The European Union as a Security Actor in the Mediterranean

ESDP, Soft Power and Peacemaking in Euro-Mediterranean Relations
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Introduction

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The publication of the proceedings of the GCSP workshop on the European Union and the Mediterranean is timely in more ways than one. First of all, the sudden emergence of European Security and Defence Policy from 1999 onwards has generated the need to examine the security and defence dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The partnership was obviously not established in connection with ESDP in mind – if only because ESDP did not exist yet at the time of the launching of the Barcelona process – but the Barcelona process clearly has security and defence implications and ESDP necessarily has a Mediterranean dimension. Secondly, and more tentatively, the ESDP is likely to increase its focus on the Mediterranean as the wars of succession in the former Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia are progressively brought to a close. Not unnaturally, the conflicts which have worked their way down the length of post-Tito Yugoslavia from Slovenia in June 1991 to Macedonia ten years later, have been the foremost security and defence concern of the members of the European Union. These wars have not yet played themselves out, as events in Macedonia demonstrate; nor is it likely that European forces deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo will be withdrawn anytime soon. By the time the ESDP Rapid Reaction Force is ready in 2003, the European strategic spotlight may well have shifted from the Balkan doorstep to the broader Mediterranean arena. Thirdly, a number of substantial material changes are due to occur within the European Union during the next two to four years. At the military end of the spectrum, we have the 2003 goal for the Rapid Reaction Force, for which a strategic rationale will need to be found above and beyond the important but exceedingly vague statement that it is
supposed to fulfil the Petersberg tasks, “including the most demanding” to use official European Council language. In institutional terms, the EU is preparing itself for the rendez-vous of 2004, which may or may not be a constitutional convention. Given the widely recognised need to give greater clarity and accountability to the EU’s institutions – and this is a requirement which appears to be shared by Europhiles and Euroskeptics alike – chances are that this will not simply be an inter-governmental conference of the sort which led to the Amsterdam and Nice treaties. And then, of course, we have enlargement, which in EU terms will not only mesh in with the institutional debate, but which will also broaden the cast of players involved in the Euro-Med process. This applies even more to NATO enlargement: with something akin to a “Big Bang” beginning to take shape as NATO’s current members prepare for the 2002 Prague Summit, countries such as Romania and Bulgaria will give a greater “Southern” tilt to the Alliance, before joining the European Union at a subsequent stage.

In other words, there could not have been a better time to bring together authors from North to South to address the whole range of the new EU-Mediterranean nexus. In doing so the paper givers, as well as the discussants and the participants in the GCSP March 2001 workshop, had to keep in mind a number of challenges, including *inter alia*:

- how to strike the appropriate balance, from a EU perspective, between hard power and soft power tools, and, further, how to better integrate these tools? Beyond the specific issues of governance and efficiency of the various elements of hard and soft power, it is indeed necessary to aim at the optimal policy mix. Here, the EU has some apparent strengths in comparison to the United States, given Europe’s substantial investment in the field of economic and social assistance, whereas the US government gives pride of place to the military component of policy. However, to the extent that the Barcelona process is essentially a soft power exercise, it runs into problems of imbalance: the successful projection of soft power in the Mediterranean is beholden to hard power factors – such as the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, to
mention the most prominent – which America’s hard power / soft power panoply is arguably better equipped to influence than the EU;

- how to improve the effectiveness of the EU’s soft power tools, be they financial, political or otherwise? Christopher Patten’s recent statements on the slowness of the EU’s development assistance make it clear that all is not well in this field. And beyond the quantitative and financial aspects, the EU’s track record of integrating soft power initiatives in the framework of so-called “common strategies” (including the one of the Mediterranean) has not been particularly impressive. Here again, Christopher Patten’s critique on the first five years of the Barcelona process comes to mind. It is also true that defining a common strategy in an arena where security challenges play such an important role – not only the Israeli/Palestinian confrontation but also the Algerian drama – may be of limited relevance if the strategy does not have substantial influence on these security, or rather insecurity, factors;

- the corresponding need for an improvement in the EU’s hard power capability. But capability does not simply flow from the existence of the relevant military tools, with the Rapid Reaction Force providing a substantial improvement. It also is a function of strategic vision: and here, the EU has not yet entered into the necessary strategic review process in order to determine what is the full range of Petersberg tasks and the strategic framework in which they should fit. It is even more so a function of the political ability to act decisively: the fact that the EU has set up “NATO-look alike” institutions is not in itself sufficient to generate decisiveness in a confederation of states which, unlike NATO, does not have a primus inter pares in the form of the United States;

- at the interface between North and South, we have the difficult combination of attempts at co-operative security (of which the Barcelona process is a soft power example) and the legacy of “vertical” confrontations be they North-South (beginning with the Reconquista and the Crusades…) or South-North (going as far back the Battle of Poitiers in the 8th century, or the sieges of Vienna by the Ottomans). From the
“Southern” perspective, ESDP and its Rapid Reaction Force does not exist in a historical vacuum; nor is there a scarcity in the “Northern” strategic literature of scenarios positing threats from the South;

- more fundamentally, we have the uncertainties created by both the social, political and strategic heterogeneity of the EU’s Mediterranean partners and the fact that all too many of the states involved are far from adhering in everyday political and social governance to the universal enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. In a Metternichian or Bismarckian age of disincarnated power politics, such disparities would not have been a major impediment. But the EU is a value-based construct; and generally, international relations are increasingly moulded by the influence of civil society which, more often than not, is value rather than interest oriented, expressing itself increasingly in the framework of cross-border solidarities (whether NGO based, or, as is often the case in the greater Middle East, in a religious setting). The gap in values is well recognised by the actors of the Barcelona process. And if one is to reduce the gap, then the process itself becomes as important as the specific policy objectives, along the lines practised by the contenders of the East-West polarisation: the “détente” era of the Cold War.

Such are some of the elements of the context in which the authors were operating when writing their contributions to this volume. Even a cursory perusal will make it clear to the reader that the debate has moved considerably since the days, not so long ago, when the Mediterranean, seen from the Western countries, was essentially the “Southern flank” of NATO. The GCSP will have succeeded in its mission if these papers and the corresponding workshop will help shift the paradigm towards the sort of cooperative security that alone can bring long-lasting peace and prosperity.
The EU as a Security actor in the Mediterranean: Problems and Prospects

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1 Introduction and Overview

The title of this paper suggests that it is probably not in its role as a security actor that the European Union (EU), as an institution, feels most comfortable. That exercising this role should encompass ‘problems’ rather than the more palatable ‘challenges’ is indicative of the type of changes facing the EU which make attaining its security goals problematic. The EU, along with other international organisations, has moved from responding to the symptoms and manifestations of insecurity to attempting to identify and address root causes of instability and insecurity on its periphery, as elsewhere.

This paper will examine the ways in which the changing character of the EU has complicated the tasks of first identifying and then addressing its policy priorities in the Mediterranean. The aim is to step back from the existing template of European relations in the Mediterranean represented by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, or ‘Barcelona process’) launched in 1995 to explore the assumptions underlying its elaboration in its current form1. The intention is not to focus on the Barcelona process as such, but rather to focus on the broader challenges (or ‘problems’) facing the EU in assuming its responsibilities as a fully fledged security actor. A

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second line of enquiry will then look at how these challenges affect the EU’s responses to appeals to reassess the ‘Mediterranean’ as currently conceived.

This touches on process rather more than substance. However, since a number of recent EU policy statements, such as the Common Strategy of the EU on the Mediterranean, have promised little new in substance, it is clear that the formula adopted for the one has profound implications for the other. It can also be argued that outcomes or end results are always unpredictable, and that complex organisations such as the EU are constantly engaged in adjusting to unforeseen eventualities for which no amount of planning can prepare them. The EU, in other words, is itself a process rather than an end-game or set of immutable structures. The substance of policy, as a result, will always be contingent on the fluidities of process, which, as the number of EU member states increases, is likely to become a more, rather than less, predictable combination in the future.

Process, however, also has a habit of starting from a common basis of assumptions, or first principles, which over time become implicit to the way policy is shaped and implemented, and through the perspective of which alternative approaches are either considered or rejected. The intention here, then, is to highlight areas where a deeper exploration of these assumptions might serve to ‘reinvigorate’ the Barcelona process in more far-reaching ways than have so far been considered. The first five years of


3 I am grateful to Mr. Andreas Strub, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, for these reflections.

4 The term ‘reinvigorating’ is drawn from the title of a paper prepared by the EU’s Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Patten, on the strengths and weaknesses of the first five years of the EMP, or ‘Barcelona process’ as it is frequently referred to. As the most far-reaching critique to date, it stops short of questioning the rationale of the Barcelona process as currently conceived – a task which falls to the signatories of the Barcelona Declaration, not the European Commission or Council secretariat per se. See Commission of the European Communities (European External Relations
the EMP have been marked by a number of successes, not least that the process continues to be supported by its 27 signatories. However, the lack of progress in the security dimensions of Barcelona, combined with the disbursement of only 26% of the funds committed under the MEDA funding line, have raised serious concerns about whether the existing model is adequate to the ambitious agenda set at the inception of Barcelona.

This paper will argue that the EU needs to reassess the EMP in a context which goes beyond the parameters of the Barcelona template alone. This is because changes in this broader context of security planning now directly impinge on its future prospects. In 1995, the security climate in the Mediterranean was different from that pertaining to the situation in 2001, just as the EU’s responsibilities in the defence and security planning sphere have grown beyond what was envisaged five years ago. The EU’s linkage of these developments to the Mediterranean context has nevertheless been slow. The EU’s Common Strategy on the Mediterranean went some way towards revisiting regional priorities in proposing to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the Barcelona Process with the aim of reinvigorating the Process and making it more action-oriented and results-driven’.

To date, the outcome of this has been the External Commissioner’s ‘reinvigorating’ paper of September 2000, but not a comprehensive review encompassing other security-related processes, above all the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).


5 Namely, the EU-15 and: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

6 See note 2 above, art. 11. The European Council also proposed that this ‘comprehensive review’ should be undertaken ‘together with its Mediterranean Partners’ (art cit), but so far, no review process outside the EU or the standard committee structures of the EMP has been established.

7 See note 4 above.
It could well be that the ‘Mediterranean’ region as currently conceived needs to be revisited in terms of its continuing utility as a functional regional unit. If the EU were to determine its priorities more fundamentally, it might make more strategic sense to approach the region in thematic rather than strictly geopolitical terms. The emerging and most pressing concerns of the EU in the region are both sub-state and supranational in character. As a result, the heavily government-to-government focus of current policy may need to encompass other actors and forms of co-operation than exist under the EMP model. One might cite the destabilising consequences of uneven economic development in states lacking democratic accountability as a sub-state problem, and the trans-national links of organised criminal networks engaged in trafficking people, drugs and arms as a supranational problem. Both types of problem require more flexible response mechanisms than have evolved through the multilateral and state-centred mechanisms of the Barcelona process, and it is this area that crucially needs to be included in a review of the EMP.

1.1 The EU: Process and Security

The starting point of an exercise like this is not entirely free of its own assumptions, namely that the EU should take the lead in reshaping Mediterranean security co-operation. The vicissitudes of the Middle East peace process, overshadowing all attempts to create a security identity in the broader Mediterranean Basin, has been a clear impediment to progress in this area. The unwillingness of southern Mediterranean states and governments to co-operate with each other over regional security issues should also not be underestimated. It seems clear, then, that the EU should take the lead in reformulating a policy which so far has elicited only a limited response, but to which Europeans attach a higher priority than their southern partners.

The background to the EU’s re-examination of its Mediterranean agenda consists, of course, of a much wider debate about functional (and operational) definitions of the EU itself, and how, and to what ends its
international character might be articulated in the wider world. This debate
too, has yet to be resolved, despite some brave attempts by European lead-
ers during the course of 2000 to articulate visions (albeit mostly ‘EU inter-
nal’) of what shape an enlarged Europe might take. In 2001, it remains the
case that the EU is a ‘multicephalous’ beast, whose members retain – and	often retain quite jealously – their autonomy of action and their sovereign
prerogatives as nation-states. Simultaneously, the same members have
been setting more collective goals and ambitions than ever, not least in
external spheres such as defence, previously shielded from collective deci-
sion-making, if not collective action.

This paradox is at the heart of an institutional network which appears
to need to keep moving to keep going, while at the same time looking for
ways to consolidate an acquis digestible and attainable enough for up to 12
new members to adopt within the next few years. Yet much of the critique
of the EU as a foreign actor over the last decade has in fact been versed in
terms of the gap between expectations and capabilities, between declara-
tory policy and its implementation, between the time, effort and resources
dedicated to formulating ‘common positions’, ‘joint actions’ and ‘common
strategies’ and their limited translation into practice. All of this suggests
that the illusive quality of ‘political will’ (for which read concrete incen-
tives and penalties attached to collective action) is absent, if not at the
beginning of a given policy process, certainly as a policy initiative pro-
gresses.

8 This term is borrowed from Jörg Monar ‘Institutional Constraints of the European
p. 46, to denote relations with third parties in which the EU’s ‘Presidency, the Com-
mission and several or even all of the member states appear as negotiators on the EU
side’.

9 Christopher Hill’s article ‘The capability-expectations gap, or conceptualising
was a clear starting point for much of this on-going debate; during the year 2000,
European leaders, including German Foreign Minister Joshi Fischer, French Presi-
dent Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair all contributed to visions
of both the internal and external character of the EU, pending enlargement.
1.2 CFSP ‘plus’ and the Mediterranean

These considerations pose a particular set of problems for the EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean. The proximity of the EU to the Mediterranean need not be pointed out, even though it remains as central as ever to the manner in which the EU will have to approach security issues on its periphery in general. Proximity, above all, leads to a blurring of purely internal and external security agendas, particularly in an area of key concern to the EU, namely the very human issue of migration in all its dimensions. The EMP has begun to address this, but in ways not sufficiently tied in with the EU’s internal debate on Justice and Home Affairs. The latter starts from the premise of ensuring an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ within EU borders through strengthening the policing of the EU’s external borders and harmonising the control of access of non-EU citizens to European territory10.

These aspirations are not entirely compatible with the ‘joint’ or co-operative security thinking of the EMP. While the EMP has tried to develop co-operation with the governments of ‘sending’ states (most notably in North Africa) in re-admission agreements for illegal migrants, European governments have undertaken to promote better integration policies for existing legal migrants inside Europe. Given the proliferation of fora, both national and EU, in which migration issues are addressed, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no clear linkage between the JHA agenda and CFSP debates on the Mediterranean. However, for the purposes of security planning, it is crucial that the two work in tandem.

The EMP has at least had the merit of seeking to combine previously unrelated or unco-ordinated spheres of EU activity towards the shared goal of creating ‘a zone of peace of stability’ in the Mediterranean Basin. Its novelty in conceptual terms was to encapsulate an integrative and ambitious vision of security running across economic, social and cultural as well

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10 See further discussion of JHA below & Jörg Monar Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion ESRC ‘One Europe or Several?’ Programme Working Paper 07/00, University of Sussex, 2000.
as traditional CFSP (diplomatic and political) lines. As such, its template even went beyond the EU’s immediate capabilities in the defence and security field, except where provisions on conflict prevention and arms control were considered in purely diplomatic terms. However, as regards the internal prioritisation of its three chapter structure (to cover ‘partnerships’ in political and security, financial and economic and human and cultural affairs), it was evident that the driver from the European side was the philosophy of free trade, from which the benefits of the remainder of the policy would both derive and be financed.

As Jon Marks expressed this in 1996: ‘(t)he creation of a free trade zone encompassing both flanks of the Mediterranean – and linked to an area stretching north to the Arctic circle and east to the confines of the former Soviet Union – fits into the 1990s dynamic of building large transnational trading and investment blocs, from which closer political and socio-cultural relations are assumed to flow’11 As subsequent experience has shown, the economic liberalisation strategies of the EU’s southern Mediterranean partners have not by themselves led to greater political liberalisation. In some cases, such as Tunisia, greater political centralisation has in fact been facilitated by the strengthening of the economy. In the socio-cultural sphere, the controversies aroused by the visa, asylum and migration questions in both the JHA arena and more immediately at national European level, have prejudiced the EMP’s ambitions towards encouraging greater contacts among the ‘civil societies’ of the Mediterranean and European regions. Without more freedom of movement for humans, as well as exported goods, the capacity of southern Mediterranean citizens to interact with their European counterparts has remained extremely limited.

The emphasis on economic restructuring towards free trade has also led to a bifurcation in the EMP’s spheres of activities, to the ultimate detriment of building a truly regional security framework. The task of economic reform lies primarily with individual states, backed up by the bilaterally

negotiated (EU-to-individual Mediterranean partner) Association Agreements, intended to act as stepping stones towards the Mediterranean Free Trade Zone initially envisaged for the year 2010. In contrast, security cooperation was posited from the outset on regional inclusiveness. Even if a large expanse of the Mediterranean’s littoral was left out of the original partnership (namely Libya, in diplomatic isolation through the Lockerbie affair), it was nonetheless clear that security in the Mediterranean was intended to be ‘indivisible’\(^\text{12}\). This meant that the security of one partner was intimately tied to the security of all the others: a fine aspiration, but one which a number of observers have contested as being too devoid of concrete applicability for regional co-operation. As the Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Wim van Eekelen, commented in late 2000, ‘the postulate of indivisibility, even if it sounded attractive, did not reflect reality, nor was it a desirable assumption from which to work’\(^\text{13}\).

Unfortunately for its longer term security ambitions, the Barcelona template was devised when optimism for peace in the Middle East was high. Its ambitions also reflected a world in which co-ordinating cross-ministerial (and in EU terms, cross-pillar) policy initiatives was not only desirable, but perceived to be ultimately possible. Given recent developments in the Middle East, the idea of combining three broad chapters, at widely differing levels of application, with twelve diversified and potentially antagonistic regional partners, would seem to be something of a tall order as things now stand in the region. What remains in 2001 is a policy, which in its broad terms still appears desirable. The question now is whether it is still possible to achieve as conceived in 1995.

To address this will require the EU to re-examine aspects of its existing approach which have not received as much scrutiny as the balance

\(^{12}\) To use the wording of the Stuttgart Euro-Mediterranean summit’s guidelines of 1999 for the basis of Barcelona’s Charter on Peace and Stability.

\(^{13}\) Wim van Eekelen quoted in the Secretariat Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Sixth Mediterranean Dialogue Seminar, Genoa, 30 November–1 December 2000.
sheet of Barcelona to date. One of these is the role of culture and the shadow it casts over the whole security debate.

2 The Approach of the EU Qua Security Actor to the Mediterranean

2.1 The Cultural Underpinnings

The EU as a security actor is both within (namely part of) the Mediterranean and outside its regional dynamics. This has led to expectations – not always well-placed – of leadership from those southern EU states situated within the Mediterranean’s collective culture. However, it has also led to perceptions of European policy in ‘north-south’ terms, where the southern and eastern rims of the Mediterranean mark not only the northernmost reaches of Africa, but also the boundaries between Europe and the Middle East, Central Asia and beyond. With the extension of the EU’s borders south to encompass Malta and the Republic of Cyprus, and eastwards (eventually) to include Turkey, this ‘north-south’ division is likely at one and the same time to become more accentuated and more fragmented.

The accentuation arises from the division between those included in and excluded from the ‘European project’. This ‘project’ denotes the process of drawing European states and societies closer together in cooperative alliances, including, for the purposes of European defence, NATO. As the consolidation of this network of alliances progresses, the non-European states and societies outside them have come to feel more acutely their exclusion from their benefits. Even where they are partially included, for example in trade co-operation with Europe, it appears to be on terms increasingly and selectively imposed by Europe itself. Fragmentation arises where the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean no longer clearly mark the divisions between regions. The external frontiers of Europe are set to become situated not only within the Mediterranean but also directly on the borders of Central Asia and the Middle East.
As a result, the ability of Europe selectively to exclude influences creeping across those borders from its periphery will substantially diminish.

Debates on European enlargement tend to accept the first of these premises – namely that Asia and Africa will be closer to the EU – without thinking through the consequences of the latter. It is perhaps in the nature of security debates that many influences external to the EU are perceived of and described in negative terms, often prefaced by the adjective ‘illegal’. The positive contribution of neighbouring societies, most evident in the history and cultures of southern Europe, receives only limited acknowledgement in Europe. At a time when internal European identities are being questioned and resistance to migrant pressures is on the increase, there is a cultural defensiveness in the European discourse which is unlikely to favour inclusive gestures further afield.

Discussions of European identity and cultural definitions have been plentiful. The importance for the debate on security co-operation is that they are implicit both to the terms of that debate and to considerations of what may or may not be achievable in regions such as the Mediterranean. Javier Solana, when Secretary-General of NATO, extolled the ‘common space, common concerns and a common heritage’ linking Europe to its southern partners. Yet few – either in NATO or the EU – have believed them worth cultivating for the purposes of a security dialogue. This is not just a question of models being imposed, at will, by stronger on weaker partners. It is also a question of recognising that relations of trust, which is the end-goal of security in the absence of war, can only be built on acknowledging the cultural equality of the partners thus engaged, even if the economics – and indeed politics – of the situation point to substantial inequalities.

2.2 The Mediterranean: Outside the ‘European Project’

In more specific terms, the ‘European project’ has started from, at best, an ambivalent, and at worst, a negative appreciation of the Muslim cultures represented in the societies of the majority of the EU’s Mediterranean partners. The secular assumptions underlying the creation of modern Europe are perceived to be difficult to transfer to political cultures which, at least philosophically, encompass both temporal and spiritual authorities. There have been numerous discussions over whether democratic governance is compatible with the apparent deification, as well as personalisation of Muslim modes of governance. Against a background of apparently flourishing Islamist movements, much of the debate has been driven by the rigidities of Islamist political philosophies, as well as by more mundane fears that elections, if encouraged and held in Muslim polities, would give rise to even more dogmatic and arbitrary regimes than those already in place.

What the EU has often failed to recognise is that Islam is as diversified in its interpretations as the forms of Christianity underpinning Europe, and that developments in North Africa are as intensely political as they are elsewhere in human societies. The failure of the EU and the US to internalise this has led to substantive failures in the Middle East peace process, where providing democratic channels for popular expression has taken second place to satisfying the requirements of the leaders and negotiators in such processes. Where the Palestinians have lost out – apart from the obvious discrepancies in their access to land, wealth and resources – is precisely where Israeli society has been accounted for because it is a democracy. Israeli leaders have been constrained by what the populace will support; Palestinian leaders by what the populace will put up with. The EU in particular has relegated long-standing Palestinian aspirations to democracy, as well as to a territorial state, to a secondary order of priority.

Without rethinking this kind of exclusion, even short term security planning has started to become illusory, as popular uprisings in Algeria as well as the Palestinian territories have demonstrated in the first half of
2001. The Mediterranean’s Arab populations suffer from a kind of dual exclusion, both from the gains of their governments’ association with Europe and from the assistance of Europe itself. Small wonder, then, that so many attempt to break out of this double bind by heading directly for Europe and more direct access to the benefits outlined in the EMP.

3 EU Enlargement and What Kind of Europe?

The process of EU enlargement is likely to make this situation worse. Where enlargement will bring a mixture of advantages and more stringent responsibilities for those brought within the EU, less thought has been given to the effects of this process on ‘outsiders’, some of whom fear permanence in that status.

The main security concerns for Europe in the Mediterranean have started to become more immediate than long-term, if one takes migration as being the most prominent issue along with the control of trafficking in people, drugs and arms and the potential spread of terrorism. Addressing these with any speed has inevitably devolved to individual EU member states with different levels of bilateral co-operation with individual Mediterranean partners or among EU member states in the context of Schengen. Despite agreements reached within the European Council16, individual EU member states have set about tackling their immediate regional agendas at the bilateral rather than multilateral EU level, as in the case of Spain and Morocco.

What enlargement adds to this is, on the one hand, the need to engage the new members of the EU in a multilateral policy (Barcelona) in which already, existing EU members have only a partial stake. Barcelona, in other

16 See the critique of Javier Solana in respect of the failure of the instrument of ‘common strategies’ introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty substantially to redress the ‘strategic’ gap at the heart of the EU’s political/CFSP decision-making: Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative Common Strategies, Council of the European Union, Doc, No. 1487/100, 21 December 2000 (declassified 30/01/01).
This is the so-called ‘Brusselisation’ of policy networks described in John Petersberg & Elizabeth Bomberg Decision-making in the European Union (Macmillan, Bas- ingstoke, 1999), pp.246–249, which describes the growing concentration in the Brussels CFSP apparatus of nationally-controlled processes controlled directly from member capitals, running counter to the growth of autonomous capacities in the heart of the EU itself.

The real danger, however, for the Mediterranean arises from the EU’s internal debate on what kind of Europe it wants to be, whether federal, or ‘multi-speed’. This threatens not only to concentrate European energies on its internal configurations at the expense of relations with its periphery, but is likely to be antipathetic to anything which threatens the collective internal harmony at a time when internal cohesion is already showing signs of strain. It has already proved difficult to co-ordinate coherent external policy within an EU of 15, giving rise to the tendency to make policy at the national level described above, even in Brussels17. There is also the question of having to manage US sensitivities over a broader number of issues. Some states, above all the United Kingdom, have already shown extreme reluctance to engage in EU policies which might threaten a more global consensus established with the US.

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In the short run, the shift of the EU’s borders southwards will probably be more symbolic than substantial, not least because Turkey’s application to join the Union still has a number of hurdles to overcome. For the rest of the Mediterranean, enlargement of the EU eastwards is likely to have more of an immediate impact, where competition over the political and economic resources of the EU will favour new members rather than Mediterranean partners.

3.1 Enlargement and the Cultural Dimensions of Security

In the longer term, the presence of increasing numbers of North Africans within Europe, whether legally, illegally, or just passing though will increase the pressure towards integrating the ‘cultural question’ within European security debates. The alternative, and more likely prospect, is a continuation of debates on the role of the migrant in European communities, and the need to find ways of satisfying the labour market demands of an ageing Europe without jeopardising social unity or collective senses of identity. The debate on the future of the EU itself is frequently couched in terms of legitimacy, accountability, collective and individual representation, reflecting the new balances which must be struck if the ‘European project’ in its EU dimension is to succeed. The danger is that if from the outset, this debate fails to be inclusive, particularly of migrant communities long resident within Europe itself, a series of questions continue to be stored up, unresolved, for when that debate is related to the ‘outside world’.

Accommodations are made for Turkey and Russia, both perceived as powers to be reckoned with at least on some level in achieving the ‘European project’. With the exception of the Gulf and, arguably, other major oil and gas producers such as Algeria, the Arab world is not perceived in this light. It is dealt with by necessity, but also with occasionally ill-disguised frustration over the failure of Arab leaders to make advances in areas more directly under their control than the vicissitudes of the global economy or the Middle East peace process. These include the whole ‘good governance’
and human rights agenda, as well as more social welfare oriented policies in the internal distribution of economic and political resources.

With enlargement, the EU may be forced to undertake a reappraisal of its own role in perpetuating this situation. The inclusion of Malta, Cyprus and eventually Turkey within the EU may reduce the Barcelona process to the EU’s relations with Arab states plus Israel, thus making it even more susceptible to the Middle East issue. The political blockages in one process, as has already been seen, create obstacles to progress in others, above all regional trade. There is danger too that internal reforms will continue to be blocked unless the EU takes a more proactive stance towards targeting funding to strategic sectors of the economy, or linking aid to advances in human rights: both suggestions put forward by the External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten\(^\text{18}\).

There are several reasons for the urgency which is attached to the EU finding ways to move the Barcelona process forward. The first, already pointed to above, is that the EU is unlikely to be able to contain the spread of human and cultural influences across its external borders as these borders move closer to the Mediterranean and Central Asia. The second is that practical alternatives need to be found to fill the ‘security vacuum’ created by the failure to reach a Middle East peace settlement. A third, related to current violence in the Middle East, is both psychological and runs across the whole region. This is that the perceived injustices perpetrated not only against Palestinians, but also Iraqis and other Arab and Muslim peoples, have encouraged much of the Arab world to unite against accelerating co-operation with Europe and the United States.

The vocal levels of both popular and elite-led Arab disgruntlement are not reserved for the EU’s regional security ambitions alone, where perceptions of unfair terms of trade, for example, have also been rising. Rather, they target the EU’s preoccupation with its own security at the expense of genuine regional co-operation. If illegal migration has driven much of

Europe’s concern with securing its southern borders, the whole spectrum of migration-related issues appears to the south as a question of control rather than partnership. This spills over both symbolically and practically into other areas of projected co-operation.

As a result, there is a growing mismatch between regional security visions. This means that for the EU to define realisable goals in the region, the views and perceptions of the EU’s Arab partners will have to be taken much more closely into consideration in the reformulation of policy. This will be especially difficult in parts of the Mediterranean where, as is already known, elite and popular perceptions of security do not necessarily coincide, and where crucially, no mechanisms have been put in place to consult with the peoples of the region, or to allow them a voice in any security debate, whether internal or external.

4 Security: Problems of Conception

Adjusting to this change of emphasis will also, however, require Europeans to reconsider what they actually mean by security applied to the specific, and largely non-military, challenges Europe faces in the Mediterranean and Middle East. The initial objective of the Barcelona process, put most succinctly by Bechir Chourou, was that ‘Europe wanted a secure access to oil and gas and protection against waves of migrants’19. This is not, however, how the ‘political and security’ chapter of the Barcelona Declaration reads. It focuses on the more standard agenda for co-operation over ‘hard’ security objectives, of arms control, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, confidence-building and conflict prevention, for example. In contrast, southern Mediterranean definitions of security are almost entirely drawn in economic terms, the principle aim being to secure European financial and technical assistance to restructure markets to meet the demands of

increased international competition, if not directly the needs of the citizens and subjects of each state.

In discussions over the gaps between these visions, what is less commented on is how difficult it has been for the EU to operationalise its own security concepts in a harmonised way. The core of security planning lies in ministries of defence and foreign affairs rather than trade or development ministries. Even within the same ministries, the desk officers for the Mediterranean region are not always linked into debates on coherent security planning. Indeed, it may even be the case that individual ministries are working at cross purposes, where one department of the ministry of defence, for example, is busy promoting arms sales in the Middle East, while another is engaged in arms control in the same region. Not all EU governments explicitly try to co-ordinate these issues and few co-ordinate them well.

There is also a problem of cultures within security communities. The military, for example, tend to see things in a ‘can-do’ way, while civilian officials, conscious of budgets and public responses, are perceived to be more cautious. Theoretical and academic debates on security are often disconnected from the demands of practical policy-making. Academics may well have ‘re-defined’ security in the post Cold War world to include the environment, human rights, ‘societal’ security and rule of law20. In practice, governments have a tendency to adapt existing instruments and policies to prevailing circumstances in the hope that re-invigorating and renaming them – as in the case of the UK’s Defence Diplomacy – will add to an overall improvement in the security environment in question.

Another divergence arising from this is that not all EU governments see security in the same way. In the case of the Mediterranean, as already noted, those closest to the region have practical issues to deal with, such as illegal migration and organised crime, which only have distant echoes

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20 See the works of Barry Buzan, who has pushed thinking ahead on this subject in the policy world, if not actual practice.
in Northern Europe. There are also differences – or, rather, varying emphases – over how to approach areas of contention, such as the Middle East peace process. The EU has a long history of ‘common positions’, but France has traditionally favoured being more proactive than either the UK or Germany, the former because of the demands of policy convergence with the US, the latter because of historical sensitivities vis-à-vis Israel.

There are likely to be no simple answers to these considerations, but the utility of maintaining a process merely to keep lines of communication open over security issues has nevertheless been one of diminishing returns since the inception of Barcelona. The failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partners to adopt the Charter for Peace and Stability in November 2000 served to illustrate the conceptual contradictions outlined above as much as the immediate fall-out from the situation in the Middle East. The Common Mediterranean Strategy (CMS) agreed at the European Council in Feira in June 2000 was equally unsuccessful in clarifying EU objectives in changed times. As a general list of existing EU policies towards the Mediterranean, to which were added references to the EU’s new security and defence policy (ESDP) and developments in the JHA area, the CMS missed a genuine opportunity to revise the central tenets of the EU’s relations in the Mediterranean, the better to match its instruments to achievable end-goals. Instead, as the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, wrote in the context of assessing the value of ‘common strategies’ in general:

‘Regarding the Mediterranean, the perceived lack of added value of the C[M]S compared with the already comprehensive Barcelona Process and the difficulties in defining the relationship between the C[M]S and the EU’s role in the Middle East Peace Process have put the consistency of the EU’s approach towards the region into question. The unspoken competition between the C[M]S and the ongoing effort to draw up a “Charter for Peace and Stability” in the Barcelona framework has added to this confusion.’

21 Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative Common Strategies Council of the European Union, Doc, No. 1487/100, 21 December 2000 (declassified 30/01/01),

5.1 The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)

The EU is not devoid of instruments to redress this confusion, including a nascent military dimension to complement its largely ‘soft’ security tools. This addition offers opportunities, but also risks, to enhancing the effectiveness of EU policy towards the Mediterranean. The main opportunity consists of being able to offer more direct military-to-military contacts within the Mediterranean, including training and joint exercises which already take place at the bilateral level. The main risk arises from the potential neglect of the EU’s Mediterranean partners as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) agreed at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 begins to take operational shape. Until now, the elaboration of the ESDP has largely focused on institutional arrangements, capabilities and process rather than on the operational side of the policy, especially as regards its geographical scope. Of the potential scenarios envisaged for the deployment of the European rapid deployment force, none have focused specifically on the Mediterranean. Rather, in the planning stages, the aim has been to plan for generic types of activity (outlined as four types of ‘Petersberg tasks’), with no specific regional focus, even if Balkans-style ground operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania) have undoubtedly coloured their potential remit.

Despite reassurances, there is still a feeling in the region that the Mediterranean could well be subject to some kind of EU-inspired military activity, if only in a ‘trial run’ of these capabilities, for example. As the WEU’s handling of the Eurofor and Euromarfor issue demonstrated in the mid-1990s, multilateral and bilateral dialogues are often notorious for not discussing in a timely fashion exactly what is on people’s minds. It is in this connection that Barcelona’s confidence-building aspirations might best be

put to effect, with an emphasis on prior (not post-facto) consultation and joint engagement where individual Mediterranean states or their international waters may be affected.

The Common Strategy on the Mediterranean in fact updated the terms of reference of the Barcelona process by referring to the need to take developments in the ESDP ‘into account’ in the context of promoting security in the Mediterranean (article 13). More explicitly, the Strategy stated that ‘the EU intends to make use of the evolving common European policy on security and defence to consider how to strengthen, together with its Mediterranean Partners, co-operative security in the region.’ (article. 8)\(^{22}\). What this might consist of however, has yet to be elaborated on, nor does the Strategy make any explicit linkage between the ESDP and the Barcelona process.

The conceptual problem associated with this is that the ESDP, like the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean and the EU’s JHA agenda, is fundamentally about Europe itself, not its neighbours. Maintaining the separation between the EU’s internal and external security policy agendas has nevertheless served to create unhelpfully negative impressions about the EU’s intentions on its immediate borders\(^{23}\). A prerequisite for avoiding this kind of confusion is for the EU to conduct a deeper re-examination of its existing priorities and policy frameworks in order to address some of the concerns raised here.


6 Conclusions

This discussion may appear to have strayed some way from more standard or traditional discussions of security issues within the Mediterranean, but its intention is to contribute towards explaining why the stated ambitions of the EU are not always followed up in practice. To a large extent, progress in this area is dependent on the resolution of issues being worked out elsewhere, the results of which only gradually feed into the security processes devised for the Mediterranean itself. There is also the perennial question of internal EU co-ordination, both at the Community level and nation-state level, which remains extremely taxing. Here, the intricacies of the EU’s decision-making processes come to the fore, since the way in which policy decisions are reached often have the most impact on the way they are expressed, acted on, or advance no further than declarations of unachievable intent.

One way out of this conundrum might be for the EU to scale down the ambitions of regional policy frameworks to concentrate on more focused and concrete strategies. Compared to the EU’s country specific strategies (towards Russia and the Ukraine, for example), the Mediterranean has always been too unwieldy a focus to permit of properly integrated or balanced European foreign policy. To admit this, however, does not necessarily mean that the Barcelona framework should be abandoned altogether. To use the parallel of the OSCE, there is scope for addressing a number of security-related issues in a framework of this size, even if measurable results are difficult to achieve over specific issues.

As far as more effective implementation of policy is concerned, however, the kind of framework adopted might better be determined by the objectives rather than the other way around. Combating transnational crime, for example, requires co-ordination across regional boundaries (Central Asia, the Balkans as well as the Mediterranean, for example)
where the networks and activities in question are concentrated. For the longer term objectives of Barcelona, in turn, a more graduated and country-specific set of priorities is needed, above all to assist in stable processes of political as well as economic change. Along with targeted and decentralised development assistance, central to this graduated approach would be initiatives to strengthen the capacity of the populations of the region to determine their own political and economic destinies. The corollary to this is for the EU to avoid any unnecessary strengthening of the centralising – and ultimately undemocratic – tendencies of a number of the region’s current leaderships. The guiding principle should be to tailor responses to more objectively defined needs of security co-operation, rather than to the demands and expectations of pre-established frameworks such as Barcelona.

Time is of the essence in a review of the EU’s *modus operandi* in the Mediterranean precisely because enlargement will change the parameters of debate about what security means for Europe. Territorial and cultural divisions can no longer act as the key determinants, or ‘gate-keepers’ of what enters and leaves the European space. This is particularly true of regions like the Mediterranean immediately on the EU’s borders, where the price for ignoring the demands of the peoples of the region, as opposed to those of their governments, is already making itself felt. Rather than being the protagonists in the rise in organised crime and the trafficking of people, the majority of the region’s populations are its victims. If the EU were to reformulate a strategy directly to address, rather than by-pass their concerns, a future picture might be one of genuine partnership, at different and more integrated levels. Only then would Mediterranean security be truly ‘indivisible’.

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European Multilateralism and Soft Power Projection in the Mediterranean

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In November 1995, the European Union signed a wide-ranging declaration with the twelve littoral states of the South Mediterranean at the end of a major conference in Barcelona. The declaration outlined an agreed policy for future relations between Europe and its Mediterranean partners which sought to create a zone of shared stability, prosperity and peace. This policy is designed to condition relations throughout the Mediterranean on a new basis of partial economic integration and co-operation over mutual security issues, together with support for regional political, cultural and social development. It has extremely ambitious objectives and represents a new departure for the European Union, although the means proposed to achieve it have been modest, not the least in view of the fact that it seeks to realise its objectives by 2010.

In reality, however, the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – the official title given to the policy, although it is better known as the Barcelona Process – is an exercise in European policy-making, in which its South Mediterranean partners have little choice but to acquiesce. It is an attempt to organise Europe’s southern periphery, an exercise in European power projection in order to deal with security threats and risks in terms that the European Union itself can articulate. As such, it reflects Europe’s own lack of capacity in hard security terms – such issues are currently left to NATO or, in the Eastern Mediterranean or the Gulf, to the United States and its chosen allies – however, the new European rapid reaction force, once it is established, will give some teeth to Europe’s new security and defence policy, even if formally within the context of NATO. The Barcelona Process
is, in short, an exercise in soft power projection, to deal with soft security issues, such as economic failure, migration, smuggling – whether of drugs or people – and the associated trans-national problems of crime and international terrorism.

The mechanisms chosen to address these issues reflect the orthodoxies forced upon European policy-makers by the nature of the Union itself. The innate tensions within the Union between national sovereignty and collective action – most obviously manifest in the relative weakness of Europe’s common foreign and security policy, despite the new role of former NATO secretary-general, Xavier Solana, as its secretary-general to the Council of Ministers – mean that European regional periphery policy can only operate at the level of the lowest common denominator acceptable to member states. It has also meant that the policy should be holistic, without recall to specificities designed to address particular aspects of Mediterranean security. Furthermore, since Europe lacks any effective collective military force, despite the 1999 Helsinki summit decision to create the 60,000-strong rapid reaction force, it clearly cannot take on hard security responsibilities alone. Indeed, as the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences demonstrated, it requires NATO and American support for any such action – and that means that many problems in the South Mediterranean region, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, are outside Europe’s competence alone. Indeed, one of the great ironies of Europe’s policy towards the South Mediterranean is that it cannot achieve its objectives before American initiatives in the Middle East have succeeded – although the United States has no role within the Barcelona Process!

European policy, however, is not simply a consequence of the constraints imposed upon the Union by its own nature. It also reflects a historical experience and a view of the Mediterranean as a European borderland – the “forgotten frontier” of the confrontation between Christianity and Islam between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries1, as much as the

Braudelian vision of the Mediterranean as a common cultural space. Such attitudes have helped to inform the holism of the European vision, in comparison to a much more complicated American understanding of what the Mediterranean represents in geo-strategy and geo-politics. For the United States, although the Mediterranean is not a key strategic region, it is one of considerable complexity. As a strategic line of communication, mainly for the passage of oil, its security has a direct implication for world energy prices, particularly for world crude oil prices. As a region of vastly different geographically-located problems, it is treated on a sub-regional basis, with Middle Eastern affairs – specifically the Middle East peace process – dominating concerns, in which soft and hard security responses may be used. As a region dominated by sub-hegemonic states – Israel, Egypt, Turkey and Algeria – each such state reflects a different aspect of American regional strategic concerns, whether strategic security, economic expansion or access to raw materials, especially in the East, alongside strategic control of surrounding regions, such as the Gulf and the Caucasus.

1 The Background to Barcelona

European Union policy formation mechanisms could not respond to such complexity, nor could the European Commission manage it, given the meagre managerial resources available to it – thus, the European Mediterranean vision is borne from exigency as much as choice and history. Equally, the current policy – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – is part of a long and slow process of policy evolution that, in its modern form, really stems from the colonial period, particularly from the French colonial possessions in North Africa – the modern states of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, collectively known as the Maghrib. Its European predecessors reflected European awareness of the economic consequences of the colonial period and of the Maghrib’s subsequent dependence on access to the European market, particularly for its agricultural and primary product exports, as well as for exports from the developing industrial sectors there. It also reflected
European realisation that demographic pressures in the region required accelerated economic development if popular aspirations were to be met and increased labour migration flows into Europe were to be avoided.

As a result of the specific provisions of the Treaty of Rome for the Maghrib, this awareness was expressed, after 1969, in a series of bilateral co-operation and association agreements, together with five-year financial protocols providing development aid. The agreements, although specifically economic in nature – they provided for free access of industrial goods and primary products whilst subjecting agricultural exports to quota regimes because of the Common Agricultural Policy – also, as time went by, began to refer to issues of governance and respect for human rights. Indeed, in 1992, the European Parliament, in a fit of pique over Morocco’s behaviour in the Western Sahara, actually withheld permission for the relevant financial protocol – to the embarrassment of the Commission which had, only five years before, to discourage a Moroccan application for European Community membership, not on the grounds of failures in governance but because it was not a definably European country. Morocco retaliated by creating difficulties over its fishing agreement with the European Union, a matter of significance to Spain and Portugal for whom access to Moroccan fishing grounds was crucial.

1.1 The Policy Develops

This apparently trivial spat, however, was to have much more significant consequences. The European Union’s Commission had long been aware that the bilateral co-operation agreements were no longer adequate to respond to the problems of the South Mediterranean region in the post-Cold War period. Although it had attempted to react to this through its “Renovated Mediterranean Policy” – which provided for a more complex aid funding function and an adjusted quota arrangement for agricultural goods to allow for full Spanish and Portuguese membership into the Union by 1996, at the end of a ten year transition period – it was clear that the new policy was not going to meet the demands that would be placed upon it.
Those demands essentially expressed the security concerns of European countries over effective policy to deal with unwanted immigration flows, since the prolonged recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s had caused a significant increase in European structural unemployment.

Yet these migration flows, which had been traditional patterns of population movement since the beginning of the century for North Africans and since the Second World War for Turks and Egyptians, were expected to increase dramatically in the future unless something was done to staunch them. European states also sought policies that would minimise spill-over from security problems within the South Mediterranean region itself – not the least the Arab-Israeli dispute, but also, increasingly, the crisis in Algeria. Any policy, however, had to take into account the other responsibilities and interests of Union members – and of the Union itself – around its periphery, particularly in the East where, after the end of the Cold War, policies were in place to support economic and political transition in Eastern Europe with a view to eventual Union membership.

There was another related concern as well which reflected the anxieties of the Union’s southern members. This was that the new European interest in the former Soviet Bloc would divert funding flows away from the south of Europe which, since it was less developed compared with the dominant triad inside the Union – Germany, Britain and France – or even compared with the Benelux countries, had dominated both Commission and private investment flows until then. Regional interest, in short, combined with the Commission’s concerns to generate a new Mediterranean policy, for South European states believed that a renewed interest in the Mediterranean generally would solve their fears of anticipated investment neglect as well. The result was a radical departure in the Union’s Mediterranean policy away from the traditional bilateral format with its emphasis on economic support.
2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The new policy was, instead, holistic in nature, directed to the Southern Mediterranean basin, from Morocco to Turkey. It did not, however, include the Balkans, an omission which was to cause havoc four years later, when Europe had to consider how to fund development after the Bosnian and Kosovo crises in its South Eastern Europe initiative. It also sought to be comprehensive since it did not focus only on economic development but addressed security, political, cultural and social concerns as well. It was in part inspired by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which had grown out of the process initiated in the Helsinki Conference of 1975 and which had played a significant role in undermining the monolithic nature of the Soviet Bloc. This had emerged in the Mediterranean as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, an Italo-Spanish proposal pushed – just before the Iraq crisis in 1990 – by the charismatic Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michaelis, but abandoned as impossibly ambitious a year later. It had been followed by a French-inspired proposal for consultations about common security problems between five European states and the five states of the Maghrib – Libya and Mauritania had joined the group – who had formed a mutual collective security and economic integration organisation in 1989, the Maghrib Arab Union, better known by its French acronym as the UMA, because of its socio-political implications in Arabic. This, in turn, had been absorbed into another Mediterranean security dialogue, led by Egypt and created in 1994, the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The point about these seemingly endless initiatives apparently directed towards intangible ends was that not only did they act as confidence-building measures in a global arena totally unfamiliar to South Mediterranean states who had previously been comfortably ensconced in the stasis of the Cold War but now had to face the fact that super-power patronage no longer existed, but they also revealed the close relationship between security issues and political and socio-cultural causes. The crisis in Algeria made the linkages crystal-clear, particularly after bombs began to explode
So-called “rogue states” or “states of concern” were excluded from the NATO dialogue. Thus Syria, Lebanon and Libya still do not take part, although Algeria does, despite its appalling human rights record.

Libya was invited into the Barcelona Process as a special guest of the European presidency in mid-1999, after the suspects in the Lockerbie affair were handed over for trial. It is not a full member of the process and, as a result, also appreciated the links between economics and security in the longer term. These realisations, in themselves, meant that any new European policy in the Mediterranean would have to address political and social issues if it were to respond to specifically European security concerns alongside the Commission’s long-standing economic interests in the region. Furthermore, such security concerns comprised soft security issues, with hard security concerns being left to a wider alliance – NATO – which was therefore, by definition, excluded from the Union’s own polices, alongside the United States! As a result, yet another dialogue developed as a confidence building measure, the NATO dialogue, which accommodated some of the Union’s South Mediterranean partners but excluded others, even though the Union itself dealt with all except Libya which was then under United Nations sanctions because of the Lockerbie affair.

The new policy, known today as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or, more colloquially, as the Barcelona Process, and which was rushed out in time to coincide with the Spanish presidency during the second half of 1995, incorporated all of these conclusions. Although primarily a security

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2 So-called “rogue states” or “states of concern” were excluded from the NATO dialogue. Thus Syria, Lebanon and Libya still do not take part, although Algeria does, despite its appalling human rights record.

3 Libya was invited into the Barcelona Process as a special guest of the European presidency in mid-1999, after the suspects in the Lockerbie affair were handed over for trial. It is not a full member of the process, only an observer, because it has not accepted the Barcelona acquis – the bundle of legislation that accompanies membership of the Partnership. It does not do so because this would threaten the jamahiri political and economic system, although it claims that it cannot do so since, although the Partnership is dedicated to peace, two of its members – Israel and Palestine – are at war and should be expelled until they make peace.
initiative designed to respond to European concerns by coping with problems along the Union’s southern periphery, it purported to be – and also was – an attempt at co-operative development within a trans-national region. Despite the fact that the economic aspect of the new policy was the most highly developed, there was also a commitment to respond to regional political and security concerns and aspirations and to resolve cultural and social differences as well. Consisting of three “baskets” of measures, the policy sought, in the words of the *Barcelona Declaration* in which it was formally announced, to create a zone of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean basin. The unspoken primary purpose, of course, was to render labour migration from the South unnecessary by stimulating economic development!

Such development was not only to be a consequence of purely economic measures; it was also to involve political, social and cultural change, in an atmosphere of comprehensive security in which all regional states would participate. In the first basket, political evolution was to address the related problems of human rights, state legitimacy and the degenerate corporate state in the Middle East and North Africa – by now profoundly neopatrimonial in nature – by actively encouraging good governance, based on the assumption that this would best be achieved through liberal democracy and a market economy. Comprehensive collective security was to result from an agreed charter of security measures, alongside existing security arrangements, such as NATO and the Western European Union. There was here, to be sure, a problem, for no allowance was made for very different American perceptions of the Mediterranean and the security problems there, an omission that was keenly felt in Washington despite initial American scepticism over the new European initiative. The socio-cultural basket, mainly aspirational in nature, was primarily devoted to supporting the growth of civil society in the South – despite governmental distaste for such developments – alongside mutual cultural tolerance.
2.1 The Economic Dimension

It was, however, the economic basket that was the real core of the new initiative. This had been negotiated in the form of a bilateral association agreement with two states – Tunisia and Morocco – before the actual structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership had been fully developed and would have stood alone as Commission policy had the full Barcelona package not been completed. It thus bears some study, for it has had the most profound effect on the Southern Mediterranean to date. Its structure was deceptively simple for it continued to be bilateral in nature, being negotiated separately with each non-member partner state and following the principles of the previous co-operation agreements. Thus it maintained quotas for agricultural exports in order to protect the Common Agricultural Policy and continued to provide unlimited access for primary products – mainly oil, natural gas and phosphates. However, in the industrial arena, it offered a free trade area agreement in addition to the traditional offer of free access to the European market for industrial goods and services – which, in practice, had often been constrained by so-called “voluntary restraint agreements” over textiles and clothes in order to protect high cost European producers. The catch was that the offer in effect required South Mediterranean participants to abandon their own tariff and non-tariff barriers to European industrial exports, thus exposing previously protected domestic industrial sectors to the full force of European competition.

Not only did this directly threaten Southern industrial entrepreneurs – and, unless aid was forthcoming, the threat to Tunisia was estimated to involve the destruction of a third of its industrial sector and the potential elimination of a further third of its 6,000 industrial enterprises, whilst in Morocco 60 per cent of the industrial base was said to face a similar fate – it also contained a profound threat to government finances as well. Outside the oil-rich states of the South, where government revenue depends heavily on rent in the form of energy taxes, most budgetary revenue is generated by customs dues and tariffs. Since Europe is by far the largest trade partner for the states of the Mediterranean region – the Union absorbs...
26 per cent of the Arab world’s exports and generates 46.5 per cent of its imports – this effectively meant that government revenue would be radically cut. As a result, new forms of taxation had have to be found in the states that have signed up to the Partnership – Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority to date, with negotiation under way with Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and Algeria, whilst Libya prepares to join in and Israel and Turkey have their own prior free trade and customs union agreements with the Union.

The problem is that many of these states have difficulties in collecting direct taxation, partly because of poverty, but also because of inadequate collection systems which lack transparency. As a result, they have turned to indirect taxation instead and value-added tax has now become common throughout the region. Whilst its efficiency is undoubted, its regressive character in such countries is intensified and adds to poverty and inequality of purchasing power.

Of course, lengthy transition periods have been offered to the new beneficiaries of this variant of the common European economic space which is due to be completed in 2010 – in fact, of course, the South Mediterranean states do not really benefit in precisely this way yet because of continuing restraints on their trade relations with Europe. Financial help also exists over the process of transition in the form of the MEDA financial programme which offered a global sum of 4.865 billion over a five year period, together with similar amounts in soft loans from the European Development Bank, of which 2.31 billion was in the form of bilateral aid. In the event, only 890 million, just 26 per cent of the committed funds, was actually spent by the end of the five-year period. The funding line was renewed as the MEDA II protocol in 1999 – with a 25 per cent increase in funding to 5.4 billion but intended to cover a seven, rather than a five year period.
### Meda I Commitments and Disbursements 1995–1999 (€ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Percentage spent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank &amp; Gaza</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral Co-operation</strong></td>
<td>2,955</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Co-operation</strong></td>
<td>480</td>
<td>230''</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,435</strong></td>
<td><strong>890</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** European Commission DG Ext

**Notes:**
- * Includes €63 million committed 1997–99 for technical assistance
- ** Includes €150 million for horizontal co-operation before 1996

Discussions also began in January 2000 to include agricultural exports within the free trade areas, but they are not due to be concluded for the next five years, even though, outside mineral exports, this is the area in which South Mediterranean states – except for Israel – have the greatest comparative advantage. Equally, no movement is expected on easing access restrictions to Europe, although, theoretically, the new economic arrangement should involve the free movement of goods, capital and labour. After all, the agreements exist primarily to exclude migration and are thus not
genuine free trade area agreements, which should provide for the free movement of goods, capital and labour. How long these agreements can be sustained as barriers to the free movement of labour remains to be seen, however.

**Mediterranean Trade: 1997 (€ billion)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports world</th>
<th>Exports world</th>
<th>Imports EU</th>
<th>Exports EU</th>
<th>EU trade as % of world</th>
<th>% EU trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>4,353</td>
<td>8,361</td>
<td>56.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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<td>2,025</td>
<td>70.42</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>13.21</td>
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<td>6,752</td>
<td>2,634</td>
<td>54.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>30.78</td>
<td>22.50</td>
<td>11,505</td>
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<td><strong>67,709</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,217</strong></td>
<td><strong>47.69</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.54</strong></td>
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</table>

**Sources:** Eurostat; WTO
2.2 Economic Outcomes

What will be the outcome of these agreements? Will they indeed stimulate economic development sufficiently fast to counter demographic pressures in a region where, until the 1990s, population growth rates on average had been of the order of 2.3 to 2.6 per cent, even if they have fallen dramatically in the past decade? It needs to be borne in mind that population growth rates of that order of magnitude imply population doubling within twenty-five years and that over 60 per cent of the populations of most South Mediterranean countries are now below the age of twenty-five. It is also worth remembering that gross domestic product growth rates, according to the World Bank, need to be between 5 and 7 per cent if the economies are to provide the necessary services in housing, education and health, let alone actually achieve positive development – and this in a region which had had an average growth in national wealth of between 1 and 2 per cent – including Israel – during the previous twenty years, according to the European Commission in 1994. And, finally, it should not be forgotten that because of these economic failures and the consequences of intensive economic restructuring over the previous fifteen years, official unemployment figures run at a chronic 15 to 30 per cent of the labour force. No wonder that migration seems an attractive option, despite European xenophobia and official discrimination.

There seems to be a growing consensus amongst analysts of the Mediterranean that the promise of economic development, in the short-term at least, is illusory, partly for theoretical and partly for practical reasons. The agreements themselves are closely modelled on the “Washington Consensus” adopted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as prescriptions for developing economies enmeshed in heavy foreign debt – as was indeed the case for most South Mediterranean economies. Neo-liberal in inspiration, they may well generate satisfactory macro-economic results but they depend heavily on stimulating foreign investment and private sector entrepreneurs, as well as on the increasingly discredited belief in “trickle-down” to achieve appropriate micro-economic
outcomes. Foreign private investment has proved stubbornly reluctant to seize the opportunities the region offers, whether as direct investment or in the form of portfolio investment as national capital markets emerge and privatisation programmes enlarge, so that the Middle East runs just ahead of Africa in the total investment stakes, even though global investment flows are picking up after the 1997 crisis. Little of the estimated $190 billion that was invested worldwide in 1999, for example, flowed into the Mediterranean, largely because other destinations seemed more attractive, as they always have.

In any case, the sheer size of the European market and the efficiency of European companies almost certainly predicates that the “hub-spoke” dependency of the past will continue and may even be worsened by trade creation and trade diversion effects. The South Mediterranean is simply too small to be able to compete effectively and its economies will continue to be satellites to Europe, with a renewal of the dualism of the past – a modern sector closely in touch with the European market in a series of cross-Mediterranean trans-national regions and a traditional sector, serving the bulk of the population and isolated from real benefit as income disparities increase. Only economic integration within the South – anticipated by the Barcelona Process after 2010 – could create a market of sufficient size to attract foreign investment and, in Gordon Brown’s immortal words, generate self-sustained “endogenous growth”. Without that, the horizontal economic cleavages across South Mediterranean societies will intensify, threatening the vertical integration that the political structures are designed to sustain. In a sense, the details do not matter; what is important is that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is acting as an immense experiment in a particular vision of development economics – more so, perhaps, than any other example such as NAFTA or Mercosur – and is already giving evidence of the stresses and defects that will emerge.
Direct Private Foreign Investment ($ million)

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<td>3,789</td>
<td>4,321</td>
<td>6,186</td>
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Note: European Union direct foreign investment into the South Mediterranean is only 2 per cent of total Union foreign investment. Total investment was below $7 billion in 1998, whereas China received $30 billion and Latin America $70 billion for the same period. Inter-Arab investment was also weak, totalling only $18.5 billion between 1975 and 1998, whilst Arab investment abroad in total (mainly in Europe and the United States) was said to have reached $647 billion by 1998.
2.3 Social and Political Consequences

Of course, economic change also produces social change as well; under the World Bank’s latest prescriptions for successful economic development, alongside openness and export-oriented growth, stand transparency and accountability as factors essential to attract the foreign investor and to ensure successful private sector development. Legitimacy, too, particularly in the form of the rule-of-law, forms part of the new package and there is an irresistible tendency, as behoves supporters of the economic theory of politics, to extend this economic prescription into the political sphere as well. The linkage of the political and economic spheres is, to say the least, questionable, although it fits well within the current orthodoxy of the match between liberal democracy and free market economies. Chile, after all, demonstrated that this linkage was not necessarily the case in the late 1970s and the 1980s, as do Singapore and large parts of Asia today.

What is certainly the case is that there are cultural and social consequences of the kind of economic development policies described above. One interesting consequence, which is not directly related to the process itself but which is a by-product and which is also linked to the phenomenon of migration, is the development of cross-Mediterranean trade networks between European suppliers and purchasers who are returned migrants. They will link in easily to the globalised trade patterns that will result from the Barcelona Process and may even become nuclei for development poles in the South. This is, incidentally, nothing new; it was first identified by researchers in the University of Amsterdam in the 1970s and is enshrined in the concept of trans-national economic regions. Another, which is related to the Process, is the universalisation of a commercial culture which itself stems from American and European paradigms, whatever the dominant cultural environment in which it appears. This will add a further horizontal cleavage to the vertically integrated societies of the South Mediterranean region. It will only be hampered by the persistent opaqueness of traditional private sector economic activity that thrives best without transparency and seeks to perpetuate rent-seeking and economic privilege through its political alliances.
The Barcelona Process, however – as befits a policy that is essentially bureaucratic in nature – has much wider social and political ambitions than this. It is integral to the Process that it should stimulate the growth of civil society within the context of legitimised government. Ironically enough, this objective goes to the real heart of the crisis within the South for, without a radical change in the nature of the political process there, the kinds of conditions and commitment needed for successful economic development cannot evolve. Most governments in the South have been constructed on a corporatist basis; they have sought to mobilise public support through vertically integrated political, social and economic structures in which the single political party has been the most obvious symbol. The attempt to achieve such structures, and to mobilise them for economic development, failed long ago both because of ideological mistakes and because the corporatist objectives themselves were unachievable. This political failure was associated with a further failure; that of the patrimonial and prebendial nature of the state in the South. Power was arbitrary and usually expressed through control of the army and the security mechanism by a group within the society that neither enjoyed generalised support nor reflected general social and political goals and that often sought to monopolise the economic process as well.

The desire of the Barcelona Process to both force such political systems to become legitimised and participatory, with restrictions on government power exercised by a vibrant civil society, is thus laudable. What may be less so is the way in which this is to be done. Considerable effort has gone into supporting non-governmental organisations under the MEDA programme – rather less emphasis has been placed on political change, particularly in respect of human rights. Thus considerable care is spent not upbraiding Israel’s disgraceful treatment of the Palestinians, both in terms of the peace process – in which Europe has very little say – and in terms of human rights abuses – about which it could say a lot. Europe’s response to the massacres in Algeria in January 1998 was, to say the least, feeble and persuaded the Algerian authorities that they had little to fear from European disapproval. Equally, Tunisia’s bizarre and endless search for Islamist
threats to its own security which involves repeated abuse of human rights goes virtually unremarked. Of course, one cannot know what is said behind closed diplomatic doors or what effect this has and this is quite correct – but “critical engagement” involves making such matters explicit whilst dialogue continues.

One reason for this reluctance to respond to what is, perhaps, the easiest issue on the collective Barcelona political agenda is that Europe and Southern governments share certain common security anxieties. This is also, no doubt, the reason why much deeper root-and-branch reform is not encouraged but there is also a certain and somewhat arrogant blindness in Europe on the issue. We laud the electoral process, when it occurs and tend to mistake it for genuine political participation of a kind that is globally applicable; we rarely consider what form of participation would be appropriate for the societies and cultures concerned. And although it is clear that cultural specificities can easily be used as a cover for profound illiberalism, are we so certain that our preferred political paradigms are always so appropriate, or even liberal? Despite official claims that there is no objection to political Islam, for instance, provided that it accepts the rules of the democratic game – that there are winners and losers whose roles may be reversed by electoral success – and that it abandons violence as a political argument – even though such views are on the margin of the overall Islamist movement – it is a legitimate question to wonder how welcoming we would really be were there any possibility that such a government would come to power, except in Saudi Arabia? European reactions to Algeria and Iran give little grounds for optimism, as far as acceptability is concerned.

It could be argued that only by creating effective civil societies and hence attitudes of mind towards government, rather than institutions, can real and legitimate political change be achieved. There is no doubt that this is so and that this alone could justify the current official reluctance to
engage governments directly in what would be wholly counter-productive
initiatives. De Tocqueville remarked almost two centuries ago that:

I accord institutions only secondary influence over the destiny of men. I
am thoroughly convinced that political societies are not what their laws
make them but what they are prepared in advance to be by the feelings,
the beliefs, the ideas, the habits of heart and mind of the men who com-
pose them.

He was talking about the United States but his comments seem to be
equally applicable to the South Mediterranean region and argue for an
increased commitment by the European Union to building civil society and
supporting indigenous political traditions which seek participation and
social justice, even if they do not match European political institutions
themselves. How will the Union digest Libya’s political idiosyncrasies,
once Colonel Qadhafi’s Jamahiriyah joins the Euro-Mediterranean part-
nership, as it will inevitably do, once it decides that it can accept the Euro-
pean acquis? Europe will find it extremely difficult to resist that Libyan
embrace, once it comes, given the desire of South Mediterranean states to
see the Barcelona Process as genuinely universal, as far as non-European
Union member countries in the Mediterranean basin are concerned.

Cultural change is an integral part of this process – not the divisive
extension of Euro-American archetypes pilloried as McWorld or the Coca
Cola culture – but the much wider influences spread by the cinema, radio,
satellite television and, latterly, the internet. As they always did – for the
phenomenon is not new, merely accelerated – they excite a contradictory
mixture of fascinated desire and moral repulsion. They thus stimulate
attempts to emulate and to exclude, attempts which are the mirror image of
Europe’s desire to exclude migrants but to export goods and services. And,
even worse, denial of access builds a determination to reject so that the
contradictions inherent in the Barcelona Process that encourage material
satisfaction but deny freedom of access generate their own dynamic of
moral rejection and political opposition. It is stimulated, too, by Europe’s
own failure to mitigate the xenophobia and Islamophobia inherent in Europe itself and its frequent failure to appreciate the consequences of its own initiatives in the field of security. For much of the violence directed towards Europe and indeed towards indigenous government in the South Mediterranean – whether Islamist or not – stems from the politics of exclusion and resentment.

2.4 The Issue of Security

Indeed, perhaps the most contentious issue is that of security within the Barcelona Process. By the end of the year 2000, during the French presidency of the Union, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was due to have drawn up a Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean along lines adopted by the Stuttgart summit of the Union last June. These guidelines were really no more than a woolly list of desiderata extending into the social and politico-economic fields as well as dealing with specific security issues. In part, this was because the Barcelona process is primarily concerned with soft security, even though, with the Western European Union due to be folded into the Union itself, together with its EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR forces, as well as the projected 60,000-strong rapid deployment force proposed at Helsinki in December 1999, now to be available as part of a future European Defence and Security Policy, there is some muscle to back up hard security concerns as well. Yet such potentially unilateral approaches to what is supposed to be an initiative to support common security goals is precisely what many Southern states fear. The row that erupted when EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR were announced in 1997 was sufficient indication of that! Nor have Southern fears been eased by the appointment of Xavier Solana as the first secretary-general of the common foreign and security policy, given his previous role as NATO secretary-general.

Ironically enough, the continued existence of NATO as the vehicle of European collective security is the major source of dissention as far as collective Mediterranean security is concerned. The prolonged NATO dia-
logue with only some of the South Mediterranean members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has done little to build confidence in NATO’s overall objectives and what little confidence there was has been eroded by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 – ironically enough, even though NATO endlessly pointed out that its actions were in support of a Muslim population – and by the new NATO strategy announced last year. The tripartite objectives of Article 5 obligations, out-of-area activities and humanitarian intervention sent shivers up many southern spines, not least because, in the Mediterranean, NATO’s out-of-area activities seemed directed against weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons and soft security targets such as migration, drugs and international crime – and political terrorism. Nor was it the topics that formed the out-of-area agenda alone that caused such anxiety, it was the unilateral nature of the decision-making process in which Southern states would be the objects of security, not participants in its application.

Of course, nothing is so clear-cut. Egyptian, Jordanian, Moroccan and Tunisian forces have engaged in Operation Brightstar exercises with American forces. Jordanians and Moroccans have also participated in SFOR’s operations in Bosnia. There are clearly cases where, in terms of peacekeeping if not peace-making, co-operation already exists. It is, however, in the way in which Europe’s hard security concerns in the Mediterranean appear to be hived off into the NATO arena in which the Partnership has no voice that creates anxieties about Europe’s good faith over common security concerns. And then, furthermore, there is the United States. America has been excluded from the Barcelona Process, largely at French behest and much to Washington’s irritation. More seriously, the United States, for whom the Mediterranean is not significant in national security terms, has, nonetheless – as was mentioned above – a much more complex appreciation of security problems there. It controlled – perhaps unintentionally torpedoed – the complicated Middle East peace process and is not too willing to consider burden-sharing with Europe outside the purely financial arena. It considers Turkey, Egypt and Algeria as significant regional hegemons or potential hegemons and does not accept the holistic European vision of an
equality of states, preferring instead to reduce the Mediterranean into a series of sub-regions for analytical purposes. It cannot divorce Balkan issues from the overall picture, nor can it ignore the Mediterranean’s role as a strategic line of communication, given its concerns over world energy prices – and instability in the Mediterranean is certainly bound to affect the global price of oil.

America is, in short, an integral player in the Mediterranean, particularly in security terms – its economic significance is much less – and it cannot therefore be excluded from the security equation. Yet, at present, Europe has not found a place for it within the overall Partnership structure. South Mediterranean states know this well and this knowledge saps a little at their commitment to the security aspects of the Barcelona Process, not the least because, during 1999, the United States hinted that there might be an alternative to Barcelona on offer – the Eizenstat Initiative. In reality, this has never amounted to much, being largely a device to isolate Libya in the Maghrib, but the interest with which Tunisians, in particular, took up the issue indicated their profound uncertainties about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The most profound anxiety for Southern members of the Partnership is the most recent of Europe’s initiatives, the intervention in Kosovo and the resulting doctrine of humanitarian intervention with its implied breach of the sacrosanct principle of state sovereignty through intervention. It is true, of course, that 70 per cent of the military burden was borne by the United States – somewhat reluctantly, by all accounts – but, for Southern Mediterraneans, it is Europe which looms nearest over the Mediterranean horizon. The flavour of Southern anxieties was seen in President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s reply to Kofi Annan’s suggestion at the end of 1999 that humanitarian intervention should be integrated into the United Nations vision. Take care, said the Algerian president, that this is not merely a cover for a renewed form of colonialism, for that is how it will be seen in the South. Indeed, that is true of much of the Barcelona acquis, economic, social and political – for better or worse, Southern states increasingly feel that the
bargain they entered into in 1995 is becoming a unilateral imposition and an intervention in which hard-won sovereignty from colonialism is to be torn apart by European-directed globalisation as the past is re-created but labelled anew. What is Kosovo, they ask, but a Protectorate and what is a Protectorate or a Mandate, but subjugation even if it is called liberation?

Interestingly enough, the problems inherent in collective and co-operative security between a group of states with very different agendas and concerns was underlined by the fact that the Charter promised at the end of 2000 could not be agreed upon. Southern states found the Union’s proposals unacceptable and the French presidency was unable to bridge the gaps in trust and understanding that existed, not the least because of the collapse of the Middle East peace process. The simple fact is that Mediterranean security is indivisible and hard security and soft security concerns are bound to impinge on one another. Equally, if the Mediterranean is genuinely to be treated as a shared common space, elements and aspects of it cannot be amputated because of the interests of outside powers, be they the United States, Russia or the Gulf. Even if the Barcelona Process is to serve specifically European interests, thus underlining the role of the Mediterranean as the “forgotten frontier”, the same assumptions will apply, particularly in the case of the Middle East, if not the Balkans.

3 The Future

By this reading, therefore, the Barcelona Process becomes no more than a kind of enforced peripheral regionalisation, a unilateral globalisation process writ small, in which sovereign states have lost their sovereignty – it never amounted to much anyway, given the compromises with international institutions over the years – and have been offered a deal they cannot refuse because no other is available. Matters, of course, are not quite like that; it is true that South Mediterranean states had little choice but to accept the Barcelona Declaration, but it is also true that they were anxious to do so, recognising their inescapable partnership with Europe, in
economic terms at least. It is equally true that governments there know that they cannot indefinitely resist the popular clamour for participatory political systems. What is difficult is the insensitivity of the European response and the unwillingness to engage, beyond the level of government, with the very civil society that Europe claims it wishes to encourage. There is also a need to persuade Southern governments that the implied abrogation of sovereignty – which, unlike the past, is not voluntary but an inherent component of the Barcelona Process – is justified by the ultimate benefits; benefits which will not mean a cultural and social homogenisation but which will preserve cultural, social and political specificities within an integrative framework. And they are determined to gain a better deal over economic development.

All these issues also inform the much wider global agenda that international affairs commentators seek to interpret, so that the Barcelona Process really does become a paradigm in itself for the future. Yet there is one aspect, implicit in the Barcelona Declaration but far removed from the day-to-day negotiations and disagreements, which is rarely mentioned in regional security discussions – the degree of European dependence on the Southern Mediterranean region. It is a little-appreciated fact that the liberalisation of European energy markets and the “dash for gas” is producing a degree of European dependence on Mediterranean suppliers that the designers of the Barcelona Process never anticipated. The issue is not one of oil, for alternative suppliers can always be relatively easily found. It is Europe’s future dependence on natural gas that is at issue. Algeria already supplies 18 to 20 per cent of European gas demand, but when Libya’s Western Gas Project comes on-stream in 2003, that dependence will rise towards a quarter of total demand. Gas is also due to come from Central Asia via Turkey and from the Gulf too, so that within twenty years the Mediterranean may become a major or even the major gas supplier to Europe. It is a dependence that cannot easily be altered, given the massive investment in fixed pipeline infrastructure – so that Europe, in its turn, becomes dependent on those that are its own clients.
Allied to this concern, which has profound security implications for Europe, is another that, ironically enough, undermines Europe’s real Barcelona agenda. This is that, in the years to come, Europe is going to increasingly depend on migrant labour, as European populations age and the European labour-force shrinks. Recently the United Nations Development Programme suggested that, within fifty years, Europe would need 136 million additional labourers – and they can only come from the Mediterranean basin! The figures may be exaggerated, but the problem is not – Germany and Britain, after all, are already proposing a green-card scheme to overcome their shortage of computer skills; to the sound of polite scepticism from South Asia, where Indian and Pakistani computer experts anticipate far greater benefits from the United States. And the problems with unskilled and semi-skilled labour – areas in which Europeans will not work – will be even more acute.

Perhaps, therefore, European statesmen should be busy trying to discourage the intensifying strains of xenophobia and racism that are coming to characterise the European discourse over migration and political asylum, rather than exploiting them for short-term electoral gain. In short, just as with energy dependence, Europe cannot escape its Mediterranean involvement – a perfect example of political symbiosis that may have interesting social and cultural consequences and should be the real paradigm for the future! Thus, in a perfect circle, soft power projection becomes interdependence as the “forgotten frontier” becomes the common arena – the stated objective of the Barcelona Process, if not its underlying purpose.
The (Ir)relevance of Security Issues in Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Dr. Bechir Chourou, Assistant Professor in International Relations, University of Tunis, Tunisia

In his opening speech at the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Marseilles on 15–16 November 2000 the French Foreign Minister Mr. Hubert Védrine indicated that the Barcelona Process, five years after its inception, shows a mixed balance sheet. On the credit side the Minister could cite only “the reality of the dialogue between States as well as between different levels of civil societies.” In his view this single achievement “is invaluable, even if its effects will be felt only gradually.” The minus column, on the other hand, had several entries including “insufficient results in social and cultural co-operation and slowness in the political field.” According to Mr. Védrine “all this is due to numerous objective difficulties which have undoubtedly been underestimated from the beginning and to unrealistic or premature expectations that the [Barcelona] Process had raised.”

The French Foreign Minister dwelled at length on various aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) but had little to say about security other than to acknowledge that some participants are reluctant to take up security issues at the Euro-Mediterranean level and to reiterate that Europe’s security and defence policy is “directed at no one.” With regard

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1 These citations and others available only in French have been translated by the author. The speech and the Presidency’s Formal Conclusions are available on http://www.presidence-europe.fr.
to a related issue – the elaboration and adoption of a Charter for Peace and Stability – Mr. Védrine simply indicated that “current circumstances do not allow the adoption of the Charter […] but] we should continue to work on it.” Such a summary treatment of what was to be the main event of Barcelona IV probably reflects France’s disappointment that the Charter was not going to be adopted during its presidency.

In the Formal Conclusions of the Presidency it was stated that the participants agreed to proceed with the political dialogue “without waiting for the adoption of the Charter” and “expressed the wish to extend the dialogue to other themes such as regional developments in the area of security, disarmament, the process of consolidation the rule of law, and respect of human rights and democratic principles.” They further agreed that the Charter is “to be based on a global approach to stability that takes into account political, economic, financial, cultural, social and human dimensions [of stability] and to serve as a general, evolving and non-binding framework and political tool for the gradual implementation of the principals of the Barcelona Declaration relating to the global questions of peace and stability.”

Setting aside the circumvolutions of diplomatic language, the main points that may be inferred from these two documents are: adoption of the Charter has been postponed sine die; when or if it is adopted it will be limited to ‘soft security’ matters; the EMP will set aside ‘hard security’ questions; the Charter is de-linked from the political dialogue; and finally, the dialogue is to include regional security and disarmament (presumably, these questions belonged to other fora; in addition, they no longer constitute ‘hard security’ matters since they will be included in the political dialogue – unless, of course, the latter is not considered as being at a Euro-Mediterranean level).

This limited and somewhat inconsistent outcome of the Marseilles Conference raises a number of questions that this paper will attempt to examine:
What is the impact that the Charter is expected or likely to have on Euro-Mediterranean relations and can the quality and intensity of that impact justify continued efforts for the formulation and adoption of the Charter? In this respect it will be argued that a Charter, regardless of its content, is not likely to be among the independent or even intervening variables that affect peace and stability in the Mediterranean. In other words current problems or conflicts that the Charter would hope to resolve or alleviate are the very ones that prevent its emergence and that would have to be resolved if the Charter is to come to life. This means – paradoxically – that opposition to the Charter is an indicator of the intrinsic need for its existence but at the same time, if it is ever adopted, this will mean that it has become of little relevance.

If a timely adoption of the Charter is unlikely, should other avenues be explored for reaching similar objectives? To be consistent with the previous point the answer should be negative because any factors that would oppose the adoption of the Charter would prevent the same protagonists from using other tools for achieving the same objectives. Consequently, it will be argued that initiatives taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) towards the Mediterranean are not likely to contribute to security – no matter how it is defined – in the region or resolve issues that the Charter could not resolve.

If the two preceding arguments have any validity they would lead to a third question, namely, whether security ought to be on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda at all. In this respect it will be submitted that although security can be discussed at the Euro-Mediterranean level, such discussions are not likely to be fruitful unless the following conditions are met: (a) it must be ascertained that any agreements reached represent the long-term interests of the participants as they are perceived by the peoples in whose names the agreements are to be made; (b) participation must be open to all countries that have clear stakes in the issues to be discussed even if such countries are not Mediterranean in strict geographical terms; and (c) non-EU
Mediterranean countries must negotiate as a single entity if a genuine partnership is to be set up between the shores of the Mediterranean.

Admittedly, it may prove rather difficult to meet any one of these conditions – let alone all three of them – in the weeks or even months to come. Nevertheless and given the atmosphere that prevails in the region, one can predict with a fair degree of certitude that a Charter will be adopted by the next French presidency, propelling, in the process, the Barcelona Process from the inertia in which it had been since 1995.

1 Security and the Barcelona Process

The Barcelona Declaration adopted in 1995 contains three main chapters or ‘baskets’: the first relating to political and security questions, the second to economic and financial ones and the third to social, cultural and human affairs. The first chapter contains issues that have come to be designated as ‘soft security’ such as respect of human rights and democratic principles, as well as other issues that were traditionally considered as elements of security but that are now put under the label of ‘hard security’; these include acquisition of conventional weapons, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), disarmament and adherence to arms control and non-proliferation regimes. The same chapter also calls for the adoption of a “pact” of peace and stability, although the term pact was later replaced by “Charter.”

The work programme appended to the Declaration called for the “conduct of a political dialogue to examine the most appropriate means and methods of implementing the principles adopted by the Barcelona Declaration.” This dialogue was launched in March 1996 when Senior Officials in charge of the political and security aspects met in Brussels to prepare an ‘Action Plan’ defining specific areas to be discussed. An initial list of six topics was adopted at the following meeting that took place in May 1996, including disarmament and confidence and security building measures (CSBM). However, by the time Foreign Ministers met in Malta in April
1997 (Barcelona II) few concrete measures could be reported aside from the establishment (in June 1996) of the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission or EuroMeSCo which is a network of foreign policy institutes. In the meantime preparatory work on a Charter for peace and stability had started and the Malta meeting instructed Senior Officials to continue that work. It should be noted that the breakdown of the Middle East peace process had made it difficult to discuss security issues and threatened to stall the entire Euro-Med process.

At the ad hoc Ministerial meeting held in Palermo in June 1998 it was decided to use ‘Partnership Building Measures’ or PBMs instead of CSBMs and Senior Officials were instructed to hold a special ad hoc meeting to prepare a draft version of the Charter to be submitted to the Stuttgart Conference (Barcelona III). When this conference convened in April 1999 the peace process was still in stalemate. Participants, according to the Presidency’s Formal Conclusions, “expressed growing concern” about that and, with regard to the Charter, declared their satisfaction with “the progress achieved since the Palermo meeting.” An informal document called “Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter” was adopted to “provide the basis for the future work of Senior Officials.” Participants further agreed that “the Charter will provide for an enhanced political dialogue […] whose primary function […] will be to prevent tensions and crises and maintain peace and stability by means of co-operative security.” Once again Senior Officials were instructed to complete a draft of the Charter by the next Ministerial meeting. That meeting took place in Marseilles in November 2000 but did not include the Charter in its agenda.

Thus, it appears that the competence of the EMP in the area of security has been eroding through re-conceptualisation, attrition or, to use Roberto Aliboni’s expression, “reshuffling of priorities”\(^2\). For example, confidence building measures (CBMs) and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) designed to prevent military conflicts or limit the use, acquisition

or proliferation of non-conventional weapons have been largely abandoned or emptied of any substance. The net result is that the EMP will deal mostly with soft security.

It should be noted that this trend is not unanimously approved nor is there agreement concerning the meaning of partnership-building and soft security. Concerning the first point EuroMeSCo produced a number of studies whose authors either support the new orientation or, on the contrary, argue that the EMP should not abandon military-related issues or at least should not rule them out completely from its competences. With respect to partnership building and soft security, Aliboni reports that the Northern and Southern members have different interpretations and perspectives concerning these questions:

In Southern perspectives, partnership-building is regarded as a process of political co-operation in which a number of soft-security issues, such as terrorism and migration, are dealt with in strict inter-state terms and on a case-by-case basis, thus minimising interferences with domestic factors.

The EU perspective seems more complex and far-reaching. Partnership-building means that political co-operation has to be upgraded with a view to strengthening the broad and long-term foundations of security … by achieving sustainable development, political democracy and good governance … This entails a much closer interplay between inter-state and intra-state frameworks, for regional security is dependent on a set of domestic processes of democratisation.

In any case this observed or advocated shift in emphasis from hard to soft security does not mean that the former is totally absent from Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is well known that NATO, the WEU and the OSCE have various activities involving a number of Southern EMP members. Those activities are widely discussed in the literature and need not be presented again, although the point may be made that they seem to have

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
focused mostly on the soft aspects of hard security. Nevertheless, it is now commonly accepted that “Euromed security relations are characterised by political differences and socio-economic tensions rather than by military conflict.”

This statement, however, would be valid—and only partially at that—if it is applied to vertical (North-South) relations viewed from a Northern perspective. To begin with it may not be applicable if one looks at South-North relations, i.e. vertical relations from a Southern perspective. Thus, and as far as some Southern partners are concerned, a military conflict in the form of a Northern military intervention in the South is not completely ruled out (cf. reactions to EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR). But depending on how its potential motives are perceived, such an intervention may either be feared or actually hoped for or counted on.

In the first instance there may be some anxieties concerning reactions to situations where, e.g., the North would consider that there are serious violations of human rights. However, by words and (lack of) deeds the North has reassuringly indicated that if such hypothetical cases were to materialise (and so far the North has not seen any materialising on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean) it would take no action which would be considered as intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign Partner as long as collateral damage and/or severe prejudice do not become alarming. Nevertheless, some Southern Partners may feel, there is always a remote possibility that the North might change its mind (cf. Kosovo).

In the second instance, some Southern Partners may consider that the primary function of the EMP is to ensure that ‘stability’ in the region is not threatened by unauthorised or unacceptable elements. To that end it would be the North’s duty to come to the help of Partners who are confronted with such a problem by giving them funds, equipment, training and other

4 Ibid.
support they may require. This is an expectation that should not be overlooked as a potentially powerful facteur de rapprochement.

The second qualification to the statement on the nature of conflicts or tensions in Euro-Mediterranean relations is that there are actual and potential military conflicts between, as well as within, Southern Partners. Of course this is not a revelation but, if one may indulge in re-treading a beaten path, it may be recalled that one of the major purposes of the EMP was precisely to help solve existing military conflicts and, especially, to avoid future ones. There may well be reasons for giving a lower priority to this objective or even abandoning it altogether at this time but this is not going to make the conflicts go away. In these circumstances, is it realistic to continue with the Barcelona Process, or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, or the elaboration of a Charter for peace and stability? Many commentators, including some members of EuroMeSCo, have argued that pursuing these activities prior to a satisfactory and definitive resolution of those military conflicts amounts to “laying the praying carpets before building the mosque” as an Arab proverb says. However, the proposed alternative courses of action seem to be in most cases based on the postulate that many things should and can be carried out in the Mediterranean while awaiting a resolution of on-going inter- and intra-state conflicts. This writer suggests that the postulate is unwarranted and proposes that the entire Barcelona Process be re-examined from its foundations. This is probably a rare case where it may be necessary to throw out the baby with the bathwater or at least have a closer look at the baby’s uncommon DNA (Debilitating Narcotised Atrophy) before deciding to save it.

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6 This is what the EU did when it recently granted 8 million to Algeria to be used in the fight against terrorism. See Lara Marlowe, “Europe turns blind eye to Algeria’s dirty war”, Irish Times, 13 February 2001. According to the article “the aid was attributed ‘almost on the sly’”, without the stipulation that human rights be respected. The author further indicates that the French Minister of the Interior has announced that “France will train Algerians ‘in modern crime-fighting and civil security techniques’ to help in the fight against ‘money-laundering and other mafia-like practices’.” But, the author adds, “it seems to have escaped the French Minister’s attention that the chief Mafiosi are the Algerian generals.”
2 An IAP as a Prerequisite for the EMP

The many proposals put forth concerning activities and programmes that could be undertaken in the framework of a revised EMP are very constructive and deserve a close examination. This applies to, e.g., Fred Tanner’s proposals concerning Petersberg-type activities that could be carried out by Euromed Partners, such as mine action, disaster relief and humanitarian emergency response. A comprehensive list of such actions has been established by EuroMeSCo. However, few – if any – of those proposals are likely to be implemented, even in the estimations of those who made them. For example, Aliboni reports that a suggestion has been made for adopting a code of conduct that would encourage reducing defence spending in favour of social and economic development but indicates that such a measure is considered as premature. Similarly, Tanner argues that the future Charter should “mark the opaque security environment in the Mediterranean with normative signposts in order to assure a coherent long-term development of the Euro-Med security partnership” but recognises that while this is predicated on “the acceptance that security building in the Mediterranean is intrinsically linked to good governance, democratisation and human rights”, there is no evidence that Southern Partners are willing to admit that there is a “relationship between regional security and domestic conduct.”

There may be reasons to believe that these and other similar objectives should be pursued despite the odds; however, the danger is that this may be used as an excuse for avoiding more difficult but necessary decisions without which an area of peace and shared prosperity will remain a mirage.


9 Aliboni, op. cit.

10 Tanner, op. cit.
Foremost among such decisions is the creation of an intra-Arab partnership (IAP). This is not a novel idea; therefore, there is little need to dwell on its merits. Suffice it to say that the current multi-bilateral approach (whereby the EU as a group deals with individual non-EU partners) is seen as inadequate and many, including the EU itself, have called on Southern Partners, especially Arab States, to organise themselves into a group for EMP purposes. What needs to be underlined, though, is that current efforts towards relaunching the EMP may detract attention from more urgent needs and become another item in the long list of excuses used by procrastinators when the issue of Arab integration is brought up.

The structural framework is already in place. The Economic Council of the League of Arab States (ALEC) could be mandated to act as the EU Commission’s interlocutor. This implies that participation in the EMP would be open to all Arab States which were not present in Barcelona. Iraq would be a stumbling block but many are coming around to the notion that little can be done in the area of military security without involving that country. For that matter, it would be advisable to bring Iran into the picture as well.

The first task of the ALEC would be to revive, revise, update and implement the numerous treaties and agreements that have been signed over the last half century but never fully implemented, including conventions regulating the movement of goods and capital signed in 1953 and the treaty establishing an Arab Common Market which was signed in 1964 and went into effect on 1 January 1965. However, it is unlikely that Arab States would do now what they have failed to do decades ago because the political systems in place have not changed since then. By and large the Arab world is today at the stage where England was before Athelstan, France before Louis XIV, Germany before Bismarck or Italy before Garibaldi. It is ruled by hereditary monarchs and presidents most of whom exercise power with few or no checks and little accountability. Most countries are run like family businesses whose workers are excluded from management; therefore, it would be unlikely that the owners/managers would accept to share
their properties with others – least of all with people who claim to be the rightful owners, and those who manage to become Chief Execution Officers will do anything to keep their positions.

To most rulers a good subject is a silent and acquiescent one, and good governance is unquestioned governance. Some Western academics may advise that this is bad for business and would drive foreign investors away11 but one can always manage to find pragmatic businessmen who are smart enough not to meddle in politics and who will deal with the boardrooms without worrying about the floor shops. Besides, there will always be enough business to meet the owners’ needs.

Without good governance, abuses cannot be denounced or stopped and efforts to base policies on societal goods rather than private interests will be thwarted. Therefore, no amount of evidence that integration or unification will be good for the Arab populations will convince rulers to accept becoming small fishes in a big pond instead of being big fishes in small ponds. Change can be brought about only through a two-stage process: a tidal wave of democratisation will have to hit all parts of the Southern Mediterranean and its hinterland simultaneously and with great force; then Arabs will be called upon to decide freely whether they want to unify and if so, through what process and at what pace.

Democracy is already lurking here and there and may even spring unexpectedly, but it will remain fragile if it remains isolated in a hostile environment. It is safe to assume that Arab populations want and are fit for democratic rule. In addition, it must be accepted that they are entitled to choose any form of government they want, whatever the ideological and political platform such a government may have. Among those seeking public office there may be local versions of a Jean Monnet or a Robert Schuman or adepts of Negib Azoury, Moufdi Zakaria or Allala el-Fassi.12

12 Three of the many Arab thinkers who called for Arab unity from as far back as the early 1900’s.
As legitimate representatives of their constituents those governments might work actively towards implementing the numerous agreements and instruments that have been signed by Arab States over the years but never implemented, thereby paving the way towards an effective and credible Intra-Arab Partnership within the framework of the Arab League.

Whatever conflicts or disagreements – profound or artificial – that exist at present must become a motive for reviving the Arab League rather than maintaining its present status as the image of Arab division. The recent decision to hold regular periodic summit meetings of the League’s member States is a step in the right direction, provided it goes beyond its symbolic value. The League will have to adopt concrete measures that clearly indicate its intent to act collectively on all issues pertaining to the region, including foreign policy.

Few Arab governments, aside from some whose leaders are dismissed as ‘mercurial’ or disconnected from reality, would accept such a departure from the past. That is why it has been suggested that the Arab populations would have to be consulted to determine whether they would favour such a development.

In light of the preceding discussion and by way of concluding, the following suggestions may be made concerning measures that need to be taken for setting an IAP as a preliminary step toward revising the EMP and the contributions that the EU may make to achieve that objective.

3 Summary and Suggestions

It is widely acknowledged that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been a failure. The main reason of that failure is the absence of a common motive for setting up the partnership. The European Union, which initiated the project, saw it as a tool to deal with a number of threats, most particularly immigration and the spread of Fundamentalism in the South. When it appeared that some of the threats were not as serious as initially thought, and that others could not be effectively tackled through the EMP, the EU
assigned other objectives to the partnership, with an emphasis on security (both hard and soft) and democracy promotion (including good governance and respect of human rights).

The Southern partners were reluctant to accept this new orientation. From their point of view the EMP was essentially a re-worded version of the Association Agreements that many of them had with the EU prior to Barcelona, and should therefore be restricted to the continuation of economic co-operation and extending financial assistance with no strings attached.

The latest deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the ensuing interruption of the peace process came conveniently to supply the needed justification for putting on hold a project that had suddenly become hazardous. In reaction, the EU did plead for de-linking the Barcelona process from the Middle East problem, but the Southern partners could ill afford to let pass an opportunity to disavow a process that would allow outsiders to interfere in their internal affairs. In fact, even if the Middle East problem were to be resolved, the South would probably find another reason for stalling the Barcelona process as long as the EU maintains its stand on democracy and human rights.

As for the EU, its interest in the Mediterranean is likely to decline as its attention focuses on the admission of new members and other more important matters. Furthermore, its interests are adequately served by the current status quo. Therefore, there are at present no compelling reasons for wasting energy on taking new initiatives, especially if there is a risk that such initiatives prove to be unproductive or even counterproductive.

Hence, “the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity” set out in the Barcelona Declaration can be achieved only if all signatories are equally committed to its realisation. To be meaningful, that commitment must be made by governments which have been given a clear mandate to do so. At the present time, few efforts have been made in Europe to mobilise public opinion in favour of the Mediterranean,
and it is doubtful that enough arguments can be found to make electors interested in anything Mediterranean other than the beaches. In the South, on the other hand, the public has not been given an opportunity to express its opinion one way or the other, but one cannot realistically expect wide popular support for the EMP as it stands today.

Consequently, the Barcelona Process is bound to whither away unless it is redesigned and rebuilt on more solid foundations. It has been argued that the first task should be to extend the membership of the EMP to all members of the Arab League and to unify the Southern segment of the partnership so as to have only two stakeholders in the EMP: the EU and the MENA group. Admittedly, this will not create an equilibrium between the two shores of the Mediterranean, but it would at least reduce the current imbalance. This task can be carried out only by the Arab countries themselves. However, the EU can make a significant contribution to help the Arabs put their house in order speedily and efficiently.

As already indicated, the Arab region is already highly integrated – but only on paper, as Arab regimes have failed to put into effect any of the outstanding integration agreements that they have signed. Many have argued that there are too many divisive factors in the region to realistically contemplate unification, integration or even simple co-operation among Arab countries. The problem with this argument is that no one knows with certitude which is accepted by a majority of Arab citizens or just by their self-proclaimed leaders. It is suggested that a possible way of finding an answer is to submit the question to a free and open public debate and allow the concerned citizens to decide whether they object to the creation of supranational institutions to which they would give a mandate to make decisions on their behalf in a variety of areas.

However, the outcome of such a consultation can be meaningful only if the latter takes place in a context where citizens are free to express themselves not only on the issue of integration but on all other public issues; to form, join and support parties and groups that propose various policies and programmes that are not restricted to Arab unity; to delegate authority to
freely chosen representatives and to hold them accountable for their actions regardless of the office with which they have been entrusted – in sum, if democratic mechanisms are applied across the entire political system and not just on certain occasions.

This is where the main difficulty lies: if the emergence of an integrated MENA requires the support of the Arab populations, and if that support can be mobilised and ascertained only in a democratic context, then a Euro-Mediterranean partnership must be preceded by the democratisation of the South. However, the change from authoritarian to democratic rule will not be speedy or easy or necessarily orderly. Long-established powerful vested interests are bound to oppose it. Nevertheless, one should adopt the premise that the change will or should take place, and then proceed to promote or facilitate it.

Once again, the legitimacy and sustainability of the democratic process depend on its ownership by the concerned societies. But this does not exclude the possibility of an EU contribution to its success. That contribution may take several forms. For example, the EU may refrain from giving direct or indirect support to governments that are patently unrepresentative, openly opposed to substantive political reforms, or suspected of violations of human rights. It may also uphold in words and in deeds basic democratic principles such as open participation in the political process and respect of majority decisions.

Once this democratic framework is set and functioning, the EMP may be evaluated, and proposals for Arab participation in it may be made and debated. In particular, opinions may be expressed concerning the desirability of closer and more comprehensive intra-Arab co-operation, the form and content of that co-operation, actual or potential obstacles opposing it and ways of dealing with them, etc. This was the kind of debate that took place in Europe in the 1950’s and that led to the rejection of the European Defence community (EDC) and the adoption of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and of the European Economic Community (EEC). It may be recalled that the debate took place in various European
countries, and that only a few of these initially agreed on a specific form of integration. A similar scenario may be envisioned in the MENA region. It is not possible – or necessary – to predict how many countries, if any, would choose to integrate, but it is possible – and necessary – to submit the question to a public debate in all Arab countries.

Of course, the ultimate decision about integration must be made by the Arabs themselves. But there are many actions that the EU may undertake to tip the balance in favour of a positive outcome. It has already publicly called for the elimination of trade barriers between Southern Mediterranean countries. It should now go further and encourage more extensive forms of integration such as the harmonisation of social, economic and fiscal policies, the free circulation of capital and labour, and the creation of supranational structures for the adoption and implementation of binding decisions. Europe has been a pioneer in the field of integration and its experience could help newcomers avoid the pitfalls of a trial-and-error approach. Perhaps more importantly, the EU could also participate in the mobilisation of the resources needed for building the infrastructure without which integration can never become a concrete reality (transport, communication, etc.). Most important of all, Europe should not be suspicious of, or apprehensive about, a cohesive and democratic Arab world, nor should it consider such a project as a threat to its interests – or anyone else’s. By trying to integrate, MENA would simply be catching up with other regions where the process is already well underway.

The following table contains suggestions for specific measures that MENA and EU states may implement for setting up a partnership between them. The measures are not presented in any particular sequential or chronological order; on the contrary, they are to be viewed as interlocking elements of a comprehensive and integrated plan.

The Barcelona process has not brought security or shared prosperity to the Mediterranean, and it is unlikely to deliver justice and democracy. Its main weakness is that it contains a fundamental contradiction between the principles and objectives it seeks to promote, on the one hand, and the tools and actors that are supposed to uphold those principles and achieve those
objectives, on the other. Resolving this internal inconsistency will be a difficult and time-consuming task, but the rewards amply justify the efforts it requires.

4  Bases of a Sustainable Partnership
Between the EU and the MENA Region

4.1 Good Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab States</th>
<th>European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adopt reforms aiming at instituting:</td>
<td>Not accept at face value reforms that are not effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- freedom of expression and association;</td>
<td>implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- separation of powers;</td>
<td>Refrain from giving direct or indirect support to regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- an independent judiciary;</td>
<td>that do not have practices compatible with good governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- an autonomous and representative legislative</td>
<td>Keep in mind that a partnership implies that partners have</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>branch;</td>
<td>the right to interfere in each other’s affairs to the extent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- non-interference of the executive branch in</td>
<td>allowed by the partnership and that this principle must</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the activities of civil society (including</td>
<td>function as a two-way street.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade unions, political parties, NGOs…).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those reforms must have concrete manifestations</td>
<td>To avoid the impression that one is being presumptuous, one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the form of:</td>
<td>may simply allude to the well-known and long-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- an open debate of all public issues,</td>
<td>practised principles of democracy, including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including foreign policy, defence and internal</td>
<td>- accepting the universality of democracy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security issues;</td>
<td>- abiding by the verdict of the ballot-box;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- public scrutiny of the activities of all</td>
<td>- accept the supremacy of principles over egotistical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public institutions and personalities;</td>
<td>interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- refrain from harassing citizens for their</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>opinions, beliefs, religious/racial/political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affiliations.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Intra-Arab Partnership as a Step
Towards a EURO-MENA Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arab States</th>
<th>European Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activate instruments of Arab integration in various fields.</td>
<td>Revise current membership in the EMP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-emphasise the role of territorial boundaries as an essential element of national sovereignty, thereby favouring:</td>
<td>Liberalise the movement of all goods (including agricultural goods) and all factors of production (including labour).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- the resolution of intra-Arab territorial disputes;</td>
<td>Invest in regional infrastructure (highways, railroads, telecommunications…).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- freedom of movement of goods, capital and men;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- making the Arab market more attractive to Arab and foreign investors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinate and harmonise social, economic and fiscal policies.</td>
<td>Supply know-how as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-ordinate foreign and defence policies with a view to:</td>
<td>Encourage Israel to revise its policy of forceful occupation of Arab lands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- achieve a peaceful and permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict;</td>
<td>Signify to Israel that it cannot expect unconditional support of its policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reduce defence spending;</td>
<td>Reduce arms sales in the region to reduce tensions and eliminate the use of force as an alternative to peaceful negotiations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- better protect Arab interests;</td>
<td>Work towards convincing NATO allies to adopt similar policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- give greater weight to Arabs in regional and global organisations;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- reverse the trend of Arab marginalisation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-emphasise hard security and give greater attention to more serious threats and risks confronting the region, particularly water scarcity, food security, ignorance, poverty, social inequality, pollution, scientific and technological dependency…</td>
<td>Dismantle EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Play down/phase out/avoid contacts with military establishments that are not under the strict and effective control of democratically chosen civilian authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate great foreign resistance to any move towards integration and unification.</td>
<td>Refrain from blocking Arab integration should it threaten to materialise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare for sacrifices should there be retaliation against such a move.</td>
<td>Accept that the Arabs are entitled to bargain hard for achieving their interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make it clear that an eventual Arab CFSP is ‘aimed at no one’.</td>
<td>Avoid actions and positions that may give the ‘West’ a negative image.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actively seek a genuine partnership between equals with any State or group of States willing to deal with Arab States as a group.</td>
<td>Actively encourage the merger of the IAP and the EMP into a EURO-MENA Partnership.</td>
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Reassessing Barcelona

Dr. Mark A. Heller, Principal Research Associate, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv

1 The Barcelona Process: Promise and Performance

By most all accounts, the balance sheet of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is quite dismal. In 2000, the European Commission report issued a report, *The Barcelona Process, Five Years On: 1995–2000* that presumed to do the accountancy. In the course of governmental affairs, such reports are normally full of self-congratulatory retrospectives. But in his introduction, even the Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten, was forced to acknowledge, with some understatement, that problems exist. And after listing them in considerable detail, he concluded that the process, after only five years, needed to be reinvigorated.

The Barcelona Declaration, adopted in November 1995, stipulated three objectives of the Partnership:

1. The creation of an area of peace and stability based on the principles of human rights and democracy;

2. The creation of an area of shared prosperity through the progressive establishment of free trade between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners and amongst the partners themselves, accompanied by substantial EU financial support for economic transition and for helping the partners to confront the social and economic challenges created by this transition; and

3. The improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society by means of exchange, development of human resources, and the support of civil societies and social development.
In each of these three chapters (or “baskets”), the results have been meager. The Commission’s review of the political-security basket cites the continuation of political dialogue as a “major accomplishment” and claims that the Partnership, through periodic meetings of senior officials, provides “the only political multilateral forum in which representatives of Syria and Lebanon regularly participate in talks with their counterparts from Israel.” Strictly speaking, this is not correct, since Syrian and Lebanese representatives also sit with Israelis in the same room at the UN General Assembly. But effective communication and understanding are no more evident in EMP fora than they are at Turtle Bay. The report also cites a number of Partnership-Building Measures (PBM), a term introduced to replace the more politically contentious concept of Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). Of these, the most noteworthy are information and training seminars for Euro-Med diplomats in Malta, and the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy institutes (which, in its original Mesco incarnation actually pre-existed the EMP). But the anticipated capstone of this chapter, the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, failed to materialise. The original plan was to adopt the Charter at a Euro-Mediterranean Summit to be held during the French Presidency in November 2000. Indeed, the Marseilles Summit was expected to signal the reinvigoration of the entire Barcelona Process. But pervasive Arab-Israeli tensions following the renewed outbreak of violence at the end of September forced the organisers to downgrade the meeting to a Conference of Foreign Ministers, which Syria and Lebanon did not attend, and the adoption of the Charter was postponed sine die.

The economic and financial chapter fared slightly better, but even here, implementation fell far short of declared intentions. Progress in the conclusion of bilateral association agreements was slow. And a variety of problems (including the failure to work out framework conventions) resulted in what is euphemistically described as “the insufficient disbursement rate of MEDA funds.” Only 26% (890 of the 3,435 million Euros committed for structural adjustment, economic co-operation and other bilateral and regional co-operation activities in the period 1995–1999) was actually
disbursed, and in the case of two partners, Syria and Lebanon, the disbursement rate was close to 0%. Moreover, there was little discernible progress in the promotion of freer south-south trade, an essential component in the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010.

Under the third chapter heading, the EU has funded a variety of social and cultural activities and exchange programs intended to promote democracy, human rights, awareness and tolerance of cultural diversity, and the vibrancy of civil society (e.g., by supporting NGOs). Without a reliable yardstick by which to measure such things as mutual understanding and tolerance of diversity, it is difficult to judge the extent of progress in this area. It is true, however, that not all third-basket activities have been immune to government suspicion or the intrusion of factors, especially regional conflicts that complicate co-operation in the first and second baskets, as well. Some, such as Med-Campus, have actually been phased out.

2 Barcelona’s Conceptual Flaw

What accounts for the gap between expectations (or hopes) and reality? The EMP has been subjected to a variety of criticisms: that it is not a true partnership because it is dominated by the European Union which initiated it and continues to fund it; that its decision-making and implementation mechanisms are cumbersome and lack transparency; and that the connection between its goals, however praiseworthy, and the primary means – regional co-operation – is not at all clear.

But the most powerful explanation is the one mentioned, if at all, only sotto voce: that its conceptual underpinning was fundamentally flawed. The most critical flaw of all was the assumption that there was a common Euro-Mediterranean space, i.e., that it actually constituted a region in any meaningful sense of the word, or, at least, that it had enough of the precur sor attributes of a region to justify attempts through institution-building to create a region. But unlike all other regional organisations in the world, the
EMP reflects neither a common identity nor common values. Its members do not share a cultural tradition, language, religion or even history of administrative unity. They possess a wide range of political systems, ranging from liberal democracy to rigid authoritarianism. Even geography does not hold them together. Some of its members are European Mediterranean states, some are European non-Mediterranean states, some are non-European Mediterranean states, and one (Jordan) is neither European nor Mediterranean. Finally, its members are not driven together by the kinds of common external challenges or threats that create alliances or functional communities. Instead, the interests they do share – peace and stability, prosperity, mutual understanding – exist only at the same high level of generality and abstraction that enables the entire world to gather under the wings of universal organisations like the United Nations. And if it is true that nothing unites the members of the EMP except the stated desire to pursue common interests at that level of generality, then the architecture of the Partnership has violated the first principle of architecture – that form follows function.

The inversion of form and function in the EMP is reflected in two other assumptions: that the member-states (actually, member-governments or regimes) are equally wedded to the idea of regional co-operation as a vehicle for the promotion of peace and stability, and that they are equally committed to the political, economic and social liberalisation subsumed in the stated goals of democracy, free trade and civil society (the last of which doesn’t need to be promoted, only tolerated). But the basis for these assumptions does not stand the test of experience.

In the first place, regional co-operation (and especially sub-regional co-operation in the Eastern Mediterranean) was “contaminated” by – i.e., made hostage to – the Middle East peace process (MEPP) and was essentially paralysed. Rather than viewing regional co-operation (“PBM”) under the aegis of the EMP as a end in itself or even as a means to promote peace and stability, many Arab states insisted on seeing it in the same way they had seen the multilateral negotiations of the Madrid process: not as a
positive-sum game from which all benefit, but rather as “normalisation” of relations, that is, a prize to Israel that should not be conferred unless and until Israel took the measures necessary, in their view, to make peace possible. In other words, they approached Barcelona, not as an institution that might improve the regional atmosphere and facilitate more productive bilateral negotiations while providing a host of other tangible benefits, but rather as another international institution, like the United Nations, in which to wage political warfare. As a result, the EMP was reduced to the seemingly absurd situation in which it could not promote peace and stability in the Mediterranean until after peace and stability had been secured.

Secondly, few of the authoritarian regimes have shown any real enthusiasm for the kind of domestic openness that might subvert their own power. Many of the requirements of free trade (abolition of state monopolies, reduction of customs and excise duties, legal security) threaten the power base and even the revenue base of neo-patrimonial regimes. And the toleration of autonomous organisations and institutions essential to vibrant civil society has encouraged public criticism of government practices to the point where some regimes have felt the need to repress them, even (as in the case of Sa’ad e-din Ibrahim’s Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies in Egypt) when those institutions operated with funding from the European Union.

The shortcomings of the EMP were implicitly acknowledged by the EU’s adoption of a Common Mediterranean Strategy in June 2000. The CMS, one of several common strategies elaborated under the umbrella of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, posits many of the same goals of the EMP and adds little in terms of substance. But its elaboration as a unilateral EU document betrays an unspoken disillusionment with the whole notion of partnership and a reversion to the pre-Barcelona mindset of viewing programs as things that Europe does for the Mediterranean rather than as things that Europe and the Mediterranean do together.
3 What Is To Be Done?

The European Union originally promoted the EMP, not just from an altruistic belief that the objectives of the Partnership were admirable in their own right, but also because it believed that its own security and prosperity were intimately bound up with developments on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. More to the point, it felt that problems stemming from political paralysis or repression, domestic or regional strife, and economic stagnation/regression in the south would spill over to the northern shore of the Mediterranean, and thence, given the progressive elimination of barriers to the movement of goods and people within the EU, to the rest of the continent. This spillover, it was feared, would take the form of illegal immigrants, smuggling of drugs and other forms of organised crime, and the spread of radical ideologies and practices (including terrorism) among expatriate communities already in Europe. Europe’s security interest in the Mediterranean does not refer to military threats as traditionally understood (invasion, missile attacks, etc.). Instead, it is grounded in these “soft security” threats, and Europe hoped to preempt these threats by encouraging regional co-operation around the Mediterranean basin in order to ameliorate the political, social and economic problems that give rise to such threats.

In point of fact, however, the net was cast too wide. The real source of soft security threats to Europe is North Africa. Because of its proximity and its historic ties to former colonial rulers, the Maghreb provides most illegal Mediterranean migrants. It is also the source of most political “spillover,” given the large Maghrebi communities resident in Europe. Finally, Europe’s dependence on North African energy (especially natural gas) makes it the locus of far-reaching economic/strategic interests. For all these reasons, Europe has a large stake in North African stability and a reason to support any efforts calculated to enhance stability, including domestic reform and regional co-operation.

But to do this more effectively, it needs to divest itself of some of the conceptual baggage that handicaps the Barcelona process. The availability
of budgets and other forms of institutional inertia mean that the EMP will continue to exist. But as the EU itself evolves, less and less will in any case remain of the EMP’s original concept. With the admission to the EU of Malta and Cyprus in the current round of expansion and the designation of Turkey as a candidate for future membership, there will eventually be little left to sustain the fiction of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Instead, there will be a European “north” and an Arab “south,” with Israel left in a kind of orphan status, Middle Eastern in terms of geographical location but as European as many of the European members and candidates-member in terms of its economic and socio-political attributes.

Thus the first challenge is to abandon the thinking behind some of the clichés that inspired Barcelona: “the indivisibility of Mediterranean security,” “the common Mediterranean space,” “the shared political destiny of the 27 partners,” etc. These have been repeatedly asserted, almost as axioms, but they have never been demonstrated, while the experience of the EMP, at least thus far, tends to demonstrate the contrary. At some point over the long-term, voluntary or coerced membership in institutions may provide a partial substitute for shared cultural traditions in building identities. Meanwhile, policymakers concerned with addressing concrete problems would do better to focus on more confined but operative commonalities.

In practice, this means concentrating on functional and geographical areas where the greatest potential for co-operation already exists. This does not necessarily entail formal dissolution of the Partnership. Nor does it preclude functional differentiation, i.e., shifting participation in different programs based on the principles embodied in the notions of “variable geography” and “coalitions of the willing.” But insofar as regional organisation for the promotion of Barcelona’s stated goals, it does entail the practical disaggregation of the non-European Mediterranean, at least into its two historic constituent parts, the Maghreb and the Mashreq, and a concentration of efforts and resources in the former, where both the greater threat to European interests and the greater potential for productive interaction exist.
In practical terms, that translates into two measures. One is European support for the reinvigoration, not of Barcelona *per se*, but rather of the Maghrebi Arab Union (UMA), the one sub-regional organisation that had at least an embryonic existence and the one that is based on at least reasonably promising foundations. The other is a European decision to revise their approach to trade in agricultural products. Access to the European market for agricultural exports is a major key to economic improvement in North Africa, hence, to a host of other Barcelona-type objectives. But agriculture was excluded from the original provisions of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area for reasons that can only be attributed to the power of domestic interest groups in Europe. If rhetoric about the indivisibility of peace and prosperity, at least in the western Mediterranean, is to be taken seriously, this issue must also be addressed in a serious manner.
Peace Making in the Middle East: Mission Possible

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Chapter 1

The conflict between Jews and Palestinians over the tiny stretch of mostly mountainous and arid Mediterranean land, just some 26,000 sq. km, about the size of Belgium, has now been going on for more than a hundred years. During that period the Palestinians have progressively lost most of what had been, at the turn of the 20th century, land totally inhabited by them to the Israelis. The 1967 cease-fire line has left them with no more than one fifth of former Palestine; and most of this land is barren and arid. And even this remaining tiny bit is being reneged by the Israelis since the start of the Oslo process.

The population living in the area has grown from no more than a few hundred thousand nomads, peasants, fishermen, craftsmen, traders and religious people around 1900 to more than 9 million, of which 6 million in Israel and 3 million in the Palestinian territories, making it the most densely populated area in Europe and the Middle East. Worse, the population is bound to grow further. By 2025 the total population of Israelis and Palestinians is expected to be around 16 million people, on the assumption that immigration and natural growth will continue.

It is necessary to recall this historical perspective if one wants to understand the most recent developments in the secular struggle between Israelis and Palestinians and to lay the foundations for a sustainable, peaceful coexistence among the two peoples.

The time span from June 2000 to July 2001 will be remembered by historians as one of the most dramatic periods in their long struggle. Never
before have the two sides been negotiating more intensively among themselves than at Camp David and thereafter. Never before has an American president become so closely involved in the peace making process as Clinton. Never have the two sides been closer to a final status agreement than at Taba on January 27, 2001; and not since 1973 have they appeared to be farther apart – indeed at the brink of outright war – than during the first months of the Sharon government in the spring of 2001.

The Palestinians have been undergoing ups and downs. After quite a remarkable economic progress and consolidation in the first half of 2000, their situation deteriorated dramatically after the outbreak of the “Al Aqsa Intifada” on September 28, 2000; to a point that their economic life has come to grinding halt, with unemployment and poverty taking painful dimensions and the government reaching a point close to bankruptcy.

Not since 1973 have the outside powers – USA, EU, Egypt, Jordan, Russia, UN – been so much concerned about an escalation of the conflict beyond the Palestinian/Israeli dimension as during the first months of 2001. And never has their assessment of the situation, the prospects and the solutions been more convergent. Gone are the days when the USA on the one hand, Russia on the other hand – with Europe and the Arab League countries in between – used to take diametrically opposed positions on the conflict and on how to bring it to an end.

Why did the pendulum swing so excessively? Why did the Palestinians decide to leave the negotiating table and resume guerrilla warfare against Israel instead? Why did Israel strike back with brutal force?

Essentially for one simple reason: both the Israelis and the Palestinians had lost sight and track of the strategic objectives that they had jointly pledged to pursue through the Oslo agreement, i.e. the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and Jerusalem as the shared capital for both states.

Too much foot-dragging and ambivalence on the Israeli side, too many psychological errors and misunderstandings on both sides, lack of communication, non-functioning “chemistry” among the leaders, disappointed
expectations by the Palestinians in economic and political improvements, and nationalistic and insensitive rhetoric by both sides, etc., have progressively created a sense of frustration on the Palestinian side that finally erupted in the second intifada. Sharon’s provocative march on the Temple Mount was no more than the final straw in an already highly explosive situation.

By June 2001, Israelis and Palestinians had inflicted upon each other sufficient suffering and pains to make them – once more – prone to a settlement by negotiations rather than by further escalation of violence. The Palestinians were visibly exhausted and close to economic strangulation, while the Israelis became more and more aware that there would be no way to ever stop suicide attacks against Israeli citizens as long as the atmosphere was charged with mutual recrimination, military presence, economic repression, growing misery and unemployment.

At the same time, the international community has become increasingly concerned about a further poisoning of relations between Israel and the Arab/Muslim world and therefore is ready to intervene once again in what threatens otherwise to become a never-ending conflict.

After four months of de facto absence from the region the new US government has appointed William Burns, the US Ambassador to Jordan and an experienced hand in Arab/Israeli relations, as the new man in charge of the Middle East. Russia has equally raised its stake in the conflict, wishing to be seen as a global power and able to make a contribution to peace making in a region where one million of its former citizens live. Egypt and Jordan had already submitted their ideas of how to overcome the present stalemate earlier in the year. And, last but not least, the EU “foreign minister”, Javier Solana, has increasingly involved himself in the issue since he was designated as the European representative to the “Mitchell Commission” in October 2000.
Two questions therefore need to be asked at this critical juncture:

- What are the basic elements on which sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinians should be founded?
- By what means can peace be finally reached; what is in particular the role of the international community in the making of peace?

**Chapter 2**

The elements on which peace between Israel and the Palestinians is to be built are in place. Camp David and the follow-up negotiations among the two sides, crowned by the final meeting in Taba (January 2001), have elucidated the pieces of the final puzzle. This will remain their lasting achievement, even if the negotiators failed to come to a formal agreement because Barak had imprudently called premature elections for February 6, 2001 and time was, therefore, running out.

Even if the new Israeli government has stated that it does not feel in any way bound by any negotiating positions that had been taken by the previous government, these elements will remain points of reference for any future negotiation. There will be no peace if either side walks away from the basic “parameters” defined by them during the final Taba negotiations.

Only if and when the two parties and the international community are fully prepared to jointly agree to a settlement along the lines of what has been envisaged at Taba and to firmly defend these with their respective constituencies is there a chance for a durable cessation of hostilities and peaceful co-existence between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab world at large.

It is, therefore, essential and urgent for both parties to focus more on the substance and long-term sustainability of their relationship than on tactical moves. Indeed, as long as Israelis and Palestinians do not look eye to eye on the critical issues that have kept dividing them it will be next to impossible for the Palestinian leadership, let alone radical Palestinian
groups, to stop violence as a means for attaining their “legitimate” objective of securing a state of their own, within the “1967 borders” and Eastern Jerusalem as their capital.

**Chapter 3**

Let us therefore have a quick glance at the essential elements of a sustainable deal between Israel and Palestine. What should be the contours of a final compromise?

Of course, it is up to the two sides to define the final compromises. But if the EU and other outside actors want to have a constructive impact on the outcome of the future negotiations they need to form an idea for themselves of what may constitute the acceptable bases for the final statute.

3.1 Palestinian Statehood

There will be no sustainable peace in the region unless Israel and Palestine mutually recognise each other’s right to exist as sovereign member countries of the international community. Whatever restrictions, e.g., in the field of security, will have to be freely agreed upon among the parties themselves.

The EU can rightly claim to have been the first outside power to have clearly stated the Palestinian right for statehood, as early as 1980, in the famous and controversial Venice Declaration.

Today, Palestinian statehood no longer appears to be a divisive issue among the parties. This merits to be duly underlined, if only to mark that there has been impressive progress in the thinking of the Israeli political elite.

Statehood implies, of course, territorial continuity and the right to travel from one point of the country to any other, without controls by outside powers. Finding a workable solution for “free passage” between Gaza and the West Bank is therefore indispensable for the success of any
negotiation. It also implies full civilian control over the land, including water and mineral resources. The existence of extra-territorial “settlements” on Palestinian land is therefore incompatible with the concept of Palestinian statehood.

These principles need to be recalled, even if transitional periods may be provided for their implementation.

3.2 Borders

This remains the major bone of contention.

If Israel had agreed – in the early stages of the Camp David II – to the principle of withdrawing to the 1967 borders, a deal would most likely have been struck by the end of 2000, before the end of Clinton’s presidency, as Arafat had hoped for. Instead, Barak dragged his feet on this issue right to the end of Camp David, asking for the annexation of 9% of the Palestinian territory and offering no more than 1% of Israeli land in compensation.

For the Palestinians who had given up 78% of the original Palestinian lands (“mandatory Palestine”) since the beginning of Jewish settlement in the middle of the 19th century, this was an unacceptable position. Both Barak and the USA should have known better by Camp David and not only at Taba, when the Israeli delegation had reduced its demand for annexation to 6% of the West Bank (not including Greater Jerusalem!) but still only with minimal offers of land compensation.

The Palestinians were willing to accept the annexation of 3% of their territory (including, of course, Greater Jerusalem) in order to allow for the territorial integration of a few major settlements within Israeli borders, but subject to full compensation by Israeli territory.

International law (UNSEC resolutions 242 and 338) and equity are clearly on the Palestinian side. Their territory (6000 sq. km) is so tiny and uninhabitable that they cannot spare any inch of it. Their population density, especially if measured in relation to fertile land, is already one of the
highest in the world. And it is bound to double within the coming 25 years, due to the doubling of the Palestinian population.

Europe and the international community should therefore firmly support the Palestinian position in their insistence for a full return of the occupied territory. Any solution falling short of a 100% return (including territorial swaps) of the land presently occupied by Israel will put major demographic strains and consequently social and political tensions on the future Palestinian state.

The future Palestinian state should, of course, be in control of its external borders with Jordan in the East and Egypt in the West, subject to a transitional period during which the control might be monitored by outside observers. This would, finally, allow Palestine to conduct its economic relations with Egypt and Jordan and the rest of the Arab world, free from stifling Israeli restrictions, and to gain a higher degree of autonomy from Israel.

Israel seems basically prepared to grant Palestine these natural ingredients of sovereignty.

3.3 Jerusalem

East Jerusalem has been – illegally – annexed by Israel. The international community has never recognised this act. That is why Jerusalem has not, until this very day, been formally recognised as Israel’s capital.

Traditionally, Israel has considered Jerusalem as one and indivisible, under full Israeli control and sovereignty, regardless of international law and the presence of some 200,000 Palestinians in the eastern parts of the city.

Jerusalem should be treated according to the same basic principles as any other Palestinian land occupied by Israel in 1967. There must be integral return of occupied land unless special circumstances rule this out and require appropriate adjustments.
Unfortunately, Israel has changed the facts on the ground in Jerusalem substantially more than in the West Bank or in Gaza. It has re-modelled the city according to its own long-term vision, building highways, expropriating land, integrating the basic infrastructure, etc., as it suited its interests and as if Jerusalem were one single city. This has created a complicated situation that cannot be redressed by simply going back to the 1967 status quo.

A solution for Jerusalem should be based on the following six basic principles:

- The city will become the capital for the two countries: Jerusalem for the Jewish neighbourhoods, Al Quds for the Palestinian neighbourhoods. (Just like Brussels is the capital of the Flemish region of Belgium and the European Union);
- Palestine will exert full sovereignty over the neighbourhoods that are inhabited by the some 200,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites;
- Israel, for its part, will have sovereignty over the sections inhabited by some 600,000 Israelis;
- Each side will exert sovereignty and control over its holy places, in particular the Temple Mount (Harim Al Sharif) and the Wailing Wall;
- Jerusalem will be an open city, allowing for free movement of its citizens; and
- The two municipal authorities will co-ordinate the management of water, sewage, power, roads, municipal transport, etc.

Surprisingly enough, the two sides have reached an extraordinary degree of consensus on these six basic principles during their negotiations in 2000/01. President Clinton has played a very helpful role in establishing the principle of Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish neighbourhoods and Palestinian sovereignty over the Palestinian neighbourhoods.

Of course, many divergences and details still remain to be settled, but the mere fact that, at a certain moment (Taba 27th January 2001, just
10 days before the Israeli general elections), in the presence of American and European observers, negotiators from both sides have been able to envisage such a bold solution for the most difficult of their many problems augurs well for the time when negotiations will be resumed.

3.4 Settlements

As long as the 150 odd settlements with some 200,000 Israeli citizens on Palestinian territory are considered by Israel as extraterritorial enclaves, which require special highways closed to Palestinians, and constant military protection by Israel, there is bound to be friction and provocation between the two sides.

There can, therefore, be no normal peaceful relationship as long as these “thorns in the Palestinian flesh” continue to subsist. The EU has constantly recalled this basic fact to the Israeli authorities; it rightly refuses to accept any products from the settlements under the free trade agreement with Israel. Still, the international community has so far fallen short of drawing the ultimate political consequences from the – illegal – “creeping invasion” of Israeli citizens into Palestinian land.

Any lasting agreement among the two sides must therefore provide for the complete evacuation of the settlements, except for those 3–4 (with about 160,000 Israeli citizens) directly neighbouring on Israel, which will be annexed by Israel as part of the final statute.

This evacuation should take place without any further delay after the signing of the final status agreements, if only to avoid any further harmful acts of provocation. But if this proves impossible, the Palestinians will have to accept a transition period, which should be as short as possible.

It is heartening to register that in the final Taba negotiations a basic consensus was reached between the two sides on the necessity to evacuate all the settlements with the exception of those very few, close to Israel, that would be annexed.
Thus an essential Palestinian demand to dispose of a state with territorial contiguity would be respected.

3.5 Security Arrangements

Israel has traditionally advanced security considerations in order to justify settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories and a strict control of the external borders of the Palestinian territory.

In exchange for abandoning both settlements and border control, it insists on alternative security arrangements to be negotiated with the Palestinians as part of the final status. These requests, which should be limited to a transitional period, are total demilitarisation of Palestine; maintenance of a small number of military outposts (“early warning stations”); and joint control of Palestine’s border crossings towards Jordan and Egypt.

The Palestinians understand Israeli concerns, but would like to minimise restrictions. After the events of recent months, they will be at pains to plead their case both with Israel and the international community. It is more likely that Israel will insist on stricter security rules than during the Taba negotiations and that it will have the backing of the international community for a relatively strong security framework.

3.6 Refugees

In 1948, almost a million Palestinians had to flee or were expelled from their homes. Today the total number of Palestinians living outside Israel and Palestinian territories is estimated to be some 3.5 million, most of whom live in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

The Palestinians have always insisted on the need for Israel to recognise, at least formally, a “right of return” and some sort of compensation for the loss of land and property incurred. They have based their demand on UNSEC resolution 194 of 1948.

Understandably, Israel has shown itself reticent to accept any such demands from the Palestinian side.
It goes without saying that any massive return of Palestinians into Israel would destroy the very fabric of Israel as the homestead for Jews from all over the world. The Palestinians are realistic enough to appreciate this, though public opinion in Israel has been led to believe that Arafat insists on 3.5 million Palestinians returning to Israel.

During the 2000/01 negotiations Israel has conceded to the repatriation into Israel of 40,000 Palestinians over a five-year period, while the Palestinians have asked for a minimum of 100,000. This shows both sides’ seriousness and realism that prevailed during the negotiations on this highly sensitive issue.

There also seems to be a wide sense of agreement between the two sides on the need for a text expressing the Israeli regret for the events of 1948 and 1967 leading to loss of life, displacement, destruction of homes, etc.

And finally, the two sides agree on the principle of establishing a compensation fund and of asking for international assistance for the relocation of refugees.

If all other issues are settled, the refugee issue will certainly find a solution, provided both sides show the necessary sensitivity for the other’s concerns and the international community lends its active support, both for allowing Palestinians to immigrate into the USA and Europe and for helping finance the appropriate housing for those prepared to stay in Jordan, Syria and – maybe even – Lebanon.

Chapter 4

After the “armistice” brokered between the two parties in early June, after the terrible suicide murder of some 20 young Israelis in Tel Aviv, the leadership on both sides seems more ready than ever during the past four months of violence and counter-violence to go back to the table of negotiation where they belong.
An enormous amount of goodwill has been destroyed during those four months. Furiousness, hatred, fear, suspicion and sadness have taken the place of confidence, optimism, collaboration and even friendship. It will not be easy to re-create the spirit of Oslo that will be needed to finally put an end to a century of hostility and have rationality, reason, pragmatism, generosity and trust prevail.

On the other hand, the unprecedented progress towards a final status settlement that had been reached between July 2000 and the end of 2001 should be seen as proof that peace could be made. But this progress was only achieved because of a rather unique combination of circumstances: at the helm of the Israeli government and in charge of the negotiations, especially in the final stage, were a few far-seeing politicians convinced of the need and the possibility to come to terms with their Palestinian “partners”. The USA had plunged into the negotiations head-long and, probably for the first time, had really assumed the role of an “honest broker” attempting to influence the positions of either side and coming up with constructive positions of their own. The EU, in particular through Miguel Martinos, its indefatigable special ambassador for the Middle East, had played the role of the discreet fourth partner in the background helping to convince and pave the way wherever needed.

Since February 2001, the circumstances may be considered as less propitious. That is the general perception. We have an Israeli prime minister with the reputation of being a “hardliner”, not willing to make any “concessions” to the Palestinians on any of the sensitive issues like settlements, borders or Jerusalem. We have an American president with little, if any penchant to get involved in the details of what is probably the most complex peace negotiation in modern times. And we have a Palestinian president whose authority has been sapped at both ends, by the extremist groups in the Palestinian camp and by the Israeli government doubting of his will and capacity to conclude a final deal.

But against these negative aspects it is also possible to score some more optimistic points.
Israel has a national unity government stretching from far “right” to “left”, which has the democratic legitimacy and authority to “sell” a peace settlement to its constituency, provided it is given strong incentives to do so.

These must come on the one hand from Arafat and the Palestinians. They must respect and impose the cease-fire, at least as long as they are given to understand that there is a realistic chance to achieve more or less what had been envisaged among the parties at Taba.

But more importantly, strong inducements must come from the outside. Without a strong and unified message from the USA, EU, Russia, Egypt and Jordan that peace is within reach, provided Israel makes the necessary “concessions” and treats Arafat and the Palestinians with the respect and dignity that they deserve, the Israelis will be tempted to play once more for time and drag their feet.

What then should happen to turn the vicious circle of violence and terror into a virtuous one of re-establishing trust and co-operation?

First, make the fragile “armistice” stand. Arafat has to deploy all his authority to prevent further acts of terror against Israeli targets, both inside the Israeli borders and against settlements on Palestinian territory.

He must also take whatever measures required to stop anti-Israel propaganda campaigns and to replace them by a constructive dialogue with the Israeli public opinion, in which he should set out his vision of co-existence with Israel. Unless he gives this the highest priority he will not be able to establish sustainable peace. He should take lessons from the Franco-German experience in the post-war years!

Second, Israel has to reciprocate immediately by stopping any further construction activities in existing and new settlements, by opening the borders between Israel and Palestine, by transferring to the Palestinian Authority the tax receipts that have been withheld for the last seven months, by allowing Palestinian workers to resume work in Israel and thereby give a boost to the fledgling Palestinian economy. These are indispensable gestures of re-creating confidence.
Third, the international community has to establish a “joint team of observers” who would operate on the ground, with free access to both sides, and report immediately on any incident that might occur. This would be a complement to the restored security co-operation between the parties.

Fourth, the outside parties have to focus their energy and imagination on rekindling the final status talks. This must happen without further delay. The fragile armistice will not last for years! The Palestinians are understandably fed up with the tergiversations and foot-dragging by the Israelis during the years following the Oslo Agreement. This must not be repeated, if one wants to avoid another intifada to break out in the not too distant future. The iron therefore has to be forged as long as it is hot, while the two parties are under the terrible shock of the events since September 28, 2000.

Fifth, to this end, the five major outside players have to sit down jointly and devise a common strategy for putting an end to the conflict. They need to share their assessment of the “concessions” both sides will have to make in order to arrive at a settlement. The results reached at Taba will have to serve as the starting point for such an exercise. Once this is done, they have to agree on how to approach the parties, on who should talk to whom in what order and with what objectives in mind. They also have to carefully weigh what each of them may put in the balance of the final negotiations. Indeed, each of the five parties disposes of assets over one or both of the conflicting parties which have not yet been fully exploited. Each of them has something to offer or to withhold; each of them possesses valuable pieces of economic, political and financial leverage through which to convince the parties to go the extra mile. And, finally, they will have to seriously consider the contributions each of them will be able to make for the surveillance and monitoring of whatever agreements are finally reached.

This approach is a very daring and even a risky one. It requires an unprecedented confidence among the outside parties, a very high degree of confidentiality coupled with the political will to bring about peace and play the role of the honest broker to that end.
It must under no circumstances be perceived as an outside complot. Both Israelis and Palestinians must be clearly told about the purpose of the exercise so as not to make them unduly suspicious.

In order to succeed, the Americans must take the lead for such a joint approach; but they may need to be convinced of its utility by their European partners.

A year ago such an approach would have been unthinkable, nor did it appear necessary. Every one had put their trust into the American ability to go it alone. Today this is no longer evident.

Sharm El Sheikh and Taba have become two major stations on the road of a constructive and more international peace diplomacy in the Middle East. Why not aim for a third and final station?

The stakes are high enough to warrant an innovative new attempt to forge peace.
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Conclusion

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The security of Europe is intrinsically linked to that of the Mediterranean: As François Heisbourg points out in his introduction to this publication, the Barcelona process “clearly has security and defence implications and ESDP necessarily has a Mediterranean dimension”. This linkage is, however, not based on an equitable relationship. The North is rich and highly integrated; the South is mostly underdeveloped and fragmented.

European policymakers try to narrow this North-South cleavage and to address the sources of pan-regional instability with help of trade liberalisation, the promotion of peace and sustainable development. This means that the European conflict prevention activities in the Mediterranean should be geared towards long-term or structural prevention. It is, after all, the root causes that lead to migratory pressures, communal violence, organised crime and the emergence of international terrorism. As George Joffé and Bechir Chourou point out in their respective studies, the EU should invest its soft power into sustainable development that deals operationally with roots of conflicts: poverty, overpopulation, resource competition and lack of legitimate political institutions.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains very much a “work in progress”, because both the North and the South are in transition. The North is developing its own crisis management capabilities under ESDP and at the same time it is extending its borders deep into the Mediterranean to include Malta and Cyprus as new EU members as soon as by 2004. The South is in transition through its efforts of economic liberalisation and its fight against adverse economic and societal effects of globalisation.
The EU has developed a number of policy instruments to shape the security paradigm of the South according to its liberal value system. This includes, first, the development of a Common Strategy. But, as Claire Spencer has shown in her study, the Common Mediterranean Strategy promises little in substance. Its merits lie in the attempt to streamline national policies towards the South within the EU confines and to “combine previously unrelated or uncoordinated spheres of EU activity towards the shared goal of creating ‘a zone of peace and stability’ in the Mediterranean Basin”.

The second instrument is the emerging ESDP. It comprises a broad spectrum of policy options, ranging from civilian crisis management all the way to the projection of “hard” military power. The actual strength of the ESDP is the civilian crisis management side, as it can contribute to a larger and hopefully coherent EU approach that combines crisis management with developmentalist and – if necessary – humanitarian policies. Actual scenarios of Petersberg missions in the Mediterranean have not yet been worked out, but they could include emergency relief operations, emergency evacuations of EU nationals and the deployment of police or peacekeeping forces for peace operations.

While the probability for the future use of ESDP in the Mediterranean is high, and according to François Heisbourg may increase even more if the stabilisation process in the Balkan continues in the coming years, there remains a great degree of misunderstanding over what the ESDP means in terms of security co-operation, both in the North and the South.

The South has been ambiguous towards the development of EU’s rapid reaction force under ESDP and more controversy is to be expected. To begin with, conflict and security are notions that risk rapidly to be instrumentalised in the cross-cultural environment of the Mediterranean. Southern states may easily perceive or portray conflict prevention policies under ESDP as yet another attempt by the West to create a tool to interfere in their internal affairs. This line of argument is due also to earlier Western mishaps concerning Euromarfor, supposedly a benign instrument of Western crisis
management, but perceived by Southern countries as an unilateral and thus interventionist force.

The ESDP will not be able to solicit co-operation among the Arab states of the Mediterranean as long as there are divergent threat assessments in the Mediterranean region. The Northern parts of the Mediterranean perceive security threats today primarily in terms of “cross-cutting” destabilising activities such as drug and human trafficking, organised crime and international terrorism. For the Southern states the primary threat comes from territorial disputes, internal and external challenges to regime legitimacy and underdevelopment. This important divergence of North-South threat assessments will make any creation of a pan-regional co-operative conflict management platform extremely challenging.

The third policy tool of the EU towards the Mediterranean is its multilateral and co-operative engagement in the Barcelona Process. As George Joffé pointed out, it is an exercise in soft power projection to deal with security issues. The authors from Europe and the South Mediterranean converge on the assessment that this Partnership is in serious trouble. Bechir Chourou, for instance, states that the process “has not brought security or shared prosperity to the Mediterranean, and it is unlikely to deliver justice and democracy”. Mark Heller highlights in his study Barcelona’s conceptual flaws. The papers mention the following four arguments: First, the EU induced economic liberalisation efforts in the South have not lead to greater political liberalisation. Second, the main security actor in the region, the US was kept outside the Barcelona Process. Third, the unfortunate linkage to the Middle East peace process stymies any process of the Barcelona process in its Political and Security Chapter. Finally, the Barcelona process is caught in a catch-22 situation with regards to conflict management: The Barcelona declaration prevents the Euro-Med Partnership from tackling current hot conflicts, be they in the Near East, the Aegean Sea or the Western Sahara. At the same time, the Partnership is unlikely to make any progress as long as these conflicts continue to sour the relations among partner states.
In the Southern part of the Mediterranean, efforts continue to promote South-South sub-regional integration. This objective is, however, thwarted by political considerations of the Maghreb governments: the Perestroika syndrome (having led to the downfall of Gorbachov’s liberalising Soviet Union) seems to be a powerful reminder for the Southern governments not to open the door to liberalisation and to more political participation. This is why the Arab Maghreb Union remains a “virtual” sub-regional free trade bloc, despite recent bilateral free trade agreements among Maghreb states. As long as the South does not manage to get its act together and to act in unison towards the North, the Euro-Med Partnership will continue to remain asymmetrical and weak in political effectiveness.

What can the EU do in view of the problem areas as identified in the studies of this publication? As to ESDP, it is important for the EU to offer the South a co-operative handle. To satisfy the requirements of equity and reciprocity it will be important to offer the Partner states access (on an ad hoc basis) to common planning and implementation procedures of civilian conflict management. For this purpose, it would appear logical that the Partner states could participate in the consultation process with the EU similar to the one the EU adopted after the Nice summit with candidate countries (15+15) or is envisaging with other interested countries such as Canada, Russia or the Ukraine. It would be unlikely that the EU would launch an emergency response or its Headline Force into the Mediterranean without the consent or the active participation of Southern states.

With regard to soft power projection, the authors converge around the suggestion to the EU to move towards a more focused and coherent policy on the root causes of conflicts in the region. Also, as the governing regimes of many Southern states are often part of the problem, the EU should lend less support to authoritarian regimes and concentrate instead more on socio-economic co-operation with a strong emphasis upon the empowerment of “genuine” civil society. The call for more conditionality to an obstinate South does come already from both the EU Commission and also member states. As a consequence, the EU should launch a policy of
implicit and explicit conditionality in the implementation of the MEDA programmes, the bilateral Association Agreements and the loans provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Furthermore, the EU should promote and finance more regional and co-operative rather than national projects. But, in this context the North needs to acknowledge that its own economic liberalisation policy towards the South is flawed, as it exempts the most important items from the envisaged free trade regime, i.e. agricultural products and services.

With regard to current or emerging conflicts, the EU is lacking any forum in the Mediterranean wherein such conflicts could be addressed and managed jointly with Southern Partners. Resistance to a pan-Mediterranean conflict prevention project does not come only from the South, but also from the EU itself: In order to get the support of the EU, the forum would need to be compatible with the mainstreaming efforts of the EU regarding conflict prevention and in particular in relation to the ESDP. European decision-makers would not be very enchanted with the emergence of a conflict prevention mechanism that would have its own Mediterranean identity and that may undercut or rival the EU conflict prevention mechanisms. Moreover, the 11 NATO members of the EU would not be interested to have a CP actor or institution in the Mediterranean that may have unfriendly or suspicious stakeholders towards NATO or its 6th Fleet in the region.

The Barcelona framework will not be the right forum as long as there is no Charter for Peace and Stability. This in turn, would be difficult to achieve as long as the Euro-Med Partnership holds on to the dogma of pan-Mediterraneanism: Mark Heller proposes that the Partnership throw over board principles such as “the indivisibility of the Mediterranean security”, “the shared political destiny of the 27 partners” etc. Instead, he calls for the adoption of pragmatic guiding principles such as “variable geography” and the “coalition of the willing”. The acceptance of such principles would open the gateway for Barcelona to formal sub-regional co-operation such
as sub-region specific round tables or militarily significant confidence-building measures.

The future of the EU’s relation with the Mediterranean will be determined by the EU resolve towards the Middle East and other conflicts in the region on the one hand and towards addressing root causes including bad governance on the other. Eberhard Rhein suggests a stronger role of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process. It is true that the EU has been part of recent peace initiatives to the region: Mr. Solana as High Representative has been present both in Sharm El Sheikh and in the Michell Fact Finding Commission. But Rhein argues that the EU should not compete with the US, but rather encourage her to take the lead again – something that has been missing ever since President Bush came into power.

For Mark Heller, in turn, the net of the EU towards the Mediterranean “was cast too wide” and he suggests for the EU to concentrate on the soft security threats of North Africa. Claire Spencer uses the same tonality when she argues that “the Mediterranean has perhaps always been too unwieldy a focus to permit a properly integrated or balanced European foreign policy”. Her suggestion to the EU is to pursue a “graduated and country-specific approach” along with development assistance and capacity building programmes in order to encourage political empowerment of the population.

To George Joffé, the future of Euro-Med relations will be characterised by the prevalence of soft and “cross-cutting” security concerns, especially with regard to energy vulnerability and migration. Europe’s natural gas dependence, for instance, will rise towards a quarter of total demand, once Libya’s Western Gas Project comes on-stream in 2003. The increased energy dependence of Europe should act as a promoter of the Euro-Med Partnership. The conclusion of this argument is implicitly if not explicitly present in all papers of this volume, namely that the model of an isolationist “fortress Europe” should not prevail as Europe will unavoidably be even more intertwined with the destiny of the Mediterranean and its Southern societies and civilisations.
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