BY ‘ANY MEASURES’ NECESSARY: NSC-68 AND COLD WAR ROOTS OF THE 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
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This working paper is one of several outcomes of the Ridgway Working Group on Preemptive and Preventive Military Intervention, chaired by Gordon R. Mitchell.
One prominent venue for public rollout of the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS 2002) was *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*. The preface of that journal’s December 2002 issue begins with two quotations from President George W. Bush’s letter transmitting NSS 2002 to Congress. It then proceeds to frame the historical significance of the president’s words:

> With those words President Bush submitted his National Security Strategy (NSS) to the U.S. Congress September 20th. Each administration is required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to submit an annual report to Congress setting out the nation's comprehensive strategic security objectives. The tradition began with President Harry S. Truman in 1950 with NSC-68, a report that focused on the United States and the then-Soviet Union and calling for a doctrine of containment that dominated the ensuing Cold War.¹

By linking NSS 2002 to NSC-68, the editors of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* present a conundrum that serves as a point of departure for this working paper. The conundrum stems from how NSC-68 and NSS 2002 compare and contrast—they share important features in common, yet also diverge in ways that make it difficult to fathom how they belong to the same “tradition.” Consider that while NSS 2002 is a public document, NSC-68 was classified and hidden from public view for 25 years. Further, NSC-68 codified the doctrine of deterrence as the cornerstone of U.S. security strategy, while NSS 2002 declares flatly that against terrorists, “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work.”² Finally, section 9C of NSC-68 stipulates that “the idea of ‘preventive’ war—in the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies—is generally unacceptable to Americans,”³ while NSS 2002 says that today, the U.S. must be ready and willing to hit enemies first, before threats fully materialize. These vectors of divergence would seem to underscore President Bush’s contention that “the basis for our mutual security must move beyond Cold War doctrines.”⁴

The conundrum is that while NSS 2002 is clearly billed as a “post-Cold War” security strategy, one that departs significantly from some of NSC-68’s key tenets, commentators still draw parallels between the two documents to generate frames of reference for understanding the new Bush security strategy. As Mark Joyce observes, “Just as NSC 68 provided an off-the-shelf
strategic rationale for U.S. intervention in Korea and, later, Vietnam, the Bush NSS established an intellectual framework for the subsequent invasion of Iraq and, potentially, for future actions against other perceived sponsors of international terrorism. More generally, in an October 2005 speech addressing the “war on terror,” President Bush explained that, “in many ways, this fight resembles the struggle against communism in the last century.” Bush’s comment suggests that clues for understanding the “current fight” may reside in historical artifacts such as NSC-68, the “blueprint for Cold War defense.”

In support of this view, Melyvn Leffler argues that, “Bush’s rhetoric and actions have deep roots in the history of American foreign policy. Understanding these roots is important because they help to illuminate the different trajectories that inhere in the American diplomatic experience.” Specifically, Leffler isolates the “hyperbolic language” of NSC-68 as a precursor to contemporary rhetoric in the “war on terror”:

The delicate balance between threat perception, the definition of interests, and the employment of power changed in 1950. The Soviet acquisition of the bomb, the fall of China, the signing of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the outbreak of hostilities in Korea accentuated the perception of threat, institutionalized the hyperbolic language of NSC 68, and inaugurated a full-scale war on communism everywhere. Eisenhower and Dulles, we now know, were more nuanced than we once thought, but their rhetoric calling on nations to take sides was a precursor of the rhetoric we hear today. The war against communism blurred important distinctions, distorted priorities, and complicated threat perception.

This essay builds context for the working paper series’ overall assessment of NSS 2002, by studying what Leffler calls NSC-68’s “hyperbolic language.” We analyze how NSC-68’s rhetoric constructs an epistemological framework that blurs important distinctions, distorts priorities, and complicates threat perception, and we chart how NSC-68’s approach to security evolves and unfolds across various administrations during the Cold War. Our study traces three threads linking NSC-68 to NSS 2002: the rhetoric in the texts of the strategy documents themselves; the institutional practices deployed to install, legitimate, and implement each strategy; and the identity of the key players involved in the various campaigns undertaken to execute the respective blueprints.
For five years following World War II, there was no definitive statement of American strategic policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had developed reasonably effective planning bodies during the war, and in 1945, turned to these bodies for advice on how to conduct the expected conflict with the Soviet Union. This was not an apparatus comparable to the notorious German General Staff, but it was a beginning. From 1945 to 1950, ideas came thick and fast from the Joint Intelligence Staff, Joint Intelligence Committee, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint War Plans Committee, and the Joint Chiefs as a whole. Periodically during these five years the question of preventive nuclear war surfaced, but never got JCS support. As Steven T. Ross suggests,

[T]he final report of the Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, the A-bomb tests at Bikini, submitted on June 30, 1947, stated that an atomic blitz could not only nullify a nation’s military effort but also demolish its social and economic structures for long periods of time. . . .The United States, therefore, had to amass a large number of weapons of mass destruction, and since a surprise attack with such weapons could be decisive, America had to be prepared to strike first.

Operation Bushwacker, of 8 March 1948, stated the basic war aim as compelling the USSR to abandon political and military aggression. Ross observes of Bushwacker that, “given the stated political goal, nothing short of the overthrow of the Soviet regime would have produced the desired results” A later plan, Trojan, of 28 January 1949, carried an annex demonstrating that the “Air Force intended to hit seventy Soviet cities with 133 atomic bombs.”

Bushwaker, Trojan, and other nuclear first-strike plans formulated by U.S. war strategists shortly after World War II never received presidential sanction. Truman intended to hold the military budget down; planners knew they had to pull in their horns. But by 1949, the wartime coalition of the western allies and the Soviet Union had largely broken down, and several traumatic events spurred the president to seek a new look at U.S. defense policy. The collapse of our ally in Asia, the Chinese Nationalist regime; the detonation by the Soviet Union of an atomic weapon; and the indictment and ultimate conviction of a high-ranking American diplomat, Alger Hiss, for perjury in denying he had passed state secrets to Soviet agents caused Truman to appoint a committee to review defense policy, chaired by Paul Nitze.

Nitze made sure that only the most dire claims about the hostile intentions of the Soviet Union found their way into NSC-68, the report drafted by his committee. The opinions of those who knew the Kremlin best, George Kennan, Llewellyn Thompson, and Charles Bohlen, were systematically excluded. The Kennan-Thompson-Bohlen group believed that Stalin’s primary aim was to maintain his tight control of the USSR and its satellites, but that he had no plan to
conquer the world. Their refutation of Nitze’s alarmism, when read today, is unassailable. Stalin, they said, was primarily concerned with maintaining his iron grip on the Soviet government, and with developing a *cordon sanitaire* in depth to prevent another invasion of Russia from the west. Nitze claimed, and wrote into our official policy, that Stalin had the intention of gaining control of the whole of Europe and all strategic points in Asia and Africa, so that the USSR could strangle the United States.

In Nitze’s view, the threat from the Soviet system was so powerful that our usual moral superiority to the godless Russians had to yield to the necessity of defeating Communism everywhere: “[T]he assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.” It was to be us or them, there were no alternatives, only complete and total hostility. Those who think NSC-68 was a necessary and legitimate call to arms do not attend to what Leffler calls its “hyperbolic language”: the USSR was irrevocably committed to conquering the world; “The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself . . . “[W]ith a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”

As John Lewis Gaddis observes, “the effect was vastly to increase the number and variety of interests deemed relevant to the national security, and to blur distinctions between them.” How should the U.S. deal with such a totalizing and ominous threat? NSC-68 spelled out the options: “The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, overt or covert, violent or non-violent, which serve the purpose of frustrating the Kremlin design.” In short, anything goes, as long as it not counterproductive. As Gaddis explains NSC-68’s logic, “The world crisis . . . rendered all interests vital, all means affordable, all methods justifiable.”

Since the United States was not ready to contemplate a war with its one-time ally the USSR at the time Nitze wrote NSC-68, it needed some selling. Truman was one of the last to get behind it. When he got the first draft from Nitze on 7 April 1950, he sat on it for a week, then referred it to James Lay, executive secretary of the NSC, for specification of precise programs that would be required, and what they would cost. Meanwhile, he directed that absolutely no publicity be given to the report or its contents. He also refused to back down from his announced determination to keep the defense budget smaller in 1951 than it was in 1950: $13.1 billion. On 10 June 1950, he told Congress, “We must not become hysterical. Our situation is strong, our strength is growing. We must remain cool, determined, and steady.”

Secretary of State Dean Acheson correctly perceived, as he wrote in *Present at the
Creation, that the main purpose of NSC-68 was “to so bludgeon the mind of top government that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out.” In “Selling NSC 68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-51,” Steven Casey explains how difficult this was until the deterioration of the military situation in Korea, the pivotal factor that eventually induced Truman to finally sign off on NSC-68.

THE COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER

After embracing NSC-68 as official U.S. strategy, the Truman administration turned next to the challenge of convincing war-weary citizens to implement its tenets. As Casey explains, most historians recount this public relations effort by highlighting State Department official Edward Barrett’s statement calling for a “psychological scare campaign” and citing Acheson’s memoirs — “throughout 1950 . . . I went about the country preaching” the main points of NSC-68, in language “clearer than truth.” However, the rhetorical strategy described by Acheson and Barrett was more nuanced than a straightforward propaganda operation designed to stoke public fear. As Casey points out, after NSC-68, Truman officials were keenly aware that overheating public spheres of deliberation with alarmist rhetoric could backfire, by inducing panicked citizens to call for desperate military measures such as a U.S. preventive nuclear first strike on the Soviet Union. Indeed, such concerns were heightened in 1950 by rumblings in Congress about the viability of war plans such as Bushwacker and Trojan: “[F]or the first time, some members of Congress were beginning to speculate on what had formerly been an almost forbidden subject—preventive war.” This delicate situation led the Truman administration to pursue a carefully calibrated approach to management of public opinion, selling NSC-68 in a fashion that would tack between the twin dangers of “atomic apathy and hydrogen hysteria.”

Because the popular mood was highly susceptible to such violent mood swings, leaders had tread carefully, tailoring their message to suit current conditions. On occasion, this might well entail overselling, perhaps even exaggerating the importance of an international incident, in order to jolt the populace out of its torpor. But at the same time, clear dangers lurked in going too far in this direction, for such activity might also create an overreaction, perhaps even sparking a widespread popular hysteria. As a result, the goal of any information campaign was to generate interest in times of apathy, but without creating a panic when the mood swiftly began to shift.
As 1950 drew to a close, Truman officials found this rhetorical tightrope increasingly difficult to traverse when a private group named The Committee on Present Danger (CPD) emerged. Led by Harvard President James Conant and atomic scientist Vannevar Bush, the CPD splashed onto the scene with a hard-line manifesto that pressed for full and immediate implementation of the NSC-68 blueprint.

While “the CPD did work hand in hand with the administration to legitimate the policy outlined in NSC-68,” it approached this task like a bull in a china shop, trumpeting hard-line themes with minimal regard for nuance or subtlety. For example, the Committee pressed relentlessly for universal military service, pursuit of U.S. nuclear superiority, and permanent stationing of American troops in Europe. It distributed 100,000 copies of a cartooned-captioned pamphlet entitled, “The Danger of Hiding Our Heads.” A series of CPD Sunday evening radio broadcasts on the Mutual Broadcasting System reached 550 affiliate stations throughout the nation. During one of these broadcasts, CPD member Major General William J. Donovan (ret.) called for “all-out employment of the nation’s economic, political and psychological weapons to regain initiative in the Cold War.” As an illustration of this NSC-68-style, ‘any measures’ necessary approach, Donovan mentioned the possibility of subversion by means of covert operation, arguing that the U.S. must “develop countermeasures that would prevent the loss of strategic areas.” One area ripe for action was Iran, where Donovan said nationalization of the oil industry was caused by “Soviet maneuvers in the economic and political life of that country.”

Donovan’s radio broadcast proved prescient — three years later the U.S. and Britain carried out operation Ajax, a covert CIA mission to oust Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh. The second author of this chapter gained insight into this mission from Dick Cottam, Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, who had been part of Kim Roosevelt’s CIA team that engineered the coup. Cottam was punctilious in observing the oath against revealing sources and methods, but he was abundantly clear about the attitude at the top levels of government: if you lie, don’t get caught. An account of how the 1953 regime change in Iran affected U.S. relations with Middle East nations, Stephen Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men, makes it clear that for American officials, ‘any measures’ necessary to ‘frustrate the Kremlin design’ included deception, as in the case of official U.S. denials that the CIA had played a role in the Iranian coup. A supine mainstream media enabled such falsehoods to persist unchallenged in American public spheres of deliberation — Newsweek’s headline echoed the administration’s cover story perfectly: “Shah Returns in Triumph as Army Kicks Out Mossadegh.”

With NSC-68 fully installed, ‘frustrating the Kremlin design’ frequently meant regime change, eliminating or attempting to eliminate leaders thought to be pro-Soviet, and this
happened not only in Iran, but also in Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Strictly speaking, these were not ‘preventive wars’ in the sense that section 9C of NSC-68 uses the concept to describe a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union. However, the numerous cases of U.S. conventional (and covert) military intervention against Cold War adversaries — so called Soviet surrogates — definitely involved preventive use of force. As such, Leffler suggests that it is worthwhile to consider these cases as precursors to the preventive military attacks against Iraq, launched under the aegis of NSS 2002.

After Kennedy’s death, intelligence analysts and East Asian experts convinced President Lyndon B. Johnson and McGeorge Bundy that China’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities would not endanger vital U.S. interests. Consequently, they did not employ preventative force directly against China or the Soviet Union, but the Kennedy and Johnson administrations did adopt unilateralist, preventative measures in relation to other perceived threats. The most conspicuous case, of course, was the deployment of force to blockade Cuba in October 1962. But Johnson’s decisions to send troops to the Dominican Republic and to deploy combat forces to Indochina were preventative in nature, although we often do not think of them in that way. But we should, if we wish to place Bush national security strategy in proper historical perspective.35

Some of the Cold War plans to facilitate American preventive war aims with strategic deception strain credulity. Consider Operation Northwoods, a scheme hatched by General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Eisenhower and Kennedy. This secret 1962 blueprint for deception came to light after it was declassified under the Freedom of Information Act and highlighted by historian James Bamford in his 2001 book, Body of Secrets.36 Lemnitzer proposed nine covert operations designed to turn public opinion against Fidel Castro and create pretexts for U.S. military intervention in Cuba.37 His catalogue of deception schemes ranged from blunt (“3a. We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba”); to terroristic (“4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area”) to convoluted (“8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela”).38

Lemnitzer’s logic shows how deceptive manipulation of U.S. public opinion and preventive warfare went hand-in-hand in U.S. Cold War strategy. “This plan,” Lemnitzer outlined in stark terms, “should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for U.S. military intervention. Such a plan would enable a
logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage
the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility
on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States." Lemnitzer’s gambit,
which Bamford notes, “may be the most corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government,” was
approved in writing by each of the Joint Chiefs, and appears to have “originated with President
Eisenhower in the last days of his administration.” Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara subsequently shelved the extravagant deception proposal when they took power, but
that did not stanch the flow of other “pretext” schemes for justifying forcible regime change in
Cuba.

In May 1963, Nitze himself proposed to the White House “a possible scenario whereby
an attack on a United States reconnaissance aircraft could be exploited toward the end of
effecting the removal of the Castro regime.” Nitze’s ambitions were clear: “[T]he U.S. could
undertake various measures designed to stimulate the Cubans to provoke a new incident.” While
Nitze and Lemnitzer’s unorthodox machinations did little to impress Kennedy, both men
continued to leave their mark on U.S. Cold War policy, eventually winning appointment to the
influential ‘Team B’ intelligence group in 1975.

TEAM B: THE SWITCHING STATION BETWEEN NSC-68 AND NSS 2002

The historical linkage between NSC-68 and NSS 2002 can be clarified by revisiting the
1975-1976 Team B exercise in “competitive intelligence analysis.” In the early 1970s, the
appeal of superpower accommodation through détente gained currency in the wake of Vietnam
and the hard-line NSC-68 consensus began to unravel. With Nitze out of government and much
of the Ford administration’s national security team cool to his Cold War fervor, hard-liners
sought new tools to create political pressure for Pentagon rearmament. As Nitze recalls, “There
being no opportunity to be an active participant in formulating government policy, I devoted my
time and energy to special projects.” Enter the Team B exercise in competitive intelligence
analysis, proposed by John Foster and Edward Teller in 1975, cultivated by Nitze, and approved
in 1976 by Director of Central Intelligence George H.W. Bush.

In this exercise, a “Team A” group of “insider” analysts, drawn from the ranks of the CIA
and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), was presented with intelligence data and asked to
generate an assessment of the Soviet Union’s strategic military objectives. Another group,
comprised of academics, retired military officers, and other “outsiders,” was designated “Team
B” and tasked to generate its own independent assessment by sifting through the same data set.
Advocates of the competitive analysis exercise suggested that by engaging in dialectical clash, the
competing groups could push each other to improve the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) process and produce a more reliable assessment of Soviet strategic objectives. The notion that constructive disagreement and debate among analysts could sharpen intelligence assessments seems benign, until one sees how the idea was put into practice.

During the exercise, Team A and Team B reached dramatically different conclusions regarding the Soviet military threat. While Team A largely reproduced the trajectory of analysis featured in previous NIEs, Team B argued that these assessments “substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope and implicit threat.” Specifically, in formulating its predictions Team B looked beyond “hard” evidence of Soviet military capabilities and focused more on “soft” evidence derived from perceptions regarding Soviet intentions. This methodological difference yielded dramatically more alarmist estimations of Soviet military spending, bomber production, anti-ballistic missile capability, and technical progress in non-acoustic anti-submarine engineering. The split on this latter issue is telling. While Team A saw little risk of Soviet breakout in anti-submarine warfare capability, Anne Hessing Cahn and Paul Prados point out that, “Team B’s failure to find a Soviet non-acoustic anti-submarine system was evidence that there could well be one.” As the Team B report explained, even though no hard intelligence data existed to establish extant Soviet capability in this area, “The implication could be that the Soviets have, in fact, deployed some operational non-acoustic systems and will deploy more in the next few years.”

The gulf between the two assessments was not surprising — in addition to Nitze and Paul Wolfowitz, key B-Teamers included Richard Pipes, William von Cleave, Lt. Gen Daniel Graham, Lemnitzer, and several other members of the influential CPD, the group that had succeeded in implementing many of the more extreme planks of NSC-68 during the 1950s. Nitze had honed a framework to “strike a chord of terror” when he had written NSC-68; and now “he brought it back into play.” Nitze’s group of Cold War veterans proved to be formidable debaters the few times that the two teams met to compare findings. For example, Team A member Jay Kalner recalled that during one encounter, “We were overmatched. People like Nitze ate us for lunch.” CIA official Sidney Graybeal reflected, “It was like putting Walt Whitman High versus the Redskins. I watched poor GS-13s and –14s [middle-level analysts] subjected to ridicule by Pipes and Nitze. They were browbeating the poor analysts. Team B was not constructive.”

This operation was “strikingly similar” to the earlier NSC-68 campaign, featuring deductive logic rooted in worst-case assumptions, intimidation of dissenters, and strategic use of the classification system to stoke public alarm. In the official CIA history of the episode, Donald
Steury writes that, “The B-Team abandoned the formula agreed upon for the experiment, in favor of a detailed critique of the assumptions and methodologies that underlay strategic forces NIEs produced over the previous decade or so.” Former CIA Deputy Director Ray Cline labeled the exercise a “subversion” of the official estimative process by a “kangaroo court of outside critics all picked from one point of view.” B-Teamers such as Graham exerted extraordinary “peer pressure” on mainstream CIA analysts to slant their intelligence findings, while fellow panelists such as George Keegan colored media coverage and primed public fear of the Soviet Union with selective leaks of alarmist data. Richard Lehman, former Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence, commented that Team B members “were leaking all over the place . . . putting together this inflammatory document.” Such leaks had palpable and lasting effects on public opinion and U.S. Cold War policy. According to Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), “The Pro-B Team leak and public attack on the conclusions of the NIE represent but one element in a series of leaks and other statements which have been aimed as fostering a ‘worst case’ view for the public of the Soviet threat. In turn, this view of the Soviet threat is used to justify new weapons systems.”

The leaks roused the CPD from its Vietnam-era doldrums, giving the organization a platform to bully advocates of superpower détente into submission. According to Hart, the Team B exercise “did not promote dissent. To the contrary, it intimidated and stifled the expression of more balanced estimates of the Soviet threat.” Ironically, all of this took place while the Soviet empire continued to crumble and Team B’s alarmist prognostications about Kremlin backfire bomber production, antimissile research and military spending were being disproved on the ground.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, conservative commentators wrote glowingly about the Team B episode and called periodically for follow-on exercises in competitive intelligence analysis. Frank Gaffney opined in 1990 that “Now is the time for a new Team B and a clear-eyed assessment of the abiding Soviet (and other) challenges that dictate a continued, robust U.S. defense posture.” William Safire followed four years later with the recommendation that “a prestigious Team B” be formed “to suggest an alternative Russia policy to Mr. Clinton.” From his academic post at Johns Hopkins in 1996, Wolfowitz restated the rationale for using dialectical argumentation as a tool of intelligence assessment. After the 11 September 2001 suicide airline attacks on the United States, Wolfowitz and other key Bush administration officials seized the opportunity to take B-teaming to a new level.
Smoke was still billowing out of the Pentagon on the afternoon of 11 September 2001, when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld began pondering how the suicide airline attacks might enable the United States to oust Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. According to notes taken by his staff, Rumsfeld wondered whether the 9/11 disaster would allow the United States to “hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time – not only UBL [Usama bin Laden].”63 Cheney, Wolfowitz and other “Vulcans” — influential White House advisors who had long envisioned war with Iraq as the centerpiece of a bold gambit to reshape the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape — shared Rumsfeld’s proclivities.64

However, the post-9/11 strategy of folding Iraq into the nascent “war on terrorism” was confounded by official Intelligence Community reporting that found a dearth of credible evidence linking Saddam Hussein to terrorist organizations of global reach such as al-Qaida. It was in this context that British intelligence chief Sir Richard Dearlove visited the U.S. for meetings where the possibility of war against Iraq was discussed. Regarding developments in Washington, Dearlove briefed Prime Minister Tony Blair on 23 July 2002 that “there was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.”65

One strategy Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Pentagon deputy Douglas Feith deployed to “fix” the intelligence was to create a Team B-type “Iraqi intelligence cell” within the Pentagon. This cell, the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG), was tasked to study policy implications of connections between terrorist organizations.66 As George Packer notes, the PCTEG concept “went all the way back to 1976 and Team B, the group of CIA-appointed outside experts, including Wolfowitz, that had come to much more alarmist conclusions about the Soviets than the intelligence agencies.”67 Initially, Wolfowitz and Feith staffed PCTEG with Michael Maloof and David Wurmser, two colleagues Feith knew from working together on the 1996 “Clean Break” report that called for preventive war against Iraq to bolster Israeli security.68

In October 2001, Maloof and Wurmser set up shop in a small room on the third floor of the Pentagon, where they went to work developing a “matrix” that charted connections between terrorist organizations and their support infrastructures. Since both men had security clearance, they were able to draw data from raw and finished intelligence products available through the Pentagon’s classified computer system. Sometimes, when they were denied access to the most sensitive material through this channel, Maloof returned to his previous office, where he could download more data. “We scoured what we could get up to the secret level, but we kept getting
blocked when we tried to get more sensitive materials,” Maloof recounted. “I would go back to my office, do a pull and bring it in.”

Early PCTEG work included a critical review of a CIA report entitled, *Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship*. In its critique, PCTEG lauded the CIA analysis for identifying numerous pieces of evidence linking Iraq to al-Qaida, but noted disappointingly that the force of these citations was blunted by “attempts to discredit, dismiss, or downgrade much of this reporting, resulting in inconsistent conclusions in many instances.” PCTEG advised policymakers to overlook such equivocation and dismiss the CIA’s guarded conclusions, recommending that “the CIA report ought to be read for content only—and CIA’s interpretation ought to be ignored.”

It was 1976 redux, with hard-liners deploying competitive intelligence analysis to sweep away policy obstacles presented by inconvenient CIA threat assessments. As Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon observe, “several members of George W. Bush’s inner circle had established themselves as perennial critics of the nation’s intelligence community. The roots of this disdain stretched back at least as far as the mid-1970s.” Only this time, unlike 1976, they were firmly entrenched in the corridors of power. Control over the levers of White House bureaucracy enabled them to embed a Team B entity within the administration itself. The stage was set for a new kind of Team B intelligence exercise—a stealth coup staged by one arm of the government against the other. In general, competitive intelligence analysis is a useful debating tool that has potential to shake up settled perspectives and clarify assumptions. However, interlocutors can manipulate the process, feigning commitment to the guiding norms of critical discussion, only to toss them aside at critical junctures for strategic gain. This subversion of the dialectical exchange resembles a political coup—the sudden and illegal seizure of power through unconventional means such as force or deception.

The coup took shape on 22 July 2002, when a PCTEG staffer sent e-mail reporting that a senior advisor to Paul Wolfowitz had told an assistant that he wanted him “to prepare an intel briefing on Iraq and links to al-Qaida for the SecDef and that he was not to tell anyone about it.” PCTEG went secretly to work, supplementing its earlier critique of the CIA’s *Murky Relationship* report by drawing on “both raw and finished IC products.” As Bamford describes, “the Wurmser intelligence unit would pluck selective bits and pieces of a thread from a giant ball of yarn and weave them together in a frightening tapestry.” However, since the PCTEG officials lacked formal training in the tradecraft of intelligence analysis, their work products were about as sophisticated as “a high school biology student’s reading of a CAT scan.”
Government entities such as PCTEG are able to access raw intelligence data because of recent efforts to improve “connectivity” – meaning that policy officials can “connect” directly to the data streams that flow through IC channels. As James Steiner notes, “because most senior policymakers and their staffs now have access to raw reporting and finished intelligence on their desktops, they are less reliant on traditional analytic centers at CIA, DIA, and State to tell them what the massive body of intelligence reporting means.” The original 1976 Team B exercise needed formal approval from DCI Bush to get off the ground. Today, connectivity enables a select few political officials to tap the classified IC data stream by clicking a switch.

Operating largely independently from the IC, PCTEG proceeded to gather its own intelligence and produce a series of briefing slides that were presented to Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz in August 2002. One slide read: “Summary of Known Iraq – al-Qaida Contacts, 1990-2002,” and included a controversial item: “2001: Prague IIS Chief al-Ani meets with Mohammed Atta in April.” A “findings” slide summed up the Iraq–al-Qaida relationship as “More than a decade of numerous contacts,” “Multiple areas of cooperation,” “Shared interest and pursuit of WMD,” and “One indication of Iraq coordination with al-Qaida specifically related to 9/11.”

Another slide entitled “Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information” took direct aim at the IC. Here, PCTEG faulted official intelligence analysts for their use of “juridical evidence” standards, and borrowing a refrain from the 1976 Team B report, criticized the IC for its “consistent underestimation” of efforts by Iraq and al-Qaida to hide their relationship, contending that, “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” The original Team B logic that curiously turned a lack of intelligence data on Soviet acoustic technology into proof of possible USSR antisubmarine warfare breakout capability had returned, this time to bolster the case for preventive war against Iraq.

Following the briefing, Wolfowitz sent an encouraging note to the PCTEG staffers: “That was an excellent briefing. The Secretary was very impressed. He asked us to think about some possible next steps to see if we can illuminate the differences between us and CIA. The goal is not to produce a consensus product, but rather to scrub one another’s arguments.” So on 15 August 2002, the PCTEG team gave their briefing again, this time for DCI Tenet and CIA analysts.

Remarkably, this briefing did not include the slide criticizing the IC for “consistent underestimation” by using “juridical evidence” standards. Tenet faced a double whammy—an independent Pentagon cell beyond his control was undermining the integrity of his intelligence analysis in top policy circles, and the cell denied him the chance to respond by concealing the attack. As Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) explains, “unbeknownst to the IC, policymakers were
getting information that was inconsistent with, and thus undermined, the professional judgments of the IC experts. The changes included information that was dubious, misrepresented, or of unknown import.”

PCTEG’s omission of the “Fundamental Problems” slide from the 15 August 2002 briefing raises serious questions about the genuineness of DOD’s commitment to legitimate competitive intelligence analysis in this case, since it is very difficult to have a frank and productive dialectical exchange when one side withholds its most powerful argument—here a frontal assault on the A Team’s analytical methodology.

With the incendiary slide removed, it is not surprising that Tenet said he “didn’t see anything that broke any new ground” in the PCTEG briefing. Although Tenet did agree to postpone release of the CIA’s new report, Iraq and Terrorism, to give time for PCTEG staffers to confer again with official intelligence analysts, the analysts who subsequently met with the Pentagon briefers were unmoved.

This setback did not derail PCTEG’s campaign to shore up the administration’s evidentiary foundation for war. While Tenet held back release of the new CIA report on Iraq’s ties to terrorism, the Pentagon intelligence cell stovepiped its incendiary findings directly to Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Vice President Chief of Staff Lewis Libby in a 16 September 2002 briefing that pre-empted release of the CIA report by two days. According to an internal memorandum, “The briefing went very well and generated further interest from Mr. Hadley and Mr. Libby,” who requested a number of items, including a “chronology of Atta’s travels.”

Two aspects of this briefing are especially notable. First, the “Fundamental Problems” slide criticizing CIA interpretive methodology curiously reappeared. Second, DCI Tenet was not aware that the briefing even took place until March 2004, when members of Congress informed him during hearings. Tenet’s testy response reflected one of the most daunting challenges facing the DCI in an era when the “red line” separating the policy and intelligence communities is continuously eroded by connectivity. As one group of former intelligence officers observed, “this increased intelligence/policy proximity, combined with revolutionary growth in information management capacity and data mining tools, has given today’s policymaker the capability to conduct his or her own fairly sophisticated analysis, independent of the traditional intelligence analysis prepared, vetted, and presented by CIA, DIA, and INR.”

According to Thielmann, these developments “greatly facilitate intelligence cherry picking, enabling policy officials to generate any kind of report through word searches that look juicy, no matter what the intelligence officials might say about the reliability of the sources on which the report is based.”
The PCTEG case shows how connectivity ripens bureaucratic conditions for Team B intelligence coups. Policy-makers and their aides can informally access secure IC databases and use powerful data mining techniques to cherry-pick intelligence. They can then bolster the persuasive power of such data by packaging them as “talking points” that carry the patina of finished intelligence assessments. The credibility of such B-teamed intelligence can be bolstered further by funneled the data directly to policy-makers, skirting peer review institutionalized by the formal processes of the official intelligence community. Stovepiping turns a competitive intelligence exercise into a Team B coup, something qualitatively different from an exchange of competing viewpoints designed to simply “sharpen the debate” among contending intelligence entities.

Strong evidence indicates that such informal B-teaming activity was rife within the Bush administration during the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, at the State Department, Undersecretary of State John Bolton pressed hard for his political staff to get electronic access to INR’s Top Secret Secure Compartmented Information. At the Pentagon, by August 2002, the small PCTEG cell had evolved into a more elaborate entity, the Office of Special Plans (OSP). The manager of the OSP operation, Abram Shulsky, was familiar with competitive intelligence analysis, having worked on the staff of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that reviewed the original Team B exercise during the Cold War. According to Kenneth Pollack, Shulsky’s cell stovepiped dubious intelligence purchased from Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC) to senior administration officials, fundamentally distorting policy-making on topics ranging from the threat of Saddam Hussein’s alleged nuclear program to the cost of post-war reconstruction in Iraq. According to Pollack, “The Bush officials who created the OSP gave its reports directly to those in the highest level of government, often passing raw, unverified intelligence straight to the Cabinet level as gospel. Senior Administration officials made public statements based on these reports – reports that the larger intelligence community knew to be erroneous.” Much of the INC’s information came from Iraqi defectors who were paid to provide testimony about Saddam Hussein’s elaborate weapons programs.

The “intelligence” officials who credited Chalabi exhibited either extreme recklessness or naiveté – there are no kinder words for it. Any lore whatsoever they had picked up about the many pitfalls of evaluating testimony would have had to make them aware of what Machiavelli said on this matter. A whole chapter by that 16th Century genius is devoted to “How Dangerous it
is to put confidence in Refugees.” According to the L. J. Walker translation of his Discourses, Alexander of Epirus and Themistocles of Athens were both done in by listening to refugees:

[S]o intense is their desire to get back home that they naturally believe much that is false and artfully add much more: So that between what they believe and what they say they believe they fill you with a hope which is such that, if you rely on it, either you incur expense in vain or take up what will ruin you. . . . A ruler, therefore, should be slow to take up an enterprise because of what some exile has told him, for more often than not all he will get out of it is shame and the most grievous harm.93

Even if the Bush administration planners had not read Machiavelli, a cursory acquaintance with American history should have given them pause in believing that they were getting correct evaluations of Iraq.94 Refugees nourished the long and costly American belief that Chiang Kai-shek was the George Washington of China, and could easily be restored to mainland power. Ngo Dinh Diem’s clout with Americans (and not just Catholics) led ostensibly intelligent American statesmen to believe that Ho Chi Minh was nothing but an agitator with little or no following. Take any one of the many American interventions to bring regime change during the Cold War: somewhere in the paper trail you will find that the Iranians were really fed up with Mossadegh and would gladly follow the Shah, or that Pinochet was a genuine democrat and Allende a Communist totalitarian.

The latest group of Iraqi refugees had names like “Curveball,” and were debriefed “at safe houses outside London, a German castle east of Berlin, a Thai resort south of Bangkok, a Dutch government office in The Hague and elsewhere.”95 Curveball’s testimony proved to be the Bush administration’s linchpin evidence allegedly confirming the existence of an active Iraqi biological weapons program, even though the official intelligence community harbored severe doubts about his credibility.96 However, such analytical skepticism was shielded from top policymakers, who received the defector testimony through a direct stovepipe channel set up to link the INC to the top levels of the Pentagon and White House bureaucracy. While such stovepiping practices are difficult to square with the basic philosophy of competitive intelligence analysis, they reflect Wolfowitz’s views on the need for new approaches to minding the intelligence-policy seam in the post-9/11 security milieu. In 2002 congressional testimony, Wolfowitz suggested, “We must also accelerate the speed with which information is passed to policymakers and operators. We cannot wait for critical intelligence to be processed, coordinated, edited and approved – we must accept the risks inherent in posting critical information before it is processed.”97
In a concrete manifestation of this normative guideline, PCTEG’s breakaway from the established intelligence community jettisoned the dialectical checks built into the competitive intelligence assessment process and shut down constructive dialogue within the intelligence community prior to Operation Iraq Freedom. Despite the fact that the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is supposed to be an “all source” agency, with access to the full range of intelligence materials circulating throughout the U.S. government, INR’s Thielmann says, “I didn’t know about its existence. They were cherry picking intelligence and packaging it for Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld to take to the president. That’s the kind of rogue operation that peer review is intended to prevent.”

“. . . AT SOME POINT, WE MAY BE THE ONLY ONES LEFT”

This chapter opened by noting how President Bush’s October 2005 comparison of “the current fight” with “the struggle against communism in the last century” jibes with Leffler’s suggestion that insight regarding NSS 2002’s dynamics may be gleaned from study of NSC-68, the “blueprint for Cold War defense.” In NSC-68’s “hyperbolic language,” we find rhetorical precursors to today’s absolutist, zero-sum terms that frame official descriptions of the Bush administration’s battle against the “evil-doers.” The “any measures” necessary logic of NSC-68 that authorized U.S. use of preventive force in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Chile, Indonesia, and Vietnam is echoed in the portions of NSS 2002 that underwrote preventive war against Iraq. Parallels also exist in the institutional practices designed to politically legitimate and implement the respective strategies. Just as the 1975-1976 Team B exercise neutralized CIA intelligence assessments that did not accord with the Committee on the Present Danger’s drive for U.S. nuclear superiority, 16 years later PCTEG and OSP “fixed the intelligence and facts” on Saddam Hussein’s ties to terrorism “around the policy” of regime change in Iraq. Mere coincidence? Not according to analysts such as Daniel Benjamin, George Packer, and Steven Simon, who note that the original Team B subversion of the CIA and the recent PCTEG/OSP end run around the official Intelligence Community were conducted by several of the same key players. The sense of Cold War déjà vu instilled by these parallels becomes more pronounced after visiting the Committee on the Present Danger’s new website. In 2004, the committee reconstituted yet again, issuing a mission statement that invokes prominently the group’s Cold War legacy:

Twice before in American history, The Committee on the Present Danger has risen to this challenge. It emerged in 1950 as a bipartisan education and advocacy organization dedicated to building a national consensus for the Truman Administration’s policy aimed at “containment” of Soviet expansionism. In
1976, the Committee on the Present Danger reemerged, with leadership from the labor movement, bipartisan representatives of the foreign policy community and academia, all of them concerned about strategic drift in U.S. security policy and determined to support policies intended to bring the Cold War to a successful conclusion. In both previous periods, the Committee’s mission was clear: raise awareness to the threat to American safety; communicate the risk inherent in appeasing totalitarianism; and build support for an assertive policy to promote the security of the United States and its allies and friends. With victory in the Cold War, the mission of the Committee on the Present Danger was considered complete and consequently it was deactivated. Today, radical Islamists threaten the safety of the American people and millions of others who prize liberty.

The road to victory begins with clear identification of the shifting threat and vigorous pursuit of policies to contain and defeat it.103

The CPD’s latest commentary and policy recommendations hearken back to 1953 and the days of Operation Ajax: “Wake Up, America!” exclaims one news release; “Iran is our new Soviet Union.”104 Echoing NSC-68, veteran CPD member William von Cleave declares: “Islamic terrorism is an unconditional and existential threat not only to America and Israel, but also to Judeo-Christian culture. . . . Only by denying success to this threat — by a combination of anticipatory defensive and offensive measures — can we defeat it.”105

While these common threads help weave the historical backdrop for subsequent analyses in this volume, points of contrast between NSS 2002 and NSC-68 also frame the study in illuminating ways. In selling NSC-68, Truman administration officials were keenly aware that a “psychological scare campaign” that over-hyped the Soviet threat could have a boomerang effect, stimulating a panicked public to call for the one policy that NSC-68 ruled out as too extreme — a preventive nuclear first-strike by the U.S. against the USSR. Steven Casey shows how the Truman White House modulated its rhetoric to avoid this “hydrogen hysteria,” employing “clearer than truth” fear appeals to cultivate political support for NSC-68, but easing back when the domestic climate threatened to boil over.106

Today, U.S. leaders confront a different variant of this same dilemma. To rally support for the NSS 2002 approach of “acting preemptively” against adversaries, Bush administration officials constructed an exaggerated threat “matrix” that linked Saddam Hussein to al-Qaida and mobilized U.S. public opinion behind a totalizing “war on terror.” While this political campaign succeeded in the short-term goal of securing sufficient public support to launch Operation Iraqi Freedom, its boomerang effects undermined U.S. security by “working as a powerful force-
multiplier for bin Laden and those he leads and inspires,” says CIA terrorism expert Michael Scheuer.\(^\text{107}\)

In the case of Truman’s advocacy of NSC-68, excessive alarmism threatened to provoke the American public to demand rash actions that would jeopardize U.S. security. For the Bush administration, exaggeration and hyperbole in selling NSS 2002 provokes a different kind of dangerous response, one that plays into Osama bin Laden’s script portraying his *jihad* as a defensive reaction against a U.S. campaign to wage holy war on Islam. When the president says, “at some point, we may be the only ones left. That’s okay with me. We are America,”\(^\text{108}\) terrorists are invigorated, not dissuaded.\(^\text{109}\) As Carol Winkler points out, Osama bin Laden “borrowed heavily from the administration’s own narrative frame for the conflict. Specifically, he evoked the settings, characterizations, and themes of the ideologically based Cold War narrative to call Muslims to war against the United States.”\(^\text{110}\)

For one post-Iraq invasion illustration of this phenomenon, Benjamin and Simon point to comments made by General William G. “Jerry” Boykin. In June 2003, while in military uniform, Boykin told a church group in Sandy, Oregon that the jihadists “will only be defeated if we come to them in the name of Jesus.” He added that, “George Bush was not elected by a majority of the voters in the United States. He was appointed by God.”\(^\text{111}\) According to Benjamin and Simon, these remarks “caused immense damage to American interest by validating an image of the United States military as a Christian army warring with Muslims in the name of Jesus.”\(^\text{112}\) One senior U.S. official, who was traveling in the Middle East during the Boykin episode, recalled, “It was the worst day of my life. It confirmed their conspiracy theory that the war on terrorism really is a war on Islam.”\(^\text{113}\) In Benjamin and Simon’s view, this episode highlights a choice facing Americans: “We must decide whether we want a strategy for this conflict or a theology.”\(^\text{114}\)

Ivan Eland is among those who believe that the “new National Security Strategy of primacy and prevention (not preemption, as advertised)” is a “fatal overextension” of our resources. “Flailing around like Don Quixote, the Bush administration . . . is merely making unnecessary enemies and falling into Osama bin Laden’s trap. . . . An attack on Iraq (coming after an attack on the Islamic nation of Afghanistan) will merely throw kerosene on the flames of hatred toward the United States in the Islamic world.”\(^\text{115}\)

History reinforces these observations. Eland writes, “Even stronger than polling results are empirical data showing the links between U.S. interventionist foreign policy and retaliatory terrorism against the United States.” He then provides analysis of “more than 60 incidents of terrorism against the United States in retaliation for an activist global U.S. foreign policy.” One of his cases is Libya, where Reagan’s provocations caused Gaddafi’s belligerent response.\(^\text{116}\) The
non-confrontational policy of George H.W. Bush reversed this hostility, and Libya eventually ceased attacks and came to terms with the US. The 1997 report of the Defense Science Board, a panel advising the Secretary of Defense, verified the link between activism and terrorism.\textsuperscript{117}

Partisan commentators frequently decry such analysis as “blame America first” defeatism, invoking what Thomas Goodnight describes in Ridgway Working Paper \#2006-4 as an “action/inaction” frame to imply that critics of U.S. military overextension advocate “appeasement” and “giving in to the terrorists.”\textsuperscript{118} But as William Hartung argues in Ridgway Working Paper \#2006-9, pro-active, preventive measures can nip future terrorist attacks in the bud, without resorting to “shock and awe” tactics that stimulate “blowback terrorism.”\textsuperscript{119}

Of course, American primacy, global interdependence, and catastrophic terrorism present novel security challenges in the present milieu. Yet it is striking how quickly today’s leaders look for answers to these challenges by reviving strategic principles and patterns of public argument forged during the Cold War, even when such principles and patterns are so clearly out of step with the current predicament.

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\textsuperscript{8} Melvyn P. Leffler, “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” \textit{Diplomatic History} 29 (June 2005): 395.

\textsuperscript{9} Leffler, “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” 411.

\textsuperscript{10} All references to American war plans in this period are from Steven T. Ross, \textit{American War Plans 1945-1950} (London: Frank Cass, 1996).
Bushwacker also has the distinction of carrying the clearest recommendation for the use of biological warfare. This would be “supplemental” to atomic warfare, and it specified the troop levels necessary to “occupy the Soviet State and its satellites, allotting forty-four air groups and twenty-five divisions for the task.” Ross, American War Plans, 85.

Although Secretary of State Dean Acheson was privy to the critical input Nitze was receiving, he did not pass it along to Truman. See Robert L. Beisner, “Patterns of Peril: Dean Acheson Joins the Cold Warriors,” Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1966): 321-356.

U.S. NSC, “NSC-68.”

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U.S. NSC, “NSC-68.”


U.S. NSC, “NSC-68”

Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 95.


Acheson, Present at the Creation, 375.


Casey, “Selling NSC-68,” 663.

Jerry W. Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1983), 60.

Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 95.

See Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 94.


Leffler, “9/11 and American Foreign Policy,” 400-401.


Bamford, Body of Secrets, 82. As Bamford details, Eisenhower “desperately wanted to invade Cuba in the weeks leading up to Kennedy’s inauguration.” The only problem was that Castro was not giving a good excuse to do so. With time growing short and his aides gathered in the White House Cabinet Room on 3 January 1962, “Eisenhower floated an idea. If Castro failed to provide that excuse, perhaps, he
said, the United States ‘could think of manufacturing something that would be generally acceptable’ . . . the idea was not lost on General Lemnitzer.’ Bamford, Body of Secrets, 83.

41 Paul Nitze, Top Secret/Sensitive Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, 10 May 1963, John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting. Quoted in Bamford, Body of Secrets, 89.


44 In Nitze’s words, “… there was considerable pressure on the CIA to bring in an outside group to double-check the agency’s findings and analytical methods.” Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost, 351.


47 U.S. CIA, Intelligence Community Experiment.


49 Jay Kalner, quoted in Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente: The Right Attacks the CIA (College Station, PA: Penn State University Press, 1998), 158.

50 Sidney Graybeal, quoted in Cahn, Killing Détente, 158.

51 Callaghan, Dangerous Capabilities, 379.


53 Ray Cline, quoted in Willard C. Matthias, America’s Strategic Blunders (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 305-06.


55 Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, 199-200.


57 Gary Hart, separate opinion, in United States, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production, & Quality The National Intelligence Estimates A–B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability & Objectives, 95th Cong., 2d sess, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), 8; see also Cahn and Prados, “Million Dollar Experiment”; and Cahn, Killing Détente.

58 Hart, separate opinion, 7.


62 According to Wolfowitz, “The idea that somehow you are saving work for the policymaker by eliminating serious debate is wrong. Why not aim, instead, at a document that actually says there are two strongly argued positions on the issue? Here are the facts and evidence supporting one position, and here are the facts and evidence supporting the other, even though that might leave the poor policymakers to make a judgment as to which one they think is correct.” Quoted in Jack Davis, “The Challenge of Managing Uncertainty: Paul Wolfowitz on Intelligence-Policy Relations,” Studies in Intelligence 39 (1996), <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/davis.htm>.


“The Secret Downing Street Memo,” *Sunday Times* (Britain), 1 May 2005, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html>. According to National Security Archive Senior Fellow John Prados, the Dearlove memo makes clear, “with stunning clarity,” that “that the goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein was set at least a year in advance,” and that “President Bush’s repeated assertions that no decision had been made about attacking Iraq were plainly false.” John Prados, “Iraq: When was the Die Cast?” 3 May 2005, <http://www.tompaine.com/articles/iraq_when_was_the_die_cast.php>.


Quoted in U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 308, emphasis added.


Quoted in U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.


U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.

U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.

Quoted in U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 309.


U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 310.

Memorandum of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, quoted in U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee, *Prewar Assessments*, 311. Senator Carl Levin spells out the upshot: “Administration officials relied on or cited these reports in their public statements about the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship and selectively used or cited questionable reports that went beyond the IC’s judgments.” Levin, “Alternative Analysis,” 16.

84 “Challenging the Red Line,” 5.


91 Pollack, “Spies, Lies and Weapons,” 88. On the role played by the White House Information Group in systematically publicizing such B-teamed intelligence, see Bamford, Pretext for War, 317-31.


94 Marquis Childs, contemplating the debacle of the Bay of Pigs invasion, wrote that, “Ever since the Russian Revolution of 1917 and increasingly in the past two decades exiles have influenced American policy and the American appraisal of critical situations. These are in most instances patriotic, dedicated, freedom-loving men and women. But by the very terms of exile they are more likely than not to be wrong in their estimates of what is happening in their former homeland. And quite understandably they want to believe that the forces of repression which drove them out can be overthrown” (Marquis Childs, “Behind the Errors on Cuban Invasion,” The Washington Post, 26 April 1961).


98 Quoted in Sidney Blumenthal, “There Was No Failure of Intelligence: U.S. Spies Were Ignored, or Worse, if They Failed to Make the Case for War,” Guardian (London), 5 February 2004, 26.
99 Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror.”
100 Wolk, “Blueprint for Cold War Defense.”
101 “Secret Downing Street Memo.”
102 Packer, Assassins’ Gate, 106; Benjamin and Simon, The Next Attack, 165.
106 Casey, “Selling of NSC-68.”
107 Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2004), 235.
110 Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism, 184.
114 Benjamin and Simon, The Next Attack, 278.