

MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN PREVENTIVE MILITARY STRATEGY

Peter Dombrowski
Strategic Research Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, MLH-231
Naval War College
2006-1

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This working paper is one of several outcomes of the Ridgway Working Group on Preemptive and Preventive Military Intervention, chaired by Gordon R. Mitchell.

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United States foreign policy has long been informed by the implicit assumption that military force can be used to counter imminent threats to national security,¹ but seldom if ever has the U.S. publicly declared a preference for limited preventive strikes and/or preventive war. The doctrine of preventive military intervention, announced formally with the publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) changed this reticence by indicating that the United States would no longer wait to be attacked before responding; instead the Bush administration pledged to strike potential attackers before they acted. Years later, senior Bush administration officials continue to support preventive use of force despite a firestorm of domestic and international criticism and charges that it contributed to the Iraq disaster.

Sustaining an explicit commitment to preventive military strategy raises an important question: Does the United States have the military capabilities necessary to implement a doctrine of preventive military intervention over time?² On initial consideration, this question might seem irrelevant. Recent U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, not to mention Kosovo and the first Gulf War, have been successful, in an operational sense, if not in strategic terms.³ Further, as has been widely reported, U.S. military spending exceeds that of the rest of the world combined so there appears little chance that any single country or even group of countries could challenge U.S. military supremacy any time soon. The Bush administration, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the military services have also committed to maintaining American predominance by actively encouraging a process of transformation designed to increase substantially the nation's military capabilities in the coming decades. In short, how could the United States have difficulty implementing preventive military strategy?

Answering this question will help determine how credible the doctrine will be as future presidents grapple with terrorist groups, state sponsors or terrorism, rogue states, and proliferators of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons.⁴ It is likely that the preventive force option will remain available, one form or another, for the foreseeable future.⁵ If so, the United States military must have the wherewithal to implement the policy successfully. Otherwise the United States might face operational failures, the loss of credibility, and, perhaps, an erosion of national security.⁶

This working paper is divided into five sections. First, it explores the general military capabilities are required to implement the doctrine of preventive military intervention. Second, it considers whether the United States has these capabilities in sufficient quantity and quality. The next section considers U.S. capabilities *vis-à-vis* two countries—Iran and Syria—that are potential targets of U.S. preventive military action. Section five discusses how U.S. military limitations, within the wider context of the doctrine of

preventive military intervention, might affect international perceptions of U.S. credibility, legitimacy and security. The working paper concludes by examining options for increasing the U.S. capacity for preventive military intervention.

PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION AND THE USE OF FORCE

Most analyses bemoan the fact that the Bush administration has used the term preemption promiscuously, thus muddying the distinction between preemption and prevention. Debates over the Iraq war and whether it was undertaken under the auspices of the new strategic doctrine or for other reasons such as upholding the credibility of the United Nations Security Council have not helped matters. Nor have the recent findings that Iraq neither possessed nuclear weapons capable of imminently threatening the United States nor had close ties with terrorist groups such as al-Qaida bolstered international confidence in the ability of the United States to execute a first-strike strategy in good faith. Other working papers in this series consider these arguments in detail and clarify the theoretical distinction between preemptive and preventive military action. My analysis focuses on the military challenges involved in implementing a strategic doctrine based on preventive use of force.

To help understand what military capabilities are required to implement the doctrine of preventive military intervention, it is first necessary to clarify what it means in terms of military requirements. Conceptually there are two general types of preventive military actions: (1) strike operations involving limited attacks against a discrete set of targets; and (2) full scale military interventions intended, for example, to topple a regime pursuing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or harboring terrorists.

The U.S. military must be prepared, out of necessity, to undertake preventive military action alone; hence in this working paper we will not focus on how the United States might undertake preventive action alongside allied or coalition forces, although, as will be discussed in the working paper's conclusion this may be an option in the future. In the near term, unless the Bush administration or its successors radically shift their relations with the United Nations, regional security organizations, and even members of ad hoc, "coalitions of the willing," the military actions associated with either limited preventive strikes or preventive wars will largely fall upon the American armed forces. One reason is practical; few countries have types of military forces necessary to conduct either strike or full combat operations far from home. Another reason is political; few states agree with the U.S. assertion that it has the unilateral right to undertake preventive military intervention. The apparent lack of trained troops and appropriate equipment among potential partners are relatively minor obstacles compared to the divergence between American understanding about when and how force might be used, legally and ethically, and the positions held by many members of the international community, including long-

standing allies like France and Great Britain.⁷ The net result of international opposition to the American position on the use of force is that many countries are reluctant to participate in American-led actions.

The problems associated with how the Bush administration made its case against Iraq have also affected the willingness of other states to join the United States in undertaking preventive military actions. Having been misled on the presence of nuclear weapons capabilities, the imminence of the threat, the extent of Iraq relations with al-Qaida, and the prospects for peace in post-war Iraq, many countries are reluctant to believe in the legitimacy of NSS 2002 itself or have full confidence in the ability U.S. intelligence and military services to support the preventive military actions. Additionally, many countries have expressed skepticism about recent American claims against Iran, Syria, and even North Korea.

U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES

NSS 2002 is a guide for using force but it tells the world little about whether the U.S. military can do what is expected of it.⁸ Does the United States have the military forces to strike weapons production facilities and/or terrorist facilities? The preceding conceptual distinction between limited preventive strikes and preventive wars helps answer this question. Limited preventive strikes are focused attacks against discrete targets while preventive wars involve more sustained campaigns designed to end, by regime change if necessary, a rogue state's ability to threaten the United States.⁹ Preventive war also implies that regime change will be accompanied by reconstruction, both political and material; the U.S. must be prepared to help create and support the establishment a successor to the regime it just displaced. At a minimum, this requires that the United States help supply security—including constabulary functions—while the new regime becomes viable. The Afghan and Iraq wars and post conflict period have taught the world that skimping on security undermines the orderly transfer of power.

MILITARY BALANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The American military has downsized substantially since the height of the 1980s buildup but this does not necessarily mean that the individual services are less capable or that they are not able to accomplish assigned roles and missions. The Navy, for example, has fewer ships than the nearly six hundred it could deploy in the late 1980s but by other measures such as firepower, the Navy is stronger today. The nature of threats have also changed, although how and why is often in dispute, so few expect the U.S. military to maintain the size and composition it held when it faced the forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Historically, the most common benchmark for assessing the appropriate size of American forces was the two-war standard. In short, the standard maintains that the United States should maintain sufficient military forces to fight and win two conflicts nearly simultaneously. In the post-Cold War

period the two-war standard has been debated and revised continuously. More recent variants discuss preparing for two simultaneous major regional contingencies and other “lesser included cases” such as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

The relationship of U.S. military force structure to the planning standards such as the ability to fight two wars has often been more theoretical than real. It is unclear whether the country met its own planning objectives at any point since World War II. A true test of fundamental U.S. planning objectives has never really happened, however, because for the most part the military has not been called upon to fight major conflicts at once. Efforts to sustain multiple smaller operations simultaneously suggest that shortfalls are myriad especially with regard to “high value, low density assets” such as air refueling tankers, surveillance and communications satellites, and language specialists, to name a few prominent examples. The U.S. military’s readiness to fulfill its planning objectives in the past, today and in the future, is in dispute. Witness for example the debate between the Bush and Kerry campaigns (not to mention congressional partisans) during the 2002 presidential race over whether the Army needs more manpower to sustain operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hotspots in the global war on terror simultaneously.

What is not in dispute is that the U.S. military today is smaller today than it was prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Currently U.S. forces consist of approximately 1.37 million active duty forces and 1.28 million ready and stand-by reserves. Table 1 provides a rough outline of America’s military strength by military service and major fighting components. While this is not necessarily the best measure of the strength of the U.S. armed forces it does enable a first order assessment.

TABLE 1
US MILITARY ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL AND CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE
30 SEPTEMBER 2004

<i>ARMY</i>	<i>NAVY</i>	<i>MARINE CORPS</i>	<i>AIR FORCE</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
499,543	373,197	177,480	376, 616	1,426,836
10/8 Active / National Guard Divisions	301 Ships	3/1 Active / National Guard Divisions	10 Air and Space Expeditionary Units	

Source: Adapted from United States, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2004* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), <<http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2004/index.html>>.

Regardless of abstract planning metrics, as a global power the United States prepares for multiple conflicts simultaneously, including both so-called “wars of choice” that fall under the rubric of the preventive military intervention¹⁰ and conflicts that are thrust upon it due to prior commitments or the

new adversaries. This is especially true if the country remains locked in counterinsurgency, policy and occupation roles in Iraq. Many reputable analysts inside and outside the government argue that a long-term military commitment to Iraq, including combat forces, is straining and will continue to strain, U.S. forces, especially the Army, Marine Corps combat units and specialized military capabilities. For this working paper, let us assume that in the short- to intermediate-term the United States will maintain between 120 and 130 thousand, if not more, troops in Iraq with an appropriate level of support by Air Force and Naval airpower as well as intelligence assets of various types. Obviously the demand for combat troops would diminish rapidly if the United States chooses to withdraw its forces from Iraq or was asked to leave by an elected Iraqi government.

PREVENTIVE STRIKE CAPABILITIES

The ability to launch strikes, preventive or otherwise, remains perhaps the greatest single strength of the United States military; in fact, it is perhaps the only capacity not diminished by the Iraq commitment. Unlike other countries, the United States is able to strike targets anywhere in the world within a relatively short period of time. Repeatedly during the long shadow war against al-Qaida prior to 9/11, the Clinton Administration attacked and prepared to attack al-Qaida facilities and leaders including Osama bin Laden; missions were often aborted not because the military was not ready to launch air strikes, cruise missiles, or special operations, but because intelligence was not always actionable.¹¹ Within months of determining that al-Qaida, under the protection of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, had planned and carried out the 9-11 attacks, the United States attacked and destroyed virtually all terrorist and military targets in the country. What makes this feat impressive is the geographic distance of Afghanistan both from the United States and from its forces stationed abroad both on land and at sea. The U.S. was able to strike at will using a wide array of precision weapons and “dumb” bombs launched from U.S. based strategic bombers, carrier-based attack aircraft, both air and sea-launched cruise missiles, and, in a few cases, unmanned combat aerial vehicles such as the *Global Hawk*. It was also able to deploy Special Forces and other covert troops on Afghani territory by December 2001, once President Bush made the decision to remove the Taliban from power.

Admittedly, some elements of the American attacks were improvised. Military analysts called it a “pick up game.” A Nimitz class nuclear aircraft carrier that normally carries a complement of 84 strike and reconnaissance aircraft was reconfigured to host special operations forces and associated air power. Covert forces operating outside the control of the U.S. military provided much of the early “on-the-ground” firepower in Afghanistan. Much of the actual ground fighting was done by the Northern Alliance with U.S. financial, logistical and intelligence assistance. Improvisation though serves only to highlight

the ingenuity and training of the American military when faced with an especially difficult military objective.

Operations Northern and Southern Watch over Iraq following the Persian Gulf War are also instructive—because the demonstrated capacity of the United States to sustain strike operations over time when necessary. For nearly six and one-half years the United States, with the support of British (and French for awhile) forces as well as the facilities and airspace of Iraq's neighbors, was able to both surveil Iraq's territory—including both the land under no-fly zone restrictions imposed by the United Nations and areas where Iraqi sovereignty remained technically intact. More to the point, U.S. planes repeatedly struck Iraqi air defense systems, intelligence facilities and other targets to enforce the UN arms and oil embargoes, prevent Saddam's forces from punishing Kurds and other rebellious groups with Iraq, and ensure that Saddam was unable to launch a full-scale NBC production program.¹²

These two examples, while extreme, illustrate the range of U.S. strike capabilities. Even the most heavily defended airspaces are eventually accessible to U.S. tactical and strategic aircraft. American air defense suppression systems, stealth technologies, radar jamming capabilities, satellite surveillance technologies, battle space management techniques, and virtually unfettered access to the global commons of space and the high seas ensure access. There are, of course, gaps and weaknesses in U.S. strike operations—poor flying weather, heavy jungle canopies, mobile targets, and so forth present formidable technical and operational challenges that have not yet been resolved.

The logic underlying preventive military intervention requires more than retaliatory one-shot limited preventive strikes or even sustained operations, however. The ambitious objectives of regime change, democratization and nation building are not attainable with limited preventive strikes. Launching preventive strikes is analogous to treating the symptoms rather the disease or underlying its causes; the best-case outcome is that a regime is deterred or discouraged from continuing harboring terrorists or proliferating unconventional weapons. In the worst case, a recalcitrant regime continues covert efforts to attain NBC weapons and/or assist ant-American terrorists groups. Preventive wars attack the root of problems posed by adversaries by removing the regime in power and installing a new one that, if the Bush administration has its way, will have similar institutions and aspirations to the United States and its democratic allies. Drive by shootings will not, indeed, lead bad guys to stop acquiring nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or from harboring terrorists. These goals require larger, more sustained commitments to the use of force.

PREVENTIVE WARS

The most controversial and militarily challenging option is to launch a preventive war to effect regime change against a “rogue” state. Preventive wars, at least as discussed by members of the Bush administration and its supporters, is for the opponent akin to total war. The regime that is attacked is literally fighting for its life and, depending on the circumstance, the lives and freedom of its political leaders. As a consequence, there is possibility that it will use whatever military means are at its disposal to ward off the attack or increase the costs on the attacking nation even to the point where preventive war is no longer an attractive option. This logic underlies the assumptions of many analysts prior to both wars with Iraq that Saddam Hussein would deploy and use chemical and biological weapons if pushed to the extreme.

The type of military force required to effect regime change is determined by the particular characteristics of the regime in question—its military capabilities, possession or not of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, the support that could be expected from the populace, terrain, and access from the sea and air, in addition to many other factors. Even for a military as experienced as the United States the types and qualities of forces required are often subject to dispute. Even relatively small operations such as preparations for the potential invasion of Kosovo generated disputes between General Clark, NATO allies, the Pentagon leadership and civilian leaders.¹³ While preparing for the 2003 Iraq invasion the Bush administration was, at least temporarily, beset by internal strife as those who advocated for a large force capable of winning through a *coup d’état* and handling all possible contingencies vied with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others who insisted that a much smaller military force, if used properly, could win through rapid decisive operations and so-called shock and awe tactics.¹⁴

As both Iraq wars demonstrated, however, defeating the enemy’s forces on the battlefield is insufficient to win a victory, especially in the case of preventive war where regime change is expected. For a viable political settlement to be arranged, the military must secure the territory of the government it has defeated. The reasons are both military—it is not in the interest of the invader to allow a resistance movement, insurgency or even civil war to develop—and political—for a new regime to replace its predecessor the invader needs political legitimacy and must demonstrate that it can protect civilians and infrastructure until a new government is ready and able to assume its responsibilities.

As a consequence military operations do not necessarily stop once major battles are completed. Rather, the nature of the military’s tasks and assignments changes. This often requires troops and equipment different from those required for major combat operations, thus creating a different type of strain on the nation’s military forces.

Iraq has re-taught the United States that it is not enough to simply destroy an adversary's armies, air forces, navies, and other military capabilities to ensure a lasting peace and reduce the possibility that the nation will have to go to war against the same adversary in the future. Unfortunately, the United States military has not focused on occupation and reconstruction for some time. Even as the administration was preparing for the Iraq invasion it was simultaneously closing down the Peacekeeping Institute at the U.S. Army War College—one of the few assets designed to prepare its troops for succeeding in the post-conflict environment it would face in Iraq as soon as the main battles were decided.¹⁵ The U.S. military suffered from what has been called “the problem of forgetting.”¹⁶

The mantra of U.S. military forces in recent years is the equivalent of “we don't do windows.”¹⁷ Time and time again, general officers have argued that the military services should focus on war fighting as opposed to all the various operations categorized as “military operations other than war” or (MOOTW). Yet in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq, the U.S. Army has increasingly found itself employed as the main implementers of a grand strategy of nation building and democratization. Contrary to popular belief, these are tasks that the United States Army and Marine Corps have historically carried out-- from its decades long efforts to pacify the Western frontier in the nineteenth century to the long-term commitments to Nicaragua, the Philippines and a host of larger countries such as Germany, Japan and later South Korea. Nowhere is this trend more evident than in Iraq. The Bush administration made public and extravagant commitments to rebuilding the nation's economy and introducing democratic political institutions, an objective whose fulfillment is contingent on the ability of the United States to provide internal and external security for the new government.

Despite history and rhetoric, neither the civilian nor military leaderships appear to have prepared especially well for what the military calls Phase IV or post hostility operations.¹⁸ As David Reiff argued, “[t]he real lesson of the postwar mess is that while occupying and reconstructing Iraq was bound to be difficult, the fact that it may be turning into a quagmire is not a result of fate, but rather (as quagmires usually are) a result of poor planning and wishful thinking.”¹⁹ Reiff's interpretation has been confirmed by General (retired) Tommy Franks' insider account of the preparations for the Iraq War.²⁰ Yet no amount of planning and no amount of can-do spirit amongst U.S. military personnel could entirely overcome the fact that American soldiers are no longer trained and equipped to serve in the post-conflict environments presented in Iraq and, perhaps, in the future if other preventive wars are launched.

At some future date, the U.S. will, in all likelihood, find itself once again in a position of nation-building, democratic or otherwise. But if the past is a guide, the United States can no longer walk away once the last full-scale battle has been fought. It must help create the conditions for self-governance, preferably democratic. If these means keeping significant forces in-country to perform policing or even counter-insurgency operations so be it. To do otherwise is to risk having to intervene militarily again and

again as the United States has done in Haiti, Nicaragua and a host of other small countries circling the globe. Further, given that military spending, expertise, capital and human resources are likely to exceed by an order of magnitude the other components of American foreign operations budgets, the military will be the primary instrument used to exercise American power.²¹

AGAINST WHOM?

In his 2002 State of the Union address President Bush specifically identified three members of the so-called axis of evil—Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Months later, then Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, John R. Bolton took the President's proclamation one step further by identifying Cuba, Libya, and Syria as states that might be subject to preventive action.²² Events appear to have taken Libya off the list of candidates for preventive war;²³ although as experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency still seek verify whether Libya has fulfilled its pledges to the international community, longer term worries remain.²⁴ Cuba, however, remains a remote candidate but still real possibility as neither the Democratic nor Republican parties can resist pandering to the Cuban exile community for votes; the Bush administration has even claimed, despite a paucity of evidence, that Cuba may be sharing biological weapons or the technologies to make them.²⁵

Other possible targets for preventive war may also warrant consideration. Several states not mentioned by President Bush have nuclear weapons, NBC development programs, and have at least been rumored to be shopping these weapons to outlaw states and perhaps even terrorists groups. Chief among these is Pakistan. Prior to 9/11, one of President Bush's special assistants on the National Security Council, Kori Schake, developed a list of so-called rogue states and potential proliferators (see Table 2).²⁶ In short, there is no shortage of potential targets for preventive military intervention in the future.

TABLE 2

POTENTIAL “ROGUE” STATES

<i>STATE</i>	<i>NBC PROGRAMS</i>	<i>TERRORISM SPONSOR</i>
Algeria	Yes	Yes
China	Yes	No
Cuba	No	No
Iran	Yes	Yes
Libya	Yes	Yes
North Korea	Yes	Yes
Russia	Yes	No
Serbia	Yes	No
Sudan	Yes	Yes
Syria	Yes	Yes

Source: Adapted from Kori N. Schake and Justin P. Bernier, “Dealing with Rogue States,” in *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, vol. 1, ed. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2001).

The next paragraphs consider most closely two cases: Iran and Syria. Both countries have been explicitly warned and even threatened by senior officials in the Bush administration. Both also represent hard cases in that they have relatively large militaries, and the type of popular support that would make them unlikely candidates for the sort of regime change “lite” represented by schemes to undermine the regime using exiles, disgruntled tribal groups or geographic regions. Other potential rogues have been set aside, for this analysis anyway, in large part because of the reverse insight offered by an Indian officer. When asked about the lesson of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the officer said: “Never fight the U.S. Without nuclear weapons.”²⁷ The United States is not eager to attack preventively against a nuclear-armed adversary.

CAPABLE FOES?

A traditional defense planner seeking specific answers to the specific question motivating this working paper might begin by generating scenarios for fighting potential target states and then war game these scenarios using existing or projected capabilities, strategies, and tactics for the United States, possible allies, the target state and its possible allies. More recently, defense planners have used capability-based techniques that address iteratively questions of strategy, budgets, and uncertain threats. Given the manpower, expertise and resource-intensiveness of these processes, they are obviously far beyond the scope of this working paper. As a very rough substitute, this working paper will assess the relative difficulty of launching a preventive war against the two countries based on three parameters: 1) geography; 2) military balance and military effectiveness; and 3) intensity of resistance before and after military intervention to an effort by the United States to impose regime change.

Geography will be discussed because a prerequisite for launching a preventive war is access to the target country. Although the United States could plausibly threaten most parts of most countries with military strikes (and even a significant number of troops using airborne landings, austere bases, and so forth), a full scale preventive war would be much more viable if the military could introduce its forces in significant numbers through land routes, major ports and/or access to functional air bases.

Military balance, for these purposes, refers simply to the numbers and nature of the military forces controlled by a particular country. According to Ken Pollack, military effectiveness “refers to the ability of soldiers and officers to perform on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions, and to execute strategies devised by their political-military leaders. If strategy is the military means to by which political ends are pursued, military effectiveness refers to the skills that are employed.”²⁸ In brief, a country can have an imposing military force structure but remain militarily ineffective when confronted with actual combat. Assessment of Iraq’s military before and after the 1991 Persian Gulf War represents an extreme example of this phenomenon.

Intensity of resistance refers to how likely or unlikely the United States is to win the support and or acquiescence of significant segments of the target countries population, political elites, and regular or irregular military forces. It also considers the likelihood that remnants of the previous regime will continue to fight as “dead enders” and/or whether there are major tribal or ethnic groups that can and will serve as alternative sources of political, economic, ideological and thus military power. The presence or absence of neighboring countries also opposed to regime change and/or an American-led invasion and reconstruction will also be considered.

IRAN

Iran remains the favorite candidate of neo-conservative activists for the next preventive war to be launched by the United States. As Charles Krauthammer argues, once there were five countries supporting terrorism and pursuing unconventional weapons—two junior-leaguers, Libya and Syria, and the axis-of-evil varsity: Iraq, Iran and North Korea.²⁹ The Bush administration has eliminated two: Iraq, by direct military means, and Libya, at least according to Bush administration partisans, by example and intimidation. As Charles Krauthammer views the situation:

Syria is weak and deterred by Israel. North Korea, having gone nuclear, is untouchable. That leaves Iran. What to do? There are only two things that will stop the Iranian nuclear program: revolution from below or an attack on its nuclear facilities. The country should be ripe for revolution. The regime is detested. But the mullahs are very good at police-state tactics. The long-awaited revolution is not happening which makes the question of preemptive attack all the more urgent.³⁰

American relations, with the government of Iran have been largely conflictual since the Iranian revolution in 1979. But unlike Iraq,³¹ Iran has not received a great deal of attention until recent years, in large part because both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush were preoccupied with Iraq. Iran, however, has played a checkered role in supporting and/or hindering American objectives in Iraq both before during and after the 2003 Iraq war. The heart of recent American antagonism toward Iran lies with evidence that Iran has pursued and may still be pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. In combination with alleged Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs during the post-Saddam period, Iran's nuclear ambitions have moved the country to the forefront of potential threats to U.S. interests.

- *Geography.* Iran is both a long way from the United States and, at least until the recent occupation of Iraq, relatively difficult to access for American armed forces. Moreover it is a very large country with an incredibly diverse terrain. The climate ranges from arid to semi-tropical along the Caspian coast. Of its five neighboring states, some of are friendly and sympathetic to the regime, while others have long histories of conflict and even outright warfare. There is a coastline on the Persian Gulf which might allow for logistical operations in addition to those based in Iraq, but all shipping must pass through the straits of Hormuz and other bottlenecks, thus leaving a potential invading and resupply force vulnerable to sea-based attacks and access denial through mining operations. In short, Iran is an inhospitable country with access limited to a relatively small coastline and such landlines of communications as exist between its long-time enemy Iraq.

- *Military balance and effectiveness.* Iran's conventional military is large but low-tech, especially given arms embargoes in place since the fall of the Shah and the tremendous losses of the Iraq-Iran war.

Iranian conventional power projection aside from terrorism is limited to its immediate neighbors. On the defense in its own country, it remains a formidable military force, however. One expert notes that it would require “a ground force of a substantial number of divisions” to “completely defeat it.”³²

The state of Iranian nuclear, biological and chemical programs remains in dispute. Most experts acknowledge a measure of biological and chemical capability, but the biggest worry is the country’s nuclear capabilities. Few think dirty bombs and other non-atomic or thermonuclear explosions can be ruled out by an invading foe. In the Iran-Iraq war, Iranians demonstrated a will to fight that shouldn’t be ignored. Despite the western weapons and intelligence channeled to Iraq, Iran was able to hold its own largely through the fanaticism of its troops and the ruthlessness of its leaders.

- *Intensity of Resistance.* Again as the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated, the nationalism of the Iranian people, and their willingness to sacrifice lives and social wellbeing are quite serious. Iraq’s political landscape is divided and contentious. Iran is relatively homogenous in terms of religion and ethnicity. Homogeneity can work for and against a potential invader. On one hand, the invader cannot hope to support one ethnic group against the others; thereby securing perhaps a territorial base and a base of support amongst at least some on the local populace. On the other hand, the possibility of finding a post-conflict political settlement is not complicated by intricacies of confessional and ethnic politics such as institutional power-sharing, the disenfranchisement of minorities, and the aftershocks of longstanding historical grievances.

In sum, if the doctrine of preventive military intervention and the fundamental precepts of the Bush administration’s approach to foreign and security policies are to be taken seriously, Iran is a potential target for preventive war and/or limited preventive strikes and perhaps even preventive war. Some analysts believe Iran might be willing to transfer its nuclear knowledge and capabilities to one or more of the terrorist groups it has supported for the past several decades, develop its own nuclear weapons and delivery systems and, perhaps even choose to use them in service of its wider regional ambitions in the Persian Gulf and the Greater Middle East. Iran will remain a serious threat to American security interests.

Yet, limited preventive strikes against Iran, much less a preventive war, will be much more difficult than in the Afghanistan and Iraq cases. Limited preventive strikes are not very likely given that like most states with nuclear ambitions, Iran has spread its facilities widely and buried many deep under ground.³³ Preventive war would be equally difficult because of the geography of Iran. Even more than Iraq, Iran possesses great strategic depth. It also has a large and relatively homogeneous population with long history of independence, nationalism, and antagonism toward the United States. Finally, although some might calculate that Iraq would provide a convenient launching pad for a war against Iran, that the

large numbers of American troops are tied up supplying basic security services in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

SYRIA

In some respects Syria is an unlikely target of the preventive war doctrine. It was a U.S. ally in the first Gulf War. Following the death of President Hafez Assad, Syria has been led by his son Bashar who is western educated and, by some accounts, more interested in accommodation with the United States than conflict. Yet major points of contention remain. Syria remains a front-line state against Israel and continues to support terrorist groups operating in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. Most important are reports that Syria was secretly aiding Saddam's regime until its final collapse and in recent months has served as a base of operations for insurgents and terrorists attacking American troops in Iraq. Although the sources of these reports are not definitive, the U.S. government has warned Syria not to interfere in Iraq and not to sponsor terrorists.³⁴ Several of the Bush administration's staunchest domestic allies, including Richard Perle, have repeatedly called for action against Syria.³⁵

- *Geography*. Syria presents a similar case to that of Iraq and Iran in terms of distance from the U.S. and its major bases. Unlike Iraq and Iran, however, it can be accessed from the Mediterranean Sea rather than the more treacherous Persian Gulf. With the American occupation of Iraq, Syria is surrounded by countries (such as Israel and Turkey) that, if not openly supportive of a potential preventive military intervention, would be unlikely to act against the United States. Two other border countries—Jordan and Lebanon—are too weak and strategically compromised to offer much support in the event of an invasion, although Lebanon may remain home to terrorists supported by Syria. In terms of terrain and climate, Syria is mostly arid desert plains and plateaus broken by some mountains in the west. In short, the country's geography offers little by way of an obstacle should the United States seriously consider preventive military action.

- *Military balance and effectiveness*. The historic record of Syria's armed forces is not very strong unless various internal military operations are counted as successes.³⁶ In its wars with Israel, Syria has been badly overmatched on land and in the air. As part of the grand anti-Saddam coalition for the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Syria was assigned few tasks of substance. Hence it is difficult to assess Syrian capabilities beyond the simple measures such as numbers of troops and quantities and qualities of weapons. Syrian armed forces, while numerically large, are plagued by shortfalls in modern weapons systems, technologies and the technical expertise to operate those advanced systems it manages to acquire. Moreover, some analysts maintain existing forces are weakened by continued reliance on habits inherited from Soviet era military advisors—a lack of tactical initiative and an unwillingness to modify pre-determined plans.³⁷ Experts suggest that the Syrian military is largely a “hollow” force that has

adopted “asymmetric warfare” as the strategy of necessity to combat its primary enemy, Israel. Thus, it maintains a large tank force to slow potential Israeli thrusts into its territory, while seeking NBC weapons and delivery systems, building up its special operations capabilities, and continuing to fund terrorist proxies like Hezbollah and Amal.³⁸ In view of its conventional weaknesses, however, Syria may have acquired non-conventional deterrents “on the cheap with chemical and biological capabilities that, coming from close distances, are quite threatening.”³⁹

In these brief descriptions of the challenges posed by Iran and Syria, it is clear that while both countries would present military resistance, the force-on-force stage of a preventive war would result, relatively quickly, in an American victory. Iran would probably present the most serious challenge both because of the nation’s large size, the number of military personnel supported, and the fact that relatively soon the status of Iran’s nuclear programs, especially nuclear weapons production, would force the U.S. military to proceed cautiously. Planners for either deep strikes against facilities or an all out invasion would need to take the same care as was involved with both Iraq invasions.

Yet, both countries would conceivably require long and strenuous commitments of military force to maintain security and stability during post-conflict operations. In Syria and Iran, forces opposing the United States, whether “dead enders” from the previous regime, or others, could find refuge in territories unoccupied by U.S. forces or even perhaps neighboring countries. Moreover, other countries in the region could readily supply weapons and materials to surviving government forces or insurgents if massive commitments of U.S. manpower to close each the borders were not made. Worse, even if collaborators and members of the exile communities could be found (*a la* Chalabi and Alawi), ethnic, religious, and tribal leaders could lead military and political opposition to American occupying forces that would tie down large numbers of troops for years if not decades.

TABLE 3
 BASIC COMPARISON OF POTENTIAL TARGET STATES:
 GEOGRAPHY, MILITARY AND PEOPLE

	Iraq	Syria	Iran
Geography			
<i>Land area</i>	438,317 sq km	185,180 sq km	1.648 million sq km
<i>Borders</i>	6	5	8
<i>Coastline</i>	58 km	193 km	2,440 km
Military			
<i>Armed forces personnel (in thousands)</i>	429	316	513
<i>Weapon holdings (aggregate number of heavy weapons)</i>	7,580	11,932	5,113
<i>Defense budget (in US dollars)</i>	\$1,300,000,000	\$858,000,000	\$4,300,000,000
People			
<i>Population</i>	23,331,985	16,728,808	66,128,965
<i>Ethnic Makeup</i>	Arab (75-80%) Kurdish (15-20%)	Arab (90.3%) Kurds, Armenians, and other (9.7%)	Persian (51%) Azeri (24%)
<i>Religions</i>	Shi'a (60%-65%) Sunni (32%-37%)	Sunni (74%) Alawite, Druze, and other Muslim sects (16%) Christian sects (10%)	Shi'a Muslim (89%) Sunni Muslim (10%)

Sources: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); *CIA World Fact Book*, and *Middle East Directory*, <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>>; and <<http://www.middleeastdirectory.com>>.

In brief, even if the end strength and military capabilities of the U.S. armed forces were increased (through ongoing transformation efforts or increases in the numbers of U.S. servicemen and women) the prospect of pursuing another preventive war against likely targets is daunting. The difficulties would be less, if the United States could disengage most of its combat troops from Iraq; but short of an unexpected political settlement or serious rethinking by Bush administration officials, this seems unlikely. Limited preventive strikes, on the other hand, are always possible if the United States is willing to assume the political risks associated with missed targets, collateral damage, and, in the case, of NBC facilities, the consequence of materials spread into the atmosphere or surrounding territory. This of course assumes that U.S. goals, such as punishing or warning adversaries, could be achieved by strikes.

WHAT DOES IT MATTER?

Does it matter whether the United States has the capacity to undertake preventive military intervention in the near-to- intermediate term? With preventive military intervention as U.S. declaratory policy, implementation difficulties, real or perceived, will affect American credibility, legitimacy, and, ultimately, security.

CREDIBILITY

Since former Presidents Johnson and Nixon tried to present their unwillingness to pull back from the Vietnam War on the basis of maintaining American “credibility,” many international relations experts have been reluctant to invoke the concept. Credibility is a nebulous concept ripe for post-hoc analysis and political manipulation.

Yet in contemporary unipolar world the stakes may be higher even than during the Vietnam era. Underlying the doctrine of preventive military intervention is the assumption that “rogue” states and terrorists may actually use NBC weapons against the United States proper, U.S. government facilities overseas or even large concentrations of American civilians living abroad. By threatening to invade or strike adversaries before they have the opportunity to attack, the United States has sought to change the dynamic of its relationship with enemies and potential enemies. Rather than assuming a reactive and defensive posture, the United States has served notice that it will act quickly and decisively when it is threatened. To achieve the desired effect of unsettling potential enemies and deterring them from attacking, the United States must have an unambiguous capacity to carry out its threats. Otherwise, the United States risks being seen as a paper tiger.

LEGITIMACY

Apologists for American hegemonic aspirations, unilateralism, and even imperialism, sometimes argue that the world is yearning for a strong leader.⁴⁰ Even a benign hegemon, willing and able to play the role of global policeman and even enforcer, may provide a stable security environment that benefits all members of the international community.⁴¹ America's ability to make and fulfill threats against terrorist groups and rogue states, then, is part and parcel of American global legitimacy.

One thesis that supports this notion, albeit indirectly, is the argument that the international outcry over Iraq was less about anger over American actions than about the process by which the United States pursued military intervention. At its simplest, the claim is that opponents to the war objected to the truncated inspection process, the badly handled politics at the UN, and the lack of consultation on war and post-war operations, even with members of the so-called coalition of the willing. Some European countries made this argument during the run up to the Iraq war, and have subsequently reiterated their position.

The overwhelming dominance of the United States military power exacerbates this problem. At least for conflict operations, the United States does not need military support to "win" military victories against most non-state and rogue state opponents. Some U.S. military analysts even argue that including coalition forces actually impedes American military effectiveness.

The same cannot be said for post-conflict operations including policing, counter-insurgency operations, and general constabulary functions. These functions are labor intensive whereas even the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are by training, doctrine and sheer numbers of troops reliant on capital intensive firepower, mobility, and intelligence. Hence as it became increasingly clear that many Iraqis would not greet their American "liberators" with open arms, the Bush administration turned, with very limited success, to coalition members, other interested parties (such as the Saudis and Pakistanis) and the UN to provide the military and constabulary capabilities needed in post-conflict operations.

How long American military predominance will continue, and how military transformation might exacerbate the existing shortfall of labor intensive, low technology, "boots on the ground" capabilities remain to be seen. What is clear is that America's legitimacy as the sole superpower with responsibility, explicit and desired or implicit and unwanted, will be damaged if it does not demonstrate the ability to meet its own or the international security community's needs. Should Iran, for example, finally acquire serious nuclear weapon capabilities and begin to play a more a threatening role in the Middle East, most other states in the region, much less the regions of the world dependent on Persian Gulf energy supplies, will be looking for ways to blunt Iranian aggression. The multilateral diplomacy currently being used to dissuade and contain Iranian nuclear ambitions may eventually give way to a desire for more coercive measures. For the foreseeable future only the United States possesses even the remotest potential to offer

a credible military option. The legitimacy of the U.S. position within the international system depends on maintaining that capacity.

SECURITY

It is possible that the United States might indeed find it necessary to launch limited preventive strikes or engage in preventive war. Some reports suggest that the war on terror has not made a significant dent in al-Qaida, although undoubtedly a large number of pre-9/11 leaders have been killed or imprisoned. Yet, recruitment has risen, and an even more networked structure has developed, to give al-Qaida a resilience few expected. Even as President Bush claims the United States has killed approximately 75 percent of the al-Qaida leadership since 9/11, both public and private analyses suggest that al-Qaida's membership has actually grown in the same period. Clearly, the Madrid bombings and other actions credited to al-Qaida suggest that whatever the status of the pre-9/11 leadership, the organization continues to have serious terrorist capabilities.

With the United States committed to preventive military intervention, the U.S. military must be capable of carrying out limited preventive attacks and, *in extremis*, even preventive wars. Given existing and projected strike capabilities there seems little doubt of the American capacity to do "drive by shootings" both now and in the future. Many new weapons programs—from unmanned combat aerial vehicles to the Joint Strike Fighter—will only serve to increase American deep strike capabilities. Whether the United States intelligence community can supply the necessary actionable intelligence remains an open question that is addressed by at least two other authors in the volume.⁴²

The ability to launch a preventive war against a "rogue" state or perhaps a failed state providing safe haven to terrorist groups is much less certain. This uncertainty is especially acute if it is necessary, as seems likely, to provide for nation building (including security) during the post-conflict operations. United States Army and Marine units are, at least as presently trained and equipped, not especially well suited to such operations. Moreover, the technological restructuring in progress, such as the Future Combat Systems (FCS) of the Army, focus on constabulary, policy, and civil affairs type activities only as a sideline. The main thrust of FCS is to fight and win wars against the main battle forces of nation-state adversaries. Counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations are dealt with largely as lesser-included cases.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

Despite its overwhelming military superiority and intense efforts to transform the United States military, implementing a strong variant of the NSS 2002 doctrine would present a serious challenge. At a minimum, it would require strengthening links with civilian intelligence agencies and improving their own indigenous intelligence capabilities so that vast improvements in strike assets (including both platforms like UAVs and the most recent generations of precision guided munitions) can be used more effectively. In effect, it would require rebalancing American military forces in ways that are largely antithetical to the thrust of American military modernization at least since the Vietnam era and quite possibly longer. The long-term trend toward replacing manpower with technology and increasing the intensity and accuracy of military firepower may continue but it would have to be supplemented by providing more attention to the less glamorous aspects of the U.S. military: civil affairs, combat engineering, policing functions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement as good old-fashioned “boots on the ground.”

MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

It would be intellectually dishonest to simply project current military capabilities forward into the future. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have emphasized the need to transform the U.S. military to take advantage of the ongoing “revolution in military affairs.” But will military transformation and the prospects for fulfilling these plans leave the United States better equipped to conduct either limited preventive strikes or preventive wars in the long-term?

Although it is too early to make a definitive assessment of transformation, early returns are positive. Some of the most thoughtful scholars have argued that the precision guided weaponry, stealth technologies, and integrated battlefield management characteristic of the new American way of war have roots dating back thirty years. Yet, transformation advocates may have oversold the concept. Transformation is touted as the means to “lock in” American operational advantages for the foreseeable future. Although transformation may provide a lasting competitive edge in mid-to-high intensity conflicts it is not clear the currently planned transformation force is suited to operations other than war, much less low-intensity-conflict (LIC) including counterinsurgency and counter terror operations.

It is not too late for transformation to shift course. Already the Army and the Marine Corps have begun adapting to the security challenges posed by al-Qaida, Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, infantry and armored officers are waging largely internal debates over the nature of armored vehicles. In preparing for the Iraq War, based largely on experiences in the Balkans and Somalia, some experts advocated that the Army and the Marines be equipped with smaller faster, lighter vehicles. The thinking then as now was that such vehicles would be better suited to the low-intensity conflicts of the future where speed and

deployability would triumph over armor and firepower. Events in Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq, for example, now may suggest otherwise.

The United States military is the most powerful instrument of military force ever, both in absolute terms and in a relative sense. The country spends more money overall, buys more high technology systems, invests more research and development, and trains its soldiers better than virtually any country or combination of countries in the world. It is optimized largely for high intensity conflicts against conventional forces and, secondarily, to provide a safe and effective strategic deterrence with its nuclear forces. It can strike virtually anywhere on earth at any time. Yet, the United States has not yet recognized that if it is going to fight Mary Kaldor's new wars⁴³ and if it is going to provide stability and security to conquered territories, it must have sufficient numbers of troops trained and equipped for peacekeeping, constabulary actions, and civic affairs. As it is currently pursued, military transformation will not solve the problems best addressed by low-technology boots on the ground.

REBALANCE AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES?

Much of the transformation rhetoric focuses on providing more strike capabilities despite the fact that strike constitutes the most successful military activity of the American armed forces. Less attention is devoted to mundane tasks like the requirements of managing the post-conflict environment. Indeed, if many military and its civilian leaders had their way there would be no need for such follow on forces. Once the military forces of an opponent were defeated other U.S. government agencies, foreign militaries or local forces could then assume the role of military operations other than war. Unfortunately as both Iraq and Afghanistan, not to mention the Balkans, have demonstrated that a serious security presence is essential.⁴⁴

The U.S. military has taken steps toward reforms. Both the Army and Air Force vision statements tout the need to become more expeditionary. Even the Navy, which has prided itself for generations as providing the long arm of American power is working with its sister services to provide even greater capabilities. The sea-basing initiative found in Chief of Naval Operations Vernon Clark's Seapower 21 plan will help free American forces from relying on land bases donated or rented from allies and states that are willing to tolerate an American presence. Yet, these efforts largely avoid the problem of numbers. Effective post-conflict operations, whether in Iraq or in the future in Iran or elsewhere require large numbers of well-trained, prepared and equipped troops on the ground. If the Bush administration and subsequent political leaders do not recognize this, and indeed resist the efforts of Congress and outside experts to increase the number of American combat troops available, the United States may win every force-on-force encounter but lose wars because it will be unable to provide the security necessary for political and economic stabilization in defeated countries.

STRENGTHEN CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES?

If one of the greatest difficulties facing the United States military is training, preparing, and equipping itself for post-conflict operations, perhaps other U.S. government agencies or departments could be created or persuaded to fill these roles. Niall Ferguson's analysis of the British Empire lauds the imperial or colonial service⁴⁵ and, at least by implication, advocates the creation of an American variant. However, it should be noted that Ferguson doubts Americans has the "right stuff" for such a venture.⁴⁶ Presumably post-conflict operations in Iraq and other future preventive wars could be handled by an American imperial service in conjunction with military elements. For another related alternative, Tom Barnett proposes a "progressive bifurcation of the U.S. military into a Leviathan force focused on waging wars and a System Administrator force focused on winning the peace." The systems integration force will be "supportive, nonlethal, and willing to submit to recognized authorities such as the International Criminal Court and the UN."⁴⁷ Presumably the systems administrator military force will support and be supported by other U.S. government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State. Another option already in widespread use in Iraq, not to mention by other countries across the globe, is relying more on private military firms (PMFs).⁴⁸ In Iraq private military contractors provide food, housing, training and maintenance functions for the U.S. military and its coalition counterparts. Reports suggest that the ratio of personnel from private military firms to official U.S. military personnel is roughly 1:10, approximately ten times the ratio during the first Persian Gulf War.⁴⁹ The trend toward using PMFs is not of course limited to the United States nor is it an entirely new phenomenon, but it does appear the United States is taking the trend to the extreme.⁵⁰ There is no reason why such outsourcing cannot be used to overcome shortfalls in personnel, expertise, and even equipment in the future if national policies and strategies demand it. The effectiveness of mercenary forces relative to regular military remains a serious question.

WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH ALLIES?

Just because preventive action is taken does not mean it has to be the sole responsibility of U.S. forces. In the first presidential debate of the 2004 campaign Democratic candidate Senator John Kerry made much of his proposal to work more closely with allies in providing security in post-war Iraq. Kerry's campaign theme simply gives voice the actual efforts of the Bush administration since the early days of the war and much of the scholarly literature on the relationship between the U.S. military and those of friends, allies, and temporary coalition members.

The most likely allies to turn to would be Europe, by revitalizing the transatlantic relationship, tightening ties with allies such as Japan, and perhaps even strengthening the military capabilities of the

United Nations. Given the events of the recent past this is likely to be a very difficult sell—the controversy over the intelligence findings the Bush administration used to sell the war, the eventual decision to act without a renewed mandate from the United Nations, and the various contretemps over the post-Iraq war period, have, by some accounts undermined the willingness of other countries to support U.S. initiatives.

Of course, even if the diplomatic and political difficulties can be overcome using a combination of deft diplomacy and generous incentives, the reality is that few countries have or will have significant military capabilities capable of deploying far from home. After several decades of trying to close the gap between U.S. and European military capabilities the distance has, if anything widened.⁵¹ Shortfalls in strategic intelligence and long-range airlift, to name two examples, will remain for the foreseeable future. One oft-raised option is to divide labor with the less capable European militaries so that they supply troops while the United States contributes technologies. Yet many European countries have resisted the *de facto* division because it puts more of their troops at risk, cedes important politico-military decisions to the United States, and fails to provide domestic benefits (such as large defense contracts or the potential for technology spillovers from investment in cutting edge military technologies).

Discussions about burden sharing with like minded allies or more temporary coalition members will lead nowhere if the United States continues to alienate much of the world through both its policies and its apparent disdain for diplomacy and international political processes. The apparent lack of planning for post-Saddam *and* the obvious difficulties that the U.S. Army have had in providing an appropriate occupation force have exacerbated tensions between the U.S. and several key allies over the decision to go to war.⁵² If Iraq had turned out as President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld among others had optimistically predicted—with a cakewalk military victory and a smooth transition to a post-Saddam Iraqi regime, critics would have had less resonance. Instead, post-war complications have reinforced international doubts about America's Iraq policies. The same reasoning often holds with punitive and limited preventive strikes—when missions succeed the criticism is muted; when there are failures such as allegedly misidentified targets (in Sudan) or large numbers of civilian casualties the United States is vilified. Military capabilities then are part and parcel of the overall position on the world stage, not just in a basic sense of raw military power, but also in a perceptual sense involving legitimacy and credibility.

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 86-88.

² There is also a necessary and intimately related corollary question; does the United States have the *intelligence* capabilities necessary to sustain a doctrine of preemption over time? I will leave this question to other contributors given the limits of time and space.

³ For a first hand account of the Kosovo campaign see Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat* (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2001). On Iraq see Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., *The Iraq War: A Military History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁴ Donald Daniel, Peter Dombrowski, and Rodger Payne, "The Bush Doctrine: Rest In Peace?" *Defence Studies* 4 (Summer 2004): 18-39.

⁵ On why preemption will remain a policy option even as the so-called Bush Doctrine *per se* is no longer tenable, Peter Dombrowski, Rodger Payne and Donald Daniel, "The Bush Doctrine is Dead, Long Live the Bush Doctrine," *Orbis* 49 (Spring 2005): 199-212.

⁶ This working paper is not intended to support the doctrine of preventive military intervention or, in particular, a strategy of preventive war. Elsewhere and in forthcoming publications I have argued against the doctrine and its application as well as considered the negative global reaction to the idea of preemption. Yet, as the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated, the dangers faced by the United States are great. See Peter Dombrowski, "Against Pre-emptive Strikes," The Information Technology, War And Peace Project website, 19 August 2002, <<http://www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/911/index.cfm?id=11#>>; and Peter Dombrowski and Rodger Payne, "Global Debate and the Limits of the Bush Doctrine," *International Studies Perspectives* 4 (November 2003): 395-408.

⁷ Payne and Dombrowski, "Global Debate."

⁸ I leave discussion of intelligence capabilities to Greg Thielmann, whose working paper in this series provides important context for my analysis, since to be blunt, military force is useless without information about what, where and whom to target. For example, to implement preventive military action the United States must know what regimes constitute "rogues," what terrorist groups have "global reach," and where both rogues and terrorists locate key facilities (for example, NBC research laboratories, terrorist training facilities, safe houses for key officials and so on).

⁹ The term "rogue" state is controversial and not compatible with the perspectives of the volume editors and many other Working Group authors. I prefer the term, however, even as I understand the intellectual and policy baggage it brings to our analysis. For better or worse, rogue state is the term of art amongst policy makers and policy wonks. On the origins of the term see Robert S. Litwak, *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 19-46.

¹⁰ Richard N. Haass, "Wars of Choice," *The Washington Post*, 23 November 2003, B07.

¹¹ Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); and United States, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004).

¹² For an official summary of Operation Northern Watch see <<http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Operations/onw/onw.htm&2>>.

¹³ Clark, *Waging Modern War*, 348 and elsewhere.

¹⁴ For the theory underlying this approach see Harlan Ulam and James Wade, Jr., *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).

¹⁵ Robert Burns, "Peacekeeping Institute May Shut Down," Associated Press Wire, 11 March 2002, Lexis-Nexis news wire database, <<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>>.

¹⁶ James Jay Carafano, "Post-Conflict Operations From Europe to Iraq," Heritage Foundation Lecture (July 2004), <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=66346>>.

¹⁷ For a strong defense of this position emphasizing that militaries of other states might do operations other than war, but the United States as the sole superpower should not, see John Hillen, "Superpowers Don't Do Windows," in *America the Vulnerable: Our Military Problems and How To Fix Them*, ed. John Lehman and Harvey Sicherman (Philadelphia, Penn.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2002), available at <<http://www.fpri.org/americanvulnerable/03.SuperpowersDontDoWindows.Hillen.pdf>>.

¹⁸ For the best nearly contemporaneous accounts of preparations for the post-war period see James Fallows, "The Fifty-first State?" *The Atlantic Monthly* (November 2002) and, after the war, James Fallows, "Blind Into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly* (January/February 2004).

¹⁹ David Reiff, "Blueprint for a Mess," *New York Times*, 2 November 2003.

²⁰ Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: ReganBooks, 2004). On postwar planning see especially pp. 351-2, 393, and 419-24.

²¹ Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003).

²² John R. Bolton, "Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction," Remarks to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 6 May 2002, <<http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm>>.

²³ Paul Kerr, "Libya Vows to Dismantle WMD Program," *Arms Control Today* (January/February 2004), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/Libya.asp>.

²⁴ Paul Kerr, "IAEA: Questions Remain About Libya," *Arms Control Today* (July August 2004), <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/IAEAandLibya.asp>.

²⁵ Kelly Wallace, "White House Repeats 'Concerns' about Cuba, Biological Weapons," CNN, 14 May 2002, <<http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/14/white.house.cuba/>>.

²⁶ Kori N. Schake and Justin P. Bernier, "Dealing with Rogue States" in *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*, Vol. I & II, ed. Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 283-297, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2001/Global%20Century%20-%20June%202001/globcencont.html>.

²⁷ See Robert A. Manning, "Triumph of the Periphery," *Washington Times*, 28 June 1999.

²⁸ Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 4.

²⁹ Charles Krauthammer, "Axis of Evil, Part Two," *Washington Post*, 23 July 2004, A29.

³⁰ Krauthammer, "Axis of Evil."

³¹ By most accounts Iraq drew the bile of neo-conservative foreign policy analysts since President George H.W. Bush decided to stand down the American military rather than topple Saddam in 1991. See James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking Books, 2004).

³² Steven Ekevich, "Iran and New Threats in the Persian Gulf and Middle East," *Orbis* 48 (Winter 2004).

³³ Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster, "A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Forces: Possible Consequences," CNS Research Story, 12 August 2004, 3-4, <<http://cns.miiis.edu/pubs/week/040812.htm>>.

³⁴ "Syria in the Hot Seat," ABC News, 15 April 2004, <<http://abcnews.go.com>>.

³⁵ Barry James, "Syria Warned—Perle Sees More 'Preemption' in Future," *International Herald Tribune*, 12 April 2003.

³⁶ Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 549-551.

³⁷ Michael M. Bennet, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* (August/September 2001).

³⁸ Anthony Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 150-155.

³⁹ Claudia Baumgart and Harald Müller, "Nuclear Weapons—Free Zone in the Middle East: A Pie in the Sky?" *Washington Quarterly* 28 (Winter 2005): 46.

⁴⁰ Thomas Barnett of the Naval War College has been an unabashed proponent of the U.S. assuming the role of "global policeman." See Richard Salit, "Finally, His Vision Finds An Audienc," *Providence Journal*, 2 March 2003, <http://www.projo.com/news/content/projo_20030302_barnett2.c0fd3.html>. For a more complete exposition of his views see Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Putnam Publishing Group, 2004)

⁴¹ Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000)

⁴² In particular, see Greg Theilmann, "Intelligence in Preventive Military Strategy."

⁴³ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).

⁴⁴ As to how and why, see James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role In Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2003).

⁴⁵ Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Decline of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), see especially pp. 361-362 and 367-370.

⁴⁶ Niall Ferguson, "The Empire Slinks Back," *New York Times Magazine*, 27 April 2003.

⁴⁷ Thomas P.M. Barnett "Mr. President, Here's How to Make Sense of Our Iraq Strategy," *Esquire* (June 2004): 148.

⁴⁸ Peter Singer, "War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 42 (Spring 2004).

⁴⁹ Singer, "Vacuum of Law."

⁵⁰ Peter Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). On the history see, pp. 19-39 and on why, see, pp. 49-72.

⁵¹ David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Marin C. Libicki, *Minding the Gape: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999).

⁵² Fallows, "Fifty-first State?," 53, "Blind into Baghdad," 52.