

**THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL**  
**OF THE UNITED STATES**

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**Engaging Russia:**  
**Can International Organizations Help?**

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**Occasional Paper**

**Marten H. A. van Heuven**

March 2000

# THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

## OF THE UNITED STATES

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**Marten H. A. van Heuven**

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THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

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## FOREWORD

Relations between the United States, the NATO allies and Russia remain critical to the future peace and stability of Europe, despite Russia's relative economic, military and political disarray since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These relations are conducted in a diverse range of bilateral and multilateral institutions that makes it hard to ensure that the governments concerned are conveying a clear and consistent message as to their respective intentions and the possibilities for the future development of their relationships. Even between the members of the European Union and the United States, consultation about their respective intentions in relation to Russia has often been less than adequate, and resulting mutual miscommunications and suspicions greater than necessary.

In this paper, Marten van Heuven has taken on himself the important challenge of attempting to sort out the potential roles and uses of the different institutions that have been established to further the Western goal of engaging Russia in a new and more productive relationship since the end of the Cold War. Studying international issues through the lens of institutions is often seen as a somewhat sterile enterprise, on the theory that it is policies and people, not institutions, that determine the outcomes of international dealings. While this may be largely true, it does not tell the whole story and van Heuven's approach here yields some important insights as to how Western policy towards Russia could be more effectively prosecuted in the coming years.

Van Heuven does not claim more weight for his approach than it can bear. But his paper prompts needed reflection as to whether the United States and its allies are managing their policies as effectively as they could. In this sense, it is a timely and useful exercise, which the Atlantic Council is pleased to put into the current policy debate on this important relationship.

The opinions expressed in the paper are those of the author and do not represent positions of the Atlantic Council.

March 2000

**Christopher J. Makins**  
President  
The Atlantic Council

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# ENGAGING RUSSIA: CAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS HELP?

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The theme of this paper may be captured in two short questions. What are the organizational tools available to the United States and its Western allies to further their objective of engaging Russia? And can these tools be used effectively to engage Russia?

The paper originated with the idea of looking at the track record of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) created on May 27, 1997, and evaluating whether the Council is being used to its full potential. It soon became clear, however, that it might be useful to broaden the context of the inquiry by considering the entire range of intergovernmental organizations in which the United States and Europe deal with Russia. This process led to the two questions posed above.

It should be made clear at the outset what this paper is not. It takes as a premise, but does not discuss, the western policy of engaging Russia. Nor does the paper go into the particular processes and procedures of each intergovernmental venue in which the West is engaged in discourse with Moscow. Finally, the paper does not deal with the many non-governmental contacts and exchanges between the West and Russia, important though they are.

This paper responds to a sense that the way in which Western governments deal with Russia has become haphazard. Even when Western policy objectives have been broadly agreed and understood (and this has not always been the case), the choice of venue for pursuing these policies seems to have proceeded more from instinct based on past practice rather than on any systematic evaluation of the potential effectiveness of the intergovernmental organizational tools available for purposeful two-way communication and interaction with Moscow. Moreover, the West's handling of these venues may in some cases have discouraged rather than encouraged Russia to engage.

The approach taken here will therefore begin with a brief but necessary review of the positions and attitudes of the key Western countries involved with Russia – the main players. Next, it will canvass the intergovernmental venues available for mutual engagement – the tools. It will then attempt to draw some conclusions, and put them into the current policy setting. It will conclude with some suggestions.

## **The Players**

Current Russian attitudes and policies have been shaped in the course of a turbulent half-century. During World War II, the Soviet Union established its role as a major allied power. After San Francisco<sup>1</sup>, it has invariably regarded permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with veto power as the international institutional embodiment of great power status. During the Cold War, Moscow also came to see its relations with Washington in terms of similarity – each country the respective leader in the East-West confrontation. The nuclear arms control process enhanced Russia's sense of great power equivalence with the United States. The demise of the Soviet Union has undercut Moscow's ability to function as a great power. Nonetheless, many Russian leaders retain an indelible sense that, while for now their country is no match for

the United States, it should be treated and allowed to exercise influence as if it retains great power status.

World War II also rekindled Russian awareness of its interests in Europe. Resisting and then defeating Hitler's Germany was a vital interest. The Cold War kept Moscow's focus on Europe as the ultimate prize in the confrontation between Soviet communism and the West. However, after the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets gained awareness that their country shared some common interests with the West. The reemergence of Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the efforts to replace communism with a democratic, market-based economic and political system have naturally opened up contacts with the United States and with European countries, to which Russians came to look for ideas, advice, assistance, markets and money. Russia and Germany, once historic rivals in Europe, are now connected by an intricate web of relations to which both Moscow and Bonn pay great attention.

The conflicts in the Balkans have starkly illuminated Russia's current position. Though Russia is a member of the organizations which have played a role in coping with these conflicts – UNSC, PJC, Contact Group and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – it has mostly played its role in these organizations with difficulty and ineffectually. It is true that Russian forces are effectively participating in SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo under ingenious arrangements making them part of the total NATO effort. But in the larger domain of European security, Moscow's approach has been hamstrung by episodic attention, ambivalent policy and inadequate resources.

Moreover, the current military action of Russian forces in Chechnya has deeply affected the Russian image and called into question Russian purposes and values. It has also raised growing concerns about the role of the military in Russian society. In sum, the questions and uncertainties that surround Russia today make for a fragile foundation for any Western effort to engage Russia.

For Germany, the evolution of Russia amounts to a vital interest, given the long and historically difficult relationship between these two countries. The Soviet Union was the proximate cause of the post-World War II division of Germany. Moscow's assent opened the way to German unification. Whatever coalition governs in Berlin, Germany will continue to set great store by its relationship with Russia. Its Russian policy will be sensitive to any swings in Russian mood. Germany will strongly favor Western engagement with Russia across the entire range of intergovernmental organizations dealing with European security and other issues of common interest. Berlin will be disposed to accommodate Moscow.

The French perspective on Russia is different. The Soviet Union has been an ally in the major conflicts of the twentieth century. Historically, the French have also tended to see their relations with Russia through the prism of perceived cultural affinity, though this may be more imagined than real. In any event, Russia has long been the country that in the French way of thinking could keep Germany in check. French interest in this triangular relationship has no doubt contributed to the French decision to participate with the Germans and the Russians in what may become a pattern of periodic high-level meetings. Such a venue, without the United States, reflects French ambivalence about the U.S. role in Europe. On the one hand Paris welcomes the United States as a power in Europe, as an anchor to keep Germany (and perhaps also Russia) in check. On the other hand, Paris traditionally has trouble with the notion of the United States as a European power and is driven by a concept of leadership in Europe which sees French and U.S. roles as mutually exclusive. Paris will view the utility to French interests of intergovernmental organizations in which France and Russia are both members through this optic.

The British view of Russia is more distant. Britain was a wary ally in World War II and a staunch opponent of Soviet communism. Its current view is marked by a desire to see Russian reform succeed, leavened by a finely honed sense of the problems that a difficult Russia could pose to British interests in Europe. Seemingly unconcerned about Moscow's reactions, the Blair government has opted for a policy of stressing British interests on the continent of Europe. Given its stance of not joining the European common currency for now, Britain has pursued its claim to a role on the continent by taking the lead with France in moving toward a European security and defense policy and a military capability of European Union countries closely linked

to NATO. None of these initiatives, however, alter the basic British preference of keeping its policy options open and pursuing British interests bilaterally. In the meantime, Britain will view the utility of various intergovernmental organizations with pragmatic eyes. When it comes to engaging Russia, London will favor the use of organizations that can help achieve practical results. It will eschew venues that do not.

The United States sees its relations with Russia in global terms. Traditionally, it has seen itself as the leader of anti-communism. At the same time it has been the principal Western interlocutor with the Soviet Union, and now Russia, on nuclear weapons and strategic arms control. Far more than any of its European allies, Washington measures Moscow's role in terms of the U.S. vision of a Europe whole and free. Through a long period starting over half a century ago, Washington has built a solid practice of dealing bilaterally with Moscow. This has become a habit which is seen as serving U.S. interests across a wide range of issues. But the more recent U.S. policy of cooperation with Russia has also put emphasis on bringing the Russians into a web of relationships with the West, such as in the PJC and the Group of Eight (G-8). Washington is likely to assess the range of intergovernmental organizations in terms of their capacity to marshal support for, and exercise influence to promote, the objectives of Russian reform, democracy, free markets, respect for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and meeting the new challenges posed by international terrorism, drugs and crime. Washington will find it hard, however, to alter its view that its bilateral relationship with Moscow is the key link between Russia and the West.

Naturally, the interests of other Western countries are also affected by the evolution of Russia. NATO and European Union (EU) members generally favor a policy of engagement, though national perspectives will differ. Thus, the prisms through which Norway and Turkey, which share common borders with Russia, view their large neighbor are different from those of, for instance, Portugal or Ireland. On the whole, all these countries will see multilateral contexts as more promising venues for effective interaction with Russia than bilateral channels, though Turkey also has a long history of bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union and now Russia.

### **The Tools**

The chart on page 5 shows, and offers the author's evaluation of, the key intergovernmental organizations that are available as tools with which the West can engage Russia. The chart is selective. Also, it may give the impression that contacts between Russia and the West take place predominantly within the fora provided by intergovernmental organizations. This is not the case. The fact is that the preferred venue for the United States and other key countries in the West has been bilateral, not multilateral. For many years, Washington has preferred to use "the channel," established by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Its current form is the high-level bilateral channel originally known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, named after U.S. Vice President Al Gore and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, though the rapid succession of Russian prime ministers and the most recent cooling of U.S.-Russian relations following the war over Kosovo and the Russian military operations in Chechnya have caused the term to fall into disuse. During the Clinton administration, this channel has been arched by a regular pattern of summit meetings. At the same time it has been undergirded by an active – and dense – pattern of contacts on the part of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott with a range of Russian policymakers. The German-Russian interface suggests a similar pattern of business done primarily on a bilateral basis. French and British leaders also appear to harbor a preference for dealing with Russia bilaterally on issues they regard as important.

Moreover, the Russians like it this way. Dealing with major European countries one on one is a form of diplomacy they understand. This pattern builds on historic diplomatic practices that have hardened into firm



## POTENTIAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL VENUES FOR ENGAGING RUSSIA\*

✓ = Actual/Past ? = Potential

NTAL

INTERGOVERNME

NON-GOVERNMENTAL

BILATERAL

### MULTINATIONAL

	UNSC	IAEA	IMF/IBRD	G-8	NATO/PJC	NATO/EAPC	OSCE	CONTACT GROUP FORMAT	EU	NGOs
PETERSBERG PRINCIPLES					?	✓		?	✓	
CONFLICT PREVENTION	?				?	?	✓	✓	✓	
CRISIS MANAGEMENT	✓				?	?	✓	✓	✓	
PEACEKEEPING	✓				✓	?	?	✓	✓	
PEACE ENFORCEMENT	✓				✓	?		✓	✓	
ECONOMIC REFORM			✓	✓				✓	✓	
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE		✓	✓	✓				✓	✓	
DEMOCRACY						✓	?	?	✓	
HUMAN RIGHTS							?	?	✓	
MOSCOW'S RELATIONS W/REPUBLICS						?				✓
MOSCOW'S RELATIONS W/CIS					?				✓	
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE						✓			✓	
EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE						?	✓	?		✓
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION		✓	✓			?				✓
WMD		✓			?				✓	
CFE					✓				✓	
JOINT EXERCISES						✓				
DEFENSE RELATED ECONOMIC ISSUES						?	?		?	✓
NARCOTICS				?	?	?		?	✓	
TERRORISM	?			?	?	?	?	?	✓	
CRIME				?	?	?	?	?	✓	
ENVIRONMENT			?	?				?	✓	

\*This chart is an effort to show how Intergovernmental Organizations have played or might play a role in engaging Russia. It represents the subjective judgment of the author.

habits. One-on-one contact with the United States is a habit that took shape during Cold War crises over Berlin and Cuba. It has been reinforced by an established pattern of working directly, and in many cases almost exclusively, with the United States on arms control and reductions. These patterns have been reinforced by the Russian drive to demonstrate that despite the appearance (and the reality) of its declining global significance, Russia in the post-Cold War period is every bit as much a power equivalent to the United States as was the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Nonetheless, the evolution of the international community and of Europe since the end of World War II has spawned a growing number of intergovernmental organizations dealing with European security and related issues. This development has brought the Soviet Union and now Russia – into a dense matrix of intergovernmental organizations, contacts and relationships. These require Moscow to engage with the West not just bilaterally, but also in many intergovernmental channels.

The U.N. Security Council remains a favored venue for Moscow. Russian permanent membership guarantees participation in all issues that come before the Council. It also provides apparent validation of great power status. The right of veto adds to potential Russian influence. Russia will be hostile to any pattern of regional security that does not derive its authority from the Council.

Moscow will also favor the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). It views these organizations as promising sources of financial assistance on a major scale.

Moscow likes the G-8, both for the prestige that goes with membership in this select group of major economic powers, but also because the format gives Russia great latitude to deal with the other members individually, in small groups, or as a single group, on issues of importance to Moscow. The G-8 is seen by Moscow as a door to financial and other assistance, and influence.

The Russian attitude toward the OSCE is more ambivalent, but positive on the whole. On the one hand, the OSCE provides the broadest possible platform from which to advocate Russian views about European security. However, the so-called Helsinki Third Basket issues of human rights, conflict monitoring and prevention, election supervision, and reporting could potentially be troublesome and render Russian governmental action vulnerable to public criticism. The bottom line, however, is that Moscow has always liked a pan-European security organization, especially one that operates largely by consensus, and the opportunity it provides for Russian participation in and influence over OSCE activities such as observer missions and election monitoring.

The contact group format is one which Moscow will continue to favor. It provides a platform for Russian views on specific security issues. The practice of Russian military participation in SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo suggests, however, that Moscow has been pragmatic in adjusting to the realities requiring Russian forces to operate alongside and in coordination with the NATO military effort.

On paper, the PJC offers perhaps the most flexible and comprehensive venue for engaging Russia. The Founding Act, signed in 1997, expresses the “enduring political commitment” of the NATO countries and Russia to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area [based] on the principles of democracy and cooperative security.” It registers the determination of NATO countries and Russia “to give concrete substance” to the shared commitment to build a “stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free.” Making a bow to the primary responsibility of the UNSC for maintaining international peace and security, and to OSCE as the “primary instrument” in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation, the Act states that the PJC “will provide a mechanism for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern.” The Council will be “the principal venue of consultation between NATO and Russia in times of crisis” or for “any other situation affecting peace and stability.” This language is unambiguous.

However, the record has fallen far short of this objective. Though Partnership for Peace, conventional arms control, Bosnia and Kosovo have repeatedly figured on the agenda, formal PJC action has consisted

mostly of endorsing positions or decisions taken elsewhere, particularly with respect to the Balkans. A review of the NATO press statements following Council sessions leaves the impression that these have been routine events, largely devoid of substance. After NATO initiated military action against Serb forces, Russia ceased cooperation in the PJC. It then came back to the Council, but refused to discuss any issue but Kosovo. It should be noted here that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) has limited itself mostly to the formulation and management of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and has not become a venue for engaging Russia on issues dealing with European peace and security.

The recent display of Moscow's sour attitude toward the PJC may have its roots in the practice NATO adopted when the Council became operational. NATO decided beforehand exactly what its spokesmen would say and declined to touch any issue that had not been thrashed out thoroughly among the Allies. While NATO's desire that the PJC not open the door to Russian influence on – or veto of – NATO action is understandable, Moscow most likely regarded this approach as falling short of what the PJC had been held out to be, and felt NATO's reticence as a slight. Nevertheless, the NATO Secretary General's meetings in Moscow in mid-February provided the occasion for a joint statement to the effect that "NATO and Russia will work to intensify their dialogue" in the PJC and would "pursue a vigorous dialogue on a wide range of security issues."<sup>2</sup> Time will tell if this development leads to a significant change in the role and potential value of the PJC.

One other venue may appeal to Russia. It is the European Union. Russia is not a member of the EU. Nonetheless it interfaces with the EU in significant ways. Moreover, the scope of the interface may grow. One element is the EU's so-called TACIS program. It provides grant finance for the transfer of know-how to twelve countries of the former Soviet Union. Russia has been a major beneficiary of this program. The program also serves the EU interest in developing closer political relations, to foster trade and development, and to provide the groundwork for mutually beneficial economic, social, financial, technological and cultural cooperation.

The other element is the decision, at the EU Council in Cologne in the summer of 1999, to adopt a common strategy on Russia. From the perspective of the members of the EU, this decision helps focus on dealing with Russia as a common task. Moreover, a successful effort to deal together with Russia would leverage their individual influence and capacities. For Russia, an institutional channel to the EU could strengthen the potential of the EU as a source of support and assistance. The EU decision, however, is more a goal than a reality. The EU Council has also decided on common strategies with respect to Ukraine and the Mediterranean. None of these strategies have, as yet, much of an agreed content. Instead, the rush to proclaim them probably had more to do with the drive toward a common and foreign security policy and the fact that the EU had just found a person – former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana – to be the High Representative whose task will be to give voice to that common policy when it emerges. In fact, the EU Council in Helsinki in December 1999 described the common strategies as a means toward more effective and comprehensive external action. In its declaration on Chechnya in Helsinki, the Council also noted that the implementation of the common strategy on Russia had to be reviewed.

### **Conclusions**

This picture permits a few modest conclusions. First, key Western countries prefer to deal bilaterally with Russia. Russia reciprocates this preference. Intergovernmental organizations are poor cousins to bilateral contacts in implementing engagement with Russia. The West will continue to face the challenge of having to coordinate bilateral and intergovernmental channels to fashion an effective pattern of engagement with Russia.

Second, Russian preference for the UNSC, the international financial institutions and the G-8 creates the opportunity for the West to use these venues as effective means of engagement. For instance, Russian interest in the IMF as a source of credits provides the IMF with the opportunity to impose conditions for extending financial aid. Also, to the extent that Russia wants not to be seen as isolated, the UNSC provides the West with some leverage as long as it suits U.S. and western interests to use the Council, though it should be remembered

that during the early phases of the Cold War, Russia did not flinch from using a steady policy of “nyet.” To talk about Western leverage does not mean that the West should seek to deal with Russia from any posture other than mutual respect due among sovereign equals. It merely underlines the proposition that in any working relationship there needs to be mutual accommodation.

Third, Russia’s conduct at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in November 1999 suggests that Moscow has no difficulty with what to others might appear as a gap between declaratory policy and state practice. Russia signed on to a Charter and a Summit Declaration while continuing a course of action in Chechnya in apparent disregard of the principles enunciated in these statements of policy.

Fourth, recent Russian unwillingness to discuss any topic other than Kosovo in the PJC indicates tight control by Moscow of the degree of its engagement with the West. It shows that Moscow can shut off contact with the West and that the Russian leadership has no hesitation in pulling this lever when it believes (wrongly) that this action is in Russia’s interest. However, the Russian freeze should not obscure the fact that in concept, mandate, and design the PJC is one of the most flexible venues available for dealing with European security issues. If the parties wish to use it, the PJC could be a highly effective tool with which to promote engagement between Russia and the West.

Fifth, the West can remind Russia that access to fora it favors – such as the G-8 – can be closed. Suggestions that the G-8 revert to the G-7 will surely be unwelcome in Moscow and could be a useful reminder that Russian access to the West and Russian state practice cannot be unlinked.

Finally, in the years to come we are likely to see the establishment of yet other intergovernmental organizations or fora for dealing with the West-Russia agenda. They can be effective, though much will depend on the specific circumstances of their creation and evolution. But yet new tools for engaging Russia will also pose the question whether it is necessary or wise to invest in maintaining all the old tools. This will require judgment and flexibility.

### **The Setting**

The question of what recommendations flow from these conclusions requires an appreciation of three basic issues which together constitute the setting for this inquiry.

The first relates to Russia. The country is now in a crisis of transition and legitimacy. This will take time to resolve. The outcome could be increasing legitimacy and stability of federal constitutional structures and practices based on democratic rule of law. Alternatively, it could be an authoritarian nationalist form of legitimacy. The actual outcome will be decided by Russians. Western conduct and perceived Western attitudes will affect this process only at the margins. However, these margins will matter. The way the West – and in particular the United States – is perceived by Russians will be a factor that could significantly affect the outcome.

The second relates to the U.S. role in Europe. In the second half of the twentieth century the United States was the stabilizer of Europe. Now, with Europe in transition, the U.S.-European relationship is also undergoing a transformation. For now, the United States still provides the less-needed external security (though the incipient discussion about regional missile defense may change European perceptions), but also helps shape the conditions for peaceful adjustment and conciliation of old disputes on a continent used to war. No European country today wants the United States to go home. But Europe wants to – and should – take greater responsibility in foreign and security policy; and the United States needs genuinely to share decision-making. In due course this is likely to happen. This evolution is likely to be accelerated by the unwillingness of the U.S. electorate to support and fund an open-ended, leading U.S. role on a continent which is not seen as posing a threat to U.S. vital interests.

The third relates to Europe itself. Conditions and outlooks have changed drastically over the past decade. Russia is not perceived as a threat – as was the Soviet Union – though its size, proximity, and its nuclear capacity will continue to keep that country high on the list of concerns in major chancelleries and board rooms. As Professor David Calleo has pointed out, its “new” security problems of terrorism, drugs, gangster-

ism, illegal immigration, and ethnic strife, are increasingly internal (though in the cyber age it is hard to compartmentalize these issues). They are also less susceptible of treatment by the stock in trade of NATO: standing military forces ready for action in and now also out of area. The EU has started down the path of a common currency. European countries are trying to shape a new defense and security policy. With the appointment of Javier Solana, a voice has been given to the attempt to shape a common EU foreign policy. Significantly, the EU has crossed the threshold toward further substantial enlargement, opening the way to include countries in East Central Europe. While this evolution does not do away with divisions in Europe, and does not resolve existing disputes, it builds an increasingly sturdy framework for handling by means of agreed procedures the normal range of regional issues without the need for a leadership role on the part of the United States.

### Suggestions

This overview of the intergovernmental tools for engaging Russia does not set the stage for major recommendations. The existing web of practices for dealing with Russia will be sturdily resistant to change. However, the analysis leads to several suggestions.

First, effective engagement of Russia requires a common approach. Without that, the array of presently available intergovernmental venues will only aggravate lack of clarity as to Western means and objectives. Despite its current difficulties, how Russia evolves is of vital interest to the West.

Second, the need for an agreed Western approach to engagement with Russia begs the question how such an approach might come about. Since the perspectives of key Western players differ, the effort to shape common policies will produce tension. Moreover, there is no obvious intergovernmental venue for shaping a common approach. There will be parallel discussions in various fora – NATO, the EU, EU/US summits, the G-8 – that will contribute to the shaping of Western policy with respect to Russia. Some of these discussions will be focused. Others will not. The process will not be tidy. But it is the best, indeed the only way, for democratic societies to sort out policies on matters of national interest through, in a phrase of Dean Acheson in a different context, the discipline of adversary procedure and the test of judgment in contested application.

Third, intergovernmental organizations *can* be effective tools for a coordinated approach that serves both Western and Russian purposes. The United States should aim to include in this process not just the key Western countries, but all European states, large and small, east and west. Here it may meet resistance from key European countries, which for their own reasons will prefer a more restricted venue. However, an inclusive approach will have a double advantage. It will marshal the broadest possible array of Western influence in support of effective engagement with Russia. It will also provide an opportunity for the views of smaller countries to be heard and weighed in a way that would not be feasible if these countries were confined to bilateral contacts with Moscow. At the same time, such an inclusive process can be managed so as to enhance Western cohesion.

Fourth, while its terms of reference would appear to make the PJC the venue of choice for engaging Russia, the political opportunity for doing so may already be a thing of the past. The PJC was created in the flush of cooperation at the Madrid Summit in 1997. But its promise as a principal venue for dealing with matters of European peace and security has worn off, the recent agreement between the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Lord Robertson notwithstanding. Its track record is thin. Its NATO setting discourages Russia. So does the NATO approach of speaking only on a pre-cleared basis. Perhaps a Western attempt to engage in real discussion could bring Moscow to see the PJC in a more favorable light. Such an effort is worth making, but if the effort is to succeed, Washington must be comfortable with it, and Moscow must see the venue as in its interests as well.

Fifth, despite the disappointing results at Istanbul, OSCE is a venue that is bound to continue to attract Moscow. It has remained free from the East-West stigma that at times traumatizes Moscow. It is based on

Helsinki principles to which all members have subscribed. It does useful, if mostly unsung, work in conflict warning, prevention and reporting, as well as the impartial monitoring of elections. It has a good record in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Americans have never paid much attention to OSCE, though a small group of administration officials and congressional participants have over the years gained a great deal of mostly positive experience with the organization. It is time to correct this situation. An effort to put more emphasis on OSCE in Washington and more public education could help refurbish domestic political support, although the golden opportunity of using the Istanbul OSCE summit for this purpose has been wasted. This could also help OSCE as a venue for engaging Russia, since it would challenge Moscow to show what it could do to give concrete support to OSCE missions, thus revealing its intentions and capabilities.

Lastly, we should start thinking about the EU as a useful, promising venue for engaging Russia on European issues. Such a suggestion may sound strange, coming from a U.S. voice. But it would have advantages all around. This approach would put on European shoulders some of the responsibilities they have been asking for and which they are trying to carry out. It would draw Russia closer to the traditions, culture and values of the European countries on its western periphery. It would usefully lower the U.S. task of dealing with Russia to more manageable proportions, while leaving the United States in the position of continuing its key role of dealing with Russia on global issues and special topics such as nuclear weapons regimes. The resulting lower U.S. profile might also be salutary, as being more in tune with the domestic political capacities of the United States. Such a shift in responsibilities and relations among Russia, the EU and the United States will not come rapidly. But it would be in harmony with the key trends described above. Of course, such a reshuffle would require new patterns of US-EU cooperation, but this is bound to happen anyway.

Bilateral relations with Russia will continue to be a major way of engaging Russia, particularly on the part of the United States and other key Western countries. In addition, the West can determine which intergovernmental organizations offer the greatest promise for engaging Russia and concentrate its efforts there, while making sure that its message is supported by action in all venues across the board. Ultimately, engagement with Russia through open intergovernmental processes and organizations can, alongside the important role of contacts with Russia in the private sector, build the web of relations and the trust that will open the door for Russia to become a fully contributing partner in the European enterprise.

<sup>1</sup> Referring to the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization – April through June 1945.

<sup>2</sup> Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Visit of the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, in Moscow on 16 February 2000, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p000216e.htm> (19 January 2000).

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