism policy debate since 9/11.

The qualitatively new threats from non-state actors – in particular, millennial Islamic extremist groups such as Al Qaeda – are typically characterized as posing a particular challenge for U.S. policymakers because of their shadowy nature. But wherever they are, these non-state actors, even if autonomous, must after all operate in states. They don't exist and operate outside the contemporary international system, whose key constituent parts remain sovereign states. Therefore, the prerequisite for addressing the *non-state* threat is the design and implementation

of effective strategies on the *state* level. Doing so will not resolve the non-state threat, but it will change the character of the problem by forcing the groups underground and curtailing (albeit not eliminating) their ability to operate.

Non-State Threats, State Strategies

State-focused strategies to counter non-state threats must distinguish between three categories of countries: active sponsors, passive sponsors, and weak or failing states lacking the governmental capacity to control either their territories or sensitive WMD-related technologies and materials. These analytical categories should not be conceived as a rigid typology since individual cases frequently overlap them in reality. For example, Afghanistan under the Taliban was both an active supporter of terrorism and a failed state. Likewise, Pakistan has been a passive sponsor of terrorism, but also has a deficit of governmental capacity to fully control its important Afghan border region.

State Sponsors

Pursuant to the 1979 Export Administration Act, the U.S. secretary of state designates those countries that provide direct support to terrorist groups or employ terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Over the past two decades, this list, published in the Department of State's annual report, *Patterns on Global Terrorism*, has been remarkably consistent, with seven countries so designated – Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Cuba. Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would have made the list before 9/11, but was omitted for the simple reason that Washington never diplomatically recognized the Kabul regime.³

This U.S. designation process has generated criticism on several grounds. Principal among these is the thorny issue of political selectivity and inconsistency. Perhaps the most egregious case of this phenomenon was the Reagan administration's removal of Iraq from the

terrorism list in 1982 at a time when Washington was “tilting” toward Iraq in its war against Khomeini’s Iran. Since 9/11, similar criticism has been raised with respect to the Bush administration’s reluctance to “name and shame” the Pakistani and Saudi Arabian governments for their alleged links to terrorism. In 2003, for example, 191 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, a sizable minority, supported congressional legislation to designate Saudi Arabia a state sponsor of terrorism.⁴

The State Department’s 2003 report reveals significant differences in behavior among the seven countries on the terrorism list.⁵ Iran remains an active state sponsor; there is evidence that governmental operatives from the Revolutionary Guards and Intelligence Ministry have played a direct role in perpetrating terrorist acts. Syria’s role has shifted from direct (as in a failed 1986 plot to bomb an El Al flight) to indirect (through its continued harboring of Palestinian groups that have conducted terrorist operations against Israel). Fidel Castro’s Cuba remains on the list largely for U.S. domestic political reasons. Once designated a sponsor, a state finds it politically difficult to get off the list, even when it is motivated to do so (as Sudan, Libya, and even North Korea have been in recent years). The change of behavior necessary to win Washington’s “delisting” and the lifting of sanctions is often unclear because of the frequent conflation of terrorism with other issues, particularly nonproliferation and human rights.

Terrorism expert Paul Pillar observes that the “incongruity between the list of state sponsors and actual patterns of state support for terrorism invites cynicism....”⁶ It has also generated calls for reform to decouple the designation of a state from the automatic imposition of economic sanctions, and to eschew linkages across policy areas. As a Clinton administration counter-terrorism official colorfully declared to a congressional committee, “If you have a problem with Cuba on human rights, get your own sanctions, don’t use mine.” Reform of the

current process would yield a state-sponsored terrorism list that provides a truer picture of behavior. It would also provide the president the requisite flexibility to pursue tailored strategies toward adversaries, as well as toward notional allies that are part of the problem.⁷ Finally, a more credible terrorist list would increase the U.S. ability to win allied support for tough international measures against state sponsors.

In the post-9/11 era, the specter of “mega-terrorism” involving WMD has transformed the issue of state sponsorship. Osama bin Laden, who declared that obtaining nuclear weapons is a “religious duty,” and Al Qaeda, which perpetrated the 9/11 attacks and whose leader’s declared intention is to carry out further mass-casualty attacks on the United States and its allies, have understandably been the primary focus of attention since 9/11. But other non-state groups – including Hezbollah, the Chechen separatists, and cults “not on anybody’s radar screen,” in the words of a CIA official – may also have an interest in acquiring unconventional weapons for a mass-casualty terrorist attack.⁸

The post-9/11 debate about the state dimension of non-state threats has centered on two issues. The first (evidenced in the case of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan) is the danger that a regime will directly cooperate with a non-state actor and permit the terrorist group to operate unfettered within that state’s sovereign borders. The importance for Al Qaeda of essentially owning a country from which to operate unfettered cannot be overstated. For that reason, the war in Afghanistan was “a war of necessity,” to destroy Al Qaeda’s terrorist infrastructure and to deny the protection of a sovereign state to a group bent on perpetrating further mass-casualty attacks. This regime-changing war also stands as a cautionary precedent and a deterrent against state collusion with non-state terrorist actors.

The second issue (invoked as a rationale for military action to depose Saddam Hussein) is the danger that a rogue state might transfer WMD capabilities to a terrorist group. A possible motivation, frequently cited in the post-9/11 debate, is a convergence of strategic interest between a state and a non-state actor. But even when a state-sponsorship link exists, as between Iran and Hezbollah, major constraints exert a powerful deterrent effect. State sponsors employ terrorist groups as instruments of policy, and that implies a high degree of control. A WMD transfer would be an extraordinary act – both in its escalatory character and in its consequent threat to regime survival. Crossing that Rubicon would mean relinquishing control of the most valuable military asset in the state’s arsenal.

What strategic interest would conceivably justify a state to run such a huge gamble? Nothing short of regime survival itself. Indeed, in the case of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein reportedly pre-delegated authority to local commanders to use WMD against coalition forces if they moved beyond liberated Kuwait to march on Baghdad and overthrow his regime. In the debate preceding the 2003 war, a finding contained in the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate militated against military action in Iraq and for the continuation of a containment strategy by warning that a regime-changing war was the one scenario most likely to precipitate Iraqi WMD use or handoff to a terrorist group.

Another possible motivation for WMD transfer to a non-state actor, cited only with respect to North Korea, is economic. Unlike other countries of concern – Iran, Libya, and Iraq – North Korea is a failed state without oil resources as a source of state revenue. Its status as an economic basket case with an advanced nuclear weapons program creates a chilling conjunction of dire need and dangerous capabilities.

In response to these post-9/11 dangers, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 proscribes states “from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.”⁹ The UN resolution establishes an explicit international red line, which U.S. declaratory policy should reinforce to bolster deterrence, and which provides a basis for collective action, including the use of force against a state whose irresponsible regime crosses it.

Passive Sponsors

The traditional focus of U.S. counter-terrorism policy has been on direct state support – an emphasis embodied in the list of state sponsors. Consistent with this approach, Iran has been viewed as the archetype: Tehran has provided *active* support to the Lebanese Hezbollah and employed the group on occasion as a direct instrument of regime policy. After 9/11, however, this traditional focus evolved and broadened. Because the 19 suicide hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and other countries not on the U.S. terrorist list, increased attention has been directed to the different, and in some ways more challenging, problem of states providing *passive* support. According to terrorism expert Daniel Byman, passive support involves regimes that support terrorism by not acting.

Passive support [is] *knowingly allowing* a terrorist group to raise money, enjoy a sanctuary, recruit, or otherwise flourish without interference from a regime that does not aid the group itself.... Often passive support is given by political parties, wealthy merchants, or other actors in society that have no formal affiliation with the government. At the high end, passive support involves governments that are knowledgeable about a terrorist group and have the capacity to quash it but do not do so; at the low end, it often involves a government that misjudges the level of the threat and deliberately does not develop the capacity to counter it.¹⁰

This critical group falls between the other two categories of states – the active sponsors and those lacking the institutional capacity and power to crack down on groups operating in their territories. With the passive supporters, the cause of their “not acting” is essentially an absence

of political will. This lack of determination can stem from a variety of sources. The passive state may believe that the terrorist group does not constitute a danger to its own regime and stability. The terrorists' cause may enjoy wide popular sympathy within the country, which prompts the government's unwillingness to confront the group for fear of an internal political backlash. In addition, the passive state sponsor, while not willing to cross the threshold of active support, may "turn a blind eye" because the regime shares the groups' political objective.

Unlike with the states on the official terrorism list, the United States does not have adversarial relations with the passive sponsors, and, indeed, several are notional U.S. allies. That status affects the choice of strategy and policy instruments to entice and coerce the passive sponsors into improved performance. Those instruments of enticement and coercion are necessarily in the political and economic realm, because the use of force is highly problematic against regimes in this category. Since 9/11, two states have been the principal focus of the increased U.S. concern over passive sponsorship: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The challenge of devising effective strategies to address the problem of passive sponsorship is complicated by the absence of international legal standards defining such activity. In part, this gap stems from the stubborn insistence of some states to retain terrorism as a legitimate instrument to further a political cause – for example, widespread popular support in the Muslim world for Palestinian terrorism against a militarily superior Israel. Increasingly, however, in the transformed post-9/11 security environment, passive sponsors of terrorism can no longer escape scrutiny and "turn a blind eye" without potentially incurring significant costs. Daniel Byman recommends that the United States and its key allies against Al Qaeda (including passive sponsors Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) adopt common standards of conduct, such as those to prevent money laundering, and then press for their adoption globally. The reform of legal

codes, the establishment of limits on acceptable support for political causes, and other measures on the national level would “be part of a broader [international] campaign to lower the high bar for what constitutes state support for a terrorist group.”¹¹ States would face the strategic choice between accepting these standards and gaining tangible benefits (starting with access to the global economy), or flouting them and risking the negative consequences (possibly including economic sanctions and a travel ban on the regime’s leadership).

The cases of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia highlight the importance of political will in ending passive state sponsorship. Despite a spike in anti-Americanism and continued popular support for jihadist causes, both states now perceive Al Qaeda as a direct threat to regime security. Political will, however, though necessary, is not a sufficient condition for ending passive sponsorship. The other key determinant is state capacity. For example, Pakistani counterterrorism operations along the Afghan frontier to rout out Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants hinge not only on Musharraf’s political will to conduct them. They are also contingent on the central government’s institutional capacity, which, since the country’s founding has never permitted the establishment of Islamabad’s effective central control over the rugged region along the border shared with Afghanistan. When regimes feel themselves threatened, passive sponsors are more motivated to develop capacity and exert that power – whether it is through improved military and intelligence capabilities or educational and other domestic reforms to address the sources of terrorist support. In developing tailored strategies to address the challenge of passive sponsorship in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and elsewhere, the United States must take into account each state’s unique requirements, as well as its ability to absorb outside assistance to increase state capacity and improve governmental performance.

Weak States

Non-state terrorist groups can flourish when failing states or weak states lack the basic governmental capacity to control their own territories. States with failing capacity range from Haiti to Somalia, and from Burkina Faso to Laos. In extreme cases of state failure or collapse, political will is essentially irrelevant; the ruling regimes have inadequate capabilities to crack down on terrorist activities regardless. In his February 2004 “worldwide threat” briefing to Congress, CIA Director George Tenet reported that more than 50 countries have “stateless zones” – “no man’s land ... where central governments have no consistent reach and where socioeconomic problems are rife...[and where] in half of these, terrorist groups are thriving.”¹² The 9/11 Commission similarly characterized this new security environment and the consequent challenge for U.S. foreign policy in its July 2004 final report:

To find sanctuary, terrorist groups have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world.... In the twentieth century, strategists focused on the world’s great industrial heartlands. In the twenty-first, the focus is in the opposite direction, toward remote regions, and failing states. The United States has to find ways to extend its reach, straining the limits of its influence. Every policy decision we make needs to be seen through this lens.¹³

But experts on state capacity offer an important caveat: Even terrorists need a modicum of stability to function. Terrorists are more interested in weak states, where some degree of authority exists and they can buy off local elites to operate freely, than in collapsed states, where the absence of any authority creates a dangerous and unpredictable environment.¹⁴

In the post-9/11 era, nation-building has a hard-headed strategic rationale: to prevent weak or failing states from falling prey to terrorist groups. Social scientist Francis Fukuyama writes that promoting governance of weak states, improving their democratic legitimacy, and strengthening self-sustaining institutions have become “the central project of contemporary international politics.”¹⁵

The challenge is daunting because the problem is immense. Given the transformed post-9/11 security environment, a formulation from the 1990s debates over humanitarian intervention has new resonance: The fact that the United States cannot do everything, everywhere, does not mean that it should not do anything, anywhere. The 9/11 Commission, with its emphasis on the dangerous linkage between weak states and terrorism, offered a criterion for making policy choices: “The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. For each, it should have a realistic strategy ... using all elements of national power.”¹⁶ This approach entails assisting the target state to develop the capacity to exercise sovereign control over its own territory, thereby making the environment less hospitable for non-state actors who would seek to use it as a base for mounting terrorist operations. In its 2004 report, the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security identified key elements of a comprehensive preventive strategy, including: increasing market access for developing countries, increasing direct foreign investment, providing debt relief, implementing measures to reduce corruption, improving U.S. sanctions policy, and better “leveraging” the U.S. investment by effectively working with other G-8 members and international financial institutions. “Identifying and addressing ... capability gaps,” the Commission on Weak States concluded, “is the fundamental strategy that will allow U.S. foreign policy to help reverse state weakness, prevent state failure, and avoid the dangerous consequences of both.”¹⁷

The *National Security Strategy* document, promulgated by the White House in September 2002, elevated military preemption to official U.S. doctrine as a response to the new age of vulnerability. In sharp contrast to the use of force against a state, military action against a terrorist group bent on mass-casualty attacks enjoys greater international legitimacy. The operation of a non-state actor, such as Al Qaeda, on the territory of a weak or failing state would

create the essential precondition for U.S. military preemption. In point of fact, the Pentagon announced a plan in March 2005 to expand U.S. military operations to prevent “states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders” from becoming havens for terrorists.¹⁸ But it would be far preferable to the implementation of that unilateral option if the low-capacity state itself acquired military and law enforcement capabilities for effective operations.

Strategies toward weak states have traditionally focused on developing local capacity and empowering regimes to assert effective control over their territory. But what if that route is not available – owing either to the magnitude of the state’s weakness or the inability of local authorities to absorb increased capacity? Stanford political scientist Stephen Krasner argues that intractable conditions of state failure may require an extraordinary remedy overriding the fundamental rules of state sovereignty: “[B]etter domestic governance in badly governed, failed and occupied polities will require the transcendence of accepted rules, including the creation of shared sovereignty in specific areas. In some cases, decent governance may require some new form of trusteeship, almost certainly de facto rather than de jure.”¹⁹ Such shared sovereignty arrangements could be undertaken by the United States, the European Union, and other major powers, or by international and regional organizations. The target state’s leadership could be induced to accept this governance arrangement through the offer of foreign assistance.²⁰

In the post-9/11 era, when state failure is viewed as having potentially adverse strategic consequences for the United States, strategies toward weak states remain focused primarily on capacity-building. The specter of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack by a terrorist group based in a failed state requires the development of capacity not just in states unable to exert effective control over territory, but also in those states that are potential sources of proscribed WMD-related technologies. Leakage of WMD technologies or expertise, rather than a direct

transfer as an act of state policy, is the more probable route by which a terrorist group might acquire such capabilities for a mass-casualty attack. In the nuclear area alone, hundreds of tons of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium are inadequately secured in Russia and many other countries around the globe. Securing nuclear materials at their source is “the single most critical layer” in a multi-tiered defense to prevent terrorists from gaining access to them.²¹ In the case of Pakistan, the concern is that rogue officers, sympathetic to Al Qaeda or a like Islamic extremist group, within the nuclear establishment might illicitly transfer a weapon to terrorists. Although they are not issues typically paired in policy discussions, capacity-building aimed at the WMD supply side to prevent leakage is an essential complement to nation-building efforts in weak states where terrorist groups might seek sanctuary.

Deterrence and WMD Terrorism

The central argument of this paper is that effective strategies on the state level are the prerequisite for meeting threats from non-state actors. A comprehensive effort to address WMD terrorism should encompass tailored strategies toward each of the three state categories. This repertoire of context-specific strategies would employ two variants of deterrence – *deterrence by punishment* and *deterrence by denial*.²² The long-term goal of this multi-tiered approach is for active sponsors to renounce terrorism, for passive sponsors to no longer “turn a blind eye,” and for weak states to develop the capacity to assert effective control over their territory to deny terrorists sanctuary. If successfully implemented, such state-focused strategies will not end the non-state threat but will alter its character and, in the words of the 9/11 Commission, “keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run.”²³

State sponsorship of terrorism, long the dominant focus of U.S. counterterrorism policy, is a “diminishing concern,” according to a Department of Homeland Security internal report

leaked to the press in March 2005. “In the post-9/11 environment, countries do not appear to be facilitating or supporting terrorist groups intent on striking the U.S. homeland.” Only Iran is identified as having “a possible future motivation” to employ terrorism as an instrument of state policy against the United States. The overall decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, as well as the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate’s salient finding, previously cited, that the imminent threat of regime change through external intervention is the primary scenario under which a state would use or hand off WMD capabilities to a non-state actor, militates against such a direct transfer. Yet though of *low probability*, this contingency – the driving force behind the “nexus” concept since 9/11 – must nonetheless be effectively addressed as part of a comprehensive U.S. strategy because of its *high consequences*.

Recent years have witnessed the steady erosion of nonproliferation “red lines” as the United States has been unable to prevent hostile proliferators from crossing key technological thresholds in the nuclear area: North Korea’s provocative nuclear test and Iran’s uranium enrichment are prominent cases in point. The bottom line is to deter the transfer of nuclear or other WMD-related capabilities to a non-state actor, such as Al Qaeda, which has expressed the clear intention to use them against the United States and its allies. U.S. declaratory policy should clearly communicate to hostile proliferators this explicit red line: The transfer of WMD capabilities by a state to a non-state actor could trigger a regime-changing response from the United States. Such a policy – deterrence by punishment – would be pursued in tandem with, not as an alternative to, international efforts to prevent these hostile proliferators from acquiring nuclear and other WMD capabilities in the first place. This red line on deliberate transfer would cover the cases of North Korea and Iran.

But what about the more acute problem of potentially negligent countries, most notably Russia and Pakistan, where the major concern is nuclear leakage?²⁴ Some experts have suggested extending the deterrent threat to these countries by enunciating a policy of “expanded deterrence” under which the country of origin of the fissile material used in a nuclear terrorist strike on the U.S. homeland would be held responsible.²⁵ Technical advances in the area of nuclear “attribution,” vigorously being pursued by the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories, will increasingly permit experts to determine the *source* of fissile material should an attack occur. The Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency established a nuclear forensic unit, which, in early 2006, had reportedly achieved an “initial integrated operational ... capability for accurate and rapid attribution.”²⁶ Nonetheless, the United States might be unable to determine the source of the material after an attack, and would not want to retaliate against a negligent state, such as Russia, which has a large nuclear weapons stockpile of its own. But a calculatedly ambiguous deterrent threat – “in the event of a nuclear attack, the country of origin will be taken into account in determining the U.S. response” – would not commit the United States to a retaliatory response against the country of origin. The aim would be to compel countries that need to improve fissile material security to do more to deny terrorists access to nuclear and other WMD capabilities. The deterrent threat would complement the offer of political and economic inducements to these states to implement effective safeguard programs. In short, the fear of *deterrence by punishment* (i.e., concern about the potential U.S. response should fissile material from their country be used in a nuclear attack on the United States by a non-state actor) could lead countries that are the potential sources of nuclear leakage to implement more effective strategies of *deterrence by denial* (i.e., safeguarding materials to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands). Most of what can be done in the

nonproliferation area with respect to WMD terrorism – from export controls to physical security at sensitive sites where nuclear materials are stored, and from interdiction of contraband cargoes to improving the capacity of states to control their own territories – falls under the rubric of deterrence by denial.

Deterrence is a Cold War-era concept, now being recast to address the exigencies of a new era. Its continued relevance after 9/11 underscores the centrality of state-based strategies. Effectiveness on the *state* level – from ending sponsorship of terrorism to developing governmental capacity to exert sovereign control over territory – is the key to countering *non-state* threats.

¹ This paper is drawn from my more extensive treatment of this subject in Robert S. Litwak, *Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11* (Baltimore and Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press and Wilson Center Press, 2007), chapter 8.

² Quoted in Jackson Diehl, "The Accidental Imperialist," *Washington Post*, December 30, 2002, p. A17.

³ For a detailed discussion of state-sponsored or state-enabled terrorism see Paul Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), chapter 6.

⁴ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 224.

⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism," *Global Patterns of Terrorism 2003*, June 22, 2004, pp. 85-93 (<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/>).

⁶ Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, p. 163.

⁷ Quotation cited and reform proposals discussed in *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

⁸ These various non-state groups are discussed in Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2004), chapter 1.

⁹ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1540, April 28, 2004 (<http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/bc94a057247ad11085256e8500541fe5?OpenDocument>).

¹⁰ Byman, *Deadly Connections*, p. 222.

¹¹ Daniel L. Byman, "Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism," *Analysis Paper*, no. 4 (Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, February 2005), p. 33.

¹² Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, "The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global Context," Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 24 February 2004 (www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/dci_speech_02142004.html).

¹³ National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 366-367.

¹⁴ See Robert I. Rotberg, "Failed States in a World of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002), pp. 127-140; Stewart Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 27-53.

¹⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 99.

¹⁶ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 367.

¹⁷ Commission on Weak States and US National Security, *On the Brink: Weak States and the US National Security* (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2004), pp. 2-4.

¹⁸ Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Strategy Aims to Block Internal Threats to Foreign Forces," *Washington Post*, March 19, 2005, p. A2.

¹⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security* 29, no.2 (Fall 2004), p. 85. This article was written before Krasner was appointed Director for Policy Planning at the State Department during President Bush's second term.

²⁰ *Ibid.* p 119-120.

²¹ Matthew Bunn, Anthony Weir, John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, March 2003), p. ix (www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf).

²² This concept is developed in Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence by Denial and Punishment*, Research Monograph no. 1 (Princeton University, Center for International Studies, January 1959).

²³ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 367.

²⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the role of deterrence see Robin M. Frost, *Nuclear Terrorism After 9/11*, Adelphi Papers, no 378 (London: Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 2005), pp. 63-68.

²⁵ Robert L. Gallucci, "Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability," *Harvard International Review* 26, no. 4 (Winter 2005, <http://harvardir.org/articles/1303/>).

²⁶ William J. Broad, "New Team Plans to Identify Nuclear Attackers," *New York Times*, February 2, 2006, p. A17.