**New tricks for the dogs of war, or just old w(h)ine in new bottles?—
securitisation, defence policy and civilian control
in Brazil, 1994-2002**

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This study addresses the question of why, in societies in transition, changes in the institutions and structures governing the relationship between civilians and the military may not always be sufficient to produce changes in real civilian control over the armed forces[1]. Even where new arrangements represent a considerable loss of previous institutionalised prerogatives, a military establishment may continue to exercise dominance over the policy formulation process, whose outcomes are a more effective measure of the relative balance of power within the civil-military relationship.

One context is which this holds true is the period since the first post-dictatorship Brazilian Constitution of 1985 and the creation of that country's Ministry of Defence in 1999; despite the formidable loss of institutional power the creation of the new Ministry represented, there has yet to occur a meaningful shift in the content of the nation's security policy. Similarly, no significant increase has yet to occur in the level of substantive contributions made by civil society within the framework of the policy process. The latter of these two decades also saw the issuance of two new National Defence Policies in 1996 and 2005 which did little to alter the *de facto* situation regarding the Armed Force' role in the governance of Brazil.

For certain armed forces—such as the Brazilian—one highly effective way of cushioning the effects of the loss of structural prerogatives lies in retaining discursive dominance within the national debate on security issues, broadly defined. In Latin America, military establishments' continued discursive dominance in the post-transition era is often a result of concerted military efforts to establish their doctrine as the sole legitimate security discourse, and actively to marginalize other competing conceptions. In the Brazilian case, the doctrine is the *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional* (DSN), disseminated in both the military

and the civilian spheres through the military educational system at whose apex sits the Higher War College (*Escola Superior de Guerra*—ESG).

The discursive dominance of the DSN hinders the ability of experts and others espousing dissident views to attain the status of "securitising actor" in the sense posited by the speech-act theory developed at the "Copenhagen School", and thus to participate fully in the threat and mission definition processes that make up the core of policy formulation. It does so by inhibiting the ability of non-coopted civil society actors (the focus here will be on the community of academic experts in the field of security studies) to develop three attributes necessary for admission to the policy process. Academics' imposed failure fully to develop these qualities hinders their effectiveness once included in the policy process, and occasionally even any participation at all.

With alternative discourses excluded or weakened, military establishments are consequently assured a significantly higher probability of obtaining policy outcomes (most importantly threat and mission definition) that reflect their retention of prerogatives and a continuation of indirect military tutelage or at best incomplete civilian control. Thus, unless efforts to neutralize the tools of military discursive dominance accompany the creation of new arrangements for civilian control, these institutions will remain ineffective and the policy context will remain favourable to the maintenance of problematic military prerogatives such as, for example, internal missions and the acquisition of weapons systems whose purposes deviate from those set out in publicly declared national foreign and security policy.

An initial section will highlight the theoretical underpinnings of the investigations, briefly discussing the securitisation approach developed by the "Copenhagen school"; the three sets of attributes posited as determining academics' access to policy processes; and the use of change in policy outcomes as an indicator of civilian control. A presentation of the Brazilian national context follows, with particular attention paid to the relevant content

of the DSN and the marginalizing tactics employed by the military education system to entrench the former as the criterion of competence in defence matters. Finally, the study will examine specific issue-related outcomes from the last ten years of Brazilian defence policymaking.

TABLE 1:
CIVILIAN CONTROL AND POLICY OUTCOMES
IN SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION

1. (Under military rule):
AFs establish discursive dominance

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2. Dominance carried over
through doctrine (DSN/ESG)

↓

3. Civil society (academics) cannot develop securitising
actor qualities/status

↓

4. Civil society ineffective/excluded
from policy formulation

↓

5. Policy outcomes reflect continued incomplete
civilian control (military prerogatives maintained)

↓

6. Institutional changes remain ineffective without
neutralizing discursive dominance

Securitisation

The authors of what has become known as the "Copenhagen School"—most notably Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver—developed an approach to the study of security issues based on the notion of the speech act. In this approach, security is defined and measured not in terms of objectively acknowledged threats, but as a semantic field in which actors seek to label a given problem with the term security for political purposes. Securitisation, as such a move is called, is a heightened form of politicisation which places an issue so labelled at the top of the political agenda. This priority is justified by the fact that the term security refers explicitly to the presence of an *existential* threat to a given human collectivity[2] on whose behalf these actors purport to speak.

The units of the "new framework for analysis" proposed by Buzan, Wæver and Jaap de Wilde are securitising actors, referent objects, and functional actors[3]. Of primary importance to our analysis are referent objects and securitising actors. The referent object of a posited security threat consists of a collectivity that is "seen to be existentially threatened and that [has] a legitimate claim to survival".[4] The nature of that collectivity, and of the "social glue"[5] that holds it together, is the core of the role of securitising actors.

These actors are empowered—in accordance with the rules that constitute the collectivity as such—to declare a given issue a "security" issue. To securitise an issue is to engage in a speech act by which an issue is moved "beyond the established rules of the game" and framed "either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. ... What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience"[6].

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[2] Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998: p. 21.
[3] Ibid., p. 37.
[4] Ibid., p. 36.
[5] The term is Alexander Wendt's. Wendt, Alexander. "Collective Identity Formation and the International State". *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 88, No. 2 (1994); p. 385.
[6] Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *New framework*, pp. 23, 27.

In the case of states, this means "authorised representatives" of the state, in accordance with the norms and rules underpinning its existence as a state. In democratic states enjoying the rule of law, securitising actors are effectively designated in the Constitution and other bylaws establishing competence in the security policy domain. Thus, in societies in transition to democracy, who is able to attain securitising actor status is often in itself a highly effective measure of the state of the civil-military relationship.

The Copenhagen authors designate several possible securitising actors, including political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. These actors vary depending on what criteria are used by the audience that they are attempting to convince that a given issue is worthy of securitisation. In other words, the role of securitising actors is played by elites, although the approach deals both with the status of elites through which they gain access and with the internal requirements for the commonality of viewpoint needed to mobilise their potential influence: "[s]ecurity is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites"[7].

Wæver points out that in order for attempts by elites to mobilise for or against the securitisation of an issue, a shared world view must be sustained within at least an inner circle of the most powerful such actors[8]. It is important to note that if the target audience—often the referent object itself—is not convinced, either because of actors' lack of credentials as a securitising actor or because it is patently problematic or not useful to label an issue a security issue, securitisation attempts can, and frequently do, fail.

The Copenhagen approach is predicated upon the consideration of five distinct thematic fields, labelled sectors, each with its own central focus, in which securitisation takes place. This sectorialisation has been one of the most influential means of broadening the definition of the analytical concept of security beyond its narrow realist interpretation.

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[7] Wæver, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization". In Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed. *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; pp. 46-86. Here, p. 57.
[8] Ibid., p. 60.

Beyond the military sector, which echoes the foundations of the realist approach to International Relations, the further fields are the economic, environmental, political and societal sectors.

In the military sector, with which the present analysis of civil-military relations concerns itself, the guiding principle is limited to relations of military coercion. The resultant referent object is almost exclusively the state, and the securitising actors are government elites, again as specified by the rules and norms constituting the state as a collectivity (in democracies, generally the Constitution or Basic Law). Securitisation theory does not specify whether these elites are civilian or military, however[9]. It is the audience of state citizens themselves who set the criterion that identifies either civilian or military actors as securitisers. There is thus a dual measure of that status, reflected both in constitutional provisions in a state context, and in popular acceptance—or, more aptly, non-resistance— towards the conferral of such status. Where military claims to status as securitising actors often rest upon exclusive technical competence in military issues, civilians' claim is based in constitutional imperatives related to civilian supremacy. The target audience for civil society representatives wishing to become securitising actors—represented in this case by local academic experts in the field of defence studies—is the mixed community of decision-makers with the authority to set policy directives.

Attributes of academics as securitising actors

Experts who wish to gain access to the defence policy formulation process must possess certain attributes. These are specialised knowledge, institutionalised prestige and normative resonance[10]. Specialised knowledge in the case of defence academics can be divided *inter alia* into two types: practical and theoretical. The latter consists of general

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[9] On the military sector, see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *New framework*, pp. 49-70.

[10] These attributes are discussed in greater theoretical and empirical detail in Kenkel, Kai Michael. *Whispering to the Prince: Academic experts and national security policy formulation in Brazil, South Africa and Canada*. Ph.D. thesis, Graduate Institute of International Studies (IUHEI), Geneva, 2005; pp. 45-73.

theories of International Relations and its subdisciplines, as well as normative worldviews taken from the practice of international diplomacy and international law. Though many policymakers in academics' audience possess academic training in these areas, this is not invariably the case, and many bureaucrats with academic grounding do not have the time (or perhaps the inclination) to stay up to date on the latest developments and debates issuing from academe. While there are little if any hindrances to academics and civilians accumulating this type of knowledge, the same cannot be said of practical knowledge related to defence issues.

Information that provides practical knowledge of defence-related issues often originates within the armed forces, which have the option of exercising tight control over its public dissemination. Thus, the ability of a given national security studies community to accrue such knowledge is often highly dependent upon the transparency of the military establishment, and by extension on the situation regarding civilian control. In light of this fact, in the majority of cases it is likely that the specialised knowledge policymakers seek from academics will be of the former category.

In addition to possession of specialised knowledge, a further requisite attribute of the successful policy academic is institutionalised prestige. The professional socialisation of academics within scholarly institutions rewards certain forms of academic production which may be different from those rewarded within policymaking circles. Security experts who seek to contribute to the policy process must demonstrate both success as it is measured within academe, and the ability to transform the output that led to that success into inputs that are useful to the policymaking community. Academics gain institutionalised prestige by publishing articles and monographs, contributing to mainstream media, exposing their ideas publicly at academic conferences and occasionally policy briefings. At a more interpersonal level, former students enter into the policy world and retain ideas learned in academe, and colleagues can further academics' reputations by word of mouth

into a policymaker's ear. The institutionalised prestige of academics also depends to a considerable extent on the reputation of the university system within the country in question and on the status of International Relations and security studies as disciplines within both the local academic structure and public debates on issues related to the security problematic.

The third and final necessary condition posits that once policymakers who have entered the policy process have provided decisional options for policymakers as outlined above, these must resonate conceptually with the normative and political outlook of the policymaker and the government she represents. In crafting their proposals to coincide with the normative outlook of the policy establishment, external advisors are often faced with a target audience bifurcated into a more progressive civilian half and a uniformed one that is more conservative in outlook. Outside participants in the policy process must meet these three conditions in order to be able to function as securitising actors and exercise some form of influence over the threat and mission definition process.

Policy outcomes and civilian control

The importance of policy outcomes as measures of the state of civil-military relations is reflected in one analyst's claim that

> [t]he best indicator of the state of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge. … To determine whether the military plays an important role in a society's political decision-making, one should identify a number of issues that pitted military preferences against those of civilians and show who prevailed.[11]

The struggle for civilian control is in this case to a great extent synonymous with the struggle for securitising actor status and for influence over policy outcomes. Securitising actor status in democratic polities is accorded by provisions contained in a given national Constitution, which will often call for (occasionally extensive) military participation in

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[11] Desch, Michael C. *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999; pp. 4-5. On the increased compliance of militaries whose missions exclude internal deployment, see also Michael Desch, "Threat Environment and Military Missions". In Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds. *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy.* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996; pp. 12-29.

policy formulation on the basis of technical expertise. However, in democratic polities, final policy control and securitising actor status are legitimised in accordance with the democratic imperative. In securitisation theory, securitising actor status confers the ability to place a given issue at a point on the political agenda that allows the use of means above and beyond the realm of normal politics. This is the link between securitising actor status and civilian control, as oftentimes the armed forces constitute those extraordinary means. Control over the armed forces thus falls to securitising actors, who hold ultimate policy control; in the words of David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux,

> [i]f civilian control is to be achieved, and if democracies are to endure, then a fundamental axiom must be respected, namely, that it is for civilians to decide when, where, and how the armed forces are to be used. Civilian leaders need not dominate all military functions, but they at least must have *ultimate* authority, meaning they must be able to decide who will decide.[12]

The superiority of democratic representativeness as the justification for decision-making power is reflected in the policy process. J. Samuel Fitch situates clearly the role of legitimate securitising actors under democratic civil-military relations:

> democratic consolidation requires policy control of the armed forces by the constitutionally designated civilian authorities to whom the military is professionally and institutionally subordinate. … In consolidated democracies, the president and the congress define the threats against which the country must be protected and the missions to be assigned to the armed forces.[13]

The security policy formulation process produces two interrelated outcomes which have both been treated as indicators of, or preconditions for, civilian control of armed forces in the relevant literature. These outcomes, which are intimately tied to the notion of securitisation, concern the definition of the threats to national security to which policy must respond, and the attendant missions to be fulfilled by the armed forces in protecting from that threat. Among other things, threat definition clarifies what policymakers perceive as being under threat, and what holds together the collectivity in whose name they are acting. In this sense, as in any other area of policy, the formulation process serves as the

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[12] Pion-Berlin, David and Craig Arceneaux. "Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America." *Armed Forces & Society*. Vol. 26, No. 3 (2000); pp. 413-436. Here, p. 420. Emphasis in the original.

[13] Fitch, J. Samuel. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998; p. 37.

locus for the amalgamation of the interests of a numerous actors with claims to securitising actor status. As such, in a democratic system it is arguably the most important stage upon which the struggle involved in civilian control plays out.

Democratic legitimacy confers upon civilian policymakers the power to portray their own parochial interests as those of the nation; according to David Mares,

> [w]hatever endangers the governing social coalition is identified as a threat to "national security". Civilian threat perception, therefore, depends on the nature of the political bargains supporting the regime".[14]

The determinants of civilian and military policy priorities elaborated by Mares make explicit the link between organizational approaches and a focus on policy outcomes:

> Unless the civil-military relationship completely excludes the military from the threat identification, the armed forces will be a lesser or greater participant in threat identification. …

> Threat identification by the military depends fundamentally on its relationship to the government and the resulting institutional incentives. If the military dominates the polity or is identified with preserving a particular political faction, it will identify threats in a fashion similar to [civilians]. …

> The need to reduce uncertainty and defend institutional autonomy and resources becomes a lens to interpret the world, much the same way as the civilian leadership's political coalition colors their view of the world.[15]

Mares' analysis localizes neatly another manner of formulating the central dilemma behind civilian control: in whose name—on behalf of what referent object—are civilians and soldiers securitising given issues within and outside of the policy process? The democratic imperative justifies the identity of civilian parochial interests with state interests while withholding this privilege to the interests of the military establishment when these represent the uniformed corporation or another entity apart from the state, such as the "fatherland" (*patria*)[16]. This explains in part why in some instances, the subordination of defence policy to foreign policy, and the making of defence policy by or with strong influence from the foreign policy establishment, is seen as a counterweight to the preponderance of military corporate interests in the formulation process.[17]

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[14] Mares, David R. "Civil-Military Relations, Democracy, and the Regional Neighborhood". In David R. Mares, ed. *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998; pp. 1-24. Here, p. 10.

[15] Ibid., pp. 13, 14.

[16] Loveman, Brian. *For la Patria : politics and the armed forces in Latin America*. Wilmington: SR Books, 1999.

[17] This was the case in Argentina and Brazil in the last decade. On Argentina, see Pion-Berlin, David. "Civil-Military Circumvention: How Argentine State Institutions Compensate for a Weakened Chain of Command". In David Pion-Berlin, ed. *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001; pp. 135-160. Here, p. 152. In Brazil, as will be

Mission definition has been portrayed by numerous analysts as an important element of civilian control. The outcomes of this process have been identified as having the potential both for increased civilian control and for the continuation of military prerogatives. The central axis here is the exclusion as a deployment possibility for the armed forces, as defined in declaratory policy, of missions against threats emanating from within the nation's borders[18]. The fundamental tenet of mission definition must be that missions are not defined to justify the armed forces in their current iteration, but rather conversely that the armed forces' existence is justified by their necessity for carrying out independently defined missions.

As will be shown below, in the case of many societies in transition from military to democratic rule—such as Brazil—fulfilling this criterion would call for a fundamental change in the doctrine currently in effect within the military establishment. Importantly in this respect, Paul Zagorski identifies doctrinal change as the "strategy most appropriate to the balance-of-power situations in which new democratic governments in Latin America find themselves". According to Zagorski,

> [t]his alternative strategy of securing civilian control aims at the reformulation of the armed forces' mission, organization, strategy and tactics, and legal status—in short, its doctrine—so that the reformed institution adheres to democratic norms.[19]

Zagorski earlier specifically highlights the necessity of this strategy in the context of the internal missions pursued by Cold War-era Latin American militaries in the name of doctrine:

> [t]he advent of the national security doctrine has only served to increase the military's privileged corporate status. … The military frequently has the mission of suppressing strikes or public disturbances, fighting insurgents or terrorists, and providing a modicum of law and order in outlying regions. The existence of such missions provides the military with the opportunity to operate with a high degree of autonomy regardless of the intentions of the law or the chief executive's desires.[20]

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discussed in greater detail below, Foreign Ministry officials were nominated Special Advisors to the Minister of Defence and placed in charge of that country's process of "modernising" its defence policy from 2000 onward.

[18] On this point, related specifically to mission definition, see *inter alia* Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, p. 416.

[19] Zagorski, Paul W. *Democracy vs. National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992; p. 81.

[20] Ibid., p. 54.

Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux also note the propensity for such "secondary" missions as disaster relief and infrastructure provision to contribute to "mission creep" and ultimately to function to the detriment of civilian control[21]. These secondary missions have often served, particularly in the Latin American context, as a way for military establishments to overcome "identity crises" brought on by the end of the Cold War and shifts in regional relationships while maintaining claims to budgetary privileges and policy influence[22]. Fitch highlights the importance of mission definition (presumably to exclude internal missions) to effective civilian control:

> [t]he second task is to clearly define the missions for which the armed forces exist. Integration of the armed forces as a component of the democratic regime will almost certainly fail if civilian leaders cannot specify a constructive role for the military within that regime. … At a minimum, civilian leaders must be able to articulate a coherent vision of the military in a democratic society and to identify the steps necessary to implement that vision over time. …
> Defining security threats, determining the allocation of resources to defense relative to other national needs, and specifying the missions of the armed forces are fundamental policy choices in any society. Hence, these choices cannot be removed from the sphere of popular sovereignty and arrogated to the military. In this view, the armed forces are *instruments* of the nation for its self-defense and protection of its right to self-government, not the saviors of the nation nor the only repository of national values.[23]

The following sections will examine the Brazilian defence policymaking context in light of the aforementioned factors and illustrate the role of discursive dominance in hindering the effectiveness of solely institutional reforms in achieving civilian control, measured in terms of policy outcomes. Following a brief overview of the basic tenets of the problematic *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional* and of the marginalising tactics used to entrench its dominant position in the national security debate, the analysis will highlight how this stands in the way of civil society actors' attaining the attributes necessary for successfully influencing the policy process. Finally, some recent policy outcomes will be

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[21] Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, pp. 416-418.

[22] See, *inter alia*, Zirker, Daniel and João R. Martins Filho. The Brazilian military under Cardoso: Overcoming the identity crisis. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000); pp. 143-170; Fuccille, Luís Alexandre. *As forças armadas e a temática interna no Brasil contemporâneo: uma análise da construção de missões de ordem e segurança internas no período pós-guerra fria.* M.A. thesis, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 1999; and Marques, Adriana A. "Em busca de uma nova identidade: a reformulação das concepções estratégicas brasileiras na Nova República". Paper presented at the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2002), August 7–10, 2002, Brasília, Brazil. In Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. "Defense and Security Challenges in the 21st Century: Continuity or Change. REDES 2002, Brasília, Brazil, August 7-10, 2002". Compact Disc. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2002. NB: all direct quotations from works not in English are free translations by the author.

[23] Fitch, pp. 173, 176. Emphasis in the original.

examined and shown to reflect the ineffectiveness of the new institutional arrangements in establishing civilian control over policy outcomes.

Discursive control: the Brazilian military educational system and its doctrine

Each branch of the Brazilian armed forces has its own separate network of professional training schools; the Army's is the best-institutionalised and extensive, consisting of almost 50 schools and academies.[24] At the apex of the military educational system sits the only academy attended by members of all three branches, as well as a large number of civilians: the Escola Superior de Guerra. Despite recent indications of an opening of its notoriously cloistered intellectual atmosphere[25], and its recent subordination to the Ministry of Defence[26], ESG remains strongly influenced by the institutional arrangements its founding officers encountered during their post-war training in the United States (the College is modelled after the U.S. National War College)[27] and particularly (and perhaps ultimately most nefariously) by the positivist traditions instilled by the French *Mission militaire*.[28] ESG's main function has been to develop and propagate the National Security Doctrine, and to install it as the optic through which matters of national security and military import are

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[24] Presentation by General-de-Divisão Paulo César de Castro at the *Seminário Política de Defesa para o Século XXI*, Câmara dos Deputados, Brasília, Brazil, 21 August 2002.

[25] Athias, Gabriela. "Pauta inclui desemprego e educação". *Especial Militar* 7. São Paulo: O Estado de São Paulo; undated. Available from http://txt.estado.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar7.html. Accessed 11 May 2005; Hurrell, Andrew. "Security in Latin America". *International Affairs* (London). Vol. 74, No. 3 (1998); pp. 529-546 (here, p. 541); Costa, Thomaz Guedes da. "Democratization and International Integration: The Role of the Armed Forces in Brazil's Grand Strategy". In David Mares, ed. *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe*. Boulder: Westview, 1998; pp. 223-235 (here, p. 226).

[26] On the subordination of the ESG to the MD, see Kenkel, Kai Michael. "Language Matters: Security Discourse and Civil-Military Relations in Brazil". *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*. Vol. 34, No. 2. (forthcoming 2006); p. 20 of 27 in manuscript.

[27] Alexandre de Souza Costa Barros, *The Brazilian military : professional socialization, political performance and state building*. (Ph. D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1978), 172; Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 54.

[28] Barros, *Brazilian military*, 82; see also Domício Proença Júnior and Eugênio Diniz, *Política de defesa no Brasil: Uma análise crítica* (Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1998), 44-45.

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discussed in Brazil. Although it is an eminently military institution, a notable percentage of

ESG graduates are civilians, in some years over half of the graduating class[29].

Alfred Stepan's interpretation of ESG's role within the military establishment applies

equally to the military's view of its role in the civilian world:

> […] the ESG performed a central function within the Brazilian military. Precisely because the Brazilian military valued doctrinal order and subjected its members to a systematic socialization process at all levels of its schooling system, they had a requirement for one institution constantly to systematize, update, and disseminate the official doctrine of national security and development. The ESG had this task. Thus, although not a center or initiative, it was the authorized source of military ideology for the military as institution.[30]

The goal of ESG's activities was the homogenisation of thinking on security matters

within the community of thinkers on the subject within Brazil.[31] The means utilised by

ESG in pursuing this mission were the development of the *Doutrina de Segurança Nacional*

and the various efforts undertaken over the years to assert its discursive dominance. By its

very nomenclature—based on the pursuit of goals termed "Permanent National

Objectives"—the DSN seeks to establish itself as the only valid security discourse:

> By classifying an objective as national and permanent, one creates a situation in which discordance is not only the distinct position of a citizen interested in coming up with alternative solutions for his country: it is treason against the Fatherland. With this, divergence of opinion is de-legitimised and conflict demonised, thereby annihilating the possibility of democratic cohabitation with the differences inherent in a complex society.[32]

In its most concise form, ESG doctrine, in the shape of the DSN, can be summarised

into the "binomial" of security and development[33]. The fundamental structure of the DSN,

as outlined in the 1981 *Fundamentos da Doutrina* (whose publicly available versions remain

largely unchanged as of 2005) relies heavily on geopolitics and romantic concepts: the

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[29] Tapia-Valdés, Jorge A. *El terrorismo de Estado: La Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional en el Cono Sur.* Ciudad de México: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1980; p. 108.

[30] Stepan, Alfred. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988; p. 47.

[31] Hunter, Wendy. *Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians against Soldiers.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997; p. 32; Campos, Iris Walquiria. "Defesa Nacional," in *A Era FHC: um balanço, eds.* Bolívar Lamounier and Rubens Figueiredo (São Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados, 2002), 474-477.

[32] Proença Júnior, Domício and Eugênio Diniz. *Política de defesa no Brasil: Uma análise crítica.* Brasília: Editora Universidade de Brasília, 1998; p. 38. Emphasis in the original.

[33] The exposition of the doctrine given here is based on the following documents: Brazil. Escola Superior de Guerra. *Fundamentos da Doutrina.* Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, 1981 (hereafter, ESG, *Fundamentos*); the 1975, 1976 and 1993 versions of the ESG *Manual Básico* (Brazil. Escola Superior de Guerra. *Manual Básico.* Rio de Janeiro: Escola Superior de Guerra, respectively 1975, 1976 and 1993; and the basic work by ESG's doctrinal *éminence grise*, General Golbery do Couto e Silva: *Geopolítica do Brasil.* Rio de Janeiro: Editora José Olympio, 1967.

doctrine's basic concepts are National Objectives, National Power, National Policy, and National Strategy (capitalization in original).

National Objectives are "the crystallisation of interests and aspirations which, in a particular phase of its evolution, the Nation seeks to satisfy"[34]. National Objectives in turn are divided into Permanent and Current National Objectives. The determinants of these national objectives include human, physical, institutional and external factors; among the human determinants is the reified notion of National Character. The Brazilian national character is described by the self-described guardians of the nation's destiny as shaped by "individualism, adaptability, improvisation, a pacifist vocation, cordiality, emotionality and creativity"[35]. According to the doctrine, Brazil's National Objectives are:

- Democracy
- National integration
- Integrity of the national heritage (*patrimônio*)
- Social peace
- Progress
- Sovereignty.[36]

According to the *Fundamentos*, "power is the capacity to impose one's will—here you have what can be said is its most simple expression".[37] "The power of groups", the document continues in laying out implicitly its view of securitising actors, " is not born and does not remain acephalic—as spontaneously as it appears, it gives origin to authority, a principle of order that leads to the concentration, in one or a few wills, of the Power of the group.[38] The Nation, in organising itself as a State, chooses a form of agglutinating and expressing its National Power—this is why the State is the Nation, politically organised"[39].

National Power, then, is "not an end unto itself—it is the means of producing effects in the social environment. In this line of thinking, National Power is the instrument which the Nation disposes of, under the direction of the State, to conquer and maintain its

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[34] ESG, *Fundamentos*, p. 26.
[35] Ibid, p. 35.
[36] Ibid, pp. 39-45.
[37] Ibid, p. 52.
[38] Ibid, p. 52.
[39] Ibid, p. 53.

objectives"[40]. National Power is divided into four "expressions", each with its own points of reference:

- The political expression, such as people, territory and political institutions;
- The economic expression, such as human resources, natural resources and economic institutions;
- The psycho-social expression, such as the human person, the environment and social institutions;
- The military expression, such as human resources, territory and military institutions.[41]

This short quotation suffices to make evident how the lack of definition of these concepts—both in terms of distinguishing them clearly from one another (several of the expressions' points of reference overlap) and the internal consistency of each—has contributed to what Samuel Fitch has termed a "conceptual morass"[42]. Alongside the lack of clear definitions of concepts, the doctrine itself devotes little attention to the transformation of its guidelines into national policy, devoting only six of the fundamental document's 344 pages to "National Policy"[43]. National Strategy, which is resumed in a 10-page section, is defined as the "art of preparing and applying National Power under consideration of existing or potential obstacles, to achieve and maintain the objectives established by National Policy"[44].

In the citation above, Proença and Diniz discuss indirectly a finding related closely to the issue of securitising actor status: if, as in the case of the DSN, policy goals are defined as permanent and immutable both substantively and normatively (and further, in a manner that privileges the position of the military establishment in politics and society), this effectively negates the need for a threat definition process, where civil-military power relationships might be actualised. Such a move further secures military dominance in that it removes the definition of threats and objectives from the arena of contention and compromise that is the decision-making process.

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[40] Ibid, p. 55.
[41] Ibid, pp. 62-63.
[42] Fitch, 107.
[43] ESG, Fundamentos, pp. 75-81.
[44] Ibid, p. 89.

A further problem regarding the democratic potential of the DSN—specifically with regard to notions of the civilian control of the armed forces—is the equality the doctrine establishes between its four "expressions of National Power". Specifically, as Brazilian analyst Domício Proença Júnior points out, the military "expression" is not subordinated to the political "expression" of power and thus is not effectively subordinated to it, as called for by even rudimentary notions of civilian control.[45]

Proença considers the effect of ESG doctrine on the way in which military issues are discussed in Brazil, even in the period after institutional reforms such as the establishment of the Ministry of Defence, to have been devastating:

> [W]e are experiencing the continuation of a situation which disqualifies both civilians and the military, and which further faces, on the path to its articulation, the diffuse obstacle of the ESG doctrine. The civilians see themselves restricted to an understanding which is entirely divorced from the reality of military practice and theory as taught in the country's war colleges. The military risk losing sight of the instrumental function of their institutions and their own corporate *raison d'être*. And the privileged space of the highest school of politico-strategic studies engenders the continuation of a double divorce: between society and the armed forces, and between the knowledges of the [military schools] and the [civilian universities]. In this way the distance between the armed forces and society is reified, with the DSN serving more to disorient than to assist those who base themselves on its constructs.[46]

This situation was exacerbated by the exalted nature of ESG at the summit of the military doctrinal development and educational system. The school became increasingly isolated as its special position made the ESG's leaders loath to open to outside input:

> This dynamic of theoretical and methodological re-adaptation was marked by two salient characteristics. First, such movements were always undertaken *from the inside* of ESG, and always bore the mark of principles and conceptions that had an original ESG profile. Thus the circle of production and transmission of knowledge and perceptions of reality—marked by some form of internal control—closed, be it due to their own doctrinal limits and/or the impositions established by the teaching method, with the aim of tying the discussions and analyses in to the theoretical maxims of the school in the most efficient way.[47]

ESG was correspondingly successful in one of its primary missions: in the words of a former instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME), "to control and make uniform the language of security"[48]. In their attempt to achieve discursive homogeneity, representatives of the armed forces have used three main tactics to maintain

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[45] Domício Proença Júnior, "Uma Visão da Defesa Nacional no Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso," Consultancy Report note during publishing of *A Era FHC: um balanço*, 3. (See footnote 30).

[46] Ibid., p. 4.

[47] dos Santos Filho, José Luiz Niemeyer. "Busca-se a segurança, planeja-se a defesa: uma introdução à (re)discussão dos conceitos de segurança e de defesa nacional na realidade brasileira ontem e hoje," Paper presented at the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2002), August 7–10, 2002, Brasilia, Brazil. p. 5. Emphasis mine.

[48] Interview with Sergio Dias da Costa Aita, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 27 August 2002.

the exclusion of civilian security analysts and to appropriate for themselves of the role of securitising actor for the Brazilian nation. The most obvious of these is made clear in repeated claims to be speaking in the name of Brazil and its "needs"[49]; this is followed by repeated questioning of the expertise, experience, and degree of specialised knowledge of civilians as compared to analysts from within the military; the final mechanism is the established through claims to political/ideological objectivity on military issues, while imputing partisanship on dissident voices.

With regard to securitisation and the actors empowered to engage in it, ESG's role was to produce a normatively homogenous elite, both civilian and military, that would function as the country's sole "accredited" securitising actors. Alexandre Barros, underscores the school's function as a training centre for an elite chosen to implement the military's project for the development of Brazil:

> The military had developed inside their corporation a project which involved civilians and military [sic] in the continual building of the nation state. However, the civilian side of this group was incapable—as defined by the military—both in quality and in quantity, to perform many of the tasks the military felt that had to be performed, thus forcing the military to rationalize their stay in power for at least some time, while the elite which the military were training achieved the required degree of "maturity", again as defined by the military.[50]

The recently retired Brazilian civil-military relations expert Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira has outlined the mechanism by which military elites choose or create civilian elites by positing the "egoism of the elites (for political direction [of the country]) and the unpreparedness of the masses".[51] Oliveira goes on to illustrate how this logic appropriates for the military action on behalf of the "common good"[52]; this is another way of describing the role of securitising actors. The unpreparedness of the masses—as compared to the specialised expertise of ESG-trained elites for running the country—is embodied in the second marginalising tactic, which claims for the military a monopoly on competence in military

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[49] On securitising actors, see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, pp. 40-42.
[50] Barros, p. 169.
[51] Oliveira, Eliézer Rizzo de. "La doctrina de seguridad nacional: pensamiento político y proyecto estratégico". In José Thiago Cintra, ed. *Seguridad Nacional y Relaciones Internacionales: Brasil.* Ciudad de México: Centro Latinoamericano de Estudios Estratégicos, 1987; pp. 37-50 (here, pp. 44-45).
[52] Ibid., p. 45.

issues. This logical link is made by a member of the ESG teaching corps, who in an article pervaded by language typical of the abidingly ubiquitous DSN states that the role of ESG is to fill a "lacuna" in competence within the country with regard to matters of security and defence[53].

One retired general provided clear example of this second marginalising tactic in admonishing that "the academics in civil society need to develop the capacity to bring their debate up to the higher level of that within the military; they will gladly have the barracks doors opened to them once they are competent"[54]. This rather disingenuous argument— for, as will be shown below, civilian expertise is highly dependent on military co-operation—leads to claims that civilian universities are less legitimate sources of scholarship and that "strategic problems lend themselves better to being dealt with by institutions with greater access to the necessary information"[55].

Another direct claim was formulated by a then-student at ECEME in *A Defesa Nacional*, Brazil's only journal dealing explicitly with defence issues, which as an ECEME journal is in essence a vehicle for the proliferation of the FA viewpoint and thus ESG doctrine. Speaking in the name of "Politics", the author, at the time an Army major, points out the incompatibility of academic notions with the true necessities of running the country in an article that merits citation at length, as it manages to include in a short space all three of the marginalising tactics mentioned above:

> Within the intellectual milieu of a free society, ideas of all sorts proliferate, many of which contribute to the evolution of that society. However, there is an enormous distance between the creation of an idea and the responsibility of its application. Let us leave the field of arts and sciences and enter into Politics […].

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[53] Fialho, Ivan. "A ESG como instituição e a defesa nacional". Unpublished paper. Rio de Janeiro: Escola de Guerra Superior, 2001; p. 70. Available from http://www.esg.br/cee/ARTIGOS/ivan1.pdf. Accessed 11 May 2005.

[54] Presentation by Gen. Valmir Fonseca Azevedo Pereira at the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2002), 9 August 2002, Brasilia, Brazil.

[55] Macedo, Ubiratan Borges de. "La Escuela Superior de Guerra: su ideologia y transición para la democracia", In Cintra, ed., pp. 17-22 (here, p. 21).

[…] A history of ideas over the last 200 years would be replete with violence practised in the name of high ideals. The causes espoused by intellectuals are not always susceptible to being carried out by Politics[…].[56]

The same article goes on further to impugn the ideological neutrality of the entire journalistic profession in Brazil:

The interaction of persons who are socially influential, albeit little informed about the Armed Forces, and intellectuals with their not-always-coherent anxieties about liberty, has, in the current setting, been disastrous for the Armed Forces, in particular the Army, and, inevitably, for the Nation. […] Almost in its entirety, when the subject is the Armed Forces, [the Brazilian media, in particular television] continues to explore the apparently inexhaustible ideological lead afforded by the Marxist interpretation of the recent history of our national life. […] There exists as well a pseudo-liberal opportunism that hastens to christen the military retrograde, nationalist and nationalising.
This is not to say that there is a conspiracy by an all-powerful media, able all by itself to mobilise public opinion against the Military Institutions. […] However, journalists live in a competitive profession, and whatever his ideals, a journalist can only exercise his profession in accordance with the conditions imposed by the journalism industry.[57]

An example of the third claim was present in the statements of recently retired ECEME instructor, who claimed that academics who continue to view negatively the FA and its continued control over the security discourse do so not for reasons of academic distance and critical evaluation, but out of personal spite over their failure to establish a Marxist viewpoint during the military regime's most intensive period of repression from 1964-1970. In his words, these "annoyed (*contrariados*) segments of society" continue to harbour "politico-ideological" resentment to the pro-Western capitalist order established with the help of the Armed Forces' *poder moderador*[58]. This is juxtaposed to claims by the same ESG faculty member cited above that the foundation of the DSN—the "binomial" marriage of security and development—is "universally accepted"[59].

The DSN's effects on civilians' ability to develop securitising actor attributes

The marginalising tactics employed by the military establishment, as well as other courses of action followed in accordance with the doctrine's logic, such as maintaining civilian competence—defined in terms set by those in uniform—at an artificially low level, have been highly effective until very recently in removing civil society actors such as

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[56] Costa, Sergio Paulo Muniz. "As elites, os intelectuais e os militares". *A Defesa Nacional*. No. 759 (1993); pp. 39-44 (here, p. 40).
[57] Ibid., p. 40.
[58] Interview with Sergio Dias da Costa Aita, 27 August 2002.
[59] Fialho, p. 68.

academics from meaningful participation in the national debate on security issues. The effects of these informal policies on the three factors listed above (specialised knowledge, institutionalised prestige and normative resonance) are the focus of this penultimate section.

One ESG alumnus, while upholding the thesis of civilian incompetence, places the onus of the lack of information circulating in the civilian security community squarely on the shoulders of the FA themselves:

> The Nation's civil segment is comprehensively under-informed about the real conditions of the Armed Forces. A real ignorance exists, on the part of society as a whole, about the quality and quantity of military equipment and arms in use in Brazil. […]
> In large part, those responsible for this disinformation are the Armed Forces themselves, who create a false image and remain hermetically closed to the discussion of certain issues, often alleging the inexistence outside of the military segment of interlocutors capable of understanding them.[60]

In Brazil, academics' access to the information that is the fabric of specialised knowledge has traditionally been limited, though this situation is changing. The Brazilian case showcases the role of theoretical specialized knowledge in determining academics' ability to build up the types of expertise that lead to inclusion in the policy formulation, as opposed to very limited role for theoretical specialised knowledge. This latter situation results from the fact that, in accordance with the DSN and its marginalising tactics, the Brazilian military have traditionally been reluctant to release specific technical data and tactical information to the civilian public.[61] Without this information, experts are not able to build up a body of specialised knowledge. Machado e Costa notes that

> [w]hen a more open regime began in 1985, when we had the civilian government, there were not even people with sufficient access to information on [defence] issues—I mean civilians, from the academic world. Because things were very closed, and nothing was open, people could only guess about what might be happening, they had no access. And it would appear that this access remains difficult even today. I mean, 15 or 17 years after the end of the military regime, it's not all the academics who have access to information, to archives and who are granted interviews by people from the military who will actually pass on to them relevant information. So, the information that the academics have is partial and sectorialised, they never have all the data on a question. Sometimes, they think they do. Each one of the various academics can concentrate the focus of his work on a given question. But none among them has a view of the big picture. And the military remain extremely closed to the participation of academics.[62]

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[60] Menezes, Delano Teixeira. "A Necessidade de uma Política de Defesa". *Parcerias Estratégicas*. No. 5 (1998); pp. 113-121. Here, p. 117. Free translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original.
[61] Interview with Rudibert Kilian Júnior and Gunther Rudzit, 22 August 2002.
[62] Interview with José Luiz Machado e Costa, 3 September 2002.

Though access to technical information can often be gained from international sources—more easily than from the Brazilian military establishment itself[63]—the specialised knowledge accumulated by Brazil's security academics remains largely centred on its theoretical manifestation. Since the DSN is presented as exhaustive in its provision of such orientation, Brazilian soldiers are quite unlikely to see the need for civilian input in this domain.

Proença comments on the division between practical and theoretical specialised knowledge and how it is distributed between the military establishment and civil society, including academics, noting that civil society is alienated by ignorance from basic issues of military affairs precisely due to the legacy of military rule and the way the subject is taught at university. When civilians do have an informed perspective, he claims, it is often the result of amateur research and personal initiatives.

Civil society, so Proença, lacks the information and technical structures to be active in defence issues; this, he asserts, is particularly true of civilian defence policymakers. The military, on the other hand, are alienated from effective debate by an inability to deal with such questions except in strictly "technico-professional" terms. Personal initiative aside, the military, especially decision-makers, thus lack an informed perspective as to the political consequences of military decision-making[64].

In addition to the obstacles it faces in accumulating levels of specialised knowledge, the Brazilian academic security studies community faces obstacles concerning institutionalised prestige as well. The ability of the Brazilian security studies community to produce relevant research and to develop a certain amount of institutionalised prestige regarding defence issues is related not only to the military tradition but to the historical development of the nation's academic caste as well. Because of the problems facing the civilian higher educational system, the well-funded and cohesive military schools remain able to

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[63] Proença and Diniz, p. 32.
[64] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

marginalize the knowledge produced on the civilian side of the equation. One foreign Brazilianist accordingly noted that "no civilian institute or university could hope to compete with [ESG] in effectiveness".[65]

Brazil's academic production is characterised by its location on the periphery of the global academic enterprise, both linguistically and geographically, a situation exacerbated by the chronic underfunding and dependence on individual personalities of library development in particular. International Relations as a discipline is very young and only slowly emerging from its period of inception, in which it was dominated by state institutions such as the Foreign Ministry[66]. Due to the structure of the funding system and to the stigma on its subject matter, security studies as a discipline in Brazil remains in its infancy, though individual experts produce work of high calibre. This is a major source of difficulty for these academics in attaining the necessary prestige (according to the precepts of academic socialisation) and specialised knowledge to allow them to fulfil the criteria for policy influence being tested here.

Advancement in the development of an independent IR discipline in Brazil suffered both from the lack of freedom of expression under the military regime[67], and also from the attendant lack of social space in the face of strongly developed research capacities within the organs of the state[68]. This is particularly true in the domain of security studies, where the legacy of military dictatorship had the strongest effect. Three factors combine to impede the increased specialisation and theoreticisation of Brazilian security studies: refusal by the Armed Forces to release important bodies of specialised data; hindrances posed by

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[65] Selcher, Wayne. "The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government". Military Issues Research Memorandum. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1977; p. 4.

[66] On the state of the study of international relations in Brazil, see Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. *O estudo das relações internacionais no Brasil*. São Paulo: Unimarco Editora, 1999; and Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. "Relações Internacionais do Brasil: Introdução Metodológica a um Estudo Global". *Contexto Internacional*. Vol. 13, No. 2 (1991); pp. 161-185.

[67] Miyamoto, Shiguenoli. "O Estudo das Relações Internacionais no Brasil: O Estado da Arte". *Revista de Sociologia e Política*. Vol. l2 (1999); pp. 83-98 (here, p. 85).

[68] This observation was phrased to the author using the cited terms by Prof. Mônica Herz of the Instituto de Relações Internacionais at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.

Brazil's peripheral status in attempts to make theoretical literature—largely originating outside the country—broadly available, and the essentially compounding factor of insufficient material resources and difficult research conditions. One Brazilian security scholar elaborates on this point:

> […] one has to consider miss-adjustments [sic], which on the other hand, draw away Brazilian potential, perpetuating a variety of undesired societal forms: lacking knowledge, misinformed, ignorant and uninterested. […] Problems which are reproduced and visualized in the lack of resources and foul conditions of the universities — reduced spaces of knowledge —and in the alarming misfunctioning [sic] and impossibilities of their researchers, analysts, formulators and educators.[69]

The insufficient perfusion of modern theoretical alternatives serves only to entrench further the outdated paradigm of the DSN. Geopolitical and romanticised approaches continue to dominate security scholarship in Brazil. While a function of active efforts by the military establishment to entrench the DSN, this is also a result of Brazil's peripheral location and linguistic distance from the Anglophone centres of global academic production. Even progressive academics and policymakers tend to frame their considerations to a varying extent using the language and discourse of the DSN, to the point were some even apologise for this fact:

> In effect, interested Brazilians lack even terms and expressions—a *language*—with which to discuss issues of security and defence that have not been contaminated by the DSN. We apologise to our readers, due to the fact that, in various moments during our discussion, we will be obliged explicitly to confront some of the terms sullied (*conspurcados*) by the DSN.[70]

The normative resonance of academics' security policy-related output is thus to a high degree determined by the boundaries on the defence debate set by military discursive dominance. Within these constraints, however, civilians and soldiers must be seen as working at cross-purposes with respect to mission definition. Where civilians were seeking once and for all to relegate the FA to an external role and to put an end to internal roles for the military, the military was seeking to retain this role and, put bluntly, to find new enemies to justify its requests based on its extant level of influence and prestige. Furthermore, civilian policymakers were seeking to establish for Brazil a purely defensive military

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[69] Dreifuss, René Armand. "The Brazilian Armed Forces: Current changes, new challenges". Updated version for publication of a paper presented at the International Political Science Association International Seminar on "Globalization of Civil-Military Relations: Democratization, Reform and Security", Bucharest, Romania, 28 June-3 July 2002"; p. 21, fn 85.

[70] Proença and Diniz, pp. 57-58.

posture—such as that ultimately reflected in the 1996 *Política de Defesa Nacional*—which was rejected by some among the higher echelons of the military, especially the terrestrial force.

The lack of normative resonance between civilians and the military serves as an important explanatory factor for civil society's lack of influence on policy. While military institutional culture is predominantly conservative, the work of many academics shows a progressive slant. Several prominent academics were involved in increasing the expertise of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party) whose candidate Lula became President of the Republic on 1 January 2003; in October 2006 Lula was re-elected to serve another four-year term beginning in 2007.

The resonance of policy inputs from Brazilian civil society is difficult to ascertain due to the lack of publicly available policy. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence in Brazil of significant divergence in normative preferences among the military establishment, civilian policymakers, and academic security experts. These relate directly to the unfinished *de facto* state of affairs regarding the civilian control of the military establishment in the country, and to the political legacy of persecution during the period of military rule. The same independence and military prerogatives that led to this divergence also create problems for the implementation of declaratory security policy in Brazil once it is formulated and disseminated within the government and armed forces.

Policy outcomes: ongoing incomplete civilian control

Two events stand out as marking the transition to institutionalised democratic control of the armed forces in Brazil following the end of the *ditadura*. These are the adoption of the 1988 Constitution, and, more importantly, the creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1999[71]. This section will investigate a serious of policy proclamations during the

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[71] On the creation process for the Ministry of Defence, see the exhaustive recounting in Oliveira, Eliézer Rizzo de. *Democracia e Defesa Nacional: A criação do Ministério da Defesa na Presidência de FHC*. Barueri: Editora Manole (2004); pp. 115-220.

relevant period to establish whether these outcomes reflect an amelioration of civilian control as would be expected given the extent of institutional change which had taken place. Of primary importance here is the issue of whether the military continue to be given missions whose geographical locus is inside the boundaries of national territory; this is an area where the policy process serves to decide the primacy of divergent interests. Relevant outcomes include the 1996 *Política de Defesa Nacional* (PDN), the final report based on the inputs from the Experts' Commission (*Commissão de Notáveis*) convoked by the Ministry of Defence in 2000, and, thematically, national policy with regard to the Amazon.

Much of the preparatory work for the 1996 PDN was done under the auspices of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (*Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos*—SAE), an organ of the executive branch led by former Navy Minister Almirante-de-Esquadra Mário César Flores until late 1994. Closely based on the 1988 Constitution, the PDN represents little more than a "harmonisation of viewpoints […]; a formulation of orientational principles […]; a declaration of international posture".[72] It lays the basis for declaratory policy, claims one analysis, in that it communicates the Brazilian government's understanding of the constraints under which defence policy is made,[73] established during the very first meetings (of a flag-rank Interministerial Working Group) ever held between the Brazilian military and civilians at which high level defence guidelines were discussed.[74]

Born precisely of the desire to alleviate through improved mission definition the military identity crisis[75] that followed the loss of the Armed Forces' traditional Cold War

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[72] Proença and Diniz, p. 18.

[73] Ibid., p. 34.

[74] Interview with Conselheiro José Luis Machado e Costa, Washington, D.C., USA.

[75] On the notion of a military "identity crisis, see Martins Filho, João R. and Daniel Zirker. "The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000); pp. 143-170; Fuccille, Luís Alexandre. "A criação do Ministério da Defesa no Brasil: inovação e continuidade". Paper presented at the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES 2002), August 7–10, 2002, Brasilia, Brazil. In Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. "Defense and Security Challenges in the 21st Century: Continuity or Change. REDES 2002, Brasília, Brazil, August 7-10, 2002". Compact Disc. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2002 (hereafter, "REDES"); p. 4; Fuccille, Luís Alexandre. *As forças armadas e a temática interna no Brasil contemporâneo: uma análise da construção de missões de*

and pre-Mercosul roles[76], the PDN establishes a set of directives that while adding a number of elements that reflect civilian wishes, maintain others that indicate military privilege; simply put, it extends to considerable breadth the catalogue of values and interests underpinning the country's defence strategy. In doing so it includes elements normatively conducive to both civilian control—such as a defensive force posture—and to military prerogatives, such as vagueness on the military role in the Amazon region, a traditional centre of the military establishment's internal role.

Other concerns in the catalogue include the country's participation in the creation of a just and equitable international order based on international law, the amplification of Brazil's presence in international decision-making bodies, nuclear and conventional disarmament, and participation in UN peacekeeping operations.[77] The doctrine was summarised in some circles as "sustainable defence", particularly with reference to the Amazonian region[78]. The PDN outlines as (non-permanent, democratically arrived-at) national defence objectives the following seven goals:

> 1. to ensure sovereignty by preserving territorial integrity, patrimony and national interests;
> 2. to ensure the rule of law and the protection of democratic institutions;
> 3. to preserve the nation's cohesion and unity;
> 4. to safeguard the people, property, and resources which belong to Brazil or come within its jurisdiction;
> 5. to pursue and maintain Brazil's interests abroad;
> 6. to protect Brazil's place in the community of nations and enable the country to become more involved in the international decision-making process; and
> 7. to help maintain international peace and security.[79]

The document's conclusion details 20 "guidelines" for defence policy, following

> "a strategic policy of deterrence based on the following premises:
> —clearly defined borders and coastlines that are internationally recognised;
> —close relationships with neighboring countries and with the international community in general, based on mutual confidence and respect;
> —the repudiation of wars of conquest; and

ordem e segurança internas no período pós-guerra fria. M.A. Thesis, Federal University of São Carlos, 1999 (hereafter, _temática interna_).

[76] Oliveira, _Democracia e Defesa Nacional_, p. 333.

[77] Oliveira, Eliézer Rizzo de and Samuel Alves Soares, "Brasil: Forças Armadas, direção política e formato institucional". In D'Araujo, Maria Celina and Celso Castro. _Democracia e Forças Armadas no Cone Sul._ Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2000, pp. 98-124 (here, p. 117).

[78] Fujita, Edmundo Sussumu. "The Brazilian policy of sustainable defence". _International Affairs_ (London). Vol. 74, No. 3 (1998); pp. 577-585; Fujita, Edmundo Sussumu. "Uma Política de Defesa Sustentável para o Brasil". _Parcerias Estratégicas._ No. 5 (1998); pp. 101-112.

[79] Brazil. Presidency. "National Defense Policy". Available from http://www.oas.org/csh/english/docwhitepapers%20Brasil.htm. Accessed 21 October 2002. Section 3.3.

—efforts at peaceful settlement of disputes, using force only as a means of self-defense.[80]

The revised *Política de Defesa Nacional* of 2005 retains the groundstrokes of its predecessor, adding but subtle enhancements to the catalogue established nine years before. In the 2005 document, there are now six defence policy objectives:

- guaranteeing sovereignty, the national patrimony and territorial integrity;
- the defence of national and citizens' interests, and of Brazilian goods and resources abroad;
- contributing to the preservation of national cohesion and unity;
- the promotion of regional stability;
- contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security; and
- the projection of Brazil into the concert of nations and its better insertion into international decisionmaking processes.[81]

The new Policy's strategic orientations based are on the following precepts, which are essentially elaborations of the predecessor document:

- perfectly defined and internationally recognised borders and boundaries;
- a close relationship to neighbouring countries and the international community, based on mutual confidence and respect;
- the rejection of wars of conquest;
- the search for a pacific resolution to conflicts;
- the valorisation of multilateral fora;
- the existence of modern, balanced and up-to-date Armed Forces; and
- the capacity for national mobilization.[82]

These objectives and basic tenets are summarised into 26 national security policy directives, whose range of concerns includes force interoperability and readiness, projection capacity, effective border patrols, suffcent financial means for the Armed Forces, crisis management, the integration of other government policies with the National Defence Policy, and Brazilian participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions. An initial perusal nevertheless indicates that the 2005 PDN should eventually offer a more cohesive and implementable declaration of future Brazilian defence policy. In doing so it builds on innovations first embarked upon in the document's first iteration.

The defensive force posture of the first PDN was an innovation in Brazilian strategic thought[83], and as such is not without its detractors[84]. The 1996 PDN raises the question of

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[80] Ibid., Sections 5.1., 4.2. For a detailed discussion of the modernisation of Brazilian security policy, see Kenkel, Kai Michael. "The Modernisation of Brazil's Security Policy: 1994-2005". In Franz Kernic and Walter Feichtinger, eds. *Transatlantische Beziehungen im Wandel: Sicherheitspolitische Aspekte der Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Lateinamerika.* Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006; pp. 165-180.

[81] Brazil. Presidency. "Política de Defesa Nacional" [2005 version]. Available from https://www.defesa.gov.br/pdn/index.php?page=home. Accessed 29 November 2006. Section 5.

[82] Ibid., Section 6.

the application in practice of declaratory policy and the relationship of the armed forces'

formulation and implementation roles. Recent Brazilian defence procurement initiatives

(*inter alia*, major tank systems, an aircraft-carrier, and the nuclear-submarine programme)

have run directly counter to the strategies and guidelines expressed in the 1996 PDN.[85] Due

to its history and vague nature as, in essence, a catalogue of first approaches to a unified

strategy by various government organs, the first PDN was not suited as the basis for

concrete defence policy. Thus, once sworn into his second term and with the new unified

Defence Ministry in place, Cardoso vested the new Ministry with the task of establishing a

viable defence policy.

The Ministry's Division of National Defence Policy undertook a policy revision, seeking

to replace the PDN with a more implementable strategy[86]. Both due to insufficient

competency within the fledgling Ministry and to a desire to ensure compatibility with the

primacy of foreign policy, a mid-level career diplomat, José Luiz Machado e Costa, was

seconded by the Ministry of External Relations to act as special advisor to Quintão.

Charged with assisting the Minister of Defence in updating Brazilian defence policy and

finding himself in a military-heavy environment, Machado e Costa realised the merits of

turning to outside experts for assistance:

> There are no civilians in the MD thinking about defence policy, there are only those in uniform who are
> in the Secretariat of Policy, Strategy and International Affairs, who are generals and colonels. So, what
> happened? I was asked by the Minister, as his Special Advisor, to be the counterpoint to this. The first
> thing I did was to say "alone, I can't pull it off. This is a very large task, and I need to get support from
> people who know these issues better than I do". I was just the intermediary.[87]

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[83] Interview with Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, Campinas, Brazil, 27 June 2002; Interview with Alexandre
    Fuccille, 1 July 2002.

[84] Cavagnari Filho, Geraldo Lesbat. "Subsídios para revisão da Política de Defesa Nacional". Suggestions
    submitted to the Ministry of Defence, Brasília, as member of the "comissão de notáveis", 30 June
    2000.

[85] Zaverucha, Jorge. "(Des)Controle Civil sobre os Militares no governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso". Paper
    presented at the Conference on Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (REDES
    2002), August 7–10, 2002, Brasília, Brazil. In Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. "Defense and
    Security Challenges in the 21st Century: Continuity or Change. REDES 2002, Brasília, Brazil, August
    7-10, 2002". Compact Disc. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2002; pp.
    10-11.

[86] See Kenkel, "Modernisation" and Kenkel, "Language matters".

[87] Interview with José Luiz Machado e Costa, 3 September 2002.

Machado e Costa set about examining the writings of the Brazilian security studies community and taking recommendations as to which other experts might be called upon. Once his selection had been made, it consisted of a group dubbed the *Comissão de Notáveis* or Experts' Commission Members include Foreign Ministry personnel such as Ambassador Gelson Fonseca Júnior (then Brazil's Permanent Representative to the United Nations), then-Foreign Minister Professor Celso Lafer; ex-SAE chief Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg; UNCTAD Secretary-General Ambassador Rubens Ricupero; and Edmundo Fujita, a mid-career security expert.

Legislators included Senator José Fogaça of the PMDB (the successor party to the MDB, the opposition under the military government) and São Paulo Deputy José Genoíno of the Worker's Party, who headed that chamber's Committee on External Relations and National Defence. The commission's military officers were all of flag rank, and all but one were retired. The one active-duty officer was four-star Army General Alberto Cardoso, head of the *Gabinete de Segurança Institucional*. It is in this office—and, to an extent in his person—that a great deal of power was accumulated, and General Cardoso's power was a favourite target of critics of the state of civil-military relations in Brazil. The retired officers were Vice-Almirante Fernando Manoel Fontes, ex-Director of the Escola de Guerra Naval (Naval War College—EGN); ex- SAE Chief Admiral Mário César Flores, who also once headed the EGN and has authored numerous articles and a book on strategy; Air Force four-star General Murilo Santos; and another former EGN director, Vice-Almirante Armando Amorim Vidigal Ferreira.

The academic members of the Commission, according to DPDN head Captain (N) Rudibert Kilian and Machado e Costa, were chosen based primarily on the abovementioned criteria of specialised knowledge and institutionalised prestige.[88] They were Prof. Luís Antônio Bitencourt, Prof. Clóvis Brigagão, Col. (ret.) Geraldo Lesbat Cavagnari Filho, Prof.

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[88] Ibid.

Thomaz Guedes da Costa, Prof. René Armand Dreifuss, Prof. José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque, Prof. Hélio Jaguaribe, Prof. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira and Prof. Domício Proença Júnior.

The Experts' inputs were condensed and amalgamated by Machado e Costa and used in the creation of a document entitled *Modernização do Sistema de Defesa Nacional.* The topics covered in this document are represented in the following table:

Table 2: Issues raised by the 2000 MoD Commission of Experts

English	Portuguese
BRAZIL'S STRATEGIC PROFILE IN THE COMING DECADES AND ITS ROLE AT THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS	PERFIL ESTRATÉGICO DO PAÍS NAS PRÓXIMAS DÉCADAS E SUA INSERÇÃO NOS PLANOS REGIONAL E MUNDIAL
FRAMEWORK OF THREATS AND STRATEGIC VULNERABILITIES	QUADRO DE AMEAÇAS E VULNERABILIDADES ESTRATÉGICAS
LINKS BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY	VÍNCULO ENTRE AS POLÍTICAS EXTERNA E DE DEFESA
THE "NEAR ABROAD": DEEPENING SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION	ENTORNO IMEDIATO: APROFUNDAMENTO DA INTEGRAÇÃO SUL-AMERICANA
SCENARIO FOR THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND AFRICA	CENÁRIO SUL-ATLÂNTICO / ÁFRICA
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES	MEDIDAS DE FORTALECIMENTO DE CONFIANÇA MÚTUA
EVALUATION OF HEMISPHERIC POLITICO-STRATEGIC RELATIONS (USA)	AVALIAÇÃO DAS RELAÇÕES POLÍTICO-ESTRATÉGICAS NO PLANO HEMISFÉRICO (EUA)
RE-EQUIPMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE CONTINENTAL BALANCE OF POWER	REEQUIPAMENTO E SEUS REFLEXOS NA BALANÇA DE PODER CONTINENTAL
POLICY ON PARTICIPATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS	POLÍTICA DE PARTICIPAÇÃO EM MISSÕES DE PAZ
RECONFIGURATION OF THE ARMED FORCES	RECONFIGURAÇÃO DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS
INSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE	ORGANIZAÇÃO INSTITUCIONAL E ADMINISTRATIVA DO MINISTÉRIO DA DEFESA
READINESS/RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES	APRESTAMENTO / FORÇAS DE DESLOCAMENTO RÁPIDO
COMBINED USE OF FORCES	EMPREGO COMBINADO
OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE (CONSCRIPTION)	SERVIÇO MILITAR OBRIGATÓRIO
PRESERVATION OF LAW AND ORDER/DRUG TRAFFICKING/NATIONAL GUARD	PRESERVAÇÃO DA LEI E DA ORDEM / NARCOTRÁFICO / GUARDA NACIONAL
CONTROL OF BORDERS, AREA SPACE AND MARITIME AREA	CONTROLE DE FRONTEIRAS, DO ESPAÇO AÉREO E DA ÁREA MARÍTIMA
SUBSIDIARY ACTIVITIES	ATIVIDADES SUBSIDIÁRIAS
ROLE OF SOCIETY IN DEFINING NEW ROLES FOR THE ARMED FORCES/SOCIETY'S PERCEPTION OF THE ARMED FORCES	PAPEL DA SOCIEDADE NA DEFINIÇÃO DE NOVAS MISSÕES DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS / PERCEPÇÃO DA SOCIEDADE DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS
CENTRE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES/INTEGRATION OF CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY IN THE AREA OF DEFENCE	CENTRO DE ESTUDOS DE DEFESA / INTEGRAÇÃO DE CIVIS E MILITARES NA ÁREA DE DEFESA
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEFENCE	CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA VOLTADAS PARA A DEFESA
DEVELOPMENT OF JOINT PROJECTS/ALLIANCES WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES AND DEVELOPED STATES	DESENVOLVIMENTO DE PROJETOS CONJUNTOS / ALIANÇAS COM PAÍSES VIZINHOS E PAÍSES DESENVOLVIDOS
INCENTIVES FOR THE NATIONAL ARMS INDUSTRY	INCENTIVO À INDÚSTRIA BÉLICA NACIONAL
BRAZILIAN LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICA	LIDERANÇA DO BRASIL NA AMÉRICA DO SUL
CURRENT NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY	POLÍTICA DE DEFESA NACIONAL VIGENTE
BRAZIL'S ADHESION TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS	ASSINATURA DE ACORDOS INTERNACIONAIS PELO BRASIL
ALCÂNTARA AIR BASE	BASE DE ALCÂNTARA
NUCLEAR SUBMARINES	SUBMARINO NUCLEAR
AMAZONIA	AMAZÔNIA
SUBREGIONAL DEFENCE MECHANISMS	MECANISMO DE SEGURANÇA SUBREGIONAL
NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY: STATE OR GOVERNMENT POLICY?	PDN: POLÍTICA DE ESTADO OU DE GOVERNO
PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL	ASSENTO NO CONSELHO DE SEGURANÇA DA ONU
DEFENSIVE DETERRENCE	DISSUASÃO MILITAR DEFENSIVA
BUDGET	ORÇAMENTO
MERCOSUL/FTAA	MERCOSUL / ALCA
NUCLEAR PROGRAMME	PROGRAMA NUCLEAR

Several of these headings present problematic outcomes when viewed under the optic of civilian control. While it must be viewed as positive for the development of civilian control that such issues as defensive deterrence and the role of society in defining roles for the armed forces are discussed, problems for civil-military relations cluster specifically around discussion of the otherwise obvious link between foreign and defence policy, as well as the question (eloquently addressed by Loveman in the Chilean case—see footnote 16) of whether defence policy is made in the name of the state or of the government. The presence of these topics must be seen as a victory for the military conception. The crux of the struggle for control, however, is the issue of internal missions. The *Modernização* document clearly provides for these in mentioning law-and-order missions, drug trafficking and the Amazon region.

In 1999, then-Army Commandant General Gleuber Vieira admitted that the terrestrial branch continued to prepare for internal missions as a function of their constitutional duty and under Presidential authority. Wendy Hunter noted than in 1998—admittedly before the implantation of the Ministry of Defence—the courses offered at the Army Command and General Staff College (ECEME) continued to devote a substantial amount of time to notions of internal security[89]. Internal missions for the Brazilian armed forces have historically centred on the Amazonian basin. The significance of this region for the role of the Army in society, and its role in the perpetuation of military prerogatives have been exhaustively discussed elsewhere.[90]

Beyond the analysis of Zirker and Henberg and Martins and Zirker, analysts of civil-military relations have a clear indicator of the state of civilian control in Brazil in the

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[89] Hunter, Wendy. Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: Present Trends, Future Prospects". In Felipe Agüero and Jeffrey Stark, eds. *Fault lines of democracy in post-transition Latin America*. Coral Gables [Boulder]: North-South Center Press, University of Miami [distrib. Lynne Rienner Publishers], 1998; pp. 299-322 (here, p. 311).

[90] Martins Filho, João R. and Daniel Zirker. "The Brazilian Military Under Cardoso: Overcoming the Identity Crisis". *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000); pp. 143-170; Zirker, Daniel and Marvin Henberg. "Amazônia: Democracy, Ecology, and Brazilian Military Prerogatives in the 1990s". *Armed Forces and Society*. Vol. 20, No. 2 (1994); pp. 259-281.

SIVAM (*Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia*—Amazonian Surveillance System). A joint, though Air Force-dominated, system of radars and intervention forces designed to combat drug trafficking and monitor the spillover of the Colombian civil war into Brazilian territory, the SIVAM is a prime example of an internal armed forces mission.

The continued existence of internal missions points towards the inadequacy of approaches focussing solely on institutional change in assessed the realities of civilian control in societies in transition. In the words of João Roberto Martins Filho, "this type of analysis does not deal adequately with the possibility that the military might cede important institutional spaces without ceasing to exercise new forms of autonomy".[91] Martins contends that as a result of the military achieving just this, "despite the publication of the PDN and the creation of the Ministry of Defence, the participation of civilians in the definition of national strategic priorities has been nil"[92].

Relating his analysis explicitly back to the importance of the language used to discuss security matters, Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira reveals clearly the impact of discursive dominance, and its ability to counterbalance institutional change, in finding that

> not a comma's worth of substantive change has been made to the doctrine of national security, except where the Cold War is concerned. … Preparation for defence against internal enemies has been made with all determination, albeit less ostentatiously. That is, the adjectives have changed.[93]

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[91] Martins Filho, João Roberto. "O governo Fernando Henrique e as Forças Armadas: um passo à frente, dois passos atrás". Paper presented at the Fifth International Congress of the Brazilian Studies Association, Recife, Brazil, 18-21 June 2000. Available from http://www.crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/martins.html. Accessed 11 May 2005; p. 2.

[92] Ibid., p. 5.

[93] "Militares ainda ocupam campos dos civis". *Especial Militar* 17. São Paulo: O Estado de São Paulo; undated. Available from http://txt.estado.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar17.html. Accessed 11 May 2005.

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