
Articles

Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and Central Europe after the EU Enlargement*

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The EU enlargement, completed in 2004, has been hailed as one of the most significant EU accomplishments. It has also been called the most effective democracy promotion mechanism ever developed and applied. There is a lot of truth in such claims. The eight Central and East European countries that joined the EU have been the most successful examples of democratic consolidation and transition to a market economy in the entire postcommunist region. This paper examines the impact of the EU accession process on democratic consolidation and the consequences of EU membership on the quality of new democratic regimes in these countries. In the first part of the paper, I will review empirical evidence showing the diverging trajectories of postcommunist transformations and the deepening split between two parts of the former Soviet bloc. In the second part, I will sketch five dilemmas faced by the new, postcommunist members of the EU. These dilemmas reveal the tension between the requirements of EU membership and continuation of postcommunist transformations aimed at improving the quality of democracy and securing faster economic growth.

THE EU ACCESSION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: COMPLEMENTARITY OR CONFLICTING LOGICS?

Since its inception, the European integration process has aimed at strengthening liberal democracy across Europe. Participation in emerging European institutions has been reserved for states with secure democratic systems and a consistent record of respect for political and civil rights. While this principle remained implicit in early EC documents, the presence of a strong democratic system in the candidate country soon became an explicit *sine qua non* condition for EC/EU accession.

Formally, the 1957 Treaty of Rome allowed any European country to apply for EC membership (Art. 237), subjecting the conditions of admission and

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necessary adjustments to Community legislation to an agreement between old member states and candidate countries. Despite the apparent openness, European leaders all knew that “a democratic political system was a necessary qualification for entry.”¹ *De facto*, Cold War divisions excluded Eastern Europe from participation in the Community, while Spain and Portugal remained isolated because of Francisco Franco’s and Antonio Salazar’s dictatorships, respectively.

When demands for Mediterranean enlargement emerged in the 1960s, European institutions systematically emphasized through their actions the strong link between the possibility of EC accession and the existence of a liberal democratic system in the candidate country. Hence, in 1962 the European Commission ignored Spain’s written request to open pre-accession negotiations. The EC suspended its association agreement with Greece in response to the 1967 right-wing coup that ushered in a military dictatorship. Likewise, the authoritarian nature of Salazar’s regime excluded Portugal from membership in the Council of Europe and, by extension, the EC. Meanwhile, three well-established democracies (Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland) joined the Community in 1973. The power of precedent thus confirmed and reinforced the general assumption: a country had to be democratic in order for its application for accession to be even considered.²

The collapse of authoritarian regimes in the 1970s enabled the Iberian countries to seek EC membership as part of their democratic consolidation strategy. “Europa conosco” (Europe is with us) was the campaign slogan of the eventually victorious Portuguese Socialist Party that supported the fledgling democracy and energetically sought EC membership in those tumultuous years. The European Community also used Mediterranean enlargement as an effective tool for securing liberal democracy in the region, reestablishing ties with candidate countries in the aftermath of authoritarian isolationism, and preventing their potential slippage into the Soviet bloc.

Similarly, the collapse of communist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe provided an opportunity for extending the zone of freedom and democracy beyond the former “Iron Curtain.” The prospect of EU membership emerged as a powerful factor in shaping the internal and external policies pursued by political actors in the new European democracies. “Rejoining Europe” became again a grand political project for the “other” Europeans. Consolidating democracy and building a market economy were means to achieving this goal.

1 Neill Nugent, “Previous Enlargement Rounds” in Neill Nugent, ed., *European Union Enlargement* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 28.

2 António Costa Pinto and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, “From Atlantic Past to European Destiny,” in Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, eds., *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*, Routledge Advances in European Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 114.

EU member states, along with their leaders and institutions, responded generously to this aspiration. Shortly after 1989, enlargement to the East became an official policy objective of the EU. In order to prepare postcommunist countries for future integration into the EU, complex aid schemes and conditionality frameworks were developed, and significant resources were committed.³ The purpose of these policies was to facilitate economic transformations, lock in the democratic gains, diminish the prospects of domestic conflicts and cross border security threats, and further support the strengthening of democracy in the region. In many respects, this has been one of the most consistent and powerful democracy promotion mechanisms ever developed.⁴

The prospect of EU membership formed the centerpiece of democracy promotion, providing powerful incentives that shaped policy preferences, identities, and the agendas of political actors in the region. Membership in the EU, according to Whitehead,

“[G]enerates powerful, broad-based and long term support for the establishment of democratic institutions because it is irreversible, and sets in train a cumulative process of economic and political integration that offers incentives and reassurances to a very wide array of social forces [...] it sets in motion a very complex and profound set of mutual adjustment processes, both within the incipient democracy and in its interaction with the rest of the Community, nearly all of which tend to favor democratic consolidation [...] in the long run such ‘democracy by convergence’ may well prove the most decisive international dimension of democratization...”⁵

Although most of the EU efforts since the early 1990s have focused on supporting the transition to a market economy and on strengthening governance capacity (Smith argues that only 1% of aid was spent on direct promo-

3 E.g. David Bailey and Lisa de Propriis, “A Bridge Too Phare? EU Pre-Accession Aid and Capacity Building in the Candidate Countries,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 42:1 (2004), pp. 77-98; Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, “Costs, Commitments and Compliance: the Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41:3 (2003), pp. 495-518; Wade Jacoby, *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Milada A. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided, Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Geoffrey Pridham, *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Postcommunist Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Heather Grabbe, *The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

4 Karen Smith, “Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy,” in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 31-57.

5 Laurence Whitehead, “Three International Dimensions of Democratization,” in Laurence Whitehead, ed., *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 19.

tion of democracy), the presence of democratic institutions and practices was a condition *sine qua non* for establishing formal linkages and mutual obligations, and for the commitment of resources. Very early in the accession process "human rights clauses" were added to all cooperation and association agreements.⁶ The so-called "Copenhagen criteria" formalized conditions for membership and stipulated that "membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union."⁷

Consequently, the yearly Commission Reports assessing the progress of preparations for accession focused on investigating the quality and stability of democratic institutions and procedures, along with the presence of social, economic and cultural rights and minority protection rights, respect for civil and political rights, fairness of elections, and an independent judiciary. Political pressure and the threat of exclusion from subsequent stages of the enlargement process were applied at any sign of backtracking from commitments to democratic procedures and guarantees of equal political rights. (Some countries made notable political efforts to respond to such criticisms, as the cases of Slovakia and Latvia illustrate.) The European Commission's concerns over the quality of democracy in the candidate countries suggest that the process of EU enlargement was designed to facilitate consolidation in the newly established East European democracies.

The assumption about a complementarity between the process of European integration and requirements of democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe has often been challenged. Critics of the enlargement process, often coming from different political persuasions, have cast a suspicious eye on the motives, goals, and tactics the EU employed in pursuing "eastern enlargement," describing it alternately as a "neo-Byzantine," "neo-colonial," or "neo-imperial" project.⁸ Concurrently, they have claimed that elite efforts to succeed in membership negotiations distorted the democratic policy making process, leaving the emerging East European democracies as shallow, unaccountable postcommunist states wherein society was increasingly disenchanted with both Europe and democracy. Accepting that accession requirements may be beneficial in the short run given the inherent challenges of postcommunist transitions, many critics nonetheless insisted that the long-term consequences

6 Schimmelfennig et al., "Costs, Commitments and Compliance."

7 Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels: Copenhagen European Council, 1993).

8 Kjell Engelbrekt, "Multiple Asymmetries: The European Union's Neo-Byzantine Approach to Eastern Enlargement," *International Politics* 39 (2002), pp. 37-52; Jozsef Borocz, "Introduction: Empire and Coloniality in the 'Eastern Enlargement' of the European Union," in Jozsef Borocz and Melinda Kovacs, eds., *Empire's New Clothes. Unveiling EU Enlargement* (Central European Review, 2001).

of accession are less certain and may indeed prove potentially harmful to democracy. They argued that EU accession policies undermine the consolidation of democracy by restricting and suppressing public debates, excluding popular actors from the policy making process, and distorting political accountability. In their view, the EU has exported its democratic deficit to Eastern Europe, thereby magnifying it and jeopardizing a historical opportunity to create fully legitimate and participatory democracies in the region. The fact that the EU assigns relatively meager resources to promoting democracy relative to those directed towards state-building and economic reforms reinforces this point. As Alex Pravda once quipped, the EU "can live with democratic deficits more easily than with budgetary or administrative ones."⁹ Claims about the existence of conflicting logics between EU enlargement and democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe have been cast, however, in a very general way and based on selectively presented evidence. The possible negative scenarios, their exact causes, mechanisms and consequences remain poorly specified and inadequately investigated.

The EU accession negotiations were indeed one-sided and elite-driven. Power asymmetries inherent in this process created various grievances and challenged unrealistic expectations. East European politicians and bureaucrats came to resent the distinct "institutional tutors and pupils" dynamics.¹⁰ EU double standards (for example, in protection of ethnic minorities rights) were widely criticized.¹¹ As in previous enlargements, "bargaining demands by applicants countries for recognition of their particular circumstances were stripped away one by one until a deal was struck that disproportionately reflected the priorities of existing members."¹² Moravcsik and Vachudova nevertheless argue that "while candidates have had to comply with the EU's requirements and acquiesce to certain unfavorable terms, EU membership has remained a matter of net national interest. On balance, the sacrifices demanded of them seem entirely in keeping with the immense adjustment, and immense benefits, involved."¹³

Another set of arguments pointing to possible conflicting logics between EU accession and requirements of postcommunist transformations focused on the process of transition to a market economy. In their 1996 paper, Sachs and Warner argued that the policy of harmonization with EU economic institu-

9 Alex Pravda, in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 13.

10 Wade Jacoby, "Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western Models," *Governance* 14:2 (2001), pp. 169-200.

11 Michael Johns, "'Do As I Say, Not As I Do': The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights," *East European Politics and Societies* 17:4 (2003), pp. 682-699.

12 Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, "National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement," *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1 (2003), p. 45.

13 Moravcsik and Vachudova, "National Interests," p. 42.

tions, regulations, and policies is likely to slow down economic growth in the region and dramatically increase the time needed to close the existing income gap between old and new members. They calculated that after adopting the EU economic model, it would take 141, 120, and 111 years respectively for the GDPs of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic to reach 90 percent of the EU average. Adopting very liberal economic institutions and policies, however, could potentially reduce the respective time period to 31, 23, and 20 years. This argument was echoed in a report published by the Cato Institute,¹⁴ according to which "incoming EU members had to choose between the common market on the one hand and economic liberty on the other. Instead of concluding free-trade agreements with the EU, the CEECs were cajoled into an increasingly centralized super state, in which most of their comparative advantages will be legislated out of existence. As a result, economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe will continue to be suboptimal."¹⁵ Citing the example of Estonia, Tupy claims that "as a result of enlargement negotiations, Estonia was forced to introduce 10,794 new tariffs against imports from outside of the EU. Estonia was also forced to adopt a number of nontariff barriers, such as quotas, subsidies, and anti-dumping duties. Unfortunately, such protectionism increases food prices and lowers Estonians' standard of living."¹⁶ Consequently, one could assume that slower economic growth and persistent wealth disparities in Europe may generate adverse consequences for democratic politics in new member states.

In sum, on the eve of the EU enlargement to the East there were two operative images of the possible effects EU membership would have on the new East European democracies. One emphasized the complementarity between EU accession and the building of democracy and a market economy in the region, whereas the second stressed the existence of conflicting logics between the requirements of accession and the necessities of further political and economic reforms. Supporters of the conflict view claimed that the EU undermines new democracies in Eastern Europe by exporting its democratic deficit and dictating unfavorable conditions for membership. All the available evidence, however, shows that the new member and candidate countries are today better off both politically and economically than other countries in the former Soviet bloc.

In order to better understand the impact of EU membership on democratization and economic growth, we need more systematic empirical research employing comparative research designs. Such research should include not only East European cases, but also those from previous rounds of EU enlargement and from other democratizing countries and regions. We also need ana-

14 Marian Tupy, "EU Enlargement. Costs, Benefits, and Strategies for Central and Eastern European Countries," *Policy Analysis* 489 (Cato Institute, September 18, 2003).

15 Tupy, "EU Enlargement," p. 1.


16 Tupy, "EU Enlargement," p. 2.

lytical approaches capable of transcending the theoretical and methodological divisions among the various sub-fields within the social science disciplines. I agree with Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier¹⁷ that existing research on enlargement is under-theorized, relies too heavily on single case, policy and descriptive studies and neglects important aspects of enlargement. However, I also think that existing studies are too heavily influenced by analytical frameworks developed within the sub-field of international relations. In short, the study of enlargement and its implications needs more theoretical, methodological, and empirical diversity.

THE STATE OF POSTCOMMUNIST TRANSFORMATIONS

What is the state of democracy across the postcommunist world and what evidence do we have to assess how successful countries of the region have been in building democratic political regimes? A few conclusions emerge from a simple review of widely available comparative data.

Graph 1: Economic Transformations and Political Rights in Postcommunist Countries, 2005¹⁸



* For representational clarity, the reciprocal of the Heritage Foundation indices is used for each country so that a larger score indicates greater economic freedom.

17 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU Enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research," *Journal of European Public Policy* 9:4 (2002), pp. 500-528.

18 Sources: www.freedomhouse.org; www.ebrd.com; www.heritage.org

First, there has been a striking divergence in political outcomes across the postcommunist space. A graph charting the progress of economic reforms as measured by the EBRD index and the extent of political rights and liberties as measured by the Freedom House Index shows that postcommunist countries that have recently joined the European Union have made considerable progress on both dimensions. These states have working market economies and the quality of their democratic institutions is similar to that enjoyed by the citizens of established Western democracies. These eight countries are closely followed by Bulgaria and Romania who joined the EU in January 2007, and by likely future EU member Croatia. Political and economic reforms in other Balkan countries as well as the other countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union are less advanced, as evidenced by much lower scores on these two indexes.

While the pace of change in the leading countries has lately become more consistent, their political and economic reforms were already more advanced in the mid-1990s. Recent data, however, show a growing split between these two parts of the former Soviet bloc, as well as a deepening of sub-regional divisions. On the one hand, there exists a striking convergence between the new member states of the EU and the official candidate countries. They are richer and have lower levels of income inequality and poverty. Moreover, their economies are growing faster, while liberal democratic standards are safeguarded by consolidated democratic systems. On the other hand, the majority of former Soviet republics (including Russia) have emerged poorer and less egalitarian while concurrently being plagued by more severe economic difficulties, massive corruption, and increasingly authoritarian political tendencies.¹⁹

Diverging patterns of postcommunist transformations have been thoroughly debated in the discipline of comparative politics (see, for example, Vachudova and Snyder 1997, Hellman 1998, Fish 1998, Greskovits 2001, McFaul 2002, Frye 2002, Bunce 1999 and 2003, Ekiert and Hanson 2003, Grzymala Busse 2003, O'Dwyer 2004),²⁰ and consensus exists among scholars on many impor-

19 Grzegorz Ekiert, Jan Kubik and Milada Vachudova, "Democracy in the Postcommunist World: An Unending Quest," *East European Politics and Societies* 21:1 (2007), pp. 1-24.

20 Milada Vachudova and Timothy Snyder, "Are Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political Change in Eastern Europe Since 1989," *East European Politics and Societies* 11:1 (1997), pp. 1-35; Joel Hellman, "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions," *World Politics*, 50:2 (1998), pp. 203-234; Steven M. Fish, "The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World," *East European Politics and Societies*, 12:1 (1998), pp. 1-35; Bela Greskovits, "Rival Views of Postcommunist Market Society," in Michal Dobry, ed., *Democratic and Capitalist Transitions in Eastern Europe. Lessons for the Social Sciences* (Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 19-49; Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 54 (January 2002), pp. 212-244; Timothy Frye, "The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 54:3 (2002), pp. 308-337; Valerie Bunce, "The Political Economy of Postsocialism," *Slavic Review* 58:4 (1999), pp. 756-793; Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization. Lesson from the Postcommunist Experience," *World Politics* 55 (2003), pp. 167-192; Grzegorz Ekiert and Stephen E. Hanson,

tant issues. Various authors, however, cite the centrality of different explanatory factors, including historical legacies, initial social and economic conditions, types of democratic breakthroughs, the choice of democratic institutions and the dominant features of domestic political competition, and the influence of powerful international actors in support of democratic consolidation. Given the small number of cases under consideration, it is difficult to decide which factor is most important. By looking carefully at these cases we can, however, propose a number of possibilities.

One potential way of testing these alternative explanations would be to look at cases where the outcome of transition was uncertain. Scholars have proposed just such a strategy for evaluating the impact of EU democratic conditionality policy on states that have a strong geographical claim for EU membership but have followed different postcommunist trajectories.²¹ They show that it is difficult to detect its impact in consistently pro-Western, liberal and reform-minded countries that have been the leaders of postcommunist transformations. In states such as Poland and Hungary, EU conditionality simply reinforced the existing trajectory of liberal democratic and economic reforms, though it did make a substantial imprint on specific policy areas. Similarly, the EU has had little impact on the countries dominated by nationalist and authoritarian political forces (such as Belarus). However, in countries with both pro- and anti-reformist parties and shifting patterns of policies, EU conditionality has produced more discernible effects (as in the case of Slovakia). Yet it is clear that more research is still needed to disentangle the complex relationships between historical legacies, domestic factors and international constraints.


Another useful way to assess the outcomes of postcommunist transformations is to compare East European countries to other cases of democratization in different regions of the world. A comparative examination of the progress of democratic consolidation across different geographic regions (again measured by the Freedom House Index) reveals that postcommunist Europe splits into two distinct groups. In the first, democracy is more advanced than in any other region that experienced third wave democratization, save for Southern Europe. Among states that comprise the second group, however, democracy is lagging behind all other regions of the world.

This simple comparison shows that postcommunist countries can claim both the best and the worst record in transitioning from authoritarianism to

eds., *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy of Communist Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Anna Grzymala-Busse and Abby Innes, "Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1 (2003), pp. 64-73; Conor O'Dwyer, "Run-away State Building: How Political Parties Shape States in Postcommunist Europe," *World Politics* 56:4 (2004), pp. 520-553.

21 Frank Schimmelfennig, *Democratic Conditionality and Democratic Consolidation in Eastern and Central Europe* (paper presented at CES conference, Harvard University, December 2003); Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*.

Graph 2: Cross-regional Comparison of Third Wave Democracies²²




* For representational clarity, the reciprocal of the Heritage Foundation indices is used for each region so that a larger score indicates greater economic freedom.

democracy. In eight leading countries the speed of democratic consolidation (defined as improvement in the areas of political rights, liberties, and democratic practices) was unexpectedly fast. In the case of these countries, early concerns about the potential for legacies of communist rule and initial conditions unfriendly to democracy to impede the reform process proved largely unfounded. As such, the extent of rights and liberties in these new EU member countries reached the level enjoyed by stable Western democracies shortly after the transition and these rapid democratic gains stabilized at a high level. Attesting to the latter point, there were no significant setbacks to democracy in these states as measured by their Freedom House scores. In contrast, Freedom House scores for many countries that emerged from the Soviet Union (including Russia) not only showed lower initial gains, but have also demonstrated a persistent tendency towards decline in recent years.

In sum, compelling evidence demonstrates that the progress of democratic transformations in one part of the former Soviet bloc has been swift and consistent during the last decade and a half. In stark contrast, the other part of the former Soviet bloc has been steadily backsliding into authoritarianism. This suggests that the EU policy of making countries eligible for EU mem-

²² Regional averages of Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties were added and divided by 2. Then the scores were reversed: the higher score indicates more extensive rights and liberties (my thanks to Amy Linch for her work on the three graphs).

Graph 3: Comparative Cross-regional Data for All New Democracies, 1998-2006²³




* For representational clarity, the reciprocal of the Heritage Foundation indices is used for each region so that a larger score indicates greater economic freedom.

bership provided a powerful mechanism for facilitating the consolidation of democracy. Thus, if consolidated democracy is perceived as characterized by stable political institutions, the rule of law, accordance of extensive protections for political and civil rights, and the transparency and predictability of political processes, accession appears compatible with these objectives. Qualifying for EU membership required aspirant states to significantly expand their administrative and judicial capacity, impose clear standards of legal protection, and to safeguard expansive social and political rights. But in order to strengthen this conclusion, we need to carefully investigate the role played by regional differences and historical legacies, as it may well be that differences in initial conditions were responsible for a large part of the evinced outcome. Future waves of enlargement, which may include other Balkan countries and possibly also Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, may provide additional empirical evidence to test the impact of EU conditionality.

23 The Heritage Foundation Index is based on 50 economic variables grouped into 10 categories: Trade policy, Fiscal burden of government, Government intervention in the economy, Monetary policy, Capital flows and foreign investment, Banking and finance, Wages and prices, Property rights, Regulation, and Informal market activity. Each category is evaluated on a score of 1-5 with 1 representing policies most conducive to economic freedom and 5 representing policies least conducive to economic freedom. See www.heritage.org

Graph 4: Average Social Security Expenditure as a Share of GDP 1980-2000²⁴



Source: World Development Indicators

It should also be noted that successful postcommunist countries not only made swift and significant progress in building democracy, but that their transition to a market economy was also faster and more durable than in other postcommunist sub-regions and post-authoritarian regions. This is important since historical experience indicates that a working market economy provides an indispensable foundation for a functioning democratic polity. While the EBRD index captures well the differences in economic transition among postcommunist countries, it is more difficult to find equally consistent and solid cross-regional comparative data. One possibility is to use the Heritage Foundation Index of economic freedom that ranks ten policy dimensions on the scale from 1 (most free) to 5 (not free).

Despite legacies of centrally planned economies, the eight leading East Central European countries rank relatively high in terms of economic freedom. In institutional terms, their economies are very similar to Southern European economies that were never collectivized and have enjoyed the benefits of EU membership for over two decades. East Central European economies also rank higher than the economies in other recently democratized regions. This is a

24 Robert R. Kaufman, *Market Reform and Social Protection: Lessons from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland* (Paper prepared for the IV General Assembly of the Club of Madrid, Prague, 10-12 November 2005).

surprising outcome given the well-known difficulties in constructing market economies and sustaining liberal economic policies.

Cross-regional comparison likewise shows that broad social protection programs and a high level of social expenditure characterize postcommunist political economy systems. According to Robert Kaufman,²⁵ these expenditures are remarkably higher in Eastern Europe than in other regions. Moreover, they increased significantly following the collapse of the communist regimes.

There exist striking intra-regional disparities in levels of national wealth, economic growth, poverty and social expenditures. Moreover, all relevant economic and social indicators show a substantial and growing gap between the new EU member and candidate countries and other parts of the former Soviet bloc. For example, in 2004 the Gross National Income per capita for new EU members was \$7,876, while it was only \$1,279 for CIS countries (World Bank 2005). Similarly, new EU member states have the lowest poverty levels among the former communist countries, while high levels of poverty characterize the low-income CIS region (on par with the poorest regions of the world). The middle income CIS countries exhibit moderate poverty levels. There are also significant disparities in social spending, as the table below illustrates.

Table 1: Estimates of Cash Transfers and Social Expenditures²⁶

	Cash Transfers/GDP ^a	Social expenditure/GDP ^b
Poland	17.7	29.5
Czech Republic	12.1	25.5
Hungary	16.5	32.3
Bulgaria	11.8	14.1
Romania	8.9	16.5
Estonia	10.0	26.0
Latvia	11.8	26.5
Lithuania	9.6	19.3
Belarus	8.9	8.3
Kazakhstan	6.9	
Russia	7.5	8.5
Kyrgyzstan	12.4	
Ukraine	9.4	9.8

Sources: a. Keane and Prasad (2002:34), from Milanovic (1998) b. Orenstein and Wilkins (2001: 4, Table 1), from Boeri (2000)

What can be concluded from this cursory overview of the political and economic transformations that have taken place in the postcommunist world? Explaining economic success is as difficult as explaining political success. The most obvious fact is that fifteen years after the collapse of communist regimes,

25 Adapted from Kaufman, *Market Reform and Social Protection*.

26 Ibid.

a wide range of political systems exists in the region, and the split between the two parts of the former Soviet bloc is deepening. While some countries enjoy highly functional democratic institutions, others suffer under authoritarian regimes of various hues. More importantly, despite the welcome phenomenon of “colored revolutions” – an attempt to renew the commitment to democracy in some of the postcommunist countries – the prevailing tendency in the post-Soviet region is toward “competitive authoritarianism.”²⁷

It is also evident from this overview that the most successful postcommunist countries have established the closest relations with the European Union. These countries have benefited from European aid and monitoring, democratic conditionality strategies, institutional and knowledge transfer, foreign investment, and, above all, from the real prospect of EU membership. The benefits and constraints proffered by the EU have shaped the character of domestic political competition, informed the agendas of many political and economic actors, and expanded opportunities for reformers. As a result, new EU member countries have implemented the most advanced economic reforms, leading to a reduction in social inequalities and the burgeoning of extensive welfare policies, all while experiencing consistent economic growth. In fact, their trajectory resembles most closely the successful pattern of South European transformations that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus one important conceptual challenge is to establish whether these developments should be explained primarily by contextual factors specific to the location of these countries in the immediate periphery of Western Europe; “correct” institutional choices and reform strategies; favorable historical legacies; beneficial configurations in patterns of domestic politics; or some other external factors, such as becoming a credible candidate for EU membership, or being subject to concerted Western pressure.

The existing literatures, focusing specifically on the effects of European integration relative to member states, the impact of enlargement on accession countries, and the role of international factors in democratic consolidation, do not offer any conclusive evidence about the nature of the interaction between external actors and domestic politics. This may be a result of inadequate research design, as well as specific analytical weaknesses and methodological shortcomings. Studies of Europeanization deal almost exclusively with old EU members. The impact of European integration on existing member states remains under-theorized and understudied, although a large number of works focusing on these issues have recently been published.²⁸ As Goetz and Hix note,

27 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy* 13:2 (April 2002), pp. 51-66; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” *Journal of Democracy* 16:3 (July 2005), pp. 20-34; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Linkage, Leverage and the Post-Communist Divide,” *East European Politics and Societies* 27:21 (2007), pp. 48-66; Stephen Holmes, “A European Doppelstaat?” *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1 (2003), pp. 107-118.

28 Johan Olsen, “The Many Faces of Europeanization,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40: 5 (2002), pp. 921-952.

"Europeanization has all the trademarks of an emerging field of inquiry."²⁹ Moreover, the consensus emerging in the work on Europeanization seems to support the contention that "...core features of the democratic polity across Europe have proved strikingly resilient in the face of the transformational effects of integration. An exception can be found among the newest democracies in the EU which exhibit signs of modest convergence."³⁰ This finding suggests that an interesting relationship may exist between the strength of democracy in accession countries and their propensity to adopt externally generated institutions, rules, and policies. In light of this, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent political, economic or cultural backwardness promotes a more or less extensive convergence process.

We know even less about the concrete impact of enlargement on Central European democracies. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, "it is striking that EU enlargement has been a largely neglected issue... The bulk of the enlargement literature consists of descriptive and often policy-oriented studies of single cases [that] ignore important aspects of enlargement – such as the pre-accession process, substantive policies and the impact of enlargement on both the EU and the accession countries."³¹ Moreover, studies designed to explore the impact of enlargement have unearthed surprisingly little solid evidence to date. For example, extant studies concerned with the impact of enlargement on regionalization and the development of territorial governance structures in candidate countries conclude that the EU influence is at best limited and ambivalent.³²

DILEMMAS AND LONG-TERM CHALLENGES TO THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY

Although there is relatively little controversy concerning the short-term benefits of the accession process and the role of the EU in facilitating the con-

29 Klaus Goetz and S. Hix, eds., *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 14-15.

30 Jeffrey Anderson, "Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:5 (2002), p. 793; cf. also Peter Mair on party systems: Peter Mair, "Political Parties and Democracy: What Sort of Future?" *Central European Political Science Review* 4:13 (2003), pp. 6-20.

31 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, "Theorizing EU Enlargement," pp. 501-502.

32 Dan Marek and Michael Baun, "The EU as a Regional Actor: The Case of the Czech Republic," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:5 (2002), pp. 895-919; see also Heather Grabbe, "How Does Europeanisation Affect CEE Governance?: Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity," *Journal of European Public Policy* 8:4 (2001), pp. 1013-1031; James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon, *Europeanization and Regionalization in the EU's Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: The Myth of Conditionality* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Michael Keating and James Hughes, eds., *The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European Integration*, M. P. I. E. – Peter Lang (2003); Martin Brusis, "The Instrumental Use of European Union Conditionality in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," *East European Politics and Societies* 19:2 (2005), pp. 291-316.

solidation of democratic and market reforms, the long-term consequences of accession with regard to the quality of democracy in postcommunist Europe are not clear. Comparisons to Southern European cases may not provide the right evidence, since the new members who joined in 2004 joined a very different European Union, one at a more advanced level of integration but, concurrently, one which is facing increasing challenges. Among these are the needs to compete internationally and sustain economic growth, all while maintaining generous welfare regimes. As a result, new members have had to adopt a larger body of European laws and regulations, were offered less generous aid, and face more constraining conditions for accession. Moreover, the 2004 enlargement unfolded in a radically transformed international geo-political and economic environment. Different experiences, security concerns, and preferences among old and new members generated tensions and disagreements that spilled over into other policy domains.

New members also face specific contextual problems generated by the multi-dimensional nature of postcommunist transformations. David Cameron has argued that new member states face a number of specific challenges with potentially problematic long-term consequences.³³ These challenges include: administering the *acquis*, deepening economic reforms, reducing high levels of unemployment, and dealing with bloated governmental structures, as well as with trade and current account deficits. In addition, there is the matter of financing accession while coping with popular ambivalence concerning EU membership. Failure to meet any of these challenges may have profound consequences for the quality and stability of democracy in these states. Apart from these policy challenges, the accession strategy and the requirements of EU membership also create distinct dilemmas and pose problems for the future democratic functioning of new member states. The following five issues form a core of potential challenges to the quality of democracy in postcommunist countries:

Recipient State Dilemma

According to Moravcsik and Vachudova, the requirements for accession are “massive, nonnegotiable, uniformly applied, and closely enforced.”³⁴ Their full adoption, as required by the accession treaties, amounts to a revolutionary transformation of the existing institutional and legal systems within a state.³⁵

33 David Cameron, “The Challenge of Accession,” *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1 (2003), pp. 24-41.

34 Moravcsik and Vachudova, “National Interests,” p. 46.

35 EU accession can be compared with a revolution due to the magnitude of rapid transformations it triggers, and perhaps to its implicit challenge to conventional understandings of state sovereignty. This is where similarities stop, however, since there is nothing more alien to the peaceful, voluntary, and institutionalized pre-accession transformative process than the typical revolutionary means of achieving change. Skocpol defines political revolutions as sets of rapid, basic transformations in a state’s institutional and legal structures

In the postcommunist cases, mandatory implementation of the existing *acquis* (with some negotiated temporary exemptions) was supplemented by the additional (informal) pressures to adopt institutions and policies that are not regulated at the EU level but which are nevertheless commonly found and practiced in the member countries (soft *acquis*). Fulfilling these requirements produced tensions between policy outcomes and the policy process. As David Cameron notes, "the new members will be re-created as states, committed to processes of policy making and policy outcomes that in many instances bear little or no relation to their domestic policy-making processes and prior policy decision but reflect, instead the politics, policy-making processes, and policy choices of the EU and its earlier member states."³⁶

Consequently, this massive and pre-determined policy implementation forestalled public debate concerning policy alternatives and distorted party competition. As Grzymala-Busse and Innes argue, new member states and their ruling parties administered the pre-set policy agenda and thus tended to compete on administrative efficacy rather than on policy issues.³⁷ This has had a direct impact on party systems and party politics in these countries. As a result, domestic politics tends to play a game of catch-up with policy choices imposed by the EU, leading intense partisan debates to focus primarily on sec-

that are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict and that do not result in simultaneous social transformations (Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4). In the light of this definition, complying with pre-accession requirements clearly entailed for Central and Eastern European candidates transformations of revolutionary magnitude. Adjustment happened on multiple levels. Each candidate had to fulfill requirements in over 30 negotiation chapters covering the entire European *acquis*. New institutions were established, while numerous old institutions were dismantled or reformed. The supremacy of EU law often placed national legislation in a subordinate position.

That being said, revolutions typically manifest themselves in outbursts of political violence; they often result in government overthrow; and occur through popular mobilization – to name but a few defining features (Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (London: University of London, 1968); Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978); etc.). Such paths towards transformation have never been associated with transformations under the EU aegis. Indeed, candidate governments voluntarily release power, delegating competence to or sharing authority with European institutions; all sovereignty transfers are peaceful, negotiated, limited and gradual; and incumbents frequently gain in terms of domestic and international legitimacy during the negotiation process. If present, broad popular support for EU accession influences pre-entry negotiations not directly via mobilization, but rather indirectly through voting for pro-EU political parties in democratic elections, without ever challenging the legitimacy of the state itself.

36 David Cameron, *The Challenges of EU Accession for Post-Communist Europe* (paper presented at CES conference, December 2003), p. 21.

37 Grzymala-Busse and Innes, *Great Expectations*.

ondary issues that are not constrained by EU regulations. Such a situation weakens the accountability of domestic political actors, while generating public skepticism about the importance of political debate. Moreover, while the disconnect between politics and policy choices grants more freedom of movement to political elites and governments, it concurrently also undermines their effectiveness in a number of ways. For instance, political parties may alienate parts of their electorate by glossing over important policy issues in their programs and campaigns. Likewise, governments may find themselves lacking the domestic allies necessary to implement specific directives, regulations, and policy requirements in the formulation of which they had no role or influence. Alternatively, governments may not face any organized opposition at the early implementation stage, but may subsequently encounter delayed opposition and face the defection of important allies. Such dynamics can prove very disruptive and politically costly, with one likely consequence being the rise of populist movements and political forces on the domestic front.³⁸ Populist parties in such a situation can build political capital by raising questions about non-negotiable policy choices and by creating or else exploiting the perception that EU dictates threaten vital national interests.

This situation points to another problem: the accountability dilemma emerging in these new democracies. When governing elites are accountable to supranational authorities that impose policy choices on them, this quite naturally raises doubts concerning the government's ability to reconcile this state of affairs with the need to also be accountable to the national electorate. Thus the "recipient state" created by the accession process may suffer not only from the attrition of legislative power and prestige,³⁹ but likewise from feeble legitimacy, distorted party competition and a populist backlash.⁴⁰ It may also not be able to mobilize citizens, assure their compliance with laws and regulations, and counter their ambivalence or opposition to the integration process.⁴¹

Activist State Dilemma

The most fundamental dimension of accession concerns the state building process and the subsequent strengthening of its administrative capacity. As Bruszt and Stark put it, "the prescriptions for European accession are about getting the rules right. The definition of success is not reduction of the state but an increase in its regulative, administrative, and (*horribile dictum*) planning capacity. State capacity, moreover, becomes increasingly defined as the capacity not simply to regulate but, in fact, to adopt specific regulations emanating from Brussels."⁴² This, of course, is not solely an East European predicament.

38 Grzymala-Busse and Innes, *Great Expectations*.

39 Holmes, "A European Doppelstaat?"

40 Grzymala-Busse and Innes, *Great Expectations*.

41 Cameron, *The Challenges of EU Accession*.

42 Bruszt and Stark, "Who Counts? Supranational Norms and Societal Needs," *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1 (2003), p. 74.

Many students of European politics have noted a growing autonomization of executive power resulting from the European integration process.

According to Goetz and Hix, for example, European integration has two types of impact at the level of domestic politics. First, the delegation of political competencies and power to the European level "constrains domestic choices, reinforces certain policy and institutional developments, and provide catalyst for change in others."⁴³ Second, the emergence of a supranational system of governance generates "new opportunities to exit from domestic constraints, either to promote certain policies or to veto others, or to secure informational advantage." Moreover, "the design of the EU means that policy-making at the European level is dominated by executive actors: national ministers in the Council, and government appointees in the Commission. This, by itself, is not a problem. However, the actions of these executive agents at the European level are beyond the control of national parliaments. [...] As a result, governments can effectively ignore their parliaments when making decisions in Brussels. Hence, European integration has meant a decrease in the power of national parliaments and an increase in the power of executives."⁴⁴

Existing studies show that this phenomenon has a more visible impact on late accession countries (which are required to adopt a much larger body of European laws and regulations) and on countries with less robust democratic traditions. As Anderson notes, "the existence of a supranational governance system has allowed political executives to expand their room for maneuver within their national political systems. This general phenomenon carries troublesome implications for a country such as Portugal which, unlike many of its fellow Member States, cannot fall back on a long tradition of a strong, independent parliament, active regional government, political parties with established credentials, or robust civic institutions (Barreto, 1999)."⁴⁵ In both of these respects new democracies in Eastern Europe face even more challenges than did Portugal or Greece. In East European cases, the terms of accession have proven less generous than during previous enlargements, and applicants have had to adopt the entire EU *acquis* to qualify for membership.

If European integration increases the prerogatives of executives and decreases national parliamentary oversight,⁴⁶ the result is a reduction in impor-

43 Goetz and Hix, *Europeanised Politics?*, p. 10.

44 Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44:3 (2006), pp. 533-562.

45 A. Barreto, "Portugal: Democracy through Europe," in Jeffrey Anderson, ed., *Regional Integration and Democracy* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 95-122; Jeffrey Anderson, "Europeanization and the Transformation," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40:5 (2002), p. 795.

46 Svein S. Andersen and Tom Burns, "The European Union and the Erosion of Parliamentary Democracy: A Study of Post-Parliamentary Governance," in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *The European Union: How Democratic Is It?* (London: Sage, 1996); Tapio Raunio, "Always One Step behind? National Legislatures and the European Union," *Government and Opposition* 34:2 (1999), pp. 180-202; Tanja Börzel and Carina Sprungk, "Under-

tance and a loss of prestige for domestic law making. The legitimacy of East European legislatures and the nature of political representation itself are at risk if these bodies are perceived as merely “rubber stamp” parliaments. If this indeed proves to be the case, the newly (re)discovered importance of parliaments in the postcommunist era may be significantly eroded, with profound consequences for the functioning of democracy.⁴⁷

The need to build up state capacity, coupled with the complexity of European integration and concomitant EU concerns about *acquis* implementation and enforcement have produced a remarkable growth of bureaucracy in the new member and candidate countries.⁴⁸ As a result, the postcommunist state apparatus is now larger, in terms of the number of central agencies and the bureaucrats they employ, than it was during the communist period. Local administrations are also larger than they were under the old regime. It is questionable whether such circumstances are the best promoters of democratic norms and practices.

Dilemma of Compressed Institutional Revolution

The accession process was first and foremost an institution building (and rebuilding) process that affected all the institutional domains of the state and all the functional domains of policymaking. Moreover, this institutional revolution followed in the footsteps of the earlier revolution spawned by the collapse of the communist regimes. The extent and speed of the transformations experienced by postcommunist countries may therefore adversely affect the legitimacy of new institutions and their embeddedness.

The quality of the rule of law and the effective implementation of the *acquis* depends not only on the administrative capacity of a state but also the degree to which the new values, rules, and practices being propounded are internalized by state functionaries and citizens. From this point of view, faster and more extensive institutional transformations produce serious problems of compliance, especially in societies demoralized by decades of authoritarian rule.⁴⁹ Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index shows, for

mining Democratic Governance in the Member States? The Europeanisation of National Decision-Making,” in Ronald Holzhaecker and Erik Albaek, eds., *Democratic Governance and European Integration* (Aldershot : Edward Elgar, forthcoming).

47 Holmes, “A European Doppelstaat?”; Jan Zielonka, *Quality of Democracy after Joining the European Union* (paper prepared for the Club of Madrid, 2005).

48 Grzegorz Ekiert, “The State after State Socialism: Poland in Comparative Perspective,” in John Hall and John Ikenberry, eds., *The Nation-State in Question* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 291-320; Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong, “Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism,” *Politics and Society* (December 2002), pp. 1-39.

49 See Piotr Sztompka, “Dilemmas of Great Transformation,” *Sisyphus* 2:9-2 (1992); and Sztompka “Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29:2 (1997), pp. 115-129, on the civilizational deficit.

example, that levels of corruption in new EU member states are significantly higher than in the old member countries (4.81 versus 7.73 where 10 is the highest score) (Transparency International 2005).

Moreover, massive institutional changes can create profound uncertainties and shifts in public attitudes as well as in patterns of political participation. Lower levels of public engagement may consequently affect the overall quality of political representation in these new democracies. One striking example of such effects is provided by the level of public participation in accession referenda and European elections.

Table 2: Voter Turnout in Accession Referenda and 2004 European Elections⁵⁰

	Accession referenda	2004 European elections
Old members/previous accessions	77.90%	52.70%
New members from East Central Europe	59.03%	31.19%

The data reveal a considerable lack of public interest and involvement in one of the most momentous developments in the history of the new member states. In comparison to both previous enlargements and current voting patterns among old members, publics in the new EU member states are less politically active and engaged. This may reflect the above dilemmas and herald the low quality of democracy stabilizing in these countries.

Dilemma of Economic Convergence

The new member states are much poorer. Their GDP average is less than 50% of the pre-enlargement EU average, and they will need to grow very fast in order to narrow the economic gap in the foreseeable future. Consequently, they require vast amounts of direct foreign investment on top of the regional aid promised by the EU. New members face massive macroeconomic problems, including high unemployment rates and high budget, current account, and trade deficits. Moreover, huge investments will be needed to bring their aging infrastructure up to European standards. Moreover, they face intense competition for foreign investment not only from other regions but also among themselves (the bulk of foreign direct investment during the last decade or so went to just three countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).

In order to respond to the challenges posed by fast economic growth, new members need to move away from over-regulated markets, excessive public spending and social protection. They also need to secure a friendly business environment that minimizes red tape and features low rates of taxation, a flexible labor market, and limited regulations. During the last several years, all new EU member and candidate countries introduced significant deregulation

⁵⁰ Source: European Parliament website

and tax reforms that have made their economies more liberal than those of the Euro-zone. For example, Poland and Slovakia reduced their corporate tax to 19%. Hungary's rate, meantime, is just 16% and Estonia does not levy corporate tax on reinvested income at all. By contrast, the corporate tax stands at 38.3% in Germany and 34.3% in France. Other countries (e.g., the Baltic Republics and Romania) have also introduced a single rate income tax (the so-called "flat tax").

The economic benefits of accession and fiscal liberalization have indeed produced faster economic growth in the region. The new EU members are growing on average twice as fast as the old members (in 2004 the average GDP growth in East Central Europe was 4.6%, in comparison to 1.8% for the previous EU-15). Reducing the income gap between the component regions of the enlarged Union requires this trend to deepen and continue for the foreseeable future. Faster economic growth can only be maintained by additional liberalizing measures and large direct investment and subsidies.

The cost of maintaining fast economic growth in the East should and will be shared disproportionately by the wealthy Union members. But economic growth is slow in the Euro-zone and the old members are not in the mood to subsidize new members to the same extent they did after the South European enlargement. The recent agreement on the EU budget that reduced the amount of structural aid to new members in the next budgetary cycle reflects the concerns and constraints faced by the old EU member states. Moreover, in order to placate their worried publics and slow down the relocation of businesses to new member countries, France, Germany and Belgium have called for a harmonization of corporate taxes across Europe. These same countries have also threatened to seek reductions in structural aid to countries that decide to reduce their tax rates. The reluctance of the majority of EU members to open their labor markets to East European workers is yet another indication of concerns about the economic impact of the enlargement on the old EU member states.

Dilemma of Marginalization

New EU members face the threat of marginalization both within the enlarged EU and in global politics. New members are not only relatively poor but, with the exception of Poland, they are also small countries that can hardly carry any clout in internal EU politics, allowing their interests to be easily ignored by the large polities of the old EU. On the eve of enlargement, Ekiert and Zielonka argued that, "enlargement is doomed to produce disappointment and frustration if it creates a center-periphery syndrome. [And that] enlargement can only be a success if it contributes to overcoming divisions in Europe rather than creating new ones."⁵¹ These issues still loom large and need to be successfully managed by the EU.

51 Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Zielonka, "Academic Boundaries and Path Dependencies Facing the EU's Eastward Enlargement," *East European Politics and Societies* 17:1 (2003), pp. 7-23.

The idea of a multi-speed Europe based on the principles of enhanced co-operation poses a serious threat of permanently marginalizing the new member states and creating a club of second-class citizens within the EU. Inevitably, the enlarged EU will face multiple divisions and conflicts over specific policies and future directions but it must avoid the danger of permanent and predictable divisions between East and West.

European foreign policy has provided another ground for generating differences and divisions between old and new members. The new EU members are generally pro-Atlanticist, pro-NATO, and distrustful of Russia. They are comfortable with the current security guarantees provided by NATO, and they value their political and economic cooperation with the USA. The debate over the war in Iraq magnified these preferences and divisions. Similarly, the uneven political support evinced for the "orange revolution" in Ukraine and the divisions that emerged over the issue of Europe's energy dependency on Russia again bespeak different foreign policy preferences. The new EU members (especially Poland) are particularly eager to contain Russia. For this reason, they support the prospect of future EU enlargement to the East, encompassing Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and remain deeply concerned about energy dependency.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper suggests that new EU members face a number of potential dilemmas, which may significantly affect the quality of their democracies. It does not endorse the view that there is a conflicting logic between the requirements of EU membership and the challenges of deepening democratic and economic transformations. The findings of this paper can be summarized in three points:

First, the empirical evidence presented herein suggests that the accession process was a powerful instrument in facilitating the consolidation of democracy in candidate countries. Accession also provided an impetus for successful economic transformation and the building of state capacity. Among the postcommunist states, those that were offered a realistic opportunity to become EU members experienced the fastest and most extensive consolidation of democracy and were most successful in creating and maintaining a functioning market economy. Other postcommunist countries meanwhile experienced either a significant erosion of their initial democratic gains or have lingered in a semi-reformed political and economic twilight zone. The accession process increased state capacity and this, in turn, provided a more secure and effective regulatory environment, facilitating the consolidation of the rule of law. It also made available external aid and oversight, both of which proved indispensable for securing a working democratic order.

Second, the nature and speed of the accession process and the requirements of EU membership pose several dilemmas that may affect the long-term

quality and viability of these democracies as well as their economic competitiveness and growth. While the swiftness and extent of the initial democratization (and subsequent democratic consolidation) are fundamentally important, the potential challenges to the quality of democracy outlined in this paper should not be ignored or belittled. Critics of enlargement have identified real issues and challenges that need to be addressed and rectified by well-designed policies intended to promote participation, deliberation, subsidiarity, and diversity on both the national and European levels.

Third, fifteen years after regime change swept across the former Soviet Bloc, liberal democracy has emerged and taken root in only a small number of postcommunist countries, contrary to widely held hopes and expectations in the early 1990s. In the majority of former communist states, political transformations either have lost momentum, resulting in partially democratic systems, or have been reversed, leading to the establishment of new authoritarian regimes. This reveals a fundamental puzzle of postcommunist politics: **Why have some countries succeeded and others failed in building and consolidating democracy and a market economy?** Understanding and explaining this puzzle is a challenge to comparative politics and political sociology. Social scientists face significant theoretical, methodological, and empirical problems in their efforts to investigate the causes of divergent outcomes in postcommunist transformations and the impact of EU policies on facilitating the construction of successful democracies and market economies. In order to understand these complex dynamics we need to transcend entrenched disciplinary and sub-field segmentation and synthesize more specialized EU studies with comparative approaches. We also need a broader comparative perspective and research designs that pay attention to both intra-regional and cross-regional differences as well as investigate the differences across successive waves of EU enlargement.

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Evolving Russian Foreign and Security Policy: Interpreting the Putin-doctrine

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Writing about Russian foreign policy is always topical, but particularly in recent years as Russia has markedly increased its foreign policy profile, undoubtedly the most powerful Russia in world affairs since the demise of the Soviet Union. Russia has also made radical shifts in some traditional areas of its foreign policy. Additionally, in 2008 Russia will elect a new president who will formally put an end to the Putin-era.¹ Thus, a preliminary evaluation of the Russian Federation's second president's foreign policy performance seems appropriate at this juncture.

In this article I do not aim at a systematic analysis of the 8 years of Putin being in office, rather, I would like to focus on those points that reveal the novel content of what sometimes is termed "Putin-doctrine" with some emphasis on East-Central Europe. In doing so, I will start by analyzing the contours of the new Russian security policy taking shape since 2003. Further, I will examine Russian-European relations and within that I put a special emphasis on the Russian policy towards Central Europe. Finally, I try to characterize the tremendous changes in Russian foreign policy since 2006.

THE CONTOURS OF A NEW RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY – THE "IVANOV-DOCTRINE"

Shortly after Putin's coming to power, first as prime minister, then as president, Russia adopted three new strategic documents: the national security strategy (January 2000), the military doctrine (April 2000), and the foreign policy concept (June 2000). These documents are characterized, first, by the fact that they are standard modern documents of the post-Cold War era, second that they preceded the 9/11 attack, and third, that they were elaborated in the Yeltsin-period. All these factors suggested a need for renewal by the new president of Russia, and this moment arrived in late 2003. The Russian defense leadership held a so-called enlarged meeting – with the participation of president Putin – on October 2, 2003, and made public a document that presented the Russian security perspective with unprecedented openness and in an unprecedentedly detailed manner, partially reaffirming, partially changing

1 Although anything can happen in politics, but there seems to be more and more evidence that Putin – in accordance with the Russian constitution – will not run for the presidency for a third term, in spite of the fact, that there have been numerous speculations and even initiatives to, in some way or another, circumvent this constitutional restriction.

the previously mentioned security documents. The 73-page document was entitled "The topical tasks of the development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation."²

The document contained six chapters and numerous illustrations covered the following items:

- The new phase of the development of the Russian armed forces
- The role of Russia in the world's military-political system
- The evaluation of the threats affecting Russia
- The character of contemporary wars and military conflicts
- The tasks of the Russian armed forces
- The priorities of development of the Russian armed forces

The main elements of the defense minister's report can be summed up, as follows. First, according to the authors of the document current world politics can be characterized by several key trends. Globalization tendencies have produced new threats (e.g. proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, drug-trafficking, etc.). Military force is applied more and more outside traditional military-political alliances. Instead ad hoc coalitions have increased in importance, with economic aims now often serving as war cause. In line with this, the role of non-state actors has grown in formulating world politics and the foreign policies of individual countries.

Second, the document identifies the regions that are considered as belonging to the "natural interests" of Russia from the point of view of national security. These are: Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Pacific. In this regard, what is of most interest, is the fact that – if taken at face value – Russia does not identify itself as a global power but rather as an actor interested in regions smaller in scope, from which whole continents are missing (like Africa or South America). This self-definition keeps Russia in a much more realistic dimension, as far as her international role is concerned, and makes her vision somewhat similar to the self-perception of the European Union.

Third, in addition to the usual classification of the threats as external and internal, the defense minister's report introduces a quite new category – "trans-border" threats. These are considered a growing concern and are defined by the document as a kind of threat which by its form is internal, but by its substance (sources, instigators, executors) is external. Examples include the support of groups aiming at later actions in Russia, support of groups whose purpose is the overthrow of Russia's constitutional order, hostile information activities, organized crime, international drug trafficking, etc.

Fourth, probably the main message of the report – formulated in different but consistent statements – is that the role of military power in safeguarding security not only remains, but is even growing. According to one characteris-

2 "Актуальные задачи развития вооруженных сил российской федерации," 11 Октября 2003 [http://www.redstar.ru/2003/10/11_10/3_01.html].

tic formulation, to safeguard “the security of the Russian Federation by only political means (membership in international organizations, partnership ties, political influence) is more and more impossible.” In comparison to the strategic documents of 2000, this is the biggest change.

Fifth, as to nuclear weapons, the document does not say anything new in comparison to previous strategic documents (it is obviously not the task of such a report), which already included the first use of nuclear weapons under well-defined conditions. What is novel in this regard are the new arguments in favor of the role of these weapons as a means of deterrence. According to the logic of the authors of the report the use of military force without Security Council mandate has given impetus to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons included. Furthermore, nuclear weapons are considered by more and more states as a usable kind of weapon, and the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons has been lowered lately. The conclusion is that in this newly evolving situation Russia should rely considerably on its nuclear capabilities, which means Moscow’s explicit return to nuclear deterrence.

Sixth, as to NATO, – although the media made much of it – the report does not offer too much that is new, but certainly uses unusual wording. The document, besides briefly describing the existing framework of cooperation between NATO and Russia, does state that there are differences of opinion between the two sides regarding two issues, the Eastern enlargement of the alliance and NATO’s participation in military conflicts. The most controversial statement asserted that Moscow expects that the alliance “take out the directly or indirectly anti-Russian components of its military planning,” or if NATO remains in the future “a military alliance with offensive doctrine” then Russia carries out “radical changes in its military planning ... including the Russian nuclear strategy.” No doubt, what we have here is nothing other than the blunt expression of how the lessons of the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia made their way into Russian security thinking. The unusual wording is not a return to the rhetoric or the practice of the cold war era, but rather a crystal-clear expression of the difference of opinion and perception on major developments in international security.

Finally, as to the reform of the armed forces, the main message of the report is that the reduction of the army has reached the level where further significant reductions are not expected. Putting it into perspective, it means that after reducing from 2.75 million men (1992) to 1.6 million (1996), reduction in force should bottom out at the level of one million by 2005.

The real importance of this document can be summarized as follows. First of all, it can be excluded that this was just an ad hoc political signal from the Russian political leadership. It is known from several sources that the document had been under preparation for a longer period of time, with the involvement of a whole range of experts (General Staff, Ministry of Defense, the presidential office, parliamentary fractions) and not only from the officialdom, but also from the influential Karaganov-body, the Council for Foreign

and Defense Policy (*sovet vneshnei i oboronnoi politiki*), and academic institutions dealing with international relations and security policy. After the publication of the Ivanov-report no serious academic discussion took place challenging the views expressed in the report, on the contrary, a number of analytic statements were issued along the same lines. For the same reason, it cannot be asserted that the report could have served the individual political ambitions of Defense Minister Ivanov, or in a wider sense the interests of the military-industrial lobby, or the hard-line military. Nor can it be interpreted as a kind of PR-activity timed for the 2007 December elections. President Putin's presence at the meeting (his introductory and closing remarks) is also an indication that the document reflects the well thought out position of the whole Russian political-defense leadership.

To sum up, while not rewriting formally the still valid series of strategic documents accepted in 2000 the current report brings in one fundamental message: if the world is evolving in the way it is perceived by the authors of document – increased likelihood of the use of military force, increased role of the nuclear weapons, decreased role of the main security institutions, the legitimization of preventive strikes – Russia cannot stop it, but rather accepts these new rules of the game and will act accordingly. What we are witnessing is not a Russian return to cold war, or the beginning of a new assertive Russia, but rather the *proliferation of the new post-bipolar security rules of the game* and their adoption for use by Moscow. It is the essence of the Ivanov doctrine.

In early 2007 the Russian Security Council announced that the military doctrine would be revised in order to reflect the “strengthening of military blocs, especially NATO”³ in international relations, but this has not happened as yet.

It is also worth noting that right after the Beslan hostage-taking tragedy of 1-3 September 2004, President Putin delivered a speech⁴ that contained important foreign policy messages, elaborations on the 2003 doctrine. The first to be mentioned, is that the Russian president expressed his nostalgia for the Soviet Union in an unprecedentedly straightforward way. This was something more than just a personal emotion. In the context of the speech, it was clear that he wanted the restoration of the lost international position of the Soviet Union to the maximum possible level. There was also a brand-new element in the speech, namely, anti-Westernism. Once he concretely mentioned the West in connection with which Russia “cannot defend itself,” and at another place the context also suggested a major anti-western attitude.

3 Viktor Yasmann, “Russia: Reviving the Army, Revising the Military Doctrine,” 12 March 2007 [www.rferl.org].

4 Putin's Beslan speech can be found at the presidential web-site's archive [http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/09/76320.shtml].

This was followed, in the wake of the Beslan events, by widely echoed announcement of Chief-of-Staff Baluevskii⁵ that Moscow was ready to make preventive strikes on terrorists anywhere in the world. Later, this was softened, in a way that such an operation can only be performed with the previous consent of the leadership of the given country.

SOLVING THE DILEMMA OF RUSSIA'S POLICY TOWARD EUROPE: THE "MISSING MIDDLE"

The main problem of the Russian policy towards Europe in the post-bipolar world could be characterized as the "dilemma of the missing middle." This means that Russia, at different levels, had very differing means of asserting its interests. While, at the level of global politics, through its veto right in the UN Security Council, and at the level of the post-Soviet space, through its traditional relations, multi- and bilateral leverages Russia could substantially influence the security situation, at the "middle level," in Europe, Moscow was deprived of almost any means to assert its interests throughout the nineties.

Moscow tried to handle this problem by way of institutionalizing its presence in Europe. Russia was, of course, a member of the OSCE, and later became a member of the Council of Europe, but the main effort was to build institutional relations with the two main hard security organizations, namely NATO and the EU. The first major step was made in connection with NATO, when in 1997 the two sides signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, providing privileged relations with Moscow in comparison to other partners of the Alliance. This document introduced a new institution, the so called NATO-Russia Permanent Council which was also unprecedented in the Alliance's external relations. In the Putin-era, in 2002 a further step strengthened Moscow's position in Brussels: under a new name, the NATO-Russia Council was upgraded, and since then on, Moscow became a quasi-member of NATO. Although without a veto, Russia got the right to participate in the decision-making process of NATO in a number of fields, putting her on equal footing with the full-scale members in the so called "format of 20."⁶

As to EU, formally-institutionally, Russian-EU relations have been well elaborated and structured. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 came into force in December 1997 and not only substituted for

5 Baluevskii's statement can be found at [<http://www.origo.hu/print/nagyvilag/20040908/ororszorszag.html>]. Hungarian National News Agency reported it after the meeting between Baluevskii and James Jones, at that time commander of NATO Allied Joint Forces on 8 September 2004 in Moscow.

6 It differed from the 1997 format which was characterized as "19+1 format," and meant that on a given issue first the 19 members of the Alliance elaborated a common position which was later discussed with Russia. In the new format all issues were discussed without a prior common NATO-stance.

the old Soviet-EC agreement, but went beyond simple trade regulation and increased and widened the scope of interaction between the two entities. In 1999, both Moscow and Brussels went further in concretizing their respective policies, by adopting the EU's Common Strategy on Russia, on the one hand, and the "Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010)" of the Russian government, on the other. This evolution led to a mutually positive conclusion on both sides that Russian-EU relations had reached a new era. The PCA regulates trade relations on the basis of MFN treatment and of the gradual elimination of quantitative restrictions, enhances economic cooperation in the field of energy, transport, environment etc. and promotes justice and home affairs cooperation in the field of drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime. Finally, it introduced increased and institutionalized political dialogue at all levels.⁷

The EU's Common Strategy was due to expire by June 2003, and the EU decided to extend the document by one year. Later – on 14 June 2004 – it was decided that the Common Strategy would not be further extended and it is being replaced by the development of the so called "four spaces" agreed at the St Petersburg summit with Russia in May 2003, namely, the "common economic space," the "common space of freedom, security and justice," the "common space of external security" and the "common space of research and education."

Indeed, judging by the basic documents regulating Russian-EU relations, other high level declarations and the ongoing practices, one can conclude that the basis for future partnership exists, and this basis consists of profound interests on both sides. However, there is a striking asymmetry between the two sides' focus: while Russia wants this partnership predominantly for economic reasons, the EU's main interest lies elsewhere, in the field of soft security: stability, democracy building, ecology, etc.⁸ This is explained, first of all, by the different interests of the two entities. Europe – meaning the enlarged EU – for

7 This latter comprises annual meetings including two presidential summits, the cooperation council at the ministerial level, cooperation committees at senior official levels, and sub-committees on technical issues.

8 The priority areas of the Action Plan which was elaborated for the implementation of the EU's Common Strategy are, as follows: foreign policy, economic dialogue, civil society, rule of law, democracy, the "Northern Dimension" [www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2000/001116/c.htm]; Chris Patten, commissioner for external relations, in a recent speech summarized the areas of cooperation, as follows: trade and investment, health and environment, organized crime, Russia's place in the world [www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/news/ip_01_72.htm]; finally EU's proposed agenda for the latest summit enlists the following topics: investment climate, WTO accession, trade issues, environmental protection, nuclear safety, organized crime, stability in Europe, disarmament and non-proliferation [www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm].

Russia appears as an economic partner, which is a traditional perception of the EU. It is the region that is the main consumer of Russian raw materials and energy products. On the other hand, aside from its exports of natural resources, Russia is a negligible economic partner, but a highly important security factor. Although the possible areas of cooperation between EU and Russia have already been addressed,⁹ Russia's first and foremost goal in its partnership with the EU is to adopt a modernization model with the help of which it wants to become a decisive actor in international politics. Within the big "area asymmetry" (economy vs. other issues) there is an additional asymmetry, namely, in the field of economic relations, first of all in trade relations. The enlargement of the EU has further increased the basically asymmetric relationship between the two entities. Before the enlargement, the EU represented Russia's largest trading partner accounting for 36.7% of Russia's imports and 33.2% of its exports, while Russia was the EU's sixth largest partner with 3.3% of its imports and 1.9% of its exports. After enlargement the numbers are: 48.26% (the EU share of Russian imports) and 56.72% (the EU share of Russian exports), 9.09% (imports from Russia) and 5.3% (exports to Russia) in 2005, the first full year of the enlarged EU.¹⁰ This means a significant increase in all areas of trade, further deepening Russia's dependence on the EU, while for the EU, Russia has become trade partner No. 4.

According to the regime of the PCA there are two highest level meetings per year. These regular events have demonstrated that the institutional links are well established and function well. In the course of these meetings a wide range of issues have been touched upon and considerable progress has been made. In the Putin era the EU-Russia summits were markedly productive. The first summit of the Putin era – the fifth after the PCA entered into force – was held in Moscow in May 2000 and proved to be a "business as usual" type of meeting without any real novelty. The following summit resulted in two innovations in the form of two dialogues: first it started the so-called energy dialogue, that put negotiations about this important sector on a regular basis, and second, it opened a new dimension in cooperation in the domain of security policy by adopting a joint declaration on "strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe."¹¹ The seventh summit in May 2001 went on to continue cooperation in the security and economic field. As to the first, the two sides reaffirmed to make "foreign and security policy matters a regular feature of the agendas,"¹² as to the second, this summit

9 During the visit of the EU troika (Russian word in EU vocabulary!) to Moscow in February 2001, a "Russian-EU forum on foreign and security policy" was organized where foreign minister Ivanov and EU high representative Solana also addressed the issue. See: [www.strana.ru/worldview/press/2001/02/16/982312673.html](http://strana.ru/worldview/press/2001/02/16/982312673.html)

10 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/russia/index_en.htm

11 Joint declaration on strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe, www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit

12 www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/summit

initiated something that has become the major characteristic feature of EU-Russian relations by now, namely the “policy of spaces,” it decided to formulate the concept of common European economic space. The following summit was the first that occurred after the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, so it was largely dominated by the topic of terrorism. Among others, a separate statement was adopted on international terrorism. The issue of the common European economic space, the energy dialogue and the dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters were also kept high on the agenda. The sixth summit in the Putin era – in November 2002 – produced a major result by the EU’s formal recognition of Russia as a “market economy” which was an important milestone on the road to WTO membership. The next (10th) high-level meeting brought about a breakthrough in the long standing issue of Kalinin-grad by adopting a set of measures called the Facilitated Transit Document (FTD) scheme valid from 1 January 2003.

Institutionally, the most important development – up until now – occurred during the summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003 which created the Permanent Partnership Council instead of the previously existing Cooperation Council, thus providing a more effective strong body. It can be regarded as a kind of equivalent of the NATO-Russia Council, although with much less Russian involvement in the decision-making process.

In Russia’s European policy East-Central Europe occupies a special place. East-Central Europe literally occupies a central position in the system of relations between Russia and Europe. This position is unique: the one-time Soviet allies have joined the basic West European institutions, and by now they have become the borderland of the West towards the post-Soviet space. As it is usually referred to in a well-known maxim, East-Central Europe’s status has changed from the Western periphery of the East, to the Eastern periphery of the West.

There are two opposing views on the issue whether there is any Russian strategy towards the region. The first – and this is held by the majority of the Russian academic and foreign policy establishment – is that there is no Russian strategic approach toward Central Europe, the only difference between them is that part of this group urges the elaboration of a strategic vision, another part does not consider it necessary. The opposing view holds that Russia has a well-formulated strategy towards Central Europe, and its content can be summarized as “new imperialism.” The main proponent of this approach is Janusz Bugajski, who wrote a book on the Russian East-Central European relations entitled *Cold Peace*.¹³ The American analyst summarizes in six points Russia’s

13 Bugajski is one of the best known American analysts on this topic and an exemplifying figure of the radical critique of Russia; see Janusz Bugajski, *Cold Peace. Russia’s New Imperialism* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004). The fact that Bugajski is not a marginal holder of this view is supported by the endorsement of the book by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who wrote that “Russia’s policies towards the countries of the former Soviet Bloc are still being influenced by an ominously imperialist nostalgia” [www.greenwood.com/catalogue/C8362.aspx].

alleged strategy in Eastern Europe: to achieve preeminent influence over foreign policy orientation and security policy; to strengthen economic benefits and monopolistic positions, while increasing dependence on Russian energy supplies; to limit the scope of western institutional enlargement in the European CIS; to rebuild a larger sphere of influence, and finally, to weaken transatlantic relations.¹⁴

The evolution of Russian-East-Central European relations in the post-Cold War era¹⁵ has been a process of their "standardization."¹⁶ This has included the following elements that characterize the present state of affairs, as well. First, ECE has radically been devaluated and has found its naturally low place in the system of priorities of Russian foreign policy.¹⁷ Second, as a matter of fact, the region has lost its autonomous value from the Russian perspective, and is approached indirectly, i.e. in the context of Russian European or NATO policy. Third, instead of the previous bloc approach Russian policy handles these countries individually or regionally – that is, differentiation has come to the fore. Fourth, these relations have been de-militarized, and, de-ideologized. Finally, all major problems that had to do with the Soviet past (Warsaw Treaty, Soviet interventions, the consequences of troop withdrawal, the inherited debts) have been settled.

The standardization process evolved by the following trajectory:

- 1990-91 – Attempts at limited sovereignty under the "Kvitsinskii-doctrine"
- 1992-94 – Democratic neglect under the "Kozyrev-doctrine"
- 1995-2000 – Rediscovery of the region in the NATO-EU enlargement context
- 2000- present – Geo-economic approach under the Putin-doctrine

The current stage of the Russian policy towards East-Central Europe is best characterized by the geo-economic approach under the Putin-doctrine. The geo-economic approach is embodied, first of all, in active economic policy towards the region. The main fields of this new "economized" Russian policy are, first of all, the energy and finance sector.¹⁸

14 This includes European post-Soviet states, the Baltic states, Central Europe and the Balkans.

15 On this topic the author has published an article "The Rediscovered Backyard: Central Europe in Russian Foreign Policy," *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia*, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, no. 16-1 (Sapporo: SRC, 2007).

16 The expression belongs to Gerhard Mangott, "Russian Policies on Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview," *European Security* 8:3 (1999).

17 For example, as opposed to the 1993 version of the foreign policy concept, the 2000 version does not refer to Eastern/Central Europe as a region of vital Russian interest. See, *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik* 3 (1993).

18 The existing Yamal pipeline in Poland, and another planned gas pipeline through Poland and Slovakia, as well as the increased Russian share of Hungary's chemical industry are illustrative examples of this.

There are two opposing answers to the question whether energy policy is a special Russian foreign policy instrument, and if so what is its content? One school of thought says that – as one analyst put it – “For the Kremlin, energy has come to represent the principal tool in foreign policy, with Moscow using energy to interfere and influence domestic political processes across Europe and elsewhere, and halt geopolitical shifts such as expansion of NATO and the EU.”¹⁹ Others describe Russian energy policy as “energy imperialism,”²⁰ or as an “energy weapon,”²¹ and recommend a tough EU response in order to let Russia “understand its future as Europe’s preeminent energy supplier is at risk.”²² The representatives of this approach also refer to the problem that Russia does not ratify the Energy Charter (practically depriving western companies from participating in the Russian energy market), and to unkind gestures of high-level Russian representatives who publicly entertained the idea of redirecting Russian supplies to North America and China.²³ In a similar vein, Polish Defense Minister Radoslaw Sikorski commented on the planned Northern Pipeline between Russia and Germany through the Northern Sea in an unusually harsh tone: “Poland has a particular sensitivity to corridors and deals above our head. That was the Locarno tradition, that was the Molotov-Ribbentrop tradition ... We don’t want any repetition of that.”²⁴

The other approach suggests that “the fear of Russia is exaggerated and there is no evidence of a malicious political intent in recent Russian energy decisions.”²⁵ I subscribe to this second approach. Russia makes no secret that it wants to use its energy potential for its domestic and international rise. As the Russian official Energy Strategy reads: “Russia owns significant energy resources ... that is the base for economic development, instrument of domestic and foreign policy. The role of the country in the international energy markets defines, to a large extent, its geopolitical influence.”²⁶ In my opinion, one can hardly find anything wrong in this statement. They represent clearly the national interests of Russia.

19 Borut Grgic, *Russian Energy Strategy: Risk Assessment for Europe*, Occasional Paper, no. 4 (Ljubljana: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 5.

20 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Moscow Gets Tough with the EU,” *RFLRL Feature Article*, 5 June 2006.

21 Keith C. Smith, “Security Implications of Russian Energy Policies,” *CEPS Policy Brief* 90 (January 2006).

22 Citation from Michael Emerson, director of CEPS in Ahto Lobjakas, “EU: The Energy Dilemma – with or without Russia,” *RFLRL Feature Article*, 22 March 2006.

23 Alexandr Miller, head of Gazprom warned EU ambassadors in Moscow, in “Gazprom smotrit na Zapad,” *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 7 June 2006.

24 Cited in Cheney, “Russia is Blackmailing Europe,” *Guardian online*, 14 June 2006.

25 Citation from Julia Montanaro-Jankovska in Ahto Lobjakas, “EU: The Energy Dilemma – with or without Russia,” *RFLRL Feature Article*, 22 March 2006.

26 “Энергетическая стратегия России на период до 2020 года” (Moscow, May 2003).

The main question is if Russian energy policy has been used for direct political purposes, or for blackmail against Europe and Central Europe. There has not been any case, when Russia could have used this instrument in Europe. There have been cases when it was used for direct political influence, but exclusively within the CIS-space, and only vis-à-vis such countries that wanted to enjoy preferential low prices and were willing to accept special political relations with Moscow (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova). In my opinion, the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute of 2005 was overwhelmingly misinterpreted by politicians, and misrepresented in the media. Although the Russian steps against Ukraine did not lack a certain political element (the timing before the March 2005 parliamentary elections) and spectacular moves (the well-publicized stop of supply), the whole issue, in its essence, was a local business dispute over the price and the Ukrainian practices of re-export for extra profit. Russia did not decrease its delivery to Europe (including Central Europe), and had no intention of blackmailing Europe. On the contrary, it is in Russia's best interest to maintain stable energy relations with Europe. Russia can hardly find alternative markets without immense investments that would put into question the whole endeavor.

The Russian policy towards Europe successfully handled the dilemma of "the missing middle." With regard to NATO and EU strong institutional structures have been established, while in the region of the former Warsaw Treaty alliances Russia managed to position itself strongly in the field of economy.

2006: A YEAR OF TREMENDOUS CHANGES IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

2006 was a year of tremendous changes in Russian foreign policy. These changes resulted in a qualitatively new phase of Russian foreign policy. This new quality can be grasped in three aspects: the forming of a new Russian national ideology, the new emphases of Russian global foreign policy and the radical shift of the Russian CIS-policy.

As to the first, it was deputy prime minister, and defense minister Sergei Ivanov, who made public the basis of the new Russian national ideology. It is composed of three main components: sovereign democracy, strong economy and robust military force.²⁷ "Sovereign democracy" was originally coined by Vladislav Surkov, the main Kremlin ideologist, in order to counter Western criticism of Russian democracy usually referred to as "*managed democracy*." Sovereign democracy means, first of all, a special Russian model of democracy, and secondly this concept holds that there is no political sovereignty without economic sovereignty. As to the latter, it does not exemplify isolationism. According to Surkov, economic sovereignty should be used to integrate Russia into the world economy. Although another deputy prime minister and possi-

27 "Sergei Ivanov vydvínul kontseptsiiu natsional'noi idei Rossii," 13 July 2006 [www.km.ru].

ble successor to Putin, Dmitrii Medved'ev distanced himself from the wording of sovereign democracy – claiming that any adjective used before democracy brings in a special taste as if it were not genuine democracy – it seems that this concept will be a basic one in the elite's new ideological stance.

In Russian global foreign policy, 2006 has witnessed further increased emphases on the following issues:

- New balance of power with the United States,
- New arms control talks with the United States,
- Increased importance of military force,
- Efforts to have Russia recognized as an energy superpower,
- No compromise on territorial issues.

As to the new balance of power with the United States, this is not a completely new aspiration by Moscow, but Putin formulated this thesis strikingly during the Russian ambassadors' meeting in June 2006 by saying that "the principle 'what is permitted to Jupiter is not permitted to an ox' is unacceptable for Modern Russia."²⁸

As to new arms control talks with the United States, Putin considered the post-cold war era the period of "stagnation" and called for a new round of such negotiations.

Increased importance of military force, has been on the rise since the publication of the so-called Ivanov-doctrine in 2003, but the 2006 presidential message to the parliament formulated for the first time that the Russian armed forces should be capable of fighting simultaneously at three levels: globally, regionally and in local conflicts.²⁹

To have Russia recognized as an energy superpower by the outside world, has been one of the most successful foreign policy issues of Moscow in recent years. In spite of the fact that Russia's membership in WTO is still pending, or that Moscow is still not inclined to ratify the Energy Charter with the EU, it is beyond doubt that Russia has established itself as a superpower with an additional pillar, leaving behind the era when she was a one-dimensional – only military – superpower.

The "no compromise" Russian approach on territorial issues has to do with the Russian Far East. Moscow has settled all major territorial disputes, or minimized them with almost all its major and minor neighbors in Europe and in Asia, so the only remaining problem of this kind remains with Japan. There are three moments that shed light on why Moscow has rejected for the long run any compromise solution on the "Southern Kuril islands" in Russian or "northern territories" in Japanese terminology. Firstly, Moscow has made public grand investment plans in the Kuril islands and Sakhalin. Secondly, the first ever sizable (5,000 troops) strategic military exercise was organized

28 RFL/RL NEWSLINE 10:116 Part I, 28 June 2006.

29 http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2006/05/10/1357_type63372type63374type82634_105546.shtml

on the Kamchatka peninsula – an exercise which is clearly, not an antiterrorist exercise. Thirdly, the Russian border patrol reacted harshly when trying to get hold of a Japanese ship in Russian waters disputed by Japan killing one of the crew.

The final component that signals the new quality of Russian foreign policy has to do with Moscow's policy in the post-Soviet region. 2006 witnessed a double radical shift in this policy in terms of the Russian approach to the frozen conflicts in the region and the pricing policy of energy materials. In the case of the previous, the traditional Russian policy used to aim at keeping the status quo, thus influencing the countries involved. After the declaration of independence by Montenegro, however, Moscow first publicly formulated that these frozen conflicts should be solved by referenda, thus changing the decade and a half long status quo. The price of Russian energy delivered to the post-Soviet region, had traditionally been politically calculated, meaning much cheaper price levels in comparison to the world market, expecting loyalty in exchange. Announcing a radical departure from this approach Putin proposed at the ambassadors' conference in June 2006 a switch to "principles applied in world economy and trade." The switch to a market economy base in energy pricing means a brand new policy in the post-Soviet region and places Moscow's capability to assert its interest on a far more effective base.

In sum, the above described changes that have become the dominant and characteristic features of Russian foreign policy, mean that Russia's role in world politics should be reevaluated. One has to get rid of the still surviving stereotypes. Russia is no longer a declining, disintegrating country suffering from permanent identity crisis. One has to take into account Moscow more than ever in modern international politics. Russia should be perceived as an evolving great power with ever clearer identity, with an increasingly strong economic base, knowing its ambitions and able to assert them more effectively.

CONCLUSION: COLD WAR VS. NORMAL GREAT POWER

In early 2007 President Putin participated in the prestigious Munich international security conference, where he delivered a remarkable speech. He made use of the conference format, and in a very open explicit manner – unusual for politicians – elaborated on the Russian perception of world security affairs. Most western commentators qualified it as a return to Cold War rhetoric. Actually, he simply summarized well-known Russian security policy concerns, and visions on unipolarity, US unilateralism, international law and the use of force, NATO-expansion, missile defense, etc. The main elements of the Russian vision on international politics and the role Moscow is to play are, as follows:

- *the revision of the Yeltsin-era military doctrine*: accepting the new rules of the game in international security policy, allowing for the use of force

more flexibly, increasing the role of more professional army in safeguarding national interests, reaffirming nuclear deterrence, allowing for preventive strikes;

- *a new kind of anti-Westernism*: counterbalance the US in military terms, and keep Western Europe away from internal human rights issues;
- *double track handling of NATO*: on the one hand, integrating into it, on the other hand, criticizing its enlargement and the redeployment of military hardware closer to Russia;
- *returning to Europe*: solving the dilemma of the “missing middle” by institutionalizing relations with NATO and EU, and by economic presence in the enlarged Europe;
- *elaborating a national ideology*: based on the thesis of sovereign democracy, strong economy and robust armed forces;
- *building a second pillar of global importance*: becoming an energy superpower;
- *modernizing relations in the CIS-region*: rejecting the strategy of reintegration, building influence on a market basis.

This is the core of the Putin-doctrine. To put it simply, the Putin-doctrine basically means the reconstruction of Russia both domestically and internationally as a normal great power.

Traditions and the Informal Economy in Uzbekistan: A Case Study of *Gaps* in the Andijan Region*

HIWATARI MASATO

INTRODUCTION

This article investigates *gaps*, traditional associations in Uzbekistan, the members of which are bound together by commonly acknowledged ties of residential proximity, school alumni membership, kinship, friendship, etc. The recent *gaps* are characterized by regular get-togethers at the houses of group members on a rotational basis. The present study, which is based on field research conducted in the Andijan region of Uzbekistan, has the following two aims across both the fields of Central Asian studies and development economics.

First, this is an attempt to quantitatively examine several functional aspects of *gap*, by using first-hand data of the household budget survey that targeted a local community in the densely populated area. The traditional institutions and practices of reciprocity in Central Asia have begun attracting broader academic concern in the course of the post-socialist transition. While scholars from Central Asia tend to emphasize their cultural aspects serving as manifestations of their original ways of livings, values or identities, those from the Western world have recently paid attention to their practical aspects helping households to cope with economic difficulties during transition periods. In spite of increasing concern for these institutions, however, there have been very few attempts to examine the quantitative magnitude of their prevalence or their contribution to the informal economy due to the difficulties involved in conducting field surveys. This article will provide a unique quantitative analysis based on an original household budget survey that was designed to grasp the realities and dynamic aspects of the tradition.

Second, by drawing upon a specific viewpoint in development economics, this article intends to bring some of the distinctive features of *gaps* into sharp relief from the comparative perspective, along with providing theoretical implications. According to the discourse in the field of economics, the present Uzbek *gaps* can most likely be classified as the so-called “Roscas” (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations). However, by investigating the actual conditions and performance of the *gaps*, some discrepancy from the general

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image derived from the economics theory as well as consistent aspects can be observed. The purpose of this article, therefore, is not claiming the function of *gaps* exclusively as Roscas, nor does it aim to construct a generalized view of *gaps*. Instead, by focusing on a specific facet of *gaps*, it attempts to shed light on their complex features in which socially originated affinity and rational motivation co-exist.

This article is organized as follows. I present an overview of *gaps* as well as the concept of the Rosca, followed by an explanation of the fieldwork process and providing basic information on the targeted community. Then, by using the survey data, I examine the differences among various types of *gaps* and their impacts on residents' economic life, focusing on their function as Roscas. The final sections consider some of the distinctive features of *gaps* and discuss their significance. Here I deal with sustainability issues and default problems, including focuses on multiple belonging to *gaps* and discusses its meaning from a network point of view. I conclude with some remarks on the implications of this research.

GAP

Gaps have been mentioned in the literature as one of the essential components in the traditional communal life of Uzbekistan.¹ As a rule, a *gap*, which comprises about a dozen members, has a leader (*jo'ra boshi*) and its own set of rules. Each *gap* holds regular get-togethers (once or a few times a month), and its members take turns to play the role of host or hostess, offering their houses as meeting places. The leader assigns substantial importance to attendance in regular gatherings and sometimes sets a rule that enables members' brothers or sisters to attend a gathering in case they are unable to attend it personally. The host or hostess usually prepares Uzbek traditional pilafs (*oshi*) and soup with meat and provides some refreshments. These get-togethers are held not only for feasts but also for discussing various topics related to social life and matters of mutual help. Even today, *gaps* are considered to consolidate members' social position in a *mahalla*² (a local community). *Gaps* have their own reputa-

1 For example, Арифханова З.Х. Современная жизнь традиционной махалли Ташкента. Ташкент, 2000; Арифханова З.Х. Традиционные сообщества в условиях независимого этнокультурного развития // Абдуллаев Ш.М. (ред.) Современные этнокультурные процессы в махаллях Ташкента. Ташкент, 2005. С. 8-52; T. Toshlonov "Mahalla Jamoatchilik Fikri va An'analari," in O. Otamirzaev et al., eds., *O'zbekistonda jamoatchilik fikrini o'rganish va shakllantirishning dolzarb muammolari* (Tashkent: Tsentr Izucheniia Obshchestvennogo Mneniia "Ijtimoiy fikr," 2003), pp. 107-111; or T. Dadabaev, *Mahalla* [in Japanese](Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2006), pp. 81-84.

2 *Mahallas* are neighborhood communities that have been reformed into formal institutions or lowest administrative units of local municipalities (*khokimiyats*) in 1990s and till present. *Mahallas* have existed since ancient times as traditional institutions in such areas as Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent and Ferghana valley. In some urban areas of Uzbekistan,

tion and serve to confirm the status system by making it a matter of prestige to belong to certain groups or displaying their status through conspicuous consumption. This traditional association that can reflect and influence people's thoughts and opinions have been often watched with keen interests by official authorities or research institutes.³

Originally, *gaps* had been associations of elderly men who would regularly meet in their houses or public places such as teahouses (*choikhona*) mainly during winter, which is the slack season for farmers. In the *mahalla* that I researched, the elderly informants often emphasized that *gaps* had provided them with valuable opportunities to acquire knowledge, such as the latest news or information regarding new fertilizers, at a time when television and radio were not common. At that time, a typical *gap* was a relatively large group comprising 30-50 members.

This practice of organizing get-togethers, which appeared to be on the wane by the 1950s, was revived remarkably in the 1970s – the era of “Soviet consumerism” under Brezhnev – when the limited access to scarce goods and service under the Soviet regime had led to the mobilization of a range of informal mechanisms. At that time, the types of *gaps* began to diversify considerably. *Gaps* began to be seen in urban areas as well and were no longer confined to men; they now involved *gaps* organized by and for women only or mixed-sex groups of married couples.

A Variety of Gaps

Thus far, the *gaps* in Uzbekistan have highly diversified membership, meeting styles, or purposes. In the following paragraphs, I will present a brief overview of various types of *gaps* by classifying them on the basis of three axes concerning their membership criteria: gender, generation, and preexisting social relationships.

First, most of the *gaps* are formed separately by and exclusively for males and females. As mentioned earlier, the traditional *gaps* were organized only for elderly men to make good use of the holidays or spend their free time gathering at the same place. However, at present in Uzbekistan, *gaps* organized only by women are even more popular. An Uzbek scholar refers to the emergence of women's *gaps* in relation to the matter of the changing position of women in the *mahalla*.⁴ Women have come to utilize *gaps* as instruments to seek the

mahallas do not have deep historical roots and have been recently created as lowest administrative units by the Uzbek government. See, for example, E.W. Sievers, “Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations,” *The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent* 2 (2002), pp. 91-158; M. G'ulomov, *Mahalla: Fuqarolik Jamiyatning Asosi* (Tashkent: Adolat, 2003); or Dadabaev, *Mahalla*.

3 See, Toshonov, “Mahalla Jamoatchilik Fikri,” pp. 108-109. These *gaps* could be once utilized by Soviet regime for ideology campaigns or propagandas of Russian life styles in 50s or 60s. See, for example, D.M. Abramson, “From Soviet to Mahalla: Community and Transition in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan.” Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University, 1998), p. 71.

4 Арифханова. Традиционные сообщества. С. 44-45.

moral support of the local community for assistance in case they face family troubles or other problems. It is plausible that the women's voices organized through the *gaps* could have led to the formation of public opinion at the local community level. In addition, it is notable that women's *gaps* are now organized not only among neighbors but also within various other types of social relationships such as relative groups or colleagues at the workplace, as seen in men's *gaps*.

Though the purposes of these women's associations are diverse, they appear to be rather practical in comparison with the traditional men's *gaps*. Not merely aiming at leisure or entertainment at the meetings, they tend to actively utilize *gaps* for mutual help such as exchanging information, sharing social experiences, or providing mutual support in daily life. For instance, women are often accompanied by their children to their meeting, with the intent of increasing cooperation and instilling moral education or discipline in their children. In addition, *gaps* often function just like Roscas as will be explained later in this section. Such financial benefits offered by women's *gaps* have often been emphasized by recent literature.

Second, *gaps* are generally formed by companies within the same generation. *Gaps* comprising members from school alumni are typical cases. Apart from schoolmate-based *gaps*, most of the *gaps* represent generation groups. With regard to women's *gaps*, for instance, the most commonly observed *gaps* are those of young brides, middle-aged women, or old women in a neighborhood. The *gaps* of the youth are also utilized for practical purposes such as exchanging information or cementing social connections. Nevertheless, on some occasions, some of the gatherings of the younger generations involve excessive entertainment with extravagant meals or the consumption of alcohol, belittling traditional activities such as moral education or knowledge acquisition. I have personally often attended the gatherings of young male *gaps*, where enjoying feasts throughout the night was the ritual. The deviations from the traditional style of the *gaps*, which have become distinctive, as the types of *gaps* have diversified during the late Soviet period, have been often criticized by the older generation.⁵

Third, it is indeed characteristic of the *gaps* that they are necessarily based on the adherence of the members to specific social relationships such as neighborhood residents, graduates of the same educational establishment, kinship relatives, colleagues at a workplace or a combination of these ties. This element of the *gaps* can distinguish them from other similar rotating associations that can be defined as Roscas. That is, an association called Roscas need not necessarily be accompanied by such close face-to-face interactions among members as neighbors, classmates, kin, or coworkers.⁶ In the same vein, there also exist

⁵ Арифханова. Современная жизнь. С. 26.

⁶ Regarding comprehensive surveys of Roscas all over the world, see, C. Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 10 (1962), pp. 241-263, 260; and S. Ardener, "The Comparative Study of

rotating associations called “*chornaia kassa*” in Uzbekistan that are characterized by group saving among coworkers at the same office. This system of Soviet practices is different from the *gaps* in that it does not necessarily require visits to each member’s house.⁷

The roles of the *gaps* necessarily depend on the types of preexisting social relationships. For instance, the *gaps* of neighbors are expected to influence the sense of participation in community activities, contributing to the formation of a strong feeling of belonging to the locality and that is the reason why the associations have been considered to be essential for communal living.⁸ In the other case, the *gaps* of female relatives are often intentionally organized for maintaining regular contact with their own families.⁹ This is because females often have to live apart from their families after marriage, following the Uzbek family custom. Furthermore, it will be expected that the characteristic of the *gaps* of coworkers would be more like of those of *chornaia kassa*.

At the same time, the classification of the *gaps* in reality is rather complicated and ambiguous in various respects. First, there are many activities commonly seen in any *gap*. For instance, outside the regular gatherings, most of the *gaps* can operate as mutual aid unit in an emergency, irrespective of the type of membership they are based on. In particular, the members join forces when some of their fellow members conduct family rituals (*toi*) such as weddings or circumcisions, which often involve huge amounts of money, materials, and labor. In addition, they take it as their duty to visit him/her and offer their help, especially, for example, when a member of their *gap* takes ill or meets with an accident. Second, from the practical perspective, the three axes mentioned above affect the characteristic of *gaps* in complex ways. For instance, we cannot predict solely based on the predominance of neighbors’ *gaps* that they are essential for the communal life in that area. Other aspects of these neighbors’ *gap* such as gender ratio or generation types may more strongly characterize the roles or positions of the *gaps*. Third, the *gaps* appear to be on the verge of changing. Those *gaps* whose members always discuss the form and content of their activities at each meeting have the potential to develop in many directions. One of the peculiar aspects of the changing function of the *gaps* should

Rotating Credit Associations,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 94:2 (1964), pp. 201-229.

7 On the other hand, the *gaps* did not necessarily involve any monetary changes until the late Soviet period. Thus, it is possible to consider that the financial uses of the *gaps* have appeared as relatively new phenomena by incorporating the function of the *chornaia kassa*. Kandiyoti pointed out in 1998 that “It is in the last five or six years that the role of the *chornaia kassa* appears to be combined with the *gaps* which are clearly proliferating.” See, Deniz Kandiyoti, “Rural Livelihoods and Social Networks in Uzbekistan: Perspectives from Andijan,” *Central Asian Survey* 17:4 (1998), p. 574.

8 See for example, Арифханова. Традиционные сообщества. С. 42-43; or Dadabaev, *Mahalla*, p. 82 et passim.

9 This is the view commonly shared by the informants of our research.

be financial use in the form of Roscas, which will be discussed in the paragraphs below.

Roscas

The function of *gaps* as Roscas has been recently pointed out by some scholars, mainly from the Western world. Their main concerns revolve around household strategies to cope with economic difficulties and uncertainties in the course of the post-socialist transition. Traditional institutions or informal associative networks that are deeply embedded in the local society in Central Asia were considered as social capital or collaterals that are helpful in the daily struggle to make ends meet and explain how a family with a monthly income of about fifty dollars can expend several thousand dollars on a wedding.¹⁰ In this context, *gaps* have been reported as unique associations that have innovative potential in adapting to the new economic pressures faced by households during the transition.¹¹

Here, the basic concept of Roscas should be explained. The Rosca, an informal financial institution widely reported in the developing world, has fascinated anthropologists for a long time and has recently attracted the theoretical attention of some economists.¹² Roscas can be categorized into several types in terms of their systems. However, they share a common basic principle: in every Rosca, all members agree to contribute a fixed amount of money or materials at each of a set of uniformly spaced dates toward the creation of a fund; this fund will then be allotted to each member of the group in turn, in accordance with some prearranged rule. The allotment is determined either through bidding, a lottery, or an arrangement by discussion.

This system is particularly effective for purchasing luxury or durable goods, rather than for small daily items of consumption. For instance, consider

10 See, for example, E.W. Sievers, *The Post-Soviet Decline of Central Asia: Sustainable Development and Comprehensive Capital* (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 91-123; Kandiyoti, "Rural Livelihoods," pp. 561-578; or Victoria Koroteyeva and Ekaterina Makarova, "Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Uzbek City," *Central Asian Survey* 17:4 (1998), pp. 579-596. Regarding neighboring courtiers, see for example, C. Werner, "Household Networks and the Security of Mutual Indebtedness in Rural Kazakhstan," *Central Asian Survey* 17:4 (1998), pp. 597-612; or J. Howell, "Coping with Transition: Insight from Kyrgyzstan," *Third World Quarterly: Third World Foundation* 17:1 (1996), pp. 53-68.

11 For example, Sievers, "Uzbekistan's Mahalla," p. 130; or Kandiyoti, "Rural Livelihoods," pp. 569-575.

12 For example, Geertz, "The Rotating Credit Association"; Ardener, "The Comparative Study"; T. Besley et al., "Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations," *American Economic Review* 83:4 (1993), pp. 792-810; J. Kovsted and P. Luk-Jensen, "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations: The Choice between Random and Bidding Allocation of Funds," *Journal of Development Economics* 60 (1999), pp. 143-172; or S. Ambec and N. Treich, "Roscas as Financial Agreements to Cope with Self-control Problems," *Journal of Development Economics* 82 (2007), pp. 120-137.

a person who can afford to save only 10 dollars a month and now hopes to buy durable goods worth 100 dollars. If this person saves alone, he or she can acquire these goods only after 10 months. However, when there are 10 persons who also save 10 dollars per month for the same purpose, they can cooperate with each other through a Rosca. If a contribution of 10 dollars from each member is collected, then one member can receive 100 dollars just after one month. Over a ten-month period, a different member will receive 100 dollars for each month. In this manner, the Rosca has been interpreted as a system that can facilitate the earlier gain of utility from the use of durable goods compared with the case of an autarky,¹³ and this hypothesis has been tested empirically in studies of economics.

The function of Roscas should not be confined to matters of purchasing luxuries. It is theoretically analogous to utilize this system for any relatively large expense at one time such as small business investments or expenses for ceremonial events. Recent studies have also pointed out that Roscas can have psychological effects such as increased self-control and a restraint in easy expenses.¹⁴ Furthermore, if flexible changes in the rotational turns are allowed, the fund can be utilized for the members' problems, facilitating urgent access to money. In this case, this financial system can also be regarded as a source of informal credit or insurance.

Concerning the Uzbek *gaps*, their effects as Roscas can be observed from several aspects. In one case, some of the recent *gaps* are organized with the main aim of seeking cooperation to purchase specific durable goods such as TVs, carpets, or jointly paying ceremonial expenses. In the other case, there is no concrete plan to purchase goods or spend for a common purpose through the *gaps*; however, *gaps* can fulfill an indirect function as Roscas. In gatherings, the leader by tradition collects membership fees to finance the host or hostess' expense; the remaining money is at the host or hostess's disposal to make any necessary purchases or to meet any other financial obligations. Since they are free to resort to any other source to add more capital, whether the funds from the *gaps* can accumulate to the level of the prices of targeted goods is not an important issue. It should be noted that in Uzbekistan, where the national currency or bank system is premature, there is a tendency for people to quickly convert them into objects such as accessories, domestic animals, or automobiles when they obtain a fairly large sum of Uzbek currency. Thus, whether or not the *gaps* actually fulfill the function of Roscas is not a matter of the intentions of the participants, and that is why this article should attach weight to examining non-subjective indices based on household budget survey.

Moreover, in Uzbekistan, this system of group savings has functioned quite effectively in coping with the intense inflation in the 1990s. The constant depreciation of Uzbek currency made it just a loss to keep them at hand for a

13 For example, Besley et al., "Economics of Rotating Savings."

14 Ambec and Treich, "Roscas as Financial Agreements."

long time, urging people to consume them rapidly, instead of enlarging personal savings, while the acquisition of foreign hard currencies like U.S. dollars were strictly restricted by the law for ordinary people. In this situation, they used the prices of specific materials as an index when they decided the amount of money that each member must contribute in each gathering, not using the unit of Uzbek currency. In the Andijan region, there is a custom to use the current bazaar prices of meat (e.g., 2 kg. of sheep) – that are quite sensitive to the movement of real and nominal prices – as an index. In this manner, irrespective of when the members receive the fund money of Roscas, they could neither benefit nor suffer losses from the inflation.

FIELDWORK

The fieldwork was conducted in a *mahalla* in the Andijan region, which is located in the eastern part of Ferghana Valley. The Andijan region is the smallest in size, but most densely populated region of Uzbekistan. Nearly 10 percent of Uzbekistan's total population lives in what comprises only one percent of the country's total territory. The households in this region have been facing the highest population pressure for a long time and have been engaged in a combination of activities to acquire different sources of income for daily survival. For instance, Kandiyoti ethnographically illustrates the complex way in which rural households in the Andijan region are responding to the new economic pressure of the transition and highlights the importance of social networks such as kinship relations or *gaps*.¹⁵ In this respect, this area appears to be in a relatively favorable situation for comprehending the vitality and prevalence of social networks in Uzbekistan. According to the government statistics for 2003, among 14 regions, the Andijan region stood at an average level of economic or social development, ranked seventh for per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP) and 6th for social infrastructure.¹⁶

The researched *mahalla*, henceforth referred to as *Oqmahalla*, is situated in Oltinkol District, one of the 14 rural districts of the Andijan region. Oltinkol District has a population of 125,000 and has few national minorities, with the exception of 4,000 Tajiks who constitute the majority in one village (*qishloq*). The land of Oltinkol has been known to be fertile. The region of Oltinkol was founded during the Qoqon Khanate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the growing needs of its population had compelled the Khans to expand their agricultural land. At the time, Oltinkol was a shallow lake. Ac-

15 Kandiyoti, "Rural Livelihoods."

16 See, *Uzbekistan National Human Development Report 2005*, UNDP and CER, p. 52, Table 3.9. The level of economic development is determined on the basis of per capita GRP, the level of social development on the basis of per income, presence of social infrastructure, turnover of goods and paid services. Estimates based on data from State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics.

cording to a legend, when people settled in the land surrounding the city of Andijan, they saw a beautiful moonlight reflection on the lake and began to refer to the land as “Oydinkol,” which means “light lake.” They began to grow wheat and cotton in the region near the lake and soon reaped rich harvests due to its fertility. Since then, the land has been called “Oltinkol,” which means “gold lake.”

The industry of Oltinkol is still heavily dependent on agriculture. Oltinkol has 12,000 hectares of irrigated land in the form of cooperative farms (*Shirkat*), 7,000 hectares of which is under cotton cultivation, and another 4,500 of which is under wheat cultivation, and the rest, under vegetable cultivation. More importantly, most of the households own private plots in their gardens (*tomorqa*), covering approximately 3,000 hectares in total. Private greenhouses are often set up on these plots and high-value products such as tomato, pepper, or tobacco are grown. These products are grown not only for self-consumption but also for sale in Tashkent or export to Russia. Moreover, Oltinkol has three large factories engaged in the processing of coats, textile and cotton; each of these factories employs more than 500 people.

The fieldwork in *Oqmahalla* began in 2002, spanning a total of six months and involving five visits to date. The survey on which this article is mainly based was conducted over August – September 2003. According to the investigation conducted by the *mahalla* committee in January 2003, the population of *Oqmahalla* comprised 486 households or 2,523 residents, which can be regarded as medium size given the size of the present *mahallas* in this country.

During the fieldwork, a one-shot household budget survey targeting 245 households or 1,344 residents was implemented. This survey began on September 12, 2003 and was completed on September 15, 2003, with the cooperation of eight interviewers. In recent years, household budget surveys meeting a certain methodological standard such as World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Survey have been increasingly implemented in developing or transition countries. Similar attempts are also made in Uzbekistan; however, this survey is different in that its sample is representative not at the national level, but at the community level.¹⁷ That is, its priority is placed not on large-scale representativeness but on examining concrete examples and structures of residents’ living environment. One of reasons for the scarcity of this type of economic survey in Uzbekistan will be political pressure or intervention by

17 Apart from household budget surveys by State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat), of which the first hand data do not have public access, there were several attempts of household budget surveys with sample sizes of 1000-2000 households level such as EESU (EUI/Essex University Survey in Uzbekistan) in 1995 or Expert Fikri-JICA Survey (see also footnotes 20) in 2003. However, the situation surrounding household budget surveys in Uzbekistan appears to be still backward, compared with neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan where World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys have already been conducted several times.

authorities. This survey is valuable in the sense that it could overcome this kind of obstacle.¹⁸

The household budget survey was conducted in the following manner.¹⁹ First, half of the households were randomly selected from the list of the households maintained by the *mahalla* committee of *Oqmahalla*. Next, the interviewers, accompanied by residents who were familiar with the *mahalla*, visited each household to conduct face-to-face interviews with one or simultaneously with several members of the household aged over 18 years; however, only those who were fully aware of the household's budget were interviewed. Although the items of the questionnaire were varied, they basically focused on economic activity in the past one month. They included questions that sought information on household composition, individual income, education levels, employment status, private income transfers, household assets, durable goods, livestock, private plots, participation in specific customs such as *gaps*, etc. The interviewers and I would crosscheck our questionnaires every night, and in case some data were missing, we would visit the same households again the next day.

Tables 1 and 2 present the household income structure and employment status of *Oqmahalla* based on the results of this survey. For comparison, the results of the household budget survey conducted in February 2003 for 1,000 sample households all over Uzbekistan are shown in the right-hand side column of each table.²⁰ Table 1 shows that the average income per household

18 Unlike a large-scale sample survey, this type of community-intensive survey becomes such a big event in the researched community that it is impossible to complete the survey without a notice of the local municipalities or SNB (National Security Service) in the current political regime of Uzbekistan. Thus, I visited the local municipalities (Andijan *khokimiyat* and Oltinkol *khokimiyat*) earlier with my colleague and explained that our concern is purely academic. Thanks to a letter of the director of the Republic Mahalla Charity Funds in Tashkent, other social connections and my own nationality, we were on good terms with municipalities and obtained necessary permits for the survey. As a result, we had no external intervention in any step of designing questionnaire, selecting samples and interviewers or conducting the survey. Graduates of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent who had a good understanding of the objective of this research participated in this survey as interviewers. During the survey, residents were surprisingly cooperative with us, since I often attended ceremonial events in the *mahalla* and was well known to all residents. To my sorrow, however, it is uncertain that this procedure can work again in present time when the radical change occurred in the personnel and attitude of local municipalities after the event of Andijan in May 2005.

19 Household means a group of individuals who live at the same dwelling and are involved into common revenues or expenses (budget).

20 This household budget survey over Uzbekistan on "Revenues, expenses and loans of people living in mahalla" was conducted in February-March of 2003 by "Expert Fikri" Center on Sociological Surveys according to the contract with Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to which the author offered the draft of the questionnaire. Households were selected using two-step PPS (proportional probabilistic sampling) procedure. At the first step, 78 sample *mahallas* were selected out of the total list of *mahallas* of the country. On the second step, 1,000 sample households out of those *mahallas* were selected for interviews, which were conducted by 57 interviewers.

Table 1. Household Income Structure in *Oqmahalla*

	<i>Oqmahalla</i> 2003.9		Uzbekistan 2003.2	
	soum	ratio	soum	ratio
Wage at main place of work	24625.8	28.6%	20040.4	43.2%
Wage at second place(s) of work	1065.6	1.2%	388.0	0.8%
Temporary or seasonal income	5524.6	6.4%	1724.2	3.7%
Maternity benefits from workplace	493.4	0.6%	145.2	0.3%
Benefits for unemployment or invalidity	786.4	0.9%	26.4	0.1%
Income from craft work	3561.5	4.1%	1086.7	2.3%
Alimony	22.5	0.0%	104.9	0.2%
Gifts from workplace or other organization	245.9	0.3%	332.9	0.7%
Pension	8955.1	10.4%	11519.6	24.9%
Other	7679.5	8.9%	3156.0	6.8%
Mahalla committee poverty benefits	131.6	0.2%	150.3	0.3%
Mahalla committee child benefits under 16 yrs.	1197.1	1.4%	1435.1	3.1%
Mahalla committee child benefits under 2 yrs.	1001.8	1.2%	1036.7	2.2%
Mahalla committee other assistance	45.1	0.1%	70.4	0.2%
Subtotal	55335.8	64.3%	41217.0	88.9%
Income from private plots	30783.6	35.7%	5131.5	11.1%
Total income received	86119.4	100.0%	46348.5	100.0%
Private transfers (cash or kind)				
Received	17857	20.7%	6883.4	14.9%
Given	31428	36.5%	5400.6	11.7%

Notes: The soum is a monetary unit of Uzbekistan. The exchange rate was approximately 1,000 soums per 1 U.S. dollar in 2003 (The unofficial rate was 1,020 soums/USD in 2003.2 and 980 soums/USD in 2003.9). An outliner was excluded from the observations in *Oqmahalla* (244 observations in total).

Sources: *Oqmahalla* is based on author's field research. Uzbekistan is based on Expert Fikiri - JICA survey (See note 20).

received from the main workplace in *Oqmahalla* is only 24,525 soums (approximately 25 U.S. dollars); however, the total income reaches 86,119 soums. The latter amount is somewhat higher than the average figure for this county. This difference is mainly caused by the two components of income: temporary or seasonal income and income from private plots. Taking the following two operational factors into consideration, the living standards in *Oqmahalla* should be regarded as average or as slightly higher than that in Uzbekistan. First, since the survey in *Oqmahalla* was conducted in the harvest season and that in Uzbekistan was conducted in winter, the demand for temporary or seasonal labors in *Oqmahalla* must have been abundant. Second, we conducted elaborate research on the income from private plots and also attempted to grasp the amount of production used for self-consumption, considering its importance in rural households.²¹ The lower part of Table 1 indicates the information on

21 Note that there is a difference in the methodology. In the survey in *Oqmahalla*, the income from private plots was calculated by dividing by 12 the estimated annual income from the private plots, while all other income was income received in the last one-month.

Table 2. Employment Status in *Oqmahalla*

	<i>Oqmahalla</i> 2003.9		Uzbekistan 2003.2	
	number	ratio	number	ratio
Work	352	100.0%	1,368	100.0%
of which:				
cooperative farm (<i>shirkat</i>)	58	16.5%	465	34.0%
private farm, full-time farmer	20	5.7%	90	6.6%
state enterprise, institution, organization	168	47.7%	526	38.4%
private firm, joint company	44	12.5%	239	17.4%
small business, crafts, household industry	39	11.1%	30	2.2%
government organization, military, other	23	6.6%	19	1.4%
Do not work	992	100.0%	3,935	100.0%
of which:				
cultivating private plots	89	9.0%	78	2.0%
student or children	554	55.8%	2,116	53.8%
pensioner	120	12.1%	521	13.2%
housewife	128	12.9%	462	11.7%
seeking a job, invalid, other	101	10.2%	758	19.3%

Sources: *Oqmahalla* is based on author's field research. Uzbekistan is based on Expert Fikiri – JICA survey (See note 20).

private or inter-household transfers.²² Private transfers involve various types of items such as cash, food, durable goods, or clothing; all these have been converted into an equivalent amount in terms of soums. The transfers received were up to 20% and those given were 36% of the average income per household, which indicates the considerable significance of the reciprocal exchange among the households in *Oqmahalla*.²³

Table 2 indicates that the proportion of state enterprises, institutions, and organizations is higher in the employment status of *Oqmahalla*. This category includes employees in the social sector, which includes schools and hospitals, and those employed in state factories as laborers. *Oqmahalla* is in charge of one brigade of the cooperative farm; however, its significance in the daily lives of the residents is not very high with regard to the number of regular workers and their salaries (the income from the cooperative farm is included in “wage at second place(s) of work” in Table 1). The results presented in Table 2 do not reflect the proportion of laborers working on private plots, since these occupa-

22 Private transfers seem to be important source of mutual aid in less-developed countries. See, for example, Jonathan Morduch, “Between the State and the Market: Can Informal Insurance Patch the Safety Net?” *The World Bank Research Observer* 14:2 (1999), pp. 187-202. With regard to Uzbekistan, some econometric analysis indicates that the private transfers were utilized as informal safety nets mainly to make up for the temporary income shocks under the transition period. See, Masato Hiwatari, “An Analysis of Private Transfers in Uzbekistan: From the Viewpoint of Social Security,” [in Japanese] *Ajia Keizai* 46:4 (2005), pp. 21-46.

23 However, we should consider the effects of family rituals (*toi*) that occur frequently in the harvest season.

tions are usually not recognized as jobs; however, it should be noted that most of the households in *Oqmahalla* are engaged in production on private plots, and the income from this comprises 35% of the total income, as shown in Table 1.

TYPES AND PURPOSES OF *GAPS*

To begin with, we attempt to obtain the overview of the general characteristic of *gaps* in *Oqmahalla* by examining their variety in membership criteria or purposes. We collected information on *gaps* concerning each member of the households during the household budget survey, accepting that different households would provide information on the same *gaps*. The information on *gaps* includes the number of members, amount of contribution, frequency of gatherings, purpose of *gaps*, systems of rotation, experience of defaults, etc. The survey data reveal that 81.6% of the sample households of *Oqmahalla* have at least one family member who belongs to a *gap*. The households belonging to *gaps* participate in 2.47 *gaps* on an average. These numbers clearly confirm that most of the households in *Oqmahalla* are intertwined in a dense web of *gap* networks. The meaning of this density of prevalence will be reexamined further below.

The economic literature of Roscas has paid considerable attention to the manner in which the order of the allocation of the lump sum fund is decided.²⁴ In *Oqmahalla*, the members decide the order by "drawing lots" or through "discussion," and not by "bidding." The high proportion of "discussion" implies that the *gaps* can also function as informal insurance to meet emergent needs.

Below, I classified the data of the *gaps* into several categories based on their membership criteria and examined their differences. Table 3 reports the frequency and proportion of the *gap* prevalence according to membership criteria. We can observe that both males and females participate actively in *gaps*. In this table, those who participate in multiple *gaps* are counted repeatedly, while the numbers counted only once for every participant are shown within parentheses. In the case of the left-hand side, a chi-square test of independence revealed that the age structure of *gaps* is not independent of gender difference, at the 1% level of significance. This result is mainly due to the difference in participation in the age group of less than 30 years. The lack of participation among young females implies that they may be in a weak position in the households and find it difficult to spend money on *gaps*. In addition, the tendency of females to rarely organize *gaps* among their classmates might be one of the reasons why there are few *gaps* of young females, as can be verified from the right-hand side of Table 3.

24 In theory, the lottery is preferred when the members are homogeneous (in respects of valuations of the durable or returns from contributions to the pool) and the bidding is preferred when credits from other sources are not costly. See, Besley et al., "Economics of Rotating Savings"; and Kovsted and Luk-Jensen, "Rotating Savings and Credit Associations."

Table 3. Types of Gaps in Oqmahalla (gender, age and social relationship)

Age	Male	Female	Total	Relationship	Male	Female	Total
less than 30	85(70)	41(30)	126(100)	Mahalla	56	131	187
31-40	78(64)	77(65)	155(129)	Classmate	153	32	185
41-50	69(49)	74(46)	143(95)	Relative	12	38	50
more than 50	26(19)	44(32)	70(51)	Workplace	16	21	37
Total	258(202)	236(173)	494(375)	Other	21	14	35
				Total	258	236	494

As percent of Total

Age	Male	Female	Total	Criteria	Male	Female	Total
less than 30	32.9%	17.4%	25.5%	Mahalla	21.7%	55.5%	37.9%
31-40	30.2%	32.6%	31.4%	Classmate	59.3%	13.6%	37.4%
41-50	26.7%	31.4%	28.9%	Relative	4.7%	16.1%	10.1%
more than 50	10.1%	18.6%	14.2%	Workplace	6.2%	8.9%	7.5%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	Other	8.1%	5.9%	7.1%
				Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Notes: The chi-square test of independence yields a P-value of 0.0002 and 0.0000 for age and relationship.

Sources: The author's field research.

The right-hand side of Table 3 classifies the *gaps* by social relationships that determine the qualification for the membership of *gaps*. The majority of *gaps* are organized according to the criteria of "living in the same *mahalla*" (37.9%) or "graduates of the same school" (37.4%), followed by "kinship relations" (10.1%) and "colleagues at work" (7.5%). The category "other" includes "friends" or "people of the same age." It can be observed that males tend to organize classmate *gaps* more often and that females tend to organize *mahalla* *gaps* and relative *gaps* to a greater extent. Regarding relative *gaps*, female informants often emphasized that *gaps* are very useful for maintaining regular contact with their own families after marriage. A chi-square test of the hypothesis that the criteria of *gaps* are independent of the gender difference is easily rejected, which confirms the above findings.

Table 4 and Table 5 categorize the purposes of *gaps* by their membership criteria. We inquired about the purposes of each *gap*, accepting multiple answers, all of which are counted in the Tables. At first glance, it is obvious that a variety of purposes to attend *gaps* were reported. The column "Total" in Table 4 shows that the purposes of "just meeting members (56%)" and "refreshment and leisure (46%)" comprise one half of the total answers. This supports the idea that the *gap* is not merely a financial institution. On the other hand, the purposes related with the functions of Roscas such as "purchasing durable goods (29%)," "saving money (4%)," and "insurance for the future (44%)" comprise about 40% of total answers.

From the other columns in Table 4, it is apparent that any type of *gap* can have various proposes and these purposes are not explicitly defined by criteria such as gender or generation. Nevertheless, we can recognize some tendency. For instance, the females tend to utilize *gaps* for the Roscas-related purposes

Table 4. Purpose of Gaps in Oqmahalla (gender and age)

Purpose	Male	Female	Total	Male (age)				Female (age)			
				-30	31-40	41-50	50-	-30	31-40	41-50	50-
Just meeting members	172	107	279	63	51	45	13	23	28	32	24
Refreshment or leisure	135	90	225	54	39	31	11	11	34	23	22
Purchasing durable goods	55	86	141	19	14	16	6	12	28	28	18
Saving money	10	8	18	2	3	5	0	0	3	4	1
Insurance for the future	99	118	217	37	34	20	8	13	42	38	25
Discussing problems	61	40	101	18	15	26	2	6	12	15	7
Barter	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Keeping social positions	4	2	6	1	0	1	2	0	0	2	0
Other	7	13	20	0	3	3	1	3	5	5	0
Total number of answers	543	466	1009	194	159	147	43	68	153	148	97

In percent of total number of Gaps

Purpose	Male	Female	Total	Male (age)				Female (age)			
				-30	31-40	41-50	50-	-30	31-40	41-50	50-
Just meeting members	67%	45%	56%	74%	65%	65%	50%	56%	36%	43%	55%
Refreshment or leisure	52%	38%	46%	64%	50%	45%	42%	27%	44%	31%	50%
Purchasing durable goods	21%	36%	29%	22%	18%	23%	23%	29%	36%	38%	41%
Saving money	4%	3%	4%	2%	4%	7%	0%	0%	4%	5%	2%
Insurance for the future	38%	50%	44%	44%	44%	29%	31%	32%	55%	51%	57%
Discussing problems	24%	17%	20%	21%	19%	38%	8%	15%	16%	20%	16%
Barter	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%
Keeping social positions	2%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	8%	0%	0%	3%	0%
Other	3%	6%	4%	0%	4%	4%	4%	7%	6%	7%	0%
Total number of Gaps	258	236	494	85	78	69	26	41	77	74	44

Notes: The chi-square test of independence yields a P-value of 0.00002 for gender difference in the left-hand side of the table.

Sources: The author's field research.

Table 5. Purpose of Gaps in Oqmahalla (social relationship)

Purpose	Mahalla	Classmate	Relative	Workplace	Other	Total
Just meeting members	65	136	35	17	26	279
Refreshment or leisure	70	97	23	15	20	225
Purchasing durable goods	61	35	17	14	14	141
Saving money	10	7	0	1	0	18
Insurance for the future	98	63	21	18	17	217
Discussing problems	36	47	8	7	3	101
Barter	0	1	1	0	0	2
Keeping social positions	2	1	2	1	0	6
Other	16	1	3	0	0	20
Total number of answers	358	388	110	73	80	1009

In percent of total number of Gaps

Purpose	Mahalla	Classmate	Relative	Workplace	Other	Total
Just meeting members	35%	74%	70%	46%	74%	56%
Refreshment or leisure	37%	52%	46%	41%	57%	46%
Purchasing durable goods	33%	19%	34%	38%	40%	29%
Saving money	5%	4%	0%	3%	0%	4%
Insurance for the future	52%	34%	42%	49%	49%	44%
Discussing problems	19%	25%	16%	19%	9%	20%
Barter	0%	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%
Keeping social positions	1%	1%	4%	3%	0%	1%
Other	9%	1%	6%	0%	0%	4%
Total number of Gaps	187	185	50	37	35	494

Notes: The chi-square test of independence yields a P-value of 0.00000 for differences in social relationships.

Sources: The author's field research.

mentioned above such as “purchasing durable goods (36%)” or “insurance for the future (50%),” while males tend to attend *gaps* for more leisurely purposes such as “just meeting (67%)” or “refreshment or leisure (52%).” A chi-square test of independence confirms this idea, rejecting the hypothesis that the purposes of *gaps* are independent of gender difference. This is consistent with our expectation mentioned above. From the left-hand side of Table 4 that classifies *gaps* further by using age differences, we can observe that the tendency to utilize the *gaps* for practical purposes such as “insurance for the future” is stronger particularly for females over 30 years of age. It appears that those women who have a certain responsibility for their household budgets attend *gaps* with their family’s living strategies in mind. With regard to male *gaps*, differences in purposes according to generations cannot be clearly observed. The serious attitude of the relatively elderly generation toward *gaps* can possibly be recognized in the high proportion of “discussion problem (38%)” in male *gaps* of the age group of 41-50.

Table 5 categorizes the purposes of *gaps* by the social relationships on which the *gaps* are based. We can recognize the tendency that Roscas-related practical purposes are more popular in *mahalla* and workplace *gaps*, than in classmate or relative *gaps*. A chi-square test of the hypothesis that the purposes of the *gaps* are independent of the criteria of *gaps* is easily rejected. This popularity of *mahalla gaps* may somewhat contradict our impression, though we could expect that of workplace *gaps* to some extent. Here, the effect of the high proportion of female participants in *mahalla gaps* that can be recognized in Table 3 must be taken into account. In addition, the popularity of practical purposes of *mahalla gaps* and workplace *gaps* can be explained by the view that in the situation wherein members meet each other almost daily, there is little necessity of maintaining regular contact through non-practical gatherings.

GAPS AND ROSCAS

Thus far, we dealt with the data of answers to the questions regarding *gaps*, in which informants’ values or thoughts about their traditions or economic motivation may be well reflected. Henceforth, we attempt to examine the effects of *gaps* as Roscas based on non-subjective indices. The result of totaling the survey data reveals that the average amount of contribution in a gathering is 4,760 soums per capita. Here, as amounts of money to be contributed were often reported in the form of materials,²⁵ they were converted into the equivalent amount in soums by refereeing to their bazaar prices at that time. It also reveals that the average size of a *gap* is 13.68 members, the average frequency of gatherings in a month is 1.21 times, and the average life of a *gap* is 6.88 years. Thus, the average amount of lump sum funds allocated to a member at every gathering is

$$4760 \times (13.68 - 1) = 60,357 \text{ soums.}$$

25 They often use a specific amount of meat as an index. See, p. 50.

Table 6. Gap Participation and Prevalence of Durable Goods in Oqmahalla

Number of <i>gaps</i> participating	0	1	2	3	4	more than 5	Co-efficient	t-statistics	Marginal effect dF/dx
Color Television	6.7%	16.7%	17.2%	40.0%	31.8%	39.1%	0.156***	0.043	0.043
Black and White TV	77.8%	86.4%	92.2%	80.0%	86.4%	91.3%	-0.003	-0.040	-0.001
Refrigerator	15.6%	22.7%	42.2%	40.0%	63.6%	56.5%	0.212***	3.780	0.078
Music player	0.0%	15.2%	17.2%	36.0%	40.9%	47.8%	0.243***	4.330	0.063
Washing machine	6.7%	10.6%	18.8%	32.0%	22.7%	60.9%	0.256***	4.180	0.066
Microwave oven	6.7%	19.7%	25.0%	36.0%	31.8%	30.4%	0.132**	2.430	0.066
Gas cooker	93.3%	97.0%	95.3%	100.0%	95.5%	91.3%	-0.168	-1.450	-0.006
Automobile	0.0%	18.2%	20.3%	40.0%	45.5%	39.1%	0.184***	3.120	0.051
Durable goods index	2.11	3.00	3.55	4.48	4.50	5.13	0.377***	7.340	-
Num.of households	45	66	64	25	22	23			
Size of household	4.64	5.36	5.38	6.12	5.82	6.78			
Income per household	48802	72596	83457	108506	112123	130822			
Income per capita	13598	14242	16116	18091	20863	21103			

Note: ***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%.

The following model was estimated for each durable good.

$$Pr(D_i=1) = F(GAP, INCOME, AGE, MEMBER)$$

where, if household i owns the durable good, $D_i = 1$, if not, $D_i = 0$. *GAP* indicates the total number of *gaps* that the household participates in, *INCOME* the household income, *AGE* the age of the household head and *MEMBER* the total number of members in the household. F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Based on the estimated results, the estimated parameter of *GAP*, the value of t-statistics, and the calculated marginal effects are shown in the table. The durable goods index is calculated by taking 1 if the household owns a durable good and 0 if it does not, and summing up the numbers for eight durable goods. The OLS was applied to the durable goods index, using the same explanatory variables.

Sources: The author's field research.

This amount accounts for 70% of the average total monthly income per household (86,119 soums) in *Oqmahalla*. Here, it is important to recognize that although each contribution is never big, the total amount of the fund becomes fairly large against our impression. As the average frequency of gatherings in a month is 1.21 times, the fund will be allocated to each member almost once a year ($1.21 \times 12 \div 13.68 = 1.06$). In addition, a household participates in 2.47 *gaps* on average. In other words, households whose members belong to *gaps* are expected to receive 70% of the monthly household income 2.5 times a year. Although the funds are used not only for Roscas but also to pay for meals and the entertainment expenses incurred for the gatherings, this fairly large amount of money should be expected to change household behavior toward expenditure or purchase.

As an attempt to investigate whether these funds could contribute to purchasing durable goods from the non-subjective indices, we examine the correlation between *gap* participation and the prevalence of durable goods. Table 6 categorizes households by the number of *gaps* in which they participate and calculates the prevalence ratio (%) of various durable goods in each category. For instance, 39.1% of the households that belong to more than five *gaps* own

color televisions, whereas only 6.7% of the households that do not belong to any *gap* do. The durable goods index is calculated by taking 1 if the household owns a durable good and 0 if it does not, and summing up the numbers for eight durable goods. The index increases with the number of *gaps* in which a household participates, as shown in Table 6. The overall results reveal that there is a positive association between *gap* participation and durable goods acquisition.

As can be recognized from the lower part of the table, however, household size and household income also tend to increase when households participate in more *gaps*. Thus, I estimated the probit models for each durable good, after controlling for the differences in the observed income or the number of household members. The results are shown on the right-hand side of Table 6. The coefficients of *gap* participation were positive at the 1% level of significance for 5 durable goods, and at the 5% level for 1 durable good.

The above results provide some support to the view that *gaps* are as well utilized as Roscas in the acquisition of durable goods. This analysis, however, has a limitation in clarifying the pattern of durable goods diffusion and cannot deny the possibility that the causation would run in reverse. In order to tackle the endogeneity issues, the panel or cohorts data should be collected in further research on this topic.²⁶

SUSTAINABILITY CONSTRAINTS AND DEFAULT PROBLEMS

As an attempt to clarify a distinctive feature of the *gaps*, we deal with the issues of sustainability and default problems in this section. The literature has unanimously emphasized that for long-enduring institutions managing common pool resources, small-sized groups or clearly defined boundaries are a necessity.²⁷ In a larger group where the costs of monitoring and enforcement are high, it becomes more difficult to keep track of defecting members.²⁸ Moreover, if the entry of new participants is not restricted, group members face the risk of any benefits they produce being reaped by others who have not contributed to the benefits.²⁹ The issues of sustainability are typically similar for Roscas. Restricting group sizes and fixing clear boundaries appear to enhance the sustainability of Roscas.

26 See, for example, T. Besley and A.R. Levenson, "The Role of Informal Finance in Household Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Taiwan," *Economic Journal* 106 (1996), pp. 39-59. I also estimated a probit model, after dividing the *gap* participation variable into the male participation variable and the female participation variable to check the difference between male *gaps* and female *gaps*. From the results, the coefficients of both variables are significant as well and the gender difference couldn't be found from this type of analysis.

27 See, for example, E. Ostrom, *Governing the Commons* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); or J.M. Baland and J.P. Platteau, *Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Rural Communities?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

28 Baland and Platteau, *Halting Degradation*, pp. 298-302.

29 Ostrom, *Governing the Commons*, pp. 91-92.

In the case of the present *gaps* in *Oqmahalla*, we obtained a notable result that any experience of a serious default problem was not reported throughout the survey. This fact is quite uncommon in terms of the situation in other countries where defaults in Roscas often cause major problems such as suicides or demands for governmental regulations.³⁰ In *Oqmahalla*, most of the respondents agree with the view that the inability of a member to pay for his or her obligation in a gathering is unlikely to lead to a major problem. *Gaps* are never disbanded and the defaulter is not banished from the group on the grounds of his or her default. Instead, the other members are tolerant of the defaulter's delay and often consider some favorable arrangements for him or her. In other words, unlike markets, *gaps* are neither simple financial organizations nor anonymous institutions. As mentioned earlier, *gaps* are always based on primary networks such as close friendships or kinship relations, and this affinity among members might serve to enhance their sustainability, thereby resolving the problems of imperfect information or enforceability.

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to completely ignore the sustainability issues. In practice, the average number of members in a *gap* is relatively small, such as 13.68 persons in *Oqmahalla*; however, the expected utilities of Roscas generally increase with an increase in the group sizes. Sustainability considerations appear to be a key to understanding this fact. According to Besley et al., a Rosca cannot be sustainable if the benefit to the first fund recipient of default exceeds the default costs that represent social sanctions, such as discomfort, loss of dignity, and other costs associated with having to confront the other members each day. This leads to the idea that the benefit of default could be reduced by lowering the number of members, if the contribution amount is kept fixed. In the case of a fixed number of members, the Rosca members would be deterred from defaulting by reducing the contribution amount per specific period. Hence, if the sustainability constraint of the Rosca is binding, the size of *gaps* may be inversely related to the size of the contributions per specific period.³¹

30 Ardener, "The Comparative Study," p. 216; and Besley and Levenson, "The Role of Informal Finance," p. 43.


31 We can easily obtain this association from the following consideration (For details, see, Besley et al., "Economics of Rotating Savings," p. 806). Consider a Rosca of length t among n identical individuals to purchase the durable good that costs B , then it meets at $\{t/n, 2t/n, \dots, t\}$. The sustainability constraint of the Rosca can be written as,

$$\left(\frac{n-1}{n}\right)t(e)[v(y) - v(y-e)] < K \quad (1)$$

where y denotes a exogenous flow of income, e a fixed amount of contribution per specific period, v individual's instantaneous utility, K the default cost caused by social sanction and $t = B/e$. The left-hand side of (1) indicates the benefit to the first recipient of defaulting. Assuming the sustainable constraint is binding, the implicit-function theorem directly yields the expression of $\partial n / \partial e < 0$, which is plotted in Fig1, under the condition that v is increasing, strictly concave and e is not too small ($e > 1$). To analyze more strictly this association using cross-section data, the differences in y and the assumption of constant B may be reconsidered.

Figure 1. Association between Size of *Gap* and Size of Contribution in *Oqmahalla*

Size of contribution in a month (soum)



Note: Pearson's correlation coefficient is -0.136 with a P-value of 0.004 .

Four observations over 80,000 soums or over 80 persons were excluded as outliers.

Sources: The author's field research.

Figure 1 plots the relationship between the size of *gaps* and that of the contribution per month from our survey data in *Oqmahalla*. There appears to be an inverse association as predicted above, although the relationship appears to be non-linear. At least, there are no *gaps* whose size and amount of contribution are similarly large, which prevents them from launching businesses or making large investments through *gaps*. The functions of the *gaps* seem to be somewhat restricted under the consideration of sustainability. This finding leads to the idea that the infrequent occurrence of default problems in the *gaps* of *Oqmahalla* might be the result of a well-monitored and restricted selection of members rather than the peculiarity of *gaps* as non-economic institutions.

Thus, it seems to be insufficient to regard *gaps* as simply being organized based on primary networks such as classmates, neighbors, or kinships; it is likely that they might select more restricted members from those primary networks under the consideration of sustainability issues. In other words, socially originated affinity and rational motivation appear to co-exist in *gaps*. This mixed view seems to be required to comprehend the dynamic aspects of the *gaps*. In the historical perspective, for instance, it was obvious from interviews that the sizes of *gaps* have been shrinking since the Soviet time, while the num-

ber of *gaps* themselves has been increasing. In light of the foregoing considerations, this fact implies that the common interests of members have gradually strengthened such that they might be required to reduce the sizes of their *gaps* in order to lighten the burden of contract enforcement. In the present time of radical change in social and economic surroundings, particularly symbolized by the intrusion of the market economy, this mixed angle of viewpoints might need more attention in comprehending the changes of traditional institutions that are underway.

MULTIPLICITY OF NETWORKS


This section considers the multiplicity of networks. Thus far, we have dealt with each *gap* individually; however, we lack a network point of view. The interactions or relationships among *gaps* have been neglected. In *Oqmahalla*, residents often stated that there is no restriction to belong to multiple *gaps*, and a considerable number of people did participate in multiple *gaps*. In addition, in territory as small as a *mahalla*, we could observe a lot in a number of *gaps*. Based on these facts, we can assume that the *gaps* are forming a complex structure of participation network with a high density. This is the other feature of *gaps* that this article will consider.

The viewpoint of multiple belonging is, in fact, important in considering the sustainability issues of Roscas, though such examples regarding Roscas have rarely been observed in the literature. The logic is considered to be analogous to the previous discussion about the size of the group. In general, belonging to multiple groups must raise default risks not only due to the increasing obligations of the participant but also as a result of increasing monitoring and enforcement costs or making boundaries of membership ambiguous. Nevertheless, in *Oqmahalla*, there are few problems of defaults or other destructive conflicts in each *gap*.

To consider this feature of the *gaps*, the multiplicity of networks seems to be a key factor. The simplest picture is as follows. A and B belong to a Rosca, but B belongs to another Rosca. From the general point of view regarding Roscas, the multiple belonging of B puts the former Rosca at risk by making it difficult to keep track of B's defecting. However, in the case of the *gap* that has a high density of prevalence, the following situation can frequently occur: A also belongs to the other *gap* that has a member, say C, who belongs to B's *gap* that A does not belong to. Here, C can function as a monitor, and B's behavior against A's interests will be restricted even in the *gap* without A. This type of restriction through indirect relationships has been referred to as the dyadic constraint in sociological literature.³²

32 More specifically, the dyadic constraint on vertex *u* excised by a tie between vertices *u* and *v* is defined as the extent to which *u* has more and stronger ties with neighbors who are strongly connected with vertex *v*. See, for instance, W.D. Nooy et al., *Exploratory Social Network Analysis with Pajek* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 147.

Figure 2 *Gap* Participation Network of the Mahalla Committee Members in *Oqmahalla*



Note: The line indicates the connection through the common *gap*, the figure in the line indicates the number of the *gaps*. The figure in the circle indicates committee member number, and alphabets posts; A denotes a member of council (*kengash*), B advisor (*maslahatchi*), C a member of subordinate commissions that work on specific tasks.

Sources: The author's field research.

To view the relational structure formed by *gaps*, we need to examine the network data that could identify those who are connected with each other through common *gaps*. Since the household survey that collected data on the basis of a household or person unit is lacking in this type of relational data, in September 2004, I conducted another survey targeting members who belong to a *mahalla* committee. The *mahalla* committee is a representative organ of the *mahalla* formed by its residents and those people who are expected to be leaders or influential persons in the *mahalla* are targeted.

Figure 2 presents the participation network of *gaps* for 45 persons who are in charge of any post of the *mahalla* committee. Here, the network data was converted into a one-mode network; the circles indicate persons and lines, *gaps*. The numbers below the circle represent the number of member and the alphabets, posts in the committee; A denotes a member of council (*kengash*); B advisor (*maslahatchi*); C a member of subordinate commissions that work on specific tasks. Those members who belong to a common household or a close a paternal kinship group are unified as a same circle whose size represents the

size of paternal kinship group in the community, considering that this type of relationship is much stronger than that of *gaps*.

Our main concern should be based on the fact that a considerable number of relationships of complete triads can be observed in the network of Figure 2. From the network point of view, this implies that members must be highly controlled by dyadic constraints. This relationship structure was realized under the peculiar condition of the *gaps* mentioned above; however, it must be considered that activists in the *mahalla* committee tend to participate in a considerably greater number of *gaps* than do ordinary residents. We can also observe isolated members who are not connected with any member by *gaps* on the right-hand side of the figure. Nonetheless, when considering other members' roles outside the *mahalla* committee or other social relationship apart from the *gaps* within the *mahalla*, we can imagine the extent to which the residents are connected with each other by the multiplicity of the networks and even simultaneously restricted by dyadic constraints.

Thus, the generous attitude towards participation in multiple associations is not necessarily irrational with regard to their sustainability issues, if we broaden our scope to the overall structure of the network. Again, we can assume a rational motivation for active participation in *gaps*. It seems that the discussion in this section should not proceed without sufficient explication or space and other approaches to this unusual but imaginable phenomenon of the *gaps* should be adopted. In any case, the meaning of a "close-knit network," a terminology often observed in the literature of the Central Asian society, should be examined further in order to understand what is really special.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article investigated *gaps* based on a field survey in the Andijan region in Uzbekistan. We attempted to recognize differences among various types of *gaps* from our statistics, as well as to examine the quantitative magnitude of their prevalence. The survey data revealed that 81.6% of the sample households of *Oqmahalla* had at least one family member who belongs to a *gap* and participated in 2.47 *gaps* on an average. These numbers clearly confirmed that most of the households in *Oqmahalla* were intertwined in a dense web of *gap* networks. While each *gap* has a variety of purposes, some tendency affected by membership criteria such as gender, generation, and type of social relationships could be certainly observed.

In comparison with the living standard data collected through the household budget survey, we clarified the impacts of *gaps* on residents' economic life. Households whose members belong to *gaps* were expected to receive 70% of the monthly household income 2.5 times a year. We could also recognize the positive correlation between *gap* participation and the prevalence of durable goods. The correlation appeared to be strong even after controlling household incomes or size effects; however, the issue of causation still remains to be observed due to the lack of time-series data.

The latter half of this article focused on some of the distinctive features of the *gaps* and attempted to show the manner in which they are noteworthy. I dealt with sustainability issues and default problems and discussed the meaning of the high density of the *gap* participation network. The scarcity of default problems or generosity toward multiple belongings should draw more attention as peculiar features of *gaps* from theoretical aspects.

The findings of this article provide implications in both the fields of economics and area studies. First, the discussion in the latter half provides an insight into the network approach in economics studies, in which they have conventionally treated a household or a person as a separate unit. More specifically, household budget surveys increasingly utilized by development economists for their analyses appear to be indifferent to the network point of view. This article, however, implied that a relational viewpoint could be essential even in a simple logic of collective action. This seems to give rise to the need for an integrated approach based on household and network data, in order to obtain well-balanced standpoints.

Second, this was an attempt to grasp a relatively new phenomenon that can be seen in the traditional institutions in Uzbekistan. As Uzbek scholars often emphasize, it would be quite correct to state that *gaps* are strongly originated in the local culture and society. At the same time, in order to grasp the rapid changes occurring in every aspect of the traditional institution, we should be more aware of how relatively new elements such as the trend of the financial use of *gaps* affects people's behaviors and perceptions.

Last, this article shed light on the distinctive feature of the *gaps* from the comparative perspective; however, it only alluded to their origin or the reason why such a difference could arise in *gaps*. These matters should be thoroughly discussed in a broader context that comprises sociological and historical perspectives. In this sense, the findings in this article should be regarded as preliminary results.

The Russian Energy Outlook and Its Influence on East Asia

MOTOMURA MASUMI

INTRODUCTION

Russian energy is becoming more important for Northeast Asian countries. For a decade, Russia has steadily increased its oil and gas production and has now embarked on expansion to the East, adding to the traditional European market, by constructing several new pipelines and elaborating new distribution plans. In addition to this, new energy flows by oil tanker and as liquid national gas (LNG) from the previously isolated Sakhalin offshore shelf are now coming on line as key sources for Asian consumers.

The aim of this article is to describe the production forecast of Russian oil and gas and its emerging oil and gas flows, especially to the east. The activity of Russian oil companies will be examined and we will see that most companies' production policies are succeeding in creating stable production growth.

The oil pipeline plans are also analyzed as the embodiment of Russian longterm energy strategy, which will affect the targeted regions. Here, special attention should be paid to Northeast Asia, where energy-dependent countries have traditionally not been cooperative with each other, but recognize that they now need to concert their policy to avoid being played off against each other.

Meanwhile, Russian gas exports are facing competition. Turkmenistan is strengthening its ties with China and the possibility of a gas pipeline project to China being realized is increasing. Gas prices play a decisive role in this case.


FUTURE ENERGY FLOW FROM RUSSIA

Shift of Global Energy Flow up to 2030 as Forecast by IEA

The shift of global oil flows in the future is illustrated by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Fig. 1 below.¹ The actual global oil flow in 2002, mainly achieved by pipelines and tankers, is shown by the size of barrels on the left side with numbers for crude oil in millions of barrels per day. The barrels on the right side are the forecast for the year 2030. Though IEA's forecast of oil demand for 2030 seems too high due to the effect of high future oil prices as a demand dampener not being sufficiently taken into consideration, the forecasted trend itself is persuasive. This study was well-cited and is still supported by most energy researchers.

1 International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2005* (Paris: 2005).

Fig. 1. Inter-Regional Crude Oil Trade in 2002 and 2030 (in million barrels per day)



Sources: IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2005* (Paris, 2005).

We might expect the following changes in global inter-regional oil flows during the next three decades: It is obvious that the world oil demand is continuously increasing and especially oil-starved East Asia will increase its oil imports, which will change the oil flow for the future as follows:

- 1) The Middle East increases its importance as oil supplier until 2030.
- 2) Oil producers in East Asia (like Indonesia) are to lose their capacity for oil export and the oil flow in this region will no longer go long distances to market.
- 3) The oil flow from Russia will acquire a new route towards the East, and will have two fronts, i.e. the traditional market of Europe and the emerging market of East Asia, including China.

Though Russia is not as powerful as OPEC countries as an oil supplier, it will be able to create a new energy flow to Northeast Asia in the next decade, if enough oil production inside of Russia is secured.

The Nature of International Pipeline Strategy

Pipeline systems have a characteristic of “self-organization.” We quite often see “positive feedback” while developing a pipeline system: once the first trunk line was constructed, new additional routes joined to the existing lines and finally grew into a total system connecting certain oil and gas regions to various markets. When there is competition between multiple plans, the plan which successfully incorporates the idea without delay will have the power of determination for the future development of the region. “Pipeline geopolitics”

Fig. 2. Eurasian Oil Pipeline Network

Notes: Solid lines show existing pipelines and broken lines - planned ones.


Sources: Compiled by the author based on *The Atlas of Oil Pipelines in Russia, CIS, Eastern & Central Europe* (Moscow: Cartographic Information Centre "INCOTEC," 2005).

is a common word, however the reality is not only "geopolitics" but rather economics, which is a complex competitive interaction among effectiveness, possibility and cost.

As will be shown in this article, Russia is able to supply both oil and gas to both Europe and Northeast Asia, and will sustain its influence on these regions. To establish an energy flow to the emerging market of Northeast Asia is now a priority for Russia. On May 26, 2004, Vladimir Putin gave his annual address to the Federal Assembly after being elected with an overwhelming 72% of support in March. In his address Putin stressed the importance of the trunk pipeline policy, as part of infrastructure development.

"...among the most important tasks that the country faces, I would like to single out one especially – the development of transport infrastructure. When we take into account the size of Russia and the geographic remoteness of certain territories from the political and economic centers of the country, I would say that the development of infrastructure is more than an economic task. Solving it will not just directly affect the state of affairs in the economy, but ensure the unity of the country as a whole letting people feel that they are citizens of a united, large nation, and that they can make use of its advantages. ... At the same time, a modern, well-developed transport infrastructure

Fig. 3. Trend of FSU Oil Production since 1950




Sources: Compiled by the author from Aleksei M. Mastepanov, *Russian Energy Strategy of 21 Century* (Japanese translation, Tokyo: Tozai Boeki Tsushinsha, 2001), *Interfax* and other sources.

is capable of turning Russia's geographical features into a real competitive advantage for the country."²

Putin went on to specify the following five oil pipeline projects in his address: i) expanding the capacity of the Baltic Pipeline System, ii) opening the West Siberia-Barents Sea Pipelines, iii) determining routes from oilfields in East Siberia, iv) bypassing the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, and v) integrating the Druzhba and Adria oil pipelines (see Fig. 2). Adding to this, he stressed the necessity to develop the gas distribution network, including expansion to the East of Russia as well as the new export pipeline to Germany, named the North European Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream).

Russia occupies the northern half of the Eurasian continent, which has two growing economic centers on both sides, Europe on the west and the Northeast Asia region on the eastern side. We should not miss Putin's strong and long-range intention to increase national power by arranging and re-arranging the transportation systems. This is key background in order to understand his pipeline policy.

2 Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on May 26, 2004. Website of the President of Russia [http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/2021_64906.shtml].

Fig. 4. Trend of Oil Production by Russian Oil Company

Sources: Compiled by the author from *Augus FSU Energy*, January 26, 2007 and other materials.

PRODUCTION FORECAST OF RUSSIAN OIL AND GAS

Production History of Russian Oil and its Outlook

Oil production in Russia was 480.48 million tons (9.61 million barrels per day) in 2006, which is only 2.2% higher than 2005.³ In actual fact, the growth rate of oil production in Russia is continuously decreasing: i.e. 11% in 2003, 9% in 2004, and 2.5% in 2005 (see Fig. 3). This trend of leveling off is mainly due to the crude oil export tax, which recorded a historic high of \$250.3 per ton (\$34.29 per barrel) in October and November in 2007,⁴ and careful observation by the Ministry of Natural Resources, which is watching over the oil companies to keep the oil production level of each oil field within the amount stipulated in the production license issued by the ministry.

However, the government of Russia is not pessimistic about future oil production, which will still increase gradually and actually exceed the optimistic case of the forecast of “the Russian energy strategy up to 2020” released by the then Ministry of Fuel and Energy in 2003.

Table 1. Recent Oil Production of FSU Countries (in millions of tons)

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Russia	304.8	323.3	348.1	379.6	421.4	458.8	470	480.5
Kazakhstan	30.1	35.3	40.1	48.2	52.4	60.6	62.6	66.1
Azerbaijan	13.9	14.1	15	15.4	15.5	15.6	22.4	32.5
Turkmenistan	7.1	7.2	8	9	10	9.6	9.5	8.1

Sources: Compiled by the author from *BP Statistical Review of World Energy* (2007).

³ *Interfax*, February 9, 2007.

⁴ Russian Governmental Resolution No. 587 (September 13, 2004).

Production Trend by Company

Even though several oil companies showed a decline in oil production, three of the largest four companies indicated steady or even lively growth (Fig. 4).⁵ This would be the reason for the steady growth of nationwide oil production.

Lukoil has been the number one oil producer in Russia since 1993, except for a period in 2003-2004 in which Yukos was at the top. Lukoil's level of oil production in 2006 reached 90.417 million tons, 3.1% growth from 2005, and has shown stable growth throughout this decade. Lukoil is also active in foreign countries like Uzbekistan, Turkey, Iraq, Venezuela etc. It is especially active in the USA with its network of service stations purchased from Getty Oil in the 1990s.

Yukos was looking like it was going to become Russia's top oil producer, exceeding Lukoil with technology imported from Schlumberger for its horizontal drilling and hydro-fracturing operation in oil fields since 1998. However, the main part of Yukos' production arm, Yuganskneftegaz, was sold to Rosneft at the end of 2004. Since then Rosneft has become one of the major oil companies in Russia, while Yukos has shrunk in its scale to one third of what it previously was. The rest of the business entities of Yukos have been auctioned off over the course of 2007. Most of them have been absorbed by Rosneft.⁶

Rosneft increased its production to 81.711 million tons in 2006, showing 10.3% growth from 2005, which is remarkable because its policy of oil field operation has proved to be the main driver. Rosneft is a state owned oil company whose technical policy is considered to be rather conservative and uninterested in Western oil technologies. However, most of Yukos' capable managers were appointed managers of Rosneft after the transfer and successfully inherited Yukos' achievements, which proved to be effective during their operations in the early 2000s.⁷ Adding in the good results of Sakhalin-1, which started production in September 2005 and reached its plateau production at 12.5 million tons per year (250 thousand barrels per day) in February 2007 and the Vankor oil field in the Evenki Autonomous District, which will start production in 2008 and will flow to the Pacific, Rosneft's activities are expected to be even more successful in coming years.

Rosneft plans to produce 103 million tons of oil in 2007, which will make it the No. 1 oil producing company in Russia. Rosneft also plans to increase production to 140 million tons by 2011-2012, Bogdanchikov, the president of Rosneft, said on September 1, 2007. Excluding the assets newly acquired from

5 The source of this figure (*Argus FSU Energy*) is a weekly magazine on the former Soviet Union's energy industry. There is a charge for access to their website which is <http://www.argusmediagroup.com/pages/StaticPage.aspx?tname=Services&pname=Publications>

6 *Interfax*, August, 16, 2007.

7 Personal communication from Thane Gustafson of Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) in April 2007.

Yukos, Rosneft has set its production target at 90 million tons for 2007.⁸ The production growth of Rosneft has been achieved not only by the Yukos acquisition, but also by its own successful investment in Sakhalin, East Siberia, and other areas.

Surgutneftegaz produced 65.552 million tons in 2006 and showed 2.8% growth compared with that of 2005, however its production growth in 2007 is forecasted at 0.9%⁹ and the company is facing a tough situation with regards to oil replacement since its new reserves are rather limited.

TNK-BP's oil production in 2006 is 72.421 million tons and is No. 3 among Russian oil companies. This volume is a 3.7% decline compared with that of 2005, however it does not imply a serious situation, because this year TNK-BP sold its Volga-Ural subsidiary, Udmurtneft, to Sinopec, one of the Chinese National Oil Companies, which is a kind of "asset management," disposing of an old oil production arm and concentrating on the prospective oil fields under high-end operation, like the Samotlor oil field in West Siberia.¹⁰ After that a 51% stake of Udmurtneft was acquired by Rosneft and Sinopec kept 49%.

The oil production of Gazpromneft, formerly Sibneft, fell down to 32.669 million tons, which is a 1.4% decrease from 2005. This is due to Sibneft's policy of distributing most of its profit to shareholders and neglecting new investments in the field, which has caused a delay in the development of oil fields.

Tatneft, with its production of 25.405 million tons, and Bashneft at 11.728 million tons, are both located in the Volga-Ural oil region, which has matured, reaching a stable production level, with no prospects for expansion.

Gas Production of Russia and Its Forecast

Gas production in 2006 was 656.233 billion cubic meters, 2.4% growth compared with 2005.¹¹ This is not a bad result compared with the foregoing trend of production levels over the last few years (Fig. 5).

Table 2. Russian Natural Gas Production and Export (in billion cubic meters)

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Total Production	590.1	584.1	581	596.6	617.6	634	641.9	656.2
Gazprom	545.5	523.1	512	523.8	540.2	545.1	547.9	550.5
Independents	6	18	n.a.	29.9	33.5	n.a.	36	47.3
Oil Companies	38.6	43	n.a.	42.9	43.9	44.9	58	58.4
Gas Export	126.8	129	126.7	129.4	138.9	149.1	151.3	151.5

Sources: Compiled by the author from Website of Gazprom; *Gas Matters* (August 2006); *Interfax*, January 9, 2007; *BP Statistical Review of World Energy* (2007); Jonathan Stern, *The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom* (Oxford University Press, 2005).


⁸ *Interfax*, September 3, 2007.

⁹ *Interfax*, April 18, 2007.

¹⁰ *The Moscow Times*, June 28, 2006.

¹¹ *Interfax*, February 9, 2007.

Fig. 5. Russian Gas Supply Outlook



Sources: IEA, *Optimizing Russian Natural Gas, Reform and Policy* (Paris, 2006), p. 193.

Gazprom's share was 92% in 1999 but steadily declined to 84% in 2006, which created a lot of criticism against Gazprom's activity inside of the Russian Government. In contrast, independents like Novatek have been increasing their production rate, especially in the 21st century,¹² which illustrates their distance from Gazprom with regard to investment policy and efficiency in operations. There has also been an increase of gas production by oil companies. The production share of the independents climbed up to 7%, while that of oil companies was 9% in 2006.

In the 1990s, three super-giant gas fields named Urengoi (discovered in 1966), Medvezh'e (discovered in 1967) and Yamburg (discovered in 1972) occupied 80% of the gas share in West Siberia. However, since the end of the 1990s the production level of these three fields has been declining rapidly. The commencement of production at Zapoliarnoe in 2001 enabled the total production level in Russia to reverse its negative trend and it increase. However, this effect will not last long and Gazprom needs to develop new gas fields to meet its outlook (Fig. 5).

12 *Gas Matters*, August 2006 (This is a publications, data and research business offering insight and analysis on the global natural gas and LNG industry. There is a charge for access to their website which is <http://www.gas-matters.com/>); *Interfax*, January 9, 2007.

Vladimir Milov, President of the Institute of Energy Policy, and his co-authors identified several problems for the Russian oil and gas sectors and asserted that Russia's energy gap between domestic demand and Gazprom's supply capacity may grow to 200-230 billion cubic meters per year in 2010.¹³ This view seems to be one-sided since the authors assume production growth for Gazprom of only five billion cubic meters from 2004 to 2010. This is completely different from the past growth trend and neglects the effect of Gazprom's new investment policy based on the higher domestic gas price. At the same time, the contribution of emerging gas production from independents and oil companies, which occupies 16% of Russia's total gas production now, is disregarded as well in calculating the gap between domestic demand and the country's production capacity

The budget of Gazprom for the year 2007 is \$19.9 billion (531.78 billion rubles), which increased 45% compared with that of 2006,¹⁴ though this is actually regarded as not large enough. This illustrates the change of the policy of Gazprom with a move towards proactive development of gas fields. For instance, super-giant Bovanenkov field on the Yamal Peninsula with reserves of 143.85 trillion cubic feet, was discovered in 1971 but had been left aside for more than thirty years due to tough drilling conditions in the permafrost region, is now scheduled for development. This will surely contribute to the forecast of gas production by Gazprom. The budget for 2008 is \$23.3 billion and with \$26.3 billion for 2009, the upward march of Gazprom is set to continue.

RUSSIA'S NEW OIL PIPELINES TO EAST ASIA

A plan to lay pipeline to the Daqing oil field in the Northeast region of China from the Angarsk terminal in the Irkutsk Oblast, East Siberia, was agreed at the meeting between Putin and the Chinese President Jiang Zemin in July 2001. As a counter, Transneft, which has the Russian monopoly of transportation of crude oil, suggested a route from Angarsk to Nakhodka.¹⁵ Both plans were endorsed by then Premier Kasianov in March 2003 and described as "the Angarsk-Nakhodka route accompanied by the spur to the Daqing oil field" – as a compromise.¹⁶ The Angarsk-Nakhodka route has now been renamed the "East Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Pipeline."

However, the plan has since changed several times. In July 2003, the route was changed to the north of Lake Baikal from the south, because crossing the


13 Vladimir Milov, Leonard L. Coburn and Igor Danchenko, "Russia's Energy Policy, 1992-2005," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 47:3 (2006), p. 305.

14 *International Oil Daily*, October 30, 2006 (This is a publications, data and research business offering insight and analysis on the oil and gas business. There is a charge for access to their website which is http://www.piwpubs.com/publicationhomepage.asp?publication_id=31).

15 *Interfax*, July 19, 2001.

16 *Vedomosti*, March 17, 2003.

Fig. 6. Oil and Gas Pipelines in East Siberia as of December 2007



Sources: Compiled by the author.

national park in the south of the lake would have been a violation of the Russian environmental law. In February 2004, the route was changed again to pass through Taishet, a parting from the Siberian Railway and BAM Railway, passing by the northern coast of Lake Baikal and finally reaching the Primorsk Krai via Skovorodino (see Fig. 6), which was formally issued as the governmental decree by then Prime Minister Fradkov in December 2004.¹⁷

The construction of the pipeline consists of two phases. The first phase is to build the section from Taishet to Skovorodino with a capacity of 600 thousand barrels per day (30 million tons per year), which started in April 2006. This is expected to be completed in 2008. This route has shifted further north from the original plan, passing by the oil region, by the order of Putin two days before the start of construction (Fig. 6). The modification is beneficial for oil companies, since they only need to lay short connecting pipelines from the producing fields to the trunk pipelines. The timing of the construction of the second phase from Skovorodino to Nakhodka depends on the magnitude of discovered reserves in East Siberia. After the completion of the first phase, oil will be transported from Skovorodino to Nakhodka by train. The second phase will start after confirming the production rate achieved by the exploration activities in East Siberia.

17 Russian Governmental Resolution No. 1737 (December 31, 2004).

The final capacity of this pipeline is 1.6 million barrels per day (80 million tons per year). The supply through this pipeline, together with the output from Sakhalin starting in 2008 (estimated at 0.4 million barrels per day, namely, Sakhalin-1: 0.25 million and Sakhalin-2: 0.15 million) through the late 2000s and early 2010s, is to cover around 12% of demand for the market of Northeast Asia, which is importing 11.3 million barrels per day including oil products in 2004 (5.1 million for Japan, 3.0 million for China, 2.2 million for Korea and 1.0 million for Taiwan).¹⁸ The terminal at Nakhodka is located close to these markets, which takes only several days by oil tanker. And moreover, there is no political choke point of the transportation in the Sea of Japan or the East China Sea. The ESPO Pipeline will play an important role for the energy security of Northeast Asia. Iurii Trutnev, Russia's Natural Resources Minister, said that there is enough volume of oil to transport, as oil companies have submitted bids to transport oil along the ESPO in the following volume: 29.8 million tons for 2009, 33 million tons for 2010 and 38.3 tons for 2011.¹⁹

In July 2007, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Transneft signed an agreement stipulating the construction of a Chinese leg of the ESPO that would run 70 kilometers from Skovorodino to the Chinese border on the Amur River as a part of the Daqing Spur. In Chinese territory CNPC will construct its own pipeline.²⁰ At the end of August 2007, Semion Vainshtok, the President of Transneft, made a report to Putin that the first phase would have a capacity of 600 thousand barrels per day (30 million tons per year) from Taishet to Skovorodino, with a capacity of 300 thousand barrels per day (15 million tons per year) for the Daqing Spur and another 300 thousand barrels per day (15 million tons per year) to Kozmino, the terminal at Nakhodka port, by rail from Skovorodino. Construction design for the second phase is already completed, with a capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day (80 million tons per year) from Taishet to Skovorodino, a capacity of 1 million barrels per day (50 million tons per year) from Skovorodino to Kozmino and a capacity of 600 thousand barrels per day (30 million tons per year) for the Daqing Spur. Branches will also be built to oil refineries in Khabarovsk (5 million tons per year) and in Komsomolsk-na-Amure (7 million tons per year).²¹

It has been discussed that the spur to Daqing raises concerns that this route connects only to the market in Northeastern China, not internationally, which will create "a monopoly of demand." That means that after completion of the pipeline the demand side will take a stronger position to decide the price of crude oil, which Russia could not resist. Such an incident did occur in the case of "the Blue Stream" gas pipeline to Turkey in 2003,²² which is well

18 IEA, *Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 2003-2004* (Paris, 2006); IEA, *Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, 2003-2004* (Paris, 2006).

19 *Interfax*, August 29, 2007.

20 *International Oil Daily*, July 20, 2007.

21 *Interfax*, August 28, 2007.

22 Arkady Ostrovsky and Leyla Boulton, "Turkey Tries to Rearrange Russian Gas Pipeline Deal," *Financial Times*, July 3, 2003.

remembered by Russian politicians and business people. To avoid such a situation, it is indispensable for Russia to have the Pacific route for the diversification of transport routes.

In September 2007, Sergei Bogdanchikov, President of Rosneft, proposed to postpone construction of the Daqing Spur in Russian territory from Skovorodino to the Amur River, though the agreement on this and the first payment by CNPC for the feasibility study had been made in July, only two months earlier.²³ Adding to the influence of monopoly, Rosneft may also fear that the Daqing Spur could have a negative effect on the second phase, when Rosneft plans to export oil products from a new refinery at Nakhodka. This means there is still controversy in Russian oil circles over the implications of the Daqing Spur and as of September 2007, CNPC is still waiting on a Russian decision.

The delay of the Daqing Spur does not affect China's oil importing schedule. Oil is a commodity and so far there is no obstacle to importing crude oil from the international market, even from Kozmino in the future. These complexities and uncertainties suggest that it is high time for countries in the Far East, as a potential market of Siberian crude, to pursue discussions to eliminate concerns regarding disruption of crude oil importing.

SLOW PROGRESS OF RUSSIA'S NEW GAS PIPELINE SYSTEM TO CHINA

Kovykta

Compared with oil flow development in East Asia, discussion of gas flow to the East, especially to China, is stagnant due to the large discrepancy of proposed gas prices between the supply side and the demand side.

The interest of CNPC in the Kovykta gas field in Irkutsk Oblast, East Siberia, dates back to 1995, when Sidanco, the licensee of the field at that time, and CNPC agreed to study development of the field and transportation of gas to China. The field was discovered in 1987 and is a unique gas field in East Siberia with reserves of 1.6 trillion cubic meters (56.4 trillion cubic feet). The feasibility study was carried out from 2002 by Russia, China and Korea after a long dispute regarding whether the pipeline route should pass through Mongolia or not, in which CNPC insisted on skirting Mongolia. The study was completed in November 2003, however it emerged that the project cost would jump from \$11 billion to \$18 billion.²⁴ In addition to that, there was a vast discrepancy of gas prices between Russia and China, which deadlocked the project.

Until recently, shareholders of the Kovykta field were TNK-BP (62.89%), Interros (25.8%) and the Irkutsk region's state property management committee (11.2%). Gazprom is interested in the development of this field, however, there is still a lot of controversy regarding the timing of development of the

23 OILRU, September 7, 2007 (This is a site of general daily news with free access at <http://www.oilru.com/>); *International Oil Daily*, September 12, 2007.

24 *International Herald Tribune*, August 14, 2003.

field. The field contains 0.3% helium, which brought another argument that the world demand-supply condition of helium is expected to be tight in the 2010s and that the best timing for this field to start production is no earlier than 2017.

There is a series of negotiations on gas prices between Russia and China, however the two are far from agreement. The recent figures are reportedly \$160-170 per 1,000 cubic meters by Russia and \$70 per 1,000 cubic meters by China at the end of 2005, which is still more than a two-fold discrepancy. The Ministry of Industry and Energy of Russia proposed a freeze of negotiation of gas export to China for two years in October, 2005.²⁵

On the other hand, the Ministry of Natural Resources has been showing serious concern about the situation of the Kovykta field for years, and mentioned repeatedly its intention to revoke the license. The field finally started producing and transporting gas to the city of Irkutsk through a domestic pipeline in 2006, however its amount of production was only 33.8 million cubic meters, which is only 0.4% of the obligatory amount of production stipulated in the license. The gas demand of Irkutsk city is thought to be approximately 2.5 billion cubic meters and the obligatory amount of 9 billion cubic meters which is stipulated in the license seems to be too large.²⁶ TNK-BP has responded to the ministry by arguing that the reason for the small production rate of the Kovykta field is the absence of an export pipeline to China, which should be constructed by Gazprom.

In June 2007, BP announced an agreement with Gazprom whereby TNK-BP, a joint venture with TNK in Russia, will sell 62.89% of its share in the Kovykta field and 50% of its share of the East Siberian Gas Company (ESGC), a gas distributor in the Irkutsk area.²⁷ TNK-BP's investment is reported at \$450 million,²⁸ and the book value is \$500 million.²⁹ Some analysts have said that the project is worth \$20 billion,³⁰ however this would be the value only after full development of the field and export to the international market is realized. Gazprom will pay between \$700 million and \$900 million for TNK-BP's stake.³¹

Andris Piebalgs, the EC Commissioner, commented that Russia has made an appropriate evaluation of TNK-BP's past investments, and this will have a good influence over the investment climate in Russia.³² Gazprom is making a

25 Sergei Glazkov, "Eastern Gas Pipeline on Hold," *Russian Petroleum Investor*, January 2006, pp. 24-29. This is one of the most popular monthly magazines in the Russian oil and gas business.

26 *Gazeta.ru*, June 6, 2007.

27 *International Oil Daily*, June 23, 2007.

28 *Vedomosti*, July 30, 2007.

29 *International Oil Daily*, June, 25, 2007.

30 *The Moscow Times*, June 26, 2007.

31 *The Moscow Times*, June 25, 2007.

32 *Interfax*, June 25, 2007.

development plan, but it is said that the production of the Kovykta field will not start earlier than 2017.

Altai

Putin visited Beijing in March 2006 and agreed with Chinese President Hu Jintao to enter into "The Strategic Partnership on Energy." Agreement was made between CNPC and Gazprom to export gas to China with 60 to 80 billion cubic meters per year to travel through "the West" and "the East" routes.

It was said "the East" route may be the pipeline from Kovykta or a line from Sakhalin, and "the West" route is also called "the Altai Pipeline System," which is to start from the gas-rich region of West Siberia, crossing the Altai pass to reach the Xinjiang Uygur region and then connect to the existing West-East pipeline to Shanghai.³³ The capacity is 30-40 billion cubic meters per year, and the pipeline will become operational in 2011. The pipeline will connect the Urengoi-Surgut-Cheliabinsk pipeline with the Nizhnevartovsk-Parabel-Kuzbass pipeline and will pass through the Novosibirsk region and Altai republic to the Chinese border (Fig. 7).³⁴

From April 2006, CNPC and Gazprom experts began to meet but the source gas field for this pipeline in West Siberia has not been announced yet. In private, it has been suggested that this project was proposed on purpose to break up a Turkmenistan gas pipeline project to China.³⁵

The plan of the Altai project rippled through the European markets when it was announced, because the China market emerged as a competitor against Europe in gas imports as a new situation in 2006. Long term contracts of gas sales and purchases for 20 to 25 years were made after the news of the Altai project between Gazprom and European energy companies like DONG of Denmark, E. On of Germany,³⁶ ENI of Italy,³⁷ and Gas de France (GdF) of France.³⁸ In addition to this, Gazprom was given direct access to the market in Italy and France.

In June 2007, Gazpromexport, an export arm of Gazprom, announced a policy to cancel the agreement on gas supply to China concluded in March 2006.³⁹ The Altai Pipeline project has met with a setback, because there was no compromise on gas price, which is almost similar to the Kovykta case. Some consultants hint that Gazprom may give up on China as a gas market and concentrate on the traditional European market, while Rosneft, which has close

33 *International Oil Daily*, March 22, 2006; *Itar-Tass*, March 22, 2006.

34 *Interfax*, September 8, 2006.

35 By oral communication with Russian oil and gas consultants based in Moscow in late 2006.

36 *Argus FSU Energy*, September 1, 2006.

37 *Interfax*, November 15, 2006.

38 *Argus FSU Energy*, December 22, 2006.

39 *Argus FSU Energy*, June, 1, 2007; *Weekly Petroleum Argus*, June, 4, 2007 (This is a weekly magazine providing commentary on the oil business scene).

ties with the Far East, is to take care of the Chinese market.⁴⁰ For Gazprom the Altai project worked to a degree to create competition between markets in the West and the East.

Sakhalin

Sakhalin-2 is to start exporting 960 tons per year of LNG in the third quarter of 2008, which is around one year behind schedule. The LNG terminal has the possibility of expanding and accepting extra gas from Sakhalin-1 as an option. The authorized state body for PSA of Sakhalin-1 decided in August 2007 to consider the possibility of gas supplies to the Russian market as a "priority option."⁴¹ This means there is no possibility of gas exports to China, though ExxonMobil concluded a preliminary agreement of gas supply with CNPC in October 24, 2006.⁴² Sakhalin-1 alone can supply 3.2 billion cubic meters of gas by 2010, and 11.4 billion cubic meters from 2015 to 2020, which were under pressure by Gazprom to supply domestically, while demand in the Russian Far East would reach 13 billion cubic meters by 2010 and 16 and 19 billion cubic meters by 2015 and 2020, respectively, according to Gazprom.⁴³ If there is surplus gas at Sakhalin-1, the gas will be supplied to the LNG facility of Sakhalin-2 at Prigorodnoe to make LNG.

Eastern Gas Program

After five years of discussion, Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko signed a decree in September 2007 approving "a program to build an integral system for gas production, transportation and distribution in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, with a view to potential gas exports to China and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region."⁴⁴ This has been labeled the "East Gas Program."

According to this program, the east of the country plans to produce as much as 27 billion cubic meters in 2010, 85 billion cubic meters in 2015 and 150 billion cubic meters in 2020,⁴⁵ in other words, gas production will increase 18-fold by 2020 and 20-fold by 2030, compared with the level in 2006. The gas supply to the United Gas Supply System (UGSS), which is the existing gas network system distributing in the European part of Russia and West Siberia, will be 35 billion cubic meters per year by 2020, and the export of gas to China and Korea by pipeline will reach 25 to 50 billion cubic meters per year. LNG to Pacific countries will amount to 21 billion cubic meters per year. A 2.4 trillion ruble (\$94 billion) investment will be necessary for the program up to 2030.⁴⁶

40 *Weekly Petroleum Argus*, June 4, 2007.

41 *Interfax*, August 2, 2007.

42 *Interfax*, October 24, 2006.

43 *The Moscow Times*, September 5, 2007.

44 Order of the Ministry of Industry and Energy, No. 340 (September 3, 2007); *Vremia Novosti*, September 10, 2007; *Interfax*, September 10, 2007.

45 *The Moscow Times*, September 10, 2007.

46 *Interfax*, September 10, 2007.

Fig. 7. Eurasian Gas Pipeline Network



Notes: Solid lines show existing pipelines and broken lines - planned ones.

Sources: Compiled by the author based on *The Atlas of Gas Pipelines in Russia, CIS, Eastern & Central Europe* (Moscow: Cartographic Information Centre "INCOTEC," 2005).

Kovykta will start production in 2017, however, if it goes into the UGSS, this timetable could be moved up. This indicates Kovykta's production program is very flexible. In June, Anatolii Chubais, Chairman of United Energy Systems (UES), asserted that the gas of Kovykta should be supplied domestically, especially to West Russia.⁴⁷

The Kovykta field has plenty of reserves and if it is to supply gas to Proskokovo to connect to UGSS, it means that West Siberian gas does not have to be transported to the south of Siberia, but can rather be transferred to the European market, which would economically make sense. At present, the policy of development of Kovykta is still proceeding at a slow pace, though the so-called East Gas Program was approved. It is obvious that if Russia wants to export gas to China, it will take a long time, say more than one decade to organize. On the other hand, if Russia wants to expand exports to Europe, to increase gas supply to UGSS from the peripheral region would be a practical solution.

Jonathan Stern pointed out, "the most difficult to know is whether Russian gas customers will be willing and able to pay prices that are sufficiently

⁴⁷ *Interfax*, June 15, 2007.

high to make profitable the development of new gas fields.”⁴⁸ The answer to this is that only the European market can afford to purchase “expensive gas.” Russia might have lost the competition in the Chinese gas market to Turkmenistan, which still can supply “less-expensive gas.”

TURKMENISTAN GAS TO CHINA: A NEW COMPETITION WITH RUSSIA

Turkmenistan's Gas Policy and Russian Influence

Turkmenistan has been content as a supplier of gas to Russia and does not have its own market. However, last year an agreement with China for gas export was made. It was possible because Turkmenistan can afford to export “less-expensive gas” at around \$100 per 1,000 cubic meters at 2006 prices, which is quite different from Russia. Russia is now shifting to “expensive gas,” or global price gas, since Russia is developing new gas regions like the Yamal Peninsula, East Siberia and the Arctic Sea, where development costs are more than two times as high as in conventional regions like West Siberia.⁴⁹ Russia is still having difficulty agreeing on gas prices with China, the main importer in East Asia, while Turkmenistan seems to have been successful in clinching a deal with China.

The gas reserves of Turkmenistan are 101.0 trillion cubic feet (2.9 trillion cubic meters),⁵⁰ which is the second largest among CIS countries after Russia and number 13 in the world. Turkmenistan produced 62.2 billion cubic meters in 2006.⁵¹ However, in 1991 it produced 84 billion cubic meters of gas and occupied 13% of the Soviet Union's production at the level of 652.3 billion cubic meters, which was almost peak production throughout its history.⁵²

In Central Asia, Turkmenistan's position is rather peculiar. Turkmenistan is the second largest gas producing country next to Russia, however the country's export route for natural gas is essentially controlled by Russia and to co-exist with Russia has been the unique solution for Turkmenistan to get along as a gas producing country. As such, it has been an important subject for Turkmenistan to find new export routes and to reduce reliance on the Russian market.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan's gas production fell drastically due to a conflict with Russia on gas pricing and with Ukraine on the issue of nonpayment. In 1998, gas production fell to 13 billion cubic meters, which was only supplied to the domestic market. Putin, who was inaugu-

48 Jonathan Stern, *The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom* (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. xvi.

49 Aleksei M. Mastepanov, *Russian Energy Strategy in the 21st Century* (Japanese translation, Tokyo: Tozai Boeki Tsushinsha, 2001), p. 576.

50 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2007) [<http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6848&contentId=7033471>].

51 Ibid.

52 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy (1992).

rated as the Prime Minister of Russia in August 1999, started negotiations with Turkmenistan from the end of that year, and agreed to the gas price of \$36 per 1,000 cubic meters, which was the price at the border between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The fact that gas exports resumed in 2000 was a diplomatic victory for Putin.

The gas price was raised to \$40 per 1,000 cubic meters in February 2000, when Russia's export gas price to Europe was around \$120 per 1,000 cubic meters. Turkmenistan's gas was being sold to Russia at one-third of the price that Russia was selling gas to Europe.⁵³ Turkmenistan's long-cherished desire is direct access to the European market, and export of its gas at the international price. "The Energy Charter Treaty," which was signed in December 1994 and entered into legal force in April 1998, declared the principle of "freedom of transit" of energy materials and products and eliminated discrimination as follows: "Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary measures to facilitate the Transit of Energy Materials and Products consistent with the principle of freedom of transit and without distinction as to the origin, destination or ownership of such Energy Materials and Products or discrimination as to pricing on the basis of such distinctions, and without imposing any unreasonable delays, restrictions or charges."⁵⁴

Turkmenistan is exporting gas through the Central Asia Center (CAC) Pipeline to Russia and Ukraine, as shown in Fig. 7. However the fact is that it actually hands over gas to Russia at the border of Uzbekistan. If Turkmenistan wished to conclude a sale and purchase agreement directly with the European market at the international price, Russia would be requested as a transit country for Turkmenistan to execute the principle of "freedom of transit" of energy. This situation could explain why Russia would not ratify the Treaty, though it was signed in 1994.

Turkmenistan has already ratified the Treaty. The EU has repeatedly urged Russia to ratify, but Russia refused to do so until the transit clause of the Treaty was replaced by one which may give advantage to Russia. As Russia still has a concern about future gas production, it is a safe policy for Russia to contain Turkmenistan in a corner of landlocked Central Asia and allow Turkmenistan only one way out – via Russia. Turkmenistan cannot be content with this situation.

A New Gas Pipeline from Turkmenistan to China


Saparamurat Niyazov, the then Turkmenistan President, visited Beijing in April 2006, two weeks after Putin's visit, and agreed with China to supply 30 billion cubic meters of gas per year from 2009.⁵⁵ Turkmenistan is the only

53 Malcolm Butler, "Russian Gas for Europe," *Oxford Energy Forum* 48 (2002). We can access the Oxford Energy Forum on the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies website [<http://www.oxfordenergy.org/forum.shtml>].

54 Article 7 (1) of Energy Charter Treaty [<http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf>].

55 *Argus FSU Energy*, April 7, 2006.

Fig. 8. Relationship between the Countries Interested in a Natural Gas Pipeline to China



Sources: Compiled by the author.

candidate who can compete with Russia in the field of gas supply in Eurasia, while Russia is aware of this situation, and their strategy has been to constrain Turkmenistan to export gas only within the markets of Russia and Ukraine. Fig. 8 describes the relationship between Russia, China and Turkmenistan, partly including the EU, on pipeline projects and other energy issues. China is in a position to accept proposals from both Russia and Turkmenistan and try to stimulate competition between these two, while Russia is eager to discourage Turkmenistan from finding its own export route.

Niyazov died unexpectedly of heart failure on December 21, 2006, and Gurbanguly Berdimukhammedov, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Health, succeeded to the presidency after Niyazov by election on February 11, 2007. In April, the new president visited Moscow and confirmed the gas supply agreement, which was concluded in 2003 to supply gas to Russia for 25 years until 2028.⁵⁶ In May, Putin, Nazarbaev and Berdimukhammedov got together at Turkmenbashi city on the Caspian Sea to agree to the new construction of a CAC-3 Pipeline to Kazakhstan along the Caspian coast and to the upgrade of other existing CAC Pipelines, which will raise the level of gas exports from Turkmenistan to Russia from 42 billion cubic meters in 2006 to 90

⁵⁶ *The Moscow Times*, April 24, 2007.

billion cubic meters.⁵⁷ This behavior indicates Berdymukhammedov appreciates the value of the Russian market for Turkmenistan and is prepared to treat it as his first priority.

However, at the same time the new leadership of Turkmenistan is likely to pursue new export routes – notably to China – to reduce their reliance on Russia.⁵⁸ In September 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of the People's Republic of China approved the construction plan of the 4860 kilometer "Second West-East Pipeline," which starts from a village named Korgas on China's border with Kazakhstan, runs parallel to the West-East Pipeline from Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous District, separates at Zhengzhou (Henan Province) and then turns to the south to Guangzhou (Guangdong Province). The capacity is 30 billion cubic meters per year. It is reported that the source of gas is not from the Tarim basin, but from Turkmenistan, and the gas price is already agreed with China at \$100 per 1,000 cubic meters,⁵⁹ which seems to be the border price at Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and happens to be the same price from Turkmenistan to Russia since September 5, 2006.⁶⁰ In 2007, some guesswork is made that the price of gas at the Chinese border would be lower than \$180 per 1,000 cubic meters, which is surely lower than the gas price offered by Russia at that time.⁶¹ The 2007 price has been raised by inflation in costs of materials and construction and seems to include transportation costs of more than 2,000 kilometers in Central Asia and tariffs of transit countries.

In April 2007, Ma Kai, the chief of NDRC of China, and Azimov, the Deputy Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, signed the intergovernmental agreement on construction of a gas pipeline in Uzbekistan, which is 530 kilometers long with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters per year.⁶² So far, Uzbekistan has no extra gas resources to export. Supposing from its length and capacity, this pipeline must be a transit line from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan. During a visit to Beijing by Berdymukhammedov in July 2007, a production sharing contract (PSC) was signed with CNPC to develop the Bagtyyarlyk acreage in the Amu Darya basin, East Turkmenistan.⁶³ In August 2007, Hu and Nazarbaev agreed to construct a pipeline through the southern part of Kazakhstan with a route reaching the Kazakhstan-China border at Korgas village and a capacity of 30 billion

⁵⁷ *International Oil Daily*, May 15, 2007.

⁵⁸ *International Oil Daily*, Jan. 8, 2007.

⁵⁹ *Wall Street Journal*, September 28, 2006.

⁶⁰ *Financial Times*, September 7, 2006; *Wall Street Journal*, September 6, 2006.

⁶¹ *China Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals*, September 1, 2007 (This is a biweekly magazine on the Chinese oil, gas and petrochemical industry. There is a charge for delivery of the magazine by email. The address is chinaogp@xinhua.org).

⁶² *International Oil Daily*, May 7, 2007.

⁶³ *International Oil Daily*, July, 18, 2007.

cubic meters per year.⁶⁴ This assures that two transit countries in Central Asia have agreed to construct gas pipelines to China.

Finally, on August 29, 2007, Berdymukhammedov announced the launch of construction of a new pipeline that will bring gas from the right bank of the Amu Darya River in Turkmenistan to China.⁶⁵

In addition to that, a new discovery was reported recently near the Yoloten Gunorta (South Yoloten),⁶⁶ which, although not confirmed yet, does offer some possibility of a hike in Turkmenistan's gas reserves.

It seems that so far Russians have failed to enter the Chinese market because of their high gas price policy, while China has been successful in finding cheaper gas suppliers elsewhere.

CONCLUSIONS

Backed up by its huge oil reserves, Russia will still increase its oil production steadily and maintain its position as the number two oil producing country, following Saudi Arabia. As for Russia's export oil pipeline system, the ESPO Pipeline is now under construction and will create a new oil flow from East Siberia to the Pacific market. Sakhalin has already started oil exports to the Far East. These could be an important development for the energy security of Japan, which has been failing to diversify its dependence on Middle East oil.

Russia is number one in the world in gas reserves and level of production. However, there is a concern about the future of gas production due to a lack of investment throughout the past decade. To cope with increasing demand from the domestic and international markets, Russia needs to activate investment for new field development and infrastructure. Gazprom has expanded its budget considerably in 2007, which was possible by revising gas prices in domestic and CIS markets. Independent gas companies and oil companies have also been achieving good performance in production growth. It is necessary to get rid of the monopoly in the gas industry by approving third party access to the trunk pipeline to create an efficient gas industry.

Gas exports to China from Siberia have been suspended and at the same time gas field development in East Siberia has lost its drive. It seems that Russia's gas export strategy in the Far East has collapsed because of soaring gas producing costs in Russia, which the northeastern part of China cannot afford. On the other hand, Turkmenistan is eager to export to China with a less expensive gas price, and this plan is taking shape instead of exports from Russia.

⁶⁴ *Argus FSU Energy*, August 24, 2007.

⁶⁵ *International Oil Daily*, August 31, 2007.

⁶⁶ *Oil and Gas International*, November 6, 2006.

Professionals or Bureaucrats? Pedagogues and the State during Russia's Great Reforms

AOSHIMA YOKO

INTRODUCTION: A TANGLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROFESSIONALS AND THE BUREAUCRACY IN RUSSIA

Riasanovsky argued that the monolithic unity between the modernizing state and educated Russian society in the "Age of Reason" since the reforms of Peter the Great was broken off in the 1840s and 1850s, and was never restored after the split.¹ Is it not possible, however, to say that the alliance between them might have lasted longer, just in another form? The harmonic relationship between enlightened despots and refined nobility was already going through changes as a result of the emergence of professional officialdom by the eve of the Great Reforms (in the second quarter of the nineteenth century).² It is well known that it was these emerging bureaucrats that led the Great Reforms, taking advantage of the changing atmosphere after the death of Nicholas I and Russia's defeat in the Crimean war.³ These "enlightened bureaucrats," as Lincoln pointed out, could not obtain the stable support of educated society outside the bureaucracy in the Great Reforms.⁴ Instead of cooperating with the educated society outside the bureaucracy, the bureaucrats created their own support network made up of professional groups, who were all close to, or

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- 1 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1801-1855* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
 - 2 Walter M. Pintner, "The Social Characteristics of the Early Nineteenth-Century Russian Bureaucracy," *Slavic Review* 29:3 (1970), pp. 429-443; W. Bruce Lincoln, "The Genesis of an 'Enlightened' Bureaucracy in Russia, 1825-1856," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 20:3 (1972), pp. 321-330; Idem, "The Ministers of Nicholas I: A Brief Inquiry into Their Backgrounds and Service Careers," *Russian Review* 34:3 (1975), pp. 308-323; Зайончковский П.А. Правительственный аппарат самодержавной России. М., 1978; Walter M. Pintner and Don K. Rowney, *Russian Officialdom: The Bureaucratization of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century* (London: Macmillan Press, 1980).
 - 3 W. Bruce Lincoln, "Russia's 'Enlightened' Bureaucrats and the Problem of State Reform, 1848-1856," *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique* 12:4 (1971), pp. 410-421; Idem, *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia's Enlightened Bureaucrats 1825-1861* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982); Idem, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990).
 - 4 Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform*. Also see Hans J. Torke, "Continuity and Change in the Relations between Bureaucracy and Society in Russia, 1613-1861," *Canadian Slavic Studies* 4 (1971), pp. 457-476; M. Raeff, "The Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial Russia, 1700-1905," *American Historical Review* 84:2 (1979), pp. 399-411.

even inside the bureaucracy. In other words, a new alliance between bureaucrats and professionals emerged in the Great Reforms.

An alliance between bureaucrats and professionals itself was not peculiar to Russia, but rather common in Western countries. In recent years, academic concern with professionals has been growing because professionalization is one of the main factors that influenced the modernizing process, and is also one of the crucial elements that constitute the middle class in modern society. A notable finding of the new studies on professionals is that the ideology of "free professions" has been revised and state control has begun to be thought of not as contradictory to the development of professions, but possibly even as a crucial factor in it, especially in the Continental nations.⁵ This new perspective on professionals has shed light on a different aspect of Russian history.⁶ The traditional view underlined the overwhelming power of the Russian state and the weakness or absence of a middle class in Russian society, which gave rise to the revolutions. In contrast, recent studies of Russian professions have shown that professionals actually developed and expanded in late tsarist Russia, accompanied by strong state initiative and control.

Yet there were some differences between Russia and Western countries. According to Bailes, while professionals in other European countries made use of state intervention to fight against "the laissez-faire ideology of free markets and nonstate intervention," Russian professionals, though they made use of state power to advance their own ends, still suffered somewhat from this state intervention itself.⁷ In other words, the bureaucracy did not so much function as a mediator for Russian professionals from the outside, like it did for their Western counterparts, but rather patronized and even assimilated the professionals inside the bureaucracy. On the other hand, this swollen bureaucracy model choked the autonomous activities of professionals, but on the other hand, it worked very effectively as a modernizing agent and "a dynamic historical counterpart to the structures of capitalism in the West."⁸

5 For example, Magali S. Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Gerald L. Geison, ed., *Professions and the French State, 1700-1900* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984); Konrad H. Jarausch, *The Unfree Professions: German Lawyers, Teachers, and Engineers, 1900-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Charles E. McClelland, *The German Experience of Professionalization: Modern Learned Professions and Their Organizations from the Early Nineteenth Century to the Hitler Era* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

6 Edith W. Clowes, Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West, eds., *Between Tsar and People: Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Harley D. Balzer, ed., *Russia's Missing Middle Class: The Professions in Russian History* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).

7 Kendal E. Bailes, "Reflections on Russian Professions," in *Russia's Missing Middle Class*, pp. 44-46. Also, see: Harley D. Balzer, "Introduction," in *Russia's Missing Middle Class*, pp. 3-8.

8 Daniel T. Orlovsky, "Professionalism in the Ministerial Bureaucracy on the Eve of the February Revolution of 1917," in *Russia's Missing Middle Class*, pp. 268-269.

The Russian bureaucracy swallowed professionals, however, not merely because it wanted to do so from the fear of professionals' independent activities, but rather because professionals themselves hoped to be inside the bureaucracy. This is the main focus of this paper. The tendency of social groups to connect with state institutions was one of the crucial characteristics of the state-society structure in Russian history. According to G.L. Freeze, in nineteenth-century Russia, a particular social group gathered spontaneously, and tended to establish close ties with a particular state bureau, in order to have their interests reflected in policies. Freeze refers to such a social group as *soslovie* [estate], which he says implied not a fixed and closed hereditary "caste," but a relatively new social group (at the beginning of nineteenth century), including a professional group.⁹ Such a group, says Freeze, "in contrast to Western estates, may have lacked autonomous social organization, but its close ties to the state provided a legal and serviceable substitute."¹⁰ But having said that, as these social groups – especially professional groups – grew, they came to hope to have their own independent activities. As a result, they faced a difficult dilemma: "to free themselves from the tutelage of the state, while still using the state for their own ends."¹¹

Such a tangled relationship between the bureaucracy and social groups, including professionals, not only accelerated the modernization of Russia, but also generated an important dynamism, born out of relationship structure's innate contradictions and the tension between those involved in the relationship and those outside of it. Earlier studies have explained sufficiently well the characteristics of the relationship between the state and professionals in late tsarist Russia, but they have not fully shown how the relationship emerged. As mentioned above, Russian professionals started to emerge around the time of the Great Reforms. At this embryonic stage, they aspired to be protected in-

9 Gregory L. Freeze, "The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History," *American Historical Review* 91:1 (1986), pp. 11-36. Reiber argued that occupational or opinion groups started to influence the government in the Great Reforms. While Freeze explained this kind of social group by using the historical term *soslovie*, Reiber called this group a "political interest group." Alfred J. Reiber, "Interest-group Politics in the Era of the Great Reforms," in Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds., *Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 58-83. About the relationship between Russian professionals and *soslovie*, see also Charles E. Timberlake, "Higher Learning, the State, and the Professions in Russia," in Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., *The Transformation of Higher Learning, 1860-1930* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 321-344. Mironov also argued that, referring to the Russian state as "the leader of modernization," at the same time, many social groups, which influenced governmental policies, were emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century. This interaction between the state and society led to creating a civil society. Миронов Б.Н. Социальная история России периода империи (XVIII-начало XX в.): генезис личности, демократической семьи, гражданского общества и правового государства. Т. 2. СПб., 2000. Гл. X.

10 Freeze, "The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm," p. 25.

11 Bailes, "Reflections on Russian Professions," p. 45.

side the state and by the state. Influenced by this aspiration, the framework for their status and activities was formed, and it was this framework that caused the tangled relationship and the aforementioned dilemma. This paper will attempt to describe this process, that is, how Russian professionals got into the tangled relationship with the state during the Great Reforms, using the example of Russian pedagogues, focusing on those under the Ministry of Public Instruction (MNP) in particular.

WERE RUSSIAN PEDAGOGUES PROFESSIONALS OR BUREAUCRATS?

Pedagogues under the MNP were trained early on by the government, in order to manage the new general education system that Alexander I introduced in the early nineteenth century, the last years of the Age of Reason. During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, this system remained small scale, because the main educational system was shifted to specialized education for each specialized occupation (officers, the clergy, legal officials, and so on).¹² Yet after Russia's defeat in the Crimean war, the necessity of educating Russian society as a whole was recognized by everybody, including the new tsar, the enlightened bureaucrats, opinion leaders, and educated society in general. In this atmosphere, the MNP started to reorganize and expand the general education system, holding up N.I. Pirogov's slogan "education common to all mankind."¹³ At the same time, the professional teaching corps for managing this new system also started to be expanded. As a result of the educational reforms of the Great Reforms, the social and economic status of pedagogues under the MNP was heightened and guaranteed by the state, and an academic background was strictly required for those wishing to be pedagogues. Delineating this process of pedagogues becoming professionals is interesting in understanding the whole process of modernization and professionalization in Russia, if we consider the fact that pedagogues under the MNP were themselves a leading group of the enlightenment, and also that the educational system would regulate the formation of other professionals.

Prominent studies of the educational reforms in the Great Reforms or teacher groups of the second half of the nineteenth century have already been published. There are, however, some weak points in the previous historiography. First, this earlier body of studies often examined Russian schools and pedagogues in the Great Reforms separately by educational level, that is, el-

12 About specialized education in Russia, see *Владимирский-Буданов М.Ф. Государство и народное образование в России XVIII века. Ярославль. 1874*; Hashimoto, Nobuya, "19 seiki zenhan Rossia ni okeru kyouiku no mibunsei-genri to elite gakkou [The Estate Principle in Education and Schools for Elites in Russia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century]," *Kyoto-furitsu daigaku gakujutsu hokoku, jinbun-syakai* 51 (1999), pp. 185-218.

13 *Пирогов Н.И. Вопросы Жизни // Журнал Министерства Народного Просвещения (ЖМНП). 1856. Ч. 91. С. 339-380.*

elementary, secondary, and higher education.¹⁴ Such an analytical framework tends to overlook a certain type of uniformity of Russian pedagogues, who shared characteristics as a vanguard of enlightenment from above. Originally, the educational system under the MNP had been a single system (universities, gymnasias, county schools, and parish schools, all treated as a whole), and there was not really a concept of such a clear division among “higher,” “secondary,” and “elementary.”¹⁵ It should be noted that elementary schools were included into the same system as universities. In Russian society, the Russian Orthodox Church did not traditionally conduct popular education very much; thus, when the state approached enlightening society, it had to create elementary-level education from the first as well as higher education. Therefore, in contrast to Western countries, where elite education (higher education) and popular education (elementary education) had different historical roots, in Russia, both of them were introduced by the state as one system of enlightenment from above, and all pedagogues under the system were supposed to be state officials. During the Great Reforms, the separation between elite education and popular education was finally introduced following the Emancipation

14 Эймонтова Р.Г. Университетская реформа 1863 г. // Исторические записки. 70. 1965. С. 163-196; *ее же*. Русские университеты на грани двух эпох. М., 1985; *ее же*. Русские университеты на путях реформы шестидесятые годы XIX века. М., 1993; Смирнов В.З. Реформа начальной и средней школы в 60-х годах XIX в. М., 1954; Ганелин Ш.И. Очерки по истории средней школы в России второй половины XIX века. Второе изд. М., 1954; William L. Mathes, “The Struggle for University Autonomy in the Russian Empire during the First Decade of the Reign of Alexander II (1855-1866),” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in political science (Columbia University, 1966); Winfried A. Kohls, “The State-sponsored Russian Secondary School in the Reign of Alexander II: The First Phase: Search for a New Formula, 1855-1864,” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in history (University of California, 1967); Joachim Krumbholz, *Die Elementarbildung in Russland bis zum Jahre 1864: ein Beitrag zur Entstehung des Volksschulstatuts vom 14. Juli 1864* (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1982); Ben Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools: Officialdom, Village Culture, and Popular Pedagogy, 1861-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Scott J. Seregny, *Russian Teachers and Peasant Revolution: The Politics of Education in 1905* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Samuel D. Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Christine Ruane, *Gender, Class, and the Professionalization of Russian City Teachers, 1860-1914* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); Trude Maurer, *Hochschullehrer im Zarenreich: Ein Beitrag zur Russischen Sozial- und Bildungsgeschichte* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1998).

15 The office under the MNP was divided according not to educational level, but educational district by the middle of the nineteenth century. At the time of the reform of the MNP in 1863, the office started to be organized by educational level. In fact, the border between higher, secondary, and elementary education was changeable. For example, the gymnasium was thought to be higher education before the Great Reforms, but since then, began to be regarded as secondary. Российская Национальная Библиотека, Рукописный отдел (РНБ ОР) ф. 531 [Норов А.С.], д. 46, л. 99-104; Министерство Народного Просвещения. Обзор деятельности отчета Министерства Народного Просвещения. СПб., 1865. С. 8-15.

Reform of 1861. In spite of this division, elementary school teachers hoped to still be officials and shared with professors the mentality as a member of one whole enlightenment group.

Besides that, earlier studies tend to see Russian educational history through the traditional prism of the stubbornness of the autocracy and its strong desire to control education. Not only Soviet scholars, such as L.G. Eimontva, Sh.I. Ganelin, V.Z. Smirnov, who considered the Russian government to be an opponent of enlightenment, but also studies in English often emphasized the attempts of the government to control every corner of education and suppress teachers' freedom and creativity.¹⁶ Yet if MNP policies are closely examined, it becomes noticeable that the MNP mainly adopted measures for the encouragement of education. The government was not monolithic. Russian ministries did not have cabinets, and were each directly responsible to the Tsar. That upper-level decision-making system encouraged conflicts between ministries. On this account, the ministries tended to depend on or connect with specialists or social groups under them to have greater power in the political arena.¹⁷ The MNP was not immune to these conflicts either: it consistently fostered the general education system, except for the years from 1848 to 1855, when it was excluded from the decision-making process of educational policy.¹⁸ After the death of Nicholas I, the MNP successfully persuaded the new tsar of the necessity of general education. Consequently, the MNP gained stronger power in the government, and eagerly constructed their own system. For these reasons, we will pay more attention to MNP measures for encouragement than to the limited achievements of the government as a whole.

16 Studies in English focused on the dilemma of the government, which attempted at once to utilize education and control its development process. See, for example, Patrick L. Alston, *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Allen Sinel, *The Classroom and the Chancellery: State Educational Reform in Russia under Count Dmitry Tolstoi* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); James C. MacClelland, *Autocrats and Academics: Education, Culture, and Society in Tsarist Russia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979).

17 George L. Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711-1905* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Daniel T. Orlovsky, *The Limit of Reform: The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Imperial Russia, 1802-1881* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Thomas S. Pearson, *Russian Officialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-government, 1861-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). They call this governmental system the "ministerial system" or "ministerial government." See also Jacob W. Kipp and W. Bruce Lincoln, "Autocracy and Reform: Bureaucratic Absolutism and Political Modernization in Nineteenth-Century Russia," *Russian History* 6:1 (1979), pp. 1-21.

18 MacClelland discusses the effort of the Russian government towards expanding education, and "a fundamental agreement" between "autocratic officials and the academic intelligentsia." MacClelland, *Autocrats and Academics*, p. xiii. As for the period from 1848-1855, see Рождественский С.В. Последняя страница из истории политики народного просвещения императора Николая I (Комитет графа Блудова 1849-1856 г.г.) // Русский исторический журнал. 3-4. 1917. С. 37-59.

The attitudes of pedagogues as professionals at the time of the Great Reforms are also not fully revealed in these earlier studies. Traditional studies on educational reforms in the Great Reforms have focused on the legal reform process, and have analyzed how the Russian educational system became closer to the modern educational system, for example, how much university autonomy was achieved, the democratization of higher learning, the creation of a united elementary school system, the institution of compulsory education, and so on.¹⁹ In this conventional analysis, opinions of teachers were at times examined, but mainly interpreted in terms of educational or political ideas to explain the aforementioned concepts; teachers' power strategies as professionals is usually ignored. On the other hand, Eklof, Seregny, Kassow, Ruane, and Maurer have investigated the attitudes and activities of teachers around 1905, but they mention the Great Reforms only in passing.²⁰

With the above-mentioned issues in mind, we will focus on the measures for the encouragement of the MNP and teachers' attitude as professionals in the Great Reforms, and show that it was pedagogues' demands that caused the tangled relationship between pedagogues and bureaucracy. Pedagogues were heavily dependent on the state during the Great Reforms. The main strategy shared by all levels of pedagogues was, above all, to have their social status and salary from the state guaranteed, and create their basic framework for professional activities, even within the state administration. This was because as there was so little acceptance of the general education system within general society or the government, and there could be little expectation of support from the traditional estate groups and local officials, who were outsiders to education. In addition to that, they believed they were performing the significant task of enlightening Russian society, as mandated by the state. Pedagogues, therefore, as they became aware of their professional consciousness, demanded a guarantee of their firm status as part of this important corps of the state.

When the Russian professorate requested that the state authorize this quasi-professional corporation, they did not support their petition with modern ideas, such as academic freedom or free professions. Rather, they articulated their status as *soslovie*, based on the charter from Alexander I, and attempted to

19 Эймонтова. Университетская реформа 1863 г.; *ее же*. Русские университеты на путях реформы; Алешинцев И.А. Гимназическое образование в России. СПб., 1911. Ч. 3; Смирнов. Реформа начальной и средней школы; Ганелин. Очерки по истории средней школы в России; Nicholas Hans, *History of Russian Educational Policy (1701-1917)* (New York: Russell&Russell Inc, 1964), pp. 92-109; Mathes, "The Struggle for University Autonomy"; Kohls, "The State-sponsored Russian Secondary School"; William H.E. Johnson, *Russia's Educational Heritage* (New York: Ostagon books, 1969); Krumbholz, *Die Elementarbildung in Russland bis zum Jahre 1864*.

20 Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*; Seregny, *Russian Teachers and Peasant Revolution*; Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State*; Ruane, *Gender, Class, and the Professionalization*; Maurer, *Hochschullehrer im Zarenreich*. Maurer elucidated the legal and social status of the professorate across the nineteenth century in detail as well.

secure this status for themselves. Moreover, gymnasium teachers tried to gain privileged status, following the example of the professorate. Considering “the *soslovie* paradigm” in Freeze’s argument, the case of teachers will give us an interesting example of professionals having privileged status though the *soslovie*, and then getting into a tangled relationship with the state.²¹

The following sections will examine how university professors and gymnasium teachers obtained their professional status by being inside the bureaucracy, and in addition, to clarify and contextualize these two professional groups, the last chapter will refer to elementary school teachers, who did not get privileged professional status. Pedagogues, the object of this paper, were not large in number. In 1865, there were 285 professors (including administrators), and in 1863, 2337 gymnasium teachers. The number of elementary school teachers was unknown, but the number of schools under the MNP was 692 in 1862-1863 and usually, each school had one teacher. Teachers were a small social group and did not have enough power in society at that time. The important point, however, is that, even though they were a small group in number, they had influence on the reform process by commenting on governmental bills regarding new educational laws, which settled their professional status.²² Meanwhile, we do not have enough information about the social background of teachers. However, we can assume that their origins were neither noble nor uniform. According to Eimontva, among 423 university teachers in 1854-1862, there were only 149 (35 percent) sons of nobility. Others came evenly from the clergy, merchants, soldiers, foreigners, tax burden estates, and so on. Also, Ruane’s data of the social background of secondary school teachers in St. Petersburg and Moscow from 1840 to 1889 show that sons of nobles were not predominant at all. In fact, an equally high percentage was occupied by the clergy, merchants, soldiers, and foreigners. More importantly was that they made remarks about reforms from an occupational standpoint. Therefore, it is possible to assume that teachers were a group who lived exclusively on

21 Freeze, “The *Soslovie* (Estate) Paradigm.” In view of the closeness with bureaucracy and the linkage with “the formerly feudal idea of Stand,” Russian professions were similar to German professions. Timberlake, “Higher Learning, the State, and the Professions”; McClelland, *The German Experience of Professionalization*; Jaraus, *The Unfree Professions*, p. 4.

22 Приложения // Обзор деятельности министерства народного просвещения и подведомственных ему учреждений в 1862, 63, и 64 годах. СПб., 1865. С. 227-229; Материалы для истории и статистики наших гимназий. СПб., 1864. С. 16-23, 74-75; Таблица, показывающая число начальных народных училищ разных наименований и ведомств и число учащихся в оных в 1862-1863 г. в тех губерниях, на которые предположено распространить новое положение о сих училищах // Государственный совет, департамент законов. Материалы. Т. 24: Дело по проекту положения о начальных народных училищах. СПб., 1863. The documents of the MNP showed that there were 1846 elementary schools under the MNP in 1865. Обзор деятельности министерства народного просвещения. С. 320-327.

their knowledge and education, not their origins, and were dependent on their occupation.²³

UNIVERSITY TEACHERS AS “THE SCHOLARLY ESTATE”

What professors in the Great Reforms sought was initial official recognition of the Russian university system in 1804. Following two laws that reorganized old historic universities in Derpt (1802) and Vil’no (1803), the general university system was established by laws in 1804, through which new universities were founded at Khar’kov and Kazan (later in St. Petersburg in 1819), and Moscow University was reorganized.²⁴ At the same time as the new laws, special charters for the universities were promulgated by Alexander I. There, the universities were defined as “an estate of scholarly men (*soslovie uchenykh myzhei*)” under the direct auspices of the emperor. The charters gave rights and privileges to this “estate,” such as the right to elect their rectors, to decide personnel affairs and internal rules, and rights of publication and censorship. The main organizational element of this “estate” was collegiate university councils made up of all the teachers in a given university. This council had a right to choose their colleagues by themselves. And, as members of the council, both professors and assistant professors were regarded as state servants of seventh- and eighth-level rank, respectively.²⁵

These autonomous rights of the universities were based on the German university model, but were also closely connected with their administrative role in the newly introduced general educational system.²⁶ Each university was built in the central city of a given educational district (originally six), and in addition to the management of its own affairs, was supposed to manage educational and administrative matters concerning all secondary and elementary schools in the district.²⁷ In other words, the Russian university was established not only as a privileged estate to spread the new general education, but also as an administrative organization under the MNP.

In practice, the management of a whole district was next to impossible for the professorate, both because the number of professors was not nearly great

23 Эймонтова. Русские университеты на грани двух эпох. С. 220-222; Ruane, *Gender, Class, and the Professionalization*, p. 202. About village teachers after the 1880s, see Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*, chap. 7.

24 Полное собрание Законов (ПСЗ). Собр. I. № 20551 (1802/12/12), № 20701 (1804/4/4), № 20765 (1803/5/13), № 21497, № 21498, № 21499, № 21500 (1804/11/5); № 27675 (1819/2/8).

25 ПСЗ. I. № 21502, № 21503, № 21504 (1804/11/5).

26 As for the borrowing of the German university model for Russia, see James T. Flynn, *The University Reform of Tsar Alexander I, 1802-1835* (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp. 16-21.

27 ПСЗ. I. № 20407 (1802/9/8), № 20597 (1803/1/26), № 21501 (1804/11/5). About the details of this university establishment, see; Петров Ф.А. Формирование системы университетского образования в России. Т. 1. М., 2002.

enough and many of them were non-Russian. The MNP, therefore, started to install its own administrators – curators of educational districts – and undertook the management of given districts without help from the professorate beginning in the 1830s. This “bureaucratic centralization” freed university teachers from the heavy burden of district management, but partially reduced their autonomous rights concerning internal university problems, as well.²⁸ In addition, in the 1830s and 1840s, the MNP set a strict educational requirement (a doctor’s degree) for a person who wished to be a professor, and at the same time, promoted the training of new Russian professors. Consequently, the number of professors gradually increased. By the eve of the Great Reforms, the professorate started to become a substantial group in terms of being able to perform autonomous activities.²⁹

It was the MNP that stimulated the awakening of the professional consciousness of the professorate. In the first years of the Great Reforms, the MNP called for the professorate to play an active role in the educational administration. In this period, the MNP set about uniting all educational institutions under the jurisdiction of the ministry. Minister A.S. Norov explained that the unification of all educational systems was critical for bridging a multiplicity of gaps between “the moral and social beliefs and interests, [as well as] all local and territorial patriotisms and attachments” in the Russian state.³⁰ For this reconstruction of the education system, the MNP needed the help and participation of professors. In fact, the MNP invited professors to be part of the inquiry commission in the ministry, which was charged with the revision of the existing educational laws. Also, the elected professors from the university councils

28 Traditional historiography considered this reduction of university autonomy as “reactionary” politics, but Whittaker and Flynn revised this view and reevaluated the 1830s educational reforms. Cynthia H. Whittaker, *The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectual Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 156-160; Flynn, *The University Reform of Tsar Alexander I*, pp. 217-241; ПСЗ. Собр. II. № 8262 (1835/6/25), № 8337 (1835/6/26). Recently, F.A. Petrov revised the formation of the university system in the first half of the nineteenth century and reached the conclusion that the 1830s university reforms preserved the core part of university autonomy and under the new system, Russian universities developed well, which is the same conclusion as Whittaker and Flynn. Петров Ф.А. Формирование системы университетского образования в России. Т. 3. М., 2003.

29 There were 285 teachers and administrators in universities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, Khar'kov, St. Vladimir [Kiev]) in 1865, but 222 posts were still vacant. In this sense, the professorate was still in the making. Приложения // Обзор деятельности министерства народного просвещения. С. 227-229. Petrov explained that in the 1840s, reform-minded (not revolutionary) professors developed, which paved the way to the reform of the 1860s. Петров Ф.А. Формирование системы университетского образования в России. Т. 4. Ч. 1. М., 2003.

30 Российский государственный исторический архив (РГИА), ф. 733 [Министерство народного просвещения], оп. 37, д. 69, л. 8-12.

came to participate in the district council under the curator of each educational district.³¹

The need for partnership with the professorate grew stronger as a result of the university student riots in 1861.³² The MNP thought that the cause of the student riots lay in the inactivity of the professors and their lack of sense of responsibility regarding university matters. For the purpose of improving university conditions, the 1862 bill aimed “to strengthen the autonomous activity (*samodeiatel'nost'*) of the scholarly university estate.” According to the MNP, this principal was meant to impose on universities “more positive duties,” that is, not only “all purely scholastic activity” but also “administrative” activity, closely related to university matters. For, “to impose new duties on the universities will doubtlessly encourage increasing enthusiasm of their respective members.” Consequently, the increasing enthusiasm of teachers would have a desirable influence on students.³³ The MNP intended to generate awareness of the responsibility borne by the professorate regarding university matters. To this end, it tried to widen the authority of the university council by calling it a “scholarly estate.”

The professorate, in turn, welcomed the policy change that arose from the 1862 bill. They took advantage of the offer by the MNP, and tried to further enlarge the authority of the university council. Above all, they insisted on the nonintervention of educational district curators in university matters. They complained that intervention of the curators was the main obstacle to universities charting the right course. The professorate, conceding that it was inactive, ascribed its inactivity to bureaucratization of educational administration after the 1830s. This was not necessarily to say, however, that they demanded independence from the state and the ministry itself. For example, Moscow University and St. Petersburg University professors suggested that the university council be permitted to make proposals directly to the minister as their “chief superior,” passing through the curator as an intermediary administrative power. To put it another way, their goal was to have “a voice of their own” as a collegiate body within the educational administration.³⁴

Khar'kov University professors justified these opinions by referring to the 1804 laws. They argued that the 1804 laws defined the university as an estate, which was “a collegium, that is to say, a corporative body,” authorized by the state and pursuing a “definite civic purpose.” It was thought, therefore, that

31 ПСЗ. II. № 30594 (1856/6/15), № 35578 (1860/3/20).

32 Милютин Д.А. Воспоминания: генерал-фельдмаршала графа Дмитрия Алексеевича Милютина 1860-1862. М., 1999. С. 157-170.

33 The main change in the existing law in this bill was to set the inspector of students under the university council from under the curator. Замечания на проект общего устава императорских Российских университетов (Замечания на проект устава унив.). Ч. I. СПб., 1862. С. 45-50.

34 Замечания на проект устава унив. Ч. I. С. 83-87, 98-99, 244, 251-252, 392-393.

the government should return to this guiding principal for the Russian university system, and protect "the scholarly collegium and its dignity" by weakening the bureaucratic power of the curators.³⁵

D.I. Kachenovskii from Khar'kov University gave one of the most comprehensive arguments on this issue. According to him, the Russian university was established as an "autonomous organization for offering civic education," and therefore, given plentiful rights and privileges from Alexander I. "The university in Russian society has been the institution of the state, and at the same time, of *narod*." Because the university was a state institution, it could have had "civic meaning," different from an "estate spirit." This "civic spirit" in universities implied an entity "in front of which all classes were equal, and in which talent could find defense and support." He insisted, therefore, that the government should restore the autonomy and dignity of "the scholarly estate" and protect it from "alien influence from outside," in order that Russian universities could offer proper "civic education." On the other hand, he pointed out that "the scholarly estate" would not be "states within a state" as in the medieval age. Russian universities "had received capital, laws, and privileges exclusively from the government; the tie between them and the supreme power has not been cut off." Hence, it was quite natural for Russian universities to be placed under a certain amount of governmental control.³⁶ Such ideas as Kachenovskii's became an ideology connecting governmental policy and the demands of the professorate.

The MNP principally accepted requests from the professorate and protected it as a legitimate corporation.³⁷ Minister of Internal Affairs P.A. Valuev was strongly opposed to this policy of the MNP. He suggested reducing state support of the professorate, and opening universities to society by introducing a system in which professors would receive payment from students for each lecture.³⁸ In spite of his opposition, the MNP insisted on protecting the professorate, and allowed professors to be independent from society. The new law in 1863 actually gave back ample rights to the university council, such as decision-making authority over financial problems and student matters. The salary of professors was doubled and the state service rank was raised from seventh to fifth rank. Also, the law confirmed again the necessity of a doctor's degree for candidates for the position of professor.³⁹ Moreover, in the commentary attached to the 1862 bill, the MNP, borrowing from Kachenovskii, affirmed that Russian universities were autonomous corporations, based on the 1804 law.

35 Замечания на проект устава унив. Ч. I. С. 281, 297-300.

36 Замечания на проект устава унив. Ч. I. С. 345-361.

37 The term "scholarly estate" was not used in the new law of 1863. ПСЗ. II. № 39572 (1863/6/18).

38 Замечание на проект университетского устава, представленный министром народного просвещения при всеподданнейшем докладе 15 декабря 1862 г. // Проект общего устава императорских российских университетов. СПб., 1862-1863. С. 4-10.

39 ПСЗ. II. № 39572.

The MNP explained that universities should “be the resource of enlightenment in the state.” In order to accomplish this task, universities should be permitted to develop “according to motives of their own,” not “as a result of alien influences from outside.” At the same time, the ministry used Kachenovskii’s words and stated that it was not society, but the government that made Russian universities, and that the university should be under “certain governmental control.”⁴⁰ Although, due to government criticism, the MNP changed the text and accompanying commentary of the new 1863 law to some degree, the MNP preserved the basic status of the university, which was privileged in society by state patronage and granted certain autonomous rights within officialdom.

The new law, however, did not give the professorate complete independence from the curators or the right to make propositions directly to the minister. This was, to some degree, an inevitable consequence of the professors’ desire to be under state patronage. While the university councils remained an administrative body inside the educational administration, by doing so, the professorate was allowed to secure itself as a corporative body that was independent and privileged within society and officialdom.

SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS – SEARCHING FOR THE UNIVERSITY MODEL

The ideal model for secondary school teachers in the Great Reforms was the Russian university. They tried to obtain autonomous collegiate power for the pedagogical councils in gymnasias, similar to that of the university councils.

There was no tradition in Russian gymnasias of having autonomous councils like those of universities. When the gymnasium system was established in 1804, teachers were supposed to have a meeting once a month per school under the director. These groups, however, were not regarded as collegiate bodies with decision-making authority of their own. In 1828, these bodies were raised to the status of “council of gymnasium,” which consisted of a director and senior teachers. But a council still did not have the right to elect its chairperson and members by itself; the teachers and the directors were nominated by the universities that supervised each gymnasium. In 1835, the right to select directors and teachers shifted from the universities to the curators. As a result, bureaucratic centralization was strengthened.⁴¹

When the Great Reforms started, the MNP tried to foster vigorous support for secondary education in teachers, local administrators, and society. In this period, the most urgent issue for the MNP was reform of the secondary educa-

40 Объяснительная записка к проекту общего устава императорских Российских университетов // Проект общего устава императорских российских университетов. С. 1-32; С проектами общего устава и штатов императорских Российских университетов // Проект общего устава императорских российских университетов. С. 1-22; По поводу нового университетского устава // ЖМНП. 1863. Ч. 119. С. 333-404.

41 ПСЗ. I. № 21501 (1804/11/5); ПСЗ. II. № 2502 (1828/12/8), № 8262 (1835/6/25).

tion system. Because the university system was thought to be relatively well developed, the ministry focused on secondary education as the next stage.⁴² In order to revitalize secondary schools, the MNP gave a great deal of weight to teachers and petitioned Alexander II to reinstate former pension privileges to teachers as early as 1855. Also, in 1859, the MNP obtained a considerably higher budget for the salaries of gymnasium teachers.⁴³

Decentralization of educational administration was also viewed as a means of eliciting the active participation of teachers, local administrators, and society in secondary education. As early as the first bill of 1860, the MNP changed the councils of gymnasium to the "pedagogical council." These new councils were composed of all the teachers at each gymnasium and given decision-making rights including selecting school books, as well as all other decisions regarding student-related issues, etc.⁴⁴ According to the commentary attached to the bill of 1862, the previous system, in which the councils consisted only of senior teachers under the strong control of a director, was against the fundamental educational principal that "all teachers and tutors of educational institutions should work collectively and seek one goal harmoniously."⁴⁵ As a result, the previous system caused teachers to feel apathetic toward their work and perpetuated intellectual stagnation, which, in turn, had a harmful influence on students. In order to change this passive attitude on the part of teachers, the 1862 bill gave the pedagogical councils "the possibility to develop freely, [and] autonomously."⁴⁶ The rights that the 1862 bill granted the councils were greater than those of the 1860 bill: the rights to make teaching plans, to give peer evaluations, and reprimand to teachers, and to decide whether a teacher should stay in the post after twenty-five years of service, to name but a few. The power to appoint and dismiss teachers was also transferred from the curators to the directors in line with the decentralization policy.⁴⁷

42 The ministry thought that the reintroduction of classicism into gymnasia was especially important for creating a firm general education system. Извлечение из отчета министерства народного просвещения за 1857 год // ЖМНП. 1858. Ч. 98. С. 141-145; Извлечение из отчета министерства народного просвещения за 1858 год // ЖМНП. 1859. Ч. 103. С. 138-139. There were 409 teachers and administrators (54 schools) in 1808, 775 (56 schools) in 1825, and 2337 (86 schools) in 1863. Материалы для истории и статистики наших гимназий. С. 16-23, 74-75.

43 ПСЗ. II. № 29195 (1855/4/5); Господину министру народного просвещения // *Государственный совет, департамент законов*. Материалы. Т. 27: Дело по проекту устава и штатов гимназии и прогимназии 1864 г. СПб., 1864.

44 Проект устава низших и средних училищ, состоящих в ведомстве министерства народного просвещения // ЖМНП. 1860. Ч. 105. С. 129-132.

45 Замечания на проект устава общеобразовательных учебных заведений и на проект общего плана устройства народных училищ (Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед.). Ч. I. СПб., 1862. С. 136.

46 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. I. С. 134.

47 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. I. С. 39, 47-50.

In addition, the 1860 bill created a new organization, *popechitel'nyi sovet* [the trustees' council], composed of representatives from each estate group, "for bringing schools closer to society."⁴⁸ The 1862 bill gave these councils substantial power, such as the right to inspect financial matters of gymnasia and to select the students to be exempted from fees. What the MNP hoped for from this council was to establish a "moral relationship between educational institutions and communities." This was meant to be accomplished by allowing "direct participation of representatives from society in the management of educational institutions" through this council.⁴⁹

At the same time, the 1862 bill suggested one more type of organization to breathe new life into teachers: the provincial school council (*gubernskii uchilishchnii sovet*), after the model of the teachers' congress in Germany. Meetings of these provincial school councils were supposed to be held in each provincial city once a month, gathering all administrators and elected teachers of the secondary schools (including girls' schools) from the entire province. Moreover, any people who wanted to participate were able to take part in the council, even if they were "outsiders."⁵⁰ The aim of these councils was to maintain the "relationship and unification of educational principals among individual educational institutions" in each province, in view of the widening decision-making power of each pedagogical council. The MNP also hoped to develop "healthy pedagogical ideas among people dealing with nurturing the young, or generally people sympathizing with educational work."⁵¹

Judging from these measures, it seems safe to conclude that the MNP tried to distribute administrative powers equally among teachers, local administrators, and society so as to encourage their interest and cooperation in the success of secondary schools. Teachers, however, were interested only in the pedagogical council. What they demanded most was recognition of the pedagogical councils as collegiate organizations, similar to the university councils. The pedagogical councils of Volyn' Gymnasium and Kazan Gymnasium, for example, strongly insisted that managerial positions such as "director" should be mutually elected in the pedagogical council. Otherwise, they said, the pedagogical council would not be "a genuine entity of collegium as a legal organization," but rather just "a sewing factory, where a chief cutter gives out each fixed work, demanding it be executed without any thinking."⁵² What is more, Nemirov Gymnasium criticized the 1862 bill, saying that it did not grant them the power to select their own colleagues. As long as the director had an arbitrary influence on the fate of teachers, there would be division and confrontation among them, and they would not be able to work as a body in soci-

48 Проект устава низших и средних училищ. С. 103.

49 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 143-144

50 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. I. С. 78.

51 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. I. С. 141.

52 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 290-296, Ч. 6. С. 5.

ety. For that reason, they hoped to entrust personnel affairs to the pedagogical council, following the university model. Failing that, they favored restoring the curator's rights, rather than giving rights to the director, who was their direct superior.⁵³ In response to these requests, some local administrators condemned them, remarking that there was no precedent in Russia or abroad for the elective system in secondary schools: "This desire comes from a less than correct comparison between the rights of the gymnasium council and those of the university."⁵⁴

Teachers, along with administrators, thought that the trustees' council was an organization that would violate their rights. The director of the Second Moscow Gymnasium asked why "representatives of various estates" were necessary just because gymnasias were open to all estates and offered general education.⁵⁵ Teachers also felt that the trustees' council "inflicted a loss of importance and significance of the pedagogical council," and "infringed even the autonomy of the pedagogical council."⁵⁶ Some councils insisted that the inviting of outside powers into schools brought conflicts between various powers and disorder into educational institutions, and that therefore, the government would do well to trust in the goodwill and honor of teachers, and rely on their education and pride. They maintained that financial inspection rights and authority over student fee exemption decisions should be returned to the pedagogical council, and that the trustees' council should focus strictly on the raising of school funds.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, teachers generally showed little interest in the provincial councils. Some expressed their approval and added that more teachers should be able to participate in the councils, while others pessimistically predicted that the provincial council system would be just a bureaucratic or formalistic organization.⁵⁸ In general, they rarely mentioned the councils. A Dinaburg Gymnasium teacher asked if Russian pedagogues showed an aspiration to come together and to exchange observations and experiences. He concluded that "this aspiration, which is totally natural among other pedagogues, does not exist among us."⁵⁹

The new law of 1864 resolved these problems in keeping with the views of the teachers. Firstly, the range of autonomous activity of the pedagogical councils was expanded. Secondly, the trustees' councils were discontinued and the only remaining position was that of "honorable trustee," whose duty was simply to provide funds for schools. Thirdly and finally, the provincial

53 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 3. С. 518-524.

54 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 166-168, 320-331.

55 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 3. С. 372.

56 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 2. С. 279.

57 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 2. С. 279, Ч. 3. С. 429-430.

58 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 377, Ч. 2. С. 113-114, 160, 179, 326, Ч. 5. С. 71.

59 Замечания на проект уст. общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 4. С. 284-285.

councils were dissolved completely.⁶⁰ In the end, the interest of gymnasium teachers was in keeping their status within the administrative organization. In response to their desires, the MNP raised the teachers' salary, heightened their status as state servants (from ninth rank to eighth), and strictly required university-level education for people who wished to be gymnasium teachers. Besides that, the MNP protected the pedagogical councils' authority and its independence from estate groups. The MNP did not, however, grant corporate status to the pedagogical council, not wanting to weaken the directors' authority over teachers. In this sense, their autonomous rights were fewer than those of the professorate, and the pedagogical councils became mere agglomerations of officials. For all that, they still achieved higher status as well as broader and more numerous autonomous rights as professionals than they had previously had.

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS – INDEPENDENCE FROM THE STATE

Having examined the cases of the two teacher groups above, we will turn our attention to the case of elementary school teachers, who lost the direct patronage of the state in the Great Reforms.

The schools, which can be categorized as elementary schools under the MNP in the pre-reform period, were parish schools and county schools. These schools, however, were very few and almost exclusively concentrated in and around cities.⁶¹ The main reason for the underdevelopment of elementary schools was, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the weakness of the educational tradition provided by the Orthodox Church. At first, the government did not have the idea of taking direct charge of elementary schools and just tried to leave the work to parish priests and landlords.⁶² However, already as early as 1820s, the MNP started to take the initiative in reorganizing elementary schools.

Regarding elementary school teachers, the government from the first considered them as professionals. The new educational laws of 1804 stated county school teachers to be twelfth-rank state servants, also required elementary school teachers to take an examination under county school teachers or gymnasium teachers. In the 1828 law, parish school teachers also were given the rank

60 С проектом устава гимназий и прогимназий // Материалы. Т. 27; ПСЗ. II. № 41472 (1864/11/19).

61 С проектом положения о начальных народных училищах // Материалы. Т. 24. С. 1. In 1862-1863, there were only 692 elementary schools under the MNP. There were 16,907 ecclesiastical elementary schools, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had 4,961 schools, the Ministry of State Domains had 5,492, and the Ministry of the Imperial Household had 2,127. Compared with other state institutions, the MNP had only about a 2 percent share of all elementary schools. Таблица, показывающая число начальных народных училищ разных наименований и ведомств // Материалы. Т. 24.

62 ПСЗ, I. № 20597. С. 4.

of fourteenth-level state servants, and they had to as before take an examination at a county school. And county school teachers were also required to take an examination at a gymnasium.⁶³ In addition, in 1846, educational requirements were clearly stated by a separate regulation for county teachers, and city and village parish school teachers. According to that regulation, in the case of county school teachers, when there was no possibility of finding candidates who had completed all courses of higher education, or at least gymnasium or other secondary education, a special examination as well as teaching practice was to be held. Also, regarding city and village parish school teachers, if there was no possibility of finding candidates who had completed all courses of secondary education, or at least county school education, people who wished to be teachers had to take a special examination as well as teaching practice.⁶⁴ The effectiveness of this regulation was doubtful, but at any rate, it was certain that the MNP considered all levels of educational institutions from parish schools to universities as one whole system, and all levels of teachers from elementary school pedagogues to professors as one continuous hierarchy.⁶⁵ However, in creating the educational system beginning with university level, which was supposed to manage schools of all other levels; elementary schools were the last project to be undertaken. Regarding village schools, they developed in the 1830s but only under other ministries, which had access to rural areas. Teachers in these schools were not professionals; teaching was a side job for priests, retired local officials, widows or daughters of local officials, or other literate area residents.⁶⁶

In the first years of the Great Reforms, the MNP still supposed the elementary school to be somehow connected with secondary schools. At first, the Ministry did not change the basic framework of educational laws, but just tried to extend elementary schools under the previous system.⁶⁷ The situation changed, however, after the emancipation of 1861, which presented the government with the challenge of educating a sudden influx of peasants. The government asked the MNP to create a plan for confronting the issue. In response to this request, though the MNP did not fully develop a clear policy on this issue, it insisted that all elementary schools under various ministries should be integrated under the MNP.⁶⁸ The government agreed with this policy because, given the unification of various categories of peasants into "one vil-

63 ПСЗ. I. № 21501; ПСЗ. II. № 2502.

64 Положение о специальных испытаниях по министерству народного просвещения (1 марта) // ЖМНП. Ч. 50. 1846. С. 116-124.

65 С проектом положения о начальных народных училищах. С. 15, 20.

66 С проектом положения о начальных народных училищах. С. 13, 37. See also Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*, chap. 1.

67 Извлечение из отчета министерства народного просвещения за 1858 год. С. 141-142; Проект устава низших и средних училищ. С. 85-116.

68 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 18-19; С проектом положения о начальных народных училищах. С. 2-3.

lage-estates," the corresponding unification of schools was seen as necessary.⁶⁹ Although all schools were not transferred immediately to the authority of the MNP, the range of the elementary schools that the MNP would manage in the future increased considerably. In addition, the task of preparing elementary school teachers was entrusted exclusively to the MNP.⁷⁰

The MNP would have to manage numerous elementary schools, but the budget allocated to the MNP was still far from sufficient even for its existing responsibilities to the university and secondary school systems, much less all three. Also, the MNP did not have effective administrative tools in villages at all. The ministry, therefore, adopted the following policies: the MNP legally abolished the intermediate level of schools – county schools –, and polarized them into pro-gymnasia and *narod* schools. Furthermore, the ministry united the all types of elementary schools under various organizations into *narod* schools. Moreover, the MNP created new administrative organizations, consisting of representatives from various bureaus. On the other hand, the MNP imposed a financial burden mainly on the *zemstvos* (the newly established local governments) and city government.⁷¹ These policies were the first step to uniting all elementary school systems in the Empire, and creating a national education system.⁷²

Elementary school teachers under the MNP, however, were unhappy about the new system. According to the change of elementary school system, the ministry deprived *narod* school teachers of the state service right, which had been granted by the 1828 law. The justification for this measure was the same as that for abolishing county schools: the need to decrease the number of *chinovniki* [officials] in order to reduce the burden on the Treasury. According to the MNP, county schools had become merely a specialized educational institution for producing *chinovniki*, and had thus lost society's trust. The ministry emphasized the burden of elementary school teachers on the Treasury as well. The ministry explained that, though the state service right could be used as "bait" to attract people of talent, their sons were destined, like their fathers, to be *chinovniki*, which would further increase the burden on the Treasury.⁷³ The MNP had created a united legal framework for elementary schools, by which

69 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 119, 21.

70 Объяснительная записка к проекту общего плана устройства народного училищ // Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 18-25; ПСЗ. II. №41068 (1864/6/14).

71 ПСЗ. II. № 41086 (1864/7/14), Krumbholz, *Die Elementarbildung in Russland bis zum Jahre 1864*, chap. V; Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*, chap. 2.

72 See Krumbholz, *Die Elementarbildung in Russland bis zum Jahre 1864*; Tsukamoto, Tomohiro, "Russia noudo kaiho-ki ni okeru sonraku gakkou seido no saihen to 'kokumin gakkou' [Reorganization of the village school system and 'people's schools' in the period of the peasant reform in Russia]," *Hokkaido-daigaku kyouiku-gakubu kiyou* 42 (1983), pp. 45-69.

73 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 1. С. 98-100, 130-133.

any private person or group could open a school freely.⁷⁴ At the same time, the ministry decided not to support elementary schools legally and financially.

This low status of elementary schools and their teachers was not rare in other Western countries, but the notable point here was the reaction from teachers to this policy. The elementary school problem attracted a great deal of attention from teachers and administrators. In the discussion regarding the 1862 bill, the debate over the problem was quite spirited. In general, many people insisted that the MNP's policy on elementary school teachers was deeply flawed and that teachers needed greater guarantees from the state. As one might imagine, in the chorus demanding state patronage, some of the loudest (and most persistent) voices were those of the elementary school teachers themselves.

County school teachers hoped to change their county schools into pro-gymnasia, which were closely connected with gymnasia. If they became pro-gymnasium teachers, they could receive almost the same level of privilege as that of gymnasium teachers. Although one teacher said he was anxious about being accepted as a pro-gymnasium teacher as he did not have a good enough educational background, most teachers seemed optimistic about reorganizing their county schools into pro-gymnasia.⁷⁵

Parish school teachers, on the other hand, were offended by the policy. One teacher from Novgorodsever Parish School implored that the MNP to give state service rank to elementary school teachers as "a reward." He insisted that elementary school teachers should be classified as officials, and that such standing was already in their blood. He was particularly concerned about the hereditary rights of state servants. If he lost his status as a state servant, even if the government compensated him with practical rights such as the status of personally honorable citizen, these new rights would not apply to his children. He worried that he would lose the trust of his family.⁷⁶

A Sergiev Lancaster Parish School teacher regarded the loss of state service rank as an "insult" to elementary school teachers. He angrily asked what the reason was that the government regarded the elementary school teacher, who was essential to the state, as "a petty official, who is a burden to the Treasury." He insisted that teachers of elementary schools should be protected by the state in order to heighten their status and authority in the eyes of students' parents. Because elementary school teachers were so humbled and vulnerable, there was no interest in trying to be a teacher other than from a person of lower class such as a townsman. But "a townsman-teacher" could not be accepted and trusted in society. The government, therefore, had to change them from

74 Обзор деятельности министерства народного просвещения. С. 204-214.

75 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 4. С. 358-360, 437; Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 5. С. 414-416, 420, 429, 440-442, 443-444, 446-447.

76 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 4. С. 199.

“townsman-teachers” into “official-teachers.” According to this teacher, “society in our country has not had independence that constructs self-consciousness apart from the rewards and titles endowed by the state.”⁷⁷ For these reasons, he claimed that support from the state was indispensable.

In spite of their desperate demands, the new law of 1864 did not guarantee the status of elementary school teachers at all, not even mentioning a minimum wage or educational requirements. Although the MNP widely touted the importance of elementary schools and insisted that all elementary schools should be under the jurisdiction of the MNP, the ministry refused to help elementary schools. The ministry responded coldly to reports from local administrators requesting financial support for elementary schools. The MNP said that it could not afford to offer such support, and added that to maintain elementary schools was the work of the *zemstvo*.⁷⁸

The MNP made a legal framework, and started gradual efforts to train professional elementary school teachers by establishing teachers’ seminaries.⁷⁹ These attempts finally began to bear fruit in the 1890s, and in the early twentieth century, the number of teachers and their activities were rapidly expanded. This was partially because the MNP and other state bureaus did not, or could not, intervene as much as before in school affairs, due to a lack of power, a lack of will, or the conflicts between the many different bureaus.⁸⁰ Moreover, the lack of support from the state led elementary school teachers to seek other ways to protect themselves and develop their professional activities. As the number of elementary school teachers increased, they started to create their own mutual-aid associations at the local level. These organizations nurtured their professional consciousness and developed into the basis of the nationwide teachers’ movement in the first years of the twentieth century.⁸¹ For all that, the lack of direct patronage from the state, and the lack of recognition as a collegiate body was seen by elementary school teachers as an insulting sign of abandonment. Elementary school teachers still belonged to the general education system under the MNP, and shared with higher and secondary education teachers the feeling that they were on a mission to enlighten estate society from above. They were regarded as members of “a divine brotherhood for devoting

77 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 4. С. 98-101, 455-466; Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 5. С. 375-390.

78 Обзор деятельности министерства народного просвещения. С. 230-263.

79 Панагин, Ф.Г. Педагогическое образование в России: историко-педагогические очерки. М., 1979; Sinel, *The Classroom and the Chancellery*, pp. 239-252.

80 Eklof explained that “the rivalry between departments worked to the benefit of the *zemstvo*, as no one institution was able to exert control” over the elementary school administration. Eklof, *Russian Peasant Schools*, p. 55.

81 Золотарев С. Очерк по истории учительского объединения в России // Профессиональные учительские организации на Западе и в России. Петроград, 1915. С. 231-293.

one's self to the great task of educating the *narod*."⁸² Despite this strong sense of mission, they felt abandoned by the state, and severely humbled and vulnerable within society.

CONCLUSION

During the Great Reforms, Russian pedagogues started being transformed into professionals, following the incentive plan of the MNP. In the Great Reforms, when the framework of professionals was being made, they aspired to be protected inside the state administration, because they wanted to gain state patronage in order to be independent and privileged within society. That is, they tried to become professionals by way of being bureaucrats.

Pedagogues under the MNP traditionally took on a unified character as a vanguard of the enlightenment entrusted with a mission to educate society from above. Therefore, even elementary school teachers were required to have a certain level of education and were considered as petty but state officials. This is the background to them preferring to remain inside the state bureaucracy. But when the MNP took the first step toward the full development of the elementary schools, they decided to separate elite schools and popular schools, and upgrade elite schools and downgrade popular schools. On the one hand, the professorate and gymnasium teachers successfully gained state patronage and high status in the state bureaucracy; on the other hand, the elementary school teachers were kicked out from the bureaucracy and were vulnerable in society. This dismal situation of elementary school teachers was not surprising in view of Western countries' teachers of the same period. But the important point is the attitude of the elementary school teachers at the time of the Great Reforms. They also thought they could be professionals and have independence as professionals only because they were officials. However, in the end, they could not keep their status as state officials, and did not have a stable basis inside the state bureaucracy. Despite this, they still aimed to recapture the status of official for a long time, and for all that time, still shared educational philosophies and goals with the MNP and other elite school pedagogues.

Meanwhile, elite school pedagogues did not settle for just being inside the bureaucracy, though they were guaranteed the status of state official. They tried to organize a collegiate organization, not a top-down hierarchical organization, in order to secure their autonomy and voice inside the bureaucracy. It is noteworthy that the professorate, who aimed to gain this autonomy inside the bureaucracy, utilized the concept of *soslovie*. In Russian society, as Freeze already indicated, *soslovie* was used as an instrument for communication and ties between the state and social groups. Moreover, in this context, attaining the status of *soslovie* was completely consistent with having a firm basis within the bureaucracy. "*Soslovie*" meant a special group that was chartered by the

82 Замечания на проект устава общеобраз. учеб. завед. Ч. 5. С. 397.

state in order to perform a state mission, and *soslovie* status was pursued by the professorate to get additional privilege beyond the status of mere official. Gymnasium teachers did not directly seek *soslovie* status, but they tried to attain similar status by following the professorate and desiring the same rights as the professorate had.

In the Great Reforms, the MNP endeavored to integrate, reorganize, and expand the general education system. For this purpose, the MNP had a keen need of teaching professionals. For this reason, the ministry, of its own accord, attempted to boost professional consciousness among teachers. Teachers, in turn, having had an opportunity to express their collective voice for the first time in Russian history, aimed to form a foundation to maintain their professional status. Russian professionals were being born inside the bureaucracy, and expected to function as a strong partner for the state bureaucracy. In fact, the professorate and gymnasium teachers attained high status, which led them to a fruitful partnership with the state. But, at the same time, they were faced with the serious dilemma of being both professionals and bureaucrats. Furthermore, the fact that elementary school teachers did not get privileged status and were forced to be independent from the state added further layers of complexity to the relationships between the state and professionals in late tsarist Russia. Such a structure was formed because the state remained functioning as the leading modernizer in Russian society in the middle and even by the end of the nineteenth century. The emerging teaching professionals did not expect to get much support from society, but instead hoped to be half-officials and protected inside the state. These complicated relationships, which emerged in the process of the Great Reforms, became an element of dynamic social and political transformation in late imperial Russian society.

“The White Tsar”: Romantic Imperialism in Russia’s Legitimizing of Conquering the Far East

MARLÈNE LARUELLE

At the end of the 19th century, many discourses of legitimation were formulated to assist the imperial advance of western powers into Asia and Africa using political, economic, cultural and scientific lines of argumentation. Administrators, colonists, missionaries and explorers developed a vivid literature on the civilizing mission born by “Whites” in the rest of the world. Imperial Russia was also part of this massive European trend, and developed discourses of legitimization to justify its push into Central Asia and the Far East. Saint Petersburg’s expansionist desires aimed at gaining control of Manchuria, Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Tibet yielded a kind of “romantic imperialism” a central feature of which was the myth of the “White Tsar.”

The notion of the “White Tsar” (*belyi tsar*) probably originated in Muscovite times. Its exact origins are unclear, but it appears to date from the time of the Golden Horde. During the reign of Vasili III, Russian monarchs occasionally used the term in diplomatic correspondence, though it had already fallen into disuse by the time of Ivan IV.¹ Since then it has been employed in relation to Asian nationalities in order to legitimate Russia’s claims to dominion over the East. The phrase “White Tsar” appeared frequently in Russian writings with respect to Inner and Eastern Asia around the end of the 19th century. Colonized peoples also developed new imaginaries in reaction to the cultural shock of colonization, attempting to reckon with the political realities to which they had come to be subjected. Buddhists, for example, attempted to incorporate well-known European political personalities into their religious pantheon by reformulating their ancient mythologies: in Tibet, the Russian tsar and Queen Victoria were seen as reincarnations of local divinities; and under Russian domination the Kalmyks and Buriats re-conceived the tsars as Bodhisattvas. The idea that Buddhist peoples awaited the arrival of the famous White Tsar deeply impressed itself on Russian nationalist circles, Dostoevsky included; he in fact declared to be pleased that “among these peoples of several million men the belief in the invincibility of the White Tsar and his sword is strengthening and has spread to the borders of India and indeed into it.”²

Academic interest in Imperial Russia’s drive into Asia has grown since the early 1990s, due to increased archival access as well as the renaissance of diplomatic and intellectual history. At the same time, the development of post-

1 I would like to thank my anonymous reviewer for having shared this information with me.

2 F. Dostoievski, *Journal d’un écrivain, 1873-1881* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), p. 1456.

Soviet scholarship on nationalities has stimulated research on Russia's Eastern borderlands. Yet despite this, the question of ideological motivations in tsarist colonialism remains largely understudied.³ This article will thus attempt to analyze the role that specific ideological references, such as the White Tsar and the Aryanness of Russians, played in legitimating imperial conquest. At issue is not to claim that this conquest was carried out in the name of these symbolic motifs when it was in fact something that responded above all to geo-strategic interests, but to underscore how much the history of ideas and political philosophy is developed in interaction with the surrounding environment. After presenting those major forerunners to the Aryan theme of the White Tsar that were the explorer Nikolai Przhevalskii, and the Buriat Lama Agvan Dorzhiev and Petr Badmaev, this article will go on to examine in more detail the character and work of Esper Ukhtomskii. In his numerous works, Ukhtomskii developed a range of arguments far larger than just the myth of the White Tsar, for his aim was to establish proximity between the Russian and Buddhist worlds based on their common Aryan identity and their hopes for a theocratic regime.

PRECURSORS: ORIENTALISM AND ADVENTURISM IN COURT CIRCLES

Already during Catherine II's reign, Russian authorities had wanted to use the religious networks of their Buddhist subjects as means to facilitate commercial penetration in Asia. During the late 18th century, many plans to conquer Mongolia in order to reach China's borders were conceived, such as those by the General Governor of Irkutsk, Ivan Iakobi for example. Yet it was not until the second half of the 19th century that Russia came to take real interest in the Buddhist world. New projects to incorporate Mongolia had been in on the drawing board since the 1850s under the direction of the General Governor of Eastern Siberia, N.N. Muraviev-Amurskii (1809-1881); but it was not until the start of the 20th century that any of them met with the approval of official circles. Some years after the second English-Afghan war (1879-1880), the Russians reached the foothills of the Pamir and no longer concealed their desire to form alliances with Tibet and China. Just before his death in 1888, the explorer Nikolai Przhevalskii called upon the tsar Alexander III to conquer Eastern Turkestan, which was then in rebellion against the Chinese.⁴ If the tsar made no secret of his doubts about annexing the region, his son Nicholas II would not have such concerns.

3 With the exception of certain fundamental works such as M. Bassin, *Imperial Visions. Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840-1865* (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) and D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun. Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001).

4 A letter from P.S. Vannovskii to N.K. Girs, 5 November 1885, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun*, p. 38.

As a matter of fact, the young Crown prince had long had his eyes set on the Orient. This is possibly because two of his private tutors were none other than prince E.E. Ukhtomskii and N. Przhevalskii, with both of whom he would begin an intense correspondence and whose numerous publications he would personally finance. The "Grand Tour," a rite of passage customarily undertaken before acceding to the throne, led the tsarevich not to the fashionable high places of Europe, but to the "Orient": in 1890-1891, the emperor-to-be set out from Greece and Egypt to visit India, Ceylon, Singapore, China and Japan, returning from Vladivostok through Russia's "interior Orient" via the Empire's Kazakh, Bashkir and Kalmyk steppes. As Sergei Witte (1849-1915) noted in his memoirs, Nicholas II was simply obsessed with Asia and dreamed of conquering the titles of Bogdykhan of China and Mikado of Japan.⁵ He was particularly attuned to discourses declaring that Lhasa, the "Rome of Asia," awaited Russian domination, and remained in close contact for several years with an Orientalist group that included E.E. Ukhtomskii, P. Badmaev and A. Dorzhiev. During the decade stretching from the 1895 Sino-Japanese war to the 1904-1905 Russian-Japanese war, under a tsar who was particularly fond of the idea of Russia's messianic mission in Asia, Russian foreign policy in Asia would be marked by a series of blunders.⁶

Przhevalskii and Russia's Mission in China

The explorer Nikolai Przhevalskii⁷ (1839-1888) was one of the first to maintain that Russia had a mission in Buddhist Asia, particularly in China and Tibet. Between 1871 and 1888, he had the Russian Imperial Geographical Society finance four great expeditions with the aim of developing routes that would enable Russia to go deep into Asia, either through Mongolia or through Xinjiang. The first expedition (1871-1873) took him to the Orod plateau and near to Lake Koko Nor. Before reaching Xinjiang, however, he was forced to turn back both because of the uprising of Yakub-Beg⁸ and the Russian occu-

5 S.Iu. Witte, *The Memoirs of Count Witte* (New York: Sharpe, 1990), p. 127.

6 D. Geyer, *Russian Imperialism. The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914* (Hamburg-New York: Berg, 1987).

7 On his life, see the biography by D. Rayfield, *The Dream of Lhasa: The Life of Nicholay Przhevalskii, Explorer of Central Asia* (London: Elek Books, 1976); N.F. Dubrovin, *Nikolai Mikhailovich Przheval'skii. Biograficheskii ocherk* (Saint-Petersburg: Voennaia Tipografiia, 1890), as well as D. Brower, "Imperial Russia and Its Orient: The Renown of Nikolai Przhevalskii," *The Russian Review* 3 (1994), pp. 367-381.

8 As soon as the first Russian-British tensions started in Central Asia, Russia turned to Oriental Turkestan while it was under Chinese domination and was granted the right to trade with it in the treaty of Kuldzha signed in 1851. The revolt of Muslims from Oriental Turkestan, which started in 1861 under the leadership of Yakub-Beg, provided Russia with a perfect opportunity to invade the region, but it was forced to retrocede it to China in 1881. Xinjiang, however, became a de facto protectorate of Russia, since the real power was in the hands of Russian consuls, not of Chinese governors.

pation of the Ili valley. He set out again the following spring with a Tibetan merchant caravan that was on pilgrimage, entering Tibet with the hope – soon shattered – of reaching Lhasa.

On his second expedition (1876-1878), he had wanted to pass via the Ili valley, Kashgar and the Taklamakan desert, before coming to the mythical Lob Nor – the legendary centre of Buddhist Central Asia that had been given life by the waters of the Tarim, and that no Westerner had reached since Marco Polo. The third expedition (1879-1880) led him to the discovery of the famous horse of the steppes, which he had named after himself. Przhevalskii reached Lhasa in late 1880 but was prohibited from approaching the town and forced to return via Mongolia and Kiakhta. On the fourth expedition (1883-1885), he abandoned the attempt to reach Lhasa, trying instead to enter a region situated between Tsaidam and Lob Nor. However, Przhevalskii was once again forced to return to Taklamakan. Again in 1888, he embarked on another voyage from Russia, via Astrakhan. This time however he was quite ill and ended up dying at the end of the same year – his wish was that his corpse be buried in Karakol (today's Kyrgyzstan).

Przhevalskii's 1872 feat of entering Tibet was the first by a Russian. In fact, until then the country was little known by Europeans in general, and so came to be the coveted object of many fantasies.⁹ His travel stories became bestsellers and were translated into many Western languages, propelling him to star member status of the Society of Geography, and earning him the recognition of the imperial family who regularly called him to their side. The explorer M.I. Veniukov (1832-1901) unhesitatingly described him as the "most famous traveller in Asia since Marco Polo."¹⁰ Przhevalskii was the first to develop the idea of the White Tsar, notably in his *Essay on the contemporary situation in Central Asia*¹¹ (*Ocherk sovremennogo polozheniia v Tsentral'noi Azii*) published in 1886. He was indeed convinced that if Russia were to attack China, the subjugated populations – Buddhists (Mongols, Tibetans) as well as Muslims (Uzbeks and Uighurs from Oriental Turkestan) – would rally to aid the tsar; Russia would thereby be able to annex these regions without too much difficulty, and then turn a weakened China into a Russian protectorate.

According to Przhevalskii, Russia's main goal in Asia was the possession of Lhasa, which he saw as the Rome of Asia. Not only was Tibet a rich kingdom but it was the capital of a still larger world comprising more than 200

9 P. Bishop, *The Myth of Shangri-La. Tibet, Travel Writing and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape* (London: The Athlone Press, 1989), and J. MacGregor, *Tibet: a Chronicle of Exploration* (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970).

10 Letter from Veniukov to the 3rd Congress of Geography, 1881, quoted by Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun*, p. 39.

11 Article from his secret memorandum, *New Considerations on the War with China* (*Novye soobrazheniia o voine s Kitaem*), published in the *Russkii vestnik* of 1886, then republished as the last chapter of his book *Ot Kiakhty na istoki Zheltoi reki*.

million Buddhists who regarded the Russian Emperor as the White Tsar: "The Mongol nomads, Muslim Chinese and the inhabitants of eastern Turkestan... all aspire to become subjects of the White Tsar, whose name, like the Dalai Lama's, appears to the eyes of the Asian masses wrapped in a halo of mystical light. (...) The intolerable yoke of the Chinese, on the one hand, and the reputation earned by our humane domination over the autochthons in our oriental possessions, on the other, are the main reasons that we enjoy a good reputation in the heart of Asia."¹² Przhevalskii thought that were the tsar to establish himself in Potala, it would give him the prestige necessary to rule all of Asia, and that a Russian-Tibetan alliance would enable both countries to surround China and to contain the British in India. Presenting himself in his correspondence to the tsar and court officials as a mere intermediary expressing Asian demands, he claimed that many autochthons had conveyed to him both their desire to have the Cossack troops free them and their belief that the Russian tsar was a "demigod."¹³ Yet, Przhevalskii would never have the fortune to reach Lhasa; only his close companions, one of whom was Petr Kozlov, would, in a later expedition (1905), finally be welcomed by the Dalai Lama at the Mongol border.

Dorzhiev or the Alliance between Saint Petersburg and the Potala

In circles close to Nicholas II, the myth of the White Tsar was further developed by the Buriat Agvan Lobsang Dordje, also known as Dorzhiev (1854-1938). In Lhasa to finish his training as a Buddhist monk, Dorzhiev was quickly accepted into the young pontiff's small group of tutors and became a confidant of the 13th Dalai Lama, Thoubten Gyamtso (1876-1898). He was the chief representative of the Russophile lobby at the Potala court, but the lobby did not have unanimous backing. Dorzhiev's opponents, who were trying to estrange him from the Dalai Lama, succeeded in forcing him to leave in 1898. Despite this he managed to return several times and remained the representative of Tibetan hope in Russia, which he pursued by advocating both a Buriat and Kalmyk pan-Mongolism and the constitution of a great Buddhist state under Russian protection. Accused by the British of being a Russian agent in Lhasa, Dorzhiev rather thought of himself as Tibet's emissary in Russia. Esper E. Ukhomskii introduced him to the Russian court where, in 1900 and 1901, he met the tsar thanks to the intervention of personalities like the vice-president of the Imperial Society of Geography, Petr Semenov Tian-Shanskii (1827-1914).¹⁴ He submitted his project for turning Tibet into a Russian protectorate to the em-

12 N.P. Przheval'skii, *Ot Kiakhty na istoki Zheltoi reki. Issledovanie severnoi okrainy Tibeta i put' cherez Lob-Nor po basseinu Tarima* (1888), pp. 509-510.

13 Ibid., p. 514.

14 P. Semenov Tian-Shanskii is supposed to have written a letter to Lamsdorff in 1900 requesting Nicholas II to grant an interview to Dorzhiev. T. Shaumian, *Tibet. The Great Game and Tsarist Russia* (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 25.

peror and met Sergei Witte, the War Minister Aleksei Kuropatkin (1848-1925),¹⁵ and the Foreign Affairs Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff (1845-1907). However, neither he nor his right-hand man, a Kalmyk by the name of Ovshe Norzunov, who was a representative in Tibet for the tsar on behalf of the Imperial Society of Geography, were unanimously liked in Russian political circles.

The idea nonetheless appealed to Nicholas II, who promised to respect Buddhism if Tibet were to accept Russian domination and decided to open a consulate on the Sino-Tibetan border in Sichuan. Russia and Tibet then engaged in some unofficial negotiations, the 13th Dalai Lama considering the "Northern Empire" a less intrusive and less dangerous protector than the British Empire. In order to counter Russian manoeuvres in Asia, the Chinese press published a fake Russian-Chinese political agreement in which Tibet, "the roof of the world," was to become a common condominium with Russia in charge of military defence and China in charge of trade. Against what they considered a provocation, the British signed an alliance with Japan in 1902, provoking Russia and China to make a treaty in return. With the end of the war in Transvaal, the British armies were redeployed, and the viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, concerned about the meetings between Dorzhiev and Nicholas II, decided to charge the Tibetan border in 1904. Lhasa, having received no military help from Russia, fell to the British. Dorzhiev and the tsar's hopes were dashed. Dorzhiev then accompanied the Dalai Lama to his place of exile in Urga where, under Russian protection, they met Nicholas II at the border town of Kiakhta. The Buddhist theocracy became a British protectorate before being retroceded to China in 1906, though the Victorian empire decided to keep its trading posts. Dorzhiev though did not lose all hope and continued in his bid to strengthen Russian-Buddhist ties.

In 1912, acting on behalf of the Dalai Lama, Dorzhiev signed with the Mongols, who had only just become independent, an agreement to establish a pan-Buddhist confederation between Tibet and Mongolia – an idea to which he would remain faithful throughout his life.¹⁶ In 1913, he took advantage of

15 A.N. Kuropatkin started his career in the regiment of Turkestan and, attracting attention for his bravery, he entered the Russian military academy. Sent back to Turkistan, he quickly became the right-hand man of General Skobelev and was also close to the General Governor of Turkistan, K.P. von Kaufman, who sent him to negotiate with Yakub-Beg during the 1876 insurrection. He then accompanied Skobelev to the Balkans in 1877-78, and after returned to participate in the capture of Gok-Tepe in 1881. In 1897, he was appointed War Minister by Nicholas II and put in charge of the Russian armies during the conflict with Japan. Following its crushing defeat, he resigned, and wrote numerous publicist works about the Russian army. He was eventually sent back to Turkestan during the 1916 uprising. For more details, see the chapter devoted to him in Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun*, pp. 82-103.

16 In 1917, Dorzhiev sat on some Buriat national committees but was suspected of counter-revolutionary activities around 1918. He was imprisoned by the Cheka, later freed, and spent the civil war in Kalmykia. In 1919, he started to collaborate with the Bolsheviks,

the fact that Orientalism had come into vogue in cultivated Russian circles, to finance the building of a Buddhist temple in the heart of Saint Petersburg. Presented as the symbol of Russia's reconciliation with its "internal Orient" and national minorities, this temple in reality would be attended by a Russian intelligentsia looking for exoticism. Further, Dorzhiev organized a support committee which included Buriat doctor Badmaev, Orientalist academics such as Vasilii Radlov (1837-1918), Sergei Oldenburg (1863-1934), and Fedor Shcherbatskii (1864-1942), and artists such as Maximilian Voloshin (1877-1932) and Nikolai Rerikh (1874-1947). The diversity of support Dorzhiev received revealed the ambiguity of the project: whereas scholars took it as a political act towards the country's Buddhists, intellectuals and artists tended to view it as a symbolic gesture pertaining to Russia's national identity. After much trouble, the temple was eventually inaugurated in 1913, just in time for the three-hundredth anniversary of the Romanov dynasty.¹⁷

Dorzhiev made a considerable contribution to the construction of the myth of the White Tsar through his unofficial diplomatic actions and statements. He was in fact the inventor of an argument Przhevalski himself had failed to notice and which Badmaev and Ukhtomskii would later adopt. The argument was simply as follows: the reason that the long-awaited White Tsar of the Buddhist mythology was in fact going to be the Russian tsar is that Shamballah, the Tibetan "paradise," was located in Russia. Dorzhiev had actually received a popular legend dating from the 13th century called "the prayer of Shamballa" as a gift from the ninth Panchen Lama, Choki Nyima (1883-1937). In this prayer it was stated that the founder of the Yellow Hat sect would be reincarnated in a town located to the North of Tibet close to the polar Circle, a town "reminiscent" of Saint Petersburg. Dorzhiev thus began developing a long series of mythological arguments justifying comparisons between Russia and Shamballah, more refined versions of which are also to be found in Badmaev's works.

Badmaev – Russia as Inheritor of the Mongol Empire

Petr A. Badmaev (1851?-1920) played a major role in elaborating the discourse about the White Tsar in Russia. Of Buriat extraction, he converted to Orthodoxy, as did his brother. His godfather was the Tsarevich Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, the future Alexander III. He studied oriental languages and

acceded to the Bolshevik Communist Party and attempted to make his nationalist imperatives compatible with the new regime. At the start of the 1930s the officially anti-Buddhist activities began: Dorzhiev was first confined to residence in western Russia and later in Transbaikalia. He was arrested by the NKVD in 1937 and died the following year from bad treatment in a prison-hospital. On his life, see J. Snelling, *Buddhism in Russia. The Story of Agvan Dorzhiev, Lhasa's Emisary to the Tsar* (Shaftesbury: Element, 1993).

- 17 A. Andreev, "La maison du Bouddha dans le nord de la Russie (histoire du temple bouddhique de Saint-Petersbourg)," in D. Savelli, ed., *Présence du bouddhisme en Russie. Slavica Occitania*, no. 21 (2005), pp. 153-177.

did a degree in medicine but never graduated, which earned him accusations of practicing medicine and pharmacopoeia illegally. In 1898, he and his brother translated the two first volumes of the Tibetan medical treatise *Guy-zhi*. Embroiled in struggles around the throne that opposed Rasputin and Ilidor, he was accused by his detractors of being the “Buriat Rasputin.” He nonetheless practiced Tibetan medicine with great success among the elites of Saint Petersburg, members of the Court, and even the imperial family.¹⁸

Introduced to the Court by Ukhtomskii in 1893, he became one of Serge Witte’s advisers on oriental policy before Witte and he became estranged over disagreements about the Trans-Siberian plan and because Witte thought him too much of a schemer. Badmaev had in fact suggested that the Tsarist authorities open a trading post in his name that would both enable Russian products to conquer Asian markets and act as a cover for future attempts at annexing the surrounding regions. The main trading post of Badmaev & Co. opened in Chita, but already by 1895 its financial and political-diplomatic results were far from satisfactory, leading both Witte and Ukhtomskii to withdraw their support for the initiative. Badmaev nonetheless continued for some time to be an unofficial instrument of Russian power in Asia, though relations between him and Nicholas II subsequently soured.

In any case, Badmaev was far from unanimously backed at the Court and some people, like War Minister Aleksei Kuropatkin, regularly complained about his influence on the tsar: “I think that one of the most dangerous features of the sovereign is his love of mysterious countries and individuals such as the Buriat Badmaev and prince Ukhtomskii. They inspire in him fantasies of the greatness of the Russian tsar as master of Asia. The Emperor covets Tibet and similar places. All this is very disquieting and I shiver at the thought of the damage this would cause to Russia.”¹⁹ Excluded little by little from ruling circles, Badmaev continued his medical activities and assisted with integrating the Buriats into Russia.²⁰ He remained a zealot for the Trans-Siberian railway, which for him signalled the beginning of Asia’s incorporation into Russia: as late as 1916, he participated in the concession of a railway line to link Semipalatinsk to the Mongol frontier and fantasized about building a great Trans-Mongolian railway. In the 1910s, he became a staunch Slavophile, rather Germanophobic, a partisan of Uvarov’s formula “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality,” and extolled the virtues of the Russian culture of working the land.²¹

18 G.V. Arkhangel’skii, “Petr Badmaev – znakhar’, predprinimatel’ i politik,” *Voprosy istorii* 2 (1998), pp. 74-84; Iu. Kuz’mín, *Tainy doktora P.A. Badmaeva* (Irkutsk: Ottisk, 2003).

19 A.N. Kuropatkin, *Dnevnik*, 22 September 1899, quoted by K. Meyer, S.B. Brisac, *Tournament of Shadows. The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia* (Washington: Counterpoint, 1999), p. 281.

20 For his and his family’s history, see B. Gusev, “Moi ded Zhamssaran Badmaev,” *Novyi mir* 11 (1989), pp. 199-226; and especially T.I. Grekova, *Tibetskaia meditsina v Rossii. Istoriia v sud’bakh i litsakh* (Saint Petersburg: Aton, 1998).

21 See his last publications: *Svoevremennost’ prizyva vserossiiskoi družhiny* in 1915, *Konets voiny* in 1916 and *Mudrost’ russkogo naroda* in 1917.

Unlike Dorzhiev, Badmaev had no fantasies of a greater Buddhist state: converting to Orthodoxy in his youth, he became a devout proselyte Christian. He fostered notions of Buriat nationalism not with a view to separatist objectives, but to taking advantage of religious and commercial ties between Buriats, Mongols and Tibetans. To these ends, Badmaev, in 1895-1896, published the first bilingual Russian-Buriat daily paper to be written in Cyrillic, *Zhizn' na vostochnoi okraïne* (*Life in the Oriental provinces*), which promoted tsarist policy among local populations. He thought Russia's mission was to become the "Byzantium of China," and when Nicholas II was in Beijing in 1897 unhesitatingly sent him extravagant memoranda about Chinese hopes and the enthusiastic welcome he would receive. He was sincerely convinced of Russia's civilizing mission in Asia: Russia, he thought, shall enter Asia "not for the profit and the exploitation of the Asian tribes, as some of the European states do, but for the very welfare of the inhabitants of Asia."²²

In the very first sentence of his book, *Russia and China* (*Rossiia i Kitai*), published in 1900, Badmaev states that it is the express "wish" of the Asian peoples to submit to Russia. He aspired to turn the Buddhist and Muslim minorities against the Manchu dynasty. He was one of the first to put forward historical arguments justifying Russia's presence in Asia. He considered that facts like Russia's lengthy domination of the Finno-Ugrian population, the republic of Novgorod's discovery of the Urals very early in its history, the national diversity of the Cossacks, and, lastly, Russia's policy of respecting conquered peoples' mores, constituted simply so many factors indicating the "naturalness" of Russia's eastward expansion. Like Przhevalskii and Dorzhiev before him, Badmaev considered Tibet rather than China to be the political crux of Asia. Thus, around 1893, he called on Alexander III to open an additional line of the Trans-Siberian Railway that would pass via Mongolia and China on the way to Gansu, the entrance to Tibet. The reasons for this Russian advance he thought completely justified: as Russia was the direct inheritor of the Mongol Empire, it had to capture Gansu since that is the point from which Genghis Khan would have conquered China.²³

According to Badmaev, Russia's destiny was to rule over continental Asia because the Russian Emperor was in fact the White Tsar, though he referred to the latter as "knight" (*bogatyr'*) in order to connect the myth to the traditional heroes of Russian *byliny*.²⁴ In his view, the tsar ought to be considered either as the reincarnation of the Buddhist goddess Dara-eke, who freed beings from suffering (in Mongol belief), or as the emanation of the king of the mystical kingdom of Shamballah, a reservoir of beneficial forces, a sort of heaven whose kings were divinities close to Vishnu (in Tibetan belief). The Empire of the

22 P.A. Badmaev, *Rossiia i Kitai* (Saint Petersburg, 1905), p. 37.

23 Ibid., p. 52.

24 The *byliny* are popular Russian poems. They belong to great poetic epic cycles telling of the feats of knights, and are part historical and part mythological.

North would thus be called on by these very peoples to dominate Asia and secure for itself a world destiny, for which Buddhism would provide the legitimisation. He claimed that “Mongolia, Tibet and China represent the future of Russia (...). May we hold together in our hands Europe and Asia all the way from the shores of the Pacific ocean to the heights of the Himalaya.”²⁵

Buoyed by such convictions, Badmaev along with Dorzhiev and Ukh-tomskii all appear to have supported some of Russia’s most bellicose stances on the Far East, which eventually led to the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war. They also wielded influence over A.S. Suvorin’s very conservative newspaper *Novoe vremia*, which at the time supported Russian ambitions in the Far East and Tibet, and published several texts written by Badmaev.²⁶ However, by 1903 *Novoe Vremia* had changed its tune. Taking a very dovish stance on East Asia, Suvorin repeatedly editorialized about the need to focus on domestic issues rather than Pacific adventures. In 1904, two parties clashed in Saint Petersburg: a prudent one, including Witte, Pobedonostsev, Kuropatkin and Lamsdorff, that was ready to relinquish Korea; and a hawkish one, including Nicholas II, Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, Viacheslav von Plehve and above all the adventurer Aleksandr M. Bezobrazov (1855-1931). The latter, who had been introduced to the tsar by Ukh-tomskii, quickly obtained the title of State Secretary of the Commission for the Affairs of the Far East. His wheeling and dealing – a forest concession in the Yalu in Korea – led Russia to reject the idea of splitting the continent into spheres of influence (Japan over Korea, Russia over Manchuria), sparking off the war.²⁷

CONCEIVING THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE INTO THE FAR EAST: ESPER UKHTOMSKII

The “Thinking Head” of Official Asiatism

Prince Esper E. Ukh-tomskii (1861-1921) was the key figure behind the “White Tsar of Asia” myth. Not only was he a schemer in Nicholas II’s court, but also an essayist of considerable scientific knowledge. Ukh-tomskii came from a very ancient noble family linked to the Riurikides. His father, E.A. Ukh-tomskii, had served as a naval officer in Sebastopol during the Crimean war, and later founded a maritime company whose ships followed a route from Bal-

25 Quoted by V.P. Semennikov, ed., *Za kulisami tsarizma. Arkhiv tibetskogo vracha Badmaeva* (Leningrad, 1925), p. 56.

26 Shaumian. *Tibet. The Great Game and Tsarist Russia*, p. 32.

27 Kuropatkin claimed in *Russkaia armiia i iaponskaia voina* (1909) that the famous Bezobrazov was directly responsible for triggering the war. He is supported in his claim by Boris Glinski in *Prologue to the Russian-Japanese War (Prolog rusko-iaponskoi voiny)* (1916); on the other hand, B.A. Romanov, in *Russia in Manchuria* (Ann Arbor: Edwards, 1952, originally published in Russia, Leningrad, 1928) lay the blame squarely on Witte’s diplomacy. For a comprehensive historiography of the subject see, Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, *Toward the Rising Sun*, and A. Malozemoff, *Russian Far Eastern Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

tic Sea to China and India via the Black sea. The young Ukhtomskii, markedly Slavophile in sensibility, published his first student poems in Ivan Aksakov's *Rus'* and continued throughout his years to submit his verse to selected periodicals, including *Vestnik Evropy*, *Russkaia mysl'*, *Niva*, *Sever* and *Grazhdanin*.

Very early on Ukhtomskii developed a passion for the Orient and the nationalities subjugated to the rule of the Russian Empire. After his studies, he was employed in the Department of Non-Orthodox Religious Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior. Then he traveled extensively throughout Siberia, developing a particular interest in the Buddhist, Buriat and Kalmyk minorities. In 1886, he was put in charge of reporting on and explaining the frictions between the orthodox missionaries and the Buddhist clergy in Buriatia. He anonymously visited about twenty Lamaic monasteries, before going to Urga and then to Beijing to meet the Buddhist leadership. In his report he strongly defended the leadership, later harshly criticizing the policy of Russification, and the aggressive promotion of orthodoxy by the Archbishop of Irkutsk, Veniamin.²⁸ A passionate aesthete, Ukhtomskii became the largest collector of Asian art in all of Russia, amassing more than 2,000 mostly Chinese and Tibetan items on his travels.²⁹ But his interest was not limited to the Far East: in 1889, he travelled along the Trans-Caspian Railway, returning full of enthusiasm for Central Asia. Later, he was elected a member of the Society of Geography and also of the Russian Committee for Central and Oriental Asian studies for his numerous works. He was then speedily recruited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Far Eastern affairs.

In 1890, he was selected to be a part of Tsarevich Nicholas's "Grand Tour," and was entrusted with the task of writing and publishing travel notebooks.³⁰ During this association he became a close friend of Nicholas II. Foreign and Russian diplomatic circles went so far as to claim Ukhtomskii was one of tsar's shadow councillors and Russia's main policy-maker for Asian affairs. As the French representative in China, Auguste Gérard, said "the tsar has chosen to make him the interpreter and the main architect of Russian policy in Eastern Asia."³¹ The publisher A.S. Suvorin declared that Ukhtomskii "says anything

28 See his report, E.E. Ukhtomskii, *O sostoianii missionerskogo voprosa v Zabaikale* (Saint Petersburg, 1892).

29 Ukhtomskii's acquisitions were originally exhibited at the museum Alexander III (today the State Historical Museum) and earned him the golden medal during their presentation in the Siberian pavilion at the Paris World Fair in 1900. They were confiscated by the Bolshevik regime and are now part of the collection of the Asian Art department of the Hermitage.

30 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *Puteshestvie gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia II na Vostok* (Saint Petersburg-Leipzig, 3 volumes 1893-1897). The book was written by Ukhtomskii but Nicholas II approved every chapter of it. It came out in three richly illustrated volumes and was quickly translated into French, German and even Chinese.

31 A. Gérard, *Ma mission en Chine, 1894-1897* (Paris: Plon, 1918), p. 214.

he pleases to the sovereign"³² and the War Minister A.N. Kuropatkin described him as "a close friend of the Emperor..., he has influenced the tsar and this influence has been detrimental."³³ Ukhtomskii did indeed use his influence to introduce to Nicholas II both the Buriat doctor P.A. Badmaev and the Buddhist monk A. Dorzhiev. However, after 1900, contacts between Nicholas II and Ukhtomskii became less frequent, and little by little Ukhtomskii was "double-crossed" by Rasputin, who monopolized the imperial family and set it at odds with him.

Having published articles for many years on Asian affairs in the highly conservative paper *Grazhdanin*, edited by his friend Prince Vladimir P. Meshcherskii³⁴ (1839-1914), Ukhtomskii tried to found his own newspaper and, in 1895, became the editor of the venerable *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*.³⁵ He hoped to turn it into an openly conservative newspaper, turned against the West, in which he could promote his Asiophile ideas and defend the minorities of the Empire.³⁶ He warned his readership against the tendency to "follow slavishly the scientific road of the West [which will only lead] to catastrophes of a revolutionary nature."³⁷ The daily *Vedomosti*, then, became an instrument for Asian affairs and served as a semi-official outlet for the government's opinions on the Orient. However, it also continued to remain open to publishing opinions different to those of its editor Ukhtomskii. The prosecutor of Saint Synod, Konstantin Pobedonostsev³⁸ (1827-1907) in particular censured it several times for stances it took in favor of the Empire's national minorities and its open sympathy for Jews and Poles. Ukhtomskii was to remain Asia's greatest exponent in Russia, and he continued to publish *Vedomosti* until the Revolution.

Ukhtomskii was particularly influential at the Court due not only to his friendship with the tsar, but also due to the interventions of his friend, Sergei Witte. The two men collaborated on many of Russia's undertakings in a Far

32 A.S. Suvorin, *Dnevnik* (Moscow-Petrograd: L.D. Frenkel, 1923), p. 113.

33 A.N. Kuropatkin, *Dnevnik A.N. Kuropatkina* (s.l.: Nizhpoligraf, 1923), a remark dating from April 7, 1898.

34 A confidant of the last two tsars who had legal training, prince Meshcherskii was a very influential conservative political personality. He was known above all as the publisher of *Grazhdanin* which in the 1890s published opinions against Jews, foreigners, the *zemstvo* and public education, none of which prevented him from obtaining Witte's political and financial support.

35 The *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti* was founded by Peter the Great in 1702 and was Russia's first newspaper. Throughout the 18th century, it was published within the Academy of Sciences by key personalities from intellectual life such as Lomonosov. In the 1860s, it became one of the main liberal newspapers, the direct opponent of the *Moskovskie vedomosti* of the conservative Katkov.

36 E.E. Ukhtomskii, "Ot redaktsii," *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, 3 January 1896, p. 1.

37 Ibid.

38 For his biography, see R.F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev, His Life and Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).

East at the time submerged in political turmoil. Though a strategic zone, Russia nonetheless left it to one side after conquering the Amur and Ussuri regions and founding Vladivostok in 1860. The decision to build the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891), however, opened new prospects for Russia's access to the Pacific. The tsarist Empire took advantage of China's defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1895, occupying Manchuria in a bid to prevent Japan from either settling on the continent or having access to the ice-free waters of the Yellow Sea. Under the pretext of protecting the Middle Kingdom, Saint Petersburg set itself up in China with the help of Li Hongzhang, a representative of the Rusophile lobby in Beijing which had attended the coronation of Nicholas II.

In 1896, Russia signed with China a treaty in which it committed itself to protect the Chinese from any attack in exchange for fast communication routes. Russia founded the Russian-Chinese bank, headed by Ukhtomskii, in order to lend China the money required by Japan as war reparation. Witte then made Ukhtomskii Russia's unofficial ambassador in Beijing. The Prince accompanied Li Hongzhang and took part in the negotiations defining the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway in Manchuria. In 1897, he became President of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, a 99-year concession given by China to Russia: the railway line had the legal status of a Russian enclave in China and turned Kharbin into a Russian colonial town. At the pinnacle of his political influence, Ukhtomskii was considered to be the unofficial but direct representative of the tsar in Asia. George Morrison, the correspondent in Beijing for *The Times*, thus wrote that though Ukhtomskii "does not have an official status and is not recognized by the diplomatic Corps, the Chinese regard him as the 'tsar's brother', or even as the tsar himself."³⁹

In 1900, Ukhtomskii was sent to Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion in order to deal with the difficult position that Russia had been put in, with both the Chinese and Western armies asking it for military reinforcement. Russia, which liked to present itself as China's protector made an offer to mediate between Beijing and the Westerners, but Ukhtomskii's delegation arrived only after the Europeans had already occupied the capital.⁴⁰ Once there, he made many diplomatic blunders which disappointed Russian political authorities. Some even maintained that, since he seems to have supported Bezobrazov's bellicose position against Witte's more moderate stance, he should be held

39 Quoted in Sir R. Hart, *The I.G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1119-1120.

40 In 1900, Saint Petersburg opted for a policy that was very favorable to the Qing dynasty. Russian public opinion did not feel concerned by the Chinese anti-European attacks, which it considered were aimed at the West but not at Russia. Russia was, however, forced to take part in the crushing of the Boxers, but did so with little enthusiasm and never officially condemned anti-Western acts of violence. For more on the subject, see D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, "Russia's Ambivalent Response to the Boxers," *Cahiers du monde russe* 1 (2000), pp. 57-79.

partly responsible for the errors in Russian policy leading to defeat against the Japanese. He nonetheless managed to retain his place in power until 1917.

All the Orients in the Service of the Imperial Cause

Ukhtomskii attracted attention for his essay writing with the publication of tsarevich Nicholas II's travel notebooks, *Journey to the Orient of his Imperial Highness the Cesarevich*. This book, first volume of which came out in 1893, constituted the first manifesto of his Asiaticism. Ukhtomskii remained a prolix writer, publishing many brochures in the years before the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Drawn from thoughts had while traveling or from attempts to conceptualize Russia-Asia ties, his publications were most diverse: though they focused mostly on China, Tibet, and sometimes Japan, they also ascribed India a key role and included many positive images of Islam and Persia.

Ukhtomskii was part of a Third-Worldism "ahead of its time," as were many Germans, including in particular Friedrich Ratzel.⁴¹ Indeed, both Ukhtomskii and Ratzel longed for an alliance between Russia and Germany respectively with China and/or Japan, at the time considered Asia's "great" or so-called "intelligent" nations. Such yearnings seemed to augur a kind of a continental Axis or coalition of the Middle Kingdoms (Germany, Russia, and China) which might one day oppose the Anglo-Saxon maritime world. But, even for a Far East expert like Ukhtomskii, Asia was merely an instrument with which to oppose Europe: his overt sympathy for it mainly served as a means to denounce the West and the "injustices committed by white man."⁴² Ukhtomskii complained bitterly about Westerners, whom he held responsible for the sometimes difficult relations between Russia and Asia. The French and British schemes in China – their missionaries and their opium trade – contributed to fuelling Asian resentment against *all* Europeans, with whom the Russians were often assimilated. As he put it: "Russia was forced to suffer materially and morally from the Bacchanalia done in the Far East by Western peoples."⁴³

Though Ukhtomskii never gave up the idea to annex part of Asia, he never wanted to see it accomplished in a violent and military way. According to him, Asia and Russia had too many points in common for their fusion not to be carried out peacefully. Yet, like many contemporaries, Ukhtomskii's plans for Russian advance, conceived as answers to the demands of Nature (*stikhiinoe*),⁴⁴ denied the existence of any borders before the Pacific Ocean. He readily

41 See for instance, M. Bassin, "Imperialism and the Nation State in Friedrich Ratzel's Political Geography," *Progress in Human Geography* 11 (1987), pp. 473-495; from the same author, "Race contra Space, the Conflict between German Geopolitik and National Socialism," *Political Geography Quarterly*, 6/2 (1987), pp. 115-134.

42 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *K sobytiyam v Kitae. Ob otnosheniakh Zapada i Rossii k Vostoku* (Saint Petersburg, 1900), p. 23.

43 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *Iz kitaiskikh pisem* (Saint Petersburg, 1901), p. 24.

44 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *Pered groznym budushchim. K russko-iaponskomu stolknoveniiu* (Saint Petersburg, 1904), p. 5.

compared the Russian expansion to the discovery of the Americas or to Vasco de Gama's circumnavigation: "In Asia, for us, there are in reality no borders, and there cannot be any other than those uncontrollable ones of the spirit of the Russian people, flowing freely forth along the shores of the vast blue sea."⁴⁵ Indeed, he made no secret either of his dreams of capturing India, Chinese Turkestan, Mongolia, and, above all, Tibet, nor of his hopes that future wars, terrible though they might be, would enable the constitution of a new Russian world Empire.

For Ukhtomskii, Russia was neither part of Europe, nor of Asia; it was a third world whose responsibility was to pacify the other two, but whose misfortune was to be the accidental victim of European colonialism. As he said: "Only Russia, [like] ancient Scythia (...), had maintained without change the balance between the oriental-type worlds and the Western-type worlds, which fight and oppose each other."⁴⁶ So, Ukhtomskii, deeming them superficial, called for the suppression of apparently existing borders: Russia was not, like every Western empire, a European state with colonies in Asia; it constituted a natural unity – and thus an indestructible one – on either sides of the Urals, claiming for itself the Scythian heritage of the middle world. Yet, this third continent was far from being neutral, since for Ukhtomskii Russia belonged much more to Asia than to Europe. Very conversant with oriental religions and a great admirer of Buddhism, he affirmed Russia's religious proximity to Asia. Staunchly opposed to the materialist and atheist West, he thus claimed that "for us, for the Russian Orient intact in its innermost depths, as for Asia, the foundation of life is faith."⁴⁷

As a result Ukhtomskii's relations with the Theosophical Society – founded in the West in 1875 and which kept several lodges in Russia toward the Bolshevik revolution – were ambiguous.⁴⁸ During his journey to India, the Crown Prince visited the Madras Society and met with one of its founders, Colonel H.S. Olcott (1832-1907). Ukhtomskii actually accepted to help Olcott by publishing and disseminating his fourteen-point call for the constitution of a syncretic universal religion in Russia. He also appealed to Buddhists from different countries to become aware of their shared unity⁴⁹ and considered this last point to be in harmony with the ideas of Russian Lamaists. He was hurt by the accusations of charlatanism against the Theosophical Society, and he suggested that Great Britain might have instigated them to counter the Russian

45 Ukhtomskii, *K sobytiiam v Kitae*, p. 84.

46 Ibid., p. 10.

47 Ibid., p. 8.

48 On Theosophy in Russia, see M. Carlson. "No Religion Higher Than Truth." *A History of the Theosophical Movement in Russia, 1875-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

49 Olcott also wanted to found an international cloister with several Buddhist universities in Buddha-Gaya – which was occupied by the British – in order to bring together the different Brahmanic sects.

presence in India. He also defended Helen Blavatsky's (1831-1891) passion for Buddhism, her openness to Orientals, and was very pleased with the positive image of Russia that she spread throughout Asia.⁵⁰ Ukhtomskii seems further to have hoped that theosophy would reconcile Christianity with Oriental religions by opening Christianity up to certain concepts coming from the Orient.

Russia and Asia's religious proximity was also considered an indication of the two spaces' *cultural* proximity. Thus, for Ukhtomskii, the Russian man in Asia was in no way equivalent to Westerner as regards colonial possessions: the Russian was not scornful of the autochthons and felt at home among them. Ukhtomskii even thought that Asian mores were not contrary to the assertion of the Russian greatness. For instance, he defended Islam at a time when the authorities in Saint Petersburg doubted the fidelity of Russian Muslims and worried about the discreet expressions of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism coming from Tatar elites. According to him, on the contrary, Russian autocracy was regarded sympathetically: Muslims "consider the conquest of Central Asia as something miraculous and are ready to reconcile with it."⁵¹ Ukhtomskii thus tried to rehabilitate the – often damaged and undermined – Turkic world in contrast to the "great" sedentary cultures, claiming that the nomads also had a high culture. He further advanced an historical argument according to which Russia was heir to the Mongol Empire, whose image he sought to restore: "Genghis Khan and Tamerlan, [were] leaders of huge armed troops, creators of unvanquished realms, [and] rulers with large spirits, [who] strengthened and enriched the pre-Petrovian Rus with their statist thinking (...), conservative in the Chinese way, [but] formed (...) by the advance of Western elements into the depths of Asia, where we are at home."⁵² The "Drang nach Osten" that began under Ivan IV would therefore mean the realization of Russia's mission, which awaited revelation from the Mongols, a topic that the Eurasianists later co-opted.⁵³

An Aryan Reading of the Asian Peoples

Ukhtomskii's reading of Asian cultures places him squarely in a tradition of Slavophile thinkers. His thought is indeed very close to notions advanced by the father of Slavophilism, A.S. Khomiakov (1804-1860), especially concerning the belief in the existence of two Asias, one "white," the other "yellow." "White" Asia denoted the Asia of Indo-Europeans, most especially of Iranians and Indians. Because the Slavs had supposedly shared with the Ayrans the same cradle, i.e., Scythia, the Iranians and Indians are regarded as Russia's brothers. "Yellow" Asia designated the Asia of Turanian or Turkic-Mongol

50 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *V oblasti neuviadaiushchei stariny* (Saint Petersburg, 1904), pp. 323-324.

51 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *Mekka v politicheskoi i religioznoi otnoshenii* (Moscow, 1890), p. 13.

52 Ukhtomskii, *Pered groznym budushchim*, p. 7.

53 M. Laruelle, *L'idéologie eurasiste russe ou Comment penser l'empire* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999).

peoples. Despite making this binary division, Ukhtomskii's own willingness to promote Buddhism as an Aryan faith simultaneously undermined it. Disseminating Buddhism in Asia was hence thought to be a means to create greater proximity with Russia and authorize the claim that Saint Petersburg's mission was to form allies with this Asian Aryan faith in order to reunify the continent under the domination of the Romanovs.⁵⁴

For several years Ukhtomskii was particularly close to Hermann Brunnhofer⁵⁵ (1841-1916), who was in charge of his public relations with Western Europe. Of Swiss origin, and holding a PhD in Indian antiquity from the University of Zurich (where he worked with Max Müller), Brunnhofer went to Courland in 1889, where he met Ukhtomskii, and ended up staying in Russia for a decade.⁵⁶ In several Germanophone Russian newspapers, such as the *Saint-Peterburg Zeitung*, he pleaded for the cause of Russian expansion in Asia. In his written works, and notably in *Russlands Hand über Asien – Historisch-geographische Essays zur Entwicklungsgechichte des russischen Reichsdenkens* (1897), he made use of Indo-European mythology to justify Russian colonization and speculated about developing a Chinese-Russian fusion to thwart Japanese expansionism. Brunnhofer claimed that the cradle of the Aryan world was not India but Central Asia. For him this was the meeting point of all races and the very the place of "race struggle"⁵⁷ which in its essence opposed two principles he considered governed the world, Iran and Turan.⁵⁸ In order to become a world power, Russia would then have to occupy this zone that had brought peoples and religions into conflict with one another. Ukhtomskii co-opted and developed this discourse, construing Central Asia as a world arena in which the struggle would be resolved between "the barbaric and eternally decadent Turan and the Iran of the Enlightenment, eternally on the defensive. (...) Hidden in here are all the world events of one of the oldest arenas of human activity."⁵⁹

However it was Buddhism that remained Ukhtomskii's first Asian love. He was impressed with its level of adaptability to the most diverse cultures,

54 M. Laruelle, *Mythe aryen et rêve impérial dans la Russie du XIXe siècle* (Paris: CNRS-Éditions, 2005).

55 For a brief summary of his life and work, K. Ernst, "Hermann Brunnhofer," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Leipzig, 71 (1917), pp. 431-432, bibliography pp. 432-437.

56 He went back to Germany in 1899, taught ancient history and the historical geography of the Orient but also Russian in Berne, and then carried on his career at the University of Munich. He translated Ukhtomskii's and Nicholas II's travel stories into German.

57 H. Brunnhofer, "Arkheologicheskie zadachi i tseli Rossii v Tsentral'noi Azii," *Russkoe obozrenie* 20 (November 1891), p. 297.

58 H. Brunnhofer, *Urgeschichte der Arier in Vorder- und Centralasien: historisch-geographische Untersuchungen über den ältesten Schauplatz des Rigvedas und Avestas* (Leipzig, 1893) and *Iran und Touran* (Leipzig, 1889).

59 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *Ot Kalmytskoi stepi do Bukhary* (Saint Petersburg, 1891), p. 63.

and thought that the Russians could learn tolerance and respect for power from it. He also appreciated "the human creed of Gautama, [which is] second only to Christianity,"⁶⁰ and, as a romantic, subscribed to the so-called mysticism of oriental religions and their intuition of a super-natural world. Russia's first mission would be to reconstitute the unity of a Buddhist continent that had been divided up into states and colonies. Achieving such a feat would be made possible by some of its native minorities like the Buriats who were the "representatives of the Russian name at the very heart of the yellow world."⁶¹ In Ukhtomskii's thinking, Buddhism was very clearly associated with the Aryan world. He considered it to have been particularly important in India in the sixth and fifth centuries BC, "precisely when the Aryans were spreading their conquests to the Indian shores and began to feel the need for a vision of the world larger than that of the Veda."⁶² According to him, this religion was particularly "Nordic," insofar as Buddhist peoples had always prayed to Am-itabha, i.e., the Buddha of the infinite light who ruled over the Nordic heavens, and had from time immemorial been attracted to "the ethereal regions of reverence and prayer, to those luminous spaces"⁶³ which were the country of the White Tsar. As a result, Buddhists peoples, he claimed "[would] instinctively feel [an] inner link with the power of the faraway North."⁶⁴

Seen in terms of its expansion throughout the Asian continent and its presence as far north as Siberia, Buddhism "turned out to be the intermediary, the tie linking the South of Asia (...) to the North."⁶⁵ Consequently, Ukhtomskii construed it as the strict precursor of a Russian Empire which was simply a North to South retracing of Buddhist expansion. Claiming, then, that Russian advance was merely the reverse counterpart of Buddhist expansion, Ukhtomskii provided further reinforcement for the arguments of White Tsar ideologists. This religion's presence on Russian territory allegedly gave to the Empire a right of preemption to the Tibetan capital Lhasa. According to Ukhtomskii, if Russia had ruled Mongolia from the 17th century, it could have taken the whole Lamaic world before the British. As such, he called his fellow country men to have a greater awareness of Russia's specific Asian role and hoped for a speedy development of scientific knowledge on Buddhism: "We are behind in our drive (...) to develop a more intimate relationship with the kingdom of the dalai-lama. Russia has all the ready information that would enable it to be ahead of every country in relations [with Tibet] thanks to its Buriats and

60 Ukhtomskii, *Puteshestvie gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia II na Vostok*, volume 2, p. 12.

61 Ibid., p. XII.

62 E.E. Ukhtomskii, *Iz oblasti lamaizma. K pokhodu anglichan na Tibet* (Saint Petersburg, 1904), p. 16.

63 E.E. Ukhtomskii, Preface to A. Grünwedel. *Mythologie du bouddhisme en Tibet et Mongolie basée sur la collection lamaïque du prince Oukhtomsky* (Lipsia, 1900), p. XVIII.

64 Ukhtomskii, *Puteshestvie gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia II na Vostok*, volume 2, p. 61.

65 Ibid., p. 18.

its Kalmyks, its experts on the Mongol world and its travelers to Central Asia. Russia has a wealth of great experts on Buddhism such as for instance S.F. Oldenburg, and so many remarkable ethnographers such as D.A. Klemets, and yet it is from foreign hands that the most important information on Tibet has been received, this country which beckons us toward it in the remote hope (...) that one day we will see the dalai-lama, the Bantchen-Bongo incarnated, within the Russian sphere of influence."⁶⁶

Ukhtomskii was also a fanatic of Indian culture. On several occasions, he made known his belief in the Indian cradle of Aryanity, and regularly implied that Egyptian culture was greatly indebted to Indian culture, a classical idea from the end of the 18th century that had been widely discredited by the time of his writing.⁶⁷ His ideological reading of the Indian world, centered on the idea of Aryanness, was thoroughly ideological, and as such he poured scorn on British philologists in their attempts to prove an Aryan proximity between the English and the Indians.⁶⁸ This "sentimental fiction,"⁶⁹ as he called it, was of course in a similar vein to and in direct competition with his own discourse. According to him, the ethnic proximity between Indians and Russians was obvious. During their raids of the Indian sub-continent, the Aryans, he alleged, had conquered the dark-skinned Dravidian masses, while their brothers, who had remained further North, gave birth to the Scythian-Slavic world. Ukhtomskii even claimed that the Rajputs were ancient Scythians who had rather belatedly interbred with the first Aryan warriors. According to him "the mighty Aryans of the Vedas and the Indian epic who fought against the autochthons of Punjab and the Dekkan were the same Slavs who settled in the forests and along the rivers of pre-historical Russia."⁷⁰

He thought it was important to put the history of the two countries in parallel so as to let their common essence disclose itself: "for the European (...), visiting the most densely populated continent means opening to oneself and to one's compatriots a new world; for the Russian, it only represents a shifting of the limit of the already known frontiers (...) of Scythia."⁷¹ Besides making classical and inescapable references to Afanasii Nikitin,⁷² Ukhtomskii remarked

66 Ukhtomskii, *Iz oblasti lamaizma*, p. 128.

67 L. Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth* (New York: Basic Books, 1974); M. Olender, *The Languages of Paradise: Race, Religion and Philology in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

68 J. Leopold, "The Aryan Theory of Race in India, 1870-1920: Nationalist and Internationalist Visions," *The Indian Economic and Social Review* 2 (1970), pp. 271-297.

69 Ukhtomskii, *Puteshestvie gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia II na Vostok*, volume 2, p. 119.

70 Ukhtomskii, *K sobytiiam v Kitae*, p. 3.

71 Ibid., p. 21.

72 Afanassi Nikitin (?-1472), a merchant from Tver, traveled for many years to the Orient (Caspian, Iran, India, Central Asia, Black Sea) from 1466 to 1472 and wrote a travel story which was published as *Voyage beyond Three Seas* (*Khozhenie za tri moria*) and is one of the oldest Russian texts about the Orient. He claimed he felt close to the peoples he encoun-

while travelling with the future Nicholas II in India on the similarities in the two peoples' clothing and aesthetic manners, and the similarity of community (*obshchina*) structures existing on both sides of the Himalayas: "These populations are foreign to the West but we Russians, we are closer to them; we understand better their simple and patriarchate mores. A glance is enough for us to see their deep resemblance with our own mujiks. Their features, the colour of their clothes, many details, of some of them, remind us of our compatriots."⁷³ Ukhtomskii also attempted to highlight a certain number of common spiritual features: the Russian peasantry's proclivity toward mysticism, he alleged, had come straight from Brahmanic India.

Finally, according to Ukhtomskii, both peoples were especially united in their age-old struggle against the Turkic enemy. "When the Hindustan and the Muscovite kingdoms were strongly subjected to the mores of their conquerors, they swiftly lost their Aryan character and adopted partly Turanian colours. (...) All this exudes a proximity that cannot be a matter of chance."⁷⁴ Ukhtomskii thus drew parallels between the two cultures' allegedly strong propensities to assimilate, which he considered a specifically Aryan trait, and something that had enabled both the Russians to conquer the Golden Horde and the Hindus to resist the Mughals. With so many common psychological features and shared historical events, Russia and India could have one common future only: the rejection of Western domination.⁷⁵ The world's future, for Ukhtomskii, would be played out in the two capitals of Asia, Saint Petersburg and Calcutta. However, he also conceived these two Aryans brothers as being in competition and was thus pleased at Russia's apparent supremacy, since Russia has managed as early as the 17th century to free itself from European colonialism by driving out the Polish conqueror from its borders; India, on the other hand, still remained silent under the British yoke. This led Ukhtomskii to hint at a possible future involving Russian domination over India, a "still possible coming, beyond the Hindu Kush, of the irresistible North."⁷⁶

However, Russia's mission was not simply to become aware of the unity of spirit and of historical ties with Asia. Ukhtomskii's insistence was above all on the notion of autocracy. According to him, in contrast to liberal Europe, Asia was the very image of a space still dominated by strong and undisputed power. At this point, the myth of the White Tsar conveniently re-surfaced to provide culturalist cover for justifying Russian autocracy: "All the peoples of

tered, particularly those of India, and availed himself of Arab, Persian or Tatar languages for the most "intimate" moments of his texts such as prayers, and in his final Orthodox orison God is even referred to by the name Allah.

73 Ukhtomskii, *Le voyage en Orient de son altesse impériale le césarevitch* (Paris: Charles Delagrave, 1893), p. 223.

74 Ukhtomskii, *K sobytiiam v Kitae*, p. 4.

75 Ukhtomskii, *Puteshestvie gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia II na Vostok*, volume 2, p. 2.

76 Ukhtomskii, *K sobytiiam v Kitae*, p. 46.

the Orient (...) know the power of the White Tsar, at whose feet lies all Asia which is related to him."⁷⁷ The idea of the White Tsar, according to Ukhtomskii, appeared among the Asian peoples when the Russian medieval princes, driven by Christian spirit, defeated the Mongols thanks to their moral qualities. Consequently, Asian admiration for Russia could be explained by a sense of moral values and Christian goodness. Ukhtomskii thus tried to justify autocracy by claiming it was the only means by which Russia could progress in Asia: "The Orient believes in us (...) as far as we cherish the best of what was bequeathed to us by the past: autocracy. Without this, Asia is not able sincerely to love Russia and identify with it painlessly."⁷⁸ The basis for this proximity between Asia and Russia is thereby alleged to be found in their similarly conservative ideologies and propensity for theocratic ideas.

CONCLUSION

Russia's attraction to Tibet was significant for its direct political implications: ideologues of the "White Tsar," such as Badmaev, Dorzhiev and Ukhtomskii were men committed to their time who tried to take their country's destiny into their own hands. In so doing, they played a by no means insignificant role in the strategic setbacks suffered in the Far East and in putting their country on course for a war with Japan that would lead to bitter defeat – the first failure of a European power against a "yellow" people. However, their opinions cannot merely be reduced to "footnotes" of the diplomatic history of tsarist Russia's last years. For what the myth of the White Tsar in fact revealed were some hidden complexities of Russian imperial thinking: even if Buddhism had turned Russia toward the Tibetan and Mongol world, considered the living symbols of Turanism, it was also, owing to its origins, an eminently Indian creation, and thus regarded as Aryan. The myth of the White Tsar thus led to ideas that humanity's origins were located in the Hindu Kush or in the Himalayas, and thus cannot be separated from a European romantic reading of the Asian world.

What was at issue here was, the idea of an intimate connection between Lhasa and Saint Petersburg through Buddhism: Russia had been called upon to become the protector State of an originally Aryan religion decreed compatible with Orthodoxy (monotheism, faith in the philosophical precepts, and the existence of a historical founder). The myth of the White Tsar thus rested on ambiguities inherent in its terms: though the destiny of Russia was really Asian, nonetheless its autocratic power remained "white," and its Empire was the Empire "of the North." The figures described above, and E. Ukhtomskii in particular, provided equivocal characterizations of the Buddhist world: what

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

⁷⁸ Ukhtomskii, *Puteshestvie gosudaria imperatora Nikolaia II na Vostok*, volume 3, p. 33.

they tried to describe was a form of “yellow Aryanism,” an Asian version of Aryanity declared compatible with their own identity claims. This is how Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia and Manchuria – all objects of expansionist desires at the turn of the century – came to be subsumed under a supposedly anti-Chinese Buddhist unity with a paradoxically Aryan identity. The much-coveted possession of Tibet would guarantee Russia control over one of the supposed cradles of the Aryan race and lead it to world domination: the idea of a “Rome of Asia” is directly inscribed in a theocratic line of Russian messianic discourse which proceeds from Orthodoxy to Buddhism by way of Aryanism.

The key element of European imperial thought was without doubt Aryanism and in Russia it found a fertile and receptive soil. As Count de Seillière (1866-1955) stated in his book on Gobineau, *Count of Gobineau and Historical Aryanism* (Paris: Plon, 1903), Aryanism was the theoretical disguise of European imperialism: it extended to all the European peoples the supremacy that was once granted only to the descendants of the barbarian invaders. Along with other imperialist powers Russia clearly also felt obliged to provide ideological justifications for its colonial march into Central Asia and the Far East at the end of the 19th century. The discourse of the White Tsar is a point in case: its function is precisely to demonstrate the natural and non-violent nature of this advance, interpreted as the simple reunifying of different peoples destined to live under the same banner. The myth further served as a means to preserve the Empire’s autocratic power, the presumption here being that autocracy was the precise political element that tied Asia and Russia together in their common confrontation against Western democracies. Ukhtomskii’s particular choice of Aryan themes was thus visibly designed to render compatible Russia’s supposed Asian future and Slavophile sentiment: the claim that Lhasa was the “Rome of Asia” signalled its consistency with the Orthodox and theocratic idea of Moscow as the third Rome. Thus, in its Aryanist version, the notion of the White Tsar contributed to the legitimizing of Tsarist foreign policy at the end of the 19th century and inscribed Russia within the general European framework of “Romantic Imperialism.”

Christian Movements in Central Asia: Managing a Religious Minority in Soviet Times

SÉBASTIEN PEYROUSE

For many centuries, the five Central Asian republics have been traditionally Muslim spaces, although Islam has not been as deeply rooted in either the South, Turkestan, or in the northern, Kazakh steppes. Since the 18th century, Christian minorities have also been present. All the three main denominations (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant) have been firmly entrenched since Tsarist times, and each has its own history and national specificities. With the arrival of Polish, Byelorussian and German peasants during the colonial advance into Turkestan, the region's first protestant and catholic communities were formed. In the 20th century, Christianity's diversity in Central Asia was amplified thanks to the diversity of nationalities existing throughout the Soviet Union and the area's role as a deportation zone. Although Russians were by and large in the majority, regions such as Kazakhstan were distinctive because of the presence there of Germans and Poles. Thus, in addition to the Russian Orthodox Church and small groups of Old-Believers, all the main Christian denominations were represented: Catholics, Lutherans, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Mennonites, Pentecostals, Presbyterians, and Jehovah's Witnesses.

The Christians living in Central Asia represent an exceptional case. Along with some in Azerbaijan, they are the only Christians to have conjoined a Soviet experience of militant state atheism and that of being a religious (and national) minority within Muslim space. This article aims to analyze the specificity of Christianity in Central Asia during the Soviet regime by looking at how central political power dealt with religions both according to the local context of Central Asia's "colonial" character, and to changes in its policies toward nationalities.¹ This study thus hopes to shed light on the diversity of religious policies during the Soviet regime, which resulted in differentiating the positions of confessions depending on their degree of subordination to power, the image they had or did not have of "national religion," and their relations to fellow coreligionists abroad. Much is known about the situation of Central Asian Islam during the Soviet period.² Starting with the premise that a minor faith can be just as pertinent for understanding a region's history, this article hopes to provide a contribution towards a better understanding of the minority religions of Central Asia.

1 T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

2 A. Khalid, *Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

THE AUTHORITIES' INDECISION IN RELATION TO CHRISTIANITY IN CENTRAL ASIA IN THE 1920s AND 1930s

On January 23 1918, legislation was adopted making official the secular policies the new Bolshevik power was to impose: the Church was henceforth separated from both the state and school. The true shape of Soviet religious policy formed during the 1920s. In 1929, an amendment to the Constitution, which until then had banned religious propaganda, added the right to freedom of religion and the right to anti-religious propaganda. This legal development translated in reality as the suppression of the right to religious instruction, which had been possible until then, if difficult. A law on religious associations, adopted April 8 1929, also considerably restricted activities essential to the life of parishes and religious congregations. On October 1st of the same year, a decree from the People's Commissariat for the Interior stipulated that religious ministers must henceforth be registered by the government, thereby giving the authorities complete control over the nomination of religious personnel. The new Constitution of 1936, for its part, restricted the freedom of all religions to worshipping while reaffirming the right to engage in anti-religious propaganda.³

As early as 1918, Bolshevik propaganda embarked on a ruthless anti-religion campaign, although in reality day-to-day politics was stamped by continual uncertainty as the Soviet authorities hesitated between recognizing and repressing religious reality.⁴ The authorities were compelled to deal with realities – geographic, economic, and social – that refused to yield to their discourses. After the Bolsheviks seized power, religious policy developed in a variety of forms, depending on factors such as, for example, the degree of control held over territories of the former empire. Indeed, in the 1920s, the new Bolshevik regime had less leeway in Central Asia than in Russia, due partly to its geographical distance and the difficulties experienced in ending the Basmachis revolts. The local authorities and party organs were above all concerned to secure full economic control of the region, to exit from post-revolutionary economic crisis, to strengthen governance structures, and to reinforce their authority.

It soon turned out that the regime's atheist policy would be a long-term undertaking. Some Communist party members even considered that, in the conditions of the 1920s, the policy itself was unrealistic. So, in spite of the considerable zeal of the "new converts," anti-religious policy did not on the whole attract many militants. Further, even though atheist structures were

3 R. Tobias, *Communist Christian Encounter in East Europe* (Indianapolis: School of Religion Press, 1956), p. 242.

4 For further details on the evolution of relations between the religious administration and the government, see W. Sawatsky, "Religious Administration and Modernization," in D.J. Dunn, ed., *Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 60-104.

the same throughout Soviet territory, they did not everywhere yield the expected results. In Central Asia, atheist militants paradoxically experienced the strong sense of isolation and helplessness that Orthodox missionaries had in tsarist times.⁵ In 1924, an organization that prefigured the future League of the Militant Godless was created in Uzbekistan, but it only really became active in 1927.⁶ A museum of atheism was opened in Tashkent in 1929.⁷ And the first atheist publications written in the local language were published around the decade's end. The government then came to give more open expressions of support for atheism in the 1930s, but this in no way solved the shortfall of workers; the number of members of the League of the Militant Godless was never large, and the means required for an effective propaganda campaign did not extend as far as peripheral regions. According to official figures, in 1940, there were some 1,200 atheist sections spread throughout Central Asia, but they counted no more than 27,000 members.⁸

Orthodoxy was the chief target of the Bolshevik regime's atheist attacks. The Archbishop of Tashkent and Turkestan, Innocent, was resolutely opposed to any change in the Church.⁹ At the Second Congress of the Eparchic Directorate in June 1918, he proclaimed the independence of the Orthodox Church of Turkestan and defined new rules for the priests of the region.¹⁰ Under his influence, the religious authorities decided to create two independent bishoprics, one for the churches of the Semirechie, with its see in Vernyi (future Alma-Ata),¹¹ and another for the rest of Turkestan. However, Innocent also had to

5 S. Peyrouse, "Les missions orthodoxes entre pouvoir tsariste et allogènes. Un exemple des ambiguïtés de la politique coloniale russe dans les steppes kazakhes," *Cahiers du monde russe* 45:1-2 (2004), pp. 109-135; T. Uyama, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and Military Conscriptation in Central Asia," in T. Uyama, ed., *Empire, Islam, and Politics in Central Eurasia*, Slavic Eurasian Studies no. 14 (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), pp. 23-63.

6 N.H. Kolemasova, "Evoliutsiia khristianskogo sektantstva v regione traditsionnogo rasprostraneniia islama (na materialakh Uzbekskoi SSR)." Doctoral thesis (Tashkent, 1981), p. 126.

7 A. Abdusamedov, A. Artykov, "Korennoe preobrazovanie sotsial'noi i dukhovnoi zhizni narodov Sovetskogo Vostoka i pobeda massovogo ateizma," *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* 22 (1978), p. 98.

8 M. Haghayeghi, *Islam and Politics in Central Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 25.

9 On the persecutions of the Orthodox Church by the new regime throughout the USSR, see L. Regel'son, *Tragediia russkoi tserkvi, 1917-1945* (Paris: YMCA, 1977); J. Curtiss, *The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950* (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1953).

10 E.A. Muzarenko, "Evoliutsiia russkogo pravoslaviia v usloviakh Srednei Azii." Doctoral thesis (Tashkent, 1990), p. 86.

11 No bishop could hold the eparchy until 1927. The see also remained vacant between 1935 and 1945: see *Svet pravoslaviia v Kazakhstane* 4:71 (2000), pp. 31-32; G. Seide, "Die Russisch-Orthodoxe Kirche in Sibirien und Mittelasien seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Ihre diözesen und Gemeinden," *Ostkirchliche Studien* 32:2/3 (1983), p. 155.

deal with the ever growing influence of the Living Church (*Zhivaia tserkov'*).¹² Made up of priests who had accepted to support the Soviet regime to prevent Orthodoxy from disappearing, the Living Church provoked virulent opposition among clergy members intent on fighting the new government's policies. After the resignation of the Patriarch of Russia, Tikhon, who was imprisoned for "anti-Soviet activities," the priests of the movement of the Living Church set up a new ecclesiastical administration and placed bishop Antonin at its head. The schism was made public on 8 May 1922.¹³ In 1923 the Living Church opposed Innocent's decision to acquire autonomy and managed to displace him.¹⁴ The partisans of Patriarch Tikhon then definitively lost their hold over Central Asia when the region's new bishop, Nikolai Koblov, condemned so-called anti-Soviet activities.

In 1923, repressive measures were begun against the Central Asian Orthodox Church, about five years later than in Russia. The Church was dispossessed of many of its places of worship. Eleven churches out of twenty-eight were closed in Turkmenistan (six alone in the city of Krasnovodsk), and seven out of eleven in Samarkand; one-hundred buildings were seized in the region of the Syr-Daria;¹⁵ and cathedrals, such as for example the Cathedral of Alma-Ata, became targets because of the symbolic power they possessed.¹⁶ The coming into force of the law of 1929 and then of the 1936 Constitution was accompanied by numerous Church closures and massive arrests of religious members. Orthodoxy remained the primary target: in 1917, the Empire counted 39,530 actively used Churches. In 1936, there were no more than 14,090, and in 1940 only 950.¹⁷ Out of the 66,000 odd members of the Orthodox clergy before the Revolution, only 6,500 remained on the eve of the Second World War.¹⁸

12 On the history of the Living Church in the USSR, see W.C. Fletcher, *A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia 1927-1943* (London, S.P. C.K., 1965); P. Walters, "The Living Church, 1922-1946," *Religion in Communist Lands* 4 (1978), pp. 235-243.

13 In the 1930s, the Living Church was despite everything just as subject to purges and persecutions as other movements. It gradually declined in importance, particularly after Stalin recognized Patriarch Sergey, and broke up definitively at the war's end. E. Roslof, *Red Priests: Renovationism, Russian Orthodoxy, and Revolution, 1905-1946* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002).

14 O. Valis'eva, ed., *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov' i kommunisticheskoe gosudarstvo, 1917-1941. Dokumenty i fotomaterialy* (Moscow: Bibleisko-Bogoslovskii Institut sv. apostola Andreia, 1996).

15 Muzarenko, *Evolutsiia russkogo pravoslaviia*, p. 101. On the Church in Central Asia, see Iu.F. Buriakov, L.I. Zhukova, V.N. Proskurin, "K istorii khristianstva v Srednei Azii," in *K istorii khristianstva v Srednei Azii (XIX-XX vv.)* (Tashkent, 1998), pp. 5-46.

16 For instance, the newspaper *Sovetskaia step'* published a column entitled "Let's close the cathedral" in which the author considered possible transformations of this edifice into more "soviet" uses, see, *Sovetskaia step'*, 15 September 1929, 4, 6, 7 and 17 October, 1929, 1 November, 1929.

17 M.I. Odintsov, ed., *Religioznye organizatsii v SSSR nakanune i v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voyny, 1941-1945 gg.* (Moscow: 1995), pp. 44-45.

18 Iu.Iu. Valis'eva, ed., *Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov' v politike sovetskogo gosudarstva v 1943-1948* (Moscow: RAN, 2001).

For other Christian movements, in particular those of Protestant origin, their fate in Central Asia was more pleasant than in the rest of the Soviet Union. Indeed in the 1920s, some Protestant denominations actually blossomed. New communities of Mennonites, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses formed. The new wave of immigration caused by the Civil War and its impact on country areas were favorable to the expansion of Protestant movements. Believers flowed into Central Asia from all around Russia. The conversion of many Orthodox members, anxious to avoid the persecutions, bolstered this Protestant expansion. Moreover, the most proselytizing strains, like the Baptists, embarked on campaigns to convert the native populations of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The relative state of religious tolerance in Central Asia also enabled the development of movements of Russian origin such as the Old-Believers, but also the *molokans*, *molokans-priguny*, *khlisty*, *khristovover* and *dukhobory*. However, their numbers remained more modest than those of the Protestants and their communities were sparsely scattered.

The period of tolerance towards Protestant movements was temporary and partial. The first ideological interferences in religious life and trials against Baptists began in the mid-1920s.¹⁹ Other Christian movements, in particular the Catholic or Armenian "national" Churches suffered the same checks in their progress. Their places of worship were closed and most of the Church hierarchy was deported. The Lutheran Church suffered a relatively rapid decline, in spite of the fact that, at their 1924 synod, they declared their allegiance to the authorities. The persecutions did not immediately provoke any generalized resistance, but some of the faithful started organizing themselves against the regime. One example of this was provided by an independent movement called the "reformed Adventists" (*adventisty-reformisty*) which was created in 1936 and managed to develop a network throughout the entire Soviet Union. In Central Asia, all the important churches, in particular those in the capitals, were closed; the Baptist place of worship in Alma-Ata was closed in 1930 and that of Tashkent in 1932.²⁰ The clergy had been decimated and those of them left had their right to celebrate church services removed.

In the first years of the regime, the Bolsheviks tried to ally themselves with Muslim revolutionaries and nationalist leaders close to the Jadid movement, but this policy altered in the 1920s. The relative tolerance that had existed between Islam and Bolshevism abruptly came to an end with the tactical reversal of Soviet national policy.²¹ The first attacks against Central Asian Islam took place during a controversy about "bourgeois nationalism" and "Sultan

19 *Istoriia evangel'skikh khristian-baptistov v SSSR* (Moscow: izd. Vsesoiuznogo Soveta Evangel'skikh khristian-baptistov, 1989), p. 499.

20 "Piatidesiatiletie karasuiskoi tserkvi evangel'skikh khristian baptistov goroda Tashkenta" (1946 g.-1996 g.), Referat, 27 (April 1996), p. 3, an unpublished document given by the Baptist Church of Tashkent.

21 On that topic, see H. Carrère d'Encausse, *Le grand défi. Bolcheviks et nation de 1917 à 1930* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987).

Galievist revisionism,"²² several years after the persecutions against Orthodoxy had begun in Russia. In 1924, as soon as the Basmachi movement had been weakened, Koranic and customary tribunals were suppressed; four years later, 15,000 religious primary schools were closed.²³ The policy of unveiling women (*hudjum*)²⁴ was at maximum intensity in 1926-27. The banning of polygamy and of purchasing brides (*kalym*) violated some deeply-ingrained Central Asian traditions that were considered as much "national" as religious.²⁵ A certain tolerance survived toward the Muslim clergy.²⁶

At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the change was meant to be radical. The policy of the "Great Turn" (*Velikii perelom*) marked the entry of the Soviet Union into Stalinism. Having failed to strengthen the undeveloped atheist organizations, Stalin moved to lay blame on local executives, whom he accused of dominating the bureaucratic machinery and of putting a brake on activities against religion. The struggle against Islam was officially declared, resulting in the closing of most mosques (from 26,000 in 1912 to only a thousand in 1941), the burning of books written in Arabic, the hunting down of clergy (often on grounds of spying for Japan), and the exclusion of Muslim followers from local Communist Parties. In 1934, the last *waqf* were requisitioned.²⁷ Like the Orthodox Church, Islam found itself accused of having been a linchpin of the tsarist government and of having collaborated with it in the counter-revolutionary effort.

The first decades of the Soviet power thus revealed the violence of atheist ideology and how it put the repressive apparatus at its service. The relatively relaxed situation in Central Asia lasted only until the start of the 1920s, before coming to resemble that already established in the other republics. Although it was different from the rest of the Union, and its atheist organizations particularly weak, Central Asia followed the same overall evolution. After a period of respite in the 1920s, repressive measures against Christianity and Islam gathered pace throughout the 1930s. Churches nearly ceased to exist on the institutional level and the clergy was massively deported.

22 For further details, see A. Bennigsen, C. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Sultan Galiev, le père de la révolution tiers-mondiste* (Paris: Fayard, 1986).

23 On the eve of the Revolution there were 12,000 mosques and 15,000 mullahs in Turkestan. Abdusamedov, Artykov, "Korennoe preobrazovanie sotsial'noi i dukhovnoi zhizni," p. 96.

24 M. Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity and Unveiling Under Communism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); D. Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

25 For further details, see S. Keller, *To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941* (Westport: Praeger, 2001).

26 A.V. Malashenko, "Religious and Political Change in Soviet Moslem Regions," in V. Naumkin, *State, Religion and Society: A Post-Soviet Critique* (Ithaca Press: Reading, 1993), p. 164.

27 R. Pipes, "Muslims of Central Asia, Trends and Prospects," *Middle East Journal* 9:2 (1955), pp. 147-162 and pp. 295-308.

THE POST-WORLD WAR II ORDER

With the onset of World War II, a period of relative religious tolerance began in the Soviet Union. After the Nazi troops entered Soviet territory on June 22, 1941, a period of national reconciliation and unity contributed to weakening atheist propaganda. The League of the Militant Godless was disbanded, anti-religious publications stopped, and atheist museums closed their doors. However, this liberalization only concerned the so-called “national” religions – those that lent praise to a national past that was more helpful than Soviet patriotism in mobilizing resistance against the Nazi invader. Lutheranism was banned from this revival of religion because Soviet Germans were generally accused of betrayal. And due to its strong ties with the West, Catholicism was also excluded. In 1944, the Armenian Church obtained the right to re-open seminars, ordinate priests, elect new catholicos, and recover certain places of worship in the Armenian SSR; however, in Central Asia, where many tens of thousands of Armenians lived, the situation of the Church failed to improve.

Orthodoxy was the first to benefit from the authorities’ newfound tolerance, which granted it a quasi-concordat. On September 4, 1943, Stalin received the three highest dignitaries of the church; later in the same year, an Episcopal synod gathered for the first time since 1917, obtained authorization to nominate a new patriarch, Sergey, and published a periodical, *Zhurnal moskovskoi patriarkhii*. The organizational framework of the Orthodox Church was restored: bishops were recognized as administrative units and the church once again had the right to possess means of transportation, to make objects of worship, and to collect incomes. In 1946, the seminaries reopened. This reversal on religion also benefited Islam. As early as 1942, the mufti of European Russia, A. Rasulaev, took the initiative to renew ties with the political power. Stalin chose to normalize relations with Islam in exchange for support in the war effort. Several spiritual Boards were created, in particular one for the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, founded in October 1943 with a see in Tashkent.²⁸ Islam was also granted permission to open the madrassah Mir-i Arab in Bukhara in 1945 and a number of mosques.²⁹

The loosening of repressive measures was less of a reality in Central Asia. In the Kremlin’s eyes, the area seemed much less threatened by Nazi invasion than the European Soviet Republics or the Caucasus. As a result, it was only towards the end of the war that Christian minorities benefited from this

28 Also created in 1944 were the Spiritual Board of the Shia Muslims and of the Sunni Muslims from Transcaucasia, North Caucasia and Dagestan. The Board of European Russia and Siberia took over from the one created by Catherine II in 1783. The administration of official Islam concerned only the Sunni and the duodecimal Shia. The Ismaelians, the Bahais, the Gholats and the Yezidis did not have any recognized Soviet structure.

29 Y. Ro’i, *Islam in the Soviet Union: From World War II to Perestroika* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

relative tolerance.³⁰ Religious communities became aware of the advantages they could gain from calling to fight against Nazi Germany, so in 1944-45 in particular many requests for officialization were submitted to the Soviet authorities. Such requests commonly made pleas for church registration so they could “pray for the victory against the enemy.”³¹ At the war’s end, the state directed administrative authorities not to hinder official priests who wished to practice in cities without church or prayer house.³² However, it was not until many years later that the situation of the Christian movements in Central Asia really began to stabilize.

The war over, religion was no longer of interest to the authorities, and, starting already in September 1944, Stalin’s tone changed. The fast emerging cold war logic meant the regime could once again combat religion without having to justify its policies on the international stage. 1947 was particularly stamped by a resurgence of anti-religious policy. The banning of believers from state institutions and the Party, the increasing severity of criticisms in the newspapers, and the creation of a society called *Znanie* to replace the League of the Godless Militants, presaged the tightening of measures to come. At the same time, there was also a revival of academic atheism, of which B. Bonch-Bruевич was the spearhead.³³

The Soviet authorities divided religions and cults of the USSR into three categories, and were thereby able to create some variability in the liberties granted to each. The first category was comprised solely of the Orthodox Church. It came under the supervision of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, which the Council of People’s Commissars created in September 1943. All the other Christian churches and recognized religions (Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, etc.) came under the jurisdiction of the Council for Religious Affairs of non-Orthodox faiths, formed in May 1944.³⁴ Just like their predecessors, both councils oversaw the correct implementation of legislation and facilitated dialogue between the state and religious institutions. A third

30 Much evidence gathered during interviews in the different republics of Central Asia with aged people showed they had strong reservations concerning a genuine and considerable change in the religious policy during World War II.

31 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Pavlodarskoi oblasti, f. 646, op. 1, d. 553, l. 61; quoted in *Iz istorii russkoi pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Pavlodarskom Priirtysh’e. Sbornik dokumentov* (Pavlodar: NPF “EKO,” 1999), p. 156.

32 A letter written by the delegate to the Council for the Religious Affairs of the Orthodox Church to the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR was distributed on that subject at the end of 1947. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

33 For a history of atheism and propaganda in the Soviet Union, see D. Powell, *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union: A Study of Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1975); D.V. Pospelovskiy, *A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism and Soviet Antireligious Policies* (London, Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 70.

34 O. Luchterhandt, “The Council for Religious Affairs,” in S.P. Ramet, ed., *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 57.

and final category included all religions not recognized by the state which the authorities wanted to combat in an official and efficient manner. The NKVD (to become the KGB in 1954) was given the responsibility for controlling and eradicating them.

The existence of numerous Protestant denominations was a strong cause of concern for the authorities, since they had a well-known propensity for proselytism. As soon as the war ended, the Soviet state decided to bring together certain influential Protestant groups into a single organization, which was officially sanctioned in exchange for collaboration. In October 1944, a Congress held in Moscow sealed a union between Evangelists and Baptist Christians, both of whom were the most numerous and widespread in Soviet territory.³⁵ In the light of considerable presence of both denominations in Kazakhstan, the Kazakhstani delegates were particularly numerous.³⁶ The Baptist and Evangelist groups of the city and the *oblast* of Tashkent were the first to recognize this union, followed by all of the Central Asian communities. The Union of the Evangelist and Baptist Christians attempted to attract other Protestant denominations on the pretext of cultural and theological similarities: in August 1945, the Pentecostals also joined the Union, and then, in 1963, after long years of debate, most of the Brethren Mennonite communities did so as well.³⁷

However, the government could not bring together all of these churches and denominations. The Catholic, Lutheran, and Armenian churches remained largely separate, with no official registration or places of worship anywhere in Central Asia, but still under the control of this same Council for Religious Affairs. The Council also dealt with the Old-Believers and other Russian schismatic movements, whose membership lived mainly in Siberia and Kazakhstan but had been weakened by the persecutions carried out in the 1930s.³⁸ There were a few remaining movements that the state refused to recognize. Some, like the Jehovah's Witnesses, were ruled out from registering due to their openly anti-communist theses.³⁹ Witness groups were discovered by chance in some country regions, notably in Kazakhstan. They had set up clandestine accommodation to celebrate worships, since they refused to attend Orthodox churches, and some even engaged in proselytizing actions.⁴⁰ The "True Orthodox Christians" (*istinno-pravoslavnye khristiane*), a movement emergent under the Soviet regime whose members chose to lead an itinerant life and opted for

35 M. Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia. Protestant Opposition to Soviet Religious Policy* (London-Melbourne-Toronto-New York: Macmillan, St Martin's Press, 1968), p. 5.

36 *Bratskii vestnik* 1 (1945), p. 11.

37 *Glaube in der Zweiten Welt* 7-8 (1989), p. 26.

38 C. Lane, *Christian Religion in the Soviet Union. A Sociological Study* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 115-120.

39 "Opyt nauchno-issledovatel'skoi raboty mezhvuzovskoi kafedry nauchnogo ateizma," *Vo-prosy nauchnogo ateizma* 15 (1973), p. 240.

40 F. Fedorenko, *Sekty, ikh vera i dela* (Moscow: Politicheskaya literatura, 1965), p. 207; W.C. Fletcher, *L'Église clandestine en Union soviétique* (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1972), p. 137.

complete withdrawal from society, constituted a similar case. The “Children of God” (*Bozh'i deti*) were theologically close to the True Orthodox Christians, and developed mainly in Kazakhstan. Its followers wholly rejected all aspects of this world, including even music instruments, and refused to talk to anyone outside the movement.⁴¹

The development of religion in Central Asia was thus quite distinct from that of European Russia. While in the latter Christianity enjoyed widespread recognition during the war and later had to endure more difficult years, in Central Asia, after having been through the inconveniences of a peripheral situation during the war, religion came to discover its benefits after the war.⁴² This fact particularly affected the Orthodox Church, which derived little benefit from the years 1943-46, but could continue its reconstruction more peacefully than its coreligionists from Russia. The eparchy of Tashkent and Central Asia re-opened in 1947. Some regional churches were authorized and priests appointed to replace the religious staff which had been decimated.⁴³ On a local level, the opening sometimes occurred so late that the population did not have the time to enjoy it. For instance, the local administration authorized the reconstruction of the church in Samarkand, but stopped the building work after the war.⁴⁴ In Turkmenistan, a few communities experienced noticeably renewed activity and the 1948 earthquake caused a wave of church reconstructions.⁴⁵

The region's number of religious Christian communities increased considerably during the war due to the deportation of “punished peoples.” That villages of deported persons were so remote and their situation so completely isolated (Germans did not have the right to settle in Kazakhstani cities before 1955) provided some compensation at a religious level. Although churches were not officially sanctioned, fewer controls existed due to the absence of any authorized prayer houses. This absence did not present any problems for the Protestants, who often allocated to laymen an important part in the life of the parish. Catholicism found itself in a similar situation. Forced to cease all its activities in Central Asia in the aftermath of the revolution, the Catholic Church, trying to survive, took advantage of the isolation of Germans and Poles, especially in northern Kazakhstan. After Stalin's death, thousands of prisoners were liberated, among whom were some Catholic priests who returned to the area and clandestinely reorganized the parishes. Although they were not officially sanctioned, the priests in these remote regions had the benefit of rela-

41 The movement was to be banned and its leaders sentenced in 1958; N. Struve, *Les chrétiens d'URSS* (Paris: Seuil, 1964), p. 218.

42 W. Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union* (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 84-87.

43 *Zhurnal moskovskoi patriarkhii* 10 (1946), p. 62 and 12 (1946), p. 44.

44 Muzarenko, *Evolutsiia russkogo pravoslaviia*, p. 104.

45 *Zhurnal moskovskoi patriarkhii* 2 (1958), p. 17.

tively tolerant authorities and operated until the 1960s at which time they, too, incurred the same inconveniences as other underground parishes.⁴⁶

Being in a peripheral situation, then, seems to have created a climate in Central Asia in which Christian religious repression was fairly lax. So despite renewed attempts at atheist discourse, the southern republics enjoyed greater flexibility in relation to the authorities than in the USSR's Russian or the European republics. While no concessions were ever officially made, either to the German minority, or to Catholicism – that symbol of the West – the Orthodox Church and certain Protestant movements, such as the Baptists, managed to retain the few advantages they had won. Yet, this is perhaps partially due to the fact that, in the eyes of the authorities, the Christian churches of Central Asia had very little significance. Not only did they form a minority compared to Islam, the state's main religious partner in Central Asia, but these Christians were also less visible to foreign observers than those of the European regions of the USSR. They were isolated, unable to file protest and thus proportionally less listened to.

So, after more than thirty years of the Soviet regime, the authorities had come to insist on not treating religion as a single bloc against which a uniform policy of exclusion would suffice. Policies varied depending on many factors: whether the religion was in a more easily controlled central region or a peripheral region, which were generally more subject to the weight of tradition and the goodwill of local administrations; whether it was a less-practiced religion, such as Buddhism, or Islam and Orthodoxy, which were more difficult to control; and, finally, policy was alert to intra-denominational tendencies, which varied from dissidence to open political rallying.

THE PROCESSES OF REGIONAL AND DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

The Renewal of Atheist Campaigns

Stalin's death in March 1953 marked a fundamental turning point in the history of the Soviet Union. Considered until then as a totalitarian system, the USSR slowly drifted toward an authoritarian and police regime. The new secretary of the Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, initiated a partial process of de-Stalinization during the 20th Congress in 1956. But although this process questioned the excesses of Stalinism, it did not question the functioning of the regime itself. So, while an end was put to mass repressions, there was at the same time an attempt to "return to Leninism," accompanied by all of the myths inherent in such a notion, among them the atheist desire to get rid of religion. The end of the Stalin years and the transition prior to Khrushchev's rise to power already indicated the new tightening of policy toward religion.

46 *W stepie dalekim: Polacy w Kazachstanie; V stepi dalekoi: Poliaki v Kazakhstane* (Poznań-Almaty: Wystawa, 1997), pp. 77-79.

As early as summer 1954, a potent atheist campaign was organized in rural areas, but the CPSU Central Committee stopped it after only four months. In Kazakhstan, anti-religious periodicals denounced the formation of new religious communities around displaced populations and "punished peoples."⁴⁷

In 1959, the first Secretary of the Communist Party decided to launch a new campaign against religion, giving himself five years to force out religion from Soviet society and promising to show soon to the world the "last Christian in the USSR." In 1960, V. Kuroyedov, who remained in office until 1985, replaced G.G. Karpov as the President of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. Khrushchev confirmed this political line at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961. Within a few years Orthodoxy lost most of the rights it had managed to acquire during World War II. Throughout the USSR, authorities closed about 11,000 out of 20,000 places of worship, 53 out of 66 monasteries, and five out of the eight Orthodox seminaries.⁴⁸ The campaign particularly targeted young people, whom the authorities wanted to keep away from religion. The entry of the young into religion was controlled. In April 1962, the 14th Congress of the Komsomols restricted the right to freedom of conscience to adults alone. Thus, parents providing a religious education to their children could be deprived of custodial rights.⁴⁹

The practice and the process of denigrating religion had changed since Stalinist-era terror. Although there was still an atheist militancy, the authorities feared popular reaction. As a result, they sometimes directly targeted believers, but preferred to lobby accusations in indirect ways, often, for instance, by denouncing church corruption cases. They also made use of apostate priests to demonstrate the church's institutional deviancy, they charged religious communities with being profitable ventures, and accused certain priests of such irreparable evils as war-time collaboration with the Nazis.⁵⁰ The local press disseminated remarks made by persons belonging to the religious order, ministers or mere believers who had converted to atheism. These remarks made possible the closing of places of worship without any legal procedure.⁵¹ The press presented most of the small denominations as a dense set of "Christian sects" and issued blanket accusations of corruption and anti-Sovietism.⁵²

47 See N. Dzhandil'din, "Sovershenstvovat' formy i metody ideologicheskoi raboty," *Partiinaiia zhizn' Kazakhstana* 5 (1963), p. 11. Also see *Pravda Vostoka* 26 (September 1962), which reported the persistence of cults and sacraments, including among persons involved in the Party's structures.

48 W. van den Bercken, *Ideology and Atheism in the Soviet Union* (Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1989), p. 114; M. Bourdeaux, "The Black Quinquennium: The Russian Orthodox Church 1959-1964," *Religion in Communist Lands* 1-2 (1981), pp. 18-23.

49 See "Eure Kinder werden weggenommen," *Glaube in der Zweiten Welt* 9 (1984), p. 10.

50 *Bloknot Agitatora* 25 (1961), p. 57; *Pravda Vostoka*, 16 February 1961.

51 10,000 churches were slated to be closed during the last four years of Khrushchev's rule. See Bourdeaux, *Religious Ferment in Russia*, p. 13.

52 *Kazakhstanskaia pravda* 17 February 1963, p. 4; "Christian Churches and Sects in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," *Central Asian Review* 4 (1963), pp. 346-347.

Specific Developments in the Central Asian Context

Regarding policies on nationalities, Khrushchev's aim was to revive the policy of indigenization and to have the Central Asian Muslim dignitaries take part in his foreign policy. But the new atheist campaign by no means spared Islam. Between 1958 and 1965, the number of authorized mosques in Central Asia dropped from 1,500 to 500 and more than a thousand anti-Islamic books were published during the same period.⁵³ In Central Asia, Christianity, not Islam, was eventually relatively more protected, although it did not escape the new wave of repression.

Orthodoxy was one of the first targets. Fourteen churches were closed in Kyrgyzia and Tajikistan during the Khrushchev era.⁵⁴ At the beginning of the 1960s, only four churches existed in Turkmenistan, one each in Ashkhabad, Chardzhou, Krasnovodsk, and Mary.⁵⁵ As of November 1959, the archbishop of Tashkent was no longer permitted to organize charities, which official Soviet legislation now banned. In December 1961, a radical measure was put forward by the Uzbek delegate to the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, Sh. Shirinbaev: the abolition of the eparchy of Tashkent and Central Asia.⁵⁶ This measure was not followed-up on, but a campaign was later launched in the local press against allegedly corrupt priests. The Catholic Church, which was trying to recover from the severe blows it had been dealt since the Revolution, was forced to close the few parishes that until this point it had unofficially been permitted to run, in particular in Kazakhstan.⁵⁷

Nevertheless, Central Asian churches on the whole were less affected by the atheist campaign than Russian ones, due to distance and the specific situation of this region. Kazakhstan was home to an exiled German minority that between 1955 and 1960 managed to regain some of its rights. The republic was also earmarked for a huge virgin-land clearance project. So, the numbers of Russians continued to increase. From 1954 onwards, more than two million "volunteers" flew in and cleared twenty-five million hectares over six years.⁵⁸ This program only strengthened the national reality of the republic. Deported peoples were already responsible for exploiting the coal and copper mines of the regions of Karaganda and Dzhezkazgan, while the Gulag (*steplag*) allowed the exploitation of the steppes in the north. To these prisoners can be added

53 A. Bennigsen, C. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, *Les musulmans oubliés: l'Islam en Union soviétique* (Paris: Maspero, 1981), p. 188.

54 A speech by Vladimir, the archbishop of Tashkent and Central Asia, at the celebration of the 125th anniversary of the Orthodox eparchy of Tashkent, 1996 (unpublished document given to the author by the episcopate of Central Asia).

55 A.M. Chipiris, "Sovremennoe sektantstvo v Turkmenskoi SSR," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk turkmenskoi SSR (Seriia obshchestvennykh nauk)*, 5 (1964), p. 75.

56 Muzarenko, *Evoliutsiia russkogo pravoslaviia*, p. 107.

57 *W stepie dalekim: Polacy w Kazachstanie*, p. 83.

58 M. Pohl, "The Virgin Lands Between Memory and Forgetting: People and Transformation in the Soviet Union, 1954-1960." PhD. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1999).

the Russians sent to the region for the virgin lands campaign as well as those come to undertake two large Soviet technological projects on Kazakhstani territory – the Baikonur Cosmodrome and the Semipalatinsk nuclear polygon.

The new industrial villages in the steppes led to the construction of some places of worship; the isolation of these communities of European origin ruled out any ideas of totally controlling local religious activities. The Soviet state was actually also compelled to make a few compromises with the newcomers, whose conditions of settlement were difficult, and so once the Komsomol brigades left the atheist campaign was relaxed. In the press stories were reported of the creation of previously unknown Russian sects in the new villages, like the *Bozh'i Korovy* or the “ladybirds.”⁵⁹ Accounts from believers come to settle in this region all spoke of a period of unofficial renewal, once more revealing the Soviet regime's – relative but real – pragmatism when it came to managing troublesome areas.⁶⁰ In order to better establish their presence in the region, the authorities felt it necessary, where politics and economics were concerned, to have Russians occupy positions of decision-making power in Central Asia. However, the state was at the same time obliged to reckon with the minority status of Russians within a Muslim-dominated Central Asia whose population was still mainly agricultural, uneducated, and above all had little mobility. It thus seems that the prevailing social and political position of Russians and other “Europeans” in the republics of Central Asia compelled the authorities to make concessions, notably on the religious level.

This minimal religious compensation given to believers in Kazakhstan also affected Germans. In September 1955, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had inaugurated diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany, visited Moscow. The West German leader managed to negotiate new statuses for the Germans prisoners deported during the war with his Soviet counterparts. After German-Soviet relations returned to normal, the German minority was no longer labeled a “punished people” and its isolated citizens were allowed to move to cities or the mostly German villages of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The political authorities themselves encouraged this regrouping as they hoped it would enable better control of the communities. However, Germans did not attain the right to return to their former autonomous republic of the Volga.⁶¹

This relaxation of national policy had religious consequences, as the Menonite and Lutheran Churches comprised mainly Germans. For the believers,

59 Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, p. 348.

60 Interviews carried out in the cities of the north of the country: Karaganda, Astana, Semipalatinsk, Kokchetau, Petropavlovsk, and Pavlodar, Spring 2000.

61 In February 1957, the authorities rehabilitated the deported nationalities. Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karatchais, and Kalmouks all eventually returned to their autonomous regions, with the exception of the Poles. As for the Germans and the Tatars of Crimea, they were obliged to remain in their zones of deportation.

this political change made it possible to use their numbers to gain some legitimacy with the local administrations. A few symbolic registrations of Lutheran churches after 1957 made the regime's concessions official.⁶² The control of the militia somewhat slackened, in particular for the Mennonites, who then could network between communities in Central Asia. Though these movements were not completely suppressed, as Khrushchev had promised they would be, they did not avoid all forms of repression. Leaders from local Protestant communities were arrested and the daily life of believers continued to be difficult. In order to avoid sanctions, the meeting place was regularly changed and services were sometimes not held for extended periods.

The Birth of Dissident Movements

The atheist campaign of 1959 once again forced religious movements to choose either between cooperating with the authorities, or refusing to do so and leading clandestine or semi-clandestine religious lives. Orthodoxy had to deal with the atheist campaign despite having submitted to political power. On the eve of Khrushchev's removal, there were only 46 Orthodox registered communities in Kazakhstan, 25 in Kyrgyzstan, 20 in Uzbekistan, 5 in Tajikistan, and 4 in Turkmenistan.⁶³ Resentment against the authorities thus became more acute as anti-religious measures intensified, giving birth to the first dissident movements. There were few protests coming from within the Orthodox Church in the USSR, in Central Asia especially where the Christians' minority status and condition of isolation consigned them to relative silence. However in Tashkent, Archbishop Ermogene stridently opposed the regime's laws and his Church's submission to power, attempting to continue regardless of the ban on organizing charitable works. As soon as he took office in 1953, he had the cathedral in Tashkent and a church in Samarkand rebuilt. He refused to exclude the young and began training a new generation of priests. His actions earned him the ire of the political authorities, who accused him of "keeping all privileges of the years before the Revolution," summarily dismissed him from his see and transferred him to the Kaluga region.⁶⁴

Though the Orthodox institution remained very centralized, the other Christian movements could not handle their internal opposition. The Protestant strains were most affected by schisms, around which some non-registered communities decided to regroup in order to cope with the difficulties. By the end of the 1940s, they formed the first Council of the non-Registered Communities of the Union in Tashkent (*Ob"edinennyi sovet po tserkovnym voprosam neofitsial'nykh obshchin goroda Tashkenta*), which arrogated the right to appoint preachers in order to free itself from the influence of both the state and the official hierarchy. Other groups in Central Asia followed this example.

62 H. Römmich, "Evangelische Gemeinden in Russland nach einem halben Jahrhundert Sowjetherrschaft," *Kirche im Osten* 14 (1971), pp. 145-146.

63 *Zhurnal moskovskoi patriarkhii* 2 (1993), p. 20.

64 Muzarenko, *Evoliutsiia russkogo pravoslaviia*, pp. 108-109.

The true split of the Protestant world in the Soviet Union occurred during the 1960s. The Baptist and Evangelical Union were given a new status, eliciting very strong reactions of protest from among the clergy and faithful.⁶⁵ These protesters organized themselves and created a dissident Baptist Union in August 1961. This Union not only formally challenged the laws, but also refused to apply them. In 1965, these dissidents founded the Council of the Christian Evangelical and Baptist Churches (*Sovet tserkvei evangel'skikh khristian-baptistov*), whose members were more commonly called *Initiationniki*.⁶⁶ In Central Asia, a similar dissident structure existed from 1964 with the creation of the Brotherly Council of the Churches of Southern Asia (*Bratskii sovet tserkvei po iugu Azii*).⁶⁷ The *Initiationniki* formed communities, mostly in Kazakhstan⁶⁸ but also in Kyrgyzia (in the regions of Issyk-Kul, Frunze, and Kant), in Tajikistan (Dushanbe and Ordzhonikidzeabad), and in Uzbekistan (Tashkent, Ferghana, Namangan, and Iangiul'). Many other groups were formed in these regions during the 1970s and 1980s.

Under Khrushchev, national and religious differentiation in policy platforms proved a significant advantage to religion in Central Asia. This differentiation became necessary on account of the European minorities living in the area – not only deported Germans and Poles, but also Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian “volunteers” who had come for the virgin lands campaign. The Protestant movements then distinguished themselves by the major role they played in the birth of religious dissidence. Brezhnev’s policy of indigenizing officials further accentuated the religious specificities of Central Asia.

THE BREZHNEV DECADES: POLITICAL STAGNATION AND RELIGIOUS DYNAMICISM?

The removal of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 left entire sections of the policy he had pursued for more than eight years open to question. The long period that stretched from the rise to power of Leonid Brezhnev to the beginning of the perestroika, a period commonly referred to as the “stagnation” (*zastoi*), proposed a new approach to the Soviet Union. Certain economic reforms were temporarily suspended and others begun before eventually being reined in by

65 See the story of a former pastor from Central Asia, T. Quiring, “Die Kontroverse um die staatliche Kontrolle bei den Baptisten seit 1961: Erfahrungen des Leiters einer registrierten Baptistengemeinde,” *Glaube in der Zweiten Welt* 11 (1988), pp. 18-32.

66 According to Soviet sources, 110,000 Baptists joined the ranks of the reformed in 1963, and 155,000 in 1966, see G.S. Lialina, *Baptizm. Illiuzii i real'nost'* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), p. 42.

67 O.P. Kislova, “Sovetskoe zakonodatel'stvo o kul'takh i ego znachenie dlia preodeleniia khristianskogo sektantstva.” *Avtoreferat* (Tashkent, 1972).

68 *Initiationniki* groups were located in almost all large Kazakh cities in the 1960s and early 1970s. These cities include: Aktiubinsk, Alma-Ata, Dzhambul, Dzhzhakzgan, Karaganda, Kokchetav, Pavlodar, Saran, Semipalatinsk, Syrianovsk, Trofimovka, and Tselinograd.

opponents. The political authorities' desire for stabilization was accompanied by a search for economic efficiency and a rationalization of the pressures put on cadres, which confirmed the ideological decline of the regime. The Brezhnev period remains a period in which there was an at once voluntary and involuntary decentralization and a profound transformation in Soviet society: demographic differentiation between "European" and "Muslim" peoples, massive urbanization, the development of an informal society, and a seizing-up economy operating in a permanent system of deficit.

A Veneer of Tolerance

Upon coming to power, the new first Secretary drew on the lessons of Khrushchev's failed eradication of religious institutions. He revised and corrected the Party line; the leadership became aware of the inefficiency of any direct and general confrontation with religion. Brutal methods of propaganda were criticized. More than ever, the authorities understood that they could not eradicate faith, and that they had to settle for some sort of measured and pragmatic cohabitation.⁶⁹ The objective was then to exploit religions by admitting they had a certain influence, but forcing them in return to enter into a role of support of official values. Brezhnev curbed the closing of the places of worship and simplified the perception of the religious landscape by the authorities. The Orthodox Church and all recognized movements were as of December 1965 group under a single authority, the Council of Religious Affairs.⁷⁰

This contradiction between halting the anti-religious campaign and refusing to repeal the policy carried out until that point, told of the uncertainties and fluctuations in the government's attitude towards religion until perestroika. From 1965 to 1979 anti-religious articles published in the Soviet press became increasingly rare (a more aggressive phase started again at the start of the 1980s but was quickly stopped). Most ideological writings during this time did not focus on religion. As in previous years, atheist campaigns were acceptable, but the prevailing mood varied between denouncing and recognizing the legitimacy of religious movements, churchgoers, and their leaders. The signing of the final part of the Helsinki Accords in August 1975 furnished the religious dissidence with a crucial instrument. The signed agreements did not impose restrictions on authorities, but it included the famous "third basket" dealing with human rights, and thereby aided a legal dissidence to emerge which de-

69 The two main atheist magazines, *Ezhegodnik muzeia istorii religii i ateizma* and *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma*, had their publication stopped. *Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma* replaced the latter in 1966.

70 The religions and denominations were now split up into three departments: a department for the affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church, one for Islam and Buddhism, and a separate one for Judaism, and the Protestant, Catholic and Armenian Churches, as well as for the movements referred to as "sects." Luchterhandt, "The Council for Religious Affairs," p. 59.

manded that the authorities respect the international agreements they themselves had signed.⁷¹

The USSR thus much publicized the various concessions it granted to religion, in the hope of reinforcing its international legitimacy. The rights conceded remained, however, strictly subordinated to the state's designs and often created no more than a simulation of religious freedom. This simulation allowed movements such as the Baptist and Evangelist Union and the Orthodox Church to regain a more official status,⁷² and the Lutheran Church to get new rights. The authorities also sought to kill two birds with one stone: by authorizing the official movements to open new Churches, they hoped to persuade the unregistered currents that they had nothing to gain by remaining in clandestinity. Thus from 1977 until perestroika, the Baptist Church was permitted to open across the entirety of Soviet territory some 300 new places of worship, the Lutheran Church 129 and the Catholic Church 40, whereas adherents to Orthodoxy, which had no real clandestine groups, only obtained authorization to open a mere 33 new buildings.⁷³ The gulf thus widened further between the official movements and the strains that had experienced schisms during the preceding decades.

Legislation was revised at the adoption of a new constitution on October 1977. This document maintained the principle of exclusion of religion in the long term, but at the price of recognizing temporary cohabitation. The emphasis was placed on a formal prohibition on including minors in religious practices: the youth were no longer to slip through the atheist net. The intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the missile crisis in Europe in 1983 ended this policy of *détente*. The renewal of tensions between the two geopolitical blocs freed the Soviet authorities from their obligations to keep up appearances. There was a noticeable increase at the time in the number of religious prisoners, which jumped from 180 imprisoned Christians in 1979 to 400 in 1982.⁷⁴ However, by allowing some believers to go abroad and by authorizing European religious officials in remote regions such as Central Asia, the Soviet authorities involuntarily opened a breach in the wall of opaqueness that it had long maintained on religious matters.

71 M. Sapiets, "One Hundred Years of Adventism in Russia and the Soviet Union," *Religion in Communist Lands* 3 (1984), p. 271.

72 In Kazakhstan in the second half of the 1960s, these two Churches counted respectively 20 official communities and 46 prayer houses as compared with only 25 mosques. See M.S. Fazylov, *Religiia i natsional'nye otnosheniia* (Alma-Ata, 1969), p. 76. For more information on the relations between the Orthodox Church and power, see W. C. Fletcher, "Backwards from Reactionism: the De-modernization of the Russian Orthodox Church," in Dunn, ed., *Religion and Modernization*, pp. 205-238.

73 Pospelovsky, *A History of Marxist-Leninist Atheism*, p. 114.

74 J. Anderson, "Soviet Religious Policy Under Brezhnev and After," *Religion in Communist Lands* 1 (1983), pp. 25-30. The Baptist movement counted 87 prisoners in 1979 and more than 200 in 1984. "Baptisty: uspekhi i poteri," *Posev* 8 (1983), p. 4 and 11 (1984), p. 3.

The Emergence of a Compromise with Islam

In Central Asia, the atheist campaign continued to affect Islam. From 1973 on, the authorities tightened their control over communities of worshippers, closed many non-registered mosques, and continued to denounce Islam as a religion which supported the status quo and was foreign and reactionary in its relationship to youths and women.⁷⁵ So-called parallel Islam was particularly targeted; there were more than 2,000 clandestine mosques compared with 365 official ones in the USSR,⁷⁶ and the clandestine network of Sufi brotherhoods (*tariqat*), in particular the *Naqshbandiyya*, was at the heart of unofficial religious activism. Despite these attacks, the Brezhnev era turned out to be rather advantageous to religions in Central Asia. Economic difficulties affected the region less than others in the USSR. It even enjoyed a rise in living standards. Improvements in health conditions as well as processes of demographic transition led to strong growth of so-called "Muslim" populations – 22.5 million people according to the 1959 census, and 42 million in 1979 – but this did not aid the resolution of other on-going problems such as poor social mobility and small numbers of mixed marriages.⁷⁷

Nationalization or indigenization was mostly carried out in political and administrative practices. The authorities wanted to reduce national inequalities within official governing bodies. Brezhnev did not launch great destabilizing reforms but he allowed much permissiveness. His policies were well received, in particular by the local elites who benefited from this so-called "stagnation." The republican leaders of the Communist Party had finally obtained stability and a situation within which they could pursue individual careers. This led to a system which favored clientelism and patronage and in which values of fidelity prevailed over competence or ideology. The Brezhnev years were indeed marked by the long "reigns" of the First Secretaries: Dinmuhammed Ku-naev ruled over Kazakhstan from 1959 to 1986, Sharaf Rashidov over Uzbekistan from 1959 to 1983, Muhammad Nazar Gapurov over Turkmenistan from 1969 to 1986, Zhabor Rasulov over Tajikistan from 1961 to 1982, and Turkadun Usubaliyev over Kyrgyzia from 1961 to 1985.

In 1964, Central Asia opened itself to foreign delegations and whenever international conferences were held there, Tashkent was presented as the great showcase of Soviet Islam. Brezhnev's USSR actually tried to present itself not only as a state that treated its national minorities well, but as a Muslim power. This "Islamic" strategy made systematic use of the Central Asian religious hierarchy in order to make overtures to the allied Muslim world, but also to pro-American conservative states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. In return, the authorities made a certain number of concessions to Islam. In 1971, a

75 *Khronika zashchity prav v SSSR*, vyp. 4 (1973), p. 36.

76 A. Bennigsen, "Islam in Retrospect," *Central Asian Survey* 8:1 (1989), p. 101.

77 H. Carrère d'Encausse, *L'empire éclaté: la révolte des nations en URSS* (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), pp. 311-330.

new madrassah, Al-Buhari, opened in Tashkent. Some students even received authorization to go to Egypt and other Arab countries to finish their studies. New publications were launched, particularly after 1968, when *Musul'mane v sovetskom Vostoke* [Muslims in the Soviet Orient] was first published in Uzbek and Arabic, and then in other languages.⁷⁸

Islam thus survived as an essential internal component of the whole Central Asian structure, as much officially as unofficially. Despite maintaining atheist ideological discourse, the authorities operated a tactical rapprochement on the practical level with Islam. Private religious freedoms were unofficially guaranteed in exchange for public political conformism. Believers were considered honest Soviet citizens and the officials representing the Spiritual Boards proclaimed compatibility between Islam and socialism on ideas of equality, the brotherhood of mankind, peace, and world disarmament. Socialism was accepted as a mode of management of reality, a program of economic and social development, and was not regarded as a rival ideology to Islamic faith. In this context, the level of religiosity – prayers, fasting during Ramadan, pilgrimages, payment of the dowry (*kalym*) – diminished, but a generalized observance of traditional family rites was maintained.

Local authorities, especially after local officialdom was largely indigenized, were increasingly reluctant to pursue any struggle against Islam. This situation provoked strong criticisms from atheist circles,⁷⁹ but these criticisms bore no consequence. The administrators of both the regional and republican governing bodies, who were often self-confessed or unofficial believers, showed significantly less enthusiasm to fight not only against Islam, but also, significantly, against the Christian denominations. Paradoxically, the Christian communities of Central Asia benefited from their minority status and from the traditional tolerance afforded other religions in Islamic lands. Muslims, even when they held high-ranked offices in Soviet bodies, did not conceal their respect for believers, of whatever religion.⁸⁰

Developments in the Situation of Christians in Central Asia

The Brezhnev years confirmed the distance between centralized religious policy and less rigorous local practices in Central Asia.⁸¹ Local administrations

78 S. Akiner, "Islam, the State and Ethnicity in Central Asia in Historical Perspective," *Religion, State and Society* 3 (1996), p. 109; M. Rywkin, "Islam and the New Soviet Man. 70 Years of Evolution," *Central Asian Survey* 4 (1987), p. 23.

79 "Fanatizm veruiushchikh i ravnodushie ateistov," *Pravda Vostoka* 24 February 1964; "Esli ty derevne ateist," *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 20 January 1970, p. 2; "Doiti do kazhdogo," *Sovetskaiia Kirgiziia*, 6 February 1973, p. 2; "Kadry ateistov," *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 27 February 1982, p. 1; "Siloi pechatnogo slova," *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 4 September 1982.

80 Indeed, during the interviews, many believers and hierarchs mentioned the relative permissiveness of the "autochthonous" or "Muslim" administrators in the management of religious issues and therefore the relative freedom of the Brezhnev era.

81 J.W. Warhola, "Central vs. Local Authority in Soviet Religious Affairs 1964-89," *Journal of Church and State* 1 (1992), pp. 15-37.

were thus free to give their own subjective interpretations of legislation depending on the church or denomination. This created difficulties for churches, to which the Orthodox Church was no exception, especially in cases of communities guided by priests in disgrace. One such community in the Ferghana Valley had its application for official status refused due to its support for its previous head priest, whose religious zeal had earned him outlaw status.⁸² The eparchy thus suffered a few setbacks, but it remained less troubled than other denominations by the difficulties involved in opening new places of worship. The Central Asian authorities held a firm position, maintaining a balance between the presence of Islam and that of Orthodoxy, and as a result they gave the right to few new places of Christian worship.

Combined with the benefits flowing from agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany signed under Khrushchev, the policy of officialization of certain religious movements also impacted the German minority living in Central Asia. A decree issued by the Supreme Soviet of 1964 confirmed its rehabilitation and cleared it of all accusations of collaboration during the war. The Mennonite Church was the most integrated and the release of its leader, D. Klassen, in 1965 was a sign of the changing relations between religion and state throughout Soviet territory.⁸³ Two years later, the Council for Religious Affairs accepted the registration of the Brethren Mennonite community of Karaganda in a framework similar to that of the Baptist and Evangelical Union, confirming this change.⁸⁴ This was the first time in the history of the Soviet Union that the Brethren Mennonites had obtained official status. Still, it would be another ten years before any new registrations were accepted – Georgievka and Merke in the South of Kazakhstan in 1976, and Novo-Pavlovka, near Frunze, in 1977.⁸⁵ The aim of the authorities was to bring the separate strands of individual movements, such as the Old-Mennonites and the Brethren, closer together in a bid to compel groups reluctant to register to make themselves known. Thus, in Central Asia, the authorities encouraged Brethren Mennonites to accept Old-Mennonites into their places of worship and invited the majority strand to make overtures toward minority groups with a view to rapprochement.⁸⁶ As a result, the Brethren community's numbers in Karaganda rose considerably. Within a few years, more than 400 church-goers were registered there.⁸⁷

82 *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* 34 (December 1974), pp. 52-53.

83 H. Woelk, G. Woelk, *A Wilderness Journey. Glimpses of the Mennonite Brethren Church in Russia, 1925-1980* (Heinrich: Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies, Mennonite Brethren Biblical Seminary, 1982), p. 98.

84 It was founded in 1956, when 21 Brethren Mennonite families decided to withdraw from the Baptist community in order to form a Mennonite group, see M. and L. Bourdeaux, *Ten Growing Soviet Churches*, Keston College book no. 17 (London: Marc Europe, 1987), p. 85.

85 Woelk, *A Wilderness Journey*, p. 133; G. Stricker, W. Sawatsky, "Mennonites in Russia and the Soviet Union: An Aspect of the Church History of the Germans in Russia," *Religion in Communist Lands* 12:3 (1984), pp. 293-311.

86 V.F. Krest'ianinov, *Mennonity* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1967), p. 79.

87 Stricker, Sawatsky, "Mennonites in Russia," p. 313.

The aim of the more numerous denominations like the Baptists, Adventists, and Pentecostals, was to broaden their network of places of worship to become more visible, but administrative pressures against them remained strong. In the 1970s, a community of Baptists in the town of Issyk in Kyrgyzstan found itself in an inextricable situation. The prayer house was closed on the orders of the local administration because the community was not registered, but registration was only granted if a place of worship already existed.⁸⁸ The few groupings of Old-Believers that remained in Central Asia, particularly in Alma-Ata, Dzhambul, and Frunze, also applied for official status, but the process was long, and, in the large majorities of cases, would never materialize. The authorities hoped that a lack of members would result in their extinction.⁸⁹ The ever-widening gap between official atheist policy and the enthusiasm held by sections of the population towards religion reached a climax when, at the beginning of the 1970s in Alma-Ata, authorities discovered a warehouse filled with Bibles published by the Seventh Day Adventists in an official printing house.⁹⁰

The situation also continued to be difficult for the Catholic Church. The authorities could not force it into isolation, especially not in Central Asia where Karaganda was held up as the Catholic – Polish and German – center of the country. The communities of Kustanai and Alma-Ata were for some time the only ones to enjoy a (mere) verbal agreement on opening small chapels.⁹¹ From 1976 on, a first step towards tolerance was taken with the opening of a certain number of Catholic buildings.⁹² In 1977, Catholics were finally granted official status in Kazakhstan, in other words more than 20 years after the Lutherans were first granted rights.⁹³ This did not mean they had authorization to lead a genuine parochial life, since the authorities hindered Catholic priests from fulfilling their functions or strongly limited their activities.

There were also movements, such as the True Orthodox Christians or the Jehovah's Witnesses, to which the state never made any concessions. As for the former, Central Asia's isolation proved an asset. Believers lived their faith in autarky and did not wish to network with other fellow communities. The authorities, who thought they had dealt them a fatal blow during Khrush-

88 "Liberté religieuse et défense des droits de l'homme en URSS," *Istina* XXII (1977), pp. 84-85.

89 *Catacombes* 1 (1971), p. 11; "Rapport sur la situation des vieux-croyants en URSS (Janvier 69)," *Istina* XXII (1977), p. 58; D.V. Pospelovsky, *Soviet Antireligious Campaigns and Persecutions* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 152.

90 *Catacombes* (July-August 1972), p. 15. See also *Glaube in der Zweiten Welt* 9 (1979), p. 13 and 2 (1985), p. 8; *Chrétien de l'Est* 45 (1985), p. 53.

91 *W stepie dalekim: Polacy w Kazachstanie*, p. 85.

92 A women's monastery also opened in Karaganda. The following year, two churches registered, one in Karaganda and one in Tainch, and in 1978 another was registered in Aktiubinsk in 1978.

93 *W stepie dalekim: Polacy w Kazachstanie*, p. 87.

chev's anti-religious campaign, saw some groups of true Orthodox Christians re-emerge in 1986, in particular in the Temirtau region near Karaganda. Comprising only a few dozen people, one of these communities was brought immediately before the courts.⁹⁴ Isolation also seriously handicapped the Jehovah's Witnesses, being spiritually dependent on the see located in New York. However, they managed to obtain some religious books, in particular the journal *The Watch Tower* (*Storozhevaia bashnia* in Russian), so they could maintain the necessary relations with Brooklyn.⁹⁵ They stayed in restricted communities until they were recognized under Mikhail Gorbachev.⁹⁶

The Progressive Roots of Religious Dissidence

A twofold phenomenon characterized the Brezhnev era. On the one hand, the development of an intellectual and religious dissidence (the Catholics of Lithuania, the Jews, the intellectuals from the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia, the Catacomb Orthodox Church, etc.) and, on the other, a continual degradation of the Soviet Union's image abroad because of its human rights situation. The Orthodoxy dissidence remained essentially within the bounds of the Slavic republics, although the political authorities also had to cope with some demands and contentions in Central Asia. None of them, however, had the actual means to grow into a developed network, as did, for example, Gleb Iakunin's Christian Committee created in 1976. The local Orthodox hierarchy was generally submissive to the authorities, and it was always going to be improbable that any of its clergy members would join anti-establishment movements operating thousands of kilometers away from Central Asian parishes. If the isolation of Central Asia led the political authorities to make more concessions to Protestants to prevent them from going massively underground, in the case of Orthodoxy this isolation was disadvantageous, since the number of members of the Catacombs Church was quite insignificant.

Orthodoxy thus remained the most controlled of the Christian denominations in Central Asia. The authorities, whether federal or republican, organized kangaroo court trials to justify imprisoning refractory priests serving in large parishes. In 1969, an Orthodox priest of Kagan (Uzbekistan), P. Adelheim, was sentenced to three years of hard labor to set an example. His dynamism was strongly frowned upon by the authorities. He denounced Marxism, criticized the isolation in which the communities of the region lived in total absence of Christian literature, and above all declared his support for Gleb Iakunin.⁹⁷ Further trials held after this one did not have the same repercussions, but they

94 Fletcher, *L'Église clandestine en Union soviétique*, p. 241.

95 V.V. Konik, *Istiny svidetelei Iegovy* (Moscow: Politicheskaiia literatura, 1978), p. 80.

96 A. Bruskin, "Svidetel'stvuet svidetel' Iegovy," *Kazakhstanskaia pravda*, 16 and 17 March 1968.

97 *Pravda Vostoka*, 12 and 26 July 1970; *Catacombes* 18 (1973), p. 9. On the reasons for Adelheim's sentencing, see also *Vestnik russkogo khristianskogo dvizheniia* 97 (1970), pp. 157-163.

all demonstrated the difficulties members of Orthodoxy faced in organizing effective dissident actions in Central Asia.

For the Catholics, the policy of *détente* between the two blocs provided an opportunity to reaffirm their demands in the USSR. Each community entertained hopes of being helped by international organizations, whether religious or non-religious. Making contact, generally by mail but sometimes by radio messages, was risky, as each community remained under strict control. Geographic distance further increased the difficulties of this approach. There were many reported trials in the press about Catholic priests in Central Asia who had tried to develop foreign contacts. In 1973, a priest and a nun in Kazakhstan were put on trial for attempting to get assistance from Rome.⁹⁸

The Baptist, Adventist, and Pentecostal movements, which had branches throughout the country, had well-organized dissidence movements and were thus a major target of the authorities. Each of them saw at least one of their leaders in Central Asia charged and sentenced.⁹⁹ Action taken in 1979 in Tashkent against the leader of the reformed Adventists, V.A. Shelkov, provides one of the more remarkable cases in the history of repression against dissenting denominations in Central Asia and the Soviet Union more generally.¹⁰⁰ Shelkov had been the leader of the reformed Adventist movement since 1949 and had founded a clandestine publisher, *Vernyi svidetel'* [The Loyal Witness], which published abundant amounts of religious literature as well as many reports on the situation of the movement.¹⁰¹ Chosen by the political authorities as the symbol that had to be removed, he endured multiple trials and served one of the longest prison sentences in the history of Soviet dissidents.¹⁰² As his influence extended beyond the limits of the Uzbek SSR, a press campaign in Central Asian and Russia was launched against him.¹⁰³ At a fixed trial, during which he had no access to a genuine defense, he was again sentenced to serve five-years in a high-security camp in Yakutia.¹⁰⁴ His sentencing elicited many reactions

98 *Action Évangélique pour l'Église du silence* 21-22 (1973), p. 4.

99 The Pentecostalist leaders were particularly targeted. See for instance *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia*, 18 August 1985.

100 Extensive literature has been written on the trial, the sentencing, the conditions of imprisonment, and the death of V. Shelkov. See M. Sapiets, *True Witness: The Story of Seventh Day Adventists in the Soviet Union* (Kent: Keston College, 1990).

101 K. Murray, "Soviet Seventh-Day Adventists," *Religion in Communist Lands* 2 (1977), p. 90.

102 *Pravda Vostoka*, 27 May 1979.

103 "Izuver' v roli apostola," *Pravda Vostoka*, 27 May 1979; *Vechernii Tashkent*, 28 May 1979. The movement tried to answer these articles through a clandestine publication refuting the accusations and the assertions of one of the authors, who claimed to be an former member of the movement: *Pravda gazety Pravda Vostoka ili kto takoi Illarionov?* (Tashkent: Vernyi svidetel', 1979). On the perception by the authorities of the activities of the reformed Adventist Church, see also "Maestro iz 'vernogo ostatka'," *Pravda Vostoka*, 17 April 1984, p. 4.

104 The Adventists officially accused the administration of causing his death. *Cahiers du Samizdat* 74 (1981), p. 15.

in the dissident world. The Christian Committee of Iakunin responded first; Andrei Sakharov then called for assistance Pope John-Paul II, the Ecumenical Council of the Churches, as well to the heads of state who signed the Helsinki Accords, but it was in vain. He also went to Tashkent during the trial. In 1981, the Soviet press announced Shelkov's death in the camps at the age of 85.

The two decades of power under Brezhnev thus constituted a significant period in the history of Soviet and Central Asian Christianity, and the policy directions taken prefigured many of those pursued after independence in 1991. The region enjoyed relative prosperity due, among other things, to a certain decentralizing of economic and administrative power, as well as to the increasingly stable position of local officials. Islam was then reinforced as a national tradition and allowed a kind of tolerance of the "Muslim" local government officials towards the Christian minorities. Religious policy thus turned out to be more than wavering. The Christian communities were encouraged to become instruments in the legitimization of a political power searching for a consensual image, but even when they rallied around this cause, they continued to undergo harassment and daily administrative inconveniences. The leaders of the dissident movements had to cope with a continual desire of the authorities to find points of dispute, that is, with a power that no longer agreed with the idea of exerting mass violence against believers, but that still sought the most effective means to limit the religious reality.

CONCLUSION

The Bolshevik regime's basic premise was that religion, and any resurgence of the old values and symbols of tsarist Russia, had to be eradicated once and for all. Yet, during the second half of the 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev was obliged to recognize that religion would provide an essential role in the context of the reforms being envisaged for Soviet society. If Soviet power aimed to eliminate the phenomenon of religion from the entire geographic space it dominated, the reality of multiple regional specificities forced authorities to adopt various policies. What started out, then, as an ideological perception of faith became gradually and often involuntarily segmented in practice – geographically, denominationally and temporally. Central Asia was never fully integrated into the general policy of anti-religious struggle. Despite all the specificities of tsarist and then Soviet colonization in contrast to Western models, as a "colonial" land Central Asia compelled the Soviet authorities to revise their atheist policy. As a consequence, there existed an almost permanent contradiction between general atheist policy and a kind of "religious necessity" in Central Asia. Faith persisted thanks to the long history of the region as a land of exile and deportation and the indispensable feature of a massive Russian presence in these peripheral regions of the Soviet Union.

These specificities do not mean Central Asia should be considered a unique and fully-fledged entity, as if it could be systematically differentiat-

ed from the rest of the Soviet Union. There were many different tendencies within the region itself. Khrushchev's economic projects, for example, affected part of Siberia and notably Kazakhstan, but not the other republics of Central Asia. The Kazakh authorities were granted more leeway to let some religious movements develop. Considering that nearly uninhabited areas had been exploited as much agriculturally as industrially, they could not maintain as strict a control as that defined by Moscow. However, local authorities of other isolated regions, like Turkmenistan, sometimes undertook more severe repressive measures. As a result, some Christian leaders who were considered too active were eliminated with no trial. Yet in Kazakhstan, the elimination of Protestant personalities required at least a trial, even if it was a fixed one.

The regime thus displayed its uncertainties and its flexibility in the different approaches it adopted towards religions. Central Asia's isolation proved favorable to certain kind of movements (mostly Protestant) and unfavorable to others (Orthodox and Catholics). For instance, the authorities granted some concessions to Protestant groups from Central Asia that refused to submit to registration or to enter official unions. Numerous communities of Mennonites and Lutherans managed to function in this region, while elsewhere they were repressed. Other groups such the Russian schismatic movements, which were less important and in decline, were by contrast subject to more persecution in Central Asia than in Russia, where their numbers were greater. The regime was also quick to see the risks of any direct and immediate confrontation with Islam, whereas in Russia itself it immediately moved to implement repressive policies against Orthodoxy. During the last decades of the Soviet Union's existence, both religions were no longer on an equal footing. Islam was more favored in practice, especially with the entering of titular officials into local political governing bodies.

There are some aspects of these last decades of Soviet power that came to foreshadow the situation of Christianity in the post-1991, independent republics.¹⁰⁵ The Christian movements underwent a great change, going from a world in which all religion tended to be excluded from public life, to a situation in which they became a minority in Islam-dominated countries. One cannot help but wonder about the degree of continuity between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and of the relevance of the 1991 breakpoint regarding religion. The gap – already perceptible in the Soviet era – between so-called “national” Churches and proselyte Protestant movements continues to widen today. Missionary movements, which regard Central Asia as a new promised land and a space of evangelization, now question denominations traditionally present on the Central Asian territory. Thus, three questions arise here: the relationship between these divergent conceptions of Christianity, the competition created

105 On the post-Soviet period, see S. Peyrouse, *Des chrétiens entre athéisme et islam. Regards sur la question religieuse en Asie centrale soviétique et post-soviétique* (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2003).

by the new “spiritual market” of Central Asia, and, above all, the conversion of titular nationalities. Is Christianity destined to remain the religion of the former colonizers, or can it hope to “autochthonize” and root itself among the eponymous nationalities?

The Intimate Jokes of “Partocentrism” in Milan Kundera’s *The Joke* and Anchee Min’s *Wild Ginger*

PANAYOT KARAGYOZOV

INTRODUCTION TO *PARTOCENTRISM*

Partocentrism is a neologism following the pattern of such established terms as *theocentrism*, *anthropocentrism*, and *ethnocentrism*, and is meant to express the central role of the Party in social life and literature during the period of Communist totalitarianism.

Maksim Gorkii’s 1906 works, *Enemies* and *The Mother*, where for the first time, the struggle of the proletariat under the leadership of the party is shown, and Vladimir Maiakovskii’s poem, *V.I. Lenin* (1924), dedicated to the Russian Communist Party, became prototypes of the Communist *partocentric* literature. In the cult poem of *partocentrism*, the Soviet poet showed the two opposites of partisan existence: the collective anonymity of the masses, on the one hand,¹ and the Party individualism being identified with its leader, on the other hand.² From this point on, the Communist Party took center stage in the official, dissident, and emigrant Russian and Soviet literatures, and after World War II in the literatures of other socialist countries.

Socialist realism, which gained a “civil statute” and picked up steam after the First Congress of Soviet Writers (1934), was not identical with *partocentrism* – it was merely a part of it. The Communist *partocentrism* was a time span dominated by a certain ideology, theme circles, and imagery, while socialist realism was among a multitude of methods for its artistic interpretation.³

In his verse *To the Party* (1929), the Bulgarian poet Hristo Radevski formulated the dogma for the Party’s infallibility (“I know, I do believe you’re [the Party is] right, even at times when you go wrong.”) This dogma attached an *indulgence*, a sacramental absolution to the Party, meaning that even if one or all party members did wrong, the Party should not be held accountable. The Communist ideologues, implying that the Party is a living organism, “of flesh and blood,” brought a zoomorphic profile to its organization. Meanwhile, as the Party was gradually taking the shape of a phoenix, its members resembled chameleons, changing their colors out of fear of their own Party.

1 “The Party/is a million-strong hand,/clenched in a crushing fist./The one is rubbish, the one is zero...” (Vladimir Maiakovskii, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia v dvukh tomakh*, Vol. 2 [Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1953], p. 143).

2 “The Party and Lenin –/are twin brothers, [...] We say “Lenin,”/and we mean the Party,/we say “Party,”/ and we mean –/Lenin” (Maiakovskii, *Izbrannye proizvedeniia*, Vol. 2, p. 144).

3 F.D. Markov, *Genezis sotsialisticheskogo realizma* (Moskva, 1970); Edward Mozejko, *Realizm socjalistyczny* (Cracow, 2001), p. 11.

Created as a political organization, the Communist Party was becoming an institution of usurpation, absurdly combining the roles of legislator, prosecutor, and judge. From a legal standpoint, *Communist partocentrism* started with the liquidation of political pluralism, first with the establishment of an ideological monopoly, and then with the merger between the Party and state. The clause in socialist countries' constitutions about "the leading role of the Party in the state"⁴ legalized the existing party-state oligarchies and The Party, with a capital "P" and always with a definite article, started controlling the lives not only of its members but of all citizens within the country.⁵

Although *partocentrism* appeared among the Slavs at first, it is not a Slavic "patent." After World War II, with the establishment of Communist dictatorships in Albania, Romania, Hungary, East Germany, China, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua, *Communist partocentrism*, initially Slavic, went on to become a world phenomenon.

THE REAL AND ARTISTIC CHRONOTOPES OF THE WORLD *PARTOCENTRISM*

Despite the fact that it reflected the national specifics of the respective literatures, *world Communist partocentrism* was amazingly monolithic. The literary similarities were oftentimes consequences of the reproduction of established (mainly in Soviet literature) *partocentric archetypes*; however, those were essentially products of typology – the common ideological source, strictly defining the standards in a socialist society. Both the typical and the specific features of *Communist partocentrism* in different regions of the world are well demonstrated by the novels, *The Joke* (1965/7), by Milan Kundera and *Wild Ginger* (2002), by Anchee Min.

The starting points of comparison include both the works as such, along with the lives and creative paths of their authors. Despite the age difference and the vast distance between the birthplaces of Kundera (1930, Brno) and Min (1957, Shanghai), they share similar stories. Both, as youngsters, were actively (and, in their own way, sincerely) involved in Communist propaganda; however, later, disappointed by the regime's cynical demagoguery, they artistically denounced *partocentrism's* anti-human nature. Kundera has lived in France since 1975, and Min moved to the United States in 1984. Both successfully exploited socialism's material and spiritual paucity, making it a fertile leitmotif for their writings.

The artistic and historical times in the novels reviewed here are the same. The time period in *The Joke* is fifteen years; starting in 1949 when socialism was enforced in Czechoslovakia, going through the regime's partial and temporary liberalization after the death of Stalin (1953) and ending with the start of attempts in creating "socialism with a human face."

4 In the *Constitution of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 1960* this clause is contained in Article 4.

5 All bolds in text are added by the article's author.

From a chronological and ideological standpoint, *Wild Ginger* is a sequel to *The Joke*. Min situated the partisan and love passions of its characters at the apogee of the so-called Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Without being set apart as an epilogue of their own, the last parts of the book succinctly inform the reader about the renunciation of the Red Guards period and the ideological warming in China in the 1990s. Most of the story in this novel is synchronously and typologically similar to the period of the so-called "normalization" of socialism in Czechoslovakia (1969-1989). Even if the *Cultural Revolution* was a modification, "normalization" was a restoration of dogmatic socialism; they were both part of the partisan *Perpetuum Mobile* through which the Party, sacrificing its members, was being reborn for old/new life. This is why, regardless of the great distance between the small Central European Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the giant Asian People's Republic of China, the story in both books is set in the real and artistic *chronotope of world partocentrism*.

FROM A LOVE OF GOD, PARENTS, RELATIVES, AND TEACHERS TO A LOVE FOR THE PARTY

The *partocentric* society is based on collectivism and centralism. *Democratic centralism*, which is typical for the Communist Party, is an absurd attempt to combine the total dependence of the individual on the collective with the immense supremacy of the individual over the collective. This means that while the party members (and all the rest) depend on the Party, the Party obeys its secretary general. Communism rejects religion, and yet, mimicking church centralism, the Party and its leader are trying to replace the Church and God. Self-proclaimed as infallible, Communists strive for a reign not only of terror, but also of love.

Inasmuch as the love for parents, children and relatives is a consequence of the natural love between men and women, the basic form of love is sexual. It is love between equal individuals, and this is why we can describe it as a *horizontal love*. Love also has a non-corporeal *vertical* direction: down to the children, and up to the parents and God. Religious love also has vertical and horizontal dimensions: towards God and towards your fellow man. To these traditional manifestations of love, the era of socialism adds *the love for the Party and the Party leader*, which negates or subjugates the natural forms of human love.

Within the Communist totalitarian conventions, religious love and ideological love are incompatible. Just as religions do not allow worshipping other deities,⁶ *partocentrism* requires its subjects not to have any other graven images,

6 "...Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness [of any thing] that [is] in heaven above, or that [is] in the earth beneath, or that [is] in the water under the earth: Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them..." (*Torah/Old Testament, Ex. 20:3-5*).

neither in the country nor abroad. In both Kundera's and Min's novels, the love for God is shown in several varieties.

The only overt opponent of *partocentrism* in both novels is the mother of Wild Ginger, who calls upon God to straighten her daughter out, because she has been "brainwashed" by the Communists, "mad, like the rest of China."⁷ The opera singer, who had been removed from the scene for political reasons, believes that the cause for her child's "madness" is her name. Mrs. Pei and her late husband did not follow the suggestion to name their daughter Plain Water, but called her Wild Ginger instead, despite the fortuneteller's warning that there was too much fire in the newborn. This breach of tradition seemed to have caused their daughter to turn from the freedom-loving person of her parents' dreams into a zealous propagandist of totalitarianism.⁸

The other older characters in these novels are also looking for a connection between religion and Communism. However, while Jaroslav's father "sends all Communists to hell," and Maple's mother believes that the guilt lies with "the Communist party [which] had banned the worship of the Spirits. And this was how our ancestors showed their anger," the Protestant, Kostka, thinks that the guilt for the ensuing atheism also lies with the Church:

Of course the Communist movement is godless. Though only those Christians who refuse to cast out the beam in their own eye can blame Communism itself for that. [...] **The churches failed to realize that the working-class movement was the movement of the humiliated and oppressed supplicating for justice. [...] By siding with the oppressors, they deprived the working-class movement of God.**⁹

Forced to make a compromise between her sincere love for Buddha and the pretentious loyalty to Mao, Maple's mother, rather unwittingly than on purpose, mocks the Party leader. Shortly after assuring that "Chairman Mao's teachings will certainly strengthen" her to hold the enormous portrait, which is much too heavy for her, at the supreme moment of "artistically" expressed love for the Great Helmsman, she collapses with his portrait in her hands and with the words "Oh, Buddha Heaven!" on her lips.

The attempt to reconcile Christianity with Communism played an evil trick on Kostka, the representative of those among the believers who have been misled by the Communist demagoguery, who, stubbornly refuses to understand that the *partocentric* system had no place for God:

Until the February 1948 coup, my being a Christian suited the Communists quite well. They enjoyed hearing me expound on the social content of the Gospel, inveigh against the rot of the old world of property and war, and ar-

7 Anchee Min, *Wild Ginger* (New York, 2002), p. 25.

8 Ibid.

9 Milan Kundera, *The Joke* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993 [Definitive version fully revised by author. Originally published in Czechoslovakia by Československý spisovatel, 1967, under the title *Žert*]), pp. 208-209.

gue the affinity between Christianity and Communism. Their concern, after all, was to attract all major levels of the populace, and they therefore tried to win over believers as well.¹⁰

Kostka's "absolute certainty," that the "line of the European spirit, which stems from the teachings of Jesus, leads far more naturally to social equality and socialism,"¹¹ and because of that, is it possible "to build a socialist society without faith in the supremacy of matter?"¹² resembles the illusions of leftist intellectuals in the period between the two World Wars that the progress of science and technology alone would be sufficient to lead to socialism. After the Communists came to power, Kostka and his *Samaritanism*, defending students being persecuted for their parents' beliefs, became grounds for the professor to be removed from the University.

In *the spirit of the times*, the religious pacifist Bedřich also makes a connection between the peace-loving nature of Christianity and socialism, writing sincere "letters he'd addressed to Truman and Stalin, passionately appealing for the disbanding of all armies in the name of socialist brotherhood."¹³ Despite the predictable outcome of his initiative, the pious Christian awaits the victory of good over evil, and in the naïve style of the good soldier, Švejk, becomes a subject and not an object of the specific army humor:

in their confusion they [the army authorities] let him to take part in drill, and though he was the only man without a weapon, he went through the manual of arms perfectly with empty hands. [...] But when on his own initiative he made a poster calling for total disarmament and hung it in the barracks, he was court-martialed for insubordination. The judges, disconcerted by his pacifist harangues, had ordered him examined by a team of psychiatrists...¹⁴

Following the Christian belief that love for God shall set them free, the faithful pacifist turns his sentence to the ideological labor camp into a source of religious content:

Bedřich was delighted: he was the only one who had deliberately earned his black insignia and took pleasure in wearing it. That was why he felt free – though unlike Honza, he expressed his independence by means of quiet discipline and contented industry.¹⁵

Of all the characters in the novels reviewed, only Bedřich manages to consistently preserve his freedom and his credo not only in public, but also in his private space. The obedient worshipper, in his own uncompromising way, reaches an intimate harmony with the Almighty, giving himself entirely to Him: "Bedřich resisted by withdrawing into his own depths to commune

10 Ibid., p. 210.

11 Ibid., p. 224.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., p. 55.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

with his mystic God, the erotic complement to this religious turn inward being ritual masturbation."¹⁶

The religious beliefs of the characters do not reject, but rather stimulate, in different ways, the natural love and acts of humanity. The faith in God and love for fellow men, combined with the gift of forgiveness, becomes their effective self-defense against totalitarian repression and uniformity.

In order to denounce the traditional social status quo, and to replace the old ideological paradigm with a new one, the Communists efficiently used the achievements of religion. They realized that the Church was merging with the faithful through its participation in the most intimate human events, such as the baptisms of the newborn, the weddings of the beloved, and the burials of the departed. Much like theocentrism, the Communist Party aimed to replace the individual under its control, replacing the established Christian sacraments and rituals with socialist ones. However, the new rituals are so absurd, that they cannot be accepted even by Ludvik, who had voluntarily broken with the Church, and, for fifteen years, had been preaching the transformation of the traditional folklore into a socialist one. After preaching sincerely and actively "the new ways of life," back in those days, he is shocked by the result of his own actions. Witnessing the rite by the name of "greeting new citizens in life" – a collectivized socialist surrogate of the Holy Baptism – Ludvik seems to hear his own former voice coming through the mouth of his schoolmate Kovalik:

There were two great opposing institutions involved: the Catholic Church with its traditional thousand-year-old rites and the civil institutions that must supplant the thousand-year-old rites with their own. [...] **people would stop going to church, to have their children christened or to get married only when our civil ceremonies had as much dignity and beauty as the church ceremonies.**¹⁷

On the one hand, Communists tried to denounce the "devastating" influence of religion, while on the other hand, they adopted the techniques of religious empathy. While Kostka and Bedřich, isolated in the penal company, place their hopes on some convergence between Christianity and socialism, most rank Communists' conscience was overtaken by the dogma of the Party's infallibility. Ludvik retrospectively paralleled his former Party and religious self-conscience like this: "looking back on my state of mind at the time, I am reminded by analogy of the enormous power of Christianity to convince the believer of his fundamental and never-ending guilt; **I also stood (we all stood) before the Revolution and its Party with permanently bowed head.**"¹⁸

The narrator in *Wild Ginger*, whose youth passes in "reciting Mao quotes like the Buddhists whispering their sacred mantras," describes how:

16 Ibid., p. 63.

17 Ibid., p. 172.

18 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 46.

To become a Maoist for our generation was like attaining the state of Nirvana for a Buddhist. We might not yet understand the literature of Maoism, but since kindergarten we were taught that the process, the conversion – to enslave our body and soul, to sacrifice what was requested in order to “get there” – was itself the meaning of our lives.¹⁹

Communist propaganda was directed mainly towards youth, whose religious consciences were not fully formed, and thus were easily molded and remodeled. However, while the process of redirecting religion into ideology was understandable, fuelling the hatred towards parents and relatives was inexcusable:

The sacrifice meant learning not only to separate ourselves from, but to actually denounce, those we loved most when judgment called. We were also taught to manage the pain that came with such actions. It was called the “true tests.” The notion was so powerful that youths throughout the nation became caught up in it. From 1965 to 1969 **millions of young people stood out despite their pain and publicly denounced their family members, teachers, and mentors in order to show devotion toward Mao.** They were honored.²⁰

Based on Mao’s statement that it is impossible for a “member of one class to love someone belonging to the opposite class,” Wild Ginger is convinced that her father, being a French diplomat, married her mother not out of love, but in order to spy on China. *Partocentrism* multiplies the “example” of the Russian pupil Pavlik Morozov, who informed on his own father.²¹ For the first time in human history, children willingly denounced their parents, replacing the bond of blood with Party association. The future “Maoist star” denounces her late father as an enemy, burns the only picture of him, and threatens her mother that she would inform the authorities about her bourgeois views, while her Czech Party “fellow man,” Alexej, officially denounces his father, believing in his “guilt”:

“My father was arrested for espionage. Do you understand what that means? **How can the Party trust me? It is the Party’s duty not to trust me.**”²²

Still, however sad the denunciation of parents, even more comical is the transformation of their public image into something related to the image of their children. After Wild Ginger meets Chairman Mao, her deceased parents, formerly “reactionaries” and “French spies,” are cleared to become “revolutionary martyrs” and “international Communists.”²³

Wild Ginger’s vow is evidence of the seemingly impossible considering the convictions of today’s young people of intellectual predilection to become part of the Communist movement:

19 Ibid., p. 27.

20 Ibid.

21 The propagandist mythologization of the Pavlik Morozov case is tracked by Catriona Kelly in: *Comrade Pavlik* (London: Granta Press, 2005).

22 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 98.

23 Min, *Wild Ginger*, pp. 92-94.

Someday, I will be a revolutionary. **A Maoist star.** I will prove that I am just as good and trustworthy as the bravest Maoist. I have made that a promise to myself. No one will stop me from being who I want to be. Not Hot Pepper, not my mother, not the ghost of my father.²⁴

FROM LOVE OF FOLKLORE TO PARTY GLORIFICATION THROUGH FOLKLORE

Jaroslav and Ludvik are the only characters in the novels discussed who have redirected their world views from God to the Party. With Jaroslav, obsessed with Moravian folklore, the change is not drastic. He has long since replaced his faith in God and the afterlife with his own concepts of them, and his joining the Communist Party has an overt competitive motivation. He does not strive to change the world, because “Nothing, not even the most promising success, could replace the joy of coming home,”²⁵ but to preserve it. For Jaroslav, the milieu of “home” is occupied by the homeland, family, and folklore, in the preservation of which he put all his soul. Jaroslav becomes a Party member out of his love of folklore. However, flirting with the socialist culture’s “going to the people,” he not only betrays the authentic folklore with his concepts of it, but also unwittingly contributes to its mimicry and agony. The “folkloristic” mythologizing of the Communist past and present has mercilessly devastated the patriotic musician’s intimate world, and the revealed deceit that despite riding the horse in the folklore role “he got with his father’s connections,” Jaroslav’s son both secretly and demonstratively prefers the modern motorcycle race, and turns the facetious teenage protest into patricide.

Unlike the inert Jaroslav, who is part of the faceless mass, paying for professional development with Party dues and loyalty to the regime, Ludvik and his ideological instigators actively use folklore for the artistic enforcement of *partocentrism*. To them, state control over songs and rituals is just as important as collectivization and nationalization, because the “collectively” created and disseminated folk art was destined to glorify and objectify the love for the Party and the leader, to strengthen collective anonymity, and to divert attention from socialism’s real problems. However, the absurd usage of folklore to redirect love towards the Party turns out to be a Trojan horse. The mass “folklore” events with the recitation of sayings by Julius Fučík, Mao Zedong, and other dead and living “titans of revolution” do not elevate the people to the proclaimed new level of spirituality, but instead degrade them further to even lower depths of bestiality, and the people cleverly renamed the Red Guard dance *Zhong*, meaning loyalty, to *Zoo*.²⁶

With an optimum dose of logic and demagoguery, the activist Ludvik presents the planned transformation of folklore ethnocentrism into class-party collectivism as follows:

²⁴ Ibid., p. 33.

²⁵ Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 144.

²⁶ Min, *Wild Ginger*, pp. 115, 124.

The ancient countryside had lived a collective life. Communal rites marked off the village year. [...] but a folk song is born differently from a formal poem. Poets create in order to express themselves, to say what it is that makes them unique. In the folk song, one does not stand out from others but joins with them. [...] It was passed from generation to generation, and everyone who sang it added something new to it. Every song had many creators, and all of them modestly disappeared behind their creation. No folk song existed purely for its own sake. It had a function. [...] all (songs) were part of a collective rite in which song had its established place. **Capitalism had destroyed this old collective life. And so folk art had lost its foundations, its reason for being, its function.** [...] But socialism would liberate people from the yoke of their isolation. **They would live in a new collectivity.** United by a common interest, their private and public lives would merge.²⁷

Thanks to folklore, the young Communists Helena and Pavel merge their personal and public lives – their love is born in the Julius Fučík song and dance ensemble, it “explodes” spontaneously during a speech delivered by the Italian Communist Togliatti, at the Old Town square in Prague, and is promoted to a marriage, according to the plan set by the Party bureau. Unknowingly, this ideological family, created as if by some kind of joke, plays the greatest joke in Ludvik’s life.

A LOVE FOR THE PARTY AND PARTY “LOVE”

While Jaroslav is a typical passive Party member, using his affiliation with the organization as a form of *indulgence*, the 20-year old Ludvik is a staunch Communist, putting a lot of passion to his public and personal life, naively believing that they can exist separately. His roots are with the Catholic Church, which is traditionally strong in his homeland; however, he officially quits it.²⁸ In order to “make history,” Ludvik “had the look all Communists had at that time, as if he had made a secret pact with the future and had thereby acquired the right to act in its name.”²⁹ Even if Ludvik’s world view and his careerism are intertwined, he is representative of the majority of young people (including the authors of these two books), who sincerely believed that socialism is just and historically inevitable:

What had attracted me to the movement more than anything, dazzled me, was the **feeling** (real or apparent) **of standing near the wheel of history**. For in those days we actually did decide the fate of man and events [...] The intoxication we experienced is commonly known as the intoxication of power, [...] admittedly, in most cases the result was an ugly lust for power, but [...] there was still (and especially, perhaps, in us, the young), an altogether ideal-

27 Kundera, *The Joke*, pp. 140-141.

28 The Communist propaganda in Czechoslovakia used the fact that the popular proletarian poet Jiří Wollker (1900-1924) officially quit the church and joined the Party.

29 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 139.

istic illusion that we were inaugurating a **human era in which man (all men) would be neither outside history, nor under the heel of history, but would create and direct it.**³⁰

The double renegade, Ludvik, is an ideological product of the transitional period between two eras. Initially a Christian, genetically belonging to the Church by virtue of the Sacred Communion, he consciously becomes a Communist apparatchik, but soon he is expelled from the Party for placing his individualism higher than his partisan loyalty. Ludvik's disassociation from these two radically different institutions is caused by his pride, equally unacceptable for both theocentrism and *partocentrism*. Both activists, Ludvik Jahn and Pavel Zemanek, are similar in their wit, their interest in women, and their applause; however, they differ in their expression of their individualism, which is characteristic for both of them. Ludvik openly expresses his innate need to subordinate others to him, while Pavel constantly subordinates his individualism to Communist collectivism. This allows the conformist Zemanek to be loved by women and his fellow Party members before, during, and after the denouncement of the cult of personality and the "deformations" of socialism. While Ludvik is too late to realize that the only individualism the Party tolerates is the one subordinated to it, Pavel subjugates even his personal life to the expectations of the collective. Therefore, quite naturally, Pavel's ideological flirt with Helena ends with a "Party-arranged" marriage, while the flirt of Ludvik with Marketa ends with Ludvik's being expelled from the Party and sent to a labor camp.

With its insolent intrusion into citizens' private lives, *partocentrism* reaches the peak of its anti-human nature. As an anonymous collective subject, most often materialized through "raised voting hands," the Party takes the professional future away from many innocent people, among whom are Kostka, Čenek, Ludvik, Alexej and his father; Wild Ginger's mother, Maple's father, and others, while the public outrage over the "enemies" of socialism – the "bourgeois" singer Mrs. Pei and the pious Communist Alexej – lead to their suicides. Party offices at various levels "recommend" Pavel to marry Helena,³¹ read Ludvik's, Marketa's and Alexej's letters, and break not only the ideological, but also the intimate relationship between Ludvik and Marketa, posthumously declaring the marriage of Wild Ginger's mother and the French diplomat "a mistake."

The omnipresence of the Party in society and its brutal intrusion into the lives of ordinary people is demonstrated by the confession of Helena:

One of my colleagues at the station, a married man, was having an affair with a girl in the technical department, single, irresponsible, and cynical, and in desperation his wife turned to our Party committee for help, we spent hours going over the case, we interviewed the wife, the girl, various witnesses from work, we tried to get a clear, well-rounded picture of things and be scrupulously fair, the man was given a reprimand by the Party, the girl a warning,

³⁰ Ibid., p. 71.

³¹ "We didn't marry for love, – Pavel told Helena years later – we married out of Party discipline..." (Ibid., p. 17).

and both had to promise the committee to stop seeing each other. Unfortunately, words are merely words, they agreed to split up only to keep us quiet and in fact went on seeing each other on the sly, but the truth will out, we soon found out about it, and I took a firm stand, I proposed that the man be expelled from the Party for having deliberately deceived and misled it, after all, what kind of Communist could he be if he lied to the Party, I hate lies, but my proposal was defeated, and the man got off with another reprimand, at least the girl had to leave the station.³²

Very often, the collective Party rights are delegated to specific apparatchiks. Hot Pepper, who is bullying her schoolmates, “represented the Red Guards” and was permitted by Chairman Mao to do “whatever was necessary to change the world,” while Helena and Wild Ginger unilaterally usurp the right to be legislators and stalwarts of Communist morality.³³ Meanwhile, in the transition between the 1940s and the 1950s, the secretary-conformist Pavel preserves the Party’s ideological purity by expelling Ludvik from its ranks, a decade later his wife Helena watches over Party morality, imposing her own double standards not only on the membership, but also on the rest of the people:

but they laid into me at a public meeting, called me a hypocrite, trying to pilory others for breaking up marriages, trying to expel, dismiss, destroy, when I myself was unfaithful to my husband at every opportunity, that was how they put it at the meeting, but behind my back they were even more vicious, they said I was a nun in public and a whore in private, as if they couldn’t see that the only reason I was so hard on others was that I knew what an unhappy marriage meant, it wasn’t hate that made me do what I did, it was love, love of love, love of their house and home, love of their children...³⁴

The peculiar Party attitude towards love is even more grotesquely manifested in Wild Ginger. Though her full, albeit false, commitment to the Party is to some extent similar to the Catholic *celibate*, the way, in which sex degenerates from a mutual reproductive act to means of self-satisfaction and its subsequent ban, is unique. Unlike the loving Helena, whose ideological values allow for sex, family, and children, her Chinese counterpart first incites her ideological partner to masturbate, while she accompanies by reciting Mao’s quotations, and then, to punish his lust, gives her virginity to him, and finally, realizing that it is impossible to keep Evergreen with the help of the Chairman, totally disgraces herself as a human being by organizing a crusade against “lust.” Wild Ginger is changed beyond recognition and not only “set laws for all the youth – anyone who was caught engaging in a sexual act would be considered a criminal,” but also “personally took charge of several raids where the Red Guards broke into people’s houses.”³⁵

32 Ibid., p. 20.

33 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 13.

34 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 21.

35 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 158.

Helena uses the power of the Party to marry Ludvik, and later, to unite and divide Party members and non-members. However, while the Czech lady is “modestly” content with her influence over her subordinate Party office, Wild Ginger feels authorized to speak for the whole Party. She engages the Party and state apparatus to set her lover up with an indictment, to be able to save him after his arrest, to steal him away from Maple, and to get him back in a sinister way. The Party-state involvement in the intimate relationship however becomes a disaster for the Maoist gone berserk and a partial retaliation for the heartless Hot Pepper, who proves that sharing the love for Mao with a mortal person is far from harmless.

Despite their best efforts, Helena and Wild Ginger fail to commit themselves fully and selflessly to the Party, its leader, and the idea of socialist equality and fraternity. The intellectual levels of these Party apparatchiks significantly exceed the primitive lust for power and gains of the aggressive Hot Pepper, and yet the unnatural suppression of love and its reckless satisfaction activates in both of them jealousy, as well as a certain sense of impunity. Wild Ginger deludes herself that the ideas of the Great Helmsman will help her suppress the urges of the flesh, Helena is well aware that “a woman cannot live without feelings, or she will not be a woman” and that is why, after the love is gone from her family life, she starts looking for it elsewhere. Even if some colleagues and fellow Party members call Helena “fanatic,” “dogmatic,” “a loyal Party dog” etc., and Wild Ginger’s lover compares the self-denial and the denial of sexual life to those who once “bound the feet of their girls and castrated their boys,”³⁶ both Party comrades fail to realize that their actions spell doom for them and their Parties.

The love for the Party demands superhuman commitment. Even more monstrous than the dissolution of the existing bonds of blood is the voluntary or forced ban on creating new ones. An extremely grotesque form of *commitment* to the Leader and the Party is the abstinence from sexual contact, femininity, family life, and maternity. After the “audience” with Mao, Wild Ginger makes a written vow of loyalty to the chairman, and that “she would give up her personal life, including marriage, to be a people’s servant and a Maoist.”³⁷ The *publicity face* of the Red Guards signs a “contract to publish her diary of the next ten years. The text would be included in school textbooks and recited by students at all levels.”³⁸ While Wild Ginger’s attempts to suppress her feminine nature and beauty (dressing “Mao style” and wearing the smallest size bras) are successful to some extent, her efforts to resist natural human love and sexual attraction are a total failure.

36 Ibid., p. 134.

37 Ibid., p. 101.

38 Ibid.

"HUMANIZING" THE PARTY, DEIFYING THE LEADER

Without overrating his own morals, Ludvik acknowledges that, as a Party member, he did wear more than one face, and yet, as paradoxical as it may sound, he didn't feel like a hypocrite, because each of them was real. The same is true for the Party with its many faces, which, despite the aim of complete uniformity of its member mass, is a "unity of diversities," including the passive Jaroslav, the opportunist Pavel, the militant Helena, the belligerent boy commander, and even the wrongfully accused "enemies with a Party ticket" Ludvik and Alexej. The ideal Party member is embodied by Marketa, who, in tune with *the face of the times*, is a hard-line, lively, and serious optimist:

a new life had begun [...] and its features, as I remember them, were rigidly serious. The odd thing was that the seriousness took the form not of a frown but of a smile, yes, what those years said of themselves was that they were the most joyous of years, and anyone who failed to rejoice was immediately suspected of lamenting the victory of the working class. [...] **a grave joy that proudly called itself "the historical optimism of the victorious class."**³⁹

The collective persona of the times are, theoretically, all individuals; however, the Party is defined and expressed by its leaders and their verbal and visual images. The beginning of the Party-leader propaganda *duality* was set by V. Maiakovskii with the cult verse that "The Party and Lenin are twin brothers." This duality is the anthropomorphic object, which the Communists (and not only they) must love, obey, and follow. For this to happen, the Party has to be *humanized*, and the image of the leader – deified, objectified, and replicated.

The attempts to portray the Communist Party as a living organism of flesh and blood, having a body, head, and even heart, began immediately after the October Revolution in Russia, and later were further developed and modified according to the local specifics of the countries with socialist regimes. In Czechoslovakia, where Klement Gottwald's cult of personality was entirely overshadowed by Stalin, the Party became the object of praise and love.⁴⁰

Even with its skillful transformation of ethnocentrism into class collectivism, the Czechoslovak Communist Party failed to procure monumental paintings and sculptures such as those of the "Motherland," "Freedom," and "Revolution." In *The Joke* the Red Army "and its alliance with our working class and its role in the victory of socialism in February 1948" is depicted by the inmate painter Čenek alternatively as "a heroically posed, warmly clad Soviet soldier with a submachine gun slung over his shoulder, a shaggy fur cap pulled down over his ears, and about eight naked women crowding around him; he

39 Kundera, *The Joke*, pp. 31-32.

40 Gottwald (1896-1953) stayed in power for a relatively short time and was almost entirely in the shadow of Stalin.

had an arm around the shoulders of each and was laughing a jubilant laugh; the other women paid court to him, extending their arms to him or simply standing there (one was lying down), showing off their pretty figures."⁴¹ The eroticized praise of the *liberating army*, where the painter's skinny schoolmate symbolizes the February revolution, the plump rear of the officer's bride – "the bourgeoisie making its exit from the stage of history," while the other naked ladies of ill-repute – the working class, freedom, equality, etc., were warmly accepted by the soldiers, but the boy commander denounced it as "perfect for masturbators..."⁴²

The humanization of the Party in Czechoslovakia is primarily verbal. In order to establish the dynamic Party *corporeality*, the Communist propaganda, in a puritan manner, used other types of allegories, synonyms, and euphemisms, such as "the spirit, the face, and the genius of the times," "the movement," "the proletarian revolution," "the helm of history," etc. It was inculcated into all Party members that "a man either was a revolutionary, in which case he completely merged with the movement into a single collective entity, or he was not, and could only *want* to be one; in that case, he would always consider himself guilty of not being one,"⁴³ which is why all Communists, depicted in *The Joke*, identify themselves with the revolution and merge with the times. The hardliners Marketa and Alexej blindly believe that "existence determines the consciousness," while the astute Pavel and Ludvik promptly realize that, in socialism, the consciousness determines the existence, because "far from the wheel of history there was no life, only vegetation, boredom, exile, Siberia."⁴⁴ Helena combines both, and even if it is a marriage of convenience, Helena's relationship with the Party is a deep, mutual, and long-term one; her merger with its body and spirit – wholesome and sincere; and the animation of the Party – convincing:

they will never make me ashamed of **loving the Party and sacrificing all my spare time to it. [...] it's only the Party that's never done me any harm, and I've never harmed the Party**, not even in the days when almost everyone was ready to desert it [...] I just clung to the Party more tightly than ever, **the Party is almost like a living being, I can tell it all my most intimate thoughts.**⁴⁵

Unlike in Czechoslovakia, the cult of personality in the PRC was strong and lasting. Propaganda uncompromisingly convinces the Chinese since kindergarten age that "without Chairman Mao we would all be dead ... And we began to love him," and that "to believe in Mao was to believe in China's fu-

41 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 84.

42 Ibid., p. 86.

43 Ibid., p. 46.

44 Ibid., p. 71.

45 Ibid., pp. 19-20.

ture.”⁴⁶ The love for the “savior” grows into beatification and deification, and his image is turned into a miraculous *socialist icon*.⁴⁷

I looked at the Mao portrait on the wall. The Chairman had kind-looking features. Smiling eyes,⁴⁸ glowing cheeks, a round nose, and a gentle mouth. It was a peaceful face. Hot Pepper once said that **if you stared at Mao’s portrait long enough, the Chairman would come alive**. His eyes would blink and his lips would open.⁴⁹

The cult of Mao trumps all other known cults in the history of *partocentrism*, and the statement that “Mao and China are one” surpasses Maiakovskii’s framework for equality between the Party and its leader. *The Savior* of the Chinese, much like a God pantheistically dissolved into the visible and invisible nature, is present in every facet of Chinese society. He is found in every school, army barracks, public building, and home, he is the visible-invisible member of each family, he is present even in Maple’s overcrowded house:

My brother’s Mao statue stood on top of the closet. The Mao portrait stared down from the wall. **We had Mao stuff in every corner of the house**. Portraits, nine of them. Mao’s image was printed on book covers, closets, blankets, windows, towels, plates, cups, containers, and bowls.⁵⁰

Going beyond every reasonable limit, the anthropomorphic fetishism and replication of Mao are devalued into an absurd kitsch. For the Communist propaganda, however, each form of visible presence of the Great Helmsman is proof of love and loyalty for him. Wild Ginger said that she spoke to the statue of the Leader “coming to life at night” at her home, and that the buttons pinned on each side of Hot Pepper’s chest from a distance “looked like two breasts with Mao heads as nipples.”⁵¹

POLITICIZED SEX

Ludvik’s excessive pride leads him to worsen and ultimately cut off all his relationships with most of his family and friends. His failure to recognize their thoughts and wishes turns his public and intimate life into a string of tragicomical absurdities. He is unable to sense that Lucie postpones giving herself to him not because she is ashamed of her virginity, but because she is

46 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 29.

47 In this, and not only this, there are quite similar motifs and scenes in *Wild Ginger* and Andrei Konchalovskii’s film *Inner Circle* (1991), which could have both a typological and a *contactological* explanation!

48 As a matter of fact, of all *socialist icons on the partocentric altar* (from Marx, to Lenin, to Gorbachev, from Ulbricht to Honecker, from Mao to Ho Chi Min and Kim Il Sung, from Gottwald to Husak, etc.), the only smiling faces are those of Stalin and Mao.

49 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 11.

50 Ibid., p. 59.

51 Ibid., p. 3.

not a virgin. He rejects the Ostrava whore, who whispers in his ear: "I only came along because of you, silly," for her desire to have sex with him without loving him, and Lucie – for her love for him and her unwillingness to go to bed with him. Despite the fulfillment of his labor camp dream: to be "served" by naked women, the stark naked Ludvik ends up on the lap of the fully dressed Lucie, just like "the naked Christ taken down from the cross and placed in the arms of compassionate Mary..."⁵²

Ludvik's attempts to mingle ideology with sex have a distinctly tragicomic outcome. Acting before himself and before the others, the virgin-young man strives to "capture" Marketa's body in some spectacular manner. However, the bait on his ideological fishing rod becomes a double trap for himself: instead of drawing Marketa to his bed, the joke-aphrodisiac⁵³ leads to him being expelled from the Party, after which the hard-line Communist girl will give herself to him with utmost abandon, if only the "prodigal son" will acknowledge his guilt and repent. Eventually, the youthful play with ideology neither helps Ludvik get Marketa into his bed, nor helps her bring the individualist joker back to the serious Party sheepfold.

While one could certainly judge more leniently Ludvik's youthful attempt to bring sex under the power of ideology within the romantic context of the times, the mature man's premeditated desire to humiliate ideology through sex is much harder to excuse. Many years after his naked body pushed Lucie away, the half-undressed Ludvik undresses Helena to let his eyes deface the wife of the Party secretary guilty for his own partisan downfall. However, the visual and sexual "desecration" of Helena does not dishonor or drive comrade Zemanek away from her. He, in his characteristic style, has long since turned his eyes (among other things) away from his forcefully acquired lascivious family partner.

Ludvik's next fiasco is as much a result of his mutilated pride, as it is of his sclerotic capability to forgive. Expelled from the Party, Ludvik (unlike Alexej) gradually starts to see himself as its enemy; however, the former Communist's aversion to God takes away the grace of being able to forgive. After a series of worldview meanderings, Ludvik finds himself closer to the Party "either you're with us, or against us," than to the biblical "turn the other cheek." He is obsessed with the thought of vengeance on his political tormentors; however, his replacement of forgiveness with a fleshy vendetta turns the joke on him. Replacing the joy of sex with vengeful orgasm, Ludvik does not desecrate the hated apparatchik's wife, but merely pleasures an ageing Party coquette, who has never been really loved by either Pavel or Ludvik. Having "screwed" Helena, he aims to "screw" her husband Pavel; however, he finds himself "screw-

52 Kundera, *The Joke*, pp. 109-110.

53 The joke-aphrodisiac is the postcard sent by him with the following text: "Optimism is the opium of the people! A healthy atmosphere stinks of stupidity! Long Live Trotsky! Ludvik." (*Ibid.*, p. 34).

ing" a long-since dysfunctional marriage. Thus, after the postcard to Marketa turns from a joke into a political verdict, the sexual retribution mutates into a grotesque. Once again, the failure to realize that the Party is not a community of individuals, but an organization of members, whose morals are quite immoral, laughs at the egocentric Ludvik.

Wild Ginger invites Evergreen to her house to cram Mao quotations. She is aware of the young and attractive activist's feelings and passion, but she is more afraid of her own behavior. This is why, after the numerous portraits and "animated" sculpture of the beloved Chairman fail to neutralize her sexual desires, the immaculate icon of Maoism hides her best friend Maple in the closet, making her an invisible "big shining light bulb" between the craving bodies of the beloved. This idea, however, turns out to be flawed. Evergreen uses the momentary exhaustion of the napping apparatchik, who has just rejected him, makes love to the hidden voyeur in the closet, and later, in order to bring him back to her and Mao, Wild Ginger (without mentioning it in her diary) seduces, for correctional purposes, Evergreen, who had become aware of his humanity. Pointing out the ugliness of the genitalia, like "a worm" and "a bee's nest," and the bestiality of sexual intercourse, Wild Ginger visually and reflectively (i.e. through the reflection in the mirror) tries in desperation to prove the superiority of Mao's ideas over the flesh.

The eroticization of God and the Saints is a known literary technique, especially during the Baroque age. While Kundera sparingly, and yet accurately, depicts how Bedrich, by "masturbating with a ritual regularity" is merging with the Creator, Anchee Min relates masturbation to the "Savior" of the Chinese in two senses. Wishing both to preserve her virginity for her ideological idol and to satisfy her physical lover's sexual needs, Wild Ginger offers a biblical compromise: Evergreen to masturbate in her presence and she to stimulate his masturbation by reciting quotations by the Chairman. While for Wild Ginger this perverse act was a remote merger with both her lovers, for Evergreen, the *politicized jerk-off* is a clear protest metaphor against the demagoguery, anti-humanism, and fruitlessness of Maoism.

Evergreen uses love to exorcise the demon of Maoism from his soul, while Wild Ginger wants to free her body for Mao by flagellation. In the name of the Chairman (but secretly from him), she commits her only sexual intercourse, for which the male victim shares the following with Maple:

[Wild Ginger] stripped herself and said she would give me what I wanted. Even if it meant that she would have to lie to keep her position. [...] I tried to hold on to my clothes when she tried to strip me. ... She insisted on us going to bed. ... She said that she had put her shame in my hands. [...] She was underneath me, her eyes were shut, her legs apart, her jaws locked tightly, as if she were going through torture [...] but she wouldn't let me go. She cried, "You must finish me!" **In the meantime she wouldn't stop talking and reciting Mao quotations.** She yelled at me, "Prove that you are not a coward, admit that you are evil seduced. Show your shame, take out your sun instrument and look at it, spit on it..." [...] She said it was her turn. She must toss

herself in the pit of shame. She must see for herself how grotesque coupling was. She pulled over a mirror and demanded that I look at myself while taking her. The ugly members of our bodies. She said, "Don't you think they are the most disgusting organs? One is like a worm and the other like a bee's nest! One should be cut and the other scorched!" She made me hate my body. I really did at that moment. I could have thrown up. She said it was the right feeling. The disgust. Keep looking. I can still see her shouting in front of my eyes. "What are these? Animals! Animals!"

I was completely impotent [...] I begged her to quit, but she said that we must fix the problem. **It was only sex that blocked my eyes to see my own potential as a great Maoist.** She said I could be fixed if I let her help. She said, "You must get erect. I must go through this in order to get it out of your system. We must do this so there will be no myth between our bodies."⁵⁴

The partocentrism manages to collectivize and politicize even sex. The lack of freedom and sincerity leads to the replacement of the actual lover or enemy with the image of another. Even if the watchful eyes on Mao's portraits fail to block the sexual wishes of Evergreen, Wild Ginger and Maple, the images and the spirit of the participants are embedded traumatically into the memories of the victims, and it makes some of them want to turn into watching from being watched. Hidden in the closet, Maple "savors"⁵⁵ the ideologically doomed flirt between Evergreen and Wild Ginger, and was dying to be in her friend's place, and when this happens, she tries to be both things for her lover's divided mind: herself and Wild Ginger. From a supreme expression of love, a way to procreate, get pleasure, etc., sex is debased down to *voyeurism* and a means for ideological revenge on third parties, in which the synthetic psycho-physical sexual intercourse is maniacally dissolved.⁵⁶

54 Min, *Wild Ginger*, pp. 153-155.

55 This is how Maple remembers her "closet period": "I peeped through the hole one night and realized that I had been looking at Evergreen. I was examining him, in the most disgusting way: I memorized the number of pimples on his face, their location and size, how they changed day by day, and how his old skin flaked and grew new skin. I paid attention to the shape of his wide shoulders, big hands, and thick fingers. I indulged in the movement of his lips..." (Ibid., p. 110).

56 "My soul had seen a female body. It was indifferent to this body. It knew that the body had meaning for it only as a body that had been seen and loved in just the same way by someone who was not now present; that was why it tried to look at this body through the eyes of the third, the absent one; that was why it tried to become the third one's medium; it saw the naked female body, the bent leg, the curve of belly and breast, but it all took on meaning only when my eyes became the eyes of the absent one.

And not only did my soul become the medium of the absent third, but it ordered my body to become the medium of his body, and then stood back and watched the writhing struggle of two bodies, two connubial bodies. [...] my soul commanded me [...] to change her body's position so nothing should remain hidden or concealed from the glance of the absent third; [...] by which she is engraved in the memory of the absent third like a stamp, a seal, a cipher, a sign. And thus to steal the secret cipher! To steal the royal seal! To rob Pavel Zemanek's secret chamber; to ransack it, to make a shambles of it." (Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 195).

The spirit of partocentrism, with its specific attributes and manifestations, is omnipresent and becomes a panacea. One of its marginal, and yet important uses, is to serve as an *aphrodisiac* and *Viagra* in the politicized intimacy. Ludvik's joke postcard failed to convey its erotic message to Marketa; however, Pavel's gift – "his most treasured possession – a locket with the picture of the Kremlin" – convinces Helena about his true feelings, and years after that, she hopes that the miraculous socialist *relic* will help her win Ludvik's love. Helena summons Communism to underwrite her marriage by Party decree and during her wedding ceremony solemnly makes her husband vow that "if we ever betrayed each other it would be tantamount to betraying everyone at the wedding, betraying everyone at the demonstration in Old Square, betraying Togliatti..."⁵⁷

As a whole, Anchee Min's characters have a significantly stronger connection to the material and verbal expressions of *the spirit of the times*. It is mandatory for all young Maoists to bring "the three treasures" to school: a button with the face of Mao, a booklet with selected quotations by him, and a red band on their hand, while the grownups must put a portrait of the leader in their homes.

Eventually, the impressive ideological fetishes and idols in Kundera's book fail to effectively generate and maintain love. While in *The Joke*, heroes vainly try to use ideology to provoke sex and Ludvik's facetious postcard remains a failed politicized invitation to love, in *Wild Ginger*, sex truly depoliticizes the characters, and the card sent by Evergreen to Maple, saying "To me love is more important than Maoism," is a triumph of love over ideology.

SEX AS A LIBERATOR: LOVE AND SEX – *PARTOCENTRISM'S GRAVEDIGGER*

If the Marxist-Leninist theoreticians see the "working class as the gravedigger of Capitalism," in the novels reviewed the awareness of human love becomes the most tender and efficient "gravedigger" of *partocentrism*. It is the very intrusion into the most intimate human realm which causes the revision and denial of *partocentrism* and cultivates an anthropocentric worldview and behavior in Ludvik, Evergreen, and Maple. Once convinced of the correctness of the Party policy, Ludvik accepts the forced breakup with the Party and Marketa as his own fault, caused by his "intellectual individualism." The attitude of the boy commander before the soldiers in the "black battalion" of the black city of Ostrava (or rather the role *played* by the young officer) and the growing chasm between Party theory and practice, however, intersects his personal injustice with the social one, while the meeting with the totally apolitical Lucie brings back his authentic human emotions. Unlike Alexej, Ludvik stops *playing* the strenuous role of political righteousness. The spontaneous soldier's love becomes for Ludvik the ideologically decisive step:

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

suddenly I'd been liberated; Lucie had come to take me off to her gray paradise, and the step that such a short time before had seemed so formidable, the one I would take in getting out of history, was suddenly a step toward release.⁵⁸

If Wild Ginger is Helena's degenerate Chinese replica, Evergreen is Ludvik's evolved counterpart. Like Ludvik, the Shanghai activist realizes his human essence gradually, however, unlike the Czech (and to his merit), he "sees the light" at the peak of his affection for Mao, and not after he withdraws, and is later removed by the local Red Guards elite. The first natural love changes the eighteen-year old Maoist, who says:

The Chairman teaches us to be selfless. But I am discovering the self, myself really, as a human being. **For the first time I've started to see things through my own eyes instead of Chairman Mao's...** It's devastating. My whole world is upside down now...⁵⁹

Even with his deep proletarian roots, Evergreen has a broader horizon than his friends, who were born in intellectual families. Unlike Wild Ginger and Maple, who make tremendous efforts to become members of the Red Guards, he belongs to the movement "by right," but this does not prevent him from understanding first that it is more important to be a human being than a Maoist, and to reach the conclusion that, under conditions of *partocentrism*, love is the only form of personal freedom. He is blinded neither by his loyalty to Mao, nor by his love for Wild Ginger, which allows him to objectively realize that while the eyes of the hard-boiled Communist Wild Ginger see only the color red, Maple's eyes reflect the rainbow. Much like Ludvik, who "leaves history," in order to enter Lucie's *gray paradise*, Evergreen, entering the dark closet of sex, left "the lit world" of Mao's ideas forever. He does not want to be a "guardian eunuch" of Wild Ginger's maidenly and ideological chastity, and even after she forced her body onto him, he prefers to continue his life with Maple, who, on the wings of love, changes her worldview radically.

Love takes central place in Maple's teenage mind. Open to the world, she has an equally strong love for her parents, Mao, Wild Ginger, and Evergreen. In the course of her physiological maturation, however, the forms of love in the rectangle, formed between Mao-Wild Ginger-Evergreen-Maple, become more and more distinctly shaped and prioritized. Despite the complicated intimate and worldview turnarounds, Maple's love and loyalty towards Wild Ginger stays constant; however, with the deepening of her love for Evergreen, her feelings for Chairman Mao sharply fade. Sex, through which she and Evergreen "offered each other something we craved – human affection,"⁶⁰ becomes a watershed event in the re-evaluation of her existential values. Feeling "bound

58 Ibid., p. 72.

59 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 119.

60 Ibid., p. 147.

by guilt yet liberated," Maple realizes that she is "no longer virgin while Wild Ginger was" and "the idea of devoting one's entire life to Mao was not only dull but ridiculous."⁶¹

The achieved "female" superiority over Wild Ginger and the turning of her back on Maoism becomes a Pyrrhic victory for Maple. Not only because *the Maoist saint* soon also loses her virginity and starts persecuting the lovers, who secede from the ideological-intimate "quartet," but also because the bond of Maple and Evergreen to Mao and Wild Ginger turns out to be unexpectedly strong. Through Wild Ginger's charisma, her fanatic Maoism has invaded Maple and Evergreen's intimate world and will not be expelled.

While Mao's portrait is an external manifestation of the cult, the chairman's thoughts were everywhere. They were being spread by the media, recited daily in the schools and other public institutions, shared in interpersonal communication, and repeated mentally by fanatic Maoists. Wild Ginger even says the Great Helmsman's pieces of wisdom... Mao's quotations in her sleep and through them, the Chairman himself, finds his way even into the most intimate human field – sex.

Like the deformed love consciousness of Helena, who, in her sexual intercourse with Ludvik demonstrates "so much of [ideological] conviction in a situation where body, not conviction, is the real issue,"⁶² the spirit of Mao also occupies the erotic space of Evergreen and Maple. In their most intimate closeness, Evergreen whispers to his partner, "let's be reactionaries, let's burn down the house of Mao."⁶³ However, the recitation of the Leader's works, which starts as a joke, becomes a facetious *aphrodisiac*, a *Viagra*, necessary for erection and orgasm. With time, the chairman's thoughts begin to replace the missing Wild Ginger, with whom, in their own way, both Evergreen and Maple were still in love. For them, Wild Ginger and Mao are identical, and mentioning the one automatically activates the image of the other. The ideological travesty degenerates into a sexual deformation, and, in order to be able to gain pleasure from sex, Maple and (especially) Evergreen need the remote presence of their former friend. Released from the influence of Maoism, the lovers remain under the power of Maoists, and for a long time fail to experience the magic of the here and now. Evergreen is erotically aroused when thinking of Wild Ginger, while Maple is aroused when imagining the future without her. However, when she closes her eyes, Maple returns to the recent past:

One night things became unbearable for me. I asked him to call me by her name. Before he could react I started to talk like Wild Ginger. **I started to recite Mao quotations the way Wild Ginger would. I copied her tone and style. I recited the quotations as I unzipped his trousers.**

He took me as I continued to recite. It was Wild Ginger's favorite paragraph:

61 Ibid., p. 145.

62 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 188.

63 Min, *Wild Ginger*, p. 149.

"Volume three, page thirty, 'Rectify the Party's Style of Work.' [...]"
 I rode him as he moved gently inside me. Through the sound of his breath
 I stared out into the night. I envisioned Wild Ginger. She stood in uniform
 with her front buttons open. Her breasts were two steaming buns.
 I took Evergreen's hands. I asked him to close his eyes. I asked him to touch
 me, to feel me, feel Wild Ginger. [...]
 And then I closed my own eyes and once again I was in Wild Ginger's
 closet.⁶⁴

ON *PARTOCENTRISM'S* GAMES, LAUGHTER, AND ABANDON

While the mature Ludvik wants to "devour" Helena with the eyes of *the other*, the young characters in *The Joke* and *Wild Ginger* aim to be noticed by the others, to impress their Party bosses and their intimate partners. This is why, in the politicized reality (and the love flirts influenced by it), all of them are more or less acting. In his youth, Kundera also joined the *ideological dance*, while Min (already to the sound of money and together with her daughter) kept dancing the *Zoo* and other Red Guards' "rondos" after her US emigration.⁶⁵ Kundera himself, about a decade after the publication of *The Joke*, euphemistically described his own *game* of youth:

I too once **danced in a ring**. It was in the spring of 1948. The Communists had just taken power in my country [...], and I took other Communist students by hand, I put my arms around their shoulders, and we took two steps in space, one step forward [...] and we did it just about every month, there being always something to celebrate [...] Then one day I said something I would better have left unsaid. I was expelled from the Party and had to leave the circle.
 That is when **I became aware of the magic qualities of the circle. Leave a row and you can always go back to it. The row is an open formation. But once a circle closes, there is no return.**⁶⁶

Apart from the authors, Ludvik and Evergreen, Pavel, Helena, Marketa, Alexej, the boy commander, Hot Pepper, Wild Ginger, and Maple also dance in the spirit (and to the drum) of the times. Some of them act seriously, others fake it, but all of them are moved by the hand of the visible and invisible dance leaders. Through their chosen or imposed roles, the young characters of Kundera and Min want to prove their maturity and manhood, and yet it is not the ideological transformations and loyalty, but the sexual love which helps Ludvik's, Evergreen's and Maple's coming of age. The intertwining of love with ideology has been a longtime obstacle in Evergreen's and Maple's path

64 Ibid., p. 168.

65 Min many times has presented "the culture" of the Cultural Revolution for American audiences, part of the spectacle being the Red Guards dances, performed by the US-born daughter of the author.

66 Milan Kundera. *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (London & Boston: Faber & Faber, 1980 [Original title: *Kniha smíchu a zapomnění*]), p. 65.

to find their own way and free themselves from the “third one.” The outcome of the misuse of the natural purpose of love and sex for Ludvik and Helena is tragicomical, for Alexej and Wild Ginger – a tragic one, while for Evergreen and Maple it is an unexpected *happy ending*. Ludvik only deludes himself that he has defeated Pavel “in grotesque sexual combat.”⁶⁷ He ransacks, and devastates not the intimate treasures of the Party secretary, but his own soul. Helena feels again that her only requited love is the one with the Party, while Alexej and the self-discredited Wild Ginger, wrongfully accused of being an enemy to the Party, fail to reach sexual maturity and continue their matter-of-life-and-death “love games” with ideology, hoping to confirm their fealty to the Party and its Leader with their suicides.

The observation of Ludvik about Alexej’s immaturity is valid for all of the young characters of the novels.⁶⁸ The tragicomic outcomes of Helena’s and Wild Ginger’s suicide attempts, however, are a result of their inability to impose Party demagoguery over human intimacy.

After the numerous jokes, blunders, and tragicomedies of politicized love, which in the words of Kundera we would describe as “laughter – beyond joking, jeering, ridicule,”⁶⁹ at the end of their novels (in different form), the Czech-French and Chinese-American writers prophetically show that the domination of the Communist *partocentrism* over religion and the Party leader over God is only temporary. In her lifetime, Wild Ginger hopes to stay in the pantheon of Maoism; however, her absurd death sentences her to oblivion and anonymity. Ironically, her dead body is not placed in the mausoleum or the tomb of her dreams, but the urn with her ashes under the name of “Found Earth” is brought by Maple’s mother to a Buddhist temple; without the Party’s support, the intimate relations, and suicide attempt of Helena end up literally and metaphorically with looseness.

67 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 277.

68 “And when I think of the immature, I think also of Alexej; he too played his great role, one that went beyond both his reason and his experience. He had something in common with our commander: he too looked younger than his age; but (in contrast with the commander) there was nothing attractive about his boyishness: he had a puny build, shortsighted eyes behind thick glasses, skin covered with the pimples of eternal puberty. [...] As soon as he found out I had been a Party member myself, he opened up to me a bit; [...]. Then he read me a poem he wrote. [...] It included this quatrain:

Do as you please, Comrades,
Make a dog of me, spit on me too.
But in my dog’s mask, under your spittle, Comrades,
I’ll remain faithfully in the ranks with you.

I understood what he meant, because I had felt just the same a year before. But now I felt it much less painfully: Lucie, my usherette into the everyday world, had removed me from the regions where the Alexeys live in desperate torment.” (Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 88).

69 Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, p. 65.

Both Kostka, the believer, and Ludvik, the unforgiving atheist and former Communist, are right in their own way. Kostka sees how “this rationalist skepticism had been corroding Christianity for two millennia. Corroding it but not destroying it. But Communist theory, its own creation, it will destroy within a few decades,”⁷⁰ Ludvik, knowing that the Party is never wrong, predicts:

Most people deceive themselves with a pair of faiths: they believe in *eternal memory* and in *redressibility*. Both are wrong faiths. In reality the opposite is true: everything will be forgotten and nothing will be redressed. The task of obtaining redress (by vengeance or by forgiveness) will be taken over by forgetting. **No one will redress the wrongs that have been done, but all wrongs will be forgotten.**⁷¹

This comes sooner for some people and nations, and later for others – all in due course...

70 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 224.

71 Kundera, *The Joke*, p. 294.

Factors for Language Decline in the Russian Far East: A Case of the Alutor in Kamchatka

NAGAYAMA YUKARI

INTRODUCTION

This paper expounds on a language decline process of the Alutor, one of the indigenous peoples of Kamchatka, the Russian Far East. In recent years, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on the history and present situation of Northern Minorities, including those in the North of Russia. Vakhtin,¹ for example, sketches a whole picture of Soviet/Russian policies toward Northern Minorities. According to Vakhtin,² most of the surveys published from the end of the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s targeted the languages of indigenous peoples in East Siberia. Vakhtin is also highly rated for his detailed survey on Northern Minorities' conversation ability in their languages.³ Despite these works, there still exists a huge gap in terms of detailed studies on the sociolinguistic aspects of each ethnic group, based on solid statistical data. In order to understand the various problems faced by Northern Minorities and also other people in the world, it is important to have a more precise understanding of their backgrounds.

In this paper, using statistical data, I discuss how the language decline of the Alutors has progressed. To be precise, I compare the number of native Alutor speakers by year in regard to the following three factors: population change, amalgamation, and change in educational policy.⁴ The results show that the language has declined severely as a result of these factors.

The construction of this paper is as follows; the first section provides general information on the Alutor people and their language. In the second section, I consider each of the factors mentioned above. The third section gives final remarks.

1 Nikolai Vakhtin, *Native Peoples of the Russian Far North* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1992).

2 Nikolai Vakhtin, *Iazyki narodov severa v XX veke: ocherki iazykovogo sdviga* [Languages of the Northern People in the 20th Century: Sketches of the Language Shift] (St. Petersburg: Evropeiskii universitet v Sankt Peterburge, 2001), p. 161.

3 Ibid.

4 Vakhtin (*Native Peoples*, pp. 15-22) outlines how the following factors influenced the minority languages: industrial development, population movement, Russian language policy, forced relocation, and the boarding-school system. The study is certainly a notable feat considering that such a survey had almost never been conducted, particularly in Russia. However, Vakhtin selects mainly the people of East Siberia and Chukotka for his study; therefore, there is very little information about Kamchatka.

GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ALUTORS AND THEIR LANGUAGE



Figure 1. Koryak Autonomous Region

forth, KAR) which is located in the northern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula.⁸

The Alutors obtained the status of an independent ethnic group in 2000 due to the Government Decree of the Russian Federation.⁹ According to the

The Alutors are a minority indigenous people of Kamchatka whose traditional occupations are fishing, hunting, gathering wild plants, and reindeer breeding. The self-designation of this people is *nəmālʔən* "Nymylan" (literally translated as "an inhabitant of a village"). The word *alutalʔən* "Alutor" just means "an inhabitant of the village Alut."⁵ Thus, "Nymylan" may be appropriate for indicating the whole ethnic group.

The Alutor language, together with Chukchi, Koryak,⁶ Itelmen, and Kerek, belongs to the Chukchi-Kamchatkan language family which is integrated into a linguistic group termed "Paleo-Siberian."⁷ Most speakers of Alutor live in the Koryak Autonomous Region (hence-

5 This village was known as *Oliutorka* in Russian.

6 The Koryaks are traditionally divided into two main groups: Reindeer Koryaks (*olennye/kochevye koriaki* or *chavchuveny*) and Maritime Koryaks (*beregovye/osedlye koriaki* or *nymylany*). The Alutors have commonly been regarded as a subgroup of the Maritime Koryaks, however, since the 1960s, some Russian linguists have been distinguishing between the Alutor language and Koryak.

7 This group consists of several language families and isolates which have no genetic relationship to each other.

8 Based on linguistic and ethnological studies on Koryak, Nagayama assumes that the Alutor people reside in the following villages: Olyutorka, Wetwey, Kultushno, Tilichiki, Wywenka, Ilpyr, Anapka, Tymlat, Ossora, Karaga in the Eastern coast of Kamchatka peninsula, and Rekinniki, Podkagernoe and Lesnaya (Palana) in the Western coast (Nagayama, Yukari, *Ocherk grammatiki aliutorskogo iazyka* [Grammatical Outline of Alutor], Endangered Languages of Pacific Rim Publications Series A2-038, Suita, Japan: Faculty of Informatics, Osaka Gakuin University, 2003, pp. xii-xiii).

9 Minority Electric Resources, Government's Decree on the List of Small Indigenous Peoples

All-Russia Population Census of 2002,¹⁰ the population of the ethnic group was estimated at about 3,000, i.e. 35%¹¹ of the total Koryak population of 8,743.¹² According to my survey, the average age of the youngest speakers is about 40, but most of them speak Russian in daily communication. Thus, the number of Alutor speakers is estimated at approximately 200-300. At present, the Alutor children do not acquire the language of their parents and grandparents any longer. The number of native speakers is decreasing year after year; thus, this language has seriously been endangered.

Alutor mainly comprises three dialects: Alutor proper, Karaga, and Lesnaya.¹³ In addition, some dialects of Koryak spoken in Penzhina District resemble Alutor in morphology, others in phonology. It should be noted that these dialects of Koryak are spoken by the so-called “Maritime Koryaks” whose lifestyle is similar to that of the Alutors. It is also important to note that the “Maritime Koryaks” share the same self-designation with the Alutors, namely *nəməlʃən* “Nymylan.”

At present, the orthography of Alutor is under construction, and there are no published educational materials on this language. However, some Alutor authors¹⁴ and teachers in elementary schools in KAR have attempted to describe the language based on the orthography of Koryak which was created in the 1930s (first based on Latin, and then on Cyrillic scripts).

of the Russian Federation (2000) http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Russia/Russia_IndigenousList_Russian.htm (accessed on 21 June 2006).

- 10 These statistical data also reveal that 23% of the entire population of Koryak speaks Koryak. This suggests that the Alutor language has approximately 700 speakers. However, this estimate appears highly optimistic, considering the fact that the younger generation of less than fifty years of age scarcely acquires neither Koryak nor Alutor, while people who are fifty years old and over account for 11% of the entire population.
- 11 Nagayama (*Oчерк грамматики*, p. xiii) calculates that Alutors, including Lesnaya and Karaga people, account for approximately 35% of the entire population of Koryaks. If these two groups are to be excluded, Alutor accounts for 25%, and its speakers are estimated at about 150.
- 12 Federal State Statistic Service, *2002 All-Russia Population Census* (2004) <http://195.133.159.86/index.html?id=11> (accessed on 25 June 2006).
- 13 For extra information on the dialects refer to S.N. Stebnitskii, “Nymylanskii (koriatskii) iazyk [The Nymylan (Koryak) Language],” in G.N. Prokof’ev, ed., *Iazyki i pis’mennosti narodov Severa, Ch. 3: Iazyki i pis’mennosti paleoaziatskikh narodov* (Leningrad, 1934), pp. 49-50; S.N. Stebnitskii, “Aliutorskii dialekt nymylanskogo (koriaktskogo) iazyka [The Alutor Dialect of the Nymylan (Koryak) Language],” *Sovetskii Sever* 1 (1938), pp. 65-66; A.A. Maltseva, *Morfologiya glagola v aliutorskom iazyke* [The Alutor Verb Morphology] (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1998), pp. 3-5; and Nagayama, *Oчерк грамматики*, pp. xiv-xv).
- 14 Kirill Kilpalin is the only author who has published folktales in Alutor (K.V. Kilpalin, *Ania: skazki Severa* [Ania: Tales of the North], Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky: RIO Kamchatskoi oblastnoi tipografii, 1993), making use of the Cyrillic script. Mikhail Popov has additionally provided Russian translations for Kilpalin’s texts.

As with other minority languages, Alutor is rich in unique grammatical features that cannot be predicted from a knowledge of major languages. However, the grammar has not been sufficiently studied. Therefore, its extinction will be a great loss not only for its speakers and their descendants but also as a human intellectual resource.

PROCESS OF LANGUAGE DECLINE

Many authors have pointed out that the proportion of native speakers of minority languages in Russia, as given in the results of the All Soviet/Russian Census, is an overestimation. Vakhtin,¹⁵ for example, explains how ambiguous is the definition of “mother tongue” (*rodnoi iazyk* in Russian). Consequently, the term does not reflect the number of people who actually use the target language in their daily conversations.

As already mentioned, the average age of the youngest Alutor speakers is about 40. As a rough estimate, all people over 50 could speak Alutor fluently in 2002. Based on this estimate, I assume that people over 40 would have spoken Alutor in 1989, over 30 in 1979, over 20 in 1969, over 10 in 1959, and all the population would have spoken Alutor in 1939. Serious decline is found during the period 1939-1959 (–23%) and 1959-1970 (–32%).

Table 1 and Figure 2 show the number of native Alutor speakers and their percentage to the total Alutor population in my estimates.¹⁶ The percentage of native Koryak (including Alutor) speakers which is given in the All Soviet/Russian Census is also shown for the purpose of comparison.

Table 1. Estimated Number and Percentage of Alutor Speakers¹⁷

	Alutor Population	Alutor Speakers	Alutor Speakers to Total Alutor Population (%)	Koryak Speakers to Total Koryak Population (%)
1939	2,445	2,445	100.0	100.0
1959	1,785	1,373	76.9	94.1
1970	2,578	1,165	45.2	81.6
1979	1,981	632	31.9	69.6
1989	2,300	426	18.5	52.4
2002	2,349	250	10.6	29.5

15 Vakhtin, *Iazyki narodov*, pp. 77-79.

16 Multiplying the Koryak population by the estimated percentage of Alutor (35%) gives the Alutor population. Multiplying the Alutor population by the estimated percentage of the corresponding generation gives the number of Alutor speakers. Note that a part of KAR was transferred to neighboring Magadan Province in 1958.

17 Source: Goskomstat Rossii, *Chislennost' i sostav naseleniia narodov Severa: po dannym perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda* [The Number and the Structure by Nationalities of Northern People: on the Data of Population Census in 1989], Tom I, Chast' I-II (Moscow: Respublikanskii Informatsionno-izdatel'skii Tsentr, 1992); Goskomstat SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia*

Note that the Koryaks whose traditional occupation is reindeer breeding keep a comparatively high percentage of native speakers. This can be explained as follows; there were few Russian speakers in reindeer camps, and reindeer breeders had many occasions to speak in their native language. Anyway, this data shows that both Koryak and Alutor speakers have suffered a sharp drop in number over the last 50 years.




Figure 2. Percentage of Alutor and Koryak Speakers to Total Population¹⁸

As mentioned above, the following three factors have impacted on the language decline in Kamchatka. They are certainly applicable to other Northern Minorities in the Russian Far East.

- Population change (= increase in newcomer population)
- Amalgamation of kolkhozes and liquidation of villages
- Change in education policy

In the following subsections, I will discuss each factor in detail.

Population Change


The proportion of non-indigenous inhabitants to the total population correlates with the language decline of the indigenous people. Obviously, the entire non-indigenous population is represented by Russian speakers. When the Russians first arrived in Kamchatka in the middle of the 17th century, none of indigenous peoples could speak Russian. Then, the more the Russian-speak-

1979 goda, Tom IV, natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Chast' I, Kniga 1 [Results of All Union Population Census in 1979, Vol. IV, Population Structure of USSR, Part I, Book 1] (Moscow, Statisticheskii Sbornik, 1989); Goskomstat SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda, Tom X* [Results of All Union Population Census in 1979, Vol. X] (Moscow: Statisticheskii Sbornik, 1990); Federal State Statistic Service, *2002 All-Russia*; Iu.A. Poliakov, ed., *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda: osnovnye itogi* [All Union Population Census in 1939: Main Results] (Moscow: Nauka, 1993); Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda RSFSR* [Results of All Union Population Census in 1959, RSFSR] (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1963, rep. Nenden/Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1975).

18 Source: Same as Table 1.

ing population grew, the more the indigenous population acquired Russian. According to a special sociolinguistic investigation on the use of native languages in Siberia and the Far East undertaken in 1968, these languages were still used actively in family and daily life conversation.¹⁹ Moreover, half of the population of the Northern people had acquired Russian as a second language by 1970, and 60% by 1979.²⁰

Ogryzko²¹ estimated the population of indigenous people at about 20,000 before the conquest of Kamchatka by Russians, and it decreased to 22% in the first 200 years. According to the data of 2002 Census,²² over 10,000 indigenous people live in Kamchatka Province, including Koryak Autonomous Region.



It indicates that these people account for 4.1% of the entire population in this area.

In KAR which was established in 1930 the growth of the non-indigenous population was not so rapid. Nevertheless, the indigenous population has always been smaller than the non-indigenous population. Figure 3 and 4 show how the population structure of KAR changed in the course of 1926-2000.²³

Figure 3. Change in Population Structure in KAR²⁴

19 I.S. Gurvich, "Etnoiazykovye protsessy [Ethnolinguistic Processes]," in I.S. Gurvich, ed., *Etnicheskoe razvitiie narodnostei Severa v sovetskii period* (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), p. 140.

20 Ibid.

21 I.I. Ogryzko, *Ocherki istorii sblizheniia korennoi i russkoi naseleniia Kamchatki (konets XVII – nachalo XX v.)* [Outline on the History of Approach between Indigenous and Russian Population in Kamchatka (The End of 17th – the Beginning of 20th Century)] (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1973), pp. 9-41.

22 Federal State Statistic Service, *2002 All-Russia*.

23 Archive sources show only the total indigenous population in both Karaga and Olyutor districts in 1926. Comparing the proportion of Karaga population and Olyutor population, I assume that Karaga population accounted for about 30% of the total population of these two districts.

24 Source: Otdel po Delam Arkhivov Administratsii Koriakskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga (OpDAAKAO). f. 9, op. 1, d. 1, l. 35; d. 5, l. 1; d. 62, l. 1; d. 138, l. 2; d. 247, l. 2; d. 363, l. 5; d. 536, l. 1; Goskomstat SSSR, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda, Tom IV*.

The non-indigenous population increased rapidly during 1929-1989 but it decreased in 2000. Karaga district has a fairly large portion of the non-indigenous population as compared with the KAR total. From 1939 to 1959, in particular, the non-indigenous population increased by more than 50% but it has reduced by about 30% after 1989. The economic situation in KAR may explain this. KAR experienced




Figure 4. Change in Population Structure in Karaga district²⁵

local economy in the 1950s which caused a remarkable increase in the non-indigenous population in this area.²⁶ The non-indigenous population has begun to move out after the dissolution of the Soviet Union because KAR, like other regions of Russia, suffered a serious economic crisis. Note that the size of the indigenous population did not change through this period.

Davydov gives an earlier date for the period of the progress in local economy. Having over-fulfilled the yearly plan for the first time in 1937, fishing became by 1940 the primary industry in the KAR.²⁷ The fish catch in KAR, in particular, dramatically grew during World War II. In 1945, it achieved 2.5 times more than the level of pre-war time.²⁸ Above all, Karaga district thrived on its fishing industry which produced 47.6% of the KAR total fish catch in 1940.²⁹ Consequently, it is natural for Karaga district to have a large proportion of the non-indigenous population as compared with the KAR total.

Figure 5 shows the fish catch in Karaga district and KAR. Similar to the changes in population, the fish catch in Karaga district also shows a big increase from the 1940s and a sharp drop down to 50% after 1989.

²⁵ Source: Same as Figure 3.

²⁶ V.V. Antropova, *Kul'tura i byt Koriakov* [The Culture and Life of Koryak] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1971), pp. 136-140.

²⁷ V.V. Davydov, "Ot Bata k Trauleru [From Dugout to Trawler]," in E. Gropianov and K. Klikov, eds., *Svet v Tundre* (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky: Dal'nevostochnoe Knizhnoe Izdatel'stvo, 1970), pp. 15-18.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 26.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 18.




Figure 5. Fish Catch and Quota Performance in KAR and Karaga district³⁰

in 1961 in Anapka) say that the population of Ilpyr village where they lived after the liquidation of their home village Anapka increased 3-4 times in summer due to the influx of seasonal workers. Having married indigenous women, some of the workers settled there permanently. Statistical data show that Ilpyr had 2,422 residents in 1964.³¹ Alexei Appolon³² (born in 1950 in Podkagernoe, Penzhina district) remembers that 1,000-3,000 workers came to Tymlat village, adjacent to Ilpyr, in the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s. Most of them came over by contract or agreement. He adds that Bashkir students were sent to this village for practical training.

Incredibly high salaries in the fishing industry attracted seasonal workers from various part of the Soviet Union: European Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Mordvinia. Alexei Appolon says that he once earned 2,000 rubles by working in the fishing industry during his summer vacation, while the average monthly salary of teachers was about 150 rubles at that time. All workers born in KAR received some allowances in addition to their basic salary, and accordingly, their income was about three times higher than that of newcomers, who received only the basic salary. Thus, it was beneficial for employers to bring seasonal workers from the mainland, even at the cost of bearing their transportation expenses.³³

However, Figure 4 shows only the permanent residents; it does not include the number of seasonal workers. Since I have no statistical data on the population of seasonal workers, I merely introduce some information that I have received from my language consultants. Tatiana Golikova (born in 1937 in Anapka, Karaga district) remembers that seasonal workers appeared after World War II. Tatiana Golikova and Egor Chechulin (born

30 Source: OpDAAKAO f. 9, op. 1, d. 8, l. 3, l. 22-25; d. 254, l. 1; d. 370, l. 1; d. 519, l. 3. No data on Karaga district are available for 1979.

31 OpDAAKAO f. 9, op. 1, d. 105, l. 1.

32 The interview was held on December 16, 2006.

33 Alexei Appolon; the interview was held on December 16, 2006.

The following passage in Rethmann³⁴ supports the above statements.³⁵

...the majority of Russian and Ukrainian “newcomers” (*priezhie* [sic]) arrived in the mid-1950s. At that time, government programs encouraged a form of economic development that invited the increased presence of Russian and Ukrainian workers and their families at the northeastern shore. The majority of whites [...] worked in the flourishing fish industry. The incentives were attractive: The wages were three times higher than on the mainland; the family of every worker received a well-equipped apartment.




Figure 6.
Number of Villages and Kolkhozes in KAR³⁶

All the facts mentioned in this section confirm that the rapid increase in the newcomer population in KAR is artificial rather than natural growth.

Amalgamation of Kolkhozes and Liquidation of Villages

The amalgamation of kolkhozes began immediately after the establishment of KAR in 1930.³⁷ The main purpose was to enhance productivity. Along with the amalgamation, “unpromising” villages were liquidated. Figure 6 shows that the number of kolkhozes decreased to 13% during 1936-1969. No official documents or resolutions are available concerning the liquidation of villages because villages were not accounted for in the statistics.³⁸ The liquidation process in KAR was completed in 1993.³⁹

As many authors have pointed out, these operations caused many problems for the indigenous people. For example, Khelol,⁴⁰ in her preface to Milgich-

34 Petra Rethmann, *Tundra Passages: History and Gender in the Russian Far East* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), p. 21.

35 However, she does not specify the sources her description is based on.

36 Source: Antropova, *Kul'tura i byt*; Khelol, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy*; Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda RSFSR*; Goskomstat SSSR, *Vozrast i sostoianie v brake naseleniia SSSR: po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda* [Age and Status in Marriage of Population of USSR: on the Data of All Union Population Census in 1989] (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1990); OpDAAKAO f. 9, op. 1, d. 60, l. 10; d. 96, l. 1; d. 363, l. 1.

37 Antropova, *Kul'tura i byt*, p.130.

38 T.M. Khelol, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie problemy razvitiia ranee zakrytykh sel v koriakskom avtonomnom okruge* [Socio-Economical Problems on the Evolution of Earlier Closed Villages in Koryak Autonomous Region] (Moscow/Palana: Izdatel'stvo MGU, 2000), p. 15.

39 Tatiana Khelol, p.c.

40 N.N. Milgichil, *The Magic Rope: Koryak Folktale*, Endangered Languages of Pacific Rim Publication Series A2-035 (Suita: Osaka Gakuin University, 2003), p. iii.



Figure 7. Iosif's Relocation Route

il's work, describes the forced relocation of the Nymylan-Koryaks as follows:

After the liquidation of villages, the inhabitants were sent to Manily, Kamenskoe, and Paren. Still now, people prefer to keep company with those from the same village, straining to maintain, in this way at least, their mother language, legends and history. However, most of the older generation found it very difficult to adapt to a new way of life, and they passed away still longing for their former homes and communities.

Here are two stories about the forced relocation of the Alutors. One is cited from Kravchenko,⁴¹ which is told by Iosif Zhukov (born in 1950, Podkagernoe).

We lived in a very beautiful place: between the villages of Rekinniki and Lesnaya. In winter, we lived in an earth house near hills; in spring, on a river shore; in summer, we moved to the sea. [...] Everything was in abundance there: fish, fur animals, meats, mushrooms, and berries. And it had BEGUN. Our reindeer were seized. They moved us to Rekinniki. They didn't give us a residence. We lived at my mother's relatives with 4 families in a flat. Everybody spoke Koryak. But when I went to a school, they spoke only Russian. If someone spoke in a native language unwittingly, they made him stand in the corner.

Then "Old" Rekinniki had closed. We were sent to a "New" one, which was constructed in a swamp. After the fourth grade, for further education, we were sent to Paren, across the large Penzhina Bay. [...] Then, Paren closed. We were detached from our families and sent to Kamenskoe, to a boarding school again. We learned only in Russian.

41 V.T. Kravchenko, *Mengo* (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky: RIO KOT, 1995), pp. 30-31.

Figure 7 shows the whole route that Iosif was forced to pursue.

Iosif has explained about his schools as follows. He studied in Rekinniki until the fourth grade. Then he moved to Paren because Rekinniki had only a four-year school. Then the Paren school switched from a seven-year to a four-year system. Thus, children in the fifth grade or older had to move to another village, Kamenskoe, which had a seven-year school. After graduation from school, Iosif landed a job in Palana, where he still lives.⁴²

Alexei Appolon, Iosif's nephew, described the relocation in greater detail. In 1959, when he was 6 years old, Podkagernoe was closed. The inhabitants of Podkagernoe were moved to Old Rekinniki. There were no cars at that time; therefore, people traveled by dogsleds, reindeer, or horses with all of their household goods. However, after two years, people were again relocated to another village, New Rekinniki. New Rekinniki had closed in 1981, and people, including Iosif's relatives, were moved to Tymlat and Ossora located on the Eastern coast of Kamchatka.⁴³ Some were moved in 1980, like Alexei and his family, but others stayed on in Rekinniki until 1981.⁴⁴

The next story was told by a native woman (born in the 1940s) during my field research in 2000. Her native village was liquidated during the Soviet era.

I had two children at that time: my elder child was 3 years old, and the younger one was at the breast. My husband and most able-bodied people, including women, were working with the reindeer herd, far from the village. Despite an announcement two months beforehand that our village was going to be liquidated, nobody believed it. One day, when I was at home with my children, a truck rode up to the entrance, and several men entered the house. These men began to load all our belongings onto the truck, and I watched them helplessly. Then the truck left for a pier, where a fish carrier was berthed. I had no choice but to go after the truck. When I arrived at the pier, the fish carrier was already full of people with baggage. Then all the people who were in the village on that day were moved to another village.



The liquidation of villages led people to a multiethnic society, from an almost monoethnic one where they had lived until that time.⁴⁵ Some of the villages to which they were sent, for example, Tilichiki, Ossora, and Kamenskoe, consisted mostly of newcomer populations while others consisted of various ethnic groups who were also relocated from their native villages. Consequently, the relocation caused an increase in mixed marriages. From my observation, Russian is dominant in mixed-marriage families, so it is clear that the increase in such marriages is accelerating the process of language decline.

42 Iosif Zhukov; the interview was held on November 2006.

43 Other stories about the relocation of the inhabitants of Rekinniki and Anapka can be found in Rethmann, *Tundra Passages*, pp. 42-43.

44 Alexei Appolon; the interview was held on November 29, 2006.

45 Some Russian-speaking families, of course, lived in these "almost monoethnic" villages, working for administration, schools, and magazines. Even so, the indigenous population constituted more than 80% of the population in these villages.



No statistical data on the rate of mixed marriage is available at this moment. However, the following two family charts which are based on my interviews with several Alutor speakers in 2002, represent the process of mixed marriages to a certain extent.

The family shown in Figure 8, whose village was liquidated in the 1970s, experienced a forced relocation. The inhabitants of this liquidated village were sent to another village, where most of the population was non-indigenous. Figure 8 suggests that mixed marriages in this area appeared approximately in the 1970s, after the forced relocation. The family shown in Figure 9 had not

experienced relocation, although mixed marriages are also found in the third generation. Since the main industry of this village is fishery, they had many seasonal workers from the continental part of Russia. Both of the men indicated in Figure 9 were such seasonal-working fishermen.

Education Policy

The change in education policy toward the minorities in Kamchatka can be divided into the following four periods:

- 1913-1949: Encouragement to use native language in education
- 1950-1979: Suppression of native language and culture
- 1980-1991: Reevaluation of native language and culture, and the beginning of its revitalization
- 1991- : Stagnation of language/culture revitalization because of financial difficulties

Figure 10 shows the change in the number of schools in KAR.




Figure 10. Increase in Schools in KAR⁴⁶

46 Source: Antropova, *Kul'tura i byt*, p. 200; OpDAAKAO f. 9, op. 1, d. 1, l. 47 and d. 60, l. 12; Otdel Narodnogo Obrazovaniia Koriakskogo Avtonomnogo Okruga, *Istoriia narodnogo obrazovaniia v Okruge* [History of Public Education in KAR] (Palana, 1990). Data on the number of indigenous children are available only for 1937, 1958, 1968 and 1982.

Figure 10 clearly shows a rapid increase in schools before the 1950s, and a rapid decrease after the 1950s. During the first years the Soviet Government encouraged teachers to use indigenous languages at school, because the majority of the indigenous population did not understand Russian well.⁴⁷ Especially in the 1920s and 1930s education in the lower grades was conducted with the help of bilingual speakers.⁴⁸ Such “interpreters” worked in Koryak schools until the 1940s.⁴⁹

In the 1920s-1930s, the Government planned to increase the literacy rate among indigenous peoples who often refused to send their children to school. The authorities often forced children to enroll to school with no heed to children’s desires. Thus, some children were hidden when officials came to a village to find school-age children,⁵⁰ while others escaped from boarding schools.⁵¹ The Government made many efforts to educate the native people: e.g., some Russian teachers acquired Koryak or Alutor, and their knowledge helped to establish Koryak orthography and/or to publish educational materials. Short-term Koryak courses for Russian-speaking teachers were held several times. Even “nomadic” schools were organized for children who lived at remote reindeer-herding camps.⁵² However, all of these attempts were aborted after a short time, because few teachers agreed to work under such conditions.

Subsequent years from 1950 up to 1979 were a period of great hardship for the minorities. The percentage of native speakers remarkably dropped in this period. As mentioned in 2.2, the Government amalgamated kolkhozes and liquidated small villages, and therefore, many villages and schools turned to be multiethnic.⁵³ Since parents’ demand for the education in Russian had grown, schools in KAR adopted Russian as the language of instruction.⁵⁴ Note that parents just wanted to teach their children Russian, and it did not mean that they rejected their own language. Increase in the Russian-speaking population raised the number of native people who spoke, or at least understood, Russian. According to Vladimir Nutayulgin (born in 1965, Wywenka, Olyutor district), in the beginning of the 1970s, almost all children understood Russian well when they entered elementary school; he was the only child who did not know a word in Russian on his first day at school.

Another important scene in this period is the prohibition of using native languages both at schools and in boarding houses. Little information about it

47 Antropova, *Kul'tura i byt*, pp. 197-198.

48 Gurvich, “Etnoazykovye protsessy,” p. 139.

49 Natalia Voronova, born in 1948, Anapka, p.c.

50 Valentina Dedyk, p.c.

51 A.E. Kibrik, S.V. Kodzasov, and I.A. Murav'eva, *lazyki i fol'klor aliutortsev* [Language and Folklore of Alutor People] (Moscow: IMLI RAN Nasledie, 2000), pp. 171-172.

52 Otdel Narodnogo Obrazovaniia, *Istoriia narodnogo obrazovaniia*, pp. 15-16.

53 Note that the indigenous population accounted for less than 50% in 1950s (see 2.1).

54 Ibid., p. 23.

has been found in published materials,⁵⁵ but the native people in KAR remember this period well even now. In addition, one Alutor male speaker (born in 1960s) told that every indigenous children had to live in a boarding school, even if his/her parents lived in the same village. He also said that teachers forbade children from speaking their native language, because both teachers and matrons knew only Russian. The majority of this generation who received their education in this period lost their native language, having been separated from their culture and language.

The amount of educational materials (Table 2) well reflects the change in the education policy. Most textbooks and readers in Koryak were published in the 1930s-1940s, although these materials are almost unavailable for school children now.

Table 2. Koryak Educational Materials⁵⁶

	Textbooks	Readers	Dictionaries	Total
1923-1949	11	14	1	26
1950-1979	2	0	2	4
1980-1991	5	5	1	11
1992-2002	2	0	1	3

In the 1980s, due to the restoration of language rights for Northern Minorities, Koryak authors also began to publish educational materials.⁵⁷ Four textbooks and one reading material for school children, and one textbook for students were published in the 1980s.⁵⁸

During the latest 10 years, efforts to publish educational materials in Koryak were frustrated because of financial difficulties. Nevertheless, teachers and researchers working on educational programs are still trying to revitalize their language.

In the 1980s, education in Koryak also restarted at many schools in KAR.⁵⁹ Now, in 2006, 18 schools and 14 kindergartens have Koryak classes,⁶⁰ out of 27

55 Vakhtin (*Native Peoples*, p. 18) outlines the physical punishment meted out in schools. However, Iosif's story (above) is the only case I found narrated by the indigenous people themselves.

56 Source: Matsumura, Kazuto, Koryak: Bibliographical guide (2004) <http://www.tooyoo.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Russia/bibl/Koryak.html> (accessed on 25 June 2006); Iu. Trushkova, "Koriakskii iazyk [The Koryak Language]," in V.Iu. Mikhilchenko, ed., *Pis'mennye iazyki mira: iazyki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Akademiia, 2003), pp. 270-273; Valentina Dedyk, p.c.

57 As mentioned above, no educational materials for Alutor have been published, since this language obtained official status as an independent language in 2000.

58 Valentina Dedyk, p.c.

59 Although Alutor lacks educational materials, many native teachers have lessons in this language, using their self-made materials.

60 There are two variations of educational program in KAR: (1) an hour "Native Language" and an hour "Native Culture" each week, in each grade, excluding the first (in Palana and Tigil); (2) two hours "Native Language" in the lower grade, an hour in the middle and higher grades each week (in other villages).

schools and 33 kindergartens throughout KAR.⁶¹

FINAL REMARKS

The language decline in Kamchatka has been caused quite artificially. All factors mentioned in this paper show that the policy imposed by the dominant society directly impacted the status of indigenous languages.

Some may claim that assimilation of a minority people by the majority and the extinction of a minor language is a “natural” process in human history. Of course, we have already experienced such phenomena since the beginning of history. Nonetheless, we must distinguish between those that occurred over a number of centuries and those that have taken place during the last five decades. The former may well be considered as “natural” but the latter should not. It should also be noted that such a claim usually arises from the side of the majority.

The choice of whether or not to abandon one’s native language is personal. However, the present situation surrounding the indigenous people in the Russian Far East does not allow them to make the choice. If humans have a power to create such a situation, they also have the power to avoid creating such a situation, too. Then, what should we do? Let us begin by making ourselves aware of the situation surrounding the indigenous peoples and their languages, and recognizing the historical background of their situation. If we shut our eyes to these situations and backgrounds, it would be akin to encouraging the decline of the languages. We have already experienced how our indifference to them can lead to an infringement on their human rights. We should guard against repeating our past mistakes. Nobody can truthfully say that the younger generation of indigenous peoples will never want to know their own language in the future merely because their parents were unable to pass on the legacy to them. We should not deprive the younger generation of their right to know the language of their ancestors.

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I would like to express my gratitude to my language consultants and friends, who gave me information about their previous and current life: Maria Nikiforova, Maria Chechulina, Luisa Uvarova, Natalia Voronova, Lidia Khutigirgina, Tatiana Khelol, Igor and Valentina Dedyk, Evdokia Pronina, Egor Chechulin, Vladimir Nutayulgin, Alexei and Elena Appolon, Iosif Zhukov, Tatiana and Saveli Golikov (titles are omitted from names), and other people of the Karaga and Olyutor districts. I also express my deep gratitude to the staff members at the Archive of KAR – Tatiana Khelol again and Elena Muravskaia – for arranging accommodation for me during my work there. Of course, all errors of fact or interpretation in the present paper are my responsibility. I am also grateful to Dr. Alexander D. King at the University of Aberdeen and Dr. Anna Bugaeva at Chiba University for their comments and suggestions. I presented the present work at the 2006 International Workshop for Young Scholars held on July 4, 2006, SRC, and benefited immensely from the comments and questions raised at this event. I thank all the participants.

61 Valentina Dedyk, p.c.

Cult of Personality in Monumental Art and Architecture: The Case of Post-Soviet Turkmenistan

JAN ŠÍR

On December 21, 2006, the death of Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov at age 66 was announced by the Türkmen döwlethabarlary State News Agency. Thus, the presidency for life of this rather odious and eccentric dictator came to an end. He autocratically ruled this energy-rich Central Asian republic since the declaration of independence in 1991. Niyazov referred to himself as Turkmenbashi, literally meaning the "Head of the Turkmen." Through his charismatic leadership, he had a tight grip on all political power in Turkmenistan. He was in control of the Turkmenistan Democratic Party, the former Communist Party. This only legal political party in Turkmenistan filled the institutional vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union. All national media were also in the hands of the first President. Turkmenbashi's peculiar semi-autobiography titled *Rukhnama*, or the "Spiritual Code," was officially proclaimed as the Holy Book. Indoctrination reached unprecedented levels. In addition, the government maintained effective control over the national economy. Turkmenistan had been repeatedly denounced for a disastrous human rights record, which could have been even worse had the regime had more efficient administrative capacities. In the context of a predominantly rural and politically indifferent society based on clan allegiances, oppression has so far provoked little public outrage.¹

The passing away of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, once almighty ruler of Turkmenistan during its constitutive period, is an important watershed for the history of this newly independent state. Coping with the manifold and troubled legacy left behind by the Turkmenbashi era will be a challenge to his successors for years to come. With respect to national ideology, a new kind of official world-view evolved in Turkmenistan since 1991. Its totalitarian character and aspirations are outstanding even in the post-Soviet context. The new ideological system contained features adopted from the Communist era, among them emphasis on state paternalism and historicism. Yet Turkmenbashi also needed to distance himself from the discredited *ancien régime*, if only to provide a sense of legitimacy for his rule. For this reason, he turned to the pre-Soviet era for in-

1 See e.g. the latest Freedom House *Nations in Transit 2006* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). For perhaps the best comprehensive works on post-Soviet Turkmenistan, see Sergei M. Demidov, *Postsovetskii Turkmenistan* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Natalis," 2002); and Shokhrat Kadyrov, *"Natsiia" plemen. Etnicheskie istoki, transformatsiia, perspektivy gosudarstvennosti v Turkmenistane* (Moskva: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk, 2003).

spiration. Ensuing revival of older traditions and customs became the driving force behind what was known as the “specific path of development,” a term coined by Turkmenbashi himself to denote the exclusionary state and nation building model promoted in Turkmenistan during the Turkmenbashi era.²

The cult of personality of President Turkmenbashi has been the unifying feature of all ideological aspects in Turkmenistan since independence. Turkmenbashi’s name is used for thousands of places and physical features throughout Turkmenistan, including at least ten towns, a river, a mountain, a bay in the Caspian Sea, and even a star in the Ursa Major constellation. In cities, municipalities and populated areas, countless squares, parks, streets and other public places carry the name Turkmenbashi, and so do various institutions and buildings (airports, schools, museums, banks or stadiums), artistic ensembles, agricultural cooperatives and factories. His face is virtually omnipresent; all banknotes, basic foodstuffs as well as the cheapest vodka feature the picture of the first President. Somewhat eerily, Turkmenbashi was present every time a TV was on, as a small golden picture of his face placed in the upper right corner of the screen accompanied each and every broadcast of Turkmen channels. He is praised in the national anthem and his birthday is celebrated as a national holiday. The first month of the year is called Turkmenbashi. His books and teachings form the core curriculum at both elementary and secondary schools. People used to swear loyalty to him unto death at spectacular public ceremonies, etc. The reflection of this personality cult in contemporary monumental art and architecture of Turkmenistan has not yet been systematically explored. This paper aims to fill the gap by a brief description and analysis of this phenomenon.

IDEOLOGY IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF ASHKHABAD

We will begin the overview of recently built sights and monuments in Turkmenistan in the Ashkhabad capital. Apart from being centers of social, economic and cultural life, the outlook of capital cities has an important symbolic function as well. Their architecture is indicative of aspirations of the ruling elite as they are seats of power at the same time. Ashkhabad, until recently a provincial town only some one hundred years old (in spite of Turkmen historiography seeking to prove its ancient origin),³ is no exception in this sense. We could hardly find a better example of a modern-day capital city being reconstructed for the purpose of underpinning a megalomaniacal rule of a single

2 For ideology of the Turkmenbashi regime, see Slavomír Horák, “Ideologija rezhima Turkmenbashi,” in *Politicheskaja nauka i gosudarstvennaja vlast’ v Rossijskoi Federatsii i Novykh Nezavisimykh Gosudarstvakh*. Otv. red. V.N. Rudenko, S.I. Glushkova, K.I. Zubkov, K.V. Kiselev, V.N. Merkushev (Ekaterinburg: UrO RAN, 2004), pp. 5-19. For context, see also his “Mify velikogo Turkmenbashi,” *Vestnik Evrazii/Acta Eurasica* 2 (2005), pp. 105-132.

3 For “thousands of years” of Ashkhabad history, see Öwez Gündogdyýew, *Aşgabat – kermatly Ärsagyň şäheri* (Aşgabat: Türkmenistanyň milli medeniýet “Miras” merkezi, 2005).

individual than Ashkhabad during the Turkmenbashi era. It is symptomatic that the building activity commenced in the early 1990s with the construction of the monumental Presidential (Turkmenbashi) Palace. It was to be the first structure of the architectonically unique palace ensemble surrounding the Presidential (Turkmenbashi) Square, which eventually became the core of a new city center. Ever since, the city has resembled a gigantic construction site. Allegoric monuments combining architecture with art conforming to ideological criteria set by the Turkmenbashi regime have become typical for the new look of the city, effectively making it an instructive textbook of the ruling ideology in marble, gold and stone.



Picture 1

The 63-meter Turkmenistan Arch of Neutrality (*Türkmenistanyň Bitaraplyk derwezesi* [Picture 1]) dominates the skyline of the new Ashkhabad city center. The arch is an allegory of Turkmenistan's conduct in the international arena oriented towards "peace and harmony." It became one of the principal landmarks of the capital soon after its festive opening in 1998. The inauguration of the monument took place on the occasion of the third anniversary of the "historic" UN General Assembly resolution. On December 12, 1995, the world community recognized Turkmenistan's pledge to be permanently neutral. Ashkhabad tends to interpret this act as a sign of unanimous international support for its policies, both foreign and domestic. The multi-story lookout tower, referred to as the "Tripod" by locals, is supported by three gigantic pylons symbolizing in the words of President Turkmenbashi the "three sources of modern Turkmenistan – neutrality, independence, and unity of the nation [spirit, e.g., *Rukhnama*]."⁴ The structure is capped by a 12-meter gilded statue of the grand architect of the neutrality concept, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, standing with extended arms and receiving blessings from above. His majestic figure is, moreover, always facing the sun, as a sophisticated technical mechanism allows for its continuous rotation over the course of 24 hours. With its original architecture and scope, the tripod outshines other monuments dedicated to President Turkmenbashi, to his mother, his father or to other historical figures both in Ashkhabad and the rest of Turkmenistan.

4 Rech' Prezidenta Turkmenistana Saparmurata Turkmenbashi na torzhestvennom otkrytii Arki Neitraliteta, *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, December 14, 1998.



Picture 2

Not to be sidelined, Turkmenistan's independence is celebrated by the Turkmenistan Independence Monument (*Türkmenistanyň Garaşsyzlyk Binasy* [Picture 2]). It is located in the Ashgabad southern district of Berzengi. The 118-meter structure is perhaps the highest in Turkmenistan. The monument is the key feature of the largest forest park in Ashgabad.

The park includes also an amphitheater, a half-fountain, half-shopping-mall in the shape of an octagonal pyramid, various aquatic structures, as well as small sculptural forms, such as busts of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi. The monument itself was officially unveiled in 2000, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the declaration of independence. Its colossal foundation in the shape of a yurt carries a 91-meter stele crowned by a viewing gallery. The height of the stele is symbolic, as 1991 is the year Turkmenistan gained independence. On the top of the stele, there is a 27-meter flagpole featuring a standard with a golden crescent and five stars. Even the length of the flagpole is symbolic, as October 27 was the exact date when Turkmenistan's independence was declared. The monument is encircled by two dozen statues representing the greatest leaders, thinkers, and poets supposedly associated with the very foundations of Turkmen statehood and spirit. The composition of the monument is complemented by a wide, perfect for parades, boulevard overlooked by a gilded figure of the "Founding Father," Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, its size reflecting the "epochal significance" of Turkmenistan's independence.⁵

Also situated within the green zone, just a few minutes walk from the Independence Monument, is the Rukhnama Park (*Ruhnama seýilgähi* [Picture 3]) built in 2003. This public park is unique in its attempt to reflect the Rukhnama book, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi's ideological masterpiece, in an original synthesis of architectonic and sculptural form. Its central component consists of an imposing copy of the "Holy Book" with a gold relief portrait of its author on the cover. Thanks to subtle inner mechanics, the book seems to come to life for the fascinated visitors. Every Saturday night (Saturday, meaning the Day of Spirit in Turkmen under the Turkmenbashi calendar), the book opens to the sound of music and "glorious episodes" of national history since Turk-

⁵ *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 27, 2000.

men's progenitor Oghuz Khan to the Turkmenbashi era are projected on its giant pages.⁶ Seven granite columns representing seven generations of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi's forefathers in the male lineage have been erected around the monument, thus underlining the historical aspect of the regime's ideology.

What we see here is a representation of conceptual cornerstones of recent state and nation building practices in Turkmenistan through monumental art and architecture, according to the precise words of President Turkmenbashi: "The Golden Age of the Turkmens has two historical foundations. One of them is Independence, [the other is] Neutrality. If [using] the comparison of the Turkmen people with a bird taking off, then one wing



Picture 3

is Independence, [and the other one is] Neutrality. And Rukhnama lights up the way for the bird."⁷ According to the government propaganda, both these national accomplishments have been made possible only thanks to the personal presence and attention of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi. Dozens of his figurative sculptures in central Ashkhabad as well as elsewhere in Turkmenistan are thus interpreted by the regime as expressions of the nation's supposed unending gratitude for Turkmenbashi's paternal love and care. Turkmenistan's day-to-day reality, however, fails to comply with these grand conceptual notions.

THE MOTHER

Turkmenbashi's mother Gurbansoltan edzhe (1915?-1948) was the second most esteemed figure in Turkmenistan's history during the Turkmenbashi era. Official biography portrays her as an exceptional personality combining all the characteristics of an ideal Turkmen woman. She was to personify "infinite kindness and generosity, purity of soul, superior honor and virtue, devotion to the family hearth and boundless love to children."⁸ Her short yet fulfilled

6 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, February 19, 2003.

7 President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov: "Harmony and mutual respect are keys to morality," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, August 8, 2002.

8 *Türkmenistanyň Gahrymany Gurbansoltan eje we Beýik Saparmyrat Türkmenbaşynyň Altyn Zamanasynyň zenanlary*. Awtorlar-düzüjiler: D.B. Berdiýew, N.A. Durdylyýew, W.M. Hramow, M.M. Mollaýewa (ylmy ýolbaşçy), O.A. Myradowa, A.A. Ýeskow (Aşgabat: Türk-



Picture 4

life, during which she gave birth to three sons, was tragically ended by the disastrous Ashkhabad earthquake of 1948. She perished in the catastrophe together with both of Turkmenbashi's little brothers and tens of thousands of other residents. A public organization called Gurbansoltan Edzhe Women's Union promotes the legacy of the "Kaaba of the Turkmen" as Turkmenbashi's mother is often nicknamed. The union backed most of the nationwide initiatives seeking to glorify the deceased mother. Among them was the granting of the republic's highest state honor of Hero of Turkmenistan in memoriam to Gurbansoltan edzhe, proclaiming the year 2003 as the Year of Gurbansoltan Edzhe, and establishing new national holidays associated with the milestones in her life.

Moreover, her name was given to a number of municipalities and districts, boulevards, and streets all over Turkmenistan as well as to governmental, educational, and cultural institutions, for instance the World Association of Carpet Connoisseurs.⁹ In 2002, the month of April was renamed Gurbansoltan in the newly adopted Turkmen national calendar.¹⁰

men döwlet neşirýat gullugy, 2005), p. 126. The book was reprinted in Russian in a series in the daily newspaper *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan* from January 20, 2006, to February 8, 2006.

9 Postanovlenie Medzhhlisa Turkmenistana "O prisvoenii zvaniia Geroia Turkmenistana Gurbansoltan edzhe – materi pervogo i bessrochnogo Prezidenta Turkmenistana Velikogo Saparmurata Turkmenbashi," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, July 6, 2002; Postanovlenie Medzhhlisa Turkmenistana "Ob ob"iavlennii 2003 goda Godom Geroia Turkmenistana Gurbansoltan edzhe – materi pervogo i bessrochnogo Prezidenta Turkmenistana Velikogo Saparmurata Turkmenbashi," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, January 18, 2003; Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistana "Ob ob"iavlennii v Den' pominoveniia obshchenatsional'nogo traura," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, April 17, 1998; Postanovlenie Medzhhlisa Turkmenistana "O pereimenovanii Iylanlyiskogo etrapa Dashoguzskogo velaiata," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, September 7, 2004; Reshenie Khalk Maslakhaty Turkmenistana "Ob obrazovanii v gorode Turkmenabate Lebapskogo velaiata etrapov imeni Geroia Turkmenistana Atamurata Niiazova i imeni Geroia Turkmenistana Gurbansoltan edzhe," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, August 13, 2002.

10 Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistana "O vvedenii v neitral'nom Turkmenistane natsional'nogo letoschisleniia turkmenskogo naroda, oboznachenii dnei nedeli, dvenadtsatiletnego tsykla zhizni cheloveka, a takzhe prazdnovanii 'Ak goiun toi'," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, August 13, 2002.

The glorification of Turkmenbashi's mother has had a strong impact upon monumental art and architecture in Turkmenistan. This process gained intensity following the festive opening in 1996 of the Ashkhabad memorial park named Motherly Love (*Ene Mähri* [Picture 4]). The park is situated in a quiet location at the beginning of a pedestrian zone in the city center. It is dominated by a bronze sculptural figure of a mother with a baby in her arms as the personification of a gentle Turkmen woman, whose slender lines appear to grow right out from the robust foliage in the middle of the pool. The thin squirts of water from the adjoining fountains symbolize the new life given by the mother to her beloved child.¹¹ This calm figurative composition was modeled on Gurbansoltan edzhe looking after the future President of Independent Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi.¹²

The figure of Gurbansoltan edzhe, however, has been perceived not only as a symbol of tenderness and purity but also of human self-sacrifice. The scene where Turkmenbashi's mother dies in the devastating earthquake of 1948 is another popular theme in contemporary Turkmenistan's monumentalism. The Earthquake Victims' Monument (*Ýer titremesiniň pidalarynyň hatyrasyna bina edilen Ýadygärlik* [Picture



Picture 5

5)) in the very center of Ashkhabad is an excellent example. It forms one urban complex together with the Arch of Neutrality, constituting the northern side of the vast Presidential Square. The inauguration of the monument in 1998 was part of the nationwide festivities to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the "heroic death" of Turkmenbashi's mother.¹³ The monument's cube-shaped pedestal with a museum inside carries on top a metal sculpture of a mythical bull attacking the globe with its horn. The globe cracks wide open and the gaping chasm is just about to swallow the focal figure of a dying mother who is raising a defenseless little boy above her head and thus saving the future President from the fury of the elements. The shining golden figure of the miraculously rescued infant is meant to highlight the nation's relentless tenacity capable of overcoming any hardship.

11 Kurbandzhemal Kuraeva, "Monumental'naia skul'ptura nezavisimogo neitral'nogo Turkmenistana," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, February 9, 2004.

12 *Novosti Turkmenistana*, May 6, 1996.

13 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 7, 1998.

Another typical version of the monumental mother can be found in front of the Ashkhabad Palace of Justice (*Adalat Köşgi*), the seat of Turkmenistan's Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court and several law-enforcement agencies. Located in the south-eastern corner of the Presidential Square, the palace opened in 2001 together with the building of the Defense Ministry, architectonically its mirror image. With these two additions, the palace complex adjoining the central city square in fact acquired its present appearance. Personifying the idea of "absolute impartiality and objectivity of Turkmenistan's judiciary," Gurbansoltan edzhe is shown here as Themis, the Goddess of Justice, with the symbolic scales in her hand. Apart from classical inspiration, the statue has also some specific features such as Turkmen national dress as well as the indispensable "Holy Book" pressed to the chest with the second hand. Thus, in an allegorical sense, the mother warrants the "rule of law" embodied in the "supreme justice of the policy of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi," grounded in "humanity and national tradition."¹⁴ The fact that brutal interrogations of prisoners of conscience took place within the palace following the reported attempt on the life of President Niyazov in 2002 puts the monument in more realistic perspective.

In this way, Turkmenbashi's mother has become one of the most frequently depicted objects in monumental art and architecture all over Turkmenistan since the declaration of independence, with the Ashkhabad Motherly Love monument serving as a source of inspiration. In regional and district centers like Dashoguz, Turkmenbashi and Tedzhen, the author has recorded numerous sculptural compositions portraying Gurbansoltan with a baby in her arms. Different variations of the theme begin to appear as well. The majestic statue in front of the Culture Palace of Turkmenbashi the Great in Rukhabat, a new satellite town of Ashkhabad, might be indicative of a certain innovation, representing Gurbansoltan edzhe with a boy standing by her side, obviously introducing him to a grand life journey. A similar scene can be seen, for instance, in the picturesque Gurbansoltan Edzhe Park, which the author came across in the Karabekaul oasis in the remote Lebap Region.

THE FATHER

Turkmenbashi's reported father, one Atamurat Niyazov (1912-?), complements Turkmenistan's version of the "Holy Trinity." Unfortunately, as in the case of the mother, there has been hardly any documentary evidence about his life. According to findings of Turkmen intelligentsia in exile based on research in former Soviet archives, no person bearing the name Atamurat Niyazov has probably ever existed.¹⁵ This fact, however, was no obstacle to his gradual glo-

¹⁴ *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 27, 2001.

¹⁵ See particularly Choushir Toppyev (pseudonym), "Styd i nenavist' Saparmurata Niiazova-Annaniiazova," *Erkin Türkmenistan*, January 2, 2005, available at <<http://www.erkinnet/chronicle4/news2860.html>>.

rification within the Turkmenbashi regime. The cult of Turkmenbashi's father traces back to the exhumation of his supposed remains in 2000. Their discovery surprisingly occurred somewhere in the North Caucasus where he is said to have fallen heroically at the hands of Nazi captors in 1942 or 1943.¹⁶ Not even the year of his death has been declared for certain by the regime ideologues.¹⁷ Numerous



Picture 6

geographical locations in Turkmenistan now boast the name of Turkmenbashi's father, including two administrative districts and a district capital, principal irrigation water canal and countless public spaces. A textile mill in Geok-tepe, a hospital in the city of Mary, an oil tanker in the Caspian Sea port town of Turkmenbashi, a motor rifle division or a collective farm all bear his name as well. Atamurat Niyazov's "credits" in the fight for Fatherland gained international recognition during protracted negotiations in 2005, when President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko reportedly awarded him the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise in memoriam in a final bid to keep supplies of natural gas from Turkmenistan flowing.¹⁸

Memorial Park of the Hero of Turkmenistan Atamurat Niyazov (*Türkmenistanyň Gahrymany A. Nyýazow adyndaky ýadygärlik seýilgähi* [Picture 6])

16 *Turkmenistan News Weekly*, May 8, 2000. Concerning the expedition searching for the remains of Turkmenbashi's father in the Caucasus, see "recollections" of the official Turkmen delegation member Murad Karryev in *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, June 16, 2000.

17 Several more or less accomplished attempts at its artistic rendering have been pursued since 1991 (e.g. in a two-part wide-screen epic movie). However, an official biography of the Hero of Turkmenistan Atamurat Niyazov had not been completed until late 2005. Unfortunately, the author has not been able to get hold of it. We thus have to rely mainly on fractional and anecdotal narration by Saparmurat Turkmenbashi available in the first volume of his "Holy Book" of *Rukhnama*, based on the memories of a certain Ivan Semenovich, whom young Turkmenbashi met sometime in the 1960s in a Leningrad library, and of a certain Chary Aga, whom he supposedly met one day on a train. See Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, *Rukhnama* (Ashkhabad: Turkmenskaia gosudarstvennaia izdatel'skaia sluzhba, 2002), pp. 49-53.

18 The facsimile of President Yushchenko's decree in Ukrainian was published on Turkmenistan's governmental server *XXI vek – zolotoi vek Turkmenistana*, May 3, 2005, available at <http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/politika/pol_out/030505.htm>. Official records in Ukraine contain no mentions about this award, although Kiev apparently did not protest nor rebut Ashkhabad news sources reporting the event.

in the Ashkhabad city is an archetype of the monumental portrayal of Turkmenbashi's father. The park was festively opened in 2001 for the celebration of the victory over Nazism. The memorial complex covers a kilometer long pedestrian zone stretching from the Motherly Love Park to the Hero of Turkmenistan Atamurat Niyazov Avenue in the west. Its central axis consists of a marble-paved boulevard, lined on both sides by decorative greenery and a variety of water pools, cascades and fountains. In the middle part we pass the Brothers (*Doganlar*) monument in honor of Turkmenbashi's little brothers, Niyazmurat (1938-1948) and Mukhammetmurat (1942-1948).¹⁹ Situated at the high end of the boulevard, there is a spectacular bronze sculpture of a soldier tightly holding his rifle. It represents Turkmenbashi's father as a World War II hero, supposedly embodying "true heroism and devoted will to victory." The monolithic figure is further accentuated through a relief depicting charging soldiers.²⁰ The platform in front of the monument with the flame of eternal glory serves as a venue for ceremonies held by the Hero of Turkmenistan Atamurat Niyazov War Veterans' Organization.

The search for an artistic embodiment of Turkmenbashi's father can be documented by a range of various sculptural compositions all over Turkmenistan. As a symbol of exemplary courage, vigor and bravery, Atamurat Niyazov is typically depicted as a soldier in a uniform with a weapon. In contrast to the monuments dedicated to the "Great Mother," which are usually part of public recreation areas and in this sense oases of rest and peace, monuments to the "Great Father" frequently stand in locations where military parades and other mass gatherings take place. The density of such monuments seems especially high on the left bank of the Amudarya river given the father's presumed connections with this region, e.g. in the town of Kerki that had itself been renamed Atamurat for the same reason.²¹ Monuments commemorating other stages of his life are apparently less common, as the soldier image best fits the mobilizing efforts of the regime. Nevertheless, Atamurat is also sometimes portrayed as a village teacher with various school aids (like in front of the Senagat bank in Annau featuring a huge abacus or on the main street of Dashoguz holding a globe).

MONUMENTS TO TURKMENBASHI'S FAMILY IN KIPCHAK

In the section above, the monuments celebrating the cult of Turkmenistan's late President Niyazov, his deceased mother, father and, to a lesser

19 For a story on Turkmenbashi's brothers see his latest "memoir book," S.A. Nyýazow, *Dogan – doganyň galasy. Ýatlamalar we oýlanmalar* (Aşgabat: Türkmen döwlet neşirýat gullugy, 2005), reprinted in Russian in a series in *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan* from November 1, 2005, to November 5, 2005.

20 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, May 9, 2001.

21 Türkmenistanyň Halk Maslahatynyň Çözüdi Lebap welaýatynyň Kerki şäheriniň we Kerki etrabynyň adyny üýtgetmek hakynda, *Türkmenistan*, December 30, 1999, available at <<http://88.247.7.7:8080/Atamyrat/htm/perman-atamyrat.htm>>.

degree, brothers, have been treated more or less individually as separate entities. At the same time, however, there is a clear tendency towards adoration of Turkmenbashi's family as a whole. Following the declaration of independence in 1991, Turkmenistan embarked upon a course of national revival through a renewal of traditional institutions. The family as the bedrock of society holds a special place within this "back to roots" process, a stance that explains the regime's heavy emphasis on the Leader's family. An unrivalled manifestation of this exaggerated family cult through monumental art and architecture can be found at Saparmurat Turkmenbashi's native *aul* of Kipchak in Akhal Region, a 15-minute drive on a brand-new six lane highway west of



Picture 7

Ashkhabad. Vigorous construction activity focused on this area.

The architectonic development of Kipchak was accelerated by the inauguration in 1997 of the 1948 Earthquake Victims' Monumental Park (*1948-nji ýyldaky ýer titremesiniň pidalarynyň hatyrasyna döredilen ýadygärlik-bag*), an accomplished variation on the topic of elemental fury as a moment of the recent past that has shaped the nation's memory. A gigantic elevated granite base with a fountain carries a sculptural figure of a mother in a desperate effort to stop a wall from collapsing on top of her sleeping son with one arm, while holding her second terrified boy with the other. The tragic scene is contrasted with the mulberry tree that survived the disaster. This silent witness to the tragedy serves now as a symbol of invincible life in the background.²²

On the opposite side of the motorway there is the Recreation Park (*Dynç alyş seýilgähi* [Picture 7]), another Kipchak memorial complex with artistic aspirations. The opening ceremony was arranged as the people's gift to the President on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday in 2000. The locals even say it was they who proudly raised funds for the construction of the monument as an expression of thanks to the village's most renowned native.²³ This claim, however, is hard to believe given the meager incomes throughout the region. Water

22 See *Milleting énesine tagzym*. Red. B. Zhutdiev, A. Akmuradov, Zh. Mulkiev (Stambul: n.p., 1998).

23 Author's interview with Orazguli Annamuradov, director of the memorial complex, member of parliament and poet, Kipchak, August 2001.



Picture 8

pools, cascades and fountains are surrounded by a half-circle covered colonnade. Golden bas-relief behind depicts the moving scene of Atamurat's final good-bye to his pregnant wife and two sons as he is leaving to the front to fulfill his patriotic duty. Colossal golden statue of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi adds a triumphant note to the monument's composition.

In 2004, the ceremonial opening of the Turkmenbashi Spirituality Mosque (*Türkmenbaşynyň Ruhy metjidi* [Picture 8]) took place. It marked the most recent stage in Kipchak's transformation into a jewel of sorts in contemporary Islamic monumental art and architecture. Propaganda pamphlets compare the mosque to the Taj Mahal for its beauty achieved through purity of form. It is currently the largest shrine in all Central Asia. A spherical cupola covers the main hall which can accommodate up to 10,000 believers. As in all preceding cases, the construction of this approximately \$100 million project proceeded under the personal supervision of President of Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi. He was even reported to have personally contributed to it with earnings from a record harvest of wheat on his small plot of land.²⁴ The four minarets above the golden dome of the white marble mosque rise to the height of 91 meters, thus again symbolically commemorating the year of Turkmenistan's independence. Yet what is certainly a new element, distinguishing the mosque from earlier monuments, is the unabashed full-scale attempt to sacralize Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, referred to in national media in later stages of his rule as God's last Prophet.²⁵ All the minarets, the dome, the arches above each of the eight entrances as well as the interior of the mosque are "adorned" not only with quotations from the Holy Qur'an, but from Turkmenbashi's "Holy Rukhnama" as well.²⁶ Visitors can borrow the complete book for prayer at the entrance free of charge.

²⁴ *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, June 18, 2002.

²⁵ See particularly Kakamurat Ballyev and Osman Odéev, "Slovo Proroka," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, May 21, 2001.

²⁶ *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 23, 2004.

The dramatic rebirth of the once almost forgotten village of Kipchak within a single decade pointedly illustrates the changing nature of the Turkmenbashi regime's ideology, which gradually kept acquiring attributes of a regular religious cult. Shortly after its inauguration in 2004, the Turkmenbashi Spirituality Mosque saw ceremonial reburial of the remains of the President's closest relatives. The urns with the ashes of his mother and little brothers from the adjacent cemetery were transferred to the family vault next to the mosque, together with the urn containing "sacred" earth from the place where the father had supposedly been buried before.²⁷ In 2006, the late President Turkmenbashi was also interred in the family vault next to the remains of his kin.²⁸ Besides, a tradition was established of holding all commemoration ceremonies on national holidays in Kipchak, since 2005 the main spiritual center and memorial complex in Turkmenistan.²⁹ Thus, Turkmenbashi's birthplace became a popular site of government-sponsored pilgrimages.

PHENOMENON OF PRESIDENTIAL ARCHITECTURE

We can thus say that the "specific path of development" that we have witnessed in Turkmenistan since the declaration of independence is inseparable from the figure of the first President, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi. Turkmenistan underwent a radical change of ideological paradigms after 1991, a move that had profound effects throughout the society. In architecture an entirely new style with distinct forms emerged, based primarily on the ideas, imagination and taste of President Turkmenbashi, which allows us to speak of a phenomenon of presidential architecture.³⁰ In the following section I use examples of recently completed projects of various structural types to illustrate several key aspects of this new style.

The forms of presidential architecture in Turkmenistan can perhaps be best observed on new government buildings that were erected on a massive scale as the status and needs of the republic's administration increased dramatically after 1991. The Spirituality Palace of Congresses and Arts (*Ruhnyjet köşgi*) at the head of the Presidential Square in Ashkhabad is an excellent demonstration of the

27 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, December 11, 2004.

28 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, December 25, 2006.

29 Postanovlenie Khalk Maslakhaty Turkmenistana "Ob uvekovochenii opory natsional'nogo dukha – Mecheti dukhovnosti Turkmenbashi i ob obespechenii ei gosudarstvennoi podderzhki," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 26, 2005.

30 For the term of presidential architecture, see Ata Kurbanaliev, "Ashkhabad: fenomen prezidentskoi arkhitektury," *Press-kur'er Turkmenbashi* 7 (2000), available at <http://www.tm-press.gov.tm/vol24_arch.html>. For perhaps the most comprehensive, rich factual work on the architecture of the Turkmenbashi era, regardless of ideological bias, see Annageldi Esenow, *Beýik Saparmyrat Türkmenbaşy eýýamynyň binagärçiligi* (Aşgabat: "Ruh" neşirýaty, 2003). See also the introductory sections to his earlier Annagel'dy Esenov, *Istoriia arkhitektury Turkmenistana* (Ashkhabad: "Rukh," 2001), pp. 7-32.



Picture 9

presidential style, which set the standards for subsequent projects as well. The palace was inaugurated in 1999 for the ninth session of the People's Council, Turkmenistan's supreme governmental body. During that session, the "Great Son," first President of independent Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, was granted the "exclusive right to exercise the powers of the head of state without term limita-

tions," against his ostentatious reluctance.³¹ Symmetric dome composition of the building seems to evoke an open book. Rhythmic row of columns in front of the long main facade with lots of open spaces provide the building with an airy and simple atmosphere, which is supposed to imitate the accessibility of the plain words of the Leader's "Holy Rukhnama" for ordinary Turkmen. The public importance of the palace is accentuated by its placement on an elevated platform that is meant to be as massive and solid as the supposed spiritual foundations of the Turkmen nation.³²

Public parks, representing the synthesis of architecture, monumental art and landscaping, provide yet another opportunity for expression of the ruling ideology. As part of governmental campaign for the greening of cities, a number of such open-air monuments appeared in the capital of Ashkhabad as well as in other cities in recent years.³³ Apart from the parks mentioned above, the Ashkhabad city Park of the Ten Years of Turkmenistan's Independence (*Türkmenistanyň Garaşsyzlygynyň 10 ýyllygy seýilgähi* [Picture 9]) deserves particular attention. This park complements the magnificent Spirituality Palace on the southern side of the Presidential Square. It was inaugurated with great fanfare in 2001 and its purpose has been to allegorically portray all the "historic successes" Turkmenistan achieved during the first decade of independence.³⁴ The park is dominated by an elevated square platform, the sides of which are

31 Postanovlenie Khalk Maslakhaty Turkmenistana "O polnomochiiakh Pervogo Prezidenta Turkmenistana Saparmurata Turkmenbashi," *Press-kur'er Turkmenbashi* 18 (1999), available at <http://www.tmpress.gov.tm/vol18_edict.html>.

32 Kurbandzhemal Kuraeva, "Garmoniiia iskusstva i mysli," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 30, 2001.

33 Leonid Kiiashko, "Parki i skvery Ashkhabada," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, September 22, 2003.

34 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 27, 2001.

symbolically exactly 91 meters long. There is a gigantic fountain on the platform in the shape of the traditional Oghuz octagonal star, which is crowned by a sculpture of ten noble Akhal Teke stallions that are relentlessly galloping forward. The direction of the herd is provided by the "Great Founder" of independent Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi. His monumental oversize golden statue is the park's conceptual pinnacle.

As centers of Islamic faith, which has always been an integral part of Turkmen identity, mosques enjoy a special status in monumental art and architecture of Turkmenistan. Following the declaration of independence in 1991, several mosques have been built as part of the regime's nation building effort. They are supposed to revive the spiritual values of the Turkmens, yet at the same time they perfectly serve the personality cult of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi as well. Prior to the construction of the aforementioned Turkmenbashi Spirituality Mosque in Kipchak, the slightly less majestic Great Saparmurat Hajji Mosque (*Beýik Saparmyrat Hajy metjidi*) in Geok-tepe was the most important shrine in the republic. The mosque is operating since 1995. Its 60-meter minarets and a light blue dome are visible kilometers away thanks to the surrounding flat terrain. This memorial complex erected in order to immortalize President Turkmenbashi's pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*) is located on the "sacred soil" of a former fortress where in 1881 the resistance of Turkmen (Akhal Teke) tribes to the colonization efforts of tsarist Russia was ultimately broken in a bloody battle.³⁵ On January 12 each year, nationwide events commemorating heroic defenders of the fortress (the fallen, according to recent "findings" of Turkmenbashi's biographers, also include his direct ancestors) take place there together with ceremonies remembering those who fell for freedom and independence of the Fatherland in more recent times.³⁶

The architecture of public buildings, such as theaters, museums or exhibition halls, is another area where the ruling ideology leaves a no less prominent mark. President Turkmenbashi achieved notoriety for his highly selective approach towards true spiritual values as demonstrated for example by banning ballet and opera.³⁷ Construction of public buildings dedicated to art and culture is nevertheless experiencing rapid growth. During the last decade, a number of impressive structures have been erected mainly in Ashkhabad; the chief purpose of these buildings is to underpin and supplement the ideological needs of the

35 Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistana "Ob uvekovechenii svetloi pamiati pogibshikh v Gekdepinskom srazhenii za nezavisimost' turkmenskogo naroda," *Turkmenskaia iskra*, February 4, 1993.

36 For Turkmenbashi's Family Tree, see *Beýik Saparmyrat Türkmenbaşynyň ömür daragty*. Düzüjiawtorlar: D.B. Berdiyew, N.A. Durdylyýew, A.A. Ýeskow, O.D. Kuzmin, M.M. Mollaýewa (ylmy ýolbaşçy), W.M. Hramow (Aşgabat: Türkmenistanyň Ministrler Kabinetiniň ýanyndaky Baş arhiw müdirligi, Türkmenistanyň Prezidentiniň Arhiw gaznasy, 2006), reprinted in Russian in a series in *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan* from November 2, 2006, to November 16, 2006.

37 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, April 3, 2001.



Picture 10

ruling regime. From the recently finished projects outside the capital, the concept and architectural form of the Great Saparmurat Turkmenbashi's Turkmenistan National Museum of White Wheat (*Türkmenistanyň Beýik Saparmyrat Türkmenbaşy adyndaky Milli Ak Bugdaý muzeýi* [Picture 10]) in Annau from 2005 stands out as a prime example of the current trend, attempting to visibly symbolize Turkmen "tal-

ent and diligence."³⁸ The cylindrical building is capped by gigantic golden ear of wheat glimmering in the sunlight and surrounded by two layers of garlands from smaller wheat ears. In front of the main entrance on a special pedestal there is a monumental statue of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi himself in the middle of a wheat field, his body charging energetically forward, presumably towards the glorious as well as bountiful future of his homeland.

Sporting facilities are an area where the personality cult finds distinctive expression. Having recovered from a series of cardiovascular interventions in the late 1990s, convalescent Turkmenbashi was strongly advised by doctors to stop smoking (a ban on smoking in public was soon afterwards extended to the whole nation by presidential decree) and to begin physical exercise.³⁹ Hence, the President, who was also the head of the national Olympic movement, became a tireless promoter of healthy lifestyle. His "concern" for the "high moral spirit and physical fitness of the golden generation entering the golden age" materialized, inter alia, in the establishment of Leader's Wellness Trail (*Serdaryň saglyk ýoly*) paved along the Kopet-Dag foothills. The 36-kilometer trail with unforgettable panoramic views of the Ashkhabad city starts on the southern outskirts of the capital. The concrete path leads through rugged mountain terrain with numerous ascents and descents; the maximum elevation difference is 800 meters.⁴⁰ In 2000, with the construction completed, the first Saturday in November was declared as Health Day by presidential decree.⁴¹

38 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, July 16, 2005.

39 Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistana "O zaprete kureniiia," *Sobranie aktov Prezidenta Turkmenistana i reshenii Pravitel'stva Turkmenistana* 1 (2000), p. 7.

40 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, November 8, 2000.

41 Ukaz Prezidenta Turkmenistana "Ob uchrezhdenii i provedenii natsional'nogo prazdnika - Dnia zdorov'ia turkmenskogo naroda," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, November 6, 2000.

During this national holiday, numerous organized groups head for the trail. Government ministers got involved as well, leading the hikes, working there as part of the out-of-town sessions of the cabinet or even spending their free time there at least once a week,⁴² thus fulfilling Turkmenbashi's whim.

Construction of hotels as attributes of a cosmopolitan metropolis has also become a progressive part of contemporary Turkmenistan's architecture, reflecting the ruling elites' desire for international recognition, which would in turn enhance their own status. Accommodating VIP guests in comfort and style was part of this strategy. Since 1993 over two dozen top-class hotels have been erected in Ashkhabad's southern suburb of Berzengi, along the motorway connecting the capital with Saparmurat Turkmenbashi's spa residence of Archabil. Though almost empty to this day, the construction of these luxury hotels spurred the transformation of the southern part of the city into a peculiar business and administration center with numerous office buildings, luxurious housing and seats of various government agencies. The so-far highest 18-story President Hotel (*Prezident myhmanhanasy*) was completed in 2004 as one of the first skyscrapers in this part of the city. Its distinctive outline is considered to be the symbol of "Turkmenistan's drive towards the future."⁴³ Indispensable "decoration" is provided in the form of a six-story high portrait of the prime mover of this "grand project," Saparmurat Turkmenbashi.

Finally, transport structures are relevant in the context of Turkmenistan's presidential architecture. In accordance with the nationwide government plans (most recently the 2003 Strategy of Economic, Political and Cultural Development of Turkmenistan until 2020), the development of transportation network is the key to sustainable economic growth given the republic's transit potential stemming from geographic location.⁴⁴ The resulting expansion of infrastructure such as railways, roads or ports provides enough space for incorporation of elements of monumental art. Among others, the tradition of building allegorical gateways to mark administrative borders of individual municipal areas has been revived. The Great Turkmenbashi White Gateway (*Beýik Türkmenbaşynyň ak derwezesi*) on the western arterial road in Ashkhabad built in 2001 is perhaps the most accomplished work of this sort. The gateway is topped by five golden domes in a distinctive national style. Reminiscent of ancient gatekeepers, the entry into the city is guarded by bronze statues of brave and watchful *nukers*, soldiers of the Khan's personal retinue. In the central part of the building between both arches there is a massive pedestal supporting an oversize golden statue of the ruler of the city, Saparmurat Turkmenbashi.⁴⁵ Similarly rendered gateways were added in the following years on Ashkhabad's eastern, northern

42 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, March 29, 2003.

43 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, July 18, 2004.

44 Natsional'naia programma "Strategiia ékonomicheskogo, politicheskogo i kul'turnogo razvitiia Turkmenistana na period do 2020 goda," *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, August 27, 2003.

45 *Neitral'nyi Turkmenistan*, October 29, 2001.

and southern access roads, as well as on the way from the International Saparmurat Turkmenbashi The Great Airport, so that the President himself can symbolically greet visitors who are entering the city.

The ruling ideology has also affected other areas of contemporary architecture in Turkmenistan, leading to incorporation of ideological symbols as integral parts of new buildings. However, due to overemphasis on a few megalomaniacal projects, construction of housing and basic urban infrastructure, to name just a few, has been largely neglected, thus further aggravating the rather dire living conditions in the country. Unfortunately, the limited scope of this article does not allow for detailed analysis in this respect.

CONCLUSION

The above survey was intended to demonstrate that a pervasive ideological system was developed in Turkmenistan under Turkmenbashi. The Turkmenbashi ideology affects practically all areas of life, reminiscent of the world's most notorious totalitarian dictatorships in modern history. Turkmenbashi's personality cult, gradually extended to include also other members of his family, provides a connecting link to all other ideological aspects of the regime. Monumental art and architecture are a specific reflection of this personality cult, as ideological considerations determine themes and topics for various projects. Their chief purpose is to symbolically underpin the uncontested one-man rule of Saparmurat Turkmenbashi. Now he is dead, but it was still too early to form any solid judgments as to the orientation of Turkmenistan under the new post-Niyazov leadership. However, the fifteen years of Turkmenbashi's regime have produced a new generation of Turkmens whose worldview does not go far beyond that of "Holy Rukhnama." Doing away with this ideological burden may therefore remain an issue long after the "Great Builder" has gone, just like his monumental sculptures as the most tangible relics of his era may also stand witness for years to come.

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Review Article

Cultural History of Early Soviet Russia and Its Repercussion to Political History*

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Frederick C. Corney, *Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004, 301 pp. ISBN 0801442192

Michael S. Gorham, *Speaking in Soviet Tongues: Language Culture and the Politics of Voice in Revolutionary Russia*, DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003, 266 pp. ISBN 087580313X

James W. Heinzen, *Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917-1929*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004, 297 pp. ISBN 0822942151

Matthew Lenoe, *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004, 315 pp. ISBN 0674013190

Elizabeth A. Wood, *Performing Justice: Agitation Trials in Early Soviet Russia*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005, 301 pp. ISBN 0801442575

Culture was a no less important domain than politics and economy in sustaining power so far as the Bolsheviks were concerned. In "Not by Politics Alone," Trotskii argued that while the October uprising enabled the Bolsheviks to seize power by deposing "the rule of exploiters," "no such means exists, however, to create culture all at once."¹ Bukharin likewise recognised that the future of the Party and the state rested on the reconstruction of culture. He went on to say that "the cultural question" was the "central problem of the entire revolution."²

In the Party language that prevailed during the 1920s, *kul'tura* (culture) was comprehended not only in terms of artistic works but also in the sphere of

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1 Leon Trotsky, "Not by Politics Alone," in his *Problems of Everyday Life and Other Writings on Culture & Science* (New York, 1973), pp. 15-24 (p. 16). Originally published in Правда. 10 July 1923.

2 Cited in Michael David-Fox, *Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918- 1929* (London, 1997), p. 5.

everyday life and practice.³ The Bolshevik leaders also believed that creating new culture and a new Soviet man constituted an historical mission to be realised through sustained political struggle and economic improvement. "The cultural front" was thus regarded as the "third front" along with politics and economy. A Trade Union journal in the early 1920s ran an article with this title, in which the new culture of the proletariat was declared to be "a mighty weapon in building a new future Communist world" that would be achieved by applying all forces and energies.⁴ At the same time, Soviet citizens were not allowed to remain as "silent spectators" in the struggle to build a new culture, but were expected to participate in that process and to "display [their] own initiatives."⁵

In spite of lofty slogans of the authority noted above, however, the creation and the institutionalisation of Soviet culture was not a straightforward process in which the Party and the state decisively took the helm.⁶ Nor was the Bolshevik culture homogenised simply "from above." Robert C. Tucker was arguably the first historian to underline this point. Since the early 1970s, Tucker has maintained that Communist state-building is not carried out by "simply imposing a ready-made, new 'communist culture' upon the receptive (or non-receptive) populace."⁷ In recent years, Tucker's standpoint has been adopted by many historians, not least because of the profound influence of the "new cultural history" and the cultural turn upon the study of Bolshevik culture. In an influential statement, Foucault suggested that the making of the new political order is not enabled merely by the relocation of the power, but it is vital to shift "the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute level and everyday level."⁸

3 See, for example, David-Fox, *Revolution of the Mind*, p. 7; Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Introduction: On Power and Culture," in *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (London, 1992), pp. 1-15.

4 *Диалект* X. Третий фронт // Профессиональное движение. 1923. № 1. С. 21-24.

5 *Вестник агитации и пропаганды*. 1920. № 3. С. 23.

6 The cultural organs of the Party and the state frequently claimed a shortage of capable staff in their departments. See Corney, *Telling October*, p. 130, and the appeal of the Communist Dramaturgy to the Central Committee in May 1921 "to send comradely Communists, artists, musicians, active artists" to improve its activities. Российский государственный архив социально-политической истории (РГАСПИ), ф. 17 [ЦК КПСС - Учетно-распределительный отдел (1919-1925)], оп. 34, д. 15, л. 8.

7 Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly* 88:2 (1973), pp. 173-190 (p. 185). See also his *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev* (Brighton, 1987); and "Lenin's Bolshevism as a Culture in the Making," in Abbott Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites, eds., *Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution* (Bloomington, 1985), pp. 25-38.

8 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, Colin Gordon, ed. (New York, 1980), p. 6.

The five recently published monographs under review deal with the cultural history of early Soviet Russia. Each book is the product of extensive archival research and all of them address aspects of the cultural history of Bolshevik state-building and institutionalisation of the cultural front in early Soviet Russia.

This review essay will, in the first place, discuss each book in turn in relation to the study of cultural history. It will then explore the projects and the struggle by the Party and state to institutionalise the Revolution in the cultural sphere until the end of NEP and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1928. Finally, the paper will argue how a greater knowledge of cultural history can expand our understanding of “the workings of politics” in the formative stages of the Revolution.

* * *

Since the early 1980s, historians of the French Revolution, following the theoretical advances made by Foucault, Derrida, and Bourdieu among others, turned to focus on “how narratives are constructed” in history, regarding “past narratives as a ‘telling’ mode of cultural expression.”⁹ Under this broad rubric, narrative, myth and collective and individual memory have inspired many conceptual discussions and empirical studies of other European states.¹⁰

There is thus a touch of surprise that the foundation narratives and myth-making of the Russian Revolution in the early Bolshevik era produced almost no detailed analysis until Frederick Corney’s recent monograph.¹¹ *Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution* traces how mythologizing

9 For example, Keith Michael Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution: Essays on French Political Culture in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1990); François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1981); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1984); Patrick H. Hutton, “The Role of Memory in the Historiography of the French Revolution,” *History and Theory* 30:1 (1991), pp. 56-69. The development of the cultural history is reviewed by Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: History, Culture and Text,” in Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (London, 1989), pp. 1-22. Quotes are from Karen Halttunen, “Cultural History and the Challenge of Narrativity,” in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (London, 1999), pp. 165-181 (p. 171).

10 Diane Barthel, *Historic Preservation: Collective Memory and Historical Identity* (New Brunswick, 1996); Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” *American Historical Review* 102:5 (1997), pp. 1386-1403; Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (London, 1975); Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed., *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past* (under the direction of Pierre Nora - 3 vols.) (New York, 1996-1998); George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Representing the Memory of the World Wars* (Oxford, 1990); Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge, 1995).

11 Nina Tumarkin published a book as early as 1983 on the making of Lenin cult in early Soviet Russia. Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, 1983).

October was developed and contoured by the acts of the telling and re-telling by the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1927. During the Civil War, the narrative of the October uprising stressed the heroic episode of the storming of the Winter Palace which formed the centrepiece of mass spectacles accompanying anniversaries of the Revolution. In this period, the staging of mass spectacles was essentially left to avant-garde artists who were authorised "to make the audience experience [their] vision as part of [spectators'] memory." It was not unusual to narrate the Revolution without the story of the Bolshevik Party (pp. 66-90).

In order to advance the institutionalisation of the memory of October, Sovnarkom established Istpart (the Commission on the History of the October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party) in September 1920. Local Istpart organs followed in subsequent years. Many Soviet citizens experienced the history of October through the events launched by the Istpart and the regime, such as mass spectacles, jubilee festivals, museums, films, questionnaires and at the "evenings of reminiscences" that became a form of collective remembering for active Party and non-party people. Producing a coherent narrative was pertinent to the legitimacy of the Party and the state, and each individual was expected to become involved in this process by conceiving a given collective memory of October and by engaging with and sometimes contesting others' memories as well.

Corney argues that an integrated narrative of October was not achieved until the tenth anniversary of the Revolution in 1927, although there were some signs of progress (p. 201). It was still a contested narrative, that is to say the memory of October was still in the course of production. The contested construction of collective memory signifies there are always various modes of memories among a given group, and one's memory is usually in conflict and entwined with others'. The multiplicity of memory was even more awkward in the incipient Soviet state. This perspective provides historians attempting to examine the creation of individual and collective memory in Stalin years with an excellent context.¹²

Nearly a decade and half ago, Steve Smith anticipated that a fresh approach to the Soviet history would be led by historians with readiness to "face up to the discursivity of history as a discipline, its subordination to the effects of language and writing."¹³ This reflected a growing postmodernist influence, especially the "linguistic turn," on the practice of history.

Michael G. Gorham and Matthew Lenoe are evidently prepared to take up this challenge. To be sure, the reconstruction of language and the Soviet-

12 Alon Confino warns historians about using "memory" in an uncritical sense. See Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History."

13 Steve Smith, "Writing the History of the Russian Revolution after the Fall of Communism," *Europe - Asia Studies* 46:4 (1994), pp. 563-578 (p. 568).

ization of the press at the early stage of the Revolution already produced a substantial number of works by contemporary observers of the early Soviet regime including René Fülöp-Miller and Alex Inkeles, and later historians such as Peter Kenez and Jeffrey Brooks in recent decades have delved into the way in which the Party and the state indoctrinated and disseminated their decisions and messages.¹⁴

Unlike previous studies on the field, however, their monographs demonstrate deeper perspectives in the study of the Soviet language and the press, especially in two respects: the use of interdisciplinary methods for examining the socio-cultural mechanism by which the voice of the Party-state prevailed by the middle of the 1930s; and elucidating the process in which ordinary people and rank and file Party members came to politicise themselves.

Employing literary and linguistic perspectives as well as cultural studies, Gorham's *Speaking in Soviet Tongues: Language Culture and the Politics of Voice in Revolutionary Russia* examines the shift of dominant "language culture" during the first decades of the Soviet state. This was simultaneously a struggle of Bolsheviks to bridge the "communication gap" between Party activists and Soviet citizens.¹⁵

Gorham acknowledges in his introduction that "the narratives and the voices used to articulate them are largely cultural constructs and that who we are is largely defined by how we write and speak" (p. 6). The book then focuses on the contestation of the language model by linguists, literary critics, and political leaders. The engagement of ordinary workers and peasants – *rabkory* (worker correspondents) and *sel'kory* (village correspondents) – in the middle of the 1920s entailed a further twist, as Gorham puts it: "if the [worker and village] correspondents were, on the one hand, to serve as the 'voice of the people' with whom they lived and worked and, on the other, to bring the Party and its idea closer to the *narod*, in which language were they to communicate: the colloquial language of the people, or the ideologically 'conscious' language of the state?" (p. 79) This was a big dilemma for the Soviet language-builders in the mid-1920s between the ideal "proletarian" voice and the "real voice of the people" (pp. 67-68).

On the other hand, Lenoe claims that the currently prevalent postmodernist interpretations of cultural practice are prone to overlook the importance of social hierarchy and differentiated responses to the official message. Instead, *Closer to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers*

14 Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin!: Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton, 2000); René Fülöp-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism: An Examination of Cultural Life in Soviet Russia* (London, 1927; reprinted in 1965); Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge, 1950); Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929* (Cambridge, 1985).

15 Gorham highlights the communication gap by quoting the column of a Moscow worker newspaper in 1926: "He's speaking incomprehensively – must mean he's a Bolshevik" (p. 22).

adopts the “production of culture” approach that highlights “the context within which human beings create particular cultural objects,” arguing that this approach enables to examine “where that [cultural] artifact fits into political and social hierarchies, and who uses for what” (pp. 3-4). The use of this methodology leads Lenoe to conclude that the Soviet status groups and hierarchies in the 1920s and early 1930s represent, and were developed by, the multi-tiered agitation and propaganda systems of the period (p. 253).

Both authors also shed light on how ordinary Party members and non-party activists came to internalise the language of the Party-state and to politicise themselves through diverse processes. As for the 1920s, this has been hitherto little discussed among historians, though it is of immense significance.

Lenoe asserts that letter-writing to newspaper editors was an important path to becoming politically active for young aspiring workers and villagers alike. Ivan Sergeevich Eroshenko, a villager in the early twenties of Kharkov in Ukraine, wrote to *Krest'ianskaia gazeta* in 1925 thanking the editors for letting him learn essential knowledge and opening a way for a politically conscious life. In this letter, Eroshenko pleaded with the editors for a map of Moscow and travel to the central editorial office in Moscow that would “arm [me] with knowledge, and send me back to the countryside for the struggle with darkness and primitiveness” (pp. 73-74). Like Eroshenko, many young active provincial citizens who had been passive newspaper readers at the beginning became political activists and local correspondents through participating in reading circles and writing letters to editors.¹⁶

Gorham cites the study published during the First Five-Year Plan by the contemporary linguist, Afanasii Selishchev [“O iazyke sovremennoi derevni,” *Zemlia Sovetskaia* 9 (1932), pp. 120-133]. Selishchev described how villagers with a mastery of the language of the Party-state were empowered in the political, social and everyday practices of rural life. A mastery of the language of authority displayed “progressiveness,” and that language came to dominate the “official public discourse and interaction.” All the same, provincial villagers often retained traditional colloquial speech manners within the private sphere (Gorham, pp. 130-131). In this sense, the adoption of the language of the Party-state was due to pragmatism. For local Party activists, it was for promotion and self-education; for non-party citizens, the use of official language was the only means to make effective appeals to the local administrators; and for the linguists and other professionals, their survival depended upon it (p. 139).

Although the two authors take different approaches, both make an invaluable contribution not only to the study of language under the early Soviet regime, but also the identity-construction and politicisation of the Party and non-Party citizens of the period.

16 On the letter-writing to the officials, see also Лившин А.Я., Орлов И.В. Письма во власть, 1917-1927: Заявления, жалобы, доносы, письма в государственные структуры и большевистским вождям. М., 1998; *idem* Власть и общество: диалог в письмах. М., 2002.

The theatre of the early revolutionary years has long attracted attention from historians of the Revolution and art historians. One reason for such enduring interest in the revolutionary theatre is that many central leaders, Anatolii Lunacharskii among others, were explicitly inclined to make use of the potential of the theatre to influence the thought and behaviour of a large audience – and ultimately, the population as a whole.¹⁷ René Fülöp-Miller observed that “the revolutionizing of the theatre soon became one of the most important branches of Soviet propaganda, and, like all Bolshevik measures, was at once provided with an elaborate ‘ideological basis’.”¹⁸ In the first years of the Revolution, there was also an exceptional situation in which the avant-garde activists attracted state-sponsored support for their experimental stagings in the official and semi-official theatres.¹⁹

A revolutionary form of theatre as distinct from traditional plays and those in the pre-Revolutionary years emerged during the Civil War – the so-called “agitation-trials.” Elizabeth Wood’s *Performing Justice: Agitation Trials in Early Soviet Russia* is the first comprehensive study focusing on the agitation-trials that became a series of educational and entertainment performances in the early years of the Revolution and evolved to “a form of spectacle that demeaned both its subjects and its audience” as well as “a form for the public branding of crimes and misdemeanors” from the middle of the 1920s (pp. 2, 203).²⁰ Wood labels the agitation trials “among the most elaborate secular, semipolitical rituals the world has ever seen” (p. 212), and they were designed to make the audience active supporters of the regime and participants in the state-building project.

The particular merit of Wood’s book is not only that it sheds light on the hitherto neglected political and cultural practice of the theatrical form, but also that it explores the role of “mid-level cultures agents” in the course of the agitation trials. The “mid-level agents” included the political instructors of the Red Army, activists in the trade unions and Komsomol, and medical experts all of whom played a central role in organising the agitation trials. By redirecting the trial from a “mock” to a real one, and by shifting the focus from entertainment to propagating a “correct understanding” of political and everyday issues, the

17 For the early years of Lunacharskii’s engagement with transforming the theatre, see, for example, Театр и революция // Вестник театра. 1920. п/а. С. 1-3; К вопросу о революционном репертуаре // Вестник театра. 1920. № 49. С. 3.

18 René Fülöp-Miller and Joseph Gregor, *The Russian Theatre: Its Character and History with Especial Reference to the Revolutionary Period* (New York, 1968; original London, 1930). See also, Fülöp-Miller, *The Mind and Face of Bolshevism*, especially the chapter entitled “Theatricalized Life.”

19 Lars Kleberg, *Theatre as Action: Soviet Russian Avant-garde Aesthetics*, translated by Charles Rouble (Basingstoke, 1993) scrutinises the avant-garde artists’ involvement in the Soviet theatre.

20 Richard Stites discusses the agitation-trials in his article, “Trial as Theatre in the Russian Revolution,” *Theatre Research International* 23:1 (1998), pp. 7-13.

mid-level agents sought to empower themselves. Wood argues that after 1925 the agitation trials sought to highlight “correct” answers in Bolshevik terms and this ultimately led to the creation of numerous “little Stalins” among local authorities (p. 10).

Whereas Wood is concerned with the mid-level Party and state agents who came to act within official lines, her attention to the action and reaction of “individual” reminds us of the need not to oversimplify the institutionalisation of the political and cultural fronts during the 1920s. James W. Heinzen’s studies on the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem) – the institution charged with “modernising” the Soviet countryside – explores the issue of individual and institutional autonomy during the 1920s. *Inventing a Soviet Countryside: State Power and the Transformation of Rural Russia, 1917-1929* argues that Narkomzem and its leaders represented the concept of *vedomstvennost’*, that is institutional self-efficiency, autarky or self-interest. This concept indicates how “the leaders of state agency often acted in the interests of ‘their’ organisation, ‘their’ staff, or ‘their’ constituency, ignoring or contradicting the instructions of superiors or the concern of peers in other institutions” (p. 5). At the beginning of the NEP, the leaders of Narkomzem criticised the coercive and military means of food requisitioning employed by the People’s Commissariat of Food Supply (Narkomprod) during War Communism. For them, it was imperative to employ persuasion, education and a scientific approach to restore state agriculture after the Civil War and the famine. The Narkomzem leaders identified themselves as the “only source of culture in the village” who could promote rational and scientific modes of production among the peasantry (pp. 53-59).

By underlining the existence of autonomy and institutional cultures within Soviet organs, Heinzen also challenges the dominant view that a total subordination of the state to the Party bodies was accomplished under NEP. Alexander P. Smirnov led Narkomzem from the spring 1923 and he represented *vedomstvennost’* in the state agency. At times, Smirnov accused Party leaders of lacking experience and knowledge of agriculture, and maintained that any appointment and transfer of local Narkomzem cadres should not be authorised without his permission. Smirnov attempted to recruit and promote non-communist specialists to the central posts of Narkomzem under his own patronage, although it was apparently at odds with the Party’s line according to which non-communists were seen as “untrustworthy.”²¹

21 The Party Central Committee decree of November 1925 prescribed that every single transfer and appointment of the local Party bodies must be conducted through Orgraspred (the Organisation and Assignment Department), and any appointment and removal of officials of local Party organs by themselves were no longer possible. Коржихина Т.П., Фигатнер Ю.Ю. Советская номенклатура: становление, механизмы действия // Вопросы истории. 1993. № 7. С. 25-38 (С. 27). For an overview of the development of the *nomenklatura* system, see T.H. Rigby, “The Origins of the Nomenklatura System,” in T.H. Rigby, *Political*

Heinzen's focus upon the *vedomstvennost'* of Narkomzem contributes to our understanding of the complex reality of Soviet organisational culture during the 1920s. As Ronald Grigor Suny points out, our perception of culture has been expanding (or deconstructing) especially since the advent of the cultural turn, and culture is now understood as a practice, or "a field of play with its borders far less clear than in earlier imaginations, its internal harmonies less apparent, in which actors and groups contend for position and power, sometimes in institutions, sometimes over control of meaning."²² The intra-institutional struggles and contestations, such as over how to restore the economy and how to conduct the promotion and appointment of individuals, were therefore not simply political struggles, but struggles over the crucial cultural sphere.

As Heinzen demonstrates, the state organs were not simply subsidiary bodies of the Party. Not a few Soviet individuals at cadre levels were acting for "their" interest and their own institutions, and even opposed the Party-state line. Moreover, even the leaders of lower Party and state organs who were appointed to their positions were not always subordinate to the central control: they were no less important "autonomous actors" in the politics of the 1920s.²³ As Stephen Cohen suggests, the autonomy of the regional leaders in 1920s had a profound influence on central Party-state politics: "machine politics alone did not account for Stalin's triumph" and the lower Party officials were "not his [Stalin's] mindless political creatures, but important, independent-minded leaders in their own right."²⁴

In addition, "informal power resource" including the personal network ties between central and regional leaders and among regional elites deserves attention.²⁵ The informal network was also deeply intertwined with the formal network system such as the appointment, promotion and transfers of cadres in lower and local organisations, and ultimately with the selection of the central leadership at the Party Congress in Moscow.²⁶ During the 1920s the Bolsheviks

Elites in the USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres from Lenin to Gorbachev (Aldershot, 1990), pp. 73-93.

22 Ronald Grigor Suny, "Back and Beyond: Reversing the Cultural Turn?" *American Historical Review* 107:5 (2002), pp. 1476-1499, available on-line <http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/107.5/ah0502001476.html> (par. 23). (Accessed 30 October, 2007).

23 Gerald M. Easter, *Reconstructing the State: Personal Networks and Elite Identity in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, 2000).

24 Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938* (London, 1974), p. 327. One of the recent works in accordance with Cohen's standpoint is James Harris, "Stalin as General Secretary: The Appointments Process and the Nature of Stalin's Power," in Sarah Davies and James Harris, eds., *Stalin: A New History* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 63-82.

25 Easter, *Reconstructing the State*.

26 An important concept to understand the political mechanism of the 1920s is "the circular flow of power" proposed by Robert V. Daniels in the 1970s. Later historians have adopted the concept as a crucial element of Party history in the 1920s. Most officials in provincial and lower Party organs were appointed by the Party Secretariat in the 1920s, and those

had not yet established a stable ruling structure throughout the country, and, as Heinzen's study attests, intra-institutional conflicts were recurrent during the period. The informal power resources provided the capacity to control the nascent state and the base on which to construct the formal structure in the following decades. The personal ties appeared to have been more than a mere "patron-client" relationship, in which centre-regional leaders were mutually dependent, but also encompassed "peerlike relations without mutual obligations."²⁷ It was also utilised as a means of information exchange between central and regional leadership, and of monitoring the practice of the regional organisations. The use of informal resources and personal ties as a means of rule signifies the multiplicity of power at "minute and everyday levels" beyond the government. But this raises the question as to how Bolshevik practices institutionalised the cultural front and how they were exercised.

* * *

William H. Sewell, Jr. insists that "cultural uniformity" can never be achieved even in authoritarian states, nor do leading actors and institutions often seek to achieve it. Instead, their approach is:

"not so much to establish uniformity as it is to organise difference. They are constantly engaged in efforts not only to normalise or homogenize but also to hierarchize, encapsulate, exclude, criminalize, hegemonize, or marginalize practices and populations that diverge from the sanctioned ideal. By such means, authoritative actors attempt, with varying degree of success, to impose a certain coherence onto the field of cultural practice."²⁸

Bolshevik cultural policy in the NEP years was indeed "to hierarchize, encapsulate, exclude, criminalize, hegemonize, or marginalize practices and populations." For instance, most Party members' access to printing facilities was strictly restricted from the middle of the decade. At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927 the Opposition handed a long statement to the Central Committee, with a request that it be circulated among the delegates of the forthcoming Congress, demanding a drastic reconstruction of the Party machinery.

officials controlled the selection of delegates to the Party Congress at the local Party meetings. At the Party Congress in Moscow, those selected delegates voted for their supporting leadership in the selection of the Party Central Committee that assumed responsibility for nomination of the General Secretary as well as Politburo and Orgburo. The General Secretary in this way could establish a mechanism to consolidate the Party's control and his authority. See Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Politics since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin: The Transition Years* (London, 1971), pp. 16-25 (p. 20). A useful discussion of the concept is provided by Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 144.

27 Easter, *Reconstructing the State*, pp. 27-30.

28 William H. Sewell, Jr., "Concept(s) of Culture," in Bonnell and Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn*, pp. 35-61 (p. 56).

The Central Committee rejected the demand as a breach of the ban on factions agreed at the Tenth Congress in 1921. Those who attempted to publish it from underground were arrested by the OGPU.²⁹ At a lower level too, Lenoe demonstrates that reporters from Party and Soviet journals and newspapers were prevented from attending any kind of Party conference or meeting. As early as 1925, even a journalist from *Pravda* was unable to interview regional Party officials (pp. 108-110). A textbook for agitators published in 1928 affirmed that the "language of the party" spoken by the Communist leadership was the "only appropriate form in which to articulate its ideas" (Gorham, pp. 122-123).

According to one's own interest, circumstance, imperative and moral as well as ideology to be sure, the Soviet citizen acted on, reacted to and interpreted Bolshevik practices to impose "a certain coherence" on the cultural front.³⁰ In analysing this, Gorham and Wood largely adopt the concept of "speaking Bolshevik" proposed in Stephen Kotkin's *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization*, which examines how and why ordinary Soviet citizens willingly or reluctantly came to act within (or beyond) the framework set up by the regime in the 1930s.³¹ Indeed, there is a dearth of literature on the aspects of "speaking Bolshevik," resistance, and the issue of Soviet subjectivity in the study of the 1920s compared to the extensive discussion of these topics among historians of the Stalin period.³² It is hoped that the monographs reviewed above will be followed by a substantial discussion by historians of the 1920s on these issues and further consideration of the extent and practice of Soviet individual and institutional "autonomy."

Having reviewed recent contributions of cultural history of early Soviet Russia, it is now worth asking if this development can be utilised in the study of other spheres of early Soviet Russia and the Bolshevik Party. Sheila Fitzpatrick suggests the studies of the 1920s have shed little light on how a greater knowledge of everyday practice and cultural history can help us understand "the workings of politics," as distinct from society.³³ Smith also insists that political history needs to be "rejigged along new axes."³⁴

29 Graeme Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 142-143; Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (2nd ed.) (London, 1970), p. 309.

30 See, for example, the articles by Fitzpatrick in *The Cultural Front*.

31 Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley, 1995). See, especially chapter 5, "Speaking Bolshevik."

32 Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization* (Oxford, 1994); Igal Halfin, *Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (Cambridge, 2003); Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); Lynne Viola, *Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance* (Oxford, 1996).

33 Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Politics as Practice: Thoughts on a New Soviet Political History," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5:1 (2004), pp. 27-54, especially pp. 37-39.

34 Smith, "Writing the History of the Russian Revolution," p. 574.

It is undeniable that the political history has been “out of fashion” in recent decades.³⁵ Fitzpatrick articulates the starting point for a new political history with inspiration from the new cultural history so as to “recast” the issues developed by cultural historians into the political spectrum.³⁶

Take Istpart, for instance. Corney notes that the arrangement of exhibitions and museums displaying the history of October and the Party became one of the main tasks of Istpart throughout the 1920s (p. 117). The Party’s central newspaper *Pravda* took note of the special exhibition of the Party’s history to the delegates attending the Party Congress.³⁷ What, then, was displayed at the exhibitions arranged by Istpart for the participants of the Party congresses and conferences, as well as Comintern congresses, all of which convened a vast number of delegates with a variety of cultural and social backgrounds? What aspects of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state were emphasised in those special exhibitions? How did their content change over the decade? How did the regional party leaders and foreign Communists visiting Moscow *conceive* the exhibition of the Party history and internalise it? Did it affect viewers’ engagement with the political activity thereafter? If there existed no single “collective memory” of October among Party and non-Party citizens by the end of the decade, how did they legitimise the Party and the state created by the October uprising?

Furthermore, we can also cross-examine the important issues, unchallenged for decades, on the politics of the 1920s, such as the development and institutionalisation of the political machinery, the decision-making process and internal Party discussion, the process by which Stalin assumed the reins of power and so on.

How did the rank and file of the Party membership and non-Party people *experience* the evolving political mechanism, i.e. bureaucratisation, development of the *nomenklatura* and constraint of free discussion at local and central official gatherings? Was there any *resistance* or expressions of *disquiet* in the course of that political institutionalisation? Did the local Party membership recognise that their promotions or transfers affected politics at the centre? How did they interpret the agenda and discussion lists set by the Party’s Central Committee in advance of the central congresses and conferences? How many of them identified and understood the nature of the ongoing leadership struggle in the mid-late 1920s? How did these reactions and interpretations differ according

35 Fitzpatrick, “Politics as Practice.” On the other hand, the leading figure of the new cultural history François Furet himself reproached cultural historians’ obsession with their search for new “fashionable” topics. Cited by Hunt, “Introduction: History, Culture and Text,” p. 9.

36 Fitzpatrick, “Politics as Practice,” p. 38.

37 At the time of the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, see Правда. 11 марта 1921. С. 4. For the Fifteenth Congress (1927) participants, there was an organised tour to the Museum of the Revolution, and the Museum of Lenin as well as to Lenin’s mausoleum. See Правда. 2 декабря 1927. С. 4.

to class, nationality and gender?³⁸ It might have been impossible to raise these questions when conventional political history was in the ascendant in the historiography of the Soviet Union. But it is certainly important and feasible to discuss them at present, and this would give wider perspectives to the historiography of early Soviet Russia.

Foucault's late works sought to investigate cultural practice through the "prism of technologies of power," not confined to the state or other authorities, but rather imbricated in the everyday cultural practice of the people.³⁹ Important contributions by cultural historians now enable us to re-analyse the "working of the politics" in the 1920s through the prism of cultural history and cultural practice.

38 For discussions of "perceptions" and "experiences," see Daniel Wickberg, "What Is the History of Sensibilities? On Cultural Histories, Old and New," *American Historical Review* 112:3 (2007), pp. 661-684. My PhD dissertation in progress is designed to examine the experiences of the Party Congress delegates in the 1920s as well as organisational and administrative aspects. Junya Takiguchi, "Orchestrating the Bolshevik Party Congress, 1918-1927: A Political and Cultural Study of the Delegates and the 'Architects'," Ph.D. dissertation in History (University of Manchester, in progress).

39 Margaret R. Somers, "What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation," *Sociological Theory* 13:2 (1995), pp. 113-144 (p. 133).

Book Review

***Ukrainian Church History* (Essays in Memory of Bohdan Rostyslav Bociurkiw with an introduction by George G. Grabowicz). *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* XXVI (Cambridge, Mass., 2007)**

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In the introduction Grabowicz explains the long history of this much-awaited collection of articles. It was thought up as one of the products of the Millennium Project that was to celebrate one thousand years of the Christianization of Rus'-Ukraine in 1988. The project was designed by the late Professor Omelian Pritsak. For many reasons, the changes in Ukraine, the demise of the Soviet Union, Pritsak's move to Kiev and shortage of funds, the publication was long delayed. Still we are pleased to have this delayed collection of articles.

Bociurkiw's first article "Some Methodological Problems in Writing a History of the Orthodox Church in Interwar Soviet Ukraine" was written in the late 1980s. It describes some problems for the study on this theme. Many historical materials were intentionally destroyed. The historian's task is to reconstruct history from the survived fragmental materials. As a leading historian of church history in Ukraine, we can feel Bociurkiw's eagerness for the reconstruction of this history from his essay.

The second article by Bociurkiw "The Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine" is on the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine in 1920-1939. It is highly valuable research. There is almost no research on the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine, in spite of many researches on the two oppressed churches, the Uniate Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. Bociurkiw clearly describes that there were many arguments on the relation with Moscow in the Russian Orthodox Church and that the Church experienced an organizational split. Then the Church was oppressed by Soviet authority. It is a surprise to know that the attack of the Soviet power to the Ukrainian nationalist reached also to the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine. In order to write the history of the Ukrainization era more thoroughly, it is necessary to analyze the movement of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the Soviet policy against it. It is a new message for the study of the history of the Ukrainization period. This article points out some key ways for the study of the church history of Ukraine in the future.

Chynczewska-Hennel's article "The Political, Social, and National Thought of the Ukrainian Higher Clergy, 1569-1700" treats the thought of church elites. The author shows the idea of the Ukrainian church elites for the maintaining of the church in the complicated relations with Poland and Russia. Chynczewska-

Hennel focuses on the thought of Mohyla, Smotryts'ky and Balaban. From her analysis, we can understand that the Union of Brest was not the end of anything, but the beginning of something. It is very interesting that just after the Union, they began to seek for a new, next Union. The attitude of Rus' church was characterized by the words of Smotryts'ky, "Uniting Rus' with Rus'."

Wolff's article "The Uniate Church and the Partitions of Poland" describes the situation of "disunion within the Uniate" with persuasive arguments. His article is solid, voluminous (more than 90 pages) and informative. In the period of the First Partition of Poland, Catherine II was playing a game for the consolidation of her rule. In the period of the Second and Third Partitions, she began to think of the "reunion" of the Uniate Church and the Russian Orthodox Church for the reinforcement of her rule in Poland. This is a new point of view. Generally speaking, Wolff's description keeps good balance. He is free from the stereotype that Catherine II intended the liquidation of the Uniate Church from the beginning of her rein. His argument, which is written after p. 225, that quantitative loss made qualitative change in the Uniate Church and millions of faithful, peasants and lower clergy changed themselves, is interesting. This paradoxical truth, "restoring the Union by themselves," which is shown by Wolff, causes the scales to fall from our eyes. This is a superb article in this collection of articles.

Himka's article "The Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, 1848-1914" surveys the situation of the Uniate Church in Galicia before Sheptyts'kyi became metropolitan. This period was very important for the study of Ukrainian modern history, experiencing of emergence of new secular national organizations like the Radical Party outside the Church. Considering the importance of this period, Himka's survey is too short in length and not so rich in content. Of course, Himka has published his voluminous book, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine*, probably we should refer to the book in detail. For example, Himka writes that Hrushevs'kyi had little sympathy for the Greek Catholic Church. We would like to know a more detailed story with sufficient evidence for this conclusion.

Sorokowski's article "The Lay and Clerical Intelligentsia in Greek-Catholic Galicia, 1900-1939" treats the relations between the Uniate Church and the secular organizations outside the Church in the interwar period. His survey focuses on the Church's attitude toward the secular organizations, from Prosvita to OUN. He also traced the change of the Church during the period of the Catholic Action. Taking it by and large, it was the problem of the relation between the Church and the Ukrainian nationalism. To sum up, Sorokowski concluded that the Christian nationalism came into being among the clerical intelligentsia under the guidance of Sheptyts'kyi. This article is a good and persuasive article which sheds new light on the change of the Church in interwar Galicia.

Budurowycz's article "The Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, 1914-1944" is a nice survey on the Uniate Church in interwar Galicia. This period can

be called the era of Sheptyts'kyi. This article can be a good introduction to Sheptyts'kyi's activity and his religious and political thought.

This volume of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* is formally dedicated to the late Bohdan Bociurkiw. But actually it is a tribute to three eminent scholars, Bociurkiw, Pritsak and Budurowycz. All three passed away recently. It is quite sad to hear and we are still stunned by the news of their death. It is a great loss to the Ukrainian academic world. At the same time, we, still alive, should develop Ukrainian studies further in order to express many thanks to our mentors.

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