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GEORGE BUSH AND THE 'PREEMPTIVE'
MILITARY FORCE DOCTRINE**

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If politics makes strange bedfellows, then few can be more curious than the evolution of the doctrines of preventive and preemptive intervention. For the cast of characters involved, I will argue, extends from United Nations Secretary Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan to former Australian and Algerian Foreign Ministers Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun respectively, all who promoted the doctrine of preventive intervention. Academics from European, Canadian and American universities were linked with policy pundits from New York and Washington in advocating this doctrine. Yet, ultimately, I argue that what had begun as a doctrine with very specific (and distinct) motives that clearly predated the events of 9/11, contained a thread that eventually wound its way to George Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, albeit it in the amended form of the doctrine of preventive intervention, as American troops engaged Iraqi forces in warfare, purportedly motivated by both (simultaneously) the existence of a clear and present danger and the impulse to spread democratic values.

In a stronger form, I shall contend that what is most striking is that although these two groups might share little in common in terms of motives or political views, they have all contributed—wittingly or otherwise—to the evolution of the doctrine of preventive intervention. *They have done so by assisting in the reconstitution of the definition of sovereignty, contributed significantly to the erosion of its standing as the operational cornerstone of the international system, and thus provided the justification for an unprecedented large scale military action.* They have, collectively, done much to denude one of the most foundational of international norms.

Of course, it isn't surprising that they did so for very different reasons. Proponents, such as successive Secretary Generals, fomented the doctrine of preventive intervention in the name of humanitarianism. They advocated multilateral action on the basis of emergent large-scale threats to civilian populations from either their own governments or from contending military-style forces in the context of disintegrating states.¹

In contrast to the doctrine of preventive intervention, others (notably Richard Haass) in its early stages of evolution advocated an alternative doctrine. This formulation justified intervention in promoting the cause of self-styled American 'imperialism' – albeit, as I shall discuss, a self-proclaimed unconventional, 'enlightened' view of imperialism in which the proclaimed intent was to use American power to extend beyond national interest to, purportedly,

a global one. This doctrine defended military and economic action on the basis of a conflict over democratic values and economic liberalism.² It was, in that sense, an attempt to operationalize the ‘liberal peace’ argument; predicated on the assumption that creating a world of liberal democracies (even, admittedly, if that was to be achieved through the use of violence) would make the world a safer place in the long term. Liberal states, proponents of this ‘liberal peace’ view argue, are generally more pacifistic and don’t fight wars against each other.³ So the creation of a world order of free trade-oriented democracies would serve American interests but also, hypothetically, the cause of global stability. This doctrine appeared to be popular with what was to subsequently materialize as the new Republican administration in the period predating the 2000 election. But it was ultimately rejected because of its explicit multilateralist leanings in favor of a neoconservative formulation predicated on more explicit national security considerations and a unilateralist process. Richard Haass, his formulation rejected, thus left his position at the Department of State within the first two years of the new administration.

The version eventually advocated by the Bush administration, threading itself from the UN to the US, was that of the doctrine of “preemptive intervention.” It justified the grounds for initiating military action on the basis of an emergent ‘clear and present’ danger to American citizens and property, regardless of whether that threat was to be carried out within the U.S. or not. Humanitarian or ‘enlightenment’ considerations were therefore replaced, by strategic ones, as the basis for the abrogation of the territorial integrity of another state, and the possible replacement of indigenous governments. What is striking is not simply the differences between the three positions but also their commonalities.

SOVEREIGNTY DILUTED

A process was set in train beginning with the debates of the early 1990s that challenged the old basis for intervention – the prevailing doctrine of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping respected the concept of sovereignty as sacred, and was reactive, limited in character, and was based on the consent of all parties. *In this paper I therefore suggest that—despite the differences in motive stretching from the presiding UN to the U.S. Administrations—advocating preventive intervention in the aftermath of the Cold War challenged a historic shibboleth, that of the preeminence of the concept of sovereignty. Doing so thus facilitated a reconstitution of an international order in which sovereignty was neither emblematic of, nor a guarantor of, the status quo.*⁴ What began as a limited incursion into sovereignty based on humanitarian grounds had the unintended consequence of generating alternative justifications, employed for very different reasons, that sought to intervene for very different reasons in very different ways.

My intent in this paper is to show that there has been a movement through these successive stages in the course of the last decade-and-a-half. The status quo was epitomized by the doctrine of peacekeeping. It represented a benchmark regarding intervention, contingent on a Weberian, Cold War conception of sovereignty—one defined in terms of territorial integrity and the right of the domestic autonomy of states.⁵ The disassembly of European empires in the two decades after World War Two extended the formal state system, albeit under bipolar management, although the process by which that retreat from empire took place contributed heavily to the creation of a series of embryonic failed states. When the inevitable failure of stable governance materialized, and intrastate conflict ensued, external intervention was predicated on a consensus being reached among belligerents that external forces had to be invited to provide a dividing line—what William Zartman termed a condition of ‘ripeness.’⁶

Peacekeeping was the dominant interventionist response of the international community during the Cold War, one that began eroding at the end of the Cold War. Certainly, the process of simultaneous convergence and fragmentation in the last two decades of the twentieth century has been well documented and debated, and the combined accelerating effects of this process on conflict needs little elaboration here.⁷ But with the reconstitution of the international system, the initial deep and abiding wedge into the Cold War conception of sovereignty blossomed with the development of the doctrine of preventive intervention. This doctrine challenged peacekeeping as the dominant policy response. It has had a humanitarian mission, as does peacekeeping. But, fomented by the disintegration of many states and the resulting genocidal activities of many ethnic groups (Serbs and Hutus being only among the most extreme examples), proponents of preventive intervention questioned the preeminence of sovereignty and the notion of territorial integrity in the limited circumstances of state disintegration and ethnic conflict. Proponents of preventive intervention have focused extensively on the human rights of victims and the responsibilities of states to enforce those rights.⁸ A shift in focus therefore occurred, from the security of states to that of individuals, with the primary proponents of the doctrine of preventive intervention being moral entrepreneurs located in NGOs, and their primary instrument being multilateral institutions attempting to employ multilateralist policies.⁹

The issue of the conditions under which intervention could take place had predated the Cold War but had largely been eschewed during those five decades. Once the very idea of the abrogation of sovereignty again gained legitimacy, a key debate ensued designed to address the question of ‘*under what conditions could non-consensual intervention be justified?*’ As Martha Finnemore suggested, in regards to strong states:

What has changed is when it will suit them—not the fact of intervention but its form and meaning. What has changed are state understandings about the purposes to which they can and should use force.¹⁰

Those proponents within the United Nations (and related state officials and organic intellectuals) emphasized humanitarian motives—within the defined parameters of the protection of civilians within failed states, in the context of multilateral processes of decision-making and joint implementation. Imminent danger demanded preventive measures.¹¹

Yet unilateralists (or those willing to construct narrow coalitions) within the Bush administration have seized upon this abrogation of the sacred cow of sovereignty to argue in favor of a broadening of the grounds for initiating action. Two formulations of this argument surfaced in the first two years of the first Bush Administration, both sharing the belief that action should be focused not so much against *failed* or *disintegrating* states but can be invoked against *oppositional* states. Regimes that either (in the first variant) broadly oppose the values, principles and practices upon which a American-led world order would be constructed, or (in the latter) those that present a purported ‘clear and present danger.’

Treating the Cold War doctrine of peacekeeping as a benchmark in which the concept of sovereignty is preeminent, this paper compares and contrasts three countervailing doctrines, and attempts to provide some links in the chain of the evolution of each. I shall describe the details of the emergence of, as well as comparing and contrasting, the four doctrines of peacekeeping, prevention, imperialism and preemption according to four dimensions. These are the nature of sovereignty according to each doctrine; their primary values; their operational attributes; and their broader mandate. Evidence for the characterization of each doctrine will be drawn from UN debates and reports, speeches by UN and U.S. administration officials, and limited materials regarding historic interventions. My goal is to understand the evolution of sovereignty’s dilution, through a fluid process that frames and legitimates for policymakers’ their intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq—if only for themselves and an American audience.

THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE OF PEACEKEEPING

As Martha Finnemore has so cogently and convincingly pointed out, there was a tradition of intervention, motivated by either debt collection or humanitarian intervention (notably to protect Christians), that predated the Cold War.¹² Yet, proponents argue that the principle of sovereignty remained resolutely eminent for the duration of the Cold War itself, both in the ‘normative discourse’ of international politics,¹³ and in the fabric of international law. The intent was to protect the weak against the strong.¹⁴ This ideal, not surprisingly, didn’t always

materialize. Soviet actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were clear episodes of incursions, albeit weakly justified by the superpower. Yet, for many colonial states, nonintervention was the general practice. To intervene without invitation was illegitimate,¹⁵ and shaped state action.¹⁶ As Finnemore succinctly states, “sovereignty and self-determination norms trumped humanitarian claims during the Cold War.”¹⁷

Certainly, there is an extensive, coherent and well-formulated literature on peacekeeping, expanded upon at length in the course of the 1990s, one that is too voluminous to detail here. Rather than recapitulate its content at length, I only seek to outline its major attributes in this discussion.

In institutional terms, John Ruggie has argued that there has not been a systematic doctrinal approach adopted towards peacekeeping at the UN. Rather, the organization’s understanding has been very poor, notably when it strays into what he describes as ‘gray area’ operations that straddle the terrain between peacekeeping (in its most limited sense) and ‘war fighting.’¹⁸ The term ‘peacekeeping,’ Ruggie points out, isn’t even mentioned in the UN Charter.¹⁹

Ruggie is content to argue that the limits of peacekeeping’s operationalization as a doctrine is the source of the problem. But the UN’s incapacity to form and implement a coherent doctrine does not detract from the notion that such a peacekeeping doctrine (whether explicit or not) exists that guides behavior. Indeed, important to its emergence over four decades was the central notion that the primary purpose of peacekeeping is to allow antagonists to end aggression in order to generate a possible agreement. Mediation is only of limited interest once both sides have exhausted their desire to fight. As Mats Berdahl suggests:

[Peacekeeping] has traditionally been used to describe various forms of legitimized collective intervention aimed at avoiding the outbreak or resurgence of violent conflict between debutants. As a distinctive form of third-party intervention governed by the principles of consent and minimum force, peacekeeping operations have been expressly non-threatening and impartial.²⁰

The thirteen UN operations between 1948 and 1988 generated, says Berdahl, a body of principles, procedures and practices that came to constitute a corpus of case law and customary practice. As Sir Marrack Goulding (former UN Under-Secretary General responsible for peacekeeping operations) has importantly noted, *this collection of law and practice sets precedent in the UN and is the primary way in which all future activity is justified.*²¹

In effect, this approach is conservative, what Thomas Weiss has referred to as ‘classicist,’ because it maintains that politics and humanitarian intervention should be completely dissociated. As he states when describing this approach:

Until recently, the two most essential humanitarian principles – neutrality (not taking sides with warring parties) and impartiality (nondiscrimination and proportionality) – have been relatively uncontroversial, as has the key operating procedure of seeking consent from belligerents.²²

The aim of intervention in the ‘classicist’ position, according to Weiss, is ‘to do no harm.’²³ To this might be added the principle that force is legitimate only as a last resort, for defensive purposes and to be used both with minimal discretion and to the least extent possible.

Unlike realists, who rejected most multilateral peacekeeping or intervention in the 1990s on the grounds that the benefits were too low, the costs too high and the options too few,²⁴ both classicist and maximalist proponents of peacekeeping therefore favor involvement on humanitarian grounds. In common with realists, however, the maximalists primarily concur with the realist assumption that the sovereignty of states is sacrosanct. To them, that means that states have rights (in the Westphalian sense). In effect:

The traditional conception of sovereignty as rights attributes to states jurisdictional exclusivity within their own borders and grants very limited and narrowly construed bases of legitimacy for other actors, whether another state or an international institution, to intervene in any form in what in their territorial locus are considered domestic affairs.²⁵

Intervention is only justified in extreme situations, with the consent (if not at the initiative) of states, and thus legitimacy is predicated on the assumption that the activities of peacekeepers are by the consent of all antagonists, impartial in conduct, and their operations are transparent, non-intrusive, and minimally coercive in character. Thus, says John Ruggie, “Peacekeeping is a device to guarantee transparency, to reassure all sides that each is carrying out its promises.”²⁶

Indeed, the primary purpose of a peacekeeping force is to protect themselves (albeit minimally or un-armed) rather than to enforce the peace or achieve broader humanitarian goals.²⁷ Strategically, this pushes proponents of peacekeeping towards insulation rather than engagement policies; withdrawal even when on the ground; and the criticism that their universalist belief that they can sustain their contribution to humanitarian fulfillment under most circumstances is badly mistaken.

Some scholars have attempted to develop a comprehensive framework that subdivides peacekeeping operations into their various component parts.²⁸ John Ruggie, however, summarizes the UN peacekeepers' posture and operational assumptions concisely when he states:

Above all, peacekeeping is predicated on the consent of the parties which, typically, have agreed to cease hostilities before a peacekeeping mission is deployed. Moreover, peacekeepers fight against neither side but play an impartial interpositional role, monitoring a ceasefire or controlling a buffer zone. Indeed, they do not fight as such. They carry only light arms and are authorized to shoot only in self-defense – and, on occasion, in the defense of their mission if they come under direct attack. Unlike fighting forces, then, peacekeepers are not intended to create the peace they are asked to keep. They accept the balance of forces on the ground and work within it. Ironically, this military weakness may be an advantage in that it reassures all parties that the peacekeeping force cannot alter the prevailing balance to their advantage. In short, peacekeeping is a device to guarantee transparency, to reassure all sides that each is carrying out its promises.²⁹

THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTIVE INTERVENTION

By 1997, the authors of one major report concluded that an alternative doctrine, what some have referred to as a 'peace enforcement' approach,³⁰ was already unfolding. As they remarked: "At the moment there is no specific international legal provision against internal violence (apart from the genocide convention and more general provisions contained in international human rights instruments), nor is there any widely accepted principle that this should be prohibited."³¹

The foundations that under gird the doctrine of preventive intervention are vastly different from that of the peacekeeping one. Rather than drawing from the idea of reaction and limited engagement, preventive intervention starts from the assumption that sovereignty is conditional upon universally acceptable behavior—international norms— and that potential large-scale conflicts with dire humanitarian implications can be identified. The purpose of preventive intervention is to forestall such crises. Timely action to intercede can therefore be successfully undertaken, it assumes, by relevant forces.³² Rather than being reactive, organizations like the UN must learn to be preemptive.³³ This belief is coupled with another, that:

Effective preventive strategies rest on three principles: early reaction to signs of trouble; a comprehensive, balanced approach to alleviate the pressures, or risk

factors, that trigger violent conflict, and an extended effort to resolve the underlying root causes of violence.³⁴

The justification for such action therefore rests on a contrasting definition of sovereignty to the traditional, hitherto hegemonic one employed by proponents of peacekeeping. The traditional view focuses on the rights of states. In this alternative version, states have responsibilities or obligations to their citizenry. One vaunted report summarized this position:

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or alter it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.³⁵

Thus sovereignty:

Does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people.... It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally—to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international human rights covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the minimum content of good international citizenship.³⁶

According to this view, the implication of this perspective is that state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens, as well as the promotion of their welfare; that national authorities are responsible to both the national citizenry and international community through the UN; and that the agents of states are responsible for their actions and accountable for acts of commission and omission. In sum, they are accountable where hitherto they benefited from purported impunity.³⁷ Failure to accept these responsibilities is the foundation for a 'just cause' for intervention.³⁸

Such claims are made against the backdrop of the development of the concept of human security, with its focus on the security of individuals as being of primary importance rather than the territorial integrity of states. This extends beyond civilian exposure in inter-state wars to the physical safety of individuals in all contexts, their economic and social welfare, and the protection of their human rights.³⁹

This kind of holistic approach to the definition of human security is consistent with the doctrine of preventive intervention in at least three different respects. First, its proponents move beyond the precipitant causes to consider underlying ones. They do so by distinguishing between

structural and *operational* elements of prevention. Broader structural components (such as the battle against poverty and disease) involve crucial long-term strategies to avoid the conditions that foster intra-state conflict. Operational aspects involve strategies that address the immediate or contingent precipitants of war.⁴⁰

Second, in contrast to peacekeeping, the focus in this doctrine is not exclusively on military intervention. Military intervention is only one form of preventive intervention. Broader strategies can include political and diplomatic initiatives, economic threats or incentives, as well as the threat or use of force. Intervention thus has twin components of sanctions and rewards that extend beyond the threat of imminent duress.⁴¹

Third, this approach extends ‘downstream’ to include not only conflict resolution but ‘peace building’, often in the form of the reintegration and reconstruction of fragmented states, comparable to the embryonic process of state building currently underway in Afghanistan and Iraq. Conflict prevention, where appropriate, thus entails an extended, indefinite commitment to a process beyond the immediate use of force and sanctions. William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, offers a less-than enthusiastic, if realistic comment that one does

... have to recognize what successful interventions involve. Simply put, they must provide a surrogate government for a very long time, normally decades, while effective indigenous governmental institutions are created. Interventions inspired only by humanitarian impulses without a concomitant willingness and capacity to provide surrogate government are both politically and morally irresponsible.⁴²

So the analysis of causes, the breadth of function and the degree of time commitment all shift in the context of the doctrine of preventive intervention from that of peacekeeping. Although there is some disagreement over the timing of force, a war fighting capacity is essential to establish and sustain credibility—and force remains ‘an appropriate’ option. Its use should be ‘fair but firm.’⁴³

Yet it would be mistaken to conclude that the only justifications for preventive intervention are idealistic or moralistic. Appealing to rationalist instincts, some commentators on the utility of this doctrine also consider the proposition that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Bruce Jentleson, for example, offers a rationalist riposte to traditional realist approaches by suggesting that the option of preventive intervention saves money because of the huge costs involved in individual peacekeeping operations in the 1990s compared to the estimated costs of a preventive intervention operation.⁴⁴ Such claims are always subject to skepticism, given the inherent gap between the known cost of prior peacekeeping operations and

the ‘guesstimates’ involved in Jentleson’s assertion. But his approach does provide the basis for serious debate amongst rationalists, and thus shifts the emphasis away from a characteristic representation of the argument as being between ‘worldly’ rationalists and ‘naïve’ idealists.

Tom Farer gives a pragmatic and contemporary face to such realist arguments when he states that advocates of humanitarian intervention have

attempted to show that unremediated butchery in foreign lands adversely affects the interests of people at home. They emphasized material factors like spikes in undocumented immigration caused by persons fleeing persecution and the threat of deadly diseases or international criminal and terrorist organizations able to incubate in anarchic places.⁴⁵

Consistent with my broad argument, the UN’s leadership has played a pivotal role in the development of this doctrine since the mid 1980s – in response to the failure of peacekeeping operations to address a succession of humanitarian crises. The doctrine has developed in stages in a dialectic interaction between world events and policy maker’s responses.⁴⁶

THE COLD WAR TRANSITION: 1986 TO 1996

A succession of UN peacekeeping failures led critics to conclude that the UN then had neither the resources nor strategy to act effectively.⁴⁷ Three cases were pivotal. The first was that of Macedonia, a very small and otherwise undistinguished operation whose importance lay in the fact that it set a precedent by becoming the first case where the principle of preventive intervention was used to justify UN activities under Resolution 795.⁴⁸ The second case was that of Rwanda which was significant because of the very size of the genocide, the clear signals of impending slaughter, the apparent capacity of the West to intervene at a relatively small cost—and its refusal to do so. More notable therefore for what the UN didn’t do, Rwanda became inextricably associated with General Roméo Dallaire’s attributed claim in April of 1994 that the deployment of a relative small number of 5,000 mobile troops could have significantly reduced the slaughter in Rwanda, if not quell it.⁴⁹

The third case was that of Somalia, where the UN made a significant movement away from the traditional peacekeeping paradigm towards something that was far more coercive in operation and broader in intent. Of the three, the importance of Macedonia as a historic precedent cannot be overstated. The role of the Rwandan genocide in illustrating the lack of equity and moral paucity of the West was of enormous importance in promoting the doctrine of preventive intervention. But, having said that, I argue the case of Somalia cannot be underestimated—both because of the way in which the West was extensively involved, and yet the failure of both the

U.S. and UN missions illustrated the need for a more coherent strategy (than peacekeeping) in the context of humanitarian crises.

In this period, it was the then-presiding Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who initially became the most vocal proponent of the development of a capacity for preventive intervention. In *An Agenda for Peace*, a 1992 report published relatively soon after his taking office, he described it in terms of being a new technique designed to prevent cross border or intra-state conflict from erupting.⁵⁰ Boutros-Ghali there introduced the concept of ‘peace enforcement’ as one designed to maintain cease-fires. As Edward Luck suggested, Boutros-Ghali stressed, “that low-level action, at modest cost and risk, may prevent the need at a later point to choose between doing nothing and intervening forcefully.”⁵¹

Two months later, as Daniel and Hayes point out, Boutros-Ghali characterized this as a task beyond a traditional peacekeeping function, entailing deployment beyond the expressed consent of antagonists and in which the UN could use necessary force. “In this way he sanctioned the term ‘peace enforcement’ and, whatever his intentions, helped advance the view that the international community now had available a continuum of options with peace enforcement in the middle.”⁵² He saw it as a way of enforcing the peace against all signatures to an agreement who violated its’ terms. “In such a conception the peace support contingent is somewhat like a policeman on the beat with authority to support community-backed norms against all comers regardless of their affiliation.”⁵³ In a further development of this idea, by 1995, Boutros-Ghali dropped the term ‘peace enforcement’ and instead simply began to refer to ‘enforcement’—thus further delineating between peacekeeping and enforcement in the move towards prevention.⁵⁴

During this period, in early 1993, Kofi Annan became the Under Secretary General responsible for Peacekeeping Operations. Prior to his new appointment, he had vocally favored adopting a new paradigm for peace support built around inducements founded on the principle that “inaction in the face of massive violence is morally indefensible, non-involvement an illusory option.”⁵⁵ Indeed, Annan had been outraged by the inequity he perceived in the West’s willingness to act to intervene in Bosnia when Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique and Liberia all then ranked markedly higher in terms of the potential magnitude of the human tragedies. Annan considered such a choice to be motivated more by the location of the war in Europe than consideration of the human implications—a clear if unpopular point he made during a visit to Sarajevo in 1992.⁵⁶

Certainly, Boutros-Ghali’s demands were most immediately stimulated by events in Somalia, where hundreds of thousands of victims were dying, yet the Organization of African Unity (OAU) opposed UN intervention because no Somali government had requested

assistance.⁵⁷ The Organization of Islamic Conference, however, did press for action, providing Boutros-Ghali with a justification to visit Somalia. In the midst of the fighting, Boutros-Ghali prevailed upon the General Assembly (GA) under resolution 733 to establish a total arms embargo (albeit belated), urge a cease-fire, establish a humanitarian relief effort and issue an invitation to all parties in Somalia to attend a meeting in New York in an attempt to establish a compromise. But efforts at reconciliation proved unsuccessful, complicated by a history of personal animosity between Somali warlord Mohamed Aideed and Boutros-Ghali himself.⁵⁸

The UN and the U.S. did eventually intervene in Somalia, an episode chronicled extensively elsewhere.⁵⁹ That intervention, according to critics, proved to be such a failure in large part because of the bad faith that existed between the United States and the United Nations. The United States was initially intent on pursuing an independent policy through UNITAF predicated on the provision of immediate relief to starving Somalis. Boutros-Ghali's objective was to institute a policy intent on the kind of nation building that would precipitate a further move towards preventive intervention. The Americans, according to Stephen John Stedman, were never going to be interested in such goals.⁶⁰ Indeed, they were preparing for an independent, short-term action before handing the operation over to UN responsibility.

Commentators have suggested that the American leadership of UNITAF marked a watershed in the expansion of functions from traditional peacekeeping to broader peace operations. In contrast, it was the initial UN deployment, UNOSOM I, that constituted a classic peacekeeping operation there.⁶¹ The UN Security Council passed resolutions 751 and 767. These resolutions sanctioned the deployment of troops, airlift of emergency supplies and the provision of an advisory team to Somalia.

The U.S. commitment extended to the provision of UNITAF troops was designed to stabilize the situation and provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This initiative, Resolution 794, was approved by The UN Security Council in December of 1992. The UNITAF force, under the designated 'Operation Restore Hope', would act forcefully and without the consent of locals if necessary. The Resolution allowed for a greater use of all necessary force when faced with resistance, the appearance of weaponry, the construction of roadblocks, or evidence of banditry.⁶²

Pointedly, the Americans therefore shifted outside the parameters of the traditional peacekeeping approach—pushing the agenda of Boutros-Ghali's peace enforcement paradigm. Notably, it was considered a successful humanitarian operation; effective in securing the distribution of relief supplies and stemming the death of Somalis.

Subsequently, it was Boutros-Ghali himself who engendered the next move towards the doctrine of preventive intervention. In the wrangling over the second UNOSOM mission, the United States reiterated its unwillingness to sustain its participation and pressed the UN to begin the transition towards its phased withdrawal, to be replaced by UN troops in the field. Resolution 814 created UNOSOM II, its mandate being to provide humanitarian intervention, generate a secure environment for economic assistance and assist in the political reconstitution of a Somali government.⁶³

Yet Boutros-Ghali recognized that only the United States could effectively disarm and demobilize the militias. He encouraged the U.S. to implement a coercive disarmament plan, extending its operations to throughout Somalia and not just in the South where it had primarily operated.

In fact, the Secretary-General did not even want to start planning for UNOSOM II until the United States accepted this broader mandate and began carrying it out. But despite a change in administrations [Bush to Clinton], the U.S. course of limiting the geographic scope of the operation, and avoiding general disarmament activities was set and would not change. As a result, Boutros-Ghali continued to insist until late April 1993 that it was premature and dangerous to begin planning for a U.S. takeover. He was so certain that UNITAF could be pressured into implementing a 'coercive disarmament' plan that the United Nations never prepared a plan of its own.⁶⁴

It was therefore Boutros-Ghali himself who demanded further aggression in a move away from peacekeeping and towards greater coercive preemption.⁶⁵ Indeed, paradoxically, as the situation in Somalia worsened (and the U.S. introduced a war fighting 'Quick Reaction Force' to Somali in search of the warlord Mohamed Aideed), the gap between the UN position and that of the UN's subsequently widened. For, counter intuitively, it was Boutros-Ghali who advocated that the UN adopt an increasingly-aggressive line even as the U.S. position was softening. Lobbying hard for Security Council Resolution 837, he advocated that UN forces use all necessary means to arrest, detain and prosecute those Somali's who had attacked UN forces. As Daniel and Hayes assert, the successful adoption of Resolution 837 "changed the entire premise upon which UNOSOM had been operating. The United Nations was now at war."⁶⁶

Some contingents, like the Italians and the French, demurred at this new UN directive, issuing conflicting orders to their troops. Nonetheless, violence escalated, with the U.S. intent on locating Aideed, while a separate UN force operated determined to defeat Aideed's SNA forces,

stabilize the environment and begin the process of nation building. Neither operation succeeded in attaining its goals.

UNOSOM failed, according to Daniel and Hayes, because it lacked the doctrine, resources or political backing to fight a war. Furthermore, according to Stephen Stedman, the U.S. refusal to support the UN mission—and the eventual U.S. withdrawal—doomed the operation to failure.⁶⁷ Indeed, Edward Luck has offered the assessment that even the mere U.S. announcement of its intention to withdraw its troops from Somalia and not join the UN operation was enough to precipitate the unraveling of the latter.⁶⁸

Nonetheless, despite the mission's evident failure, events in Somalia proved to be a watershed. They signaled the consolidation of a move away from peacekeeping to something that was broader in scope and different in character. Boutros-Ghali's efforts to bring order to Somalia and consolidate the humanitarian operation there may have failed. But they laid the foundation for the idea of linking enforcement powers to a political mandate. Kofi Annan may have been correct in suggesting, in a 1994 interview, that it would be some time before the UN would support a peace enforcement mission of its own.⁶⁹ But the foundation had been laid for the construction of a doctrine in support of that idea,⁷⁰ with the UN the location for discussion.⁷¹

THE CONSOLIDATION PHASE, 1996-2001

This period was marked by a different kind of conflict and intervention, traceable to the low-level sustained presence in Macedonia into 1999, and the precipitous series of events that marked the sustained NATO campaign in Kosovo as sanctioned by the UN. Both could be linked to the principles of preventive intervention. But neither was precipitated by the same kind of broad-based humanitarian crisis as was evident in the first half of the 1990s.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali had been the first high-ranking official to so aggressively promulgate the intellectual and emotional development of the doctrine of preventive intervention. But the appointment of Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the UN signaled its 'take off' stage as he emphatically promoted humanitarian intervention, through the UNDP's yearly reports.⁷²

In perhaps his cumulative statement, The UN's Millennium report entitled, *We the Peoples: The Role of The United Nations in the 21st Century*, Kofi Annan offered his views about the major challenges facing humanity in the new century. The central theme in his discussion about poverty, aids, debt relief, and conflict prevention was that of a 'human-centered' approach to security.⁷³ He redefined security in terms of demographic, poverty-related and substantive violent threats to individuals rather than the more traditional conception of security as being a threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.⁷⁴ In that context, Annan characterized

the necessary move as being from the movement from a ‘culture of reaction’ to a ‘culture of prevention.’⁷⁵

Bruce Jentleson suggests that Annan advocated an enormous shift in order to reinterpret a series of UN Articles as being collectively threaded to justify preventive intervention. These include Articles 2(7) on sovereign rights; Article 3 on rights regarding life, liberty and personal security; Article 55 on human rights as a fundamental and universal freedom; and Article 56 that pledges membership action towards promoting these goals. Thus, according to Annan, “even national sovereignty can be set aside if it stands in the way of the Security Council’s overriding duty to preserve international peace and security.”⁷⁶

Such rhetoric found its way into a series of UN documents sponsored and issued by the Secretary-General designed to exhort the Security Council and General Assembly to accept this interpretation. In attempting to justify a new interpretation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, Annan, for example, stated that “conflict prevention is one of the primary obligations of member states set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and United Nations efforts in conflict prevention must be in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”⁷⁷ Military and diplomatic intervention has therefore become one of the key elements of this ‘culture of prevention’.

Annan’s comments were acute and focused, suggesting that “the time has come to translate the rhetoric of conflict prevention into concrete action.”⁷⁸ Annan attempted to reorganize the UN institutionally along these lines, focusing his efforts on reorienting the fourteen departments under the umbrella of the Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination in 1998 primarily in order to address the issue of prevention. He also aggressively promoted a series of UN resolutions designed to strengthen peacekeeping and nation building capacities, and to focus the efforts of the Department of Political Affairs on playing a useful role in such cases.⁷⁹

Annan was not alone in these efforts, being assisted by a series of senior former politicians and high profile UN officials. The leading members of this group included Lakhdar Brahimi, former Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs and chair of The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; Mohamed Sahnoun (senior Algerian Diplomat, OAU and Arab League official, and Brundtland Commission member); and Gareth Evans, former Australian Minister and Member of Parliament.⁸⁰ The latter two served as co-chairs of the 2001 report entitled, *The Responsibility to Protect*, issued by an NGO, The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. That report is arguably the most comprehensive statement of the foundations of a preventive intervention doctrine to date. Not surprisingly, although funded by the Canadian government, the mandate of the commission was to reinforce Annan’s rhetoric.

The first phase of the evolution of the doctrine of preventive intervention was therefore primarily developed in the context of African conflicts. The second, generally however, was not. War raged in the former Yugoslavia, as NATO forces brought a dictator to his knees. But this case made UN officials focus increasingly on the cases that predated 1996, and how the genocides of the period could have been avoided.

American reaction to these efforts was sporadic and occasionally hostile. Some exceptional American scholars to this trend, such as Bruce Jentleson (formerly a State Department official and senior advisor on foreign policy to Al Gore), were writing extensively on the normative, political and policy aspects of what Jentleson preferred to term ‘coercive prevention.’⁸¹ In general, Jentleson provided evidence that contradicted the traditional conservative assessment that claimed that the American public opposed military intervention in addressing the large-scale effects of humanitarian crises.⁸²

This period was marked by several cases of ‘indirect American intervention’ (East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) and one outstanding, contentious case of direct intervention in Kosovo. Critics contended that the NATO bombing in Kosovo might have been illegal under international law⁸³ (albeit that the bombing was purportedly justified by Belgrade’s abrogation of UN Security Council Resolution 1199) because China and Russia refused to sanction the bombing campaign. Others denounced the American position as hypocritical because President Clinton claimed a moralist and collectivist impulse but was in fact unilateralist in action and self-serving in motive.⁸⁴ Proponents of the action, in contrast, suggested that it took place without Security Council support, but may have been legal according to a growing volume of humanitarian law by virtue of precedent.⁸⁵

Concerns about interventional law, however, seemed to play no obvious role in explaining the decision by President Clinton to articulate his ‘Clinton Doctrine’ on 22 June 1999. Here, in offering a perspective consistent with and congruent to, the doctrine of preventive intervention, Clinton offered “an avowal to stop mass murder everywhere despite the cost to the principle of sovereignty.”⁸⁶ Seemingly, the Clinton administration’s position had become congruent with that of Annan’s; sovereignty was conditional and the use of force legitimate. The ‘can of worms’ that had opened up concerned the condition under which it was applicable.

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPERIAL INTEGRATION

Any chance of continued congruence between the UN position and that of U.S. policymakers, however, was quickly eclipsed by George W. Bush’s presidential triumph. The new President has articulated his explicit hostility to such humanitarian, preventive missions,⁸⁷

indefatigably stated during the 2000 presidential campaign with the comment that “We should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and nations outside our strategic interest.”⁸⁸ Pressed to view American involvement as necessary, conditioned more by American interests in and the structural conditions that others argued necessitated engagement, Bush and his advisors seemed immovable on the issue. Their position echoed the sentiment of some commentators that it was not the American role to prevent each tragedy (nor was it capable of doing so) and that American national interest, not moralism, should be the basis of decision-making.⁸⁹

The American objective as defined by Bush and his advisors, was conditioned by two considerations; to avoid being bogged down in the prospect of ‘nation building’ (‘the Vietnam syndrome’) and to avoid taking casualties as the foremost goal (the ‘zero casualties syndrome’). Humanitarian intervention, many such as influential columnist Charles Krauthammer argued, would clearly transgress both of these primary policy goals.⁹⁰ Bush, in effect, was echoing and responding to the policies and events of his father’s administration.⁹¹ Only later were events in Iraq to reflect how far George W. Bush had reversed course on both of these issues.

American commitment to the development of the doctrine of preventive intervention therefore stalled. Within the White House, however, two alternative doctrines were being contested that both concurred with the UN and the Clinton Administration’s view that sovereignty was conditional. Yet these two views were driven by contrasting impulses.

The first doctrine was articulated by Richard Haass, who then held the post of director of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department. Haass dramatically outlined his views in a speech before the Foreign Policy Association. These were reflective of an imperial notion of America’s role in the world. Haass spoke of the paucity of, and confusion about, both the goals and the instruments of policy. This confusion, he suggested, engulfs the way in which Americans respond to a series of transnational threats, including mass destruction, terrorism, infectious diseases and environmental degradation. In the aftermath of September 11th, according to Haass, there is a need to develop a new doctrine that fuses the “transnational and the traditional” and to provide a coherence and rationale for addressing a series of threatening situations across Latin America, Asia and the Middle East.

Such a doctrine, Haass suggested at the time, “not only gives overall direction to policy, but it also helps establish basic priorities. It can help shape, size, and direct the allocation of resources, while allowing policymakers to conserve that most precious of all resources, their time”. Furthermore, suggested Haass, “a doctrine offers strategic clarity.”⁹² He labeled his a *doctrine of integration*. Haass outlined the central rudiments of such a doctrine when he stated that:

In the 21st century, the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with U.S. interests and values, and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible. Integration of new partners into our efforts will help us deal with traditional challenges of maintaining peace in divided regions as well as with transnational threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also help bring into the globalized world those who have previously been left out. In this era, our fate is intertwined with the fate of others, so our success must be shared success. We are doing this by persuading more and more governments and, at a deeper level, people to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate for our mutual benefit. Integration is about bringing nations together and then building frameworks of cooperation and, where feasible, institutions that reinforce and sustain them even more.⁹³

The values reflective of this doctrine are predictable – the rule of law; limited state power; and a respect for women, private property, equal access to justice and religious tolerance. All were depicted as universal values although many are arguably predominantly American in character. In sum, Haass claimed that these values “are captured by the idea of integration,” a “profoundly optimistic approach to international relations” in which (through a process of consultation and cooperation) power can be pooled.

Integration should be applied to both relationships (between the U.S. on the one hand, and both developed and developing countries on the other) and to institutions (multilateral and regional). The purpose should be to create “an architecture for this new global era that will sustain the cooperative pursuit of shared global interests.” In addressing the concerns of humanitarian crises that have more commonly been associated with preventive intervention, Haass commented (with apologies for the long quote) that:

Some nations and their people cannot now tap into the benefits of the globalized economy because of these countries’ institutional and economic weaknesses. It would be morally repugnant—and defy our nation’s deepest values—to ignore the plight of the citizens of such countries. And, as Afghanistan taught us all too well, it would also be unwise to look away when states begin to fail. Today’s humanitarian problem can all too easily become tomorrow’s strategic threat. It is for reasons such as these that the United States is pressing for fundamental reforms in how the World Bank handles development assistance. And, that is

why President Bush announced last month his bold initiative to dramatically increase American foreign assistance by 50% over the next three years. The Millennium Challenge Account, moreover, will be allocated according to criteria that stress the mutually reinforcing connections among good governance, the rule of law, investment in people, open markets, and poverty reduction. Establishing new norms for this new era will be equally important to our success. The right to self-defense is an international norm that none deny. But over the past decade, we have seen an evolution in how the international community views sovereignty. Simply put, sovereignty does not grant governments a blank check to do whatever they like within their own borders. Instead, the principle that sovereignty carries responsibilities is gaining ground. We saw this in the humanitarian interventions of the past decade, such as in Kosovo. When governments violate the rights of their people on a large scale—be it as an act of conscious policy or the byproduct of a loss of control—the international community has the right and sometimes even obligation to act. Since September 11, behind President Bush’s leadership, we have seen similar changes in how the international community views states’ responsibilities vis-à-vis terrorism. Countries affected by states that abet, support, or harbor international terrorists, or are incapable of controlling terrorists operating from their territory, have the right to take action to protect their citizens.⁹⁴

According to Haass, the tools for implementation should be diplomatic, economic, military, financial and legal. The purpose, according to his doctrine, thus clearly extended to nation building in order to address a series of transnational, collective action problems. America, Haass pointed out, could provide leadership but (given their scale and scope) could not address them alone.

Notably, Haass explicitly suggested that coalitions in addressing problems will be fluid in character, as will the issue of using formal institutions as conduits. By implication, the role of the UN would therefore not be embedded in the functioning of this doctrine (one also referred to as constituting a new norm by Haass). The NATO decision to take military action regarding Kosovo prior to a Security Council sanction might therefore have initiated an unanticipated precedent by Russia and (perhaps more significantly) the People’s Republic of China.

Haass’ integrationist doctrine was clearly distinct from the doctrine of preventive intervention. But the linkage was that his doctrine attempted to specify the legitimate conditions under which preventive intervention would be appropriate. The doctrine thus justified action that

abrogated state sovereignty. Common to the UN position is its multilateral character, use of proportional force, willingness to respond in the context of humanitarian crises, and broad moralist component. Its contrast, however, lay in the centrality of American self-interest, and a willingness to use force to address issues of liberal trade and democratic governance that emphasized ‘the liberal peace’ argument, and extended well beyond any simple humanitarian mandate. A free trading liberal democratic world would be a stable one, and transnational forces should be used to address what he characterizes as transnational problems.⁹⁵

THE DOCTRINE OF “PREEMPTIVE” INTERVENTION

The second doctrine being fermented in the White House by neoconservative proponents at the time was that of preemptive intervention (often, confusingly, referred to interchangeably as “preventive intervention” by White House staff and military advisors).⁹⁶ This alternative doctrine distrusted multilateralism, saw problems with cooperative security (as an attendant attack on *American* sovereignty), and focused on the use of power for the purpose of national security defined in narrow terms. While Colin Powell as Secretary of State represented to them the epitome of multilateralism, the neoconservatives seemed to be gaining the upper hand. That trend, however, certainly accelerated as a result of the events of September 11th. In effect, Haass lost the debate and so resigned to become the President of the Council on Foreign Relations where he could continue to advocate his multilateralist agenda. But although the neoconservatives rejected Haass’ argument, some elements of it nevertheless subsequently resurfaced as a result of political expediency, as an increasing welter of evidence suggested that the rationale for intervention in Iraq (unconventional weaponry) was decidedly weak.

As a presidential candidate, George W. Bush clearly signaled an explicit hostility to multilateralism: To both humanitarian missions and collective security. He preferred to pursue a narrower definition of self-interest and state sovereignty in a spirit of unilateralism.⁹⁷ The first Bush Administration’s policy responses regarding the Kyoto Accord, the ICCJ, The Biological Weapons Protocol, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were reflective of this view.⁹⁸

The Bush administration’s posture on preventive intervention was indefatigably stated during his presidential campaign, summed up with characteristic brevity with the statement that “We should not send our troops to stop ethnic cleansing and nations outside our strategic interest.”⁹⁹ Pressed to view American involvement as necessary, conditioned more by American interests in and the structural conditions that others argued necessitated engagement, Bush and his neoconservative advisors seemed immovable on the issue. Their position echoed the sentiment of some commentators that it was not the American role to prevent each tragedy (nor was it capable

of doing so) and that American national interest, not moralism, should be the basis of decision-making.¹⁰⁰ Military force was supposedly to be used by the U.S. quickly and at moderate cost, consistent with supposedly historic (if in fact factually inaccurate account of) American behavior.¹⁰¹ Other governments meanwhile—such as the Dutch, Canadian, British and Swedish—shifted towards fostering far better pragmatic connections between humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution in this period according to Thomas Weiss.¹⁰²

Bush, in effect, was echoing and responding to the policies and events of his father's administration. George Bush Sr. had wanted to avoid being bogged down in a quagmire when initially engaging in Somalia, driven to act by a humanitarian impulse but keen to avoid the suggestion that Americans were either there to govern or to assist in forming a new government.¹⁰³

Nonetheless, all of George W. Bush's expressed goals were subsequently belied by events in Afghanistan and Iraq. September 11th was perhaps emblematic in demonstrating that the U.S. cannot avoid engagement. Rather than *whether* the U.S. engages the rest of the world, it is *how* the U.S. engages it that is key. Bush's version of engagement was signaled early. He emphasized the notion of the 'culture of prevention,' in speaking of a possible terrorist attack, when he stated that, "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."¹⁰⁴ Yet the purported purpose of his preemptive intervention has been well documented. The primary goal was to protect U.S. domestic citizens, not foreign civilians. Innocent people were now identified as those on the streets of Boston and not Baghdad; Baltimore, not Basra. The intent in doing so was twofold.

The first was to respond to a perceived imminent threat by either foreign governments or the terrorists that they purportedly harbored in order to thwart attacks against Americans, whether they were located on home or foreign soil. Countries that were considered the launching pad for terrorists were to be held culpable and could not claim immunity from hostile intervention on the grounds of sovereignty.

The second, more extended intention of the doctrine of preemptive intervention was to derail the efforts of foreign governments to develop new technologies to create (effectively irresistible) nuclear, biological or chemical weapons that could hold the United States (and its closest allies) strategically at bay—seemingly on an immutable basis. North Korean or Iranian nuclear capacity presented the United States with a nightmare scenario; the possibility that countries could be used as terrorist bases and could develop even more threatening weapons—their safety from American military action guaranteed by their capacity to offer a single, albeit it devastating, military response.

In effect, however, sovereignty was further diluted. Preemptive action on the basis of a ‘clear and present danger’ has been invoked before. Arab troops massing on the border to attack Israel in 1967 had prompted an Israeli countermeasure—and the notion had gained both legitimacy and currency. But here it was invoked with far less clarity as to the threat; the danger being extended geographically across the globe and (paradoxically perhaps) into the future in order to address a concern that some countries might generate the technological capability of creating an unassailable reprisal capability that might put it beyond the American capacity to intervene. In the latter case, therefore, ‘clear and present danger’ in fact came to include the concept of the ‘potentially materializing danger’ in the doctrine.

The logic of this position was epitomized by the example of Richard Cheney’s defense of U.S. and allied intervention in Iraq, when he stated that:

But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Among other sources, we’ve gotten this from the firsthand testimony of defectors—including Saddam’s own son-in-law, who was subsequently murdered at Saddam’s direction. Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. Armed with an arsenal of these weapons of terror, and seated atop ten percent of the world’s oil reserves, Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy supplies, directly threaten America’s friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or any other nation to nuclear blackmail.¹⁰⁵

The counterpart to emergent foreign threat is the potential injury with which it threatens Americans at home – as articulated by President Bush’s subsequent statement that:

Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. . . . The danger is clear: using chemical, biological, or one day nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their state ambition and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country or any other.¹⁰⁶

As Ken Roth summarized it:

[T]he United States-led coalition forces justified the invasion of Iraq on a variety of grounds, only one of which—a comparatively minor one—was humanitarian. The Security Council did not approve the invasion, and the Iraqi government, its existence on the line, violently opposed it. Moreover, while the African

interventions were modest affairs, the Iraq war was massive, involving an extensive bombing campaign and some 150,000 ground troops. . . . To justify the extraordinary remedy of military force for preventive humanitarian purposes, there must be evidence that large-scale slaughter is in preparation and about to begin unless militarily stopped. But no one seriously claimed before the war that the Saddam Hussein government was planning imminent mass killing, and no evidence has emerged that it was. There were claims that Saddam Hussein, with a history of gassing Iranian soldiers and Iraqi Kurds, was planning to deliver weapons of mass destruction through terrorist networks, but these allegations were entirely speculative; no substantial evidence has yet emerged. There were also fears that the Iraqi government might respond to an invasion with the use of chemical or biological weapons, perhaps even against its own people, but no one seriously suggested such use as an imminent possibility in the absence of an invasion.¹⁰⁷

However egregious the Administration's claims subsequently proved to be, the accusations that Iraq was a haven for terrorists; that it was within striking distance of securing a military capability that would protect it from U.S. incursion; and that it could soon pose a possible future threat to U.S. security at home found a resonance among the American public – and gave the neoconservatives within the Bush Administration a coherent doctrine upon which to found their claims.

SUMMARY

In the last two decades, three doctrines have evolved that challenge the traditional autonomy of states as sovereignty-based rights. These are summarized in Table 1. As mentioned earlier, this figure attempts to classify them according to their characterization of sovereignty, their values, operational attributes and broader mandate. They are also listed chronologically in terms of their initial formulations, although all currently interact with and (in that sense their respective proponents respond to) each other. When George W. Bush contended that “moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place,” he came close to the assertion that preventive intervention is justifiable because of a universal right of victims to enjoy a ‘freedom from fear.’ What they more explicitly share, as Table 1 points out, is the belief that sovereignty is conditional upon the upholding of responsibilities. Where they differ is the substance of those responsibilities—and the process by which those responsibilities should be enforced.

TABLE 1
FOUR DOCTRINES OF INTERVENTION:
THE EVOLUTION OF A NORM

	Peacekeeping	Preventive Intervention	Imperial Foreign Policy	Preemptive Intervention
Nature of Sovereignty:	Rights Sovereignty Sacrosanct	Responsibilities Sovereignty Conditional	Responsibilities Sovereignty Conditional	Responsibilities Sovereignty Highly Conditional
Nature of Primary Values:	Impartiality Consent	Partiality for Victims Possibly Non- consensual	Partiality for those denied human rights, democracy or economic liberalism	Partiality for Domestic Population Non-consensual
Operational Attributes:	Reactive Late Entry Force as last use Self Defense No Political Mandate Transparency of Operation	Proactive Early entry Force as appropriate use Citizenry Protection Possible Political Mandate Clarity of Message	Proactive Early entry Force as appropriate use Establishing peace among nations Clarity of Message	Proactive Early Entry Overwhelming use of force Domestic Citizenry Protection Transformative Mandate Clarity of Message
Broader Mandate:	Humanitarian Operation Central but not limited to UN Role Multilateralist	Commitment to Peace Building Coalitional Structure Multilateralist	Construction of world order built on guiding principles. Preferably Multilateralist	Responding to Perceived Clear and Present Danger Dominantly Unilateralist

The Bush administration soon encountered the limits of the doctrine of preemptive intervention. It engaged in limited (and unsuccessful) nation building in Afghanistan; more extensive (although to date by no means any more successful) nation building in Iraq. Furthermore, the failure to find any evidence of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons research

or production ultimately drove it back to Haass' doctrine to justify its actions in Iraq. And, with no little irony, the subsequent U.S. action in Haiti is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of preventive intervention —the use of forceful action before the number of casualties escalated. These examples all demonstrate that while one doctrine may predominate for a while, they all may exist simultaneously – and lack the distinct clarity their proponents suggest they have when actually employed by policymakers. What makes each distinct, nonetheless, is their purpose, means and consequences.

Furthermore, the larger picture may portend a trend: In a world in which globalization has already redefined (although not necessarily shrunk) the economic capabilities of states, these prevailing and contesting security doctrines challenge the capacities of states to enhance the safety of civilian populations. The dilution of sovereignty has not been complimented by the blossoming of collective security institutions, nor the support for that concept amongst those best able to implement such policies. New technologies have created a global capacity for intervention but no accompanying agreement about when or how to intervene. The product is a world devoid of rules, with only contested beliefs about when to abrogate sovereignty. Only one thing is clear; sovereignty, as we routinely enforced it in the second half of the twentieth century, is now largely moribund.

¹ For further details on the evolution of this debate within the United Nations and affiliated organizations see Simon Reich, "Power, Institutions and Moral Entrepreneurs," ZEF-Discussion Paper on Development Policy No. 65, Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn, March 2003, <<http://www.mafhoum.com/press7/226P3.pdf>>.

² Richard N. Haass, "Imperial America," Brookings Paper, November 2000, <<http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/haass/2000imperial.htm>>. Haass most recently outlined an 'integrationist' doctrine in Richard Haass, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World," 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, New York, 22 April 2002, <<http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm>>.

³ The literature on this issue is voluminous, needing no recapitulation here. But for notable examples see the works of John O'Neal, John Owen, and Bruce Russett.

⁴ Stephen D. Krasner, in *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) has, of course, argued that sovereignty is varied in character and was never as foundational as those who caricature realism have argued. For varied contrasting views see Daniel Philpott, "Usurping the Sovereignty of Sovereignty," *World Politics* 53 (January 2001): 297-324, and his *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); *State Sovereignty as a Social Construct*, Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of International Relations," *International Organization* 48 (Winter 1994): 107-30.

⁵ For a discussion of the benchmark UN Position on peacekeeping and intervention see The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85-93.

⁶ For a comprehensive statement, see I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: the Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in

International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War, ed. Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman (National Academy Press, 2000), 225-250; and more recently, in a post-9/11 context, see the application of the concept in I. William Zartman, "The Attack on Humanity: Conflict and Management," Social Science Research Council Paper, <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/zartman_text_only.htm>.

⁷ For a concise but clear listing of these forces and their influences on intrastate conflict see Fen Osler Hampson, Jean Daudelin, John B. Hay, Holly Reid and Todd Martin, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁸ For a summary statement of this position see The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001), xi.

⁹ For a concise justification of the principles legitimating intervention by just such a moral entrepreneur see Kofi A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, 18 September 1999.

¹⁰ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 11.

¹¹ Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention*.

¹² Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention*, cf. p.3 and Chapter 2.

¹³ Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention*, 6.

¹⁴ Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, "Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law," in *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 177-203.

¹⁵ Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention*, 16-17.

¹⁶ On the influence of legitimacy on state action see Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

¹⁷ Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention*, 16-17. For the purposes of this paper I adopt J.L. Holzgrefe's definition of humanitarian intervention as "the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory it is applied." See J.L. Holzgrefe, "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate," in Holzgrefe and Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 18.

¹⁸ John Gerard Ruggie, "The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether?," in *The UN, Peace and Force*, ed. Michael Pugh (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 1-2.

¹⁹ Ruggie, "The UN," 5-7.

²⁰ Mats Berdahl, "Whither UN Peacekeeping? An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping with Proposals for its Enhancement," Adelphi Paper 281 (1993): 3.

²¹ Personal conversation between author and Sir Marrack Goulding, Zentrum for Entwicklungsforschung, Bonn, Germany, 5 July 2002.

²² Thomas G. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," *Ethics & International Affairs* 13 (1999): 1.

²³ Weiss, "Principles," 3.

²⁴ Bruce W. Jentleson, "Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political and Policy Dilemmas," Peaceworks No. 35 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, October 2000): 5. For a discussion of the conditions under which bilateral intervention might occur see Patrick Regan, "Choosing to Intervene: Outside Intervention in Internal Conflicts," *Journal of Politics* 60 (August 1998): 754-779.

²⁵ Jentleson, "Coercive Prevention," 18.

²⁶ Ruggie, "The UN," 6.

²⁷ William Odom, "Intervention for the Long Run: Rethinking the Definition of War," *Harvard International Review* (Winter 2001): 50.

²⁸ For a good example see Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman and James Wall, "International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (February 1998): 33-55.

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- ²⁹ Ruggie, “The UN,” 5. Note that Ruggie draws extensively from Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), which I discuss later.
- ³⁰ Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 19.
- ³¹ The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997), 28.
- ³² For such a list of factors see, for example, Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 43-44.
- ³³ See, for example, Kofi Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Document A/55/985-S/2001/574, 7 June 2001, 1.
- ³⁴ Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, xviii.
- ³⁵ International Commission on Intervention, *Responsibility to Protect*, xi.
- ³⁶ International Commission on Intervention, *Responsibility to Protect*, 8. For an academic analysis in support of this view tracing a broader historical element see Bruce Cronin, “Changing Views of Sovereignty and Multilateral Intervention,” in *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics*, ed. Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (Albany, NY: SUNY Press), 159-60.
- ³⁷ International Commission on Intervention, *Responsibility to Protect*, 13-14.
- ³⁸ International Commission on Intervention, *Responsibility to Protect*, 32-34. This same point is also made by Jentleson in “Coercive Prevention,” 19-20.
- ³⁹ International Commission on Intervention, *Responsibility to Protect*, 15.
- ⁴⁰ This distinction is discussed in Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 39; and amplified in Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 7.
- ⁴¹ Again, this point is deliberated upon at length in Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 48-63. Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), focus on a variety of coercive aspects to extend the notion they developed of ‘coercive inducement’ option that judiciously employs forceful persuasion implement community norms or mediate in crisis, including but not limited to military force. See Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 21-22.
- ⁴² Odom, “Intervention for the Long Run,” 52.
- ⁴³ Jentleson, “Coercive Prevention,” 5.
- ⁴⁴ Jentleson, “Coercive Prevention,” 5.
- ⁴⁵ Tom J. Farer, “Humanitarianism Intervention before and After 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy,” in Holzgrefe and Keohane, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 59.
- ⁴⁶ For an extended discussion of these events see Reich, “Institutions and Moral Entrepreneurs.”
- ⁴⁷ Joel Stedman, “UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy,” in Daniel and Hayes, *Coercive Inducement*, 40-41.
- ⁴⁸ See, for example, Alice Ackermann and Antonia Pala, “From Peacekeeping to Preventive Deployment,” *European Security* 5 (Spring 1996): 83-97; Mats Berdahl, “United Nations Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia” in *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, ed. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (London: Palgrave, 1995), 232; Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 64; Jentleson, “Coercive Prevention,” 6, 16.
- ⁴⁹ For just one example of this oft-cited claim see Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 6.
- ⁵⁰ Berdahl, “Whither UN,” 18.
- ⁵¹ Edward C. Luck, “The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace Operations,” in Daniel and Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, 69.
- ⁵² Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 18-19.
- ⁵³ Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 23.
- ⁵⁴ Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 18-19.
- ⁵⁵ Kofi Annan, “Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century” (New York: United Nations Working Paper, 1996), 15.
- ⁵⁶ Stedman, “UN Intervention,” 47.

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- ⁵⁷ Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 84.
- ⁵⁸ Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 86
- ⁵⁹ See, for examples of an extensive literature, Mike Blakely, "Somalia," in *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, ed. Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); Carnegie Commission, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, 75-90; Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 73-112; and William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and 'State Building' in Somalia," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), 311-366.
- ⁶⁰ Stedman, "UN Intervention," 48.
- ⁶¹ This view is expressed by Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 86.
- ⁶² Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 90.
- ⁶³ Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 98.
- ⁶⁴ Daniel and Hayes (with Oudraat), *Coercive Inducement*, 99.
- ⁶⁵ See Gary Anderson, "UNOSOM II: Not Failure, Not Success," in Daniel and Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, 273; 278-279.
- ⁶⁶ Anderson, "UNOSOM II," 102.
- ⁶⁷ Stedman, "UN Intervention," 69. Gary Anderson's comments are consistent with Stedman's assessment. See Anderson, "UNOSOM II," 273.
- ⁶⁸ Luck, "Case for Engagement," 71.
- ⁶⁹ Stanley Meisler, "Kofi Annan: The Soft Spoken Economist who runs UN Peacekeeping Forces," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 June 1994.
- ⁷⁰ An outstanding case for examination is that of Bosnia. But, I believe, doing so would support a comparable argument detailed in the Somali case. Unlike in Somalia, UNPROFOR, the provided force provided by the UN preceded any U.S. involvement. It initially proved inadequate in dealing with the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs. It was only when U.S. policy changed course, and they began air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions, that all antagonists were coerced into participating in the Dayton Peace Accords. See, for example, Joseph R. Biden, "Bosnia: Why the United States Should Finish the Job," *SAIS Review* 18 (Summer-Fall 1998): 1.
- ⁷¹ Luck, "Case for Engagement," 69.
- ⁷² For a perspective consistent with this see, for example, Adam Garfinkle, "Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Preventive Intervention," *Orbis* 45 (Fall 2001): 503.
- ⁷³ Kofi A. Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of The United Nations in the 21st Century*, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2000), 43.
- ⁷⁴ See, for example, Caroline Thomas, *Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).
- ⁷⁵ Although there are numerous examples of Annan offering this statement, for emphasis, see the first line of Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 6.
- ⁷⁶ See Jentleson, "Coercive Prevention," 20.
- ⁷⁷ Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 1.
- ⁷⁸ Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 3.
- ⁷⁹ Annan, *Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 13-15.
- ⁸⁰ Gareth Evans also serves as President of a Brussels-based NGO, the International Crisis Group, devoted to the issue of preventive intervention.
- ⁸¹ Jentleson, "Coercive Prevention."
- ⁸² See Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (August 1998), especially p. 406.
- ⁸³ See, for example, Julie Mertus, "Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo," *William and Mary Law Review* 41 (May 2000): 17453. Mertus does argue, however, that the intervention may indeed be justifiable according to the UN Charter.

⁸⁴ For a discussion of this issue see Jeffrey C. Isaac and Suzanne Dovi, "Hypocrisy and the Limits of Debunking it," *Polity* 34 (Fall 2001): 31-40.

⁸⁵ See, for example, Klinton W. Alexander, "NATO'S Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval," *Houston Journal of International Law* 22 (Spring 2000): 403. For a further variety of assessments by notable legal scholars see "NATO's Kosovo Intervention," Editorial, *American Journal of International Law* 93 (1999), <http://www.asil.org/kosovo.htm>.

⁸⁶ Cited in Garfinkle, "Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy," 507.

⁸⁷ For a sympathetic statement of this perspective see Charles Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism," *Washington Post*, 8 June 2001, A29.

⁸⁸ George W. Bush to ABC News, 23 January 2000 quoted in Garfinkle, "Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy," 503. For supporting evidence see Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2000): 45-62.

⁸⁹ For an expression of this position see, for example, Christopher Layne, "Minding Our own Business: The Case for American Non-Participation in International Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations," in Daniel and Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping*, 87-88.

⁹⁰ Odom, "Intervention for the Long Run," 48-49.

⁹¹ George H.W. Bush had wanted to avoid either problem when initially engaging in Somalia, driven to act by a humanitarian impulse but keen to avoid the suggestion that Americans were either there to govern or to assist in forming a new government. See Odom, "Intervention for the Long Run," 48-49.

⁹² See Haass, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy."

⁹³ Haass, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy."

⁹⁴ Haass, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy."

⁹⁵ Support for Haass' views can be found in the work of some noted academics, particularly Michael Ignatieff, who argues for "a responsibility to protect, prevent and follow through." See Michael Ignatieff, "State Failure and Nation Building," in *Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Holzgrefe and Keohane, 320. It is a forceful liberalism in which Security Council authorization is preferred but not required and sovereignty has an instrumental value but is not absolute.

⁹⁶ In effect, there appears to be little operational distinction employment of the two terms by the Bush Administration. For the purpose of clarity, I therefore use the terms distinctly.

⁹⁷ For a sympathetic statement of this perspective see Krauthammer, "The New Unilateralism."

⁹⁸ Michael Mazarr, "Saved From Ourselves?," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2002): 228.

⁹⁹ George W. Bush to ABC News, 23 January 2000, quoted in Garfinkle, "Strategy and Preventive Diplomacy," 503. For supporting evidence see Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," 45-62.

¹⁰⁰ For an expression of this position see, for example, Layne, "Minding Our Own Business," 87-88.

¹⁰¹ Odom, "Intervention for the Long Run," 48.

¹⁰² Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," 17.

¹⁰³ Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," 51.

¹⁰⁴ George W. Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point," 1 June 2002, <<http://222.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html>>.

¹⁰⁵ Richard Cheney, "Vice President Speaks at VFW 1034d National Convention." 26 August 2002, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/print/20020826.html>>.

¹⁰⁶ George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, 17 March 2003, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>>.

¹⁰⁷ Ken Roth, "War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention," Human Rights Watch World Report 2004, <<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm>>.