Foreword by Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, Chief Editor
(2nd Issue Editor)

I am pleased to introduce to you our second issue. This publication explores police transformations in post-Communist societies. This issue includes an overview of police reforms in Central and Eastern Europe by Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin, an article devoted to reforms in Ukrainian militia by Adrian Beck, a contribution of Maria Los exploring several aspects of the privatization of the state security apparatus in Poland and finally an article written by Nikolai Petrov offering an analysis of elites changes in the spatial organisation of the Russian power ministries as they were affected by the federal reform (please read Gilles Favarel-Garrigues’ presentation of these contributions in the next document).

The issue also presents a number of reviews of recent French, Russian and English books:

- Anne Wuilleumier reviews (in French) a collective book edited by Gilles Favarel-Garrigues linked to this issue’s topic;
- David Betz reviews Knoph’s book “Civilian control of the Russian state forces”;
- Elena Zdravomyslova reviews a book written by Amy Caiazza on the role of gender and citizenship ideologies in contemporary Russia;
- the book reviewed by Amandine Regamey (“My byli na etikh voinkh”) is part of a research project led by Iakov Gordin on the history of the Russian-Caucasian wars of the 19h and 20- centuries. This book is the first one about the 20- century.
- Youri Vavokhine reviews a recent book by ethnologist Ekaterina Yefimova on the prison as a “marginal” subculture, as well as the Russian criminal tattoo encyclopedia.

Many thanks to all who contributed to this issue!
We look forward to hearing from readers and potential contributors to future issues. Please consult the pipss web page for deadlines, style guidelines and other information for contributors.
Crime, Insecurity and Police Reform

in Post-Socialist CEE

Abstract

This article provides an overview of changes in modes of reforms of the structures and processes of policing in the context of the democratic transition of Central and Eastern Europe. It begins by discussing the concept of democratic policing as the ostensible goal of police reform in democratising states, then draws out the general parameters of police reform in CEE, including some of the obstacles and problems that have been encountered, and future directions for research.

While police reform in post-conflict settings has received much attention recently from both academics and practitioners, comparative studies of transformations of policing systems in countries undergoing more peaceful transitions from authoritarianism and state socialism to democracy are surprisingly less common. In a recent comparative research project on police reform in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), we attempted to examine police reforms in fourteen countries since 1989. This article discusses some of the findings of that book and provides an overview of the challenges of reforming the structures and processes of policing in the context of the democratic transition of Central and Eastern Europe. It begins with a discussion of the concept of democratic policing as the ostensible goal of police reform in democratising states, then outlines the general parameters of police reform in post-socialist states, including some of the main obstacles and problems that have been encountered. Finally, it outlines some directions for future research on crime control and police reform in the region.
Democratic policing

The provision of security to citizens and communities is an essential function of the modern state. The police is the key state agency responsible for policing and ensuring public security, and is thus strongly linked with the well-being of individuals and communities through its routine provision of preventive, administrative and punitive services, including the undertaking of criminal investigation, recovering stolen property and bringing suspects to justice. In post-authoritarian and post-communist countries alike, the dismantling of regime policing and the establishment of democratic policing – policing that is professionally effective, accountable and legitimate – is an indicator of the consolidation of democracy.

Conceptions of democratic policing, which then are the yardsticks by which the performance of policing systems will be measured by the international policy community and progressive police leaders, have slowly coalesced in transnational policing regimes, and have become entrenched in international/transnational agreements and understandings, such as UN Codes of Conduct for law enforcement or the use of force by or the Council of Europe codes of conduct for police; European Union guidelines for reform of the policing systems of potential accession countries; guidelines for democratic policing in post-conflict societies, or reform commission reports in societies seeking to end or lessen sectarian violence and conflicts.

Conceptions of and policies for democratic policing center on a set of core values and norms, which consistently, though expressed in somewhat different language, show up in scholarly and policy oriented writings. Democratic policing is characterized by an orientation to service for civic society, rather than the state; transparency and accountability; the representativeness of personnel as measured by the distribution of salient identities in society; integrity management as a central function of police administration; a semi-autonomous
status of the police organization and system; the treatment of police as citizens; and the possession of skills needed to perform allocated tasks efficiently and effectively, as indicated by the degree of professionalism at all ranks of the organization and across specific functional tasks (e.g., managerial skills at the higher ranks, technical skills in investigations, or people skills by street level police in encounters with citizens).

Striving to achieve these values is seen as essential to any claim that reforms in the structure, culture or work performance of the police which can be labeled democratic. The validity of core values is not much of an issue anymore; the difficulty is converting core democratic values into effective policies which are accepted by the state, civic society and the police. The most difficulty transitions, given the legacy of socialist policing policies, cultures and values, include the quest for representativeness, such that major salient social identities (specifically gender and ethnicity) are reflected in the composition of police personnel; integrity management, that is operational policies which actively and persistently enforce stated normative standards to prevent corruption and abuses of power; semi-autonomy which refers to the need and capacity by the police to balance responsiveness to state and civic society demands with the requirement that the police to enforce the law impartially, professionally and without bias; internal democracy within the police organization; and accountability by the police to relevant state legislative, executive and judicial organizations and to civic society. The component elements are closely inter-related in democratic policing. If effectively implemented, core values will lead to enhanced performance which ensures the personal safety of the population and public order balanced against the demands that policing be attuned to professional, integrity and service oriented priorities. Accountable police are transparent in their procedures and operations and are subject to both internal and external control mechanisms that ensure the police are performing their functions in a way that respects rule of law and the human and civil rights of the people they serve. Police who enjoy public
legitimacy are viewed both by state actors and the public as representing salient and legitimate interests in society, hence as acting fundamentally in the public interest and effectively fulfilling their duties in a trustworthy and just manner. Key to the concept of legitimacy is consent. Liberal democracies uphold the value of consent of the governed, which bestows legitimacy and the moral right of government to govern, a function which includes the provision of basic public services such as security and order. The need for consent is especially true of police, who wield much potential power, both intrusive and coercive, over citizens. Public consent and legitimation of policing in democracies are based on the general belief that police adhere to the law and due process, are subject to control, are accountable and transparent, are politically neutral, and seek to protect human and civil rights.8

The specific operational meanings of democratic traits in policing will have to be attuned to the nature of work done by the police, whether normal street policing, intelligence, public order or state security work. For example, accountability and transparency mechanisms will have to vary by the type of work done. Intelligence led policing may be legitimately restricted in access and transparency by legal requirements (such as in case work) or national security concerns; but the basic principle that the police are not be unchecked masters of their domain and powers applies equally to all manners of policing.

Challenge of police reform in post-socialist CEE

The post-socialist region at present contains a diversity of states ranging from the nearly consolidated democracies of Central Europe to various post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, making generalisation increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, common experiences in the structure and functioning of socialist police continue to influence the development of post-socialist police organisations and criminal justice systems. Policing in the Marxist-Leninist systems of CEE was based on the model developed in the Soviet Union and subsequently exported to client
regimes. The Marxist-Leninist state was ideologically framed as a socialist state of the people and also their political organisation. Since the function of the state was to facilitate the transition to an ideal Communist society where all means of production would be communally owned, it justified exercising control and coercion to that end. As a result, criminal law was intended to protect both citizens and the socialist state from criminal acts, and ‘to help propel the system toward Communism’. Police were a key instrument in protecting both state and citizens, and fostering development of socialist consciousness by enforcing conformity with state ideology.9

While the Soviet-style militia gradually evolved from a militarised body that suppressed political opposition to a law enforcement body responsible for ensuring public order (and relying on the complicity of citizens in their own control), it remained an authoritarian police force closely tied to the party-state.10 Common to all socialist systems, the mission of the police (militia) was essentially political – ie. to further progress towards communism under the leadership of the communist party. The authority of the police derived from policies determined by the party central committee and police were in practice subordinate to the party and expected to execute the will of the party. Party influence was pervasive, with political indoctrination of recruits (recruitment was often influenced by the degree of ideological commitment of the applicant), and most police were party members. Socialist-era police were also highly centralised, with high degrees of supervision over daily activities and decisions, and had a militarised administrative style based on the strict obedience of orders. Centralised control also prevented the development of administrative autonomy of local police.11 Given the tightly constrained decision-making power of individual policemen who normally had to seek approval from higher-ups on most decisions, the development of individual powers of judgement and discretion among individual police officers was inhibited.12 Socialist-era police also lacked transparency, and the existence of classified laws and regulations that reached
into areas of daily life including religion, mobility and housing meant that the state's authority as exercised by the police was both overarching and unknown to citizens. Furthermore, the Party functioned above the law, with a prohibition against investigating and prosecuting Party members unless authorised by the Party itself. Manipulation of the legal process was thus enabled by the blurring of political, judicial and law enforcement powers and close links between Party, procuracy and police.

While Western European democracies underwent a process of liberalisation in their criminal justice and penal policies after World War II, which included abolition of the death penalty and the development of alternatives to imprisonment, the criminal justice systems of Communist countries did not experience the same type or degree of liberalisation. Compared to Western European states, official crime rates were very low. Since state socialist ideology held that crime was by definition a capitalist phenomenon that was supposed to disappear with the achievement of communism, a lower crime rate confirmed the superiority of the communist system over the capitalist system. As a result, officials tended to actively discourage the reporting of crime, with the result that crime rates were artificially low levels and are considered unreliable by analysts. Toward the end, as the Soviet Union neared its collapse, the gap between the official rhetoric of decreasing crime and the experienced reality of insecurity and fear of crime became too great to paper over by manipulating statistics on crime made known to and solved by the police, leading to a somewhat more accurate official depiction, yet one which still fell far short of the known numbers of crimes which circulated among the security establishment. At the same time, socialist criminal policy was harsh in comparison to that in Western Europe, and rates of incarceration were high through convictions in criminal cases and by the use of psychiatric evaluations for unsocialist thoughts and acts. For example, whereas Western Europe relied heavily on fines in terms of penal sanctions (often comprising over 80 percent of penal sanctions in many European countries),
Poland relied predominantly on the punishment of imprisonment, with fines constituting less than 10 percent of penal sanctions during the 1970s.15 With the change in regime in 1989, CEE states faced a triple challenge: overcoming the communist legacies in their criminal justice systems; reforming the police to reflect principles of democratic policing including international standards in human rights; and contending with the growth in crime and public fear of crime. More broadly, post-communist states faced the task of building criminal justice systems that were more democratic and transparent. Crimes had to be redefined, depoliticised, and penalties diversified and made less harsh. Criminal justice system transformation included removing references to socialist rule of law, introducing due process guarantees, eliminating the categories of ideological crimes and crimes by analogy16, abolishing the death penalty and introducing more lenient sentencing as well as reducing the reliance on imprisonment by introducing alternative forms of penalties and non-custodial sanctions such as fines, while also improving living conditions in prisons.

The post-1989 social context was one of growing levels of poverty, unemployment and extremes of social differentiation at the same time that privatisation of state assets and market reforms were transforming numerous economies throughout the region. Policing was often severely under-resourced, and understaffing due to the departure of many personnel from police structures (for better paying private employ in private security firms or as muscle for organised crime), low levels of public trust and prestige accorded the police, and serious morale problems left the police structures weakened and less able to fulfil their functions in an ever more challenging environment.17 All post-socialist societies experienced an explosion of regular and transnational organised crime involved in smuggling drugs, people, arms, or conventional contraband such as cars, and in some areas, the criminalisation of the economy through growth of the shadow economy and links between organised crime and corrupt state officials.18
Due to the problematical crime recording practices throughout the region, pre-1989 and post-1989 comparisons must be approached very cautiously and some analysts maintain it is more useful to look at 1990 figures with subsequent years, a period when many of the earlier constraints on reporting crime no longer applied and new methods of compiling crime statistics were implemented. A number of comparative crime surveys have been undertaken and demonstrate clear trends across the region. After the fall of communist regimes in 1989-91, Central and Eastern European societies experienced major changes in the nature and extent of crime. Crime rates throughout the region exploded and showed overall upward trends which continued throughout the next decade. Some of the biggest increases were seen in property offences. The median rate for domestic burglary in 2000 was 72 percent higher than the rate in 1990, while that for motor vehicle theft in 2000 was 236 percent higher than in 1990. Some violent offences grew more modestly, with the median rate of rape offences at 8 percent higher in 2000 than in 1990, and assault 16 percent higher. However, median rates of robbery were 100 percent higher in 2000 compared to 1990, and homicide showed a 30 percent higher rate. Some of the growth in crime was country and even city specific. For example, in St Petersburg, the level of all crimes increased 2.3 times between 1987 and 1995, while violent serious crime (murders) increased 6 times in the same period.

According to one study, the early explosion of violence and crime peaked in the mid-1990s, with subsequent decreases to 2000 in certain categories as police and state authorities became more adept at dealing with crime, including organised crime, and as political and socio-economic conditions began to stabilise. On the other hand, consistent growth in property offences throughout the 1990s has been hypothesised as reflecting the growth in unemployment and the expansion of the market economy, and correspondingly the availability of goods.
The impact of the surge in crime on citizen attitudes has been significant. Post-socialist CEE publics have demonstrated high levels of fear of crime and feelings of insecurity. At the same time, they generally continue to perceive the police as corrupt or as serving the interests of the state or private interests rather than those of the community.24 The International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) indicated that of all the major regions of the world, citizens in the countries in transition of CEE feel least safe, with 46 percent saying they feel safe in the street, while 53 percent feel a bit unsafe or very unsafe.25 In 1995, for example, 40 percent of respondents in the Czech Republic felt insecure on the street near home after dark, while 35 percent of Poles felt insecure. The widespread fear of crime is not only a result of the actual increase in crime rates, but also in part a function of the liberalisation of the media in post-socialist societies and their transformation from ‘good news media’ which censored domestically troubling news items, to ‘bad news media’ operating on the assumption that crime and exposés of corruption and ineffectiveness of state officials, including the police and criminal justice system, sells more papers.26 During the period from 1992 to 1996, the general level of satisfaction with the police controlling crime locally either decreased or remained at the same level across the countries in transition, and in no country (with the exception of Slovenia in 1992) were a majority of the citizens satisfied with the police.27 Satisfaction levels with the performance of the police are much lower in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. In a 1996 survey, 73 percent of Western European respondents were satisfied with the police performance, increasing to 78 percent in the 2000 survey. By comparison, only 33 percent of Central and Eastern European respondents were satisfied in 1996, increasingly marginally to 34 percent in 2000.28 Publics in the CEE countries in transition also cite police as the public officials most frequently involved in corruption, particularly in Russia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Georgia.29
Another major difference between Western Europe and CEE as revealed in the ICVS is in attitudes towards the police. Victims of crime in Central and Eastern Europe remain less likely to report the crimes to police, with 32 percent of victims reporting the crimes to police in 1996, increasing slightly to 34 percent in 2000. In comparison, 48 percent of victims in Western Europe reported crimes to police in 1996, with 56 percent doing so in 2000. Reluctance to report crimes in post-socialist societies may also result from fear of revenge by the organised gangs responsible for certain types of crimes.

The growth in public fear of crime throughout the post-socialist region has significance for politics and policy. In contexts where public fear of crime reaches high levels, public, media and political parties can create pressure for punitive crime control policies as ‘law and order politics’ comes to dominate the political agenda, leading to calls from certain political parties, media and members of the public for more punitive crime control policies. In some countries, such as Poland, there was a time lag before public fear of crime began to be felt on the policy level. The immediate impulse following the change in regime in 1989 was liberalisation of criminal justice policies, and during this period experts in criminal justice tended to dominate the discourse and development of policy. By the second half of the 1990s, however, law and order politics began to take effect as political parties began to swing their support behind more populist alternatives to crime control policies. In the case of post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe, fear of crime was a countervailing factor to the tasks and challenges of liberalising the overly harsh criminal justice systems (as compared to Western European states). Indeed, under the pressure of law and order politics and criticisms of sentencing policies perceived as too lenient, Polish penal policy is no longer on the path of liberalisation, sentencing has become more severe, and rates of imprisonment in Poland have steeply increased in recent years. A similar dynamic is visible in Estonia, where a political party with a strongly conservative social platform and law and order politics came to prominence in
2003 and has led the trend towards a more punitive criminal justice policy.33 In the Balkans, the emergence of state-organized crime syndicates engaged in smuggling of all kinds of goods and people, a traffic protected by violence and fear, undermined much of the impetus for reform and increased public demands to crack down on crime.

Thus post-socialist societies encountered significant challenges in transforming their policing structures. All of the states share the legacy of a decades-long experience as state socialist regimes which used the Soviet model of policing based on police that remained subject to Party control. Moreover, all of the states experienced sharp increases in crime and pervasive public fear of crime and the perception that police were unable to adequately assure the their personal safety and protect their property. These factors also contributed to the widespread emergence of private police and security firms, a theme to which we will return later in the paper.

Experiences in post-socialist police reform

Fundamental and sustained reform of the regular policing system has proven one of the more difficult tasks faced by the post-socialist states. While many changes have been made in police organisations in terms of the declaratory statements of policing officials, legal frameworks and symbolic and structural reforms implemented (such as changing the name of the organisation from militia to police, changing uniforms and rank structures), they have often proven superficial and do not yet appear to have succeeded in fundamentally changing the working values, habits and practices of the police to the point where they could be said to fully embody democratic policing. The police cannot yet be said to espouse a service mentality and the relationship between citizens and police must still undergo fundamental change before it can be said that police are accountable and enjoy public consent and legitimacy. Chronic underfunding and
lack of effectiveness in combating crime contribute to the lack of public trust and confidence in police organisations throughout the region.

Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the police reform experience is becoming increasingly differentiated across the post-socialist region. The states differ greatly in terms of the sizes of their territories and populations, the nature of the regime change to democratic systems, as well as the rates at which they have subsequently transformed their political and economic systems. While some states have moved quickly to ‘rejoin’ European structures, with the added incentives and normative models implied by the dynamics of accession and improvements in overlapping areas such as state administration reform and judicial reform, others retain authoritarian governments, have experienced armed conflict and inter-ethnic violence, or face internal security threats in the form of nationalist revolts and insurgencies. And while, as discussed above, all post-socialist societies have experienced surges in crime, some have the added burdens of high rates of corruption of state structures, notably including police and other security services, and the penetration of organised crime throughout state structures and societies.

The greatest progress among post-socialist states towards establishing effective, accountable and legitimate police has occurred in certain Central European states such as the former GDR, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Legislative reform in the area of policing is at an advanced stage in these countries, and progress towards both depoliticisation and demilitarisation of the ethos and culture of police has been realised. However, decentralisation of policing has been slower to take root, or where it has occurred, has resulted in lack of cooperation among local police organisations due to shortages in personnel and resources.34 Aside from former East Germany, which is not easily compared with the other post-socialist states that were not absorbed by another entity and benefited from the same scale of investment of resources into
the reform process, police reform has progressed in those states that are acknowledged to be the most advanced in terms of democratisation and creation of market economies. This group of states have also joined the European Union or are in the process of joining, and hence must harmonise their legislation across many fields. EU accession requirements, however, have focused more on improvements in the efficiency of policing, in particular international police cooperation and the countering of serious transborder crime, than the achievement of democratic policing as defined in this article.35 Moreover, international human rights monitors continue to note continuing problems with abuse of certain categories of individuals, namely Roma and other visible ethnic minorities (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia) and pervasive low-level corruption among police (Poland). These sources also note continuing problems with human trafficking through the region.

Present-day candidates for EU accession Bulgaria and Romania have been active in reforming police structures and legislation but continue to experience problems with police use of excessive force and mistreatment of detainees and continuing police accountability problems.36 Important changes are evident in policing in post-socialist Lithuania, where a new structure, in combination with a determined effort to combat organised crime through the passage of new anti-organised crime legislation, an increase in funding for police recruitment, training and equipment, and the creation of specialised units, is considered to have contributed to improvements in combating organised crime by the mid-1990s.37 While police abuse of detainees remains a problem, improvements have been made to police accountability.38

Police reform in the Western Balkan states not only confronts the legacy of state socialism, but is also distinguished by the recent experiences of authoritarianism, inter-ethnic tensions and armed conflict and their lingering aftermaths in terms of organised criminal networks, widespread trafficking and corruption. Achieving
democratic policing throughout the region is vital for long-term reconciliation and peace-building efforts. Where police had been involved directly in armed conflict or paramilitarised through being subject to military command, discipline and combat roles, one of the major tasks involves entrenching the philosophy and functions of the organisation as a professional civilian law enforcement agency that serves the citizens. Further, police officers who had been involved in ethnic cleansing and human rights abuses must be identified and removed from the police in order for the organisation to begin regaining the trust and confidence of local minority communities. Where police organisations are ethnically homogenous, they must become more representative of the diversity found in local communities. The Western Balkans sub-region is also unique in the sustained engagement of international and regional organisations through peace support missions, rule of law assistance and security sector reform programs that directly affect policing organisations. In some states, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of the pressure for democratic policing reform derives from the international community. In some states, the police experience in the armed conflict strengthened initial public confidence in the police as a key institution of the new state, although it also tended to strengthen the bonds of loyalty and the code of silence among police officers, complicating efforts to improve accountability and root out corruption.39

Police organisations in many Soviet successor states continue to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies, and remain more militarised, centralised and politicised than is generally the case in Western societies. Indeed, the politicisation of Russian law enforcement was recently cited by a leading democracy monitoring NGO as one of the key factors for its downgrading to ‘not free’ status in its annual ranking of states.40 The problems of police transformation must be seen in the broader context of corruption and organised crime that pervade many of these states. In certain countries police continue to exhibit serious problems of abuse of power, corruption, mistreatment and even torture of detainees and
prisoners. One legacy of the Soviet system is the highly centralised plans and a culture that discouraged initiative and the development of personal discretion among officers. This has had a lingering effect on leadership and management in post-Soviet societies, including in the policing field. Post-Soviet states have systems of legal education that tend to be highly theoretical, without adequate teaching of practical skills. Police officers applying for management training at the National Academy of Internal Affairs in Kyiv, for example, are required to have a law degree. The training of police managers in Ukraine tends to heavily emphasise learning the legal framework and theoretical issues, rather than practical and effective management techniques.

Moreover, centralised control and party oversight, led to a fear of discretion at the lower ranks. Police working the street were reluctant to take any action not directly specified or sanctioned by their superiors, leading to vast inefficiencies and massive corruption as officers went in search of directions whenever an unusual situation occurred, rather than use their discretion to arrive at a situationally justified solution, or sought to solve the problem faced by intimidation and corrupt means. Of course, the willingness to make decisions which are not precisely spelled out by law or organisational regulations is a fundamental aspect of democratic policing. The exercise of discretion at the lower ranks of the police organization is shaped largely by occupational cultures, and those are the most difficult elements of policing to change by formal policies and training. The continuity of occupational cultures in the policing systems of CEE states has proven to be a major obstacle to the effective implementation of reforms.

A development that is having profound impact on policing and the provision of security, including throughout the post-socialist region, is that of the privatisation, or alternately, the multilateralisation of policing and security. Bayley and Shearing have posited this broad trend as heralding a fundamental transformation in the
governance of security involving the separation of those who authorise policing from those who actually perform policing. In other words, policing is no longer exclusively carried out by governments, and that there is an ongoing transfer of both functions (the authorisation /demand of policing and its provision / supply) away from governments. It goes beyond privatisation; the boundary between private and public domains is becoming increasingly blurred in the policing domain. Consequently, the term multilateralisation is preferred over privatisation.44

The transformation in policing involves a fundamental shift in how policing – and security more generally – is being governed.45 Not only is the authority to produce security being transferred to groups within states, but this authority is being handed upwards (supranationalisation) to international political actors such as the United Nations and European Union, but also to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, regional actors such as the OSCE46 and OECD47, and foreign assistance agencies within states,48 who are increasingly becoming concerned with state spending on security and the relationship between economic and political development and reform of the security sector. This transformation suggests the need for governance of policing and security at transnational levels.

Multilateralisation of both the auspices and providers of policing is evident in post-socialist states, and is particularly striking in Russia. Public fear of crime escalated dramatically while police lacked adequate resources and know-how to combat the surge in crime. Additionally, policing capacity was undermined as many members of the regular police and state security agencies left the services for private sector employment with private security companies. The police were perceived as unable to provide public security, and as a result those who could afford to turned increasingly to private security agencies. These agencies have become providers of many functions traditionally performed by the state,
including law enforcement, but also administering justice, resolving disputes, protecting people and property, debt enforcement and intelligence-gathering.\textsuperscript{49} In post-Soviet societies, the emergence of a ‘shadow state’ and underground, largely criminalised, economy controlled by organised crime groupings led to a system of private and brutal enforcement and protection, or policing, of that economy, and spilled over into the legal economy as legitimate domestic and international firms were pressured into buying protection for their personnel and properties against criminal acts from the very people most likely to do them. The state police could do little to protect companies against such extortion and demands for participation by organised crime in their legitimate activities.

The Russian transition from state socialism involving rapid privatisation and economic liberalisation from 1992-1995 also triggered important structural changes in the provision of law enforcement, security and justice. The transition created a broad array of new economic actors who required protection in an environment rife with extortion and criminal groups. However, such protection was not provided adequately by the Russian state security and law enforcement services, which experienced personnel loss and diminishing efficiency as the state deliberately sought to decrease the power of state security and law enforcement structures by decentralising them and creating multiple agencies with overlapping areas of jurisdiction. As a general result of these reforms, state control over organised coercion and administration of justice became increasingly fragmented. The vacuum in protection resulted in a surge in growth of private protection and enforcement agencies that drew on the personnel of state security structures and offered services based on special relationships with those state structures. What has become visible in Russia is a ‘hybrid sector’ of private security firms that exist between the private sector and the state. These profit-driven firms sell protection and contract enforcement services, drawing especially on their links with state security organs to not only provide protection, but to engage in directly in the sphere of business transactions through informal
negotiations with other enforcers in case of breach of contract or failure to service a debt.\textsuperscript{50} Large private protection companies ‘tend to preserve their corporate identity and resemble privatized segments of the state defense and security ministries. The chiefs of private protection companies openly admit what they call mutually beneficial cooperation with the state organs, meaning an exchange of operative information for money or equipment.’\textsuperscript{51} The Russian state encouraged the formation of such firms through legislation that made it easy to set up such agencies, particularly if an individual had professional experience in state law enforcement or security organs. In such a way, creating space for the establishment of private security firms was a means of facilitating the reemployment of former security and police officers in the private sector.\textsuperscript{52}

Private security agencies in the region have close links to state police and security agencies, due in part to having absorbed large numbers of former secret service, police and army officials, and communist-era high officials. In Poland, the private security sector ‘is more numerous, better armed and equipped and more visible than the state police sector, and it offers both legal and criminal services.’\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, ‘the police routinely direct victims of certain crimes to look for private protection and assistance or else, through inaction, tacitly encourage other victims to seek private means of redress.’\textsuperscript{54} In Russia, private security companies constitute a form of ‘hybrid policing’, with PSCs often maintaining close relations with local police and helping to define and maintain public security as well as protecting their private clients.\textsuperscript{55} There is also a state body, the Extra-Departmental Protection Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (UVVO) which contracts with individuals and firms to protect private property, while still retaining public security responsibilities.\textsuperscript{56} Aside from contracting the UVVO for protection, private interests may seek mafia protection or may approach local police agencies and/or their individual agents for protection and special services. Having privileged access to state providers of policing is closely linked to power in Russia. One means of gaining access is
through corporate donations; local MVD organs, for instance, are the second largest recipient of corporate donations following the disabled.57

The situation in Russia, with its diverse range of security auspices and providers, is suggestive of a weak state which has difficulty meeting the security needs of its citizens. The selling of protective services to private interests by state agencies such as the UVVO, and the privileged access to services of MVD organs through private donations may help to aggravate and deepen problems of legitimacy by the public providers of security. Nevertheless, some experts on the dynamics of weak and failing states maintain that international donors have over-relied on the state as the main authorizer and provider of security. Rather, they suggest that reforming the governance of security in weak and failing states requires drawing on local knowledge and creative mobilisation of a broad range of non-state actors and resources, both domestic and transnational. Creative partnerships in security governance, including those between state and non-state actors, is being advanced as a potential means of serving local public security needs while relieving pressure on state agencies and enabling them to emerge or regenerate.58

Conclusions

While the countries of CEE and FSU are increasingly diverse, especially in terms of the consolidation of democracy and stability, they share common political, economic and social legacies from their recent experience of state socialism. The effects of Soviet-type policing continue to be felt in these countries, although it is expected that with the passage of time, post-socialist conditions will fade and more distinct national systems of policing will become evident. The homogenising effects of international norms and EU standards as well as the impact of international donor assistance must also be taken into account as factors shaping the future development of these policing systems.
Despite the structural and procedural reforms implemented in policing organisations across the region, the overall results are not yet satisfactory, especially when one takes into account the views of citizens and crime victims. The continuing low rate of public confidence and satisfaction in the police and reluctance to report crime, along with the generally elevated fear of crime and feelings of insecurity throughout the region, speak to an urgent need for improving police performance in crime prevention and control and changing the relationship between the police and local communities. The record of the past fifteen years indicates that the transformation from authoritarian to democratic policing is not something that can be quickly achieved, but is a long-term process requiring years of reform and investment.

Finally, new forms of security provision have emerged throughout the region. Private security companies have become suppliers of services previously provided by the state through its monopoly on legitimate violence. The proliferation of private security companies and their ambiguous links with state police and security institutions require further study, with special attention to implications for security governance.

But a focus on policing, in all its multilateralised forms, will not be enough. As noted earlier, crime and fear of crime are powerful political issues which are easily exploited for partisan and personal gains. The temptation to use crime and the police as political symbols and issues is ever present. Only when that temptation is resisted by political leaders and community activists can reform of policing systems begin to move toward democratic norms and forms.

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Footnotes:


5 As Bayley (2001: 76) has noted, ‘the elements of democratic police reform are no longer problematic.’


11 Wolfe, pp. 27-30, 94.
Officers were free to be corrupt and abusive, as that activity was condoned by their superiors. Yet for decisions which might go against organizational expectations or the personal preferences of superiors, or when officers were not sure whether a decision they made would offend them, officer would request guidance in order to protect themselves against recriminations. For an insightful discussion of the occupational culture of the socialist police, in this case the Russian militia, see Louise I. Shelley, *Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996, 98-105).


The analogy crimes were a real violation of due process since they did not specify specific acts but merely stated that any acts which were similar to, or analogous to acts defined as crimes could be treated as crimes.


Aebi, pp. 45-46.


Aebi, pp. 49, 53.


Zvekic, p. 77.


Zvekic, p. 53.

Alvazzi del Frate, p. 66.
31 Krajewski, p. 379.
32 Krajewski, p. 402.
35 For example, see Comprehensive Monitoring Reports 2003 for each of the candidate states before they joined the EU in May 2004. Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/index.htm
43 Beck, Barko and Tatarenko, p. 465.
46 e.g., *Police Reform. Developments in Serbia and Montenegro*, a Newsletter published by OSCE, Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, Law Enforcement Department
51 Volkov, p. 489.
52 Volkov, p. 486.
56 Gavarel-Garrigues and Le Huérou, p. 20.
57 Gavarel-Garrigues and Le Huérou, p. 21.
Reflections on Policing in Post-Soviet Ukraine: A Case Study of Continuity

Abstract

Over the last 10 years the countries emerging from the break up of the Soviet Union have grappled with the reform of their criminal justice systems, with some enjoying considerable success, while others have seen virtually no change whatsoever. This article reflects upon the experience of Ukraine in its attempts to reform the police, and argues that it is more a story of continuity than change, with pre-independence structures, cultures and power elites predominating. It suggests that political and ideological ambiguity has led to uncertainty about how the police should be reformed from one previously focused on serving the state and ‘collective’ interests to one meeting the needs of the individual and local communities. The article begins by highlighting some of the key reforms that have been undertaken by the Ukrainian police in the years since independence, and then goes on to detail the significant factors that have impeded this process. It concludes by reflecting upon future priorities and the prospects for developing a more democratic policing model in Ukraine.

The extent of democratic reform in the societies emerging from Soviet control and influence can best be described as patchy and inconsistent, with some countries making considerable progress while others continue to reflect many of the practices of the past. Reforming criminal justice systems – the quintessence of the former regime – has proved to be a particularly difficult, drawn out and contentious task for many countries. Although the rhetoric of modernising and democratising the criminal justice system is regularly espoused by political elites, particularly in terms of signing up to international conventions on human rights and inviting overseas groups to participate in reform projects, political discourse...
has been dominated by issues of crime control and order maintenance rather than broadening access to justice and increasing transparency and accountability: ‘increased crime rates and fear of crime have resulted in order maintenance replacing freedom and democracy at the top of political agendas’².

Indeed, for many states of the former Soviet Union, the start of the 21st Century has seen them continuing with criminal justice systems that remain highly centralised and for the most part politicised and militarised police forces that are barely different from those operating prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union³.

In countries such as Russia and Ukraine very little progress has been made in democratising police relations with the public despite numerous declarations, presidential edicts and even changes to the law. Overt statements expressing the need to re-orient the police towards public needs, to develop more transparency, and make public opinion the main criterion for evaluating police performance have in reality produced very little change in practices and procedures. In these countries there have been numerous examples of what might be described as tokenised reform experimentation – political declarations of reform followed by piecemeal, poorly funded and resourced initiatives (sometime involving overseas assistance) that become emasculated by political opportunism, inept and ill informed implementation programmes, corruption and deceit. Some international evaluations have highlighted such problems: ‘many of the accumulated lessons are negative ones – techniques or tactics that don’t work, create unfortunate side effects, or simply produce less than was promised’⁴.

Unlike many of the states emerging from the Soviet Union, independence for Ukraine did not bring sweeping political change and many of the ‘new’ ruling elite were previously senior members of the communist party who were not in a hurry to bring about significant political and structural change⁵. This lack of a ‘revolutionary’ transformation from the previous regime partly explains why the Ministry of Interior (MIA) has retained a strong centralised structure and lacks clarity about its future role in Ukrainian society⁶. Political and ideological
ambiguity has led to uncertainty about how the militia should be reformed from one previously focused on serving the state and ‘collective’ interests to one meeting the needs of the individual and local communities.

It will be interesting to observe how the recent election of the so called reforming President Viktor Yushchenko will impact upon the police reform agenda in Ukraine, and whether he has the political will to take on the entrenched power elites within the Ministry of Interior, and bring about more widespread change within the militia.

This article begins by highlighting some of the key reforms that have been undertaken by the Ukrainian Militia in the years since independence, and then goes on to detail the significant factors that have impeded this process. It concludes by reflecting upon future priorities and the prospects for developing a more democratic policing model in Ukraine.

Militia Reform

Prior to formal independence, a new law governing the work of the militia was passed by the Parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in December 1990. Article 1 of this law outlined the main role of the militia as being: ‘... the state armed body of executive authority that protects the life, health, rights and liberties of citizens, the property, environment and interests of society and the state from illegal encroachments upon them’. The Act publicly stated the key activities and responsibilities of the militia, which included: the maintenance of public order; carrying out preliminary investigations and holding inquests on cases within its jurisdiction; crime prevention; the protection of individual, collective and state property; administration of gun permits; the managing of special facilities for homeless people and isolation wards for infected offenders; the administration of immigration control (passport control and registration of foreigners); managing traffic safety; and supervising recently released prisoners.
It also put the rights of the citizen before those of the state, a significant change in emphasis from the previously accepted doctrine that the militia were the ‘punishing sword of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’.

For many commentators, however, a more symbolic step in the reform process was the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution, although the considerable lapse in time between December 1991 when participation in the Soviet Union was terminated and the eventual adoption of the Constitution in 1996, speaks volumes of the lack of political commitment to change and the dominance of the nomenklatura in creating reforms designed to preserve the previous political and economic system. The Constitution set the overall parameters within which the Militia were to operate:

‘The human being, his or her life, health, honour and dignity, inviolability and security are recognised in Ukraine as the highest social value. Human rights and freedoms and their guarantees determine the essence and orientation of the State. The State is answerable to the individual for its activity. To affirm and ensure human rights and freedoms is the main duty of the State’.

The new Constitution was accompanied by the ‘Conception of the Development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) System of Ukraine’, which outlined the need for change, and despite little political consensus within Parliament on how the militia should be reformed (a recurring theme throughout post-Soviet Ukrainian history), several key components were agreed. These were:

- The militia should focus on protecting the life, health, rights and freedoms of the individual and the interests of society and the state;
- the structure of the MIA should be simple, flexible and cost-effective;
- the work of the MIA should be focused at the local level;
- the public should have free access to information about the work of the MIA;
- consideration should be given to the way in which support services are organised and the pay and rank structure should be reviewed;
• there should be close co-operation between the militia and local authority bodies in order to maintain public order.

The key notions of democratic policing (legitimacy, accountability and professionalism) can be seen within these statements. Legitimacy in terms of meeting the needs of the individual first, and being focused at the local level; accountability in terms of access to information and to a certain extent in co-operation with local authority bodies; and professionalism in the recognition of the need to review structure and pay, and become more flexible. How these sentiments were to be transformed into policy and practice was less clear, however, although Ukrainian academics and police practitioners at the time felt that their should be a general move away from the previous Soviet model towards the development of a system based upon accepted best practice from the rest of the world.

Since 1990 there have also been a number of other notable laws, presidential edicts and government decrees passed covering the work of the militia. These include laws on ‘Operational and Investigational Activity’ (1992); ‘the Organisational and Legal Basis of Tackling Organised Crime’ (1993); ‘Tackling Corruption’ (1995); ‘Public Participation in Maintaining Public Order and State Borders’ (2000); ‘the General Structure and Strength of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (2002); and Presidential Edicts on ‘a Complex Targeted Programme of Tackling Crime’ (1996-2000); ‘Concepts of Tackling Corruption’ (1998-2005); ‘Complex Programme of Crime Prevention’ (2001-2005); ‘Establishment of Local Militia’ (2001); and ‘Further Measures for Strengthening Law and Order, Securing the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens’ (2002). In addition, in 1998 the responsibility for prisons was moved from the MIA to the ‘State Department of Ukraine for Matters of Implementing Punishments’, although the MIA continues to carry out a wide range of functions beyond those normally associated with the police (see below). This plethora of legislative activity, however, has seen relatively little change in the day-to-day working practices of the militia and the
way in which they are perceived by the public. In some respects it can be portrayed as rearranging the deckchairs on the Titanic – a programme of root and branch reform is still required rather than mere alterations to the existing structure.

Obstacles to Reform

For many commentators, the reform of the police in Ukraine has been piecemeal and partial, lacking a systematic and systemic approach. It is a country almost always on the verge of reform, but has become bogged down by a whole host of interrelated factors that have combined to reduce not only the impact of reforms introduced to date, but also conspire to inhibit the entire reform process. It is instructive, therefore, to consider the current obstacles to police reform in Ukraine.

The Sovietised Reform Process

The unique political milieu within Ukraine at the time of independence had a powerful influence upon the nature and pace of proposed militia reform. The compromise negotiated between the former Ukrainian communist leadership and the 'new reformers', which essentially left the previous ruling oligarchy in power, meant that opposition to change was built into Ukrainian political transition. Whereas some other states emerging from the Soviet Union sought to remove much of the previous nomenklatura, including many of the senior ranks within the militia (such as the Baltic countries, which declared the previous law-enforcement agencies as institutes of a foreign state), Ukraine was characterised by the continuing dominance of the previous ruling elite. This in turn has seen much of the former soviet style of political control and decision-making, based upon centralisation, obfuscation, secrecy and diktat, remaining the overriding approach adopted. The influence of this can be seen in the numerous laws, presidential edicts and governmental decrees relating to militia reform passed since 1991, which are strong on rhetoric but extremely weak on detail and often lack the
necessary enabling legislation or financial support. The Soviet culture of plans and reports without any interposing action seems evident in much of the reform process in Ukraine. This is particularly characterised by the official crime statistics, which seem to have more to do with sustaining an illusion of efficiency and control than reflecting the current state of crime and the militia’s response to it (see below).

Organisation and Management

Much of the previous Soviet structure and organisation, which is based upon a highly militarised authoritarian model of control and decision-making, remains within the Ukrainian militia. Indeed, while accurate official statistics are not readily available, evidence from individual training institutions suggest that the years since independence have seen an increase in the overall number of those holding senior ranks within the organisation. This is partly explained by the ongoing link between rates of pay and rank – militia personnel can only improve their level of recompense by achieving a higher position. Indeed, duties that were previously a civilian position sometimes now proffer a rank upon those holding the post. This ‘rankification’ process has reinforced the militarised nature of the police in Ukraine, which in turn further acts to stultify the reform of the organisational structure.

In addition, recent research has shown that the militia remains a highly bureaucratic organisation, with perhaps as few as one-quarter being employed directly to protect public order or tackle crime. There has also been a continuation of a Sovietised model of control, reducing officer discretion to a minimum through close supervision, and a stringent hierarchy of decision making from above. The flow of information is strictly controlled and is primarily from the bottom up, and the extensive use of record keeping maintains an occupational culture of conservatism. Moreover, concerns persist about the ongoing influence of nepotism and personal relations in the promotion process: ‘it is
dangerous when promotion is dependent not on the basis of special knowledge and personal characteristics, but on informal relations.\textsuperscript{18}

Militia managers also maintain a monocratic system of routinized superior-subordinate relationships.\textsuperscript{19} Recent research conducted in Kyiv highlighted the continuing reliance upon an authoritarian and disciplinarian model of management with militia managers being perceived by junior ranks as lacking leadership and ‘people management’ skills.\textsuperscript{20} These views were particularly strong amongst female officers and younger male officers. Work is now underway to develop new management courses to address these issues, although at the moment they are only being provided for the most senior ranks within the militia.\textsuperscript{21}

Militia power elites are also predominantly male with women officers rarely reaching beyond the rank or sergeant or colonel.\textsuperscript{22} A recent internationally funded project in Kyiv found that not a single woman was enrolled on the senior commanders course because: ‘women do not reach this rank in the Ukrainian militia’.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, there is some evidence that in Ukraine ‘unofficial quotas’ are currently set, aimed at capping the number of women in the militia – each militia training institution is said to ‘receive instructions’ from the Ministry of Interior to make sure that no more than 10 per cent of students each year are female, while senior militia managers are encouraged to maintain an 8 per cent level in the militia.\textsuperscript{24}

Whilst a number of political moves have been attempted to develop a more decentralised militia structure,\textsuperscript{25} the overarching Soviet model of central control and command remains firmly entrenched. Where a more decentralised model has been piloted (for instance in the cities of Berdiansk, Kyiv and Kharkiv) local Ukrainian researchers have described the results as impressive: ‘it helped to establish militia/public partnerships, to bring the militia under efficient democratic
control, and compelled the local authorities to improve the financial and technical upkeep of the militia and social welfare of its employees. As yet, however, the necessary enabling legislation to facilitate the rest of Ukraine to adopt this approach has not been passed by the Ukrainian Parliament and as such the militia remain a highly centralised organisation, with little local input into the setting of, or control over, their plans, priorities and indeed practices.

Performance Indicators: The Soviet Mythology of Success

A key stumbling block in the reform process has been the continuation of soviet practices of measuring crime and the performance of the militia. Like police agencies throughout the world there is a strong reliance upon official statistics to assess levels of crime, which take little account of unrecorded and unreported crime and act more as a measure of the administrative (in)efficiency of the police than a true indicator of the level of criminality in society. Estimates suggest that towards the end of the Soviet period the militia in Ukraine failed to register roughly one-third of the crimes reported to them, although this is now thought to be an underestimation. More critically, however, the key performance indicator for the militia remains the crime clear up rate, which compared with other non-Eastern European countries, continues to be unbelievably high. It generally hovers around the 90 per cent rate and for certain offences (such as murder) it is often 100 per cent (compared with for instance the UK where it is about 25 per cent). This seemingly impressive rate of success, however, has more to do with dubious militia accounting practices than the way in which the militia are organised or perform their duties. Centrally agreed targets for clear-up rates and associated sanctions for non-compliance act as a powerful incentive for the militia not to record crimes that will prove difficult to solve such as car crime and burglary. Most Western commentators tend to agree that as a measure of police performance, the clear up rate and levels of crime are poor indicators, offering only a partial reflection of the way in which the police perform. Scepticism and cynicism about the veracity of police crime statistics is now so common in
Ukraine that many procurators advocate the transfer of control over data registry to civilian authorities30.

This mythology of success causes three key problems in the reform process. First, it acts to perpetuate existing practices (if it works don’t fix it). Second, it undermines societal confidence in the extent to which the militia have become more accountable and transparent (a service-oriented approach is seen to be subservient to organisational priorities). Third, it can undermine attempts to persuade Ukrainian politicians and indeed oversees agencies that additional funding is required to reform the militia (existing levels of funding are already producing outstanding results).

Militia – Public Relations

Another key obstacle to reform is the public’s apathy and general hostility towards the militia. Recent research shows that the majority of respondents considered the militia to be inefficient and not ready to help ordinary citizens31. One recent commentator painted a gloomy picture where most Ukrainians fear the police and agents of law enforcement organs more than they do criminals32. Surveys of the public regularly highlight concerns about corruption, rudeness and low professionalism within the militia33. More positively, research has shown that both the militia and the public recognise the importance of improving the relationship between them and two-thirds of the public surveyed were willing to establish closer links, providing it was well organised and perceived to be the right thing to do34. A recent pilot study in the city of Kharkiv, funded by the UK government, had some notable success in beginning to bridge this gap, and developing alternative ways of organising the militia at the local level35. How the results from this experiment will be incorporated into the ongoing reform process and disseminated more broadly throughout Ukraine, however, is still not clear, although 90 per cent of the recommendations made by the project team were
incorporated into a ‘Decision of the MVD Council’ (something which all militia departments are suppose to follow).

Training and Selection

When independence was declared in 1991, Ukraine did not have a recognised structure of law-enforcement training and research. Most of the high-level research and training centres were located in Russian cities such as Moscow, Leningrad and Omsk, leaving a vacuum that needed to be filled. There was only one militia higher school in Kyiv, and militia schools in some regions, which carried out basic training of rank and file militia, and provided some special courses for militia officers responsible for fighting economic crimes (for example in Kharkiv).

This situation has since been improved and there is now a network of training and research institutions, with the two most significant being the National Academy of Internal Affairs based in Kyiv and the National University of Internal Affairs in Kharkiv. These two centres annually train more officers than all the other institutions in Ukraine put together, and now employ a wide range of specialists carrying out a wide range of research and training programmes.

Nevertheless, the system for training police officers faces a number of problems that need to be resolved. There are few links between theoretical courses and practice; a weak system of professional training; and insufficient training in communication skills and methods of working with the public. According to one Ukrainian academic: ‘the main focus of improving the education system today is a reorientation from an informative type of education to one that allows cadets to prove and develop cognitive and creative leanings and to develop their professional qualities to ensure their effectiveness … these need to become core components of the education of future militiamen’36. There is also a continuing strong emphasis (particularly for those attending higher education establishments) on teaching the law rather than providing training relevant to the
requirements of being a police officer. Graduates of these programmes are awarded a Diploma in Law and many decide to take these skills into the private sector where pay and conditions are far superior to those offered by a career in the militia. This has caused a major problem with retention of the young office corp within the Ukrainian militia – only a relatively small proportion of students studying at the academies have any intention of remaining within the militia. The relatively poor level of pay and the significant reduction in social status associated with the militia has also had a negative impact upon the number and quality of candidates applying to join the militia. The Ukrainian militia is currently 12 per cent under strength and there is widespread concern that the current selection process is admitting candidates who are unsuitable for work in the police, often lacking basic levels of education.

Problem of Corruption

The problem of corruption is a major obstacle not only to the reform of the militia, but more broadly, the economic and political well being of the country. For some it has become endemic, leeching into every facet of Ukrainian society, severely undermining the prospects for developing a democratic society. Western businesses cite corruption as one of the main reasons why they are unwilling to invest in Ukraine, and the Corruption Perception Index ranks it as one of the countries with the highest rate of corruption in the world, rated 85th out of 102 countries surveyed. While the debate about the causes of corruption in post Soviet societies continues (some argue that Ukraine was never governed by the legal rationality associated with Weberian bureaucracy, and much of what outsiders call corruption reflects traditional exchange relationships) what is clear is that the militia are regularly highlighted as one of the state groups most involved in corrupt practices. Very little data is available on the scale and extent of the problem; it has been estimated that only between 2 and 5 per cent of bribery cases ever reach the criminal justice system, and in 2000 some 15,000 civil servants were convicted (5 per cent of the total). Various surveys suggest
that as much as 60 per cent of government officials' income comes from bribes. The militia account for 26 per cent of those called to account for corruption and bribery makes up for 13.6 per cent of all crimes committed by members of the militia. While much of the corruption can be regarded as relatively insignificant, often committed by employees of the State Automobile Inspectorate (GAI), other more serious incidents committed by the militia are evident, such as performing 'services' for wealthy individuals, criminal groups and businesses. This can take the form of selling information, providing protection services, or negotiating with fire, health and tax inspectors. At the highest level, this can involve very serious crime such as kidnapping and murder, for instance, allegations have been made that the former Minister of the Interior, Yuriy Kravchenko, acting on instructions from the President, was involved in the murder of the journalist Georgi Gongadze.

The gravity of the problem of corruption cannot be underestimated and will play a major role in undermining efforts to develop a more democratic policing system in Ukraine. The impact on the public perception of police integrity and efficacy is considerable and no doubt helps contribute to the scale of unreported crime and the public’s ongoing scepticism about the militia’s raison d’etre.

Oversight and Control

For the most part, the pre-independence structure of oversight and control has remained largely unchanged, although there have been some notable changes. Reports of instances of abuse of power, corruption and torture persist and calls for greater accountability continue. When the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine’s ‘Transitional Statutes’ expired, only the courts were left with the right to issue arrest warrants although how strictly this is adhered to by militia officers is open to debate. The creation of the Ombudsman’s Office, oversight of the Minister of Interior by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Parliament), the creation of special committees set up by local authorities to monitor the work of the militia...
and perhaps more significantly, the revised role of the Procurators Office, which became the highest supervisory body charged with controlling observance of the law by all Ukrainian subjects (Law on the Procurator’s Office, 1991, which included Article 5 ‘… ensuring that bodies which fight crime and misdemeanors observe the law), have all brought some modicum of greater oversight and control over the militia. Indeed the Procurators office annually uncovers about 15,000 crimes ‘concealed’ by the militia and opens criminal investigations into another 15,000 cases that the militia unjustifiably decided not to investigate. There is ongoing concern, however, about the lack of independence of the Procuracy and uncertainty about its future role and function.

In June 2003, a new law was adopted entitled ‘On Democratic Civilian Control Over Military and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State’. According to Article 7 of the law, the system will consist of control by: parliament; the president; executive authorities and local authorities; judicial bodies and the prosecutor’s office; and the public. This new act continues to give primary responsibility for overseeing observance of the law to the Prosecutor’s Office, although Articles 19 and 20 give the public and the media (in theory) greater access to information about the militia: ‘the mass media can, as laid down, ask for and receive (free of charge) from … law enforcement bodies open information, documents, and materials within their competence…’ (Article 20). In addition, the MIA have begun to make more information available to the public through the annual publication of regular reports on its activities and a new ethical code has been introduced for MIA employees. It is too soon to say how these new initiatives will work in practice, although it is hoped that it will bring about greater levels of accountability and control over the militia.

Future Priorities

A recent Ukrainian document, perhaps inadvertently, neatly summarises the current situation. It states that the MIA has recently started to draft a new reform
programme, with the help of the National University of Internal Affairs. Those working on the project state that ‘the reformed militia will comply not only with Ukrainian legislation but also with the norms of international humanitarian law, the standards of democratic police activity and the interests of Ukrainian citizens, society and the state as a whole’ (emphasis added)\textsuperscript{51}. Simple deduction would suggest that the current Ukrainian militia are not meeting these norms, standards and requirements.

The legacy of the Soviet Union continues to pervade all aspects of the militia in Ukraine and the attempts to reform it since independence in 1991. It is a country that recognises the necessity for change but lacks the political will to design and deliver a programme that necessitates a radicalised approach to the creation of a new structure and ethos. The notion of democratic policing as defined by many western scholars is for the most part singularly absent in Ukraine\textsuperscript{52}. Undoubtedly democratic ideals can be seen in much of the law making over the past 10 years, but there has been little evidence of this being translated into operational policies and rules for working. As Marenin states ‘the challenge for democratic policing … is to translate principles into rules of work which can be taught, enforced, rewarded if properly done and sanctioned if abused’\textsuperscript{53}. To date the policing culture in Ukraine is such that implementing the existing legal rhetoric, observing the rule of law and delivering many of the other practices of democratic policing (such as accountability, transparency and so on) seem emasculated by a sovietised tradition still focused on protecting the elite and maintaining the status quo.

More specifically, emphasis needs to be given to developing the service function of the militia, which is not only concerned with partnerships between the militia and the public, and the development of a respectful and attentive attitude to all citizens, but is also focused on putting individuals’ rights and interests at the
centre of all militia activity. This in turn will help to overcome some of the hostility ordinary citizens have for the militia and improve levels of accountability.

There needs to be a rationalization of the functions of the MIA. This has already begun (with the removal of responsibilities for prisons) but other tasks could be reallocated such as: registration of motor vehicles and driving tests; prevention of air and reservoir pollution by motor transport and farming machinery; passport and immigration control; providing quarantine measures during epidemics; and responsibility for bringing infected and ill people to hospital and reporting them to the medical services for obligatory examination and treatment\textsuperscript{54}. This would enable the militia to focus more on their core functions of public order, crime control and crime prevention.

The MIA has been plagued by a lack of financing. Observers suggest that the Ministry receives only around one-third of the funding it requires\textsuperscript{55}. Between 1997 and 2000 wage delays were a regular occurrence for militia officers, whose average salary is now around US $100/month. In addition, militia officers have lost a number of social guarantees, such as free public transport, and housing benefits, which has put further pressure upon their incomes. Severe financial constraints also make it difficult to retain staff (in the last three months of 2002, 5,537 MIA employees resigned); attract high quality trainees; purchase much needed equipment, renovate building; and even provide petrol for police cars (the MIA state that they will only receive 9 per cent of the necessary funding for non-salary costs in 2003).

In terms of the ruling elites within the Ministry of Interior and the Ukrainian militia, there is a pervading sense of continuity of power, control and influence. The years of transition have realised little change in the mechanisms through which the previous Soviet elites have continued to sustain their lineage. The opportunity to be promoted to the highest ranks continues to be more about whom you know,
how much cash you can pay and what favours have you done than personal ability, leadership skills or scholarly activity. The situation was neatly summarised by a young Ukrainian militia officer when responding to a question about his likelihood of becoming a general: ‘you must be joking, I’m not the son of a General, my father is not rich, and I don’t take enough bribes!’.

Undoubtedly, considerable challenges face the reformers in Ukraine and it could take a generation before any significant change takes place. The recent election of Viktor Yushchenko as President could be the catalyst and political stimuli to kick start the reform process, although the extent to which he will prioritise police reform is as yet unclear. There are many able and committed people working within the MIA who seek to create a Ukrainian militia that is committed to the notions of democratic policing. Whether they will be successful is highly dependent upon a sea change in thinking amongst the ruling elite, something which to date has been largely absent.

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Endnotes:

5 O. Bandurka, and Y. Dreval, Parliamentarianism in Ukraine, the National University of Internal Affairs, Kharkov, 1999; G. Smith, Reforming the Russian Legal System, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996.
6 Y. Kravchenko, Problems of Reforming the Bodies of Internal Affairs (Organizational and Legal Questions), Candidate’s Thesis, University of Internal Affairs, Kharkov, 1998.
7 Smith, 1996, op cit.

10 The various laws passed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine can be viewed at: http://www.rada.kiev.ua.


13 O. Bandurka, O.Bezsmertniy, and V. Zuy, Administrative Activity, Espada, Kharkov, 2000.


15 An example provided by Ukrainian colleagues was the position of head of logistics for a police college that had previously been a civilian post, but was turned into a position with a rank of Colonel in order that the level of pay could be increased.

16 Bandurka, 1996, op cit.; M. Frolov, Departments of the Bodies of Internal Affairs in the Conditions of Law Reform, the National University of Internal Affairs, Kharkov, 2000.


22 This was a comment made by a course tutor at the Kyiv National Academy of Internal Affairs, who was taking part in a project funded by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, focussing on the reform of police management courses at the Academy.

23 Unfortunately, it was impossible to find any official documentation stipulating such orders. Interviews with senior staff at the Ministry of Interior stated that such ‘norms’ do not exist on paper, but take the form of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ within the Ministry.


Ibid.

National University of Internal Affairs Propositions of the NUIA on the Reform of the System of the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, up until 2006, National University of Internal Affairs, Kharkov, 2002.


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Reshaping of Elites and the Privatization of Security: The Case of Poland

Abstract

Using the example of Poland, this article examines the central role of secret services in the regime transformation and new elites’ formation. It traces strategic processes of dispersal and privatization of the communist security apparatus and analyzes the strategic value of the new private security sector. Its multifaceted linkages as well as its involvement in crime, marketing of fear, tying surveillance with prestige and amassing potentially useful information are examined. This sector’s vital role in shaping new definitions of (dis)order and providing new risk management strategies is discussed within a changing, global context.

The 1980s in Poland were a peculiar and momentous period in the history of communism. It was a time when the inherent contradictions of that regime reached their final paroxysmal stage, with communist principles of ruling simultaneously intensifying and disintegrating in myriad of overt and covert ways. The decade witnessed a strange sequence of decadent power excesses, wide-ranging covert operations and a frantic transfer of property rights from the state to the nomenklatura actors, both corporate and individual. This process included a notable emancipation of secret services and their nascent privatization that eventually included their goals, functions, resources and know-how.

In a book I co-authored with Andrzej Zybertowicz, we offered a thorough analysis of the process of police state privatization in the post-communist Poland. That book documents a complex, and largely covert, process, which encompassed the following undertakings: converting certain police state functions into private operations; the private appropriation and selective destruction of the contents of secret services’ archives; active role of secret services in private capture of the
state economy and the infiltration and manipulation of various agendas of the new state. Based on our research, we concluded that this process was not extemporaneous but largely organized and coordinated:

“A combination of pre-planned and carefully executed strategies, a relative unity of interests and the ability – due to superior resources and information – to respond coherently to unexpected developments, enabled the party/police state elite to become the authors and principal beneficiaries of the state’s massive privatization”2.

In the present article, I look at selected aspects of the privatization of the state security apparatus and the process of elite positioning and reconfiguration before and following the systemic change of 1989. These developments go far beyond the efforts to secure “soft landing” (economic endowment) for the former nomenklatura and include a merger of former party and secret services elites as well as privatization and managed dispersal of such key functions of the state as intelligence gathering, security and the monopoly over legitimate uses of coercion.

Emancipation of secret services in the 1980s

The emergence in 1980 of the mass opposition movement Solidarity called for escalation of secret infiltration of society and an extraordinary mobilization of the military and civilian secret services. Additionally, the Soviet, East German and other communist intelligence services, alarmed by the Solidarity movement’s potential influence, rapidly expanded their clandestine presence in Poland3. The Martial Law imposition, in December 1981, set the stage for a structural shift of power from the Party to the security complex, which encompassed military and civilian intelligence and counter-intelligence, the political police and various special forces. At least 8000 military commissioners were dispatched to numerous state institutions and enterprises4. The entire state administration was increasingly staffed with military and secret services functionaries and the overall
command of the country was taken by a military council headed by Army General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

The 1980s saw also an increased power of the security sector in the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev launched his perestroika under the protective umbrella of the KGB, the only major institution exempt from his reforms. As Waller argues in his book on the KGB in post-communist Russia:

“Gorbachev enjoyed the strong support of the KGB leadership and vice versa. His was a conscious policy to strengthen the KGB while attempting to create the conditions for Soviet society to become more creative and dynamic (p. 2). Gorbachev inherited the chekist system in toto and instead of marking it for reform, he insulated it from the publicity of glastnost and the structural changes of perestroika. Under Boris Yeltsin the Russian Federation maintained the cultural continuum … (p. 5, 7). Instead of starting anew and ridding itself of the chekist legacy… the Russian government chose to embrace it and rely on it as a pillar of stability and a starting point for future society5”.

While in Russia this process resulted eventually, under Vladimir Putin, in a blatant take over of the state by the secret services’ interests and mentality, the developments in Poland and other Central European states have been more subtle and hidden. What needs to be stressed, however, is the fact that contrary to the common claim that the last decade of communism was marked by its softening and liberalization, both the Soviet Union and Poland experienced in the 1980s considerable strengthening of the structures, status and size of secret services. Their gradual self-elevation was paralleled by a relative decline in the position of the Party. With the communist ideology and economy waning, the Party elite looked to the security apparatus for a way out.

Reforms and the elite reconfiguration in the 1980s
In the book I wrote with Andrzej Zybertowicz, we argued that the increase in the relative power of secret services entailed significant changes in their role. No longer expected to act in the name of defunct ideology, they could engage in innovative political and economic strategies to advance pragmatic, long-term interests of the communist elites, of which they became a prominent and vital division.

The second part of the 1980s was the time when a new type of economic reform emerged in Poland, which no longer aimed at salvaging the ideological pretence of the superiority of the state economy. It was pushed forward by the most dynamic Party/police elites, whose concept of “restructuring” the economy and the state involved laying the legal framework for their privatization “from within.” These elites spearheaded the marketization of the indolent economy by using their legislative power, secret services’ networks, intelligence and protection as well as the second economy/organized crime connections and schemes.

As it has been well documented, under Edward Gierek’s reform program in the 1970s, the Party elite went on a rampage of corrupt pseudo-privatization of the economy through elaborate second economy schemes, assisted by foreign credits. Less known is the fact that major scams were also carried out abroad by the intelligence services, who initiated a number of criminal enrichment ventures under the cloak of intelligence operations. They involved burglary, fraud, smuggling and other forms of organized crime. These criminal operations were designed to supplement the services’ already oversized budget, but much of the loot ended up in private hands.

The subsequent economic reforms, in the 1980s, enabled a formal legitimation of the nomenklatura’s informal property rights acquired in the earlier period. A slew of new laws led to the proliferation of officially registered joint-stock companies and partnerships formed on the basis of state economy units. By the time the first
semi-democratic elections were held, in June 1989, there were already 3000 joint-stock companies in Poland. In 75 percent of cases they were created on the basis of the 1700 largest state enterprises10 and, generally, involved party/secret services elites. A preferred business arrangement was based on the, so-called, hybrid property11, where profits were appropriated privately, while costs and liabilities were covered by the “mother” state enterprise. This created a new reality of a future-oriented restructuring of the economy, which laid a foundation for the smooth transformation of these elites into the new post-communist ruling class. What was rarely noticed by economists, however, was the reality that this new legal framework also enabled the private take over of certain aspects of the state, including establishment of private detective agencies – a striking development within the context of a militarized police state of the post-Martial Law era. The first security company was founded as early as 198612, but it was with the passage of the Economic Activity Act of December 1988 that the door was wide open for the emergence of a versatile and rapidly expanding private security sector.

While many functionaries got opportunistically involved in new, semi-legal money-making ventures, it is possible now to reconstruct a more complex picture of interests, designs and plots, going beyond the individual greed. At stake in these processes were long-term interests of communist elites, not only nationally but also internationally. The latter aspect was coordinated by the KGB, whereby the directives for collaborative, private economic ventures were apparently coming from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, whose cadres consisted mostly of employees of the First Directorate of the KGB13.

Domestically, it was crucial to coordinate actions of two types of key elites: the political nomenklatura, which included members of the apparatus of both the Party and the secret services, and the economic nomenklatura comprised of the
The final period of communism in Poland was marked by intense factional struggle within the Party and the security apparatus, which expedited the advancement of those individuals and networks that were the most viable and dynamic candidates for class conversion. The new political class consisted of generally younger men, well traveled and educated, with ties to military or civilian security agencies and/or their informal networks. Many of their personal relationships developed during their early career stages in the apparatus of Communist Youth organizations. Cynical about ideology, they managed these organizations more like private enterprises, deriving from them various types of profit and capital (including social capital). For many of them, it was an opportunity to hone their entrepreneurial or managerial skills. They frequently traveled abroad, on foreign scholarships or through their involvement with secret services. Their links to secret services, and especially military intelligence, expanded greatly their prospects and indelibly marked their group ethos.

Through their travels and missions, these new cosmopolitans forged many useful friendships and established valuable contacts with academic and business circles in the West. Back in Poland, however, their careers and ambitions were
closely tied to their advancement within the Party apparatus and/or the secret services, which, in turn, was contingent on their good relations with the Soviet embassy and its KGB contingent. Close social ties between the Party elite and the embassy personnel were part of the standard code of conduct for ambitious apparatchiks. The last communist Prime Minister, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, commented on this in a 1996 interview, stating that the advancement in the Party depended on the support from Moscow and good relations with the Soviet Embassy were instrumental to securing it were.

The first non-communist Interior minister Krzysztof Kozlowski made a similar comment in 1996, reacting to the public disclosure of a friendship between a KGB man and the sitting Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, a former Communist Party official. According to Kozlowski, "[Oleksy] seems not to have noticed that in 1989 Poland became a sovereign state and, by the same token, the contacts that in the 1980s were not de facto treated as spying have now changed their meaning... Formerly, nobody in the Party saw anything wrong with them. On the contrary, for the Party activists it was a chance to speed up their career".

These contacts assumed a new significance in the late 1980s, when the Soviet intelligence services intensified their activities in order to ensure the continuous collaboration of the elites in the anticipation of major institutional changes in Poland. These efforts became even more intense after the Interior Ministry was passed to Kozlowski in 1990.

"Until the spring of 1990, Soviet comrades were daily visitors in the offices of the Interior Ministry... [Then] the situation changed radically... From that point, the Russians began constructing a regular intelligence net... This net does not consist exclusively of typical agents, the Russians have also sought to include
personalities from various elites to be used as trustworthy sources of information…”21.

Despite their privileged status and abundant opportunities for enrichment, the rejuvenated and ruthlessly ambitious communist elites perceived the structural limits of the old system as an exasperating barrier to their aspirations. They realized that if they played their cards well, they could fashion for themselves a much brighter future under pseudo-capitalist conditions.

Securing the long term interests of political elites

For communist elites it was imperative to design alternative ways of exercising control over the transforming society and ensure the hold on power in the event of the old regime’s collapse. This called for a comprehensive engagement of secret services in securing alternative forms of surveillance and active control in the politically, economically and technologically changing reality. To be ready for every contingency, it was vital to prepare a private take over of strategic sectors by informal communist elite networks. These sectors included security, justice system, banking, the mass media and new electronic communication systems (among them the emerging field of Internet access provision and surveillance). To ensure success in this endeavour, it was also vital to consolidate the unity of the key elites involved. Given that these strategic domains were already heavily controlled by the secret services, they became a natural and best informed force in this process. Moreover, acting through a network of secret collaborators, they could ensure a low profile of their efforts, crucial for the preparation stage. In order to placate the emerging alternative elites, a new strategy was devised in the second half of the 1980s, which deployed intricate covert operations to infiltrate, divide, mould and harness the opposition22. A blueprint for this strategy (including the Round Table talks) was prepared for General Jaruzelski, in secrecy, by the, so-called, group of three. The group consisted of the chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence, General Pozoga, a Politburo member,
Stanislaw Ciosek and a governmental *port parole* and *eminence grise*, Jerzy Urban²³.

The Round Table talks were directly and actively coordinated behind the scenes by Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak, who also headed the communist side at the talks and presided over the process. His unlikely metamorphosis from a symbol of repression into a peacemaker can be explained by the fact that the Round Table talks were conceived as a centerpiece of a series of operations surrounding the reform process and it was crucial to give a new image to the dreaded secret police. Kiszczak’s new, benevolent persona detracted from the fact that he was responsible for ongoing repressions, organized the ‘operational protection’ of the Round Table talks, had direct access to surveillance data on the opposition and was able to influence the selection of the Solidarity representatives to ensure the inclusion of a certain number of undercover secret service functionaries and secret collaborators²⁴.

The Round Table talks were not only a momentous political event, it was also a forum where various covert associates of the secret services were publicly validated as oppositionists²⁵ and where early signs of merging of elites were overtly displayed²⁶. Following the Communists’ dismal showing in the semi-democratic elections in June 1989, the “good will” created during the talks facilitated the retention by Communists of the key ministries within the new Solidarity government (including General Kiszczak as the Interior minister) and the installment of General Jaruzelski as the President of Poland.

Securing the financial back-up for political aspirations

The Party’s inner circle realized early that it was vital to secure long-term funding for an uninterrupted exercise of power in the event the Communist Party (PUWP) is politically displaced. In the late 1980s, the Party assets were in part liquidated; funds²⁷ were surreptitiously exported abroad and/or invested in a myriad of
complicated financial ventures and foundations. Their connection to the Party was effectively erased through skillful maneuvering and the speed, with which they were launched, dissolved, converted and multiplied. The secret services’ know-how, the protection they provided and the agencies they ran in foreign countries were all instrumental in carrying out these schemes. When the Communist Party disbanded itself voluntarily, in January 1990, there was a recognizable, close-knit group of activists behind the push for its dissolution. In a well orchestrated maneuver, they turned the Communist Party’s funeral into a founding ceremony of their new political party, the Social Democracy of Poland (SdRP). As it was later revealed, they were assisted in doing so by a special loan from the KGB.

The principals of the founding group were a future Interior minister and eventually Prime Minister (Leszek Miller) and a future President of Poland (Aleksander Kwasniewski). The new party’s leaders presented themselves as continuators of the Communist Party’s reformist wing, thereby laying claim to the old Party’s organizational structure, operational resources and material wealth. The failure of protracted legal efforts to return the Party’s estate to the people of Poland only shows the depth and strength on the new party elite’s influence. By taking over the Communist Party’s wealth, its hidden foreign bank accounts and its sizeable shares in numerous private ventures, the SdRP automatically gained an immense advantage over other parties. When, eventually, in February 1991, a new law was promulgated that nationalized the Party’s assets, the SdRP declared that its bank accounts were empty and all the burgeoning ventures turned suddenly into failing operations. A series of staged bankruptcies helped further to muddle the origins of the wealth of the SdRP’s political network and, ultimately, forestall any attempts at expropriation or prosecution. The same purpose was served by the party’s move to rename itself as the Union of Democratic Left (SLD).
As of 2005, the group behind these maneuvers has been in power for eight out of 15 post-communist years. The key of their success lied in their foresight, founded on the secret services’ intelligence. Their comprehensive but flexible management of the transition process was made possible by a combination of knowledge, skills and operational resources of the united political (Party/secret services/army) elite that allowed a swift take over of both the economy and the strategic power/information/financial sectors.

The role of former secret services in economic scandals of the post-communist era

The scale of participation of secret services networks in the criminal economic schemes is becoming increasingly recognized as the years go by. Much of the relevant information can be gleaned from various reports authored by or leaked from various control agencies and/or journalistic investigations. There is no room here to elaborate on this issue, but it is important to note that the ever growing evidence suggests that no serious economic scam would have been possible without an active presence and often the leading role of former secret service operatives and their secret collaborators. This includes such major scandals as those related to FOZZ, BIG, Orlen and PZU. Given that all major criminal economic plots have been at least to some extent international in scope, the former services’ logistical support, intelligence and contacts were of critical importance. Their ability to privatize Export/Import companies and other agencies formerly controlled by the communist services provided a fitting foundation for internationally ramified ventures. Moreover, the active involvement of former Soviet Bloc secret services in creating and/or supporting various organized crime networks also facilitated their own economic schemes.

Based on his recent research, Zybertowicz has concluded that one of the key mechanisms behind the success and impunity of current criminal economic schemes – some of them truly gigantic in scale – has been the “triple hook-up principle” (zasada trojwarstwowego podczepienia). This mechanism depends on:
(1) association with some important and preferably international activities conducted by high status state bodies, (2) involvement in covert operations authorized by these bodies, and (3) engagement in hidden activities aiming at illegal conversion of public resources into private ones. This type of arrangement assures that illegal activities are doubly sheltered from scrutiny - by the prestige of their overt structural framework and the classified nature of their key operations. Indeed, the criminal justice system has repeatedly been paralyzed by the alleged security risks posed by the evidence needed for prosecution of major criminal affairs.

A managed commercialization of the means of coercion and surveillance

As demonstrated elsewhere, “post-communist privatization was envisioned from the beginning as reaching beyond the economic sector and into the core of the secret control apparatus” (p. 185). This represented immense resources of a strategic importance, including intelligence, skilled human resources, nets of secret agents, surveillance technology, operational resources, international contacts including those with foreign intelligence agencies/agents, as well as connections to organized crime. With the state’s transition towards democracy, the old police structures had to be downsized, refurbished and vetted. Preparations for such an eventuality started early, with police state resources being channeled into the emerging private security market, controlled and staffed by former secret services’ functionaries.

The new security sector involved property and personal protection companies, detective services, information, lobbying and public relations services (including professional “dirt diggers”) as well as economic intelligence agencies. Some of these companies have branches in different regions of Poland and some are international in nature. As a rule, they have been created by police and secret services functionaries, sometimes on the basis of the police sport clubs. The owners include many generals, communist and post-communist chief
commanders of the police and services, Interior ministers, heads of relevant
departments and various other powerful figures in the field of civilian and military
intelligence and security. An influential figure in shaping the new sector was the
founder and chief of the dreaded communist anti-terrorist brigades (ZOMO),
deployed conspicuously and bloodily during the Martial Law. It has been
estimated that in the early 2000s, protection/security companies40 employed
approximately 200,000 people, while detective companies employed around 4,
000 people.41 When they were first created, many prominent companies had
recognizable origins in specific services, such as civilian intelligence, the
economic crime section in the Police Headquarters, anti-terrorist brigades or the
criminal branch of the police42.

Given the simultaneous and rapid emergence of private security services in all
post-communist countries, it is vital to consider a possible role of the
Soviet/Russian intelligence services in their creation. According to Antoni
Macierewicz, the Interior minister in 1991-92, the creation of the detective and
security companies was initiated and at least in part directed by the
Soviet/Russian intelligence services as an alternative surveillance apparatus to
replace the old one, which had been fully integrated with the Soviet services. He
commented on the private security industry: “The Russians organized it, shaped
it into an organizational structure, penetrated it and maintained it, apparently for
information gathering purposes”43.

One of the early organizers of the private security sector, President of the
Association of Security and Detective Companies, was actually exposed in 1991
and convicted of spying for the Soviet and later Russian military intelligence
(GRU). In the mid 1980s, he was a member of Interior Minister Kiszczak’s team
of advisers44. As the Association President, he collected detailed information
about the member companies and expected them to send reports about their
activities, contacts and any attempts at penetration by Western intelligence45.
Simultaneously, he was providing GRU with information about the new Ministry of the Interior and with the names of potential candidates for GRU spies.

An important aspect of the reorganization and verification of the secret services after the regime change in 1989 was an outright exemption of the military services from any such procedures. The military intelligence and counterintelligence - a vital component of the Warsaw Pact system, whose members were regularly trained in the Soviet Union – have been allowed to continue in the same shape, with the same personnel, old nets of informers and no civilian oversight of any sort. The assumption was that these sensitive services will reform themselves without any external intrusion. From scattered but persistent evidence, it appears that the military secret services have provided needed support and protection to many key post-communist players. They have constituted a ramified formation that is in effect untouchable, because – to use the words of one journalist – it “ties together too many important people in Poland, too many issues and interests”\textsuperscript{46}.

In the late 1980s, when private security companies were being set up based on the Economic Activity Act, they were treated as any other economic activity and were not screened, licensed or regulated in any special way, despite their use of weapons, sensitive information and sophisticated surveillance equipment. Even with the regime change in 1989, there was a remarkable reluctance to interfere with the private security sector’s development. The first attempt to establish a form of oversight was a decision, in 1991, to grant the Interior Ministry the right to supervise protection/security companies\textsuperscript{47}. It was only in 1993, however, that the Ministry established an office entrusted with carrying out this task. It was headed by a former communist secret service agent, had only eight members of staff and had no computerized information system\textsuperscript{48}. The first law on Protection of Property and People was passed in 1997\textsuperscript{49} and came into effect in 1998, almost ten years after the system change. Significantly, the law did not cover detective
Moreover, it allowed the industry a two year period for meeting the new legal requirements. It introduced screening and licensing procedures for both companies and their staff, whereby the regional police chiefs were authorized to use their discretion, practically with no accountability and supervision. What is also worthy of note is that the bill – prepared by the SLD government – considerably broadened demand for private security by making it compulsory for a whole range of state and private establishments to retain professional security/protection services. This was an enormous boost to the industry. Private security workers were authorized to use a huge range of instruments of coercion, including handcuffs, police batons, dogs, gas pistols, electric paralyzers and, in justified circumstances, firearms. Characteristically, the new law was vague as to the range of services allowed and the limits to the use of intrusive means and violence. While it granted private security agencies the powers akin to those given to the police, it did not provide formal safeguards to prevent human rights abuses or deployment of these services in political struggles.

A bill regulating private detective services, including economic intelligence services, was eventually passed by the parliament in 2001 and was promulgated in 2002. It introduced special procedures for licensing both detective companies and the individual detectives. Licenses to the former were to be granted by the Interior Minister, and the latter by examination commissions formed by regional police chiefs.

In addition to detective and security companies that make their services available to various clients, larger businesses build their own security/intelligence departments. The dependence of business on former and current secret services operatives is considerable, but it remains unregulated and intelligence freely crosses the public/private divide. Winning contract bids, choosing wisely business partners, the ability to undermine credibility of competitors, all depend
on access to the information and skills possessed by secret services, private security sector and/or intelligence workers retained on continuous basis by the business in question. Upon leaving state agencies, operatives are permitted to enter the private security sector without any “quarantine” period. Nothing prevents them from treating secret information gained in their former employment as their private capital. The telecommunications sector is known to have especially close ties to former (and also current) senior members of secret services and to employ a virtual army of security/espionage experts. To quote a journalist’s comment: “If you gathered all the heads of their security departments in one hall, it would look like a secret meeting of the Office of the State Security”.

The amount of information possessed by private security and intelligence sector represents a pool of knowledge that can easily be translated into political and/or economic power. The impact of secret information on the political realm can be seen in a number of high level scandals, when leaks or deliberate disclosures by secret services –who often use the private sector or the media as intermediaries– have led to the fall of top politicians, including three Prime Ministers and a Deputy Prime Minister. The more recent scandals illustrate the role of the secret and strategic information in the maintenance of an illicit web of connections between the public and private economic sectors that involves top levels of political hierarchy. In effect, the state has been torn by unremitting fighting among groups that seem to be mutually bound by relations built on an intricate complex of the secret knowledge and mutual blackmail. The creation of a loosely regulated, private security sector has allowed for the continuous pervasive influence of the former police states power/knowledge on the new structures of the formally democratic state. In Poland, as in other post-communist states, the common phenomena of late modernity – such as the “surveillant assemblage” – have coalesced with both the traditions of the police state and their private reincarnation in the new security/intelligence industry.
The private security industry and crime

While some politicians, including members of the parliamentary commission for secret services have commented that the private security sector poses a potential threat to the national security, there is not enough direct evidence to allow a systematic analysis of the conspiratorial designs behind its inception and development. What have been better documented, although not systematically studied, are its involvement in crime and its role in undermining the status of the state police.

The security sector’s links to the organized crime have been noted when, especially in recent years, many mobsters from major gangs have been prosecuted based on testimony of their associates turned police informers. According to these witnesses, the huge organized crime revenues have been routinely invested in legal ventures, such as security companies, restaurants, real estate and sport clubs. The gangs as a rule hire outsiders to run these businesses for them, either as money laundering venues and pure fronts for organized crime or as information gathering and contact-making places, sometimes of international dimensions. Given that some Polish mafia figures have become secret informers for Western intelligence agencies, they need information to satisfy their protectors. Foreign services appear to be interested above all in the intelligence on Russian and other “Eastern” mafias, and a number of Polish gangsters as well as former secret services operatives have secured foreign citizenship, such as Austrian, Israeli and American, in exchange for their collaboration in this area.

Private security services have from the beginning attracted much media interest, because of numerous spectacular criminal incidents involving them. Their brutal methods of debt collection, protection rackets, bloody turf wars, insurance frauds and collaboration with organized crime became early on an integral part of their image. By August 1995, the Interior Ministry inspected 219 security companies.
and in 43 cases revoked their business concessions. Many companies were found to employ people with serious criminal records, but none of them was disqualified for doing so. With the growing negative publicity, the Supreme Chamber of Control (NIK) undertook, in 1996, an eight months probe of the industry. Many unlawful activities were exposed, largely corroborating earlier inquiries and media reports. The NIK documented how various companies were involved in prostitution, extortion, arson (as a means of intimidation or in connection with insurance frauds), defrauding organizations that hired them, bloody turf wars with competing businesses and the illegal employment of state police, State Security Agency (UOP), state fire brigades and Border Guard functionaries, as well as people with criminal records.

While the private security sector fulfils a variety of important needs in the changing social and economic landscape and many firms are professional and reliable, the industry’s criminal image persists because of continuous predatory activities that can be traced to its members. Their employment in guarding financial and economic institutions, their services related to installation of security systems, their involvement in information gathering, all create huge opportunities for criminal abuse of trust. In addition to crimes that involve illegal services, where the client explicitly or implicitly expects the company to use criminal means, for example, to get rid of a competitor, recoup debt or use illegal surveillance, employees of security companies often use the information gained through their employment in their own predatory schemes.

Security sector employees have been identified in numerous bank robberies, vanishing security vans transporting large sums of money, hostage-takings and kidnappings. These crimes are often executed by security guards donning their uniforms and using deception by pretending they are on duty. One particularly bloody incident involved a group of security guards, who robbed a bank and killed three of its female employees and a fellow security guard, who unwittingly
let them in, when the bank was closed\textsuperscript{64}. They were part of a larger gang specializing in bank robberies that were executed on the basis of information and contacts gained through their work. The police confirmed that it is common for private security personnel to exchange information about different establishments, their security systems, cash held on the premises and other relevant features\textsuperscript{65}. In the case of this particular gang, its members deliberately moved from one security firm to another every few months in order to make contacts and get insight into the working of different agencies. In keeping with the 1997 law, they were all licensed and passed required tests\textsuperscript{66}.

It has been noted that those security workers, who are arrested for major crimes often show little remorse. Some give an impression that they treat the agency that employs them as akin to a criminal gang, where one has to prove one’s toughness and earn respect by committing daring crimes\textsuperscript{67}. The prosecutors in the above mentioned bank robbery case commented publicly on the way the suspects recounted the details of their crime as if it were a fascinating detective movie\textsuperscript{68}. Whether the specific criminal decisions are made by the company board or its employees, the owners are likely to partake in the earnings. The illicit profits are invested heavily in legitimate businesses and real estate. This is where many threads of the post-communist power networks crisscross and reinforce the web of socially destructive relationships.

In order to understand the process of privatizing the communist police state, it is important to acknowledge that it was not limited to secret services’ personnel, inside (secret) knowledge, know-how and technical resources. The privatization process included also the mentality and cultural legacy predicated on secrecy, pursuit of anti-social goals, exemption from responsibility and suspension of morality. These features appear to have been reproduced both in the post-communist politics and in various private ventures and sectors surreptitiously
transplanted from the previous regime. This privatized legacy has facilitated and solidified an intricate fusion of interests of political, business and security elites.

The private security industry and the police

Both the state police and secret services, dwarfed by the huge private security sector, maintain close ties with their private counterparts. This relationship is mutually beneficial, even if largely illegal. Selling information to both detective and protection companies is believed to be routine. “The police force provides its members with a salary, insurance benefits, bonuses, nets of informers and equipment, but they earn real money by selling information” 69. For example, the police who specialize in investigating car theft have been known to have standing arrangements with private detectives, specializing in stolen car recovery (for both the victims and insurance companies), to sell them tips as to the whereabouts of the stolen vehicles. They may also sell information about the owners of stolen vehicles to enable the company to offer them its services. Even more important than illegal tips related to specific offences is illegal transfer of a larger body of classified information, which private agencies gather for their own data banks and information files. The amount and scope of information held by some of the private detective and intelligence companies for undisclosed purposes is believed to be staggering.

Given the large number of former policemen, their relatives and friends working in or owning firms in the private security sector, it is not surprising that the border between these two security domains have become blurred. Many police officers regularly moonlight in private agencies and refer to them crime victims. Various police stations have been known to involve their sport clubs in provision of private security services, lease office space in their buildings to private security companies, organize joint training for the police and private security agents and illegally subcontract various tasks to the private sector. In some cases, the illegal merger between the two sectors has been taken so far that the police and private
agents are jointly involved in routine forms of policing, including patrolling streets together in either police or private agencies’ vehicles. Judging by media reports and a sizable number of prosecuted cases, the police also participate in criminal schemes together with their private partners.

Moreover, in their roles related to licensing, issuing firearms permits, making recommendations for certain strategic security contracts and exercising oversight over the industry, regional and central police functionaries and their networks are in a unique position to shape the industry according to their own private ties and interests.

Risk, fear and security

The security industry, whose business depends on trust, seems to be rather inept in its efforts to establish itself as trustworthy and reliable. Some attempts at repairing their image have emerged in popular TV serials and other types of entertainment, featuring kindly, heroic or glamorous private security agents, either fictional or modeled on real-life figures, such as a maverick detective, ex-militiaman, Krzysztof Rutkowski.

Part of the problem lies undoubtedly in this sector’s inherited mentality and the perception that illegal gains and murky connections can be far more profitable than their legitimate day-to-day business. Yet there is also a perverse market relationship between the image of rampant crime and lawlessness and the demand for security services. By contributing to the overall level of insecurity, these “merchants of fear” – as they are often called in the media – gain both notoriety and business. They are simultaneously feared and indispensable. This relationship is reinforced by the new “responsibilization” philosophy, promoted by politicians, police and private sector, which centers on citizens’ ability to defend themselves. By both elevating fear and making people responsible for their
own safety, this approach gives them a stake in normalizing the security industry as a vital source of protection.

A police inspector and editor-in-chief of the Police Gazette wrote in her introduction to the catalogue of the 1994 National Exhibition of Security Systems ‘Garda 1994’: “We live in an atmosphere of fearfulness. It is not only in the streets that danger lurks, it invades our homes. It ravages our lives”74. Fear of crime has both a market dimension and political dimension. It is a particularly useful commodity in transition countries, where the apparatus of police state is being dispersed and politicians can no longer rely on the earlier totalitarian politics of fear. As I have shown elsewhere, in the process of systemic transition, fear of the state has been transformed into fear of crime and gave a new lease of life to the kinds of knowledge (and power techniques bound up with them) that had been strategic under the former regime75.

Fear has become a dominant factor in the real estate market, which is evident, for example, in its monthly publication. For example, an article advertising the international construction and development company SKANSKA, starts with selective statistical information about crimes that are on the rise, understaffing of the police and their poor crime solving rates in Warsaw. Then, the article points out that in addition to the crime-ridden Warsaw, where home invasions and burglary are rampant, there is “another Warsaw – modern and European,” where office buildings, supermarkets and upscale housing are set in a safe and exclusive environment. Finally, we learn that SKANSKA is part of this Warsaw and its residential complexes provide the highest levels of security by using suitable security companies, comprehensive camera surveillance systems and numerous other technologies of interior and exterior monitoring. Interestingly – probably to address public apprehension about security companies – the article underlines that SKANSKA also implements multiple control procedures over the security agents it employs76.
In a housing-starved society, the construction boom that followed the regime change has created a unique opportunity for the coupling of the notion of status with that of surveillance. Rapid processes of risk privatization and proliferation of risk-management strategies were part of the technological revolution that came with the opening to the West. Moreover, the new consumerism and increased ownership of automobiles, houses, summer cottages and sophisticated appliances have created new needs for insurance and security. Potential buyers learned to include the price of security when calculating purchase costs.77 “Gated” communities, secure buildings, alarm and surveillance systems and cellular phones have quickly emerged as desired security features, symbolizing success and initiative. The editor-in-chief of the real estate monthly points that even a superficial perusal of housing ads in the press suggests that luxury is becoming synonymous with “a high fence, locked gate, security guard and secure parking”78. Thus expensive security arrangements have become in themselves signs of ownership and exclusivity and the subjection to routine surveillance is being transformed into a status symbol.

As they re-emerged as a private security sector, the former secret services have quickly become the primary providers of risk definitions and risk-management technologies. Unlike the communist security forces that protected the state and state property, the new sector’s definitions of risk pertain in large part to protection of private property and profits. By simultaneously contributing to social insecurity, defining risks and supplying expensive and intrusive means to address them, this sector has worked to shape a new risk mentality that generates mushrooming demand for its own product and services. It also shapes new status hierarchies and their cultural corollaries as the quest for security is driven by an ingenious combination of fear and status.
Private policing in the global context

Private security/policing emerged in Poland and other formerly communist countries simultaneously with the privatization and marketization of the national economy. Historically, in the West, gradual development of capitalist economy was accompanied by the emergence of modern public policing that epitomized the trend toward monopolization of means of coercion and order-maintenance by the sovereign state. In contrast, the formation of capitalist economy in post-communist countries has been characterized by a rapid de-centralization and dispersion of means of coercion. Given the basically totalitarian nature of policing under the former regime, its de-monopolization was bound to lead to the diffusion of the police state mentality, methods and patterns of operation.

The post-1989 attempts to build the “law-based state” were, somewhat incongruently, paralleled by oblique processes of privatization and dispersion of the former security apparatus. With the systemic change, came the need for a new notion of order and it is important to inquiry about the grid of institutions, groups or “nodes” (to use Shearing’s concept) that have influenced this process. In addition to political change, the sudden emergence of substantial private spaces, both open and those that are closed to the public, created opportunities for novel forms of order and normative regulation.

There is a superficial similarity between the development of private security companies in post-communist countries and a sustained trend in Western post-industrial states towards privatization of important state functions. Yet the latter appears to have been triggered by a very different reality of “the crisis or overextension of the welfare state,” with all its fiscal, ideological and structural corollaries. Another factor linked with increased reliance on private policing and security is the massive expansion of privately-owned spaces, such as shopping malls and entertainment complexes, which admit the public and often depend on it for profits. It is safe to assume that with changes in property relations and
diversification of property forms, the relationships linking various forms of security also change. Finally, it has been noted that with technological and economic changes, many jobs that fulfilled secondary controlling functions, such as bus conductors or concierges, have disappeared over the years, creating greater need for formal surveillance mechanisms. While all these interpretations are to some extent applicable to the situation in post-communist countries, apparent similarities should not be taken at their face value.

The partial privatization of the police state's secret apparatus has to be treated as a distinct process requiring proper historical contextualization. Nevertheless, some lessons can be learned from Western inquiries into privatization of mechanisms that were formerly part of state control. Firstly, it appears unlikely that privatizing control can contribute to a reduction in its scope and intrusiveness. Secondly, it should not be assumed that introduction of parallel private policing only implies divided responsibility for maintaining order and does not influence the very production of definitions of order. As Shearing and Stenning discovered in their pioneering work on private policing: “What we are witnessing through the growth of private policing is not merely a reshuffling of responsibility for policing public order but the emergence of privately defined orders, policed by privately employed agents that are in some cases inconsistent with, or even in conflict with, the public order proclaimed by the state.”

While, in principle, a diversification of the process of social construction of order can be viewed as a sound development, the origins, nature and linkages of various systems of regulation need to be carefully scrutinized in any assessment of their contribution to the normative pluralism and democratic development. Thirdly, the description of private security as private has to be deconstructated in a specific historical context. It is vital to explore the multiple connotations of the private in post-communist societies, comprehensible only in relation to the on-
going social re-construction of meanings of space, civil society, the individual, corporate interests, community, market and so forth. The liberal conceptual traditions – such as conceiving of civil society in terms of market and private economy, seeing space in terms of private-public dichotomy and representing corporations as “individuals”\(^\text{86}\), have been blamed by Western researchers for de-politicizing the capitalist reality and obscuring the structural and cultural kinship between corporations and the state. Although the liberal ideology has played a prominent role in the realm of post-communism, it has been reframed as an antidote against the former regime’s ideology and reality and can only be understood within the context of a wholesale normative reconstruction of these societies. Moreover, given the contest between the post-communist and post-Solidarity elites, this reformulation has assumed in Poland quite unique forms and shades. Control of the strategic - overt and covert, private and public - tools of social control has been crucial in this contest and it is surprising that it attracted so little research and academic attention.

Fourthly, a clear distinction between private and public security sectors is not sustainable. Researchers have repeatedly pointed to their merging and interweaving in the process of pluralization of policing\(^\text{87}\). New theories emerge that situate this process within a multi-site model of governance, where multiple “nodes” related to the state, the market, the voluntary sector, globalization and so forth, constitute together a complex realm of regulation, prevention and enforcement of security\(^\text{88}\).

This is a useful framework for further research. Yet the specificity of the post-communist states has to be always kept in mind. Their distinct feature is that private security/intelligence industry has sprung from the police state infrastructure and is permeated by its mentality and traditions. Privatization meant more than the loss of state monopoly of the use of coercion; more crucially the new state has practically given up control over the vast, privatized
legacy of the former police state. Moreover, all these happened in a period of rapid technological change and accelerated globalization.

The information age rewards skills related to surreptitious information gathering. Given that the global market needs locally based professional intelligence, it is not surprising that former communist police state operatives have been sought by various international players, from intelligence services to business corporations to criminal organizations. Ironically, their knowledge, expertise and experience have appreciated with the collapse of the former regime. Unlike the employees of old communist bureaucracy and industries, whose skills became largely obsolete, the strategic knowledge and skills of secret apparatus networks have catapulted them to the centre of the new geo-political universe and legitimated them internationally as bona fide elite.

In a remarkable twist of fate, global technological changes shifted the centre of economic activity to the areas where former secret service operatives and younger, cosmopolitan nomenklatura activists could capitalize on their experience and expertise in such fields as (dis)information technologies, communications, image-(re)making, (in)security, foreign banking, economic and technological espionage, market intelligence, surveillance, conspiracy and arms trade. The private security/surveillance/intelligence industry is located at the core of this field and represents a strategic sector of an immense political and economic value.

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Footnotes:

2 Ibid. p. 185.


Los, 1984, 1988, 1990


For example, in the early 2000s, under Prime Minister Leszek Miller, the Treasury minister, deputy minister of Finance, two undersecretaries of the state, the chief negotiator on Poland’s accession to the European Union and a number of high officials in security and customs agencies disclosed that they were either secret agents or functionaries of the communist secret services, in most cases the military intelligence. It is difficult to estimate the number of undisclosed agents among the current and past office holders (Pytlakowski, P., ‘Koledzy z Alei Niepodleglosci’, *Polityka*, 25 Jan. 2003, pp. 24-7). See also Mikolajewska, 2004a on Miller’s “dirt-digging” team.

see, e.g., Pytlakowski, Ibid.


It is worth noting that even when Oleksy resigned as Prime Minister, his party (SdRP – the Communist Party successor) offered him resounding endorsement by electing him as their leader.


The same was true of East German intelligence operatives (see, e.g., Sawicki, Op.Cit.).


see Los and Zybontowicz, 2000, Op.Cit.: chapter 5 for detailed description and analysis of this process.
Many secret collaborators of communist services were subsequently elevated to important posts in various areas of political, economic and social life. Their oppositionist image, hidden network connections and vulnerability to blackmail made them ideal actors in the post-communist schemes.


Writing in 2003 about a dangerous and well entrenched web of interests linking the SLD (the SdRP successor) politicians and secret services networks, Andrzej Zyburtowicz points out that “the Prime Minister [Miller] and the President [Kwasniewski] not only constitute the focal points of that web but are simultaneously hostages of these networks, which lifted them to their current positions, and their protectors.”


see Los and Zyburtowicz, 2000 op. Cit. for a description of some of the pertinent developments

**FOZZ** - a special state Fund for Foreign Debt Servicing – was established legally by the last Communist government a week after the commencement of the Round Table talks. As it is now known, its head was working for the military secret services. In 1989-90, the public funds which FOZZ had at its disposal amounted to the equivalent of around 1 billion USD. At least half of this money appears to have been appropriated for private investments at home and abroad. The process of FOZZ liquidation started in 1991 and its investigation continues to this day. The FOZZ scam is often seen as both the archetype and catalyst of the wave of economic scandals that followed. BIG, a private bank – Bank of Economic Initiatives – was established three days after the electoral defeat of the Communist Party. Large amounts of state funds (including FOZZ funds) were channeled into BIG and it was involved, along with many other similar ventures, in numerous,
ramified schemes designed to effect an unstrained flow of state assets into private ventures of former communist elites. Many key roles were played by secret services agents. PZU was a communist State Insurance Agency (the insurance monopolist), which was later converted into a state company and established a number of subsidiary companies. They included PZU Zycie, which seems to have been particularly active in diverting huge amounts of public money into private investments, mass media, political parties and so forth. The company – currently under investigation - appears to have corrupt connections to many important political and business players and the scandal involves both former and present secret services. Orlen – a privatized oil company has attracted attention because of its perceived potential for undermining the security of Poland’s energy supply. A protracted criminal investigation and the current parliamentary commission of inquiry point to an octopus like structure that has its tentacles in all influential power networks in Poland. It involves also powerful Russian and Western interests. According to many observers, Orlen represents only one element of a broader corrupt system surrounding the privatization of the Polish petrochemical industry. While the current secret services may have some legitimate reasons for involvement, both the former and current secret services operatives seem to be actively engaged in this area. What is also worth noting is the context of this article is the role of Orlen, PZU and a number of other current scandals in unraveling the unity of ex-communist elites.

41 The total number of people employed in January 2004 by the regular state police was 99,625 (Komenda Gówna Policji -www.kgp.gov.pl)
50 Many commentators found this puzzling, especially given a very high involvement of detective companies in criminal activities, such as extremely brutal methods of debt recovery, gathering of information through illegal means and close ties to organized crime (see, e.g., Socha, R., ‘Najemnicy z licencja’, Polityka, 25 April 1998, pp.27-8.
The concept of ‘surveillant assemblage’ refers to a process of convergence of the previously discrete surveillance systems (including those related to work, consumption, public areas, traffic, insurance, and so forth). While these systems continue to produce separate flows of information, the increase in information sharing (and selling) have contributed to a more comprehensive surveillance coverage. As Haggerty and Ericson (Cf. Haggerty, K.D. and Ericson, R.V., ‘The surveillant Assemblage’, British Journal of Sociology, 51(4), 2000, p. 609) point out: “a range of desires now energize and serve to coalesce the surveillant assemblage, including the desires for control, governance, security, profit and entertainment.” While serving diverse, public and private, purposes, multiple surveillance activities develop linkages that may range from occasional contacts to stable, institutionalized cooperation.


see, e.g., Kudzia and Paweleczyk, 2002 Ibid.


Siloviki in Russian Regions: New Dogs, Old Tricks

Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of elites changes in the spatial organisation of the power ministries as they were affected by the federal reform. The main hypothesis is that Federal okrug administrations were introduced to break the ties binding the regional and federal levels of siloviki and at the same time create bridgehead from which to establish supervision over all the levels.

Why “siloviki”?

Unifying term ‘siloviki’ (power men), which means usually officers of numerous power and law enforcement agencies, both active and former, got wide circulation under ‘silovik’ Vladimir Putin. Not only is it due to the fact that being much less noticeable earlier they demonstrate now rapid expansion both in terms of persons and relations, but also to the way the whole management machine is organized. Another reason is that they do appear as a united corporation in spite of all internal conflicts and contradictions; a corporation that opposes itself to the ‘civilian’ section of management. Their corporate norms and rules of behavior were spread everywhere and dominate now in the whole Russian state apparatus. This phenomenon can be called ‘FSB-ization’ by the name of Federal Security Service (FSB), the major KGB successor.

The present paper is aimed to give the reader a general understanding of the phenomenon and provide him with simplest descriptive schemes in genre of political entomology.
Siloviki are coming

All three prime-ministers appointed by weak and pretty unpopular president Eltsin during a year after 1998 financial crises – Evgeny Primakov, Sergei Stepashin, and Vladimir Putin – had the experience of managing secret services: Foreign Intelligence in case of the first one and FSB in two other cases. It’s possible thus to speak about siloviki's casting for the second or even the first most important office in Russia.

Named director of the FSB in 1998, Putin had in the past held the very lowly rank of KGB lieutenant colonel. As a result he was regarded by many of the organization’s leading generals as an upstart and a political appointee. During a year in charge of the FSB Putin managed to get his own people into the administration of the service but it would be most premature to speak of his total control over that body. In the army, MVD, tax police and other power ministries the former secretary of the Security Council was still weaker, following his abrupt promotion to the very heights of the Russian political Olympus5.

Once president, Putin naturally wanted to turn the security structures into a support for his rule. It was not enough to simply change ministers. In the best of cases it would take them a very long time to establish their own control over such enormous bureaucratic pyramids as, say Ministry of Interior with 2 million employees. By creating an intermediate administrative level between the central authorities and those in the regions it would be possible to break the ties binding the regional and federal levels of siloviki and, at the same time, create a bridgehead from which to establish supervision over both the one and the other levels. The okrugs thus formed a wedge between the federal hammer and the regional anvil. The new institutions were not burdened with old feuds and would enable work with cadres (selection, practical testing and training) while providing a sharp impetus towards the replenishment of personnel. To a great extent the introduction of the okrugs permitted the reproduction of cadres in its full cycle to
be restored (recruitment, training, preparation of reserve cadres) after the nationwide system, formerly exercised by the apparatus of the Communist Party, was destroyed in 1991. Less than a year after the reforms had begun it proved possible to replace the ministers of Defense and of Internal Affairs and begin a “purge of staff headquarters”. Two years later the entire bloc of power ministries could be reformed on the eve of the next elections, thereby completing the transfer of the levers of control over the country’s numerous security structures into the hands of Putin’s close supporters and comrades in arms. There was a sharp increase in the horizontal rotation of the regional chiefs of those structures, thereby ensuring their greater loyalty to the president’s team.

The okrug police administrations created by Putin’s 4 June 2001 decree became powerful bureaucratic players. Their chiefs, holding ranks up to colonel-general, are appointed by presidential decree and report directly to their minister in Moscow. Each okrug’s regional police chiefs report to them. The okrug chiefs have staffs of up to 150. Their responsibilities include coordinating the work of the MVD within their okrugs, collecting and analyzing information and giving it to the envoys, and combating organized crime. Each okrug chief is the commanding officer for all MVD units in the okrug.

Cadres for Putin’s reforms

In the federal-security reform, as in any plan for state reorganization, there are two chief elements. On the one hand, there is the structural and functional aspect that is linked to the reorganization of the layers of the system and the links between them. On the other hand, there is the question of cadres. The success of the reforms that have been implemented is now, it would seem, not determined by institutional and functional design but by cadres and their willingness and ability to make a reality of the outlined transformations.

To analyze the situation with cadres we have taken the three main power ministries of those represented in the regions, FSB, MVD and prosecutors
FSB was close to the proponents of the current reforms, continues to function in its accustomed regime and is an almost wholly closed organization. MVD was an alien organization to the reformers, has been zealously reformed and is comparatively open in informational terms. Finally, even during Eltsin’s reforms the FSB continued to remain to a large extent under the control of the central political authorities. The regional administrations of the MVD, on the contrary, in many respects came under the supervising control of the regions’ political leaders: during Putin’s recentralising reform, therefore, they became the arena of numerous conflicts that erupted into public rows.

The reform of the MVD was sharply intensified after the appointment as minister of Boris Gryzlov in April 2001. The leadership in the central apparatus was almost entirely replaced; a single line of command on the territorial principle was established; main departments (GUVD) were created in each of the seven federal okrugs. The renewal of cadres that initially embraced the top ranks of the ministry has also begun at the regional level. Each month the press reports new resignations and appointments of police chiefs at the local level: in 2003 alone 23 heads of regional departments (UVD) were replaced and in 2004, 14 more.

As already noted, in its spring 2001 amendments to the law concerning the police the Duma deprived regional leaders of the right to approve the appointment of heads of UVD. The upper Federation Council, where the governors then still sat, resisted and did not want, without a fight, to surrender its right of second say in such appointments. Their objections had no real effect and since mid-2001 the new procedure has been in force.

At a meeting of the Security Council on 31 May 2002 Putin declared that the system of rotation would be restored in order, one, to retain professionals and, two, to “extract” them from the ties and circumstances that build up over years. “Issues of rotation are already being decided in the MVD,” said Gryzlov; “leaders
of the territorial organs are being replaced.” Let us see how a renewal of the siloviki has proceeded in the MVD and the FSB, by examining all the available materials.

Table 1: Regional leadership of MVD and FSB in federal okrugs and its renewal (as of 1 January 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Okrug</th>
<th>N° of leaders*</th>
<th>Replaced since 05.2000</th>
<th>Average time in post (year and month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UVD</td>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>UVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>10(10)</td>
<td>9(10)</td>
<td>10(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>18(18)</td>
<td>11(17)</td>
<td>11(12)/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>12(13)</td>
<td>10(13)</td>
<td>8(15)**/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga</td>
<td>13(15)</td>
<td>12(15)</td>
<td>5/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals</td>
<td>5(6)</td>
<td>5(6)</td>
<td>5/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia</td>
<td>11(16)</td>
<td>8(16)</td>
<td>4/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East</td>
<td>7(10)</td>
<td>8(10)</td>
<td>6/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>74(88)</td>
<td>63(87)</td>
<td>46(48)/74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Number of leaders for whom the date of appointment is known (in parentheses total number in okrug).

** Number of regions where replacements were made (in parentheses total number of replacements). Since the UVD chief for Ingushetia and Chechnia changed twice, and the local FSB chief in Chechnia, Tuva and the Maritime region also changed twice, the total number of replacements exceeds that of the regions where they took place.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)

The first striking impression is the abrupt renewal of the regional leadership of the MVD during Putin’s presidency. In 2001 alone almost every fourth regional
police chief was replaced, many times more than the two previous years. The jump in numbers in 2001 is partly explained by the creation of the seven okrug heads of the GUVD. In spite of the large-scale replacements almost two fifths of regional MVD chiefs, as of mid-2003, were pre-Putin appointees\textsuperscript{9} and these numbered some long-term survivors who had held the post during the Soviet period.

Two, the career of those appointed in Putin’s levy differed fundamentally from Eltsin-era appointments. The great majority of police chiefs appointed in the 1990s had worked all their lives in their own region but most of the new Putin appointees were transferred from senior posts in other regions. We can thus talk about a transition from a Brezhnev-era model of stagnation to the preceding model of intensive horizontal rotation. Similarity with the latter is further emphasized by the use of a pattern of appointments common within the Communist Party during the Soviet period when people moved “from region to region via Moscow” or “from second or third to first-ranking in one’s own region via Moscow”. It is important to note that the federal ministry in Moscow is far from playing just an auxiliary role as a staging post in these personnel changes: it is not just the place where the apparatus gets acquainted with the candidate for an important post and the candidate gets to know those serving in the ministry. MVD generals and senior officers from the regions may be appointed to leading posts within the ministerial apparatus and several years later again return “to the region”. The present chief (since July 2002) of the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region GUVD, M. Vanichkin, first headed GUBOP and then the Russian national bureau of Interpol; the chief of police in the Voronezh region since September 1997, A. Dementyev, was deputy head of GUBEP and head of GUBOP; V. Shevchenko, the chief NPof the Rostov GUVD since December 2001 was deputy head of GUUR; the Sverdlovsk GUVD chief since October 2001, V. Vorotnikov, was head of the passport and visa department at the MVD; the Kalmyk republic’s
chief policeman, since March 2003, is V. Matveyev who was deputy head of the legal department at the MVD.

Three, it is not proving at all easy to “uproot” the leadership of the MVD’s regional structures. This is especially true in the ethnic republics where it is not just a question of local ties but of ethnicity.\(^\text{10}\) If the proportion of “locals” to “outsiders” among the regional police chiefs /12/ in predominantly Russian regions was 1:1, in the ethnic republics and districts the proportions were almost 4:1.\(^\text{11}\) We may add that among the outsiders who were appointed after the federal reform began, half came from “their own” federal okrug. The balance between locals and outsiders has changed substantially since the reform began: now the ratio is 1:1 in the ethnic republics and districts and one local to two foreigners in other regions – moreover a third of the locals, in the latter case, were returning to the region after serving in another area\(^\text{12}\).

The statistics of replacements in the okrugs and the average time served as UVD chief is presented in Table 1. A substantial unevenness in the process of renewal may be observed. In the Urals and Northwest okrugs almost all the UVD chiefs have been replaced and their present time in post barely exceeds 12 months. In the Siberian and Volga okrugs only one third of the regions have been affected and the length of service, accordingly, is 4-5 times longer. The latter two okrugs, we cannot help but recall, are those headed by civilian envoys and they contain the maximum number of ethnic regions. Until early 2003 the Central okrug was also among those lagging behind but in 2003 alone five police chiefs were replaced, or every third or fourth.

We may note that the renewal of the regional corps of police chiefs is aided by the rule that on reaching the age of 55 a police chief is automatically retired\(^\text{13}\). Only by special decision of the minister can the length of service be increased by a year (and there may only be five such extensions, up to 60). The system of
rotation is thus underpinned by a special and external “ejection” mechanism. Such an age limit simultaneously assures the loyalty of police chiefs to the minister, no matter whether they are locals or outsiders: it is he, and not the governor, who decides whether an MVD general may continue to be an acting police chief or not. /13/

The Federal Security Service (FSB)

The FSB is a structure of a quite different kind that never came under such great influence of the regional governors as the other siloviki. It would be logical to expect that personnel changes as a consequence of a considerable strengthening of the Center would be less. That, however, is not the case. The changes are intensive -- half of the heads of regional FSB departments were appointed under Putin -- but the reasons are different than in the case of the MVD. Instead of the replacement of “bad” chiefs, here it is a question of career advancement linked to the appointment of FSB colleagues to the most varied posts: from presidential envoys and Chief Federal Inspectors14 to MVD chiefs (Udmurtia 2002, Chechnia 2000), senators (Tuva 2001-2, Omsk region 2002, Krasnodar region 2003) and even governors (Voronezh and Smolensk regions). At the regional level the FSB appears even more renewed than the MVD. Since Putin came to power more than two thirds of regional FSB chiefs have been replaced15. Almost all the present regional FSB chiefs took up their posts no earlier than Eltsin’s second term of office: of the more long-serving incumbents we may note those in the Altai (since 1991), Nizhny Novgorod (since 1992), Kurgan and Tambov regions (since 1993). At the opposite end of the scale are Chechnia and Kalmykia where FSB chiefs change every two years, working “in shifts”.

The trajectories of career advancement in the FSB differ significantly from those in the MVD, both in the pre-Putin and the present patterns. As a rule, an FSB operative rises to the level of a deputy head of the department in “his own”
region. Further promotion in that region to head of department seems more to be an exception than a rule and it makes no difference whether it is an ethnic republic or a predominantly Russian region. Of those presently heading regional FSB departments barely one in five, or one in six, have made that move (typically, all the “old-timers” who have been in their posts for ten years and more made their careers in the same region). The most widespread variant is the sideways promotion when there is a radical change of region in the transition from deputy to regional department head. Frequently this sideways promotion passes through the central FSB apparatus in Moscow. However, unlike the MVD’ candidates for promotion, the FSB promotees more often serve for a time, working in the inspectors’ department in Moscow, rather than take up important posts there. It is important to emphasize that in the MVD, where the system of horizontal rotation of leading cadres is being recreated, the scope for such rotation is, as a rule, limited to the federal okrugs: within the FSB, where the principle of rotation had been preserved before the federal reform, such moves were made around the whole country.

A pattern of purely horizontal shifts at the level of regional department chiefs is also extremely widespread within the FSB, e.g. from Kalmykia to Vladimir (1998) or Ulyanovsk (1999), Ryazan to Stavropol (2001), Omsk to Krasnoyarsk (2002), and Kamchatka to Krasnodar (2003 via Kyrgyzstan).

The statistics for turnover in regional FSB chiefs (see Table 1) differs rather from that for the MVD. The average time in post for department chiefs is almost the same for both organisations -- three years after the federal reform began we may note, as a purely symbolic detail, that it equalled the age of that reform! The variation between the okrugs, however, was substantially less for the FSB: from less than two years in the Southern okrug to almost four years in the Volga and Urals okrugs. This may provide evidence of two things. One, the federal reform in the FSB did not, unlike that in the MVD, lead to fundamental changes in the
system whereby the corps of regional chiefs was formed and replaced. Two, the difference between predominantly Russian regions and ethnic republics is much less pronounced and the *okrugs*, correspondingly, are more homogeneous in their composition.

Deserving particular attention are the regional FSB chiefs who serve in the central regions of the *okrugs* and head the Councils of FSB agencies (see fn. 3). Only two of them (Volga and Urals *okrugs*) held their posts under Eltsin. All the rest are Putin promotees, including Moscow and Novosibirsk where regional FSB chiefs were appointed as the federal reform began and Yekaterinburg where the FSB chief was replaced a couple of months earlier. Petersburg stands out for having twice changed its regional FSB chief during the reform period: the first was squeezed out by the presidential envoy, the second left immediately after a new envoy was appointed. Thus the FSB may only be considered the forerunner of the federal reform in an institutional sense: it is certainly not the case with its cadres, at least at the level of those heading the Councils of FSB agencies.

The federal inspectors

No less indicative is the choice of cadres to serve in the teams of the envoys and as federal inspectors in the regions. How did the presidential envoys form their administrations? In each of the three cases where the envoy did not come from Moscow a back-up man from the presidential administration appeared: the former chief of the department for the coordination of presidential representatives Anton Fyodorov was appointed in the Central *okrug* and his deputies in the Southern and Far-eastern *okrugs*. The most Moscow-based administrations are those of Kiriyenko (5 Muscovites including himself) and Drachevsky (four including himself), with Poltavchenko in Moscow coming third only (three). The same administrations excluding the last are newly arrived, less indigenous. There were no representatives of the Volga regions among Kiriyenko’s administration leadership, and both the Siberian and Far-eastern *okrug* administrations have
only one local born member each. Turning to the envoys’ deputies we find businessmen and retired politicians in the case of Kiriyenko, while fellow generals and senior officers serve in the cases of Cherkesov, Kazantsev, and Drachevsky: one can say that at least part of these appointments was inspired by the envoys themselves.

In the case of chief federal inspectors in the regions who replaced the former presidential representatives the role of envoys is less pronounced, except maybe for the Northwestern and Volga okrugs. Appointments of federal inspectors in general look strong and well prepared. They are very different from the commissar-type presidential representatives appointed in 1991, being a kind of transmission belt for regional political-economic mechanisms. This is clearly shown by their previous jobs, e.g. Komi president’s chief of staff, deputy heads of government of Udmurtia, Mordovia, Saratov region, and the Orenburg regional government chief of staff. Usually the chief inspector is directly and strongly connected to his region. However, there are some exceptions, above all in Siberia. Muscovites were appointed to Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and the Maritime, Kemerovo, and Krasnoiarsk regions – all troubled regions with authoritarian leaders.

Many Muscovites were moved to the regions as a result of the reform (they work not only in the okrug administrations, but in General Prosecutor’s offices, MVD etc) and this is an unusual phenomenon. Where departure for the periphery offers questionable career advancement, the move can be explained either by the temporary character of these official journeys or by the mobilization of the bureaucratic apparatus which exercises a kind of military discipline.

Three important innovations attract one’s attention if the federal inspectors are compared with the former presidential representatives. One, the whole territory of the country is covered without exceptions, including former “troubled” regions
(Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia) where presidential representatives were previously absent. Two, there has been careful consideration of the ethnic factor especially with regard to the most conflictual republics, with the understandable aim of not letting conflict with the central authorities acquire an ethnic dimension. Thus an ethnic Tartar – but from Moscow -- is appointed to Tatarstan, a Bashkir is sent to Bashkortostan, and the same practice is applied to the North Caucasian republics. Yakutia is under an ethnic Russian inspector, but one who speaks the language and has the experience of working as deputy head of the government there.

The third innovation we may term “federal reform-2” on analogy with the formation of the okrugs. Certain inspectors are responsible for more than one “subject of the federation”, in many cases for two or even three regions. In some instances, it’s a return to the pre-1991 administrative-territorial pattern, with the inspector being responsible for an ethnic autonomous okrug or district as well as the region within which it is located\textsuperscript{21}. The return to the old structure -- as regards the inspectors -- has not been realized in full. Exceptions have been made not only for enormous autonomous okrugs like Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets, but also for, say, the Nenets district as well\textsuperscript{22}. Each of these has its own chief federal inspector.

In other cases, there are surprising and unusual combinations. One chief federal inspector (CFI) covers both Yakutia and the Magadan region, another combines Kamchatka with the ethnic Koriak and Chukchi autonomous okrugs, a third is responsible for both the Tuva and Khakasia republics. It looks as though these inspectorates were created for specific persons: a general from the border guards rather logically takes care of the Chukchi region along with Kamchatka, while a former high-ranking local official oversees the huge combined territory of Yakutia and the Magadan region. One further very strange such innovation is the unification of the Kabarda-Balkar republic with Kavminvody, that part of the
Stavropol region, which in 1993 gained the status of a special ecological-resort area under joint federal and regional jurisdiction. The pairing of mutually hostile Ingushetia and North Ossetia with Ingushetia’s former speaker Magomed Sultygov as the CFI also appeared very odd. It looks as if the territorial ranking and related status of the various constituent regions of the Russian Federation, unlike the ethnic factor, do not deserve attention. None of the “small” autonomous regions, except for Nenets, rated its own CFI, and a number of Northern Caucasian republics were put under a single CFI, as though they were being bound together to form a reliable unit for this section of Russia’s borderlands.

Who are the chief federal inspectors? Half of those 40 whose biography is known to us originate from KGB (15), MVD (5), and the so-called control departments of regional administrations (3). There are at least five chiefs of the regional FSB among these 40 inspectors, four more are chiefs of regional Tax police with the rank of general. MVD chiefs are fewer, only in the Yamal-Nenets and Tambov regions: maybe this is because they are more often “governor’s guys”. If the military are added one can conclude that three fourths of federal inspectors came from power ministries and the special services.

In the three years that have elapsed since the CFIs were appointed, in July to October 2000, they have been replaced in almost every second region. This should not be surprising; it’s a normal phenomenon. It is more surprising that only one presidential envoy has been replaced during this time. Given the rather haphazard selection of those who fill that post this can only be explained by the lack of clear functional demands. The CFIs are a different matter: their functions are far more specific and so greater demands are placed on them, hence the turnover.

It is interesting to see where the former CFIs went and who replaced them.
Structural changes led to the appointment of CFIs to the two capital regions where they had not been in existence earlier. There were also changes in the areas they covered: the Jewish AO and the Karachaev-Cherkes republic, formerly inspected, respectively, from the Khabarovsk and Stavropol regions, gained their own inspectors, as did Chechnya. When the new Federation Council was formed 3 CFIs became senators (from Ulyanovsk, Omsk and Perm) and another, from Khakasia, became head of the Federation Council staff. CFIs from Moscow were replaced by locals in the Maritime and Irkutsk regions. Finally, promotions elevated the Ivanovo CFI E. Shkolov to become an aide to the head of the presidential staff while the Nizhny Novgorod CFI S. Obozov was made deputy envoy. In a number of cases the departure of the CFI was preceded by serious rows, e.g. Altai, Irkutsk and Moscow regions, or even criminal investigations, e.g. Udmurtia and Bryansk region.

Overall, therefore, the CFI played a comparatively small role as a reserve of cadres and in many cases their replacement was unavoidable.

The prosecutors: once again the Sovereign's eye

Prosecutors who were the first to pass through mass ‘cleansings’ are the lone among analyzed siloviki categories who still remain not finally reformed yet. There are pretty many of them who came to their posts in mid or even early 90-ies and made careers in their own regions.

If chief militia and FSB men are appointed by president and chief federal inspector by the presidential administration head demanding for a minimal submitting, prosecutors are appointed by the prosecutor General with local authorities approval needed. The latter can sometimes demonstrate their character like in cases of Moscow prosecutor in 2000, Krasnoyarsk krai in 2001 or Bashkiria in 2004. If a guy comes from outside the region than the scheme
works according to which he is usually getting appointed deputy prosecutor first and active prosecutor later before being confirmed by regional legislation. «Bringing of a regional legislature into line with federal one” can serve a test, a business game, which lets to check in reality independence of prosecutors from regional authorities, their loyalty to the Center and effectiveness.

Many of prosecutors have passed through severe trials. Out of recent examples there are Bashkiria and Tatarstan prosecutors' coming against local authorities, which ended by heart attack and resignation for the former. Udmurtia’s prosecutor in 2003 behaved in a different way, occupying position of local authorities in their conflict with the Center over VGTRK – All-Russian State Television and Radio Company. He was fired in result, but according to local journalist approaching the pension age he was waiting for an apartment being thus more dependent from republican authorities than from Moscow.

Prosecutors by their life path originate most of all from the very midst of the masses. After serving in the army as conscripts they went to law schools, became investigators and were climbing up step by step at career stairs.

An average regional prosecutor is younger than his colleagues- siloviki – he is 49. He is at his post practically from the beginning of reforms – for three years and a half and, probably will resign from this very post sometime in future, although it's not clear in how long. However, there is a chance to grow to the deputy prosecutor general or to a regional governor. The horizontal rotation of prosecutors itself was minimal last years due to ongoing intensive renewal of their corps there were a lot of vertical mobility with deputy regional prosecutors, regional centers’ prosecutors and branch prosecutors growing to regional prosecutor. About two fifths of current regional prosecutors including almost all veterans made careers in their own regions, about the same share – in other regions of their federal district, and less than a quarter – in other districts.
The role of the Prosecutor general office district departments as of regional prosecutors incubator is minimal, except for North Caucasus department and position of prosecutor in Chechnya with rotation twice a year. Ten prosecutors have passed through Chechnya with two of them already heading regional offices in Rostov and Volgograd.

There are regions where prosecutors can’t seat in their chairs for long: Stavropol Krai and Kurgan (prosecutora there are fourth in raw since reforms have been started), Kalmykia, Chita (third in raw). Moscow city prosecutors serve regularly as victims of political games.

Not only scandalous conflicts in Nenets okrug, Kamchatka etc. can illustrate well increased independence of prosecutors, but their active participation in the last series of gubernatorial elections as well. In Koryak okrug prosecutor B. Chuyev consolidated siloviki and came to the runoff; in Kirov oblast’ the former prosecutor N. Shaklein, although not regional one, was elected to governor’s office.

The general pattern: unity of time and space

Now, when we traced the development at regional level in major siloviki corporations – pillars of the new Putin’s regime, the general time pattern of the on-going federal reform can be considered.

Figure 1 shows dynamics of CFI, FSB and MVD chiefs and prosecutors replacements against the background of a regional political calendar – gubernatorial elections. Distinct branch specialization of reform years is clearly seen there. The year 2000 can be called prosecutor-gubernatorial – there were 20 prosecutors and 15 governors replaced. The year 2001 was “militia’s” with 21 new chief of UVD/GUVD being appointed! The year 2002 is “siloviki/s”: 20 new prosecutors, 19 CFI and 18 chekists! The next year 2003 is “militia’s” again – 27
replacements! Finally, the year 2004 is “prosecutors-FSB’s” – 18 and 17 replacements accordingly.

Thus, temporal patterns differ. In FSB rotation is rather stable by years: 12 persons in 2000-2001 and 16-18 during last years. Replacements of regional heads follow the four-year cycle although slightly diffused, they reach maximum in 2000 and correspondingly 2004, and are less pronounced in between. Regional militiamen went through two huge waves of replacements: in 2001 the first, in 2003 the second. Prosecutors have similar waves although with a shift – in 2000 and 2002, less in 2004.

There is strong variation among regions in character and intensity of powermen and law enforcement replacements. There were six cases of volley, total replacements, when the whole team of siloviki was renewed in a year or so: Petersburg (late 2002 - 2003), Volgograd (late 2000 – 2001), Tver (late 2002 - 2003), Magadan (2002-2003) oblasts, Krasnoyarsk (2001) and Stavropol (late 2001 – 2002) Krai. In several cases more: Mordovia, Tuva, Udmurtia, Perm, Sakhalin oblasts, Krasnodar Krai replacements were total although took longer. Another pole consists of regions without any replacements like Dagestan, Kabarda-Balkaria, and Aga-Buryat district, or with isolated replacements: Tatarstan, Chuvashia, Altaysky Krai, Orel, Penza, Tambov, Tula, Samara, Kemerovo oblasts, Yamal-Nenets and Ust-Orda Buriat districts. Majority of them are regions with influential regional leaders being them M. Shaimiiev, E. Stroiev, K. Titov, A. Tuleyev and others having strong positions.

Regular combinations of regional siloviki replacements are of special interest. Some of them can be seen at the first glance. For example, one could see that in four regions out of six with blitz-replacements of all federals there were governors who changed as well, with the new governor coming at the end of all replacements, a kind of finale. Another curious regularity is almost an omen: in
one third of all cases of governors replacements they were preceded by prosecutors replacements on the eve of elections (within half a year). One can suppose that the Center, when replacing prosecutor just before gubernatorial elections was making usage of an administrative resource by incumbent much harder.

It would be logical to expect that a new governor coming to power would not work well together with siloviki, inherited by him from his predecessor and would try to replace them. To test this hypothesis we made a so called ruler of replacements with a new governor coming taken as a zero point. Analysis of about a third of governors’ changes in 2000-2002 showed that, following a governor, CFI and UVD chief have been changed with a probability of 2/3, and prosecutor and FSB chief with a probability of 2/5. All siloviki replacements are taking place in average during the second year after the governor’s arrival with the following logic: militia chief is the first to be replaced at the beginning of the governor's second year (in 14 months after election); prosecutor’s turn comes in the middle of the second year (16 months), FSB representative follows (17) with CFI being replaced in the last turn (19).

It would be wrong to overestimate the degree of coordination of different agencies actions dealing with local cadres replacements. However the lack of such coordination can lead to the result, opposite to the desired one, – a temporal loss of control over the situation. The case of Tver can serve as a good illustration here. Almost simultaneous replacement of CFI, MVD and FSB chiefs, and prosecutor with strangers’, who came from outside led to half a paralysis of the Center there, just on the eve of gubernatorial elections. However, such cases are pretty rare.

Table 2. Replacements of governors, chief federal inspectors, FSB and MVD chiefs by years, 2000-2004.
**Siloviki in regional elites**

Let us look at how *siloviki*, whose loyalty to the Center increased sharply with the reforms, are included into regional political elites. The recent study on regional elites by the Institute of situational analysis and of new technologies (ISANT) makes it possible to evaluate enrootedness and influence of major federals-*siloviki* on a base of 66 regions.

First of all, only in one case out of 66 – Irkutsk oblast’ – experts did not include any *siloviki* into two dozens of the most influential persons in politics and top thirty in the economy. In 16 regions, more *siloviki* occupy only a single position in the lists. It is CFI most of all. Militia chief are twice less common, in rare cases there are prosecutor, UFSB chief and even first deputy envoy. As for the rest of the country, 49 regions chiefs of power and law enforcement agencies occupy from two to five positions among most influential persons.

Chief federal inspectors are mentioned most often – in two thirds of all cases (49 regions), including 19, where CFI are included in top ten and Chuvashia, Kursk, Orel, Samara, and Tula where they are coming in top three (although being third everywhere). It should be noted that CFI are usually most influential among the four of federals. In 35 regions they are either leading, or being single ones mentioned. In Chuvashia and Lipetsk not only chief but ordinary federal inspectors are mentioned as well. In Altaysky and Stavropol *Krais*, Amur, Kirov,
Orel, Tyumen oblasts CFI are included to the list of most influential persons in economy as well. The average rating of CFI in those four dozens of regions where they are mentioned as influential is about 13.

Regional UVD bosses are mentioned in 41 case. They do occupy three seventh positions (in Krasnoyarsky Krai, Volgograd and Omsk oblasts), forth (Belgorod), fifth (Kaluga) and sixth (Tver) positions. Most of all they do occupy second place among the four of feederals (16 regions), although a little more rarely the first and the third (in 12 cases each). In ethnic republics (there are 10 of them in our sample) ministers of interior are mentioned almost everywhere, including Bashkiria and Kalmykia where they head the list of federals, and Yakutia and Tatarstan where they are single federals in ratings. The average rating of militia generals is 17. In a few cases, namely in Kemerovo, Kirov, Ryazan, Tula, they are represented in economic ratings as well.

Prosecutors are represented among most influential persons in regional politics in half of the regions36, including those seven, where they head the four of federals and the one – Orenburg region, where the prosecutor leads the whole list. In Altaisky and Primorskii Krai prosecutors are represented in economic rating as well. The average rating of prosecutors for 33 regions is 17,5.

UFSB chiefs are most secretive actors on the regional political scene. As representatives of the political establishment, they are mentioned in one third of the regions only – 26. However, in nine cases they do head the quartet of federals. In one case – the Kostroma region- they head the whole list. In three more regions, – Altaysky Krai, Voronezh and Nizhegorodskaya oblasts, they are mentioned among the first three. In result the average UFSB rating – 17 is the same as for chief militiamen. In republics, UFSB just like prosecutor is a rare bird among elites.
Once in a region…

The impression about shifts occurrence would not be complete if we did not give specific cases, illustrating the general concept and helping the reader understand deeper the essence of what is going on.


The story about the Kalmykian minister of Interior replacement starts in mid 2002, when, on the eve of regional presidential elections, the Kremlin started to clean a stage. FSB chief and prosecutor were already replaced earlier. Internal security department of the federal MVD together with FSB checked local militia and reported numerous abuses. Among other things they found facts of militia’s protection of illegal fish-caviar and oil businesses in the territory of the republic. Minister Sasykov was offered to give his resignation, but he refused. Pressure on him including through central media was increasing. Meanwhile elections were held and incumbent president Ilyumzhinov was reelected although not as triumphally as earlier, while a candidate of the opposition backed by the siloviki wing of the Moscow presidential administration failed. At the beginning of 2003 Sasykov was discharged by the federal minister Grizlov order but he refused to obey. Instead of letting newly appointed minister (he was UVD chief from Siberian Tiumen oblast’ which is far away from Kalmykia) to his office he started to dispute MVD orders and even results of the Ministry’s attestation in local court, and later sent a letter to all regional militia chiefs claiming not to obey to “engineer Gryzlov, who does not make head or tail of the militia”. There was natural double power in republican MVD for several weeks. In May Sasikov was fired by presidential decree and a kind of special operation was organized. The general was invited to the meeting of MVD chiefs of Southern federal district, and when he left the republic he was arrested on accusation of abusing power and sent to Moscow under convoy. He was kept there till July when finally freed given a written undertaking not to leave the country – prosecutor’s general office did not find any evidence against him. However, the initial replacement of Sasykov
was sent back to Moscow and a new minister was appointed who suited republican authorities better – deputy head of the district’s Main UVD department Ponomarev.

2003, Tver oblast’.

During the year prior to gubernatorial elections, all major siloviki and law enforcement chiefs were replaced in the region with “Varangians” coming from different parts of the country. First during the fall 2002, the chief federal inspector, a former army reserve colonel from Petersburg, was replaced with FSB general Yu. Tseberganov from Transbaikal Chita region. Next January A. Rekhtyuk from Vladimir replaced FSB general who occupied his office since 1998. Two months later the local UVD chief commanding since 1996 was replaced by colonel A. Kulikov from Petersburg.

Meanwhile the administration has been shaken by corruption scandals, in September the office of the governor was searched. About this time the regional prosecutor left from his office. The tough competition between three generals took place at the State Duma and simultaneous gubernatorial elections. They were chief federal inspector Tseberganov, retired deputy-minister of Interior I. Zubov, and active deputy minister V. Vasil’yev, all of them being “Varangians”. D. Zelenin, an entrepreneur from outside the region was elected the new governor, while colonel-general V. Vasil’yev became a State Duma deputy.

Conclusion

Administrative-power skeleton was constructed or perhaps restored during Putin’s first presidential term. It consists of mighty verticals going from the top to the very bottom, and horizontals. Verticals are doubled – administrative and power – to be stronger. Administrative verticals are inherited from the Soviet-Communist past, they never disappeared, although regions were more independent for a while especially when electing governors. Power verticals are
being constructed all over again, being connected at the regional level to a solid slab. They are connected between different agencies both within the region (by means of collegium under chief federal inspector, law enforcement collegium with prosecutor at the head, antiterrorist commission headed by deputy governor and regional security council headed by governor) and between regions, including different district collegiums and councils as well as cadres' horizontal rotation.

What is next? A lattice can serve both carrying construction, which promotes the country’s unity, horizontal and vertical mobility, spatial justice; and a prison’s cage for regional elites and population. Which particular role will be realized depends heavily on the society itself, on Russian citizens.

The Center’s actions look coordinated and strategically shaped only when they are observed from far away, with high degree of generalization. But seen from closer they look far more occasional, reactive and chaotic. However, in conditions of strong disbalance in favor of the Center it is him who nevertheless celebrates a victory finally. Regional leaders can win separate battles only, while their loss of the campaign on the whole is predetermined.

It appears now that the administrative-power slab built up by the Kremlin only looks monolithic. There are growing contradictions between structures and agencies, which constitute it. Partly they are inspired by the Center itself, which acts by the principle ‘divide and rule’; partly they are inevitable consequences of the fight for power at regional level. Major pairs in conflict are: FSB and MVD, FSB and administrations, MVD and prosecutor’s office. FSB plays a special role in these conflicts: it is it who controls partly the whole cadre sphere, that is doing cleansings and that delegates if necessary its representatives to other power structures and administration. The problem is that such a system of surrogate division of power is closed from society even for mere observation, not to speak about control; it does not obey to strict rules and is not self-sufficient – it needs a constant interference from above to keep the balance.
Finally, the other side of mass *siloviki* expansion outside of their agencies is an intensive vertical growth and sharp rejuvenation of cadres inside these agencies. It means that when appointing commissars-*siloviki* to positions of chief federal inspector and others, when promoting them to governors, Putin kills two birds with one stone: he is strengthening his positions in different spheres by those who came from power agencies, and simultaneously he is strengthening loyalty of these very structures, where more and more newly promoted are obliged to him for their career growth.

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Annexed documents

Graph 1: Siloviki replacements in regions by years

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004
Footnotes:


2 It can be mentioned that different law enforcement agencies were headed in the past not only by president Putin (FSB), but also by prime-minister Fradkov (FSNP – Tax Police) and the State Duma speaker Gryzlov (Ministry of Interior). According to O. Kryshtanovskaya, who used the term ‘militocracy’ to describe the current Russian regime, the share of ‘men in epaulettes’ among top managerial elite (starting from deputy minister and higher) is 25%.

3 Several manifestations of this phenomenon can be mentioned showing usage of the cold war methods in internal politics. They are: - The growing presence of FSB representatives in executive and legislative structures, and growing FSB control over all spheres of societal life including the economy, politics, mass media, etc.; - The growing role of the FSB, police, and military in society in general along with the restoration of public trust in them and acceptance of the need for order and security (especially after the 1999 Moscow bombings); - Actions according to the principle “the ends justify the means” with double standards and the placement of “the highest interests of the state” (as understood by ‘siloviki’ themselves above everything; - Oversimplification of decision-making process, avoiding any uncertainty including the one connected with elections, and preferring a kind of paramilitary type direct subordination to any other ‘complicated’ scheme; - Closeness and a lack of transparency in the functioning of the executive; - Approach toward politics including elections as toward a special operation; - Public opinion manipulation through an “information war” with propaganda and counterpropaganda operations; - The large-scale use of compromising materials (including those gathered under the slogan of fighting corruption), blackmail, which is becoming a “normal” political instrument (the back side of the coin is that authorities become interested in having dirty, corrupt governors, and more manageable ministers); - The use of law instead of the rule of law, with the General Procurator’s office and the court system apparently being used to support the authorities rather than acting independently in support of the law. For more details read Nikolai Petrov, Policization versus Democratization. 20 Months of Putin’s “Federal” Reform. PONARS policy Memo # 241, 2002. http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/policymemos/pm_0241.pdf.

4 Reference to a famous metaphor of Leonid Smirnyagin, advisor to Eltsin on regional issues, who described himself as a person staying far above political animals or insects.

5 Putin was appointed secretary of the Security Council on 29 March 1999 and served there until 9 September that year when he was made acting Prime Minister. He himself became a member of the Security Council with his appointment as director of the FSB on 24 July 1998.

6 Those appointed to head the chief administrations of the MVD for the okrugs were appointed in July-August 2001 from among those heading the regional internal affairs departments. Central – lieutenant general Sergei Shchadrin, head of Rostov region GUVD (after he was promoted to deputy minister in October 2003 he was replaced by his
deputy major general Alexander Kirushev as active chief); Urals -- lieutenant general Alexei Krasnikov, head of Sverdlovsk region GUVD; Volga -- lieutenant general Vladimir Shcherbakov, minister of internal affairs for Udmurtia; North-West -- major general Boris Uyemlyanin, head of Arkhangelsk region GUVD (replaced in May 2003 by major-general Andrei Novikov, head of administration for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, formerly working in Petersburg; in February 2005 Novikov left for Moscow being appointed deputy Minister of Interior); Far Eastern -- lieutenant general Anatoly Zolotaryov, head of Khabarovsk region UVD; Siberian -- major general Yury Skovorodin, head of Perm region UVD; and Southern -- lieutenant general Mikhail Rudchenko, head of Krasnoiarsk region GUVD (after he died in Chechnia in February 2002 he was succeeded by colonel-general Mikhail Pankov, deputy commander of the MVD internal troops). Thus in three of the seven okrugs (Central, Siberian and Southern) the police chiefs were “outsiders”. However, there was no special scheme behind these long-distance transfers. Sergei Shchadrin, for instance, was initially appointed to his “own” Southern okrug but preferred transfer to Moscow. During the first three years after these appointments the heads of the GU in both okrugs with civilian envoys were promoted. By March 2005 only four district MVD generals kept their posts out of seven with replacements in North-Western (twice), Southern (twice), and Central districts coming most of all from MVD district headquarters.

The Soviet Union had three power ministries: the Ministry of Defense, the KGB, and the Ministry of Interior. In contrast, Russia has created 14 power ministries who each have thousands of troops at their command. The Armed Forces (Vooruzhennyie sily), numbering 1.2 million, are subordinated to the Minister of Defense and the General Staff, and consist of land forces, naval forces, strategic rocket troops, air forces, and paramilitary troops. They are organized by territorial units and centrally subordinated divisions. The Ministry of the Interior has 200,000 Internal Troops, plus ten thousand more special forces: regional Special Rapid Reaction Forces (SOBRs) and Militia Special Purposes Forces (OMONs). The Federal Border Guard Service has another 200,000 troops. The Federal Agency on Governmental Communication (FAPSI) has 55,000 troops; there are 50,000 railroad troops, 30,000 civil-defense troops under the Ministry of Emergencies (plus several divisions for special purposes), and 20,000 troops in the Main Department for Special Programs of the president. The Federal Service for Special Construction (Spetsstroi) commands 14,000 troops; the Federal Guards Service (FSO) with its presidential brigade oversees 3,000; and the Federal Tax Police Service and State Customs Committee have special physical protection units with 10,000 troops. Then, of course, there are the forces of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) with its spetsnaz, and the spetsnaz of the Main Department for Punishments (GUIN) of the Ministry of Justice. A modest estimate shows that there are up to a dozen and more generals in a region.

When still director of the FSB Putin very clearly outlined his position on this issue during an interview with Izvestia in late 1998: “The FSB should be preserved as a unified, powerful and exclusively federal and vertically organised system.” Furthermore, “The most important thing is that the general direction be correct. That the service should grow stronger and by its actions strengthen Russian statehood,” Izvestia, 19 December 1998.
Of 74 regional police chiefs for whom I was able to gather information, 29 were appointed before 2000 and 45 since.

The scale of the problems with which the federal leadership has to cope can be illustrated by the replacement of the minister of internal affairs in the Kalmyk republic. To begin with there were lengthy attempts to persuade this local, an ethnic Kalmyk and fellow-student of the president Ilyumzhinov, to “go quietly”: pressure was applied by the federal ministry (major investigations, reports to the ministry collegium), information was leaked and there were scandalised publications in the press. When this made no difference a new minister was appointed. The former incumbent refused to obey Gryzlov’s order, contesting it in court, and for two months there were two ministers. Finally the insubordinate general was lured to a meeting in the neighbouring region and arrested on a very phoney pretext. Several months later, when the change had been effected, the former minister was released.

Such information was analysed for the incumbent police chiefs in 67 regions. Of 23 in ethnic republics and districts 14 had grown up in the region, three were of the same ethnicity but from elsewhere while five were appointed from other regions. Of 44 police chiefs in predominantly Russian regions, 17 were locals, a further four were local but had served elsewhere immediately before their appointment (as a rule in Moscow). Twenty were outsiders while three more were promoted from within the region but had moved there not long before.

Of 36 appointments analysed for 2000-2003, 11 were made in ethnic areas (six locals, including one not appointed directly and 5 outsiders) and 25 in predominantly Russian areas (eight locals, including three via another region, and 17 outsiders).

This rule affects ranks up to and including lieutenant general; from colonel-general upwards the age limit is increased to 60.

In Belgorod, Omsk, Riazan, Cheliabinsk and the Khanty-Mansy district the local FSB chief became Chief Federal Inspector; in Kursk and Tver regions, respectively, the Volgograd and Chita FSB chiefs became CFI.

Of the 71 regional FSB chiefs for whom we managed to collect information, 22 were appointed before 2000 and 49 since then.

Slightly more common is the “region to region via Moscow” model (Buriatia 2002, Smolensk 2002, Sverdlovsk 2000, Sakhalin 1999, Vologda 1999); less common is the shift “from second- or third-ranking to top post via Moscow” (Murmansk 2002, Moscow 2000).

There are two exceptions that confirm this rule, the FSB chief for Petersburg and the Leningrad region and the FSB chief for Moscow and the surrounding region. Both previously headed major departments in the federal level FSB. We may note that the chiefs for the two capitals head the largest departments in the FSB and, formally or not, rank as deputy directors of the FSB.

If there is anything really good about the formation of the federal okrugs, I guess it’s a rather essential move towards the restoration of the unified elite space, which in past years was split into 89 pieces with elite pupation by regions and an almost total absence of horizontal elite movements.

If we do not count Kiriyenko himself who left Nizhni Novgorod in 1997 and Valentin Stepankov, the former Prosecutor General. The latter earlier served in Perm and came
back to his region in 1995 after the failure of his Moscow career. During the last three years he has represented Perm in the State Duma.

20 The old system of presidential reps was dismantled when the federal inspectors were introduced, the reps being informed in mid-May that their prerogatives were revoked since the inauguration of the president on May 7th. They were given two month to find a new job. About one third managed to find employment within the new structures: either in the okrug administrations or as chief federal inspectors (a total of 20), mostly in the Central and Siberian okrugs.

21 This is the case with the Perm (Komi-Permiak AO), Khabarovsk (Jewish AO), Chita (Aga-Buryat AO), Irkutsk (Ust’-Orda Buriat AO), Krasnodar (Adygea) and Stavropol (Karachai-Cherkes republic) regions.

22 One may add that in spite of all territorial-administrative changes of the last decade the FSB territorial departments maintained the same unified units: Moscow and the Moscow region, Petersburg and the Leningrad region, and the Arkhangel’sk, Irkutsk, Kamchatka, Magadan, Perm, Tyumen and Krasnoyarsk regions together with their autonomous ethnic districts.

23 Not only was the Stavropol region divided into two, each part having its own federal inspector: the same happened to the neighbouring Krasnodar region, with a separate inspector supervising Sochi, the main Black Sea resort.

24 No other details of these controllers’ biographies are available, but at the present time this is the service for regular officers of the KGB-FSB, as is the Federal tax police service.

25 From the Khanty-Mansi district and the Omsk, Cheliabinsk, Riazan and Volgograd regions.

26 Of Karelia and the Volgograd, Vologda, and Murmansk regions.

27 This total includes instances when CFIs responsible for two and more regions were replaced (characteristic of the Southern and Far Eastern okrugs). The actual number of individuals who were replaced was 35.

28 The Omsk CFI S. Mironov spent a few months in this post but soon returned to his former appointment.

29 “Oko Gosudarevo” is the term used in old Tsarist times.

30 This is perhaps effect of asymmetrical sample – we did manage to find information about age of 24 prosecutors only – it’s about a third of all of them.

31 However, there are long-livers among prosecutors, who came to their offices in early 90-ies. They are prosecutors of Altaiiski Krai, Orenburg and Tambov oblasts. Arkhangel’sk, Irkutsk, and Vladimir prosecutors who were appointed at the beginning of Eltsin’s second term can be considered to be long-livers as well.


33 Chief federal inspectors as single siloviki representatives are reported in Komi Republic and Khanti-Mansi okrug (8th place in both cases), Tomsk (11), Moskovskaja (14), Iraroslavl (19), Perm (23), Sakhalin (24), Kurgan (25), and Leningrad (25) oblasts.

34 MVD/UVD chiefs are reported as single influential siloviki in Belgorod oblast’ (4th place), Tatarstan (16), Novossibirsk oblast’ (16) and Iakutia (34).

35 Prosecutor is the most influential of federals in Pskov oblast’, where he comes seventeen in politics, FSB chief – in Moscow (16), first deputy envoy – in Sverdlovsk
(10). One could mention also that envoy himself is included into Petersburg lists being ranked sixth according to his political influence and thirteenth by economic influence; first deputy envoy is included into Rostov list (18), deputy envoys in Buryatia (3), Krasnodar (15) and Stavropol (third in politics, 26th in economy). Besides them deputy prosecutor general is mentioned out of district-level bosses in Khabarovsk krai (23).

36 It seems interesting that prosecutor general V. Ustinov used results of this study to address regional prosecutors at recent collegium. Rossiiskaia gazeta, 13.07.2004.
Since the first movements were set up in 1989, organisations of soldiers' mothers have, in their daily work, been collecting a unique mass of information on national service conditions and the situation of the Russian army. Of course, this comes from oral accounts by soldiers and their families arriving in their tens every day in different committees throughout Russia, but also from written sources. This takes the form of letters and explicative notes, press articles and photos, even drawings and caricatures, which are an integral part of young recruits' folklore.

The use made of this type of document by volunteers in the committees of soldiers' mothers is, mostly, somewhat scanty. Essential information gleaned from letters or explicative notes is used to pad out such or such soldier's file. Other, more general documents are sometimes pinned up in the committees' offices but, more often than not, are filed away in no precise aim, through lack of time or means, but also because there is no clear vision of how this kind of account could be used. Under the pressure of daily emergencies, volunteers in the committees of soldiers' mothers rarely have time to study the documents passing through their hands longer than is strictly necessary.

Nevertheless, accounts by soldiers, conscripts and former soldiers reveal much to the outside reader.

Although the general problems concerning national service in Russia are often widely known - mistreatment by officers and older soldiers, no respect for soldiers' dignity and integrity, deplorable material conditions - their range and
traumatic effect often defy the imagination of anyone who has never been directly confronted with national service.

It is, therefore, much to the credit of the "Soldiers' Mothers of Saint Petersburg" organisation that they have translated general concepts into simple words and lent emotional overtones to hard facts in the book "Armiia I Ia". The documents brought together under this title are very diverse. Firstly, there are accounts or descriptions written specially for the book, both by young soldiers and by older people who served in the Soviet army. But a great deal of room in this collection is given over to documents coming from the activity of soldiers' mothers' organisations: explicative notes written by soldiers about the problems that led them to contact such organisations; letters requesting help; letters from young soldiers to their parents, which the latter put up for publication. The authors have finished off the collection with extracts from press articles, interviews with political or military figures as well as the results of a public opinion poll on the perception of national service, carried out for the Soldiers' Mothers of Saint Petersburg.

It is true that the documents are unequal in their content and interest, and that the book appears as something of a patchwork. This disparate nature does not, however, diminish the value of the book, which does not claim to be as thorough or exhaustive as a university work. The interest of this collection does not lie in its analysis, but in the words of those who agreed to speak of their experience to the volunteers in the Soldiers' Mothers of Saint Petersburg organisation, as well as in the authors' conviction that these words are important. The emotion filling most of the accounts and the minor details of soldiers' and officers' daily life tell us more about the reality of national service than any number of analytical articles. In this sense, the step taken by the Soldiers' Mothers of Saint Petersburg resembles that of the Bielorussian author Svetlana Alexievich who, since her first book "War's Unwomanly Face", has had her heroes speak in the first person singular, real protagonists of a tragic story. As with Alexievich, it is a chorus of human
voices and a succession of poignant monologues that we remember most in "Armiia I Ia". If intimate knowledge of a problem is one of the keys to its solution, this collection undoubtedly takes part in the useful task of revealing what life is like behind the doors of Russian barracks.

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Footnotes:

This book includes diaries and reports of eight participants (mostly Russian officers) of different "post-Soviet wars", beginning with Nagorny Karabakh and ending with the war still going on in Chechnya. The contributions have been collected on the web site www.ArtOfWar.ru, where there can be found literary texts as well.

In charge of the defense of the USSR which will soon not exist, Soviet soldiers in Nagorny Karabakh appear as helpless witnesses of a war fuelled by Moscow decisions. They are abandoned to their fate by a military hierarchy anxious first of all to save its stripes (Iouri Girenko, V Soiuze vse spokoino, Armia gosudarstva, kotorogo net).

In the first testimonies, war and massacres appear as a background upon which develops the ordinary life of a military base. But the other stories take us into the heart of the war, especially the narration of Mironov (la byl na etoi voine) recounting his experience in Chechnya with the style and rhythm of a war movie: panting movements of soldiers in Grozny where death can meet them anywhere in the ruins, the hanging of a Chechen sniper by soldiers in front of indifferent officers and the discovery of a Russian soldier, emasculated and crucified.

The other three accounts (Valerij Gorban’, Dnevnik ofitsera OMONA ; A Agalakov, Khozhdenie za 3 goroda, Shalnaia pulia - slavnyi zvuk ; A. Zhembrovskij, Iz boevogo zhurnala) are testimonies of soldiers and officers stationed in an hostile Chechnya. In the first as well as in the second war, their life was made up of expectations: duties at checkpoints, long hours watching for enemies harassing them, a slow counting of the days before going back home.
The life of these officers of the special forces appears to be a several-week parenthesis in the course of their "normal" life, thousands of kilometers away from home (the authors of these testimonies come from Siberia or the Far East). Their life is limited to the military base, isolated, in a hostile environment. The outside world can be summarized in a few words: *dukhi* (this Chechen fighters' nickname is the same as the one used to designate Afghans in the 1980’s), snipers, *zelenka* (wood and undergrowth hiding the whereabouts and movements of the *dukhi*).

Relations with civilians are limited to the bare essentials: they have no knowledge of the Chechen population, and it is only thanks to the civilians’ testimonies (who have lived through the war) that we get a glimpse of the local people. G. L Passarar (*Nabludenia i razmyshlenia ochevitsa Chechenskoj Voiny*) tells about the tensions between Chechens and Russian speaking peoples after Dudaev came to power, but also about the solidarity existing between neighbors. The most surprising report is the one written by Alexandre Akhanov (*Poezdka v Chechniu*) who, for one month, in march 2000, lived in Grozny, and was welcomed by people he met by chance (supporter of pro-russian mayor Gantemirov, university professors who had only their vegetable garden to live on) and lived as if war was only (once again) a background…

**Amandine Regamey**

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This book examines the importance of gender and citizenship ideologies and the opportunities available for interest groups and related civic initiatives in relation to the role of conscripts mother’s in contemporary Russia. Amy Ciazza asks: what is the role of gender culture in the development of the Russian civil society? The author argues that gender-typing of citizenship and popular beliefs about the different civic obligations of men and women can be efficiently mobilized by interest groups that wish to exercise pressure on the policy makers.

The author is correct to conclude that Russian perceptions of civic participation have never been gender neutral. Both state ideologies and popular views share the basic assumption of fundamental (but not essentialist) gender difference and deduce legitimate differences in gender roles and civil participation. The core of man’s civic duty is obligatory military service. The core of women’s civic role is motherhood combined with waged labour. However, this gendered citizenship seems to be in crisis in Russian society, at least in male terms, since the late Soviet period. The author focuses her attention on the 1990s when Russia was still in the situation of the crucial institutional transformation with the uncertain rules of the game in public realm.

During the post-Soviet period, the crisis of gendered citizenship reveals itself in the mass evasion of obligatory military service which is plotted not just by the draftees themselves but by their families and often with the help of civic organizations. The mostly tacit and seldom articulate resistance stemmed from both particularly harsh conditions in the military and wavering public support for the Chechen war. The crisis of obligatory military service in Russia influences not only the military and conscripts but all the whole of Russian society and makes an impact on women’s participation in civic affairs.
Women care. In most societies this is the part of their gendered self. But then the questions are: what is the repertoire of the care; where does the care reach to; and what are the target objects of such care? This makes difference crucial to distinct gender orders. In the case of Russian women’s civic organizations their care is not limited to the private life of their families: their version of maternal care has political potential, reaching out to the political realm. Women care about human rights, about economic provision for families, about military reform and alternative military service. Sometimes they organise in order to achieve concrete goals positioned by the shared understanding of the care priorities. Obviously not just women’s status in society is their concern: their ‘female consciousness’ as Amy Ciazza calls it (referring to Reinhart) extends the limits of traditional definitions of woman’s gender role.

The book starts with two introductory chapters which give the reader a comprehensive framework for the following discussion. In the first chapter a general concept of the book is outlined as well as its theoretical underpinning. In the second the context of the Russian political-institutional opportunity structure is presented. The author bases her argument on a comparative study of four cases of the Russian interest groups that differ in their policies, political importance and in their gender ideologies. The data includes structured in-depth interviews with activists and experts as well as evidence from the media, legal documents, pamphlets and leaflets and mass opinion surveys which the author uses to illustrate her arguments in terms of her theoretical model.

After these two introductory chapters the text is divided into two main sections: the first focusing on gender ideologies and motherhood policy and the second on gender ideology and military service policy. In the first of these two parts the author discusses the women’s policies of two very different organizations: the political movement “Women of Russia”; and the Moscow Center for Gender Studies, an academic unit and NGO. The second section analyses two
organizations that strive to exercise influence on the military service policies in
the Russia: Russian Committee of Soldiers Mothers - RCSM (which claims to
have 300 branches all over the country and which has been active since the late
1980s) and Antimilitarist Radical Association (a small civic initiative based in
Moscow, established in 1995).

The development of the theoretical model in the first two chapters is clear and
inspiring. The author develops her argument on the basis of political
opportunities structure approach developed by the theorists of social movements
which put emphasis on stable and changing aspects of political context on the
emergence, development and forms of civic participation and collective action
(McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1978). By political opportunities they mean
elements of political context that encourage and constrain collective mobilization.
They focus on static and dynamic aspects of the rules of the game in political
institutions and look into the ways in which they affect the levels of mobilization,
strategies and outcomes of protest (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995; Rucht 1996).
Political opportunity structures comprises four main dimensions: (1) the relative
openness of the institutionalized political system; (2) the level of stability of elite
alignments; (3) the role of elite allies; and (4) the state’s capacity for repression.
Recent work has pointed to the need of distinguishing between the institutional
opportunities and discursive or ideological opportunities shaped by political
cultures. Ideological opportunities determine which constructions of reality
resonate with mass beliefs and which actors and claims are considered
legitimate in the public discourse.

Following this approach, which proved to be heuristic in different contexts, Amy
Caiazza differentiates institutional and ideological opportunities. She correctly
admits that in the transitional societies political opportunities are structured very
differently than those in most consolidated Western democracies. Describing
Russian political institutions in 1990s she speaks about instability in the ‘rules of
the game’, the relative closure of the political institutions and the lack of responsiveness for the interest groups especially in traditional hermetically-sealed field of the military policies. Economic hardship and inequality made it difficult for interest groups to rely on significant resources from the Russian citizens; and the ‘Soviet legacy of oppression’ made it difficult for groups to network and mobilize popular support because of fundamental distrust in politics and political activism … (pp.8-9) A relatively unresponsive and inefficient government meant that opportunities to influence policies were limited. The new constitutional design, the institutional crisis of 1993, new electoral law rules as well as the Chechen crisis all created an unclear institutional background for mobilization. On the other hand political opportunities allowed the very existence of the initiatives and their in some cases surprising achievements.

It is possible to elaborate the major theoretical model Caiazza uses. It would be possible to use the concept of political opportunities to discuss civic activism in contemporary Russia, and to expand such a discussion further in order to account for the specific barriers for civic participation caused by the culture of networking and the modes of using social capital (in terms of Bourdieu and not Putnam) in order to find solutions for the families and individuals concerned. On this note, several questions present themselves: why should citizens politicize their demands if they can find necessary solutions using private channels? What is more risky and costly? What is more costly is obvious for a rational Russian citizen. However, if private channels for evading certain civic obligations (i.e. military draft) did not work it would result in a mass societal mobilization on these issues. Path-dependency in corruption is the major cultural obstacle for any civil society. However, this corruption is framed by the Russian citizens as a legitimate social arrangement necessary to achieve justice when proper reforms are not undertaken and put into action.
Another aspect of ‘political opportunities’ that needs more scrutiny than given in Cianzaa’s study is, in my view, its regional aspect. In the case of Russian Federation, national, regional and municipal opportunity structures differ significantly. Differences in regional political regimes have their impact on different strategies of regional civic initiatives and different framings of their agenda and identities. There are regions where Soldiers Mothers work hand in hand with regional military commissariats in a corporatist way. In other situations they radically oppose the local military. Another organisation, ARA probably only has a chance of functioning effectively in Moscow and there are no branches of these organization in the regions. That is why ARA remains a group with small visibility in spite of the attractiveness of its agenda for the democratic public.

In general the approach and empirical research used in the book seems to me extremely Moscow centered which is rather typical for post-Soviet studies (though there are a few exceptions). It overlooks regional differences in political opportunities, mobilization strategies and success which are essential for Russian civil society and the Russian political landscape.

Another aspect of political opportunities mentioned in the book but not included in the basic conceptual scheme is the trans-national level of political opportunities such as global civil society pressure on the Russian authorities and international support for civic human rights initiatives that in turn provide the chance for mobilization of the domestic human rights NGOs. Nowadays it is an especially relevant level of analysis both when the an ‘anti-spy’ campaign has marked the relationship between Putin’s regime and civil society and when conservative parliamentarians denounce the provision of Western resources to the Committee of Soldiers Mothers.

The concept of ideological opportunities also needs to be expanded. Ideological opportunities are not limited to gender beliefs. The possible mobilization of
female consciousness that could be called a ‘Lissistrata strategy’ should be underpinned by other – diagnostic and prognostic framings - developed by the groups. The master framework of human rights is currently one of the major pillars on which different groups ground their framing strategies. The reviewer’s own research shows that the human rights ideological package really became the master framework for civic initiatives and NGOs in Russia.

Another theoretical issue that needs further clarification is the issue of the success of civic initiatives. In the social movement literature this concept has always been tricky. From the perspective of political science it is clearly the political influence that a group is able to exercise. Caiazza even suggests the formal criteria for success in the case of the political movement “Women of Russia”, success being measured by the number of parliamentary decisions supported by the Women of Russia faction in the Parliament that passed the majority vote. However, for sociologists it is clear that success is not limited to the accomplishment of a goal formulated in the program of organization, especially when speaking not about a political party but about grass roots activism. One should take into account other aspects of success, such as the very visibility of the group and legitimacy of its existence. The movement’s effects are not always immediate and apparent. Sometimes the impact is rippling with effects experienced decades after the movement's most intense period of agitation.

The organization itself has a complicated vision of its success. Recently (November 2004) Soldiers Mothers announced that it was going to establish the political party as an act of despair because other political actors are not able to address the issues of demilitarization and Chechen war. If Soldiers Mother’ is registered as political party and takes part in the 2007 election should that be considered a success or the evidence of the failure of the peacemaking activities of the civic initiative? For the reviewer the answer is far from obvious.
The tricky thing is that the success can be ascribed to an organization when it is just one of many actors that have contributed to certain political or cultural change. For example, the Soldier’ Mothers success in advocating the adoption of the Law on Alternative Military Service is impossible to distinguish from the influence of various parliamentary factions, the reformist branch of the military and the contribution of a list of influential interest groups. In the reviewer’s opinion it would be better to speak about the success of the social movement whose aim was to establish an alternative to the military draft and to see what were the strategies of all the actors who contributed to success.

The main focus of the book is the very idea of mobilising mothers and the role of traditional identities and relevant framings in the development of transitional civil society space. This idea is proved also by the research on ethnic mobilization in Russia. However, I would point out the idea of femininity and motherhood in Russia is far from traditional. To repeat again it is the path dependency from the Soviet period that the role of a mother is not secluded in child-caring, child-rearing, nor domestic care since at least 1917 (and even before in the social democratic rhetoric) the public role of the ‘new’ woman who had to fully participate in social life was part of an ideological package: meaning that a woman has civil duties of public participation. Motherhood ideas can underpin certain duties and rights of the new woman: such as her duty to economically contribute to the family budget or even to be a major breadwinner in the family or the duty for civic control of the military draft. But the image of a radical fighting for the human rights during motherhood is quite distant from the traditional understanding of motherhood itself. That is why the Russian mobilization of motherhood differs strategically from the silent mourning protest of the Madras of Plaza de la Mayo, but instead uses use lobbying, picketing, marching, manipulation and various business-like strategies.
The case studies presented in the book provide rich information about policy making in Russia, especially on the Family Code and military policy. The perspective is comparative throughout. The researcher locates case studies within the broader context of the different opportunities opened for their agenda and activities of interest groups. In the second section Caiazza contrasts political organization Women of Russia and Moscow Centre for Gender Studies convincingly showing that the family politics of the parliamentary faction underpinned by traditional ideology of women’s competence was more successful at political activism than academic feminists trying to introduce the liberal version of the equal opportunities concept to the parliamentary commission dealing with the issues of ‘women, family and children’. But why should one compare these groups that are so different in their strategies? In my view, in each case success has to be measured in its own way. If a political party’s success obviously can be measured by its electoral presence and the viability of its proposals in the Duma, the success of a think-tank or of academic unit is a different one. It includes the introduction of gender studies in the universities, the network of researchers doing gender studies and a methodological mainstreaming of gender approach for instance.

The most interesting section is chapter six dealing with the radical mobilization of mothering by the Russian Committee of Soldiers Mothers. Caiazza gives a very good account of the diverse strategies used by this organization in its efforts to influence military policy in Russia. Among these strategies are political organization building, networking and international support. The exploitation of traditional ideas about women and motherhood shows to be one of the major resources of Soldiers Mothers. The researcher argues that the success of the group is basically due to its maternal image which resonates to popular gender beliefs in Russia. To the reviewer, though these ideological resources are very important because they help to legitimize the group activities vis-a-vis military patriarchs and the broader public they are not sufficient to explain the successes
of the movement itself. The branches of Soldiers Mothers organizations exist all over Russia. Soldiers Mothers units exist in 300 Russian towns. Not all of them follow the radical agenda of CSM. But anyway all of them demand better draft conditions and fight violations of human rights in the army. At the same time, their agenda is shared by other groups such as the 'Mothers’s Right' Foundation, ARA and others. However, the speakers for all the anti-military movement in public opinion are Soldiers Mothers and this is not only due to their gender ideology but also due to skilful agitation campaigning, networking and organization. Organizational networking is important resource for the committee. Another reason for the visibility of Soldiers Mothers is the growth of mass grievances and escapism caused by the military draft and military policies in Chechnya. If these problems were not considered of priority for the Russian families Soldiers Mothers could not capitalise on their slogans and on their gender framing.

The book argues that ideas about gender played a central role in shaping the ideological opportunity structures that existed in Russia. The general conclusion of the author is that two groups of factors facilitated the success of the organizations – institutional opportunity structures and gender ideologies. When the institutional structure is weak and comparatively non-responsive as in the case of Russia in 1990s, gender ideologies are the key resources for success. The reviewer shares this assumption but thinks that the relevance of the agenda of the group to the mass grievances and discontent that are framed in terms of human rights’ violations should not be overlooked. Soldiers Mothers could utilise the idea of radicalised motherhood only because the crisis of obligatory military service as well as endless war in Chechnya and terrorist attacks caused tensions in society and made the elite sensitive to these issues. Gender ideology is packed into the ideology of human rights and this makes it attractive and this combination is crucial for interest groups’ activity framing.
The research on the role of traditional (gender) identities in civil participation in the case of Russia should be continued. It seems that certain vivid and influential segments of civil society can emerge on the basis of so-called primordial identities. The strategies of international NGOs have to take into account this conclusion that Caiazza brings forward in her book.

And now the final question mark: what will be the future of these organizations, these interest groups that were studied by Caiazza in the earlier phase of Putin’s presidency? The corporatist strategies of presidential office (that sometimes are called the strategies of social partnership or associational democracy) are highly selective. Will Soldiers Mothers negotiate with authorities or it will establish oppositional party? What are the limits for gender ideologies capacity to mobilise support? Prognoses are difficult.

Elena Zdravomyslova

The first study focuses mainly on the inmates and their sub-culture rather than on the russian-soviet penal institution itself and provides a close examination of different aspects of social action and social control problems within the prison universe. The issues of power, domination and struggle are apprehended in a very serious and explicit way, and that is how the author diverges from the approach proper to the Russian folklorists. Even if this study doesn’t pretend to a rigorous use of sociological or politological concepts, as for instance the concept of public space (formal or informal), it could be an interesting reading for anyone wishing to apprehend how in very concrete situations subjects can inverse negative and stigmatizing perceptions of themselves which are imposed upon them by a repressive institution, and develop from it positive collective identities. Without referring to any concepts of E. Goffman or of H.S. Becker, the author examines how a society of inmates manages to ensure its cohesion thanks to a sort of symbolic fight, war of perceptions and signs which the members of this prison society lead against the institution.

The singularity of this research is to emphasize a specific object for the purpose of decoding the semantic system of inmate society, namely the most ordinary, the most routine behavior of the prisoners (bytovoe povedenie). These behaviors, which are supposed to carryout some symbolic functionalities, could participate in a metaphoric struggle against the institution and would also tend to define the place of each individual in the social structure, even maybe this social structure itself. For instance, probably because food was used during the soviet period as a submission instrument, the prison society had worked out a precise regulation of inmates’ behavior and attitudes including smallest gestures in relation to this object.
The food distributed by the administration is perceived as enemy’s feeding; so, for some prisoners, it is bon ton to refuse it totally (and ritually) or, for others, to consume it while hurling insults at it (p.68). For every inmate aspiring to be recognized by the community as having at least a minimal degree of “dignity” (p.83) the canteen must be assessed as a clearly negative place. As for the criminals (“toughs”, blatnye) who pretend for a maximum of “dignity”, the usual norm is a sort of food asceticism together with an apology of hunger and bad-fed body (while the unequally redistributed by the institution abundance is apprehended as a submission technique aiming to pervert inmate solidarity). Thus, general starvation would represent a form of communication which symbolically could even better unite prisoners than a shared in common meal. Regarding others elements such as tee, alcohol and tobacco, which are situated at the edges of official spaces, their consumption is reduced to specific forms and implies some communitarian codes that are centered on the idea of general and joint resistance to the shortage (cf. p.64 : “obchtchak”). Any individual attitude or gesture are banned from the consumption rituals. This kind of attitudes, gestures and models of behavior would operate as symbols of independence and resistance relative to the administration and even as insubordination symbols.

The situation is the same for many other objects like money or private property, interchange, work, speech – they tend to be limited in their presence, put in quarantine, regulated in their use, escorted by a pack of complex metaphoric constructions aiming to deprive these objects of any faculty for perverting the three key concepts of the inmate semantic system: “solidarity”, “equality” (within one category) and “dignity”. Each inmate has unequal access to these key values as it largely depends on the facility of each prisoner for using behavior codes together with symbolic efficiency. All these results in a prison society structured in several superposed categories.
However, even if Efimova manages to show very well an inmate society which defend itself and is able to attack, the struggle instruments and the discourse strategies used by the institution are not analysed. Thus, the author fails to explain to which extent combative skills of the inmate semantic system are connected to the detention conditions, administration techniques and custodian’s subculture.

Finally, another object seems also to be left aside, namely the semantics of the virility. Even if this object is mentioned more than once in the analytical parts of the study and to a greater extent leaks out from the speech of the inmates, their humor, their stories and tattoos, largely represented in Efimova’s book. Indeed, the system of binary oppositions, which emphasizes the concepts of “solidarity”, “equality” and “dignity”, is saturated with virile connotations, allusions to manliness as a basic value, synonym of insubordination, resistance, power; while the lack of the “dignity” is associated with derogatory perceptions of femininity; hence the symbolic content of some informal sanctions like “abasement” (opuskanie).

Such structure-forming role of various virility conceptions valid in the russian-soviet prisons also clearly appears in another work which is often referred at by Efimova – Russian Criminal Tatoo Encyclopedia by D. Baldaev*. It deals broadly with sexist tattoos. Thus one can find there caricature pictures of soviet leaders (including Lenin and Stalin) stressing the cruelty and power, sexually represented, of these characters, pictured with horns and huge phallus. As for individuals that are considered as exposed to this power like, for instance, inmates involved in denunciation or other forms of cooperation with the administration, they are often associated to a humiliating feminine image. As for individuals able to set a rude opposition against the institution, like criminals (blatnye), they are attached to tattoos underscoring some conception of virile dignity.

Youri Vavokhine

The Swedish Defence Research Agency has published over the years a good number of high quality analyses of Russian foreign, defence and security policies, including civil-military relations. This report on Civilian Control of the Russian State Forces by Jan Knoph stands in good company.

There are many good things to say about this report so it may seem perverse to begin with a criticism but I have one major problem with the work which it is useful to get out of the way in the beginning. Knoph sets himself the brief of looking at civilian control both as a matter of theory and of practice. This troublesome marriage of perspectives causes him a number of problems. Far too much time is spent discussing the theory of civilian control, which is a shame because the civil-military relations literature is already voluminous and, frankly, rather dull when compared to the frequently fascinating things Knoph has to say about the Russian practice. More importantly, it begs the question: what do Western theories of democratic civilian control really have to say about the reality of Russian civil-military relations?

I would argue not much. What is more I think from what he has written that Knoph would agree. The main preoccupation of civil-military relations theory has tended to be the prevention of coups, but as Knoph makes clear “the main problem of Russian civil-military relations is not coups, but the habit of applying military solutions to civil problems…” (p.24) Later on he continues in a similar vein: “Russia is united on the principle of civilian control but divided on the contents and purposes thereof. Generally in Russia civilian control has the purpose of improving budgetary control and reducing corruption.” (p. 64) Based just on these criteria, the state of Russian civil-military relations is perhaps not that bad. It isn’t democratic and it’s not at all transparent but budgetary control of
the Ministry of Defence is better under Putin than it was under Yeltsin and—though this is obviously hard to judge—one hears fewer stories of egregious corruption in the ranks than one did in the mid to late ‘90s. In the past, Russian civil society has played essentially no role in the oversight of the armed forces. Nor does it now—but then the masses are not exactly clamouring for that right either because “Russian political culture does not hinder authoritarianism and militarization.” (p. 19)

This is not to say that there are not grave problems at hand. There are a great many in which the status quo in civil-military relations does harm to Russian society. But what really alarms the man or woman on the street is not that their system of civil-military relations departs from a notional liberal democratic norm but that they’ve an army which consumes their sons for whom army service means squalor, disease, brutal hazing and the risk of death in Chechnya or some other unwinnable brushfire war. Knoph acknowledges this in more formal terms: “Looking into the contemporary Russian state forces the absence of civilian control is less shocking than the absence of organisational control.” (p. 111) Knoph is on top of what is being written by Russians about these issues which makes the report useful for researchers not able to monitor the Russian language press. The report is strongest when it focuses on the practical challenges.

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