Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack:
An in-Depth Investigation into the 2002
Bali, Indonesia, Bombings

2007-14

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The Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh is dedicated to producing original and impartial analysis that informs policymakers who must confront diverse challenges to international and human security. Center programs address a range of security concerns—from the spread of terrorism and technologies of mass destruction to genocide, failed states, and the abuse of human rights in repressive regimes.

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This working paper is one of several outcomes of Professor William W. Keller’s “Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack” Capstone course from the spring of 2007.
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2002 Bali Bombings
Executive Summary: Bali Bombings, 2002

The October 12, 2002 Bali nightclub bombings demonstrated the severe international consequences of violent extremism. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Indonesian terrorist group with multiple connections to al-Qaeda, planned and conducted the operation. These attacks, which killed 202 people, presented a number of conflicts for the Indonesian government. Indonesian authorities are hesitant to take action for fear of upsetting the country’s overwhelming Muslim majority. For this reason, they have failed to combat indigenous terrorist organizations effectively, and have even been reluctant to condemn Islamist extremist groups who carry out atrocities in their midst. Ultimately, these bombings present a paradox because while Bali is an Indonesian island, the targets were clearly chosen to maximize casualties among tourists who frequented the island. JI’s primary goal, however, is the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia and not a war with the West. This analysis examines these perplexing and contradictory facts in an attempt to explain this particular attack, and derive lessons that can be applied to prevent future terrorist activity.

Finding #1
The Indonesian government has adopted an ambiguous stance with respect to terrorism. While there have been a number of major arrests and successful prosecutions, the country’s leadership has not taken the appropriate proactive stance against extremist groups, such as JI.

- Key Indonesian officials have even expressed solidarity with JI, refusing to acknowledge its terrorist operations or even its existence.

- An overwhelming majority of Indonesians do not view terrorism as a major concern. Instead they fear an attack from the United States. Reluctance to condemn JI reaches all levels of Indonesia’s socioeconomic ladder.

- Indonesia has not maintained its obligations to freeze the assets of individuals on the UNSCR 1267\(^1\) list. The government’s failure to enforce these sanctions may be the result of poor interagency coordination and lack of human and technical capacity in the government and financial institutions.

- Indonesia routinely grants sentence remissions to prisoners, which resulted in the early release of several convicted terrorists.

Finding #2

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\(^1\) Note: UNSCR 1267 refers to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, which freezes the assets and imposes a travel ban and arms embargo for designated individuals and entities. JI was designated as an entity related to al-Qaeda on October 23, 2002.
The use of Islamic boarding schools known as madrassas\(^2\) in Indonesia has played a significant role in spreading the teachings of JI and Islamist militancy throughout Indonesia and Malaysia. Madrassas are also shown to be a key site for targeting upcoming terrorist recruits.

- In 1971, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar founded an Islamic boarding school known as al-Mukmin.\(^3\) This was the main base for their ideological teachings. Al-Mukmin started with thirty students, but enrollment had grown to 1,900 by 2003.\(^4\)

- JI operatives routinely interfaced with students in state-run religious schools, at times taking them to terrorist training camps, and seeking to recruit them to their Jihadist cause.

Finding #3
Southeast Asia represents a major nexus of Islamist militancy that may require concerted international attention. While the United States focused much of its financial and military assets on the Middle East, counterterrorism in Southeast Asia needs to become a higher priority.

- Significant evidence indicates that al-Qaeda and JI worked together prior to the Bali attack. Both Hambali and al-Faruq have provided a detailed account of JI’s involvement with al-Qaeda. Several key members of both organizations corroborated their information.

- Major terrorist groups, including JI and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, have strong roots in Southeast Asia. Al-Qaeda supported both of these organizations in the past. ASG, for example, received financial assistance in the millions of dollars, as well as the training of its members in camps inside Afghanistan.\(^5\) ASG is also known to cooperate with JI, whose members have trained on the island of Mindanao. Together these groups represent a potential destabilizing factor for the region.

Finding #4
Indonesia continues to have severe internal security problems rooted in the inability of government to divide roles and responsibilities for the Indonesian National Police and the military.

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\(^2\) Note: Madrassas are also termed as Islamic schools but the term is more commonly used in South Asia; whereas, pondok madrassass or madrassass are the terms applied in South East Asia, specifically Malaysia and Indonesia.


• The police do not have the ability to crack down on terrorism in Indonesia.

• The division of responsibility between the Indonesian National Police and the military is unclear with respect to internal security, especially counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It will be difficult to define a transitional role for the military in internal security while police capabilities are being developed, without further blurring the lines between them.

Finding #5
In the wake of the Bali Bombings, Indonesia’s newly formed and yet untested Constitutional Court produced the unexpected and positive decision of declaring Ex Post Facto Law unconstitutional.

• Under the 2000 draft of the Indonesian Constitution, the court declared Law No. 16 of 2003 unconstitutional because the law permitted retrospective prosecution of terrorists. The decision eliminated the retrospective power of the legislation, but the anti-terrorism laws remain in force.

• Tensions remain in the judicial community as to the effect of this ruling. While some scholars and legal professionals herald the decision as greatly beneficial for the Indonesian judicial system, others fear it casts uncertainty on the ability to punish Bali bombing suspects already convicted under the now repealed legislation. The results of future terrorist prosecutions remain uncertain because of this watershed decision.

Recommendations

• The Indonesian government needs to crack down on terrorism. Despite political concerns of upsetting the Muslim majority, the government must initiate aggressive steps to disrupt and degrade JI’s capabilities. There must also be a public condemnation of these extremist groups from the highest government officials.

• The government must convince approximately 13,000 madrassas that provide religious education within Indonesia to refrain from extremist teachings.

• The international community must promote a more vigorous anti-money laundering campaign in Indonesia through three means: the strengthening of Indonesia’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the promotion of FAFT’s (Financial Action Task Force) nine “special recommendations”, and increased efforts to enforce the United Nations’ designations. There must also be efforts to track the underground financial activities that resulted from increased targeting efforts.
• Stronger cooperation in the international community will be required to combat terrorism, primarily in the areas of intelligence sharing and counterterrorism measures. Specifically, there needs to be infiltration at various operational levels as well as the military efforts to eliminate the presence of extremist groups known to operate within the Southeast Asia region.

• The controversial decision in the Kadir case marks a new era of judicial review in Indonesia. The Constitutional Court’s power has been tested but not entirely established, thus the Indonesian judicial community must clearly determine its future.
Analysis of the Attack
Terror Attack: October 12, 2002

Bali is Indonesia’s most popular tourist vacation spot. A typical Saturday night in Kuta, the nightlife capital of Bali, began in full swing as backpackers, surfers, and tourists started to make way to the main drag, Jalan Legian. But as we now know, October 12, 2002, would be unlike any other Saturday before.

One of Jalan Legian’s known hot spots was the exclusive Sari club. Sari was for visitors only and the place to be that night if you were Australian or a western tourist. October is peak vacation time for young Australians, much as Cancun, Mexico, is a popular destination for college students during spring break in America.

Two doors down and across the street Paddy’s Irish Bar, another popular destination frequented by westerners, was bringing in crowds of people. Traffic along the street was the characteristic bumper to bumper and parking was only allowed on the right side of the road, leaving just one lane for travel.
At 11 p.m. a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device hidden in his backpack in Paddy’s Irish Pub. Approximately 15 seconds later, a much larger explosion ripped through the Sari club when a white Mitsubishi L300 minivan pulled up to the sidewalk outside of the Sari club packed with C4 high explosive and ammonium nitrate and blew up. This second bomb caused extensive damage from a considerable distance. The sound was heard at the airport, located four kilometers away. Local businesses and surrounding neighborhoods had windows blown off and tiles and frames torn apart. People standing outside of the club, on the street were the first fatalities of the blast.

Sari’s roof, made from rice stalks burst into flames. The wooden frame of the club added to its quick destruction as did the gas cylinders. Within just minutes the roof began to collapse on the people underneath who were stuck there due to injuries or trapped under the debris.6 Many were then burned to death. Vehicles parked on Jalan Legian were also engulfed by flames on that October night. One survivor described it as “hell on earth.” “All I saw was people burning, little girls with their hair on fire trying to put it out, and I’m telling them to run,” recalled William Cabler, a 42-year-old surfer from California who was in the Sari Club.7

A third and final bomb was detonated 45 seconds after the Sari explosion near the United States and Australian consulates by the use of a mobile phone. This blast was small in comparison to the other two and caused no injuries or casualties. It seems that the final explosion was intended to be a political statement, rather than to actually take lives.

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The response to the disaster on Jalan was quite quick. It was almost impossible not to see or even feel the van explosion from miles away. After the initial shock, rescue teams were on the way. Police, firefighters, paramedics were on scene by midnight. Traffic and transport head Haji Bambang coordinated the evacuation of the injured to hospitals and clinics. He told *Time* magazine shortly after the attack about his need to hurry the victims out of the area, “We were trying to get the victims out because of the danger of explosions—gas canisters in the bar, the Freon in the air conditioners—and of the roofs falling down.”

**Medical Response**

Locals assisted as much as they could by evacuating people to medical facilities by cars, cycles and taxis. Many were taken to the Graha Asih hospital, but the small facility was ill-equipped to cope with the scale of injuries. The Australian government reported that approximately 110 Australians left Bali for Darwin, Sydney, and other major cities to obtain medical treatment. At 3:00 a.m. local authorities began to remove corpses and body parts from the blast area. The following afternoon, Australia sent three military C-130 planes for emergency medical assistance and also arranged for airlines to bring uninjured Australians home.

Bali’s main hospital, the Sanglah Hospital was also put at over capacity due to the tragedy. The hospital was a nightmare situation, with many people lying on the walkways and in the wards. Doctors were confronted with a multitude of patients with relatively minor injuries such as lacerations of the skin, shrapnel wounds, and minor burns. These patients were given basic treatment and advised to fly back to Australia as soon as

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8 Ibid.
possible. The more seriously injured patients had been admitted to wards. An early decision was made to locate the non-Indonesian patients into Ward Six, which was then called the “Australia Ward.” This allowed doctors and nurses to focus their resources; however, it also created additional logistical problems (e.g. the beds were old, heavy, and not on wheels):

Moving them involved placing a hydraulic hoist arrangement under the bed, manually pumping it up to raise the bed, and then slowly and precariously wheeling the bed to [the] Australia Ward. Almost all ward patients had serious, full-thickness burns (ranging from about 25 percent to 85 percent) and many had shrapnel wounds or intra-abdominal injuries. One patient had a torn right brachial artery, one a crushed left foot and right leg (both requiring amputation), another a fractured cervical vertebra and fractured pelvis and intra-abdominal wounds with damaged bowel. Two intensive care units held several ventilated patients with severe injuries, including major burns and abdominal trauma. One of these patients was a young unidentified girl who had a severe head injury and inhalation burns and was on escalating doses of isotropic drugs. It was evident her death was imminent. A difficult decision was made to transfer her to Australia in the hope that she would survive the trip and die on home soil.10

Financing

Terrorist groups have traditionally been viewed as being driven by politics and religions convictions, while criminal groups pursue only one thing: profit. Recent trends,
however, indicate that terrorist groups are increasingly using criminal activities to acquire funding. For example, the 2004 Madrid bombings were largely funded by money earned from trafficking in hashish and ecstasy. Other terrorist groups have turned towards “drugs, smuggling, and fraud…car theft, selling pirated CDs, and counterfeiting money.”\textsuperscript{11} JI’s story is no different; the majority of its finances for the Bali attack were acquired through robbery. JI’s spiritual head, Abu Bakar Bashir, was quoted as saying, “you can take their blood; then why not take their property?”\textsuperscript{12}

Estimates for the cost of the entire attack range from $50,000\textsuperscript{13} to $120,000\textsuperscript{14}. Mubarok, otherwise known as Hutomo Pamungkas, was the financial manager for the cell and coordinated the receipt and dispersal of funds for the operation through his personal bank account.\textsuperscript{15} Funding for the Bali attack, specifically, was thought to be acquired through two major sources: criminal activities and a contribution from al-Qaeda.

A variety of criminal activities supplied the majority of the funding for carrying out the Bali attacks. In August 2002 three men robbed 5.5 pounds of gold and $500 in cash from a jewelry store on Java Island, with an estimated worth of US$90,000 in five pounds of gold and $500 in cash for the attack.\textsuperscript{16} It was ultimately used to finance the attacks. A maid in the store was shot during the robbery. Three JI members, Abdul Rauf alias Syam (Rauf), Andi Octavia alias Yuri (Yuri) and Junaedi alias Dedi Amin (Amin) were likely the three men involved in the crime; however, they have not been charged

\textsuperscript{11} David E. Kaplan, Bay Fang, Soni Sangwan. U.S. News & World Report. 5 December 2005. Vol. 139, Iss. 21; p. 40-42, 4
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
with direct involvement in the attack. Experts estimate that the majority of the funding was used for living expenses and logistical details, since the actual cost of the bomb materials and vehicles was probably less than US$10,000.

Additionally, Imam Samudra may have used credit card fraud, also known as “carding” to fund the attacks. In fall 2004, Samudra published a 280-page book with an entire chapter titled, “Hacking, Why Not?” where Samudra encourages Muslim radicals to “take the holy war into cyberspace by attacking U.S. computers, with the particular aim of committing credit card fraud, called ‘carding.’” He writes in his book that “if you succeed at hacking and get into carding, be ready to make more money within three to six hours than the income of a policeman in six months.” Samudra’s laptop computer was seized by authorities, who determined that Samudra attempted carding; however, it remains unclear whether he was successful.

In addition, al-Qaeda is thought to have contributed approximately US$30,000 for the attacks. Following the attack, al-Qaeda leaders were said to have been extremely satisfied with the results of the attack and gave an additional US$100,000 to JI for future operations. A link-chart showing all financial transactions associated with the attacks is depicted in Figure 3 in the Appendix.

Following the attack, JI lost much of its financial momentum when its major assets were frozen. The United Nations Security Council designated JI as an entity related to al-Qaeda through the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 on

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
October 23, 2002. Moreover, individuals associated with JI have been separately designated as global terrorists, thereby freezing the funds of key players involved with JI. The Resolution calls for all States to freeze the assets or other financial resources of entities or individuals on the list. Designation also imposes a travel ban and arms embargo upon the designated party(s). In response to the Bali attacks, the United States government named JI as Specially Designated Global Terrorists through Executive Order 13224 on October 23, 2002. Inclusion on this list blocks U.S. assets of designated persons or entities and prohibits any U.S. citizen from pursuing financial transactions with a designated party.

In addition to losing much of its financial mobility through its designation as an international terrorist group, many of JI’s key leaders were arrested in connection with the bombing. Therefore, JI has been forced to look elsewhere for additional sources of funding. Paradoxically, following the attack, JI gained a lot of publicity from other like-minded individuals and groups, which has allowed JI to continue acquiring resources through alternative means, including reliance on the hawala system, siphoning funding from charities, and donations from other terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and mujahideen KOMPAK. Other sources of finances have come from JI-linked businesses and member contributions of five percent of their salaries to JI. See Appendix 2 for additional information.

Goals of the Attack

JI sought to achieve several major goals in the attack on Bali. There were many goals that the attack in Bali, Indonesia sought to achieve. The primary motivation was to create an independent Islamic state in the western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago,
and ultimately, the creation of a pan-Islamic super state across SE Asia (Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines).

**Mission**

According to Abul Istimata of the Katibatul Istimata Al-Alamiyah (International Suicide Batallion), the mission of the 2002 Bali attacks and future attacks is to destroy America and to kill its citizens, as well as countries that stand with the United States in the “American infidels of the Cross in the new Crusade,” which is how they refer to the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Istimata also refers to destroying the interests of “infidel countries of the Cross and American terrorists” throughout the world.²³

**Why Bali?**

Indonesia, like many Southeast Asian countries has been called a “country of convenience” for terrorist operations. What makes Indonesia a country of convenience is the lax visa requirements, the fact that it is a major transit hub, and finally that there are porous borders. In addition, access to weapons is plentiful, as the government tends not to exercise control over the trading of illegal goods within its borders. Other factors include economic disparity, the growing backlash to globalization trends, the lack of political freedom, and the failure of secular states and secessionist aspirations.²⁴

Following the arrest of Imam Samudra, authorities inspected his computer, which included a website that he created to explain Muslim questions about the Bali attacks. He urged all Muslims to defend the honor of Muslims by acting according to what is right in

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²³ "Four Corners." [www.abc.net.au](http://www.abc.net.au). ABC. 4 Feb. 2007


one’s own group or community. The following text box is Imam Samudra’s explanation of why JI chose to attack Bali. 25

**Why was Bali our target?**

1. It is a gathering place for all the nations of imperialists, terrorists, oppressors, and destroyers of the virtue of Indonesian women - who, it should be noted, are Muslems.

2. Are there Muslems who do not know that Bali is a centre for dealing in narcotics?

3. Bali is one of the world's largest and most popular places for sex outside marriage, in a country where the majority of the population are Muslems, in a country with many Religious Scholars, Preachers, Proselytisers, and Islamic harakah activists. This is an irony which shames us in the presence of Allah, the Almighty and most worthy of praise.

4. Particularly in Jalan Legian Kuta, there are substantial gangs of Jews (May Allah curse them), who use Bali as an intelligence conduit and a place to rendezvous, [in their efforts] to destroy the Islamic community.

5. It was a relatively soft target for striking against citizens of countries who proudly, arrogantly and grandiosely trample on the honour of Muslems by involving themselves in the crusade under the leadership of America (cursed by Allah alaihim), especially by raining thousands of tonnes of bombs on weak men, Moslem women, and innocent babies in Afghanistan.

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25 "Four Corners." [www.abc.net.au](http://www.abc.net.au). ABC. 4 Feb. 2007

<http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2003/20030210_bali_confessions/samudra_site.htm>.
Explosive Devices

The combination of the three bombs in the Bali attack took the lives of 202 people and injured an additional 209 people. It is believed that three men, Dulmatin, Abdul Roni, and Idris, lead the team for bomb assembly and delivery. The three were thought to have met for the first time in September 2002 at the home of Herniyanto in Solo. Dr. Azahari Husin has been identified as making the bomb for this attack and others, including the 2003 JW Marriott Hotel Bombing in Jakarta and the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Chemicals for the three bombs, including ammonium nitrate, potassium chlorate, aluminum powder, and sulfur, were purchased at the Tidar Kimia chemical shop in Surabaya, East Java. The owner of the shop, Silvester Tendean, admitted after the attack that he sold the chemicals and wrote a false invoice for Amrozi. He was eventually sentenced to six months in jail. Amrozi has also been identified as the purchaser of the L300 Mitsubishi van that was parked outside of the Sari Club.

The first bomb detonated at Paddy’s Pub was a smaller bomb hidden in the backpack of a suicide bomber. This bomb consisted of no more than 2.2 lbs (or 5 kg) of TNT. This bomb may have been set off to drive people from the bar into the streets, where the congestion would have caused more people to be afflicted by the second, larger bomb at Sari’s nightclub: “The simultaneous blasts were designed, investigators say, to funnel people closer to the last – and deadliest – blast.”

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Sari’s nightclub was the sight of the most deadly of the three bombs. Although initially thought to be a C-4 explosive, it actually was made from 110-330 pounds of ammonium nitrate,\textsuperscript{30} which is a readily available fertilizer used in Indonesia. Although commonly used as a fertilizer, ammonium nitrate becomes a powerful explosive when mixed with oil. Ammonium nitrate was also used by bombers in the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.\textsuperscript{31} Refer to Figure 2 in the Appendix for a diagram of a similar bomb made using ammonium nitrate.

Maria Ressa of CNN describes the bomb at Sari’s: “That explosion was so fierce, a doctor at the site said, it ruptured the internal organs of many of the people inside the club. The fires that followed burnt them alive.” She quotes al Qaida expert, Rohan Gunaratna, as saying “The Bali bomb was designed to cause maximum fatalities and casualties…”The explosion…was designed ‘to make people burn and suffer.’”\textsuperscript{32} The explosion left a one-meter deep crater where the nightclub once stood, and windows throughout the town shattered.

Larry Sanders, a fertilizer expert, explains the science behind the use of ammonium nitrate in bombs:

“Ammonium nitrate and diesel oil make a good bomb because ammonium nitrate is unstable. When it’s heated, it breaks down to give off nitrogen, water vapor and oxygen, along with heat. That oxygen feeds the flame that’s heating it up. So from the initial ignition, you get oxygen, which allows more of the oil to burn, creating

more oxygen, which allows more of the oil to burn … and so on in a feedback loop. The fertilizer acts as an accelerant, speeding up the rate at which the oil burns. The end result is that instead of burning slowly, the oil burns up in an instant, creating a huge volume of expanding gas – a big explosion.”

The Sari Club bomb was triggered via cell phone, with a white L300 Mitsubishi minivan packed with the explosives. Inside the van, which was purchased by Amrozi for US$3,300, were twelve plastic crates carrying the explosives.

A third bomb that caused no casualties was set off approximately 500 meters from the U.S. Consulate in Denpasar, which was seven kilometers away from Sari’s nightclub. It was detonated using a cell phone. This bomb included less than one pound of TNT. However, the Australian Federal Police reported that the bomb was filled with human excrement for maximum moral damage. Ali Imron suggested that this bomb was a “warning that the attack in Legian Street was intended for the United States and not Australia or other countries.”

This bomb caused a slight injury to one person and only modest damage to the surrounding area.

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Indonesian Government
Finding #1

*The Indonesian government has adopted an ambiguous stance with respect to terrorism. While there have been a number of major arrests and successful prosecutions, the country’s leadership has not taken the appropriate proactive stance against extremist groups, such as JI.*

The current security issues in Indonesia have deep roots in the ethnic, cultural, and religious makeup of the country. The internal conflicts of Indonesia exert major influences in the region. Indonesia has a population of 230 million, which includes 200 million Muslims. This makes Indonesia the largest Muslim country in the world, and overall the fourth largest nation.\(^{37}\) These are facts that are often lost on Western observers. Within this religious framework, there is a movement that is pursuing the establishment of an Islamic state in place of the current secular government. There are like-minded organizations in the neighboring countries of Malaysia and the Philippines, which include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Moreover, these extremists have engaged in terrorist activities on their own domestic territory, while their targets often include Western tourists, civilians, and establishments.

Election reforms have not significantly curbed the country’s tolerance of Islamist extremism. Indonesia, with its burgeoning Muslim population, has suffered with the presence of these violent organizations whose goals are to create a renewed caliphate. Critics argue that the country’s political leadership has done very little to address this issue. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is the largest and best example of a terrorist organization in Indonesia. It is responsible for a number of terrorist attacks including the 2002 Bali

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nightclub bombings, the subject of this report. Author Greg Sheridan, who has spent
time traveling within Indonesia notes that JI, “is on the United Nations’ list of terrorist
organizations, yet Indonesia has declined to ban JI. It has also declined to close down a
network of pesantren, or Islamic boarding schools, of which many JI terrorists are
alumni.” As Sheridan explained, the UN, as well as other Western nations including
the United States and Australia, considers JI a terrorist group. Indonesian officials,
however, have hesitated to condemn JI. The fact that JI is not considered a serious threat
to Indonesian security is particularly telling of the country’s attitude towards Islamist
extremist groups. This position of tolerance for JI exists at all levels of the socioeconomic
ladder within Indonesia, including the highest rungs of power and influence.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono says he cannot submit legislation to
parliament, proscribing JI because of insufficient “proof” it exists. The speaker of
Indonesia’s parliament, along with many of the country’s Muslim leaders, has
even visited Ba’asyir [leader of JI] in jail to show solidarity with this “victim” of
pressure and interference by the United States and Australia.39

This example reflects a laissez-faire attitude that the government takes towards
terrorism within its boarders, and has increased Western concern of the slow pace of
reform in Indonesia. The country has improved its electoral process, and given the
decades of authoritarian rule, their progress is commendable. It is clear, however, that
internal political considerations trump counterterrorism actions. Scott Atran, author and
research scientist is familiar with Indonesia and interviewed JI’s leader Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir in prison. Following his visit to Indonesia, he was especially dismayed with the

39 Scott Atran, To Jihad and Back Foreign Policy, November/December 2005, 79.
Indonesian government’s lack of action against JI. “If anything, the entrenchment of
democracy has weakened Indonesia’s willingness to fight terrorism. The country’s
minority-led democratic government, whose very survival requires the support of Islamic
parties that range from the militant to the mainstream…”  

Atran contends that political
calculation limits what the Indonesian government is willing to do. Action against JI
might lead to a disappointed Muslim majority, and thus the country’s leadership remains
guarded when it comes to condemning terrorism.

The country is not completely negligent with respect to counterterrorism efforts,
but their true nature remains paradoxical. For instance, in recent years, the Indonesian
government has conducted several initiatives to curb internal extremism. These examples
include Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s efforts to use Muslim leaders in the hopes of
dissuading the country’s youth from joining terrorist affiliated organizations. There
have also been dozens of suspected terrorists arrested in the last several years, and the
creation of a terrorism and transnational crime task force, designated for overseeing
counterterrorism trials in the country. Indonesia has also implemented constitutional
reforms, aimed at modernizing their legal system. The subsequent trial of the JI members
responsible for the Bali bombings represents the government’s apparent willingness to
tame an extremist problem, or at the very least keep it under moderate control.

Unfortunately, there continue to be multiple hurdles within the Indonesian justice
system, the government, and especially the population. The nation’s attitude is not only
demonstrated by the country’s top officials afraid to challenge JI, but also in the people’s

41 Indonesia: 2005 Overview http://www.tkb.org
42 Ibid.
willingness to accept the group’s presence. These combined factors shape Indonesia’s attitude towards terrorism. In fact, the population within Indonesia does not share the same fear of Islamist extremism at all, and does not view it as a significant threat to security. “[W]hereas Americans are preoccupied with the global terrorist threat, Indonesians are not. In a June survey, less than one percent of respondents listed terrorism as a priority for the next government.”\textsuperscript{43} Inside a country that has endured decades of severe corruption and authoritarian rule, the population has been slow to recognize Islamist extremism as a major concern. Rather, the Indonesians see the West, especially the Untied States, as the more relevant threat. “According to the Pew Survey of Global Attitudes, in June 2005, 80 percent of Indonesians feared an attack on their country by the United States.”\textsuperscript{44} This represents a clear disconnect between U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad and the Indonesian people. It also points to Indonesia’s suspicion of outside superpowers, and perhaps their willingness to tolerate their own internal security issues instead of seeking the help and consultation of the United States.

**Response to attack**

In May of 2002, in an effort to verify the validity of U.S. claims regarding terrorism in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian vice president, Hamzah Haz, met with the leaders of several known terrorist organizations. JI leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was also in attendance. After four hours of dialogue, Haz announced that there was no credible terrorist threat in Indonesia. He stated that these organizations only wanted to promote

\textsuperscript{44} Scott Atran, *To Jihad and Back* Foreign Policy, November/December 2005, 79.
the inclusion of religion in Indonesian life. Less than six months later, terrorists associated with these same organizations killed more than 200 people in the Bali bombings.

A notice issued by the U.S. State Department about a week prior to the bombings warned that terrorists in Indonesia might possibly attack non-official targets including “clubs, schools, places of worship.” Bali was among several locations that the U.S. told Indonesia was threatened. The U.S. warnings were made at a variety of levels, including meetings between the U.S. Ambassador, Ralph Boyce, and Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The United States had not obtained any specific information regarding a planned bombing in Bali. Officials stated that if they had had any such information, they would have issued a public warning about such a potential danger. Numerous indications that terrorists were planning additional attacks around the world were received which prompted a Worldwide Caution to be issued on October 10, 2002. Prior to that date, the U.S. obtained information about several non-specific threats concerning American interests around the world, including Indonesia. This was the subject of a number of earlier statements and actions by the U.S., including a number of embassy closings. These statements indicated that tourists and tourist areas were potential targets. Since September 11th, the Bali bombings of 2002 have been the deadliest terrorist attack in the world. Immediately following the events of October 12th, Indonesia, along with their international partners, worked to strengthen their defenses against terrorist threats, specifically efforts to cut the flow of funds to terrorists. Realuyo

and Stapleton suggest that these efforts by Indonesian authorities and the international community have created a case study for counterterrorism strategy. This strategy has been implemented through advancing law enforcement, public designation, and capacity building operations.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) were the first international responders. Two liaison officers from the AFP were on hand assisting the Indonesian National Police by 3:00 AM on October 13, 2002. Contributions from the AFP were significant during the forensic investigation and in the disaster victim identification. 48 Due to the large number of fatalities, investigative teams from Sweden, Taiwan, and Japan arrived on-site to help with crime reconstruction. 49 In the aftermath of the bombings, international outrage resulted in an immediate response. A partnership of 52 countries united on October 23, 2002, to request and/or to support the United Nations terrorist designation of JI. More than 150 jurisdictions have agreed to freeze the assets of JI-related individuals. This designation created the largest alliance against a major terror group since the designation of al-Qaeda and the Taliban following the September 11th attacks in the U.S. United Nations members were mandated to freeze and capture all assets linked to JI. The response has since promoted international cooperation to combat terrorism through law enforcement, intelligence, and capacity building operations.

Organizations Involved
Organizations

Islamic extremism is associated primarily with the Middle East. America’s preoccupation with Iraq, Afghanistan, al Qaeda and the Taliban has dominated the media, while other parts of the globe are battling similar but often overlooked terrorist situations. One such region is South Asia. Diverse and extremely populous, the countries in this area have confronted radical, violent behavior for decades. From the Philippines to Indonesia, extremists have plotted extensively to create Islamic states based on religious law. This section examines these various groups including Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. While they are distinct and separate, these particular organizations are interwoven into their respective country’s societal ladder and have similar far-reaching terrorist connections.

Jemaah Islamiyah

The principle terrorist group said to be responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings is the Southeast militant Islamic organization Jemaah Islamiyah, meaning Islamic community and often referred to as JI.

Finding #2

The use of Islamic boarding schools known as madrassas in Indonesia has played a significant role in spreading the teachings of JI and Islamist militancy throughout Indonesia and Malaysia. Madrassas are also shown to be a key site for targeting upcoming terrorist recruits.

History

Years before Jemaah Islamiyah ever existed, Indonesia was home to an Islamist extremist group started by Muslim militia members in 1942 named Darul Islam. This

Note: Madrassas are also termed as Islamic schools but the term is more commonly used in South Asia whereas pondok madrassas or madrassas are the terms applied in South East Asia, specifically Malaysia and Indonesia.
group practiced and recognized only Shar’ia law but in 1962 was shattered when leaders of the organization were killed. Abdallah Sungkar was an avid follower of Darul Islam’s teachings. Born in 1937 in Indonesia to Yemeni parents, Sungkar started to develop an anti-Christian mindset, something that was not taught within Darul Islam. He saw Christian missionary efforts as a threat to his beliefs. One year after the fall of Darul Islam, he met a man with a very similar background to his own, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The two formed a bond and in 1971 founded a pesantren, a religious Islamic boarding school, named al-Mukmin. The school was soon moved to Nguruki, a village outside of Solo and therefore renamed Pondok Nguruki. This was the main base for their ideological teachings. Pondok started with only thirty students, a number that grew to 1,900 in 2003.

In 1978, Ba’asyir and Sungkar’s activities came to a halt after their arrest by the Suharto government for violating secular authority according to a 1963 subversion law. They were sentenced to nine years in prison but were released in 1982. However, the Supreme Court re-instated the full sentence in 1985 suspecting the pair’s intentions. Before they could be apprehended, the men fled to Malaysia. That was to be their home base for many years as they became revered figures, claiming that Muslims were under attack. Ba’asyir and Sungkar were able to form a brotherhood with other radicals who escaped Indonesia. They continued extremist teachings at the Pondok Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem, where Sungkar insisted on secrecy to bring forth an Islamic state.

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This was based on the belief that their fundamentalism would be brought to a stop by authorities and heads of state.

Johor, Malaysia is a city known today to be filled with Islamic radicals. This was the birth place of JI in 1993, a movement preaching violence to reach its goals. Sungkar never lived to see the operations of JI as he died of natural causes in 1999. Ba’asyir returned to Indonesia because the Suharto regime had fallen in 1998, a casualty of the Asian Financial Crisis.\(^\text{54}\)

**Recruitment**

Recruitment for Indonesian areas Poso and Ambon took place in a training camp in Pandeglang run by JI operative Imam Samudra. A member of Samudra’s group would talk to students from local state-run Islamic high schools. Some were within a pesantren and some were separate. Students would be invited to a meeting and shown videos about the war in Ambon and Poso. These propaganda videos were made by KOMPAK, a mujahidin-affiliated organization and caused outrage against Christians just as planned. Students were then invited back for religious study sessions where people sat around in a circle and studied the main facets of Sungkar’s teachings of faith, hijrah, and jihad with a strong Wahhabi influence.\(^\text{55}\)

After four months, students were told that they had to put the jihad concept into practice. They were invited to join the “struggle.” Those who accepted were introduced to firearms and weapons almost immediately. The training locations for these methods were found to be in rented houses in Cimalati, Pasir Eurih, and Saketi. An additional


\(^{55}\) Ibid.
house was found in Malimping, Banten and at least one in West Java, in Ciseeng, Bogor. Training included learning to make bombs. When ready, trainees were named Laskar Mujahidin and sent to Poso or Ambon.  

Singapore’s recruitment was focused on 15 percent of the republic’s population: the lower-middle-class Malaysians and Indonesians. These individuals were employed, educated, and had no previous ties or any indication of possibly following radical teachings. Since local mosques did not follow Wahhabism, many of these recruits congregated privately. Research has indicated that these seemingly average citizens were brought into JI through a mix of peer pressure, group thinking, and religious propaganda. Those who were seen as alienated but grasped needed skills were also prime potential JI members. For example, JI leaders tried to get technical students from the University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) in Johor.  

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56 Ibid.  
Finding #3

Southeast Asia represents a major nexus of Islamist militancy that may require concerted international attention. While the United States focused much of its financial and military assets on the Middle East, counterterrorism in Southeast Asia needs to become a higher priority.

JI Connection with al-Qaeda

After the September 11th attacks, both domestic and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies began to search for links between al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. But the September 11th attacks were not enough to convince authorities in Southeast Asia that al-Qaeda had a presence in the region. Dr. Michael Smith of the Department of War studies in London states:

Some Southeast Asian governments had detained a number of suspects in late 2001, official and academic opinion had, until Bali, either neglected or discounted the extent to which an Islamic terror network had taken root across the region...The reasons for this oversight seem to reside in the fact that these intelligence services, in effect, imbibed the official regional view, purveyed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which proclaimed regional harmony and stability among its membership.\(^{58}\)

Unfortunately, most of the countries that represent the ASEAN were more concerned with their own political stability within their states than with what was occurring outside and thus gave little heed to a developing terrorist threat in the region. This neglect by

these countries was a catalyst to an already active Islamist militancy breeding ground in Southeast Asia.\(^5\)

The bombings in Bali quickly gained the attention of the world and many began to wonder what terrorist organizations actually operated in Southeast Asia. Both academic scholars and government officials have published lengthy articles on this subject. The purpose of this section is to give a brief synopsis of whether or not there was a link between al-Qaeda and JI prior to the Bali attack. This section will also discuss the key players from each terrorist group, terrorist financing links, and joint training operations.

*Is There a Link?*

Immediately following the Bali attacks, there was wide skepticism on whether or not JI could have orchestrated such an event and whether they were somehow connected with al-Qaeda. Australian police and intelligence officials publicly denied any connection between the two terrorist groups. In January 2003, Australian police stated that there was no concrete evidence that showed the terrorist organizations were collaborating together.\(^6\) Shortly after the attack, the BBC World News edition stated: “An al-Qaeda link has not been established and an attack on a civilian resort would be a departure from the normal pattern of attacks on the symbols of American power.”\(^61\) In another BBC News article it quotes JI’s spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir praising bin

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\(^5\) Ibid.


Laden as a “true Islamic warrior” but denies any involvement with bin Laden himself and al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{62}

It was obvious that immediately after the Bali attack, information was scarce regarding JI’s involvement and their connection to al-Qaeda. However, since the attack, many new facts have come to light. There have been many arrests and evidence collected that directly links al-Qaeda to JI and also links them to the attack in Bali. Perhaps the strongest evidence to support these links came from Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali. Hambali was arrested in southern Thailand on August 11, 2003. Although the interrogators questioning Hambali were skeptical of some of the information he gave during his interrogation sessions, much of it was corroborated by the confession of two of his closest associates, Ba’asyir bini Lap also known as Lillie and Mohammed Farik bin Amin.\textsuperscript{63}

The way in which Hambali was captured demonstrates a strong link between JI and al-Qaeda. Lillie received his military training in an al-Qaeda camp. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Lillie was recruited by Hambali for a suicide attack. Lillie claimed to have met with Osama bin Laden himself as well as Amin and swore allegiance to bin Laden.\textsuperscript{64} Hambali stated in his interrogation that he recruited the cell that Lillie and Amin were a part of on behalf of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11 attacks. Mohammed informed Hambali that this cell would be used for an airline hijacking operation. A Malaysian pilot named Zaeni was supposed to be

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
the pilot for the operation and backed out of the plan and was later arrested.\textsuperscript{65} Because
the cell’s mission was aborted, Lillie and Amin started to work directly for Hambali in
Southeast Asia. Police were able to arrest Amin and Lillie, who then lead police to
Hambali. According to all three of their confessions, they claimed to be working as a
liaison unit between al-Qaeda and JI.\textsuperscript{66} The information gained through Hambali’s
confessions provided a previous unknown insight into the actual links between the two
terrorist groups. As will be discussed further in this section, there clearly was a
connection between JI and al-Qaeda before the Bali attacks, Hambali’s capture was only
one of several key links between the two groups.

\textit{Key Personnel}

Hambali is probably the strongest link connecting JI and al-Qaeda. Many have
speculated as to whether or not Hambali is the top member of al-Qaeda operating within
Southeast Asia, or, if he is the top member of JI working alongside al-Qaeda, or if he is simply a liaison between the two
terrorist groups. Hambali is deeply imbedded in both terrorist
organizations and is the only non-Arab to sit on al-Qaeda’s
leadership council. Hambali’s connections with al-Qaeda go
all the way to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was al-Qaeda’s
number three before his arrest.\textsuperscript{67} A CNN article states that
Hambali shuttled between Pakistan and Southeast Asia and according to interrogation

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} "Ressa: Hambali the Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah Link." CNN.Com, 14 Aug. 2003. 15 Jan. 2007
reports, was involved in planning the attack along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh. During 2000 he organized a meeting between senior al-Qaeda leaders in Malaysia, where the September 11 attacks were discussed. Among those attending the meeting was the supposed mastermind behind the USS Cole bombings as well as the bombers operating within Southeast Asia. Three of the September 11 hijackers were also in attendance.

Although Hambali was considered by many to be the mastermind behind the Bali attack itself, the spiritual leader of JI was Abubakar Ba’asyir until his capture. Many authorities believe Ba’asyir has connections to al-Qaeda. Ba’asyir has denied any connection with al-Qaeda but claims bin Laden is a “true Islamic warrior.”

According to a CIA report obtained by TIME magazine, Ba’asyir had authorized Omar al-Faruq, al-Qaeda’s senior representative in the region, to use JI operatives and resources to conduct embassy bombings. Faruq also stated that Ba’asyir was eager to work with al-Qaeda and had his own men to provide weapons and explosives to Faruq and his associates.

Another key player linking the two terrorist organizations together was Omar al-Faruq. Faruq was a Kuwaiti citizen of Iraqi heritage and a senior al-Qaeda member who was mainly responsible for being a liaison between al-Qaeda and JI, much like Hambali.

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68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
Faruq was captured in Indonesia in 2002, and later escaped from prison. In 2006, Faruq was killed by British troops in Basra, Iraq. U.S. officials believed that Faruq was one of Bin Laden’s top representatives in Southeast Asia and coordinated the activities of the local Islamic terrorist groups. Faruq’s interrogation provided a much clearer picture of al-Qaeda’s involvement in the region, much like Hambali’s. During Faruq’s interrogation, he confessed to being al-Qaeda’s senior representative in the region and stated he was ordered to carry out attacks against U.S. interests in the region. As previously mentioned, he was given manpower and other resources from Ba’asyir to conduct bombings in the region. In a separate report obtained by TIME, it stated that Faruq hosted Zacarias Moussaoui during his swing through Malaysia in 2000. Faruq was given instructions by Moussaoui to purchase four tons of fertilizer and then left the country before he instructed Faruq what to do with it. Faruq was trained during the early 1990s in an al-Qaeda camp in Khaledan, Afghanistan.

Another key player in both the al-Qaeda and JI organizations is Yazid Sufaat. Sufaat was a former Malaysian army officer educated in the United States with a degree in biochemistry from California State University, Sacramento. Sufaat is believed to be

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73 Ibid.
one of al-Qaeda’s main anthrax researchers. Working through one of JI’s regional groups, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Sufaat was active in hosting and assisting visiting al-Qaeda members. In 2000, Sufaat hosted the Pentagon hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhamzi. During this same year, Sufaat also hosted Moussaoui and assisted him with funding and papers for him to enter the United States. Sufaat even supplied him with a cover that would allow him to enter as an Infocus Technologies “marketing consultant.” Infocus Technologies was one of the several businesses with which Sufaat was involved.

Conclusion: al-Qaeda Connection

It is clear that al-Qaeda and JI have many links ranging from finances and leadership, to joint-training camps. Since 2001, coalition forces have made it more difficult for al-Qaeda members to train and recruit in that region. Expanding their operations to Indonesia only makes sense. Many people forget that Indonesia has the highest Muslim population in the world. Until recently, the governments have been more worried about their own political stability within their own respective country than focusing on the increased presence of al-Qaeda in the region. It should also be noted that many of the key figures linking JI to al-Qaeda such as Hambali and Faruq were both trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and were able to transfer much of what they learned

76 Ibid.
to the camps in Indonesia. From the interrogations of Hambali and Faruq, it is also clear that al-Qaeda did partially fund the Bali bombings, as well as the Marriot Hotel bombing. It is likely that JI and al-Qaeda members will continue to use Southeast Asia as they have in the past, while American military interests are still focusing on Iraq and Afghanistan.
Finding #4

Indonesia continues to have severe internal security problems rooted in the inability of government to divide roles and responsibilities for the Indonesian National Police and the military.

Indonesia’s efforts to combat terrorism in are not optimal, but they represent substantial progress in five major areas: legal framework, financial/regulatory, a new Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit created with assistance from U.S. and Australian authorities to allow tracking of suspicious financial transactions, improved law enforcement, and the prosecutorial/judicial process. The United States and other partners have assisted Indonesia in successfully prosecuting terrorists and developing new counterterrorism laws. Since July of 2002, the U.S. has been training Indonesian judicial authorities in drafting and amending legislation, which would allow them to adopt the U.N. conventions related to terrorism. With the continued threat of attacks from Southeast Asian terror networks like JI, Indonesia has worked diligently with the U.S., Australia, Japan, and other allies to strengthen its counterterrorism regime.77

For many Indonesian people, the main response was one of great shame and also anger toward their own authorities that have been unable to come to grips with the terror in their own country. The risk of destabilization in Indonesia has long since been exacerbated by the political crisis that started under Abdurrahman Wahid and continued under the Megawati administration. During the final months of Wahid's presidency, the more militant and radical Islamist groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Defenders of Islam) and Laskar Jihad (Holy Warriors) Islamic militia, observing the political instability, seized the opportunity to act outside the law following Wahid's

expulsion of military hardliner General Wiranto (ret.) from the cabinet and his removal of the army from matters of internal security, which were handed over to the police. These violent and aggressive elements of the Indonesian Muslim community were able to exercise a huge influence, disproportionate to their small representation in society.

The events in Bali, however, have also greatly strengthened the power of the Indonesian military (TNI). TNI chief General Endriartono Sutarto stated that if the government wants to beef up the “fight against terrorism” it must impose a tough law that provides a legal basis that enables the military to move fast. Sutarto's position follows rising concerns over the ability of the police, currently the only institution authorized by law to deal with internal security issues, to crack down on terrorists operating in the country.78

A major challenge facing Indonesia’s new president, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is the reformation of the internal security sector. Primary action could include initiating a comprehensive review of policy and operations, in order to develop plans for organizational reform, a legislative agenda and a strategy for conflict prevention and resolution. Only presidential leadership can overcome institutional rivalries and implement a process that is vital to Indonesia’s democratization. Some of the major problems regarding this initiative are:

- Unclear institutional division of labor, particularly between the police and the military (TNI);
- Contradictory or ambiguously worded legislation on some aspects of internal security and no legislation at all on others;

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• Lack of accountability of the security services;
• Inadequate oversight of operations; and
• No strategic direction.

One of the most challenging issues is the distinct division of labor between the police and military. This issue is made even more difficult by the fact that the Indonesian National Police has only been separated from the military since April 1, 1999, made possible through democratic reforms.\(^7^9\) Responsibility for internal security has been allocated to the police; however there are some "gray areas", such as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, where the roles are poorly defined. Moreover, even in areas that are exclusively police responsibilities, such as upholding law and order, police capacity remains weak. Police forces need to be doubled and their performance significantly improved before the military can be strictly confined to external defense, the ultimate goal of most reformers. The question remains, how to define a transitional role for the military in internal security, while police capabilities are being developed, without further blurring the lines between them.

Intelligence is another difficult area, particularly in regards to Indonesia's terrorism problem. The intelligence roles of the police, military, and National Intelligence Agency (BIN) overlap, and coordination is not structured. The government needs to work out an appropriate division of labor, probably through legislation, ensuring that all three maintain political neutrality, are subject to civilian oversight, and do not acquire powers beyond what is acceptable in a democratic society.

\(^7^9\) *Police Formally Separated from Armed Forces*. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, pt. 3, Asia-Pacific, April 5, 1999.
In addressing the problem of the lack of a clear policy direction and control over internal security, the president has several options. The first is to strengthen the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs. Another is to develop a U.S.-style National Security Council, an idea much talked about but difficult to implement without a legislative mandate. Internal security issues could also be given to an existing ministry to handle, or a new ministry could be created for the purpose, although any new bureaucratic body would require funding, and the president would have a hard time securing the necessary support from a confrontational parliament, which he does not control. Whether reforms succeed or not, without accountability, legislative or bureaucratic changes can only do so much in trying to solve the problems. The Yudhoyono government should begin an in-depth review of internal security by considering the production of a concept paper that defines the problems, allocates responsibilities among different bodies, provides guidance on capability development, and identifies how these will change as conflict is resolved and capacity improves.

**Recommendations from the International Crisis Group**

**To the Government of Indonesia:**

1. Produce a publicly available concept paper on internal security, including counter-terrorism, as the basis for the division of responsibility, legislation, transition planning, and resource allocation.

2. Affirm unambiguously that the police have primary responsibility for internal security.

3. Define clearly the transitional and ongoing military (TNI) contribution to internal security without compromising civil control.
4. Allocate clear political responsibility to an appropriate minister or executive agency for preventing and resolving politically motivated internal conflict.

5. Initiate a five-year police development plan to raise capabilities to the desired level.

6. Initiate an intelligence policy paper, as follow-on to the internal security concept paper, to lay out the basis for legislation and operational development of the intelligence agencies and executive, parliamentary and judicial oversight mechanisms.

7. Define the role and responsibilities of regional governments for security.

8. Following comprehensive review of the issues, test desired internal security arrangements in a pilot project in a relatively conflict-free province, including increasing police numbers and effectiveness and streamlining the army territorial command.

9. Use and support the expertise that can be marshaled by NGOs and other elements of civil society interested in security sector reform.

**To the TNI:**

10. Accept that security sector reform based on democratic norms, including the lead role of the police, is essential for Indonesia's security and prosperity.

11. Work constructively with the police and civil society to ensure that a draft law on TNI assistance to the police is quickly produced and made available for public discussion.

12. Demonstrate commitment to democratic reform by participating in the processes suggested above and by exploring options for streamlining the territorial structure to meet transitional internal security requirements and likely ongoing commitments.
To Donors:

13. Provide technical and financial support to the government for a comprehensive internal security review clarifying the roles of the TNI, police and BIN and planning reform and development accordingly, with particular attention to command and control arrangements, strengthening judicial and legislative oversight mechanisms, and conflict prevention and resolution.

14. Continue to assist the police as the primary agency responsible for internal security but find ways to re-engage with the TNI, in particular by:
   (a) Assisting with legislation on intelligence activities and military assistance to the civil authorities and revision of the emergency powers law;
   (b) Establishing a forum in which donors can discuss the reform agenda, capacity development and policy planning directly with the TNI; and
   (c) Augmenting or reinstating specific training and educational opportunities for members of the TNI in defense and budgetary planning and management.

15. Coordinate assistance to avoid duplication in security sector reform and consider measures in assistance packages that might reduce the problem of inadvertently fuelling competition and rivalry among the security agencies.80

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Legal Analysis
Finding #5

In the wake of the Bali Bombings, Indonesia’s newly formed and yet untested Constitutional Court produced the unexpected and positive decision of declaring Ex Post Facto Law unconstitutional.

Ex Post Facto Law and the Bali Bombing: The Trial of Masykur Abdul Kadir and its Effect on the Indonesian Legal System

Although the role played by Masykur Abdul Kadir (“Masykur”) in the planning and execution of the Bali bombings was comparatively small, legal challenges associated with his trial and a challenge of Law No. 16 of 2003 (“Law No.16”) produced a verdict appealed to the highest court in Indonesia, the newly formed Constitutional Court. Legal scholars argue that the case was a watershed moment in Indonesian Constitutional law, producing a decision that would change the face of the Indonesian Court system and ultimately deem Ex Post Facto\textsuperscript{81} law unconstitutional. On Friday 23 July 2004, the Denpasar District Court sentenced Masykur Abdul Kadir to 15 years’ imprisonment for assisting those convicted of the October 2002 in Kuta, Bali. His appeal to the Indonesian Constitutional Court, claimed Law No. 16, under which he had been prosecuted and convicted for his involvement in the bombings, was unconstitutional. His council argued against the ex post facto application of anti-terrorism legislation used to prosecute the defendant. They asserted that Art 28I(1) of the Indonesian Constitution prohibits the retrospective application of laws. This argument proved successful, and the court exercised a constitutional review, declaring Law No. 16 to be invalid.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{81} After the thing is done; after the act is committed. Signifying something done after, or arising from or to affect, another thing committed before. Ballentines, (1969). \textit{Calder v. Bull}, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).

\textsuperscript{82} Butt, and Hansell. ‘Casenote: The Masykur Abdul Kadir Case: Indonesian Constitutional
This section addresses the specific facts of the case at bar, the challenges made by the attorneys on both sides, the legal elements required to challenge ex post facto law in the Indonesian High Court, as well as the legislative, governmental, and public implications of the decision.

**Indonesian’s Court System and the Creation of a Constitutional Court**

Indonesia’s Supreme Court, Mahkamah Agung, is the highest standing court in the country. The legal system was created in the civil law tradition and does not follow the principles of precedent. Decisions handed down by Indonesia’s highest court are not binding on future decisions, only the case at bar. Cases progress from the State Court level (Pengadilan Negeri) to the High Court on appeal (Pengadilan Tinggi). Appeals from the High Court can be appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court can serve as the highest level of appeal from a case originating in a lower court. The Supreme Court also conducts case review if new evidence is found warranting a re-trial.

Despite criticism from legal experts and professions, constitutional review of statutes was not within the auspices of the Indonesian Superior Court during Soeharto’s time in power. Legal review to ensure conformity with the Constitution was not required or permitted. After Soeharto’s 34 years in power, several amendments were made in an attempt to create a Constitutional Court and address questions of the constitutional legality of commonly applied statutes. On November 9, 2001, the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) of Indonesia was created by the third amendment to the existing constitution. The Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to hear cases stemming from

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Court Decision No 013/PUU-I/203’ (2004) 6 Australian J of Asian Law, 179

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questions of a statute’s constitutionality, as occurred in the Masykur case. Law No. 24 of 2003 formally establishing the Constitutional Court was passed on August 13, 2003 and began hearing cases.

The Court’s jurisdiction is described in article 24C(1) of the Constitution. It states, “The Constitutional Court has the authority to adjudicate with finality at first and final instance the review of legislation as against the Constitution, disputes on the jurisdiction of state institutions whose authority is provided for in the Constitution, the dissolution of political parties, and the settlement of disputes concerning the results of general elections.” The case at bar concerns the constitutionality of ex post facto law in attempting to apply anti-terrorism legislation passed after the “Bali Bombings” to prosecutions stemming from that act. The newly established constitutional court was established, convened, and began hearing cases only a few months before the Masykur case questioned the legality of retrospective application of law.

**Other Criminal Charges and Sentences**

Masykur’s less significant role in the planning of the bombings was overshadowed by the intensity of legal, political, and public reaction centering on the constitutional appeals central to his case. There were, however, several less revolutionary legal findings in the case of other key figures in the Bali bombing. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, spiritual leader to the organization Jemaah Islamiyah, was deemed instrumental in the bombing. He was allegedly viewed as “trying to overthrow the government and set up an Islamic state” was charged with treason by authorities in April

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83 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 24 (c)(1).
of 2004. Ba’asyir had also been linked in the past to the al-Qaeda network.\(^{84}\) Although frequently charged with engineering the attack, charges relating to the Bali bombings were not initially prosecuted against him. Though initial charges against him did not relate to his involvement in the bombings, he was connected to several church bombings in December of 2000, and to bomb plots against the United States and other Western interests in Singapore. Ba’asyir was acquitted of treason, however, he was convicted of various lesser offenses and was sentenced to prison for four years. It was not until October 15, 2004, that Ba’asyir was arrested and charged with his involvement in the Bali bombings as well as for his connections to the August 5, 2003, Marriot Hotel attacks in Jakarta. Though he received a verdict of “not guilty” pertaining to the Marriot Hotel bombings, he was convicted of conspiracy for his involvement in the Bali bombings and received a sentence of two and a half years in prison. Reports that he was the “mastermind” of the Bali attacks coupled with a sentence of less than three years met with strong criticism from both the Australian and U.S. governments, as well as domestically. Ba’asyir was released from prison after a total term of twenty six months.\(^{85}\)

**Masykur Abdul Kadir**

Although not viewed as indispensable to planning or key in executing the attacks, it was the criminal charges and subsequent trials surrounding Masykur Abdul Kadir’s involvement in the Bali Bombings that created the most significant controversy and legal consequences associated with the attacks. Masykur’s alleged involvement with the “Bali Bombers” including Muklas, Iman, Samudra, Imron, and Amrozi was reported by


prosecutors to extend to planning elements of the attack. Masykur was said to have aided the group by renting vehicles and surveying the targeted areas as well as meeting those involved after the event had already occurred.

Masykur was tried in the District Court of Denpasar where he claimed he had no knowledge of the bomb plot. Masykur asserted he knew the accused bombers only through his work as a tour guide and learned of their involvement in the bombing only after the attack. Despite his claim of “not guilty,” Masykur was convicted under Art. 13(a) of Law No. 15 of 2003 for aiding the bombers, notably Imam Samudra, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.86

**Expos Facto Law: Law No. 16 of 2003**

The constitutional challenge tied to the Bali Bombings case centers on Law No. 16 of 2003. This law was a part of a series of broadly formulated and interpreted anti-terrorism legislation. The laws allowed for significant leeway in the prosecution of those suspected of terrorist acts and made specific penalties a statutory rather than judicial matter. The laws defined terrorism beyond the execution of any specific act, extending those who could be prosecuted under the statutes to parties accused of assisting criminal terrorist acts in any way, physically or financially. The laws included in this series of legislation were three fold. The passage of the two of these laws, Law No. 1 of 2002 and Law No. 2 of 2002 were impacted by the Bali Bombings themselves which had occurred only six days before Laws No. 1 and 2, passed on 18 October 2002. They were passed as

an emergency measure by President Megawati Soekarnoputri in accordance with her emergency legislative powers provided for in Art. 22 of the Indonesian constitution.

Article 22 states,

(1) Should exigency compel, the president shall have the right to determine government regulations in lieu of statutes.

(2) These government regulations must obtain the agreement of the House of Representatives during its next session.

(3) Should there be no agreement, these government regulations shall be revoked.  

Law No. 1 of 2002 and Law No. 2 of 2002 eventually obtained the requisite agreement of the House of Representatives, the DPR, through Law No. 15 of 2003 and Law No. 16 of 2003 on April 4, 2003.

While Law No. 15 of 2003 establishes the parameters of anti-terrorism legislation, it is Law No. 16 of 2003 that enables the Law No. 15 to be used retrospectively. Law No. 16 of 2002 permitted law enforcement of all levels, from police to prosecutors, to conduct their investigations and prosecutions of the Bali Bombings according to the requirements of Law No. 1. Thus the constitutional challenge asserted by Masykur’s attorneys takes no issue with Law No. 15, the body of the anti-terrorism legislation, but with Law No. 16 which permits its application ex post facto.

Arguments: Defense

87 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 22 § (1),(2),(3)
Council for Masykur presented arguments in Constitutional Court argued Masykur’s council relied on Article 28 I (1) of the amended version of the 1945 Constitution which states, against Ex Post Facto Law claiming that he could not be punished for committing an act prohibited by Law No. 15 because the act in question had been committed before the passage of Law 15. Masykur claimed, “the state cannot legislate to make an act illegal and then apply that legislation to a person who performed that act before that legislation was enacted.” 89 Article 28I (1) of the amended Constitution of Indonesia states,

(1) The rights to life, freedom from torture, freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of religion, freedom from enslavement, recognition as a person before the law, and the right not to be tried under a law with retrospective effect are all human rights that cannot be limited under any circumstances. 90

Council argued that the right against Ex Post Facto law was absolute and could not be permitted under “any circumstance.” Law No. 16, the law actually being reviewed in the constitutional challenge, allowed for the application of Law No. 15 which outlined the specific anti-terrorism provisions. The applicant also argued that the ability to make law with retrospective ability conferred upon the government powers that were not afforded to it in the Constitution.

Arguments: The Prosecution

90 Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia [Constitution] Art. 28I(1).
The Indonesian government’s case against Masykur focused on three central points. It first argued the international necessity and responsibility of creating more stringent anti-terrorism provisions. Second, the government argued the laws in force at the time the Bali bombings occurred were not equipped to target terrorism as stringently as warranted by recent terrorist activity. Finally, the prosecution claimed that Masykur’s claim that Ex Post Facto legislation was prohibited by the Constitution was insufficient as a singular basis for holding Law No. 16 of 2003 as unconstitutional. The prosecution claimed that Art. 28I(1) could be limited by Art. 28(J)(1) and (2) which states,

(1) Every person shall have the duty to respect the human rights of others in the orderly life of the community, nation and state.

(2) In exercising his/her rights and freedoms, every person shall have the duty to accept the restrictions established by law for the sole purposes of guaranteeing the recognition and respect of the rights and freedoms of others and of satisfying just demands based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security and public order in a democratic society.\(^{91}\)

The government argued that the right that freed citizens from retrospective prosecution under Article 28I was outweighed by the gravity associated with a crime such as terrorism, deeming it an “extraordinary crime” and going so far as to equate it as a “crime against humanity.” However, terrorism has yet to be included in the types of offenses prosecuted as Crimes Against Humanity by the International Criminal Court of the International Court of Justice and would likely not be considered a crime of universal

\(^{91}\) Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia [Constitution] art. 28, 29
jurisdiction in this circumstance.\textsuperscript{92} Regardless of this distinction, the government argues that the use of retrospective legislation is warranted despite probations under Art. 28I due to public policy concerns. The government claims that due to the extraordinary nature of the crime and its impact on the rights to life and orderly community, among others, overrides any constitutional concerns afforded to the accused.\textsuperscript{93}

**Holding:**

On 23 July 2004, Law No. 16 was declared unconstitutional and thus Masykur’s original conviction was overturned by a holding for five to four. The majority echoed the defense’s argument that Art. 28I(1) explicitly prohibits Ex Post Facto application of law. The court employed the strict wording of Art. 28(1) which states that a right preventing Ex Post Facto Law “cannot be diminished under any circumstances.” Although the Indonesian judicial system is not bound by precedent, the court also relied upon landmark decisions in international law as background for their decision. They cited the Nuremburg trails and their prohibition of using laws developed after the Holocaust to prosecute war criminals for Crimes Against Humanity.\textsuperscript{94} Also used as persuasive authority for the decision was the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which states,

(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty

\textsuperscript{92} International Court of Justice Statute, Art. 34(1), General Information, 1 April 2007. \url{http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation.htm}.


be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.

(2) This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 95

The prosecution’s attempts to equate acts of terrorism of the magnitude of the Bali Bombings with Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, crimes of universal jurisdiction, could not be substantiated by the court due to the absence of such rulings elsewhere in international law. The court also countered the prosecution’s policy arguments which contended the rights of those denied liberty and safety by terrorism to supersede the rights of the accused with policy arguments charging the potential for Ex Post Facto law to be used by certain political leaders and regimes against those who oppose them. Although significant policy discussion and the frequent mention of persuasive international law precedent featured prominently into the court’s opinion, the decision was ultimately based on the court’s strict interpretation of the Art. 28I(1).

The dissent challenged the majority opinion with arguments that freedom from the application of retrospective laws have been denied in some cases. These cases, however, have been limited to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or the International Court of Justice and include the specific and narrowly defined categories of Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes. 96 Ultimately, the dissent made little argument to suggest the wording of Art. 28I(1) was open to interpretation,

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preferring to rely on the gravity of the crime as a justification for employing “rule without law.”

Despite the controversy surrounding the ruling, the strict interpretation of the law of the standing constitution as well as the goal of adhering to principles of international law and human rights prevailed in the Indonesian Constitutional Court with the definitive determination that Ex Post Facto Law cannot be applied.\(^{97}\)

**Future Concerns:**

The portion of the Indonesian Constitution, Article 28 I, which deemed Ex Post Fact legislation unconstitutional, was based upon sections of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\(^ {98}\) While this reflects Indonesia’s attempts to adhere to principles of international law and human rights, the effect of Indonesia’s ban on retrospective legislation remains to be seen. The Indonesian judiciary is not bound by precedent and comments by Justice Minister Yusirl Mahendra made shortly after the holding was delivered indicate resistance to allowing those convicted under Law No. 16 of 2003 to use the constitutional rulings to overturn their convictions. The constitutional ruling leaves convictions under Indonesia’s domestic Criminal Code as the most constitutionally viable option for prosecuting Bali bombing suspects. The Justice Minister and other key legal officials fear that such a remedy will fail to produce convictions citing such a concern as the reason the anti-terrorism legislation of Law No. 16 of 2003 was created.


Those convicted under the now void anti-terrorism legislation, face additional obstacles in use of the ruling that Law No. 16 of 2003 is unconstitutional to nullify their convictions. Some scholars and government officials view the constitutional ruling as preventing only future retrospective prosecutions.

To date, numerous appeals and calls for judicial review have been lodged for suspects convicted under Law No. 16 of 2003. The effect of the landmark ruling in the Masykur Abdul Kadir case remains to be seen as each case will likely be re-examined, appealed, and charged under the Criminal Code. Regardless of how each individual case concludes, Indonesia’s commitment to maintaining a climate of fairness and sensitivity to human rights concerns within their legal system is apparent in 2003’s Constitutional Court decision.
Dossiers
Short Profiles

**bin Abdul Haq, Huda**

Described as the overall coordinator of the 2002 Bali Bombings, Huda bin Abdul Haq, AKA Mukhlas, was the Commander of Mantiqi 1, a regional subgroup of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), as well as the head of JI’s Islamic Military Academy. During 2001, it is believed that he took over for Riduan Isamuddin as JI’s Operations Chief for South East Asia.

Mukhlas knew of his role in the Bali bombings as early as February of 2002. During a meeting with other JI operatives, he was given the task to carry out and implement the next attack on South East Asian targets. Sometime between March 2002 and September 2002, Mukhlas received more than $30,000 from fellow JI operative Wan Min bin Wan Mat for use to carry out the Bali bombings. These two specific actions place Mukhlas at the top of the JI command structure for the execution of the attacks.

On December 4, 2002, Huda bin Abdul Haq was arrested in Central Java, Indonesia for his role in the Bali attacks. On October 2, 2003, he was found guilty of helping to coordinate the Bali attacks, and was sentenced to death by firing squad. As of this writing he is incarcerated in Indonesia.

**Aburrabman, Mohamad Iqbal**

Long time associate of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Mohamed Iqbal Aburrabman, AKA Abu Jibril, was not only a Senior Operative of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), but also the Commander of its Paramilitary Wing. He has also been linked to other organizations, including acting as a financial conduit for al-Qaeda in South East Asia, and as a member of the executive committee for Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI).

Jibril’s participation in the 2002 Bali bombings is unclear, however his involvements with JI and al-Qaeda brings about suspicions that he may have played a key role in the attacks. In June of 2001, he was arrested in Malaysia for his association with JI, but was released two years later. Immediately following his release from Malaysian authorities in August of 2003, Jibril was arrested by Malaysian Immigration authorities for falsifying his identity during his return to Malaysia in the latter part of 2000. After serving five and a half months in Kamunting Prison, he was released and deported to Indonesia.

On May 14, 2004, Mohamed Iqbal Aburrabman was detained immediately following his arrival into Indonesia subsequent to his release and deportation from Kamunting Prison in northern Malaysia. As of this writing he is in the custody of Indonesian authorities on suspicion of identity fraud.

**Amin, Dedi**

Known for helping to finance the 2002 Bali bombings, Dedi Amin, AKA Junaedi, was an Operative for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well as a Personal Protection Officer for fellow JI member Imam Samudra.

Little is known about Junaedi’s involvement within JI, however it is believed that he became personally attached to Imam Samudra in 2001. Prior to the Bali attacks in October of 2002, Junadi was involved in a jewlery store robbery in the West Java town of Banten, Indonesia. Along with Abdul Rauf and Andi Octavia, the trio stole US$90,000, which helped to finance the Bali attacks.

On November 21, 2002, less than two months after the attacks, Dedi Amin was arrested by Indonesian authorities near Serang. On September 8, 2003, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison for helping to provide funding for terrorist actions.
**bin Amin, Mohammed Farik**

Known for his expertise in electronic telecommunications, Mohammed Farik bin Amin, AKA Zubair, was an operative for both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda. Little is known about Zubair, however it is believed that during 2002, he personally transferred funds from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to other JI operatives, further indicating al-Qaeda’s involvement in the Bali attacks. Some of these funds may have been transferred into bank accounts owned and operated by Riduan Isamuddin, a close associate of Zubair.

In June of 2003, Mohammed Farik bin Amin was arrested in Thailand, and was subsequently handed over to U.S. authorities for interrogation. In 2006, he was one of multiple terrorist suspects transferred to detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

**Azi, Abdul**

Identified as a close associate of Riduan Isamuddin, Abdul Azi Haji Chiming was a financial officer for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). He also became an officer with the Umm al-Qura Cambodian charity, which had been used by JI to launder money throughout South East Asia.

Although Azi’s full involvement within JI is relatively unknown, from September of 2002 till March of 2003, he housed fellow JI member Riduan Isamuddin while living in Cambodia. During this time, he agreed to look after Isamuddin’s finances.

On May 27, 2003, Abdul Azi Haji Chiming was arrested for having connections with JI.

**Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar**

Labeled as the Spiritual Leader of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is believed to have been responsible for giving orders to top level JI commanders. He is also credited with the co-founding of the JI terrorist organization.

Along with Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir co-founded the Pondok Ngruki school located in Solo, Indonesia in 1973. Many of the Bali bombing suspects have attended this school, at which time most are believed to have adopted the radical ideologies of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Along with the creation of the JI organization, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is credited with the founding of the Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia (MMI) as well as the Rabitatul Mujahidden.

On October 19, 2002, shortly after the Bali attacks, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was arrested in connection with the attacks on charges of conspiracy. After a short time in prison, he was released, only to be arrested again in connection with the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia. In March of 2005, he was sentenced to 30 months in prison. After a reduced sentence for good behavior, he was released from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta, Indonesia on June 14, 2006.
al-Faruq, Omar

One of the main links between Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda, Omar al-Faruq was a Terrorist Operations Commander for the al-Qaeda cell operating in South East Asia. During his time in Indonesia in 2001, al-Faruq became largely affiliated with JI as an Operations Liaison between JI and al-Qaeda until his capture in early June of 2002.

Although a direct connection between al-Faruq and any one member of JI has not been established, it is believed that due to his operational title, he had vast capabilities to both use and assist JI at his discretion.

In June of 2002, Omar al-Faruq was arrested by Indonesian officials near the city of Bogor. At the insistence of the U.S. government, he was transferred to Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, where he remained until his escape to Iraq in mid 2005. On September 25, 2006, al-Faruq was killed by British forces during a shootout near the city of Basra, Iraq.

al-Ghozi, Fathur Rohman

Labeled as a significant link between the Moro Islamin Liberation Front (MILF), and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi was a demolitions expert for both organizations as well as a liaison officer between the two. Although his role in the Bali attacks may have occurred well before the initial planning stages, he has still been labeled as a key figure within the organization.

Like many other JI operatives, al-Ghozi attended one of the several madrassas located in Indonesia. After travelling to Afghanistan during the early 1990’s to receive military training, al-Ghozi was designated by the upper JI leadership to establish a training camp in conjunction with the MILF at Camp Abubakar in Mindanao. In December of 2000, al-Ghozi helped to plan the bombing of a passenger train in the city of Manila, killing 22 people and injuring more than 100.

On January 15, 2002, Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi was arrested by Phillipine authorities and charged with illegal possession of explosives and fraudulently obtaining passports. In April of the same year, he was sentenced to 17 years in prison. Approximately 15 months after his conviction, al-Ghozi escaped from prison. On October 13, 2002, he was reportedly killed by authorities near the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines.

Hendrawan, Jhoni

Noted as the man responsible for detonating the smallest of three bombs during the Bali nightclub attacks of 2002, Jhoni Hendrawan, AKA Idris, was the logistics officer for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Although he has already confessed to detonating the bomb outside the U.S. consulate, he is also believed to have purchased the Yamaha motorcycle, rented the apartment where the bombs were constructed, and owned the cell phone used to detonate the Sari Club explosive.

At what point Idris became a JI operative remains unclear, however during the 1990’s he studied at the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School in Johor, Malaysia where it is believed he met two other JI operatives, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Huda bin Abdul Haq.

In June of 2003, Jhoni Hendrawan was arrested after allegedly robbing a bank. Based on information already obtained by Indonesian authorities, he was held on charges of participating in both the Bali bombings of 2002 and the JW Marriott Hotel bombing of 2003. On August 24, 2004, he was cleared of all charges in connection with the Bali attacks but was found guilty of his participation in the Marriott Hotel bombing and was sentenced to ten years in prison.
bin Husin, Azahari

Tasked to arrange and execute the 2002 Bali Bombings, Dr. Azahari bin Husin was the chief demolitions and engineering expert for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It is believed that he was the chief instructor and engineer behind the creation of the main explosive device used in the attacks.

At what point Dr. Azahari bin Husin became a member of JI still remains unclear, however it is believed that he became involved at some point after he was introduced to Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir during the mid 1990’s. Following this period, he grew ever more infatuated with explosive devices and demolitions, and even authored a “bomb manual” used as an instructional tool for creating the main explosive device used in the Bali attacks. He is suspected to have participated in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia.

On November 9, 2005, Dr. Azarhari bin Husin committed suicide by detonating an explosive device prior to an arrest attempt by Indonesian authorities in Malang, East Java, Indonesia.

Imron, Ali

Responsible for manufacturing the largest bomb used in the Bali bombings, Ali Imron was a field coordinator for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It is believed that he was recruited by his older brothers Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Huda bin Abdul Haq. On the day of the Bali bombings, Imron was tasked with transporting the L300 minivan and suicide bombers Iqbal (LNU) and Jimi (LNU) to within a few hundred feet of the Sari Club.

Although Imron was greatly influenced by the membership of his brothers within JI, it is believed that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, whom Imron met in the 1990’s, also had a significant influence on his recruitment into the organization.

Less than four months after the attacks occurred, Ali Imron was arrested in Indonesia while attempting to flee the country. Due to his apparent remorse for his involvement in the attack and his substantial cooperation with law enforcement officials, Imron was given a sentence of life in prison, which was delivered on September 19, 2003.

Isamuddin, Riduan

Acting as the operations chief for both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the South East Asian cell of al-Qaeda, Riduan Isamuddin, AKA Hambali, established the links between both JI and al-Qaeda, and has been identified as the main conspirator in the Bali attacks.

Hambali’s involvement in JI dates back to 1985, when he met the co-founders of the JI organization, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Although his ties with al-Qaeda have been contested, Hambali did organize a meeting between September 11th hijackers Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi in January of 2000. This al-Qaeda connection is believed to be the main source for the financing of the Bali attacks.

On August 11, 2003, Riduan Isamuddin was arrested in Thailand on conspiracy charges. Although it is believed he was held by U.S. intelligence agencies at an undisclosed location shortly after his arrest, he has since been transferred to a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba.
Janjalani, Abdurajak

Known as the founder of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Abdurajak Janjalani was also the commander of ASG, and a known associate of Osama bin Laden.

Although not much is known about Janjalani and his associations with other groups operating in South East Asia, his action of splitting ASG from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has been well documented.

On December 19, 1998, Abdurajak Janjalani was killed by hostile fire from Filipino authorities on the island of Basilian.

Janjalani, Khadafi

Nicknamed “The Good-Hearted” for his relatively passive demeanor, Khadafi Janjalani took over as commander of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) shortly after his brother Abdurajak Janjalani’s death in December of 1998. Although his assumption of leadership was meant to reduce dissention among the group, quite the opposite occurred, resulting in the creation of multiple factions within the ASG organization.

Coinciding with ASG activities, Khadafi was believed to be responsible for the kidnapping and beheading of a U.S. national in June of 2001.

Reports from detained ASG members indicated that on September 4, 2006, Khadafi Janjalani was mortally wounded by Filipino authorities. Nothing more than mere speculation at the time, it was not until four months later, on January 20, 2007, that Filipino authorities were able to positively identify remains found in a makeshift grave on the island of Jolo, as being those of Khadafi Janjalani.

Kadir, Masykur Abdul

Although reported to have had a limited role in the October Bali attacks, Masykur Abdul Kadir was an operative for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). During the latter part of 2001 and the months prior to the attacks, Kadir assisted fellow JI member Imam Samudra with finding residence in Indonesia for purposes of planning and logistical support.

It is relatively unknown when Kadir joined JI, however it has been speculated that he was recruited by Samudra, along with Andi Octavia and Abdul Rauf. Of the more than thirty Bali suspects believed to have participated in the attacks, Kadir is the only native of the Bali area.

On September 29, 2003, Masykur Abdul Kadir was sentenced to 15 years in prison for his participation in supplying JI operatives with residence and transportation. His trial gained greater publicity not for the actual attack, but instead for his attempt to appeal the decision citing the new anti-terrorism legislation as unconstitutional. Although in July of 2004, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled in his favor, his case was deemed an exception based on the societal impact of the attack. The Court thus upheld the original 15 year prison sentence.
**bin Lep, Mohammed Nazir**

Known for his connection with multiple terrorist organizations, Mohammed Nazir bin Lep, AKA Lillie, was a terrorist operator for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well as an operative for al-Qaeda.

Little is known about Lillie’s involvement within JI, however authorities know that of the suspected JI operatives in custody, he is one of the few with a university degree. Lillie was known to be a personal associate of Riduan Isamuddin, and was actually found to have been with him while hiding from authorities in Thailand.

On August 11, 2003, authorities arrested Mohammed Nazir bin Lep in Ayutthaya, Thailand. Due to his close association with Riduan Isamuddin, he was handed over to U.S. authorities, and transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in 2006.

**bin Maidin, Ibrahim**

Listed as the commander of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Singapore Branch, Ibrahim bin Maidin was also a member of Rabitatul Moujahedeen, an organization believed to have been developed by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Riduan Isamuddin.

Ibrahim bin Maidin’s involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings is unknown, however his ranking within the JI organization is considered significant. He is believed to have joined JI as early as 1990, and began his military training in al-Qaeda run camps in 1993.

In December of 2001, Ibrahim bin Maidin was arrested by Singapore authorities for plotting to bomb U.S., Israeli, and British diplomatic and political offices.

**Mohammed, Khalid Shaikh**

Perhaps regarded as the most dangerous terrorist in the world next to Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the operations chief for al-Qaeda, and the mastermind behind the September 11th attacks.

Mohammed’s ties to terrorists place him at the top of the planning for the 2002 Bali attacks, but until March of 2007, there was little information to back up this claim. After being transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Mohammed began giving information, even admitting to planning the 2002 attacks.

On March 1, 2003, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was arrested by U.S. and Pakistani authorities in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. In 2006 he was transferred to a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba to undergo extensive interrogation as to his knowledge of current and future terrorist acts.
**bin Nurhasyim, Amrozi**

A suspected operative for the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, AKA Amrozi, is the brother of JI’s South East Asian Operations Chief Huda bin Abdul Haq, AKA Mukhlas, and JI operative Ali Imron.

Although Amrozi denies any connection with JI, his actions leading up to the Bali bombings prove otherwise. Not only was he responsible for supplying the vehicle used in the bombing, he also purchased the chemical components of the explosives one month prior.

On August 7, 2003, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim was found guilty of helping to plan and carry out the Bali attacks. He was sentenced to death by firing squad, however due to legal technicalities, this sentence is still pending. He has since been transferred to Nuskambangan Prison.

**Octavia, Andi**

A native of Indonesia, Andi Octavia, AKA Yuri, was an operative for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well a Personal Protection Officer for fellow JI member Imam Samudra. Prior to the Bali attacks, he performed target reconnaissance of Bali and the surrounding areas, as well as helped to secure funding by being an accomplice to a jewelry store robbery in August of 2002.

Like many other JI operatives, Yuri attended the Pondok Ngruki School located in Solo, Indonesia. It is believed that during his time there, he became radicalized and began to show sympathy for organizations such as JI. It is believed that during 2001, Yuri became close with fellow JI member Imam Samudra, and was eventually led into becoming an operative for the organization.

On November 20, 2002, Andi Octavia was arrested by authorities in the West Java region of Indonesia.

**Pamungkas, Hutomo**

Labeled as a financial officer and logistics expert for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Hutomo Pamungkas, AKA Mubarok, was also the commander of the JI Mantiqi III cell operating in the Menado wakalah.

Mubarok’s affiliation with JI was believed to have begun sometime during 1994, where it has been documented that he took an oath of allegiance to Abdullah Sungkar. Although his role in the Bali bombings was relatively small, he did receive US$90,000 from Abdul Rauf, which were the proceeds from a local jewelry store robbery that would eventually be used to finance the attacks.

On January 13, 2003, Hutomo Pamungkas was arrested in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. A little more than one year after the attacks on October 16, 2003, he was sentenced to life in prison for his involvement with both the bombings and JI.
**Pitono, Joko**

Considered the protégé of Dr. Azahari bin Husin, Joko Pitono, AKA Dulmatin, was a demolitions and electronics expert for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It is believed that he constructed the main explosive device used in the 2002 Bali bombings and may have also been responsible for its detonation.

Believed to have joined JI in the mid 1990’s, Dulmatin learned demolition techniques while in Afghanistan training camps. These techniques were useful when he was given specific instructions from his mentor, Dr. Azahari bin Husin, on how to construct the main explosive device used in the Bali attacks.

In August of 2003, Joko Pitono fled to Mindanao in the southern Philippines to avoid arrest from Indonesian authorities. Since that time, he has been suspected of becoming an operative for the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), giving demolitions expertise in exchange for safe haven. Although his current whereabouts are unknown, it is believed that he was wounded by Philippine military personnel in an armed confrontation on the southern island of Jolo on January 25, 2007.

**Rauf, Abdul**

Also known as Syam, Abdul Rauf was an Operative for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well as a personal protection officer for fellow JI member Imam Samudra.

Like many of the Bali suspects and JI operatives, Syam had attended one of the many Madrassas located in Indonesia as a youth. After meeting Imam Samudra in 2001, he helped to perform target reconnaissance of Bali and the surrounding areas in mid 2002 to prepare for the attacks. In August of 2002, Syam orchestrated the robbery of a jewelry store in the town of Banten, Indonesia, and also helped to prepare the bombs to be used prior to the attacks.

On November 19, 2002, Abdul Rauf was arrested by authorities in Serang, Indonesia.

**Roni, Abdul**

Known for his expertise in the manufacturing of explosives, Abdul Roni was an operative for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well as a member of the JI bomb assembly and delivery team.

Little is known about Roni’s involvement within JI. Due to his expertise, he was requested to attend a September 2002 meeting in Solo, and was tasked with helping to build the bombs to be used in the attacks. Three weeks prior to the bombings, Roni arrived in Denpasar to mix and develop the chemical compounds to be used in the explosive devices.

As of this writing Abdul Roni’s whereabouts are unknown.
Samudra, Imam

Perhaps considered the most intelligent of the Bali bombing suspects, Imam Samudra acted as the terrorist operations planner for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Additionally, he was the organization’s computer expert and provided for the recruitment of future operatives.

Mr. Samudra has been identified in connection with at least two other terrorist incidents besides the Bali attacks. These attacks, the Christmas Eve bombings of 24 churches in 2000 and an attack on a crowded shopping mall in August of 2001, display his expertise in both military training and explosives.

On November 21, 2002, Imam Samudra was arrested on a bus in Indonesia while attempting to flee to Malaysia. On October 9, 2003, he was found guilty of helping to coordinate the Bali attacks, and was sentenced to death by firing squad. As of this writing he is incarcerated in Jakarta, Indonesia.

Sufaat, Yazid

Known primarily for his research of biological and chemical weapons for al-Qaeda, Yazid Sufaat was also an operative working for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It is believed that due to his background in chemistry and laboratory sciences, he supplied JI with technical assistance on bomb manufacturing and detonation.

Sufaat’s work within JI is relatively unknown, however on at least one occurrence, Sufaat received orders from Riduan Isamuddin to forge documentation proclaiming to have employed Zacarious Moussaoui for an amount of US$2,500 a month with US$35,000 up front.

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Sufaat fled to Pakistan fearing U.S. prosecution for his assistance in housing al-Qaeda operatives who participated in the attacks. On December 9, 2001, Yazid Sufaat was arrested while attempting to re-enter his home country of Malaysia. As of this writing he is detained by Malaysian authorities.

Sungkar, Abdullah

Labeled as the first operational commander of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abdullah Sungkar was a close associate of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as well as Riduan Isamuddin.

Along with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Abdullah Sungkar co-founded the Pondok Ngruki school located in Solo, Indonesia in 1973. Along with the creation of the JI organization, Sungkar is credited with radicalizing and recruiting JI Operations Chief Riduan Isamuddin in the late 1980’s.

After the death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1999, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir took over as the spiritual leader of JI, and the position of operational commander was handed over to Riduan Isamuddin.
Top, Noordin

Known as the most wanted man in South East Asia, Noordin Top was a demolitions expert, financier, and recruiter for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In February of 2002, Top was tasked with planning the next bombing: the Bali bombings in October of 2002.

Top is believed to have begun helping JI during the mid 1980’s, where during his time at the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School, he met Huda bin Abdul Haq, and is believed to have met Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Although his direct participation in JI is not documented until the mid to late 1990’s, it is noteworthy that Top became good friends with Dr. Azahari bin Husin, Top’s science professor at the University of Technology in Malaysia.

Although his current whereabouts are unknown, Noordin Top is believed to be located somewhere in Indonesia. In January of 2006, claims surfaced that Top had created a new organization, known as the Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad. Speculation has risen recently of collaboration between JI members and government officials due to Top’s ability to avoid capture, specifically during an April 2006 raid on a house in Central Java, Indonesia, where Top avoided being detained.

bin Wan Mat, Wan Min

Labeled as the “Bagman” for the Bali bombings, Wan Min bin Wan Mat was the regional chief and financial officer for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as well as an operative for the group known as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).

Wan Min’s involvement in JI can be traced back to 1993, following his co-founding of the Al Tarbiyyah Al-Islamiyyah Luqmanul Hakiem religious school located in Johor. Shortly after joining JI, Wan Min attended training camps set up by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), revealing his several ties to other significant organizations in South East Asia. His actions in the Bali bombings and the delivery of funds to Huda bin Abdul Haq, place him as a key member within the JI organization.

On September 27, 2002, prior to the Bali attacks, Wan Min bin Wan Mat was arrested in Kelantan, Malaysia.

Yunos, Saifullah

Suspected of being an operative for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Saifullah Mukhlis Yunos was more commonly known as the demolitions expert for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as well as its special operations group leader.

Although his involvement with JI is relatively unknown, Yunos played a key role in the December 30, 2000 “Rizal Day Bombings” in Manila, which killed 22 people. His ties with JI seem to be primarily due to his relationship with Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi.

In May of 2003, Saifullah Mukhlis Yunos was arrested in the southern Philippine city of Cagayan de Oro.
Long Profiles

bin Abdul Haq, Huda

Full Name: Huda bin Abdul Haq

Aliases: Ali Gufron
         Ali Gufron al Mukhlas
         Mukhlas
         Sofwan

Birthplace: Solokuro, Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia, 9 February 1960

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Brothers – Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Ali Imron

Previous Occupation: Preacher

Current Status: **CAPTURED**

Sentenced to death by firing squad

Affiliations: Commander – Jemaah Islamiyah, Mantiqi One
               Operations Chief – Jemaah Islamiyah, South-East Asia
               Head of the Islamic Military Academy – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1982
  - Graduates from the Pondok Ngruki School located in Solo, Indonesia
  - Meets Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
- 1983 – 1986
  - Travels to Malaysia
  - Establishes the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School in Johor, Malaysia
  - Reunites with his brother, Amrozi bin Nurhasyim
  - Meets Riduan Isamuddin and joins Jemaah Islamiyah
- 1987-1989
  - Travels to Pakistan and meets up with Arab Mujahideen
  - Fights against the Soviets in the Afghanistan – Soviet War
  - Meets Osama bin Laden
- 1999
  - Travels to Singapore to recruit operatives
- 2001
  - Returns to Indonesia and takes over as operations chief for Jemaah Islamiyah
- February 2002
  - Attends a meeting with other Jemaah Islamiyah operatives to discuss their strategy in South East Asia and is tasked to implement the next attack
- March 2002 – September 2002
  - Receives US $30,500 from Wan Min bin Wan Mat to use for the Bali attacks
- 4 December 2002
  - Arrested in central Java, Indonesia
- 2 October 2003
  - Sentenced to death by firing squad
Aburrabman, Mohamad Iqbal

Full Name: Mohamad Iqbal Aburrabman

Aliases: Abu Jibril
Abu Jibril Aburrabman
Fihiruddin Moqthe bin Abdul Rahman
Fihiruddin Muqti
Mohamad Iqbal Rahman
Ustad Rahman

Birthplace: Tirpas-Selong Village, East Lombok, Indonesia, 17 August 1958

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Brother – Irfan Suryahardy Awwas

Previous Occupation: Preacher

Current Status: CAPTURED
Served five and a half months in Kamunting Prison, located in northern Malaysia, for immigration and forgery charges. Deported to Indonesia in May of 2004 and is detained for identity fraud as of this writing

Affiliations: Senior Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah
Paramilitary Wing Commander – Jemaah Islamiyah
Executive Committee Member – Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia
Financial Conduit – al-Qaeda

Key Activities:
- 1980 – 1984
  - Becomes a preacher at the Sudirman mosque in Yogyakarta, Indonesia
- 1993
  - Instructed by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to set up operations in Malaysia
- January 2000
  - Returns to Indonesia
- August 2000
  - Becomes a member of the executive committee for Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia
- September – December 2000
  - Returns to Malaysia
- June 2001
  - Arrested by Malaysian authorities and charged with trying to establish a South East Asia-wide Islamic state
- August 2003
  - Released from detention by Malaysian authorities
  - Arrested by Malaysian Immigration authorities
- 14 May 2004
  - Deported to Indonesia Immediately detained upon arrival by Indonesian authorities for identity fraud
Amin, Dedi

Full Name: Dedi Amin

Aliases: Engkong Junaedi

Birthplace: Unknown

Citizenship: Unknown

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Unknown

Current Status: CAPTURED

Sentence to 15 years in prison for providing funds for terrorist actions on September 8, 2003.

Affiliations: Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah
Personal Protection Officer – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 2001
  - Meets Imam Samudra
- August 2002
  - Robs a jewelry store in the West Java town of Banten with Abdul Rauf and Andi Octavia
- 21 November 2002
  - Arrested by authorities in Serang, Indonesia
- 8 September 2003
  - Sentenced to 15 years in prison for providing funds for terrorist actions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Full Name:</strong></th>
<th>Mohammed Farik bin Amin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aliases:</strong></td>
<td>Zaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zubair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Birthplace:</strong></td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship:</strong></td>
<td>Malaysian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Known Siblings:</strong></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previous Occupation:</strong></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current Status:</strong></td>
<td><strong>CAPTURED</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arrested in Thailand in June of 2003. Detained at a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba as of this writing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliations:</strong></td>
<td>Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operative – al-Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Activities:</strong></td>
<td>- 1990 – 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Earns a degree in electronic telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Travels to Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2000-2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Trains at the al-Farouq terrorist camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Transfers funds from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to Jemaah Islamiyah operatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- June 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Arrested in Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Sent to a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Azi, Abdul

**Full Name:** Abdul Azi Haji Chiming

**Aliases:** Unknown

**Birthplace:** Thailand

**Citizenship:** Thai

**Known Siblings:** Unknown

**Previous Occupation:** Teacher

**Current Status:** **CAPTURED**
Arrested on May 27, 2003, for having affiliations with Jemaah Islamiyah

**Affiliations:** Financial Officer – Jemaah Islamiyah
Officer - Umm al-Qura

**Key Activities:**
- September 2002 – March 2003
  - Houses Riduan Isamuddin in Cambodia and agrees to look after his finances
- 27 May 2003
  - Arrested for having connections with the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah
Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar

Full Name: Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
Aliases: Abu Bakar Bashir
Abdus Samad
Abdus Somad
Ustadz (“Teacher”)

Birthplace: Jombang, East Java, Indonesia, 17 August 1938
Citizenship: Indonesian
Known Siblings: Unknown
Previous Occupation: Preacher
Current Status: RELEASED
Released from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta, Indonesia, due to a reduced sentence for good behavior on June 14, 2006

Affiliations: Spiritual Leader – Jemaah Islamiyah
Leader – Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia
Leader – Rabitatul Mujahideen
Member – Komando Jihad

Key Activities:
- 1973
  - Co-founds the Pondok Ngruki School along with Abdullah Sungkar
- 1978
  - Jailed by Indonesian authorities for promoting the creation of an Islamic state and for being a member of Komando Jihad
- 1985
  - Travels to Johor, Malaysia
- 1990’s
  - Creates Jemaah Islamiyah along with Abdullah Sungkar in 1993
  - Returns to Indonesia in 1998 and becomes the “Emir” of Jemaah Islamiya after the death of Abdullah Sungkar in 1999
  - Forms the group Rabitatul Mujahideen in 1999
- August 2000
  - Forms the group Majelis Mujahideen Indonesia
- 19 October 2002
  - Arrested in Solo, Java, Indonesia, on conspiracy charges associated with the Bali attacks
- 2003
  - Found guilty of conspiracy charges but is released after a short sentence
  - Arrested in connection with the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta
- March 2005
  - Sentenced to 30 months in prison on conspiracy charges
- 14 June, 2006
  - Released from Cipinang Prison due to a reduced sentence for good behavior
al-Faruq, Omar

Full Name: Omar al-Faruq

Aliases: Mohammed Assegof
         Mahmud bin Ahmad Assegaf
         Mahmoud Ahmad Muhammed

Birthplace: Kuwait, 24 May 1971

Citizenship: Kuwaiti, Iraqi

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Unknown

Current Status: **DECEASED**

Killed on September 25, 2006, during a pre-dawn raid by British forces in Basra, Iraq

Affiliations: Terrorist Operations Commander – al-Qaeda, South East Asia
              Operations Liaison – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
  - Receives paramilitary training at the al-Qaeda camp located in Khaldan, Afghanistan
- 1995
  - Travels to the Philippines and joins Camp Abubakar run by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
- 1996 – 1999
  - Travels to Indonesia and becomes al-Qaeda’s terrorist operations commander in South East Asia
- 2001
  - Moves to Cijeruk, Indonesia and becomes an operations liaison between al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya
- 5 June 2002
  - Arrested by Indonesian officials near the city of Bogor
- 8 June 2002
  - Transferred into U.S. custody and transported to Bagram Air Force Base located in Afghanistan
- 9 September 2002
  - Confesses to CIA interrogators of being a senior al-Qaeda operative in charge of coordinating South East Asian Islamic militant groups
- July 2005
  - Escapes from U.S. custody and flees to Iraq
- 25 September 2006
  - Killed by British forces during a shootout in the al-Tuninnah neighborhood located in Basra, Iraq
Full Name: Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi

Aliases: Abu Saad
Edris Anwar Rodin
Randy Adam Alih
Randy Alih
Rony Azad bin Ahad
Sammy Sali Jamil

Birthplace: Madiun, East Java, Indonesia, 17 February 1971

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Brother – Muhajir (LNU)

Previous Occupation: Teacher

Current Status: DECEASED
Reported to have been killed by authorities in the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines on October 13, 2003.

Affiliations: Demolitions Expert – Jemaah Islamiyah
Demolitions Expert/Trainer - Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Liaison Officer – Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Key Activities:
- 1980’s
  - Attends the al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki
- 1991 - 1995
  - Travels to Afghanistan for military training
- 1996
  - Travels to the Philippines
  - Designated by JI to set up a training camp within the MILF’s Camp Abubakar in Mindanao
- December 2000
  - Helps to plan the bombing of a passenger train in the city of Manila in the Philippines to take place on December 30th. The attack kills 22 and injures over 100.
- 15 January 2002
  - Arrested by Philippine authorities and is charged with illegal possession of explosives and fraudulently obtaining passports
- April 2002
  - Pleads guilty and is sentenced to 17 years in prison
- 14 July 2003
  - Escapes from prison
- 13 October 2003
  - Reportedly killed by authorities near the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines
**Hendrawan, Jhoni**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Jhoni Hendrawan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases</td>
<td>Gembrot Idris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace</td>
<td>Sumatra, Indonesia, 1968 (estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Indonesian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known Siblings</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Occupation</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Status</td>
<td>CAPTURED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sentenced to ten years in prison for his participation in the 2003 JW Marriott Hotel Bombing in Jakarta. He has been cleared of all charges arising from the Bali bombings.

| Affiliations | Logistics Officer – Jemaah Islamiyah  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bomb Assembly and Delivery Team – Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Key Activities | - 1990’s  
|----------------|---------------------------------|
|                | - Studies at the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School in Johor, Malaysia  
|                | - Believed to have met Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Huda bin Abdul Haq  
|                | - August 2002  
|                | - Attends a meeting in Solo and is given the task of providing logistics  
|                | - 5 October 2002  
|                | - Checks in to the Hotel Harum in Denpasar. He arrives with the Yamaha motorcycle purchased for the attack as a getaway vehicle  
|                | - January - June 2003  
|                | - Confesses during the trial of Huda bin Abdul Haq to using a mobile phone to detonate the bomb near the U.S. consulate  
|                | - June 2003  
|                | - Arrested after robbing a bank  
|                | - April 2004  
|                | - Trial begins for his participation in the Bali attacks and the JW Marriott Hotel bombing  
|                | - 24 August 2004  
|                | - Cleared of charges for participation in the Bali bombings, but found guilty and sentenced to ten years in prison for participating in the JW Marriott bombing of 2003 |
bin Husin, Azahari

Full Name: Dr. Azahari bin Husin

Aliases: Doctor Azahari
“Demolition Man”

Birthplace: Malaysia, 1957 (estimated)

Citizenship: Malaysian

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Professor

Current Status: DECEASED
Presumed to have committed suicide by detonating an explosive device prior to an arrest attempt by Indonesian authorities on November 9, 2005.

Affiliations: Chief demolitions and engineering expert – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1970’s
  - Travels to Australia for academic study
- 1980’s
  - Returns to Malaysia to obtain a university degree in engineering
  - Travels to England and enrolls at Reading University
- 1990’s
  - Earns a PhD in geophysics from the Reading University in England
  - Becomes a lecturer at the University of Technology at Skudai in Johor, Malaysia
  - Believed to have met Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir during this period
  - Travels to Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines during the latter part of the decade for demolitions training
- 2001
  - Leaves for Indonesia during the last few months of the year in fear of being investigated as a terrorist following the events of September 11
- February 2002
  - Attends a meeting with other Jemaah Islamiyah operatives to discuss their strategy in South East Asia and is tasked to arrange and execute the attack
- March 2002 – October 2002
  - Writes a “bomb manual” on how to create and engineer the main bomb to be used in the Bali attacks
- 2003 – 2005
  - Believed to have participated in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia, the Jakarta Embassy bombing in 2004, and the second Bali bombing in 2005 in conjunction with Noordin Mohammed Top
- 9 November 2005
  - Commits suicide by detonating an explosive device prior to an arrest attempt by Indonesian authorities
Full Name: Ali Imron bin Nurhasyim

Aliases: Alik

Birthplace: Tenggulun Village in East Java, Indonesia, 1973

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Brother – Amrozi bin Nurhasyim
Brother – Huda bin Abdul Haq

Previous Occupation: Teacher

Current Status: CAPTURED
Sentenced to life in prison

Affiliations: Field coordinator – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1980’s
  - Attends the Al-Mukmin boarding school
- 1990’s
  - Teaches at the Tenggulun Islamic school
  - Travels to Malaysia and meets Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
- March 2002 – October 2002
  - Helps to complete the largest of the bombs to be used in the Bali attacks
- 5 October 2002
  - Attends a meeting with Jemaah Islamiyah operatives Amrozi, Idris, Samudra, and Dulmatin, at the Hotel Harum in Denpasar
- 12 October 2002
  - Drives Iqbal (LNU) and Jimi (LNU) in the L300 minivan to within a few hundred feet of the Sari Club in Bali
- 13 January 2003
  - Arrested in Indonesia while attempting to flee the country
- 19 September 2003
  - Sentenced to life in prison
Isamuddin, Riduan

Full Name: Nurjaman Riduan bin Isamuddin

Aliases: Encep Nurjaman
Hambali
Hambali Nurjaman
"Asia’s bin Laden"

Birthplace: Sukamanah Village in Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia, 4 April 1964

Citizenship: Indonesian, Sudanese
Known Siblings: Brother - Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan
Previous Occupation: Preacher

Current Status: CAPTURED
Held in U.S. custody at a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba as of this writing

Affiliations: Operations Chief – Jemaah Islamiyah
Operations Chief – al-Qaeda, South East Asia

Key Activities:
- 1970 – 1984
  - Becomes involved in radical Islam while enrolled at Al-I’anan Islamic High School
- 1985
  - Travels to Malaysia seeking a university scholarship to study Islam
  - Meets Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
  - Becomes involved in Jemaah Islamiyah
- 1988 - 1989
  - Travels to Afghanistan to become a Mujahideen
  - Fights against the Soviets in the Afghanistan – Soviet War
  - Meets Osama Bin Laden
- 1990 - 1999
  - Travels to Sungei Manggis Village, Malaysia
  - Meets Muhammad Iqbal
  - Takes charge of Jemaah Islamiyah's operations in Malaysia and Singapore
  - Re-establishes links with al-Qaeda and begins developing regional operatives
- January 2000
  - Organizes a meeting between al-Qaeda operatives Khalid Al Mihdhar and Nawaf Al Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- February 2002
  - Holds a meeting with other Jemaah Islamiyah operatives to discuss their strategy in South East Asia
- March – September 2002
  - Provides US$30,500 in three installments to Wan Min bin Wan Mat
- 11 August 2003
  - Arrested in Thailand on conspiracy charges
- 2006
  - Sent to a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Janjalani, Abdurajak</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full Name:</strong> Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aliases:</strong> Ustadz Abubakar Janjalani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Birthplace:</strong> Philippines, 1959 (estimated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizenship:</strong> Filipino</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Known Siblings:** Brother – Khadafi Janjalani  
Brother – Hector (LNU) |
| **Previous Occupation:** Unknown |
| **Current Status:** DECEASED  
Killed on December 19, 1998, by Filipino authorities while attempting to avoid capture |
| **Affiliations:** Founder/Commander – Abu Sayyaf Group |
| **Key Activities:**  
- 1980 – 1987  
  - Receives religious and Arabic training in Libya and Syria  
  - Travels to Afghanistan  
  - Receives paramilitary training while in Khost, Afghanistan  
  - Meets Osama bin Laden  
- 1988 – 1989  
  - Fights against the Soviets in the Afghanistan – Soviet War  
- 1991  
  - Forms the group Abu Sayyaf after it splits from the Moro National Liberation Front  
- 19 December 1998  
  - Killed by hostile fire from Filipino authorities on the island of Basilian |
Janjalani, Khadafi

Full Name: Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani

Aliases: Amir Khadafi Abubaker Janjalani
Abu Muktar
Daf
Jimar Manalad Montanio
Khadafi Montanio
Omar Bin Salik
Pek
“The Good-Hearted”

Birthplace: Isabela, Basilan, Philippines, 3 March 1975

Citizenship: Filipino

Known Siblings: Brother – Abdurajak Janjalani
Brother – Hector (LNU)

Previous Occupation: Unknown

Current Status: DECEASED
Believed to have been killed on September 4, 2006, by Filipino authorities. On January 20, 2007, DNA tests confirmed that the remains discovered on Jolo Island belonged to Khadafi.

Affiliations: Leader/Commander – Abu Sayyaf Group

Key Activities:
- 1995
  - Captured by Filipino Marine and 2MBde intelligence operatives
  - Turned over to the Philippine National Police, but escapes less than two months afterwards
- December 1998
  - Takes over as leader of Abu Sayyaf, after the death of his brother Abdurajak Janjalani
- 1999 – 2000
  - Believed to have traveled to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia
- June 2001
  - Believed to have been responsible for the kidnapping and beheading of a U.S. national
- 4 September 2006
  - Reported to have been mortally wounded by Filipino authorities
- 27 December 2006
  - His remains are reported to have been found in a makeshift grave near Patikul, on Jolo Island, in the southern Philippines
- 20 January 2007
  - DNA tests confirm that the remains found in an open on Jolo Island are those of Khadafi Janjalani
Kadir, Masykur Abdul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name:</th>
<th>Masykur Abdul Kadir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace:</td>
<td>Bali, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship:</td>
<td>Indonesian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Known Siblings:</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Occupation:</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Status:</td>
<td>CAPTURED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sentenced on September 29, 2003, to 15 years in prison for his assistance in the attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliations:</td>
<td>Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Key Activities:            | - August 2001 – September 2002  
                            |  - Helps Imam Samudra find and rent a house in Solo, Indonesia, to be used for plotting the Bali attacks  
                            | - July 2002  
                            |  - Believed to have accompanied Andi Octavia and Abdul Rauf during the reconnaissance mission of Bali and the surrounding areas  
                            | - August 2002  
                            |  - Believed to have helped Jhoni Hendrawan purchase the Yamaha motorcycle to be used in the attacks  
                            | - 29 September 2003  
                            |  - Sentenced to 15 years in prison for his assistance in the Bali attacks  
                            | - 24 July 2004  
                            |  - Challenges the Ex Post Facto application of Law No. 16 of 2003 |
bin Lep, Mohammed Nazir

Full Name: Mohammed Nazir bin Lep
Aliases: Bashir bin Lap
         Lillie
         Li-Li
Birthplace: Malaysia
Citizenship: Malaysian
Known Siblings: Unknown
Previous Occupation: Unknown
Current Status: CAPTURED
Arrested in Ayutthaya, Thailand, on August 11, 2003. Held at a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba as of this writing
Affiliations: Terrorist operator – Jemaah Islamiyah
             Operative – al-Qaeda
Key Activities: - 1990’s
              - Attends the Polytechnic University in Malaysia and earns a
                degree in architecture
              - 2002 – 2003
                - Transfers al-Qaeda funds to be used for the Jakarta Marriott Hotel bombing to take place on 5 August 2003
              - 11 August 2003
                - Arrested by authorities with Riduan Isamuddin in Ayutthaya, Thailand
              - 2006
                - Sent to a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name:</th>
<th>Haji Ibrahim bin Haji Maidin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace:</td>
<td>Singapore, 1951 (estimated)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Citizenship:</td>
<td>Singaporean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known Siblings:</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous Occupation:</td>
<td>Apartment superintendent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Current Status: | **CAPTURED**  
Arrested in December of 2001 by Singapore authorities |
| Affiliations: | Commander – Jemaah Islamiyah, Singapore Branch  
Member – Rabitatul Moujahedeen |
| Key Activities: | - 1990  
- Believed to have joined Jemaah Islamiyah  
- 1993  
  - Travels to Afghanistan to train at an al-Qaeda training camp  
- December 2001  
  - Arrested by Singapore authorities for plotting to bomb U.S., Israeli, and British diplomatic and political offices. |
Mohammed, Khalid Shaikh

**Full Name:** Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

**Aliases:**
- Abdulrahman A.A. Alghamdi
- Ashraf Refaat Nabith Henin
- Fahd Bin Adballah Bin Khalid
- Hashim Abdulrahman
- Hashim Ahmed
- Khalid Abdul Wadood
- Khalid al-Shaykh al-Ballushi
- Mukhtar the Baluchi
- Salem Ali

**Birthplace:** Kuwait, 14 April 1965

**Citizenship:** Kuwaiti, Pakistani

**Known Siblings:** Unknown

**Previous Occupation:** Unknown

**Current Status:** CAPTURED

Arrested by U.S. and Pakistan authorities in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on March 1, 2003. Detained at a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba as of this writing.

**Affiliations:** Operations Chief – al-Qaeda

**Key Activities:**
- 1986
  - Graduates from North Carolina A&T University with a degree in mechanical engineering
- 1987 – 1989
  - Fights against the Soviets in the Afghanistan – Soviet War
- 1992
  - Wires US$660 to one of Ramzi Yousef's co-conspirators in support of the first World Trade Center bombing
- 1996
  - Travels to meet Osama bin Laden and proposes what would become the 9-11 plot.
- 1 March 2003
  - Arrested by U.S. and Pakistan authorities in Rawalpindi, Pakistan
- 2006
  - Sent to a Guantanamo Bay detention facility in Cuba
- March 2007
  - While under interrogation, admits to planning the 2002 Bali attacks.
bin Nurhasyim, Amrozi

Full Name: Ali Amrozi bin Haji Nurhasyim

Aliases: Amrozi
"The Smiling Assassin"

Birthplace: Tenggulun Village in East Java, Indonesia, 5 July 1962

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Brother – Huda bin Abdul Haq
Brother – Ali Imron
Step-Brother – Sumarno (LNU)

Previous Occupation: Mechanic

Current Status: CAPTURED
Sentenced to death by firing squad. Incarcerated at Nusakambangan as of this writing
Prison. Sentence is pending due to legal technicalities.

Affiliations: Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah (suspected)

Key Activities:
- 1980’s
  - Travels to Malaysia in search of work
  - Reunites with his brother, Huda bin Abdul Haq
- 1990’s
  - Becomes more involved in the Al Islam Boarding School
  - Meets Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
- April 2002
  - Meets with his brother, Huda bin Abdul Haq, to decide on targeting Bali for the attacks
- September 2002
  - Purchases Chlorate and other chemicals from the Tidar Kimia fertilizer and chemical supply shop in Surabaya, Indonesia
  - Transports the materials to Denpasar, Bali for storage
- 5 October 2002
  - Checks in to the Hotel Harum in Denpasar. He arrives with the L300 Mitsubishi minivan purchased for the attack
- 5 November 2002
  - Arrested in East Java, Indonesia. Confesses to owning the minivan and purchasing the chemicals used in the attacks
- 21-22 December 2002
  - Flown to Java and Lamongan for a series of police re-enactments
- 12 May 2003
  - Trial begins for his participation in the Bali bombings
- 7 August 2003
  - Sentenced to death by firing squad. Incarcerated in Denpasar Prison
- October 2005
  - Transferred to Nusakambangan Prison
Octavia, Andi

Full Name: Andi Octavia
Aliases: Yudi Yuri
Birthplace: Sukamanah, Malimping, Banten, Indonesia, 1980
Citizenship: Indonesian
Known Siblings: Unknown
Previous Occupation: Unknown
Current Status: CAPTURED
Arrested by authorities in West Java Indonesia on November 20, 2002
Affiliations: Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah
Personal protection officer – Jemaah Islamiyah
Key Activities:
  - Attends the Pondok Ngruki school in Solo
- 2001
  - Meets Imam Samudra
- July 2002
  - Performs target reconnaissance of Bali and the surrounding areas
- August 2002
  - Robs a jewelry store in the West Java town of Banten
- 20 November 2002
  - Arrested by authorities in West Java, Indonesia
Pamungkas, Hutomo

Full Name: Hutomo Pamungkas
Aliases: Mubarok, Utomo
Birthplace: Kulon Progo, Indonesia, 31 December 1969
Citizenship: Indonesian
Known Siblings: Unknown
Previous Occupation: Teacher
Current Status: Captured
Sentence to life in prison on October 16, 2003.
Affiliations:
- Financial officer – Jemaah Islamiyah
- Logistics expert – Jemaah Islamiyah
- Commander – Jemaah Islamiyah, Mantiqi III, Menado wakalah
Key Activities:
- 1980’s
  - Attends the al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki
- 1990
  - Travels to Afghanistan
- 1994
  - Travels to Malaysia, and takes an oath of allegiance to Abdullah Sungkar
- 1998
  - Named as commander of the Menado wakalah under the regional direction of Mantiqi III
- 1999 – 2001
  - Suspected of being involved in arms smuggling aiding Jemaah Islamiyah
- 2002
  - Becomes a teacher at the Lamongan pesantren
  - Receives US$90,000 from Abdul Rauf, proceeds from a local jewelry store robbery for purposes of financing the October 2002 attacks
- 13 January 2003
  - Arrested in East Kalimantan, Indonesia
- 16 October 2003
  - Sentenced to life in prison
Pitono, Joko

Full Name: Joko Pitono

Aliases: Abdul Martin
        Amar Umar
        Amar Usman
        Djoko Supriyanto
        Dulmatin
        Jak Imron
        Muktamar
        Novarianto
        Topel

Birthplace: Petarukan Village, Pemalang, Central Java, Indonesia, 16 June 1970

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Used car dealer

Current Status: UNKNOWN
Suspected to be located somewhere in the Philippines

Affiliations: Demolitions and electronics expert – Jemaah Islamiyah
Bomb assembly and delivery team – Jemaah Islamiyah
Operative – Abu Sayyaf Group

Key Activities:
- 1980’s
  - Studies at the SMP Pemalang Islamic School, travels to Malaysia
  - Attends militant training camps in Afghanistan
  - Returns to Indonesia and attends the Pondok Ngruki School in Solo
  - Believed to have met Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and to have joined Jemaah Islamiyah
- August 2002
  - Attends a meeting in Solo and is given the task of building the bombs to be used in the attacks. He is to use the specifications given by Dr. Azahari bin Husin
- September 2002
  - Believed to have received 20 million rupiah ($1,300) from Huda bin Abdul Haq for bomb components
- 5 October 2002
  - Attends a meeting with Jemaah Islamiyah at the Hotel Harum in Denpasar
- August 2003 - 2005
  - Flees to Mindanao in the southern Philippines and is suspected of working for the Abu Sayyaf Group in return for safe haven from Indonesian authorities
- 25 January 2007
  - Believed to have been wounded by Philippine military personnel in an armed confrontation on the southern island of Jolo
Rauf, Abdul

Full Name: Abdul Rauf

Aliases: Sam bin Jahruddin
         Syam
         Seyam

Birthplace: Cipondoh, Tangerang, West Java, Indonesia, 1981

Citizenship: Indonesia

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Unknown

Current Status: CAPTURED

Affiliations: Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah
             Personal protection officer – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
  - Attends the Pondok Ngruki school in Solo
- 2001
  - Meets Imam Samudra
- July 2002
  - Performs target reconnaissance of Bali and the surrounding areas
- August 2002
  - Robs a jewelry store in the West Java town of Banten and collects close to
    US$90,000 in cash and gold. Transfers the proceeds to Hutomo Pamungkas
- September – October 2002
  - Helps to prepare the bombs to be used in the attacks
- 19 November 2002
  - Arrested by authorities in Serang, Indonesia
Roni, Abdul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full Name:</th>
<th>Abdul Roni</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>Previous Occupation:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Status:</td>
<td>UNKNOWN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Affiliations:    | Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah  
|                  | Bomb assembly and delivery team – Jemaah Islamiyah |
| Key Activities:  | - September 2002  
|                  |   - Attends a meeting in Solo and is given the task of building the bombs to be used in the attacks  
|                  |   - 25 September 2002  
|                  |   - Arrives in Denpasar to mix and develop the chemical compounds to be used in the explosive devices |
Samudra, Imam

Full Name: Imam Samudra

Aliases: Abdul Azis
Abdulaziz bin Sihabudin
Abu Omar
Fatih
Faiz Yunshar
Hendri
Heri
Hudama
Qudama

Birthplace: Serang, Banten, Indonesia, 14 January 1970

Citizenship: Indonesian

Known Siblings: Sister – Alyiah (LNU)

Previous Occupation: Teacher

Current Status: CAPTURED
Sentenced to death by firing squad. Incarcerated in Jakarta, Indonesia as of this writing

Affiliations: Terrorist operations planner/Field commander coordinator – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1980 – 1990
  - Attends school in Java, Indonesia. Receives a degree in engineering
  - 1990
  - Travels to Malaysia and becomes a computer teacher at a religious high school
- 1991 – 1993
  - Travels to Afghanistan and receives military and explosives expertise
  - 1998
    - Takes an oath of allegiance to Jemaah Islamiyah leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
  - December 2000
    - Returns to Indonesia and provides assistance to Riduan Isamuddin in organizing the bombings of 24 churches in Indonesia on December 24
- July 2001
  - Provides explosives and detonators to two men who carry out an attack on a Jakarta shopping mall on August 1
- August 2001 – September 2002
  - Rents a house in Solo, Indonesia, to use for plotting the Bali attacks
- 5 October 2002
  - Holds a meeting with Jemaah Islamiyah operatives Amrozi, Idris, Ali Imron and Dulmatin, at the Hotel Harum in Denpasar
- 21 November 2002
  - Arrested on a bus in western Java while trying to flee to Malaysia
- 9 October 2003
  - Found guilty and sentenced to death by firing squad
Sufaat, Yazid

Full Name: Yazid Sufaat

Aliases: Yazud bin Sufaat

Birthplace: Johor, Malaysia, 20 January 1964

Citizenship: Malaysian

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Malaysian Army Captain, Laboratory Technician

Current Status: CAPTURED
Detained by Malaysian authorities as of this writing

Affiliations: Biological and chemical weapons researcher – al-Qaeda
Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1983-1987
  - Studies in the U.S. and receives a degree in chemistry and laboratory science from California State University in Sacramento
- 1990’s
  - Returns to Malaysia
  - Joins the Malaysian military, is promoted to Captain, and becomes a laboratory technician in a medical brigade
- January 2000
  - Uses his residence in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to hold a meeting for al-Qaeda operatives taking part in the September 11, 2001 attacks
- October 2000
  - Houses Zacarias Moussaoui and supplies him with identification papers at the request of Riduan Isamuddin and is instructed to pay Moussaoui US$2,500 a month and US$35,000 up front
  - Receives instructions from Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi to purchase 4 tons of ammonium nitrate, which is bought from a company called Green Laboratory Medicine
  - Travels to Afghanistan and serves in a Taliban medical unit
- October 2001
  - Flees to Pakistan
- 9 December 2001
  - Arrested by Malaysian authorities while attempting to enter the country
Sungkar, Abdullah

Full Name: Abdullah Sungkar

Aliases: Unknown

Birthplace: Indonesia, 1937

Citizenship: Indonesia

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Teacher

Current Status: **DECEASED**
Died of natural causes in 1999

Affiliations: Spiritual leader/operations commander – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1973
  - Co-founds the Pondok Ngruki School along with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
- 1985
  - Travels to Johor, Malaysia
- 1986 – 1989
  - Meets and radicalizes Riduan Isamuddin
- 1990’s
  - Creates Jemaah Islamiyah along with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 1993
- 1999
  - Dies of natural causes
Top, Noordin

Full Name: Noordin Mohammed Top

Aliases: Abdurrachman Aufi
Noordin Muh Top
Noordin Mat Top
Noordin Din Moch Top
"The Moneyman"

Birthplace: Johor, Malaysia, 11 August 1968

Citizenship: Malaysian

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Teacher

Current Status: UNKNOWN
Believed to be located somewhere in Indonesia

Affiliations: Demolitions expert – Jemaah Islamiyah, Mantiqi One
Financier/recruiter – Jemaah Islamiyah

Key Activities:
- 1980 – 1987
  - Attends school at the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School in Johor, Malaysia
  - Meets Huda bin Abdul Haq
  - Believed to have met Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
  - Studies at the University of Technology in Malaysia, and receives a Bachelor’s of Science degree
  - Meets Dr. Azahari bin Husin
- 1992 – 2000
  - Teaches at the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School in Johor, Malaysia
  - Becomes increasingly active in Jemaah Islamiyah cell Mantiqi One
- September 2001
  - Flees to Indonesia following the U.S. led crackdown on international terrorism
- February 2002
  - Attends a meeting with other Jemaah Islamiyah operatives to discuss their strategy in South East Asia and is tasked to plan the bombings
- January 2006
  - Claims to have created a new organization called Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad
- April 2006
  - Escapes a raid on a house in the village of Binangun in Central Java, Indonesia
bin Wan Mat, Wan Min

Full Name: Wan Min bin Wan Mat

Aliases: Abu Hafis
Abu Hidayah
Wan Halim

Birthplace: Kelantan, Malaysia, 23 September 1960

Citizenship: Malaysian

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Teacher

Current Status: CAPTURED
Arrested on September 27, 2002, in Kelantan, Malaysia

Affiliations: Regional Chief – Jemaah Islamiyah, Malaysia
Financial Officer – Jemaah Islamiyah
Operative – Kumpulan Militan Malaysia

Key Activities: - 1980’s – 1990’s
  - Receives a Masters degree in Science from Manchester University
  - Co-founds the Al Tarbiyyah Al-Islamiyyah Luqmanul Hakiem religious school in Ulu Tiram in Johor
  - Teaches at the University of Technology in Malaysia
  - Becomes involved with Jemaah Islamiyah in 1993
  - Trains at the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Mindanao camp in 1996
- 2000
  - Travels to Afghanistan to receive military training
- February 2002
  - Attends a meeting with other Jemaah Islamiyah operatives to discuss their strategy in South East Asia and is tasked to be the treasurer for the next attack
- March – September 2002
  - Provided with US$30,500 in three installments from Riduan Isamuddin and passes it along to Huda bin Abdul Haq
  - Arrested in Kelantan, Malaysia on 27 September 2002
Yunos, Saifullah

Full Name: Saifullah Mukhlis Yunos

Aliases: Unknown

Birthplace: Lanao del Sur, Philippines, 7 July 1966

Citizenship: Filipino

Known Siblings: Unknown

Previous Occupation: Unknown

Current Status: CAPTURED
Arrested in the southern Philippine City of Cagayan de Oro in May of 2003

Affiliations: Demolitions expert – Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Leader – Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Special Operations Group
Operative – Jemaah Islamiyah (suspected)

Key Activities:
- 30 December 2000
  - Carries out the “Rizal Day Bombings” in Manila on behalf of Jemaah Islamiyah
- May 2003
  - Arrested in the southern Philippine city of Cagayan de Oro
Appendix 1: History of Indonesia

Indonesia: A Country of Contradictions

Nestled in the southwest corner of the Pacific Ocean, Indonesia is one of the largest and most complex nations in the world. Consisting of over 17,000 islands, Indonesia was originally settled by Dutch traders in the 17th century. It remained a European colony for the next 300 years. Wanting its rich natural resources, the Japanese occupied the country in 1942 and remained there until the conclusion of the war in 1945. Following their defeat at the end of World War II, the Japanese left Indonesia and the country began its movement toward independence. The Dutch however, were reluctant to give up one of their colonial jewels, and an “armed conflict” ensued until Indonesia finally gained its independence in 1949. 99

The road toward prosperity has not been easy for Indonesia. Following independence, Sukarno emerged as a national figure and served as the country’s first president. As an authoritarian leader, “Sukarno’s presidency relied on balancing the often opposing forces of the military, Islam and Communism. Increasing tensions however, between the powerful Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the military culminated in an abortive coup on 30 September 1965, during which six top-ranking generals were murdered…”100 Eventually, Sukarno was deposed after a military coup, and General Suharto took over the Presidency in 1967. The leadership change did not bode well for the country and decades of extreme and exhaustive corruption crippled Indonesia. Instead, the upper echelons of the Indonesian government embezzled billions in government funds, while the nation continued to suffer from poverty in a military state.

100 Ibid.
One estimate indicated that General Suharto had raided the government of more than $15 billion, “and that a total of $85 billion was illegitimately moved from the banking sector into private hands.”\textsuperscript{101} There was a gross misappropriation of government funds, sinking the country further into poverty and driving a wedge between the overwhelmingly poor citizens and the elites in the government and military. In addition, as is the typical behavior of authoritarian states, political opposition was suppressed and people deemed as enemies of the state, were killed in the tens of thousands. Moreover, Indonesia did not have a clear separation between the state and the military. Instead, the military permeated all levels of the government. “Under Suharto most, if not all, government ministers were generals or former generals, and the military was involved in every aspect of political life.”\textsuperscript{102} This type of military intrusion into government affairs had disastrous effects for Indonesia and remained in place for the next three decades.

Following the collapse of Thailand’s currency in the late nineties, much of Southeast Asia was rocked by a severe financial crisis. The instability quickly spread on the continent, and Indonesia was particularly vulnerable. After more than three decades of military dictatorship, the county failed to keep up with the technological advancements, especially with respect to computer software and sophisticated financial instruments.

The Southeast Asian country that was the most authoritarian and the most corrupt, Indonesia under Suharto, was the one that was the least flexible, least capable of adopting new software, and the one that eventually melted down-because the

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
Indonesia masses were not ready to share the pains of reform, because they did not feel the government was their own.\textsuperscript{103}

There was a clear disconnect between the people and the country’s leadership. Much of Indonesia was aware of the egregious corruption, and the weight of the financial crisis was too much for Sukarno’s regime to bear. As a result, under increasing pressure from the international community, Suharto resigned from power in 1998. The shift in power served as an opportunity for Indonesia to institute a number of governmental reforms, also known as Reformsi.

Two major changes include the 1999 openly contested parliament elections and the 2004 direct election of a president.\textsuperscript{104} These were significant advancements for Indonesia, because the country’s citizens actively participated in the election process, without the fear of repercussions from the government and military. While Indonesia has made these advancements, the country remains in dire straits. It was the hardest hit by the 2004 tsunami, with deaths in the tens of thousands and making whole towns and islands uninhabitable. Also, Indonesia has yet to recover from the financial turmoil of the late nineties with its GDP levels still below Suharto’s years and with underemployment exceeding 40 million.\textsuperscript{105}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{103} Thomas Friedman, \textit{The Lexus and the Olive Tree} (Anchor Books, 2000), 188.
\bibitem{105} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
Appendix 2: Current Sources of Funding

Alternate Forms of Financing

After its designation as an international terrorist group and after many of JI’s key leaders were arrested in connection with the bombing, JI has been forced to find alternative means for acquiring funding to continue operations. Examples of JI’s new covert methods to gain funding include the use of the hawala system and siophining funding from charities, which are both explained in greater detail below.

Alternative Remittance Systems

Alternative remittance systems, otherwise informally known as “hawala,” are becoming a more popular means of transferring funds between terrorists. Hawala is efficient, cost-effective, unregulated, and leaves no paper trail. Interpol describes hawala as, “money transfer without money movement.”\(^{106}\) Hawaladars, or hawala dealers, have a detailed network of other hawaladars who transfer money based on the honor system. Forbes Magazine estimates that in 2004 alone “an estimated 35 percent of the $150 billion in global transfers to developing countries flowed through these channels--and possibly far, far more.”\(^{107}\) While hawala transfers are an enormous concern for counter-terrorism finance purposes, the informal money transfer networks have also been used for other nefarious purposes, including drugs, sex trafficking, weapons, and even body parts.

An example of a hawala transfer is as follows (See figure below for pictorial depiction): Abdul wants to transfer $1,000 to his cousin Mohammad in Indonesia. To save the time and money of going through a bank, Abdul contacts a hawaladar that lives

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down the street from him, Yasmeen. Yasmeen calls a fellow hawaladar in Indonesia, Chulam, who happens to live in the same town as Mohammad. Yasmeen asks Chulam to give the $1,000 to Mohammad and agrees to eventually pay Chulam back in the future in the form of a hawala in the other direction. No money is actually moved between countries, and no paper trail exists. Therefore, it is difficult to even associate Abdul and Mohammad with one another.

**Pictorial Depiction of Hawala**

Most hawala transfers are a legitimate means of transferring money between countries. Many foreign workers send their remittances this way, or a student might choose to conduct a hawala to obtain funding from family in other countries for university fees or books.

However, hawalas are also an easy and “safe” way for terrorists and drug dealers to transfer money. In addition, there are few overhead costs associated with hawala, as hawaladars only need a cell phone and notebook for equipment. Many operate out of store fronts, share space with other businesses (such as a jewelry store), or even work

---

from a café table. This underground network provides protection for terrorists desiring anonymity and no paper trail of transactions.

The legality of hawala is controversial. Interpol points out that, “depending on one's perspective (and possibly jurisdiction), hawaladars are either engaging in foreign exchange speculation or black market currency dealing.”\(^{109}\) This difference is referred to as “white” transfers, where the money is legitimate, and “black” transfers, where the money is typically associated with illegitimate activities like narcotics trafficking and fraud. It is likely that JI has used hawaladars to transfer money between countries.

**Charitable Organizations**

JI has been found to exploit the charitable sector for logistical support, recruitment, and for the acquisition and movement of funds. For example, in August 2006, JI was found to have been receiving funding from the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). The Philippine and Indonesian branches of IIRO were ultimately designated by the United States Treasury Department for facilitating fundraising for al-Qaeda and related groups, including JI. Additionally, Abd Al Hamid Sulaiman Al-Mujil (Al-Mujil), the Executive Director of the IIRO Eastern Province (IIRO-EP) branch office in Saudi Arabia, was designated for providing IIRO “donor funds directly to al-Qaeda and is identified as a major fundraiser for the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).”\(^{110}\)

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The US Department of Treasury holds the authority to domestically designate charities through sanctioning terrorist-related charities and associated officials. As of September 29, 2006, forty-three charities worldwide and twenty-nine associated officials have been designated for their support of terrorist operations. These seventy-two designations constitute fifteen percent of all U.S. designations associated with terrorism.\textsuperscript{111}

The issue of terrorism financing through charities has been extremely controversial, due to the lack of intelligence available to the public regarding the nefarious activities of certain organizations. To the public, the blocking of certain charitable organizations looks as though the U.S. and its Western allies are profiling Muslim organizations. Additionally, charities may be involved in both legitimate charitable activities and illegitimate support of terrorism. It may not be immediately evident to the public that nefarious activity is occurring behind the scenes. Often, the public becomes enraged when a charity is identified as supporting terrorism and is shut down, because some legitimate activities are also halted upon designation.

Appendix 3: Jemaah Islamiyah: An In-Depth Analysis

This section explores the intricate facets and complexities of JI from its roots to its motivations to its make-up among the Southeast Asia region.

**Ideology**

According to Singapore native and terrorism scholar Rohan Gunaratna, Jemaah Islamiyah wants to create an Islamist state within Southeast Asia and follow the belief that radicalized Muslims are not able to live as they should inside the borders of a non-Islamist state. In addition, he states that this group wants no separation of politics and religion and to live by Shar’ia law.\(^{112}\)

The network of Jemaah Islamiyah focuses on Wahhabism, often referred to as Salafism. To understand the group’s ideology, it is imperative to understand this facet of Islam. Named after Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, this movement is primary in Saudi Arabia and Qatar and concentrates on Qur'an and hadith as fundamental texts as well as Wahhab’s book *itab al-Tawhid* ("Book of Monotheism"), and the works of the earlier Islamic scholar Ibn Taymiyya. Wahhabis, unlike the Sunnis, do not follow any specific method but claim to interpret the words of the prophet Muhammad directly. They believe that they must restore Islam away from any innovations, superstitions, and regulations and strive for the religion in its purest form. Wahhabism is known to be very conservative, encompassing all aspects of life. Common activities such as listening to music or praying at tombs (regarded as polytheistic) are seen as contrary to Islam in this sector of the religion.\(^{113}\)

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Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI)

The Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia was Ba’asyir’s political organization. The formation of MMI caused further tensions within the JI network because of the methods Ba’asyir followed which were seen to go against Sungkar’s original teachings. MMI did not want to refrain from Indonesian elections but instead work with Muslim candidates to promote Islamic law. This was seen as taboo by radicals since working within any political system that was non-Islamic is seen to possibly contaminate faithful followers.

Make-up of group:

It is estimated that Jemaah Islamiyah has approximately 1,000 members. The organizational structure of the group is vast and complex; it consists of four major cells known as Mantiqis (see above).114

114 “CRS: Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” Updated Feb. 2007.Pg. 9
**Malaysian branch** — The Malaysian branch is known to have the largest number of members, approximately 200 as of 2003. It is broken up into six sub-divisions known as *wakalah* and operates out of the following areas: Kuala Lumpur, Johor, Kuantan, Perak, Kelantan, and Negri Sembilan.\(^\text{115}\)

**Singapore branch** — The Singapore cell had around 80 members in 2001 and became very active that year in hopes to strategically attack major Western targets within the country. Headed by 51-year-old Ibrahim bin Maidin, an apartment superintendent, this cell had five functions: operations, security, missionary work, fund-raising, and communications.

**Indonesia branch** — This cell is connected to Ba’asyir’s political organization mentioned earlier, MMI. It also was the home to two of JI’s paramilitary groups: the Laskar Mujahidin and the Laskar Jundullah. Because of Indonesia’s lack of a terrorism crack-down, it was no surprise that JI operated much more overtly here than in any other cell. The country was the location of many of the training camps (see recruitment) and became the center of JI operations from 1998 and onwards.\(^\text{116}\)

**Philippine branch** — While the smallest division of the group, the Philippine cell served as the major logistics operator for attaining explosives and weapons. The leader was an Indonesian man named Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, a pupil of Ba’asyir’s al-Mukmin pesentren. After being recruited and made head of the Philippine cell al-Ghozi he attained native fluency of the language. He then began setting up the division through intense recruiting and networking.


Motivation for Bali Attack

JI’s operational commander Hambali called a meeting in 2002 in Southern Thailand to reconfigure the strategy for terror.117 This was after Singapore’s international security department had prevented planned attacks to be perpetrated by JI.118 Angered by this, Hambali decided to go after soft targets in Southeast Asia, mainly unsuspecting Western tourists in regional vacation areas. With little security and easy infiltration capabilities, JI had swiftly planned Bali as their next target.

While JI has been linked to the Bali bombings through financing, operatives, and admission by members of the group, leader Abu Ba’asyir denies the Bali connection. In a 2005 interview he was asked about the bombings in his homeland. The following are his responses in regards to the Bali attacks:

Q. In your personal view, what do you think of bombings in our homeland, namely the Bali, Marriott and Kuningan bombings?

A. I call those who carried out these actions all mujahid. They all had a good intention, that is, Jihad in Allah’s way, the aim of the jihad is to look for blessing from Allah. They are right that America is the proper target because America fights Islam. So in terms of their objectives, they are right, and the target of their attacks was right also. But their calculations are debatable. My view is that we should do bombings in conflict areas not in peaceful areas. We have to target the place of the enemy, not countries where many Muslims live.

Q. What do you mean by “wrong calculation,” that the victims included Muslims?

A. That was one of them. In my calculation, if there are bombings in peaceful areas, this

will cause fitnah [discord] and other parties will be involved. This is my opinion and I could be wrong. Yet I still consider them mujahid. If they made mistakes, they are only human beings who can be wrong. Moreover, their attacks could be considered as self-defense.

Q. Does that mean you think they didn’t attack?

A. No, they didn’t attack because they defended themselves. They shouldn’t be punished.

In Bali where 200 people died, it was America’s bomb. That was a major attack and Amrozi [the Bali plotter who bought the explosives] doesn’t have the capability to do that.119

Ba’asyir went on to say that Amrozi was surprised to see the Bali explosion and that the bomb was a “CIA Jewish bomb.” He claims to believe that Amrozi did not have the capacity to create such a blast. Denial is not new for Ba’asyir as he has said on other occasions that there are no al-Qaeda ties and that Jemaah Islamiyah does not exist.120

Christmas Eve Bombings 2000

(Also see Appendix for full list of attacks attributed to JI)

JI carried out terror operations just two years prior to the 2002 Bali bombings. Its network reach is very organized, as shown by the Christmas Eve bombings of 2000. Bombs were delivered to an extensive group of 38 churches in the following cities: Jakarta, Bekasi, Bandung, Sukabumi, Ciamis, Mojokerto (in Java), Medan, Pematang Siantar, Pekanbaru (in Sumatra), Batam, and Mataram (on the island of Lombok). The


bombings killed 19 people and injured over 120 people.\textsuperscript{121} While the number of casualties and injuries were not as high as in Bali, these bombings required even more coordination and preciseness. The Christmas Eve bombings however, did not go smoothly, and fortunately for the innocent targets, the operation ended with quite a bit of failure. A number of the explosives never went off and some were diffused by the police. Many of the bombs that worked went off at 9 p.m., while the rest went off sporadically in the time span between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. A few even went off prematurely in Bandung and Ciamis, causing the deaths of the perpetrators.

\textit{Manila Bombings-Dec. 31, 2000}

Just days after the Christmas Eve bombings, JI struck again in the Philippine capital, Manila. This time there was a series of five explosions among the city’s public transit systems, killing 22 people and leaving over one hundred injured. Al-Ghozie, the head of JI’s Philippine branch, was the organizer of the attack. He was assisted by Saifullah Yunos, also known as Mukhlis Yunos. Yunos was the leader of the MILF Special Operations Group and since his arrest in 2003 has admitted his role in planning and executing the Manila attacks. The targets were the Light Railway Transit system, the public bus system, the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, the Dusit Hotel, and the Plaza Ferguson (located very close to the U.S. Embassy). This operation proved to be quite successful as four of the bombs exploded right around midnight as planned. The fifth device was found near the Dusit Hotel in Makati City around 2 a.m. in the form of a gift-wrapped package. Security guards went to an empty gas-station to examine it and

contacted police but the package exploded when police tried to diffuse the bomb. One officer died and another was injured.  

Appendix 4: The al-Qaeda Link: Financing and Training

The Connection to Al-Qaeda

Bali Financing

Tracking money transactions among and between terrorist groups is one of the most challenging aspects of intelligence gathering. Focusing specifically on the Bali attack, there were several sources that point to the money coming directly from al-Qaeda to JI. When Hambali was interrogated, he provided a significant amount of information regarding both personnel and financing between the two terrorist groups. Hambali stated that al-Qaeda initially provided $30,000 dollars to fund the Bali attacks, and as a result of the successful attack, provided additional funds totaling over $100,000 dollars for future needs and operations. Hambali also stated that $45,000 of this was sent directly to JI members in Indonesia and $15,000 to the families of the jailed Bali plotters. Hambali speculated that the remaining funds were used to finance the attack in Jakarta that killed twelve people at a Marriot Hotel. Hambali also confessed during his interrogation that JI was almost completely dependent upon al-Qaeda for money, and almost all of JI’s money had been lost from raids and arrests, and even went so far as to say that “JI is essentially destroyed.” Hambali was particularly difficult to track by money because he had human couriers throughout the region to distribute the funds. Some analysts have indicated that Hambali at one time had as much as $500,000 dollars to use for terrorist purposes. This money was supposedly used for the cost of travel and training members

124 Ibid.
of al-Qaeda in camps both in Afghanistan and the Philippines. The money was also used to purchase arms and explosives and help augment the costs of the JI-run madrassas.\textsuperscript{125}

*Time Magazine* reported that al-Qaeda was using charities to fund much of their money to JI. In May 2003, a Saudi-funded charity in Cambodia was closed due to major cash flows that sent alarms throughout the financing network. One of the men arrested in the Cambodian based charity, Abdul Azi, stated that he personally knew Hambali and was in charge of his accounts in Cambodia.\textsuperscript{126}

Dr. Zachary Abuza is considered by many to be an expert on terrorism financing. In 2003 he published a report focusing on the financial networks of al-Qaeda and JI through the National Bureau of Asian Research. The report provides a detailed look at how the organizations were networking their funds to further the cause of global terrorism. Abuza states that before JI was able to gain its own financial strength, Southeast Asia was simply a back office for al-Qaeda. In early 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department compiled a list of over 300 individuals, charities, and corporations in Southeast Asia that were believed to be al-Qaeda and JI funders.\textsuperscript{127} The report also claims that Hambali had approximately $500,000 dollars at his disposal for terrorist purposes. Abuza details how the Cambodian charity, the Om Al Qura Foundation became a money transfer point between the two organizations. Om Al Qura was initially

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
set up to school teenage children and was believed to have transferred several million dollars for al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{128}

The financial links between al-Qaeda and JI are extensive. The interrogation and capture of many of the key terrorists from both organizations have established that al-Qaeda was responsible for funding the Bali attack. Both Hambali and Faruq confessed to al-Qaeda’s connection and provided similar figures and facts to prove that they were involved with the Bali attack. While JI funded the majority of the attack, al-Qaeda still contributed $30,000. It is unclear whether or not JI really needed this additional funding or if this was a means for al-Qaeda to be involved in the operation.

\textit{Joint Training}

Much has surfaced in recent years regarding the joint training between the Southeast Asian terrorists of JI and those in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Maria Ressa of CNN states that Southeast Asia is a perfect target for al-Qaeda to establish training camps because of its fledgling democracies, fragile economies, and most importantly, the world’s largest Muslim population.\textsuperscript{129} Indonesia was viewed as such a vital location for al-Qaeda to expand their training network; several top leadership figures from al-Qaeda visited Indonesia for further planning. Several video tapes found in Afghanistan show al-Qaeda training taking place at a camp in Indonesia. Al-Qaeda expert, Rohan Gunaratna claims it was a tape of a camp in Poso, Sulawesi, which was run by al-Qaeda. Gunaratna claims that hundreds of European al-Qaeda operatives were sent to Indonesia for


training. Intelligence documents obtained by CNN claim that Omar al-Faruq was responsible for establishing this camp. Two more camps would follow, one specifically requested by Osama bin Laden himself.

Both MILF and Abu Sayyaf also received training support from al-Qaeda. As early as 1988, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin Laden’s brother-in-law, had set up several businesses to support these Indonesian terrorist groups. ET, Dizon Travel, as well as Dizon Realty and several other nongovernmental organizations and charities were established. These business enterprises were used to fund training camps like Camp Abubakar in Mindanao. Camp Abubakar was overrun by the Philippine army in 2001. Before the camp was destroyed it provided instruction in munitions handling and assassination skills, and brought in mujahideen expertise from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Algeria. Documents obtained by the Philippine police show that Osama bin Laden sent Sudanese colonel Ahmad al-Gamen to Mindanao to train MILF members in explosives and commando techniques. The police file stated: “The MILF is known to be maintaining Camps Hodeibia and Palestine inside the Camp Abubakar complex for the training of mujahideen volunteers from other countries handled by Afghan veterans believed to be supported by bin Laden.”

Rodolfo Mendoza, former counterterrorism task force head of the Philippine National Police corroborated this information during a CNN interview stating: “There were foreign nationals like French Algerians, Egyptians, and Pakistanis

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131 Ibid.
who were trained by Filipinos inside Camp Abubakar.¹³⁴ Mantiqi III (M3) was one of the four regional JI organizations that served as a major logistics node. One of M3’s primary tasks was to coordinate with MILF training bases in the southern Philippines. As previously mentioned, Camp Abubakar was a hub for al-Qaeda-related training. Camp Abubakar contained three sub-camps for international terrorists.¹³⁵ Camp Hudaybiyya and Vietnam were used for mainly local JI Malaysians and Indonesians. Camp Palestine was reserved for Arabs. After Camp Abubakar was destroyed, M3 shifted their training operations to the Faruq established camp in Poso, Sulwasi. Indonesian JI member Parlindungan Siregar and Imad al-Din barakat Karkas, a Spanish al-Qaeda leader, were also credited with establishing the camp.¹³⁶ Omar Bandon, who was a veteran of Afghanistan, ran the camp which consisted of eight to ten small villages with small arms and combat maneuver training areas. Up until the arrest of al-Qaeda member Luis Jose Galan Gonzales in Spain, authorities were not aware of the camp in Poso. Gonzales admitted to having been trained at this camp from JI members. It is estimated that at least 200 Arabs trained at the facility.

Appendix 5: Abu Sayyaf

Abu Sayyaf: Bearer of the Sword

Indonesia is not the only country in Southeast Asia to battle host Islamist militancy. Rather, much of that area is considered a nexus for Islamist extremism. For example, the Philippines confronts a number of insurgent groups with a variety of aims. Like the radical groups that exist within Indonesia, there are these organizations within the Philippines that want to establish an Islamic theocratic state. These include the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Their terrorist activities have ranged from kidnappings to bombings, but ultimately their presence contributes to overall instability in the region. Abu Sayyaf, while smaller in number than other terrorist groups, continues to participate in terrorism and thus represents a significant problem for the government of the Philippines. Examining this group, in comparison to JI allows for a more thorough understanding of terrorism and overlapping security concerns in Southeast Asia.

ASG is part of a larger Islamic separatist movement in the Southern Pacific realm, with rivals and partners in countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, and particularly Indonesia. There are some conflicting reports about the exact time of their founding, but most suggest that they emerged in the early 1990s as an offshoot of the Moro National Liberation Front, one of the earlier Muslim extremist groups. ASG was looking to create an independent country made up of certain regions in the Philippines, and chose to apply pressure on the Philippine government through terrorist actions. Their goals include, “the creation of an independent Islamic state encompassing parts of Southern Thailand, the island of Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, and Mindanao, areas
where Moro Muslims, a minority ethnic group make up majority of the local population.\textsuperscript{137} Like that of JI in Indonesia, ASG is attempting to create an independent Islamic country, apart from the existing government in Manila. What makes this case distinct is that the Moro Muslims do not make up an ethnic majority in the Philippines. Rather, ASG concentrates its efforts not on gaining control of the entire country but instead focusing on specific ethnic majority locations.

The ideological premise behind ASG’s existence has continued to change since the group’s inception. According to several sources, many of the key members in ASG, including its former leader Abdurajak Janjalani, were veterans of the mujahideen campaign against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{138} & \textsuperscript{139} The important contacts made during this time, which included meetings with bin Laden and his associates, influenced ASG’s structure and operations. Moreover, the jihad in Afghanistan gave birth to an entirely new generation of terrorists. These disaffected individuals were enthralled with the idea of a “holy war” and many acquired the appropriate military training during the Afghan war in the 1980s. Support, including significant financial assistance, was given from these top terrorist leaders in Afghanistan to the future members of ASG. “No less a figure that Osama bin Laden’s own brother-in-law, Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, personally arranged initial funding for the group through one of the Islamic charities he operated in the Philippines at the time.”\textsuperscript{140} The group benefited from these well-placed individuals and as a result, ASG flourished. While the group profited from its connection with Islamist extremists in Afghanistan, there are sharp distinctions, especially with respect to

\textsuperscript{137} Abu Sayyaf Group, http://www.tkb.org (Terror Knowledge Base), 1.
\textsuperscript{138} Abu Sayyaf Group, (Philippines, Islamist separatists) http://www.cfr.org, 23 Jan. 2007, p.2
the practice and understanding of Islam. According to journalist and author Mark Bowden, in his recent piece for the Atlantic Monthly entitled “Jihadists in Paradise,” the practice of Islam within ASG is corrupt and its members suffer from a severe lack of religious understanding. One hostage of the group described such gross misinterpretations: “Unfamiliar with the Koran, the outlaws had only a sketchy notion of Islam, which they saw as a set of behavioral rules, to be violated when it suited them. Kidnapping, murder, and theft were justified by their special status as ‘holy warriors.’”

ASG apparently lacked the religious convictions of other extremist groups, and rather were Muslim jihadists in name only. Some might argue that this made the group more vulnerable to manipulation and ultimately defeat.

Initially, Abu Sayyaf’s intentions were grandiose in design and scope. There were terrorist plots aimed at assassinating Pope John Paul II and plans to detonate bombs on a dozen airliners over the Pacific. Neither of these ideas came to fruition, however, and ASG’s motivations appeared to change. Kidnappings for ransom were an easy way for this terrorist organization to gain international recognition and money, and a string of them ensued in the nineties and the early part of this decade. Their victims have ranged from American and European tourists to Christian missionary workers. In addition they have also demanded prisoner exchanges for some very high profile terrorists. “In 2000, Abu Sayyaf captured an American Muslim visiting Jolo Island and demanded that the United States release Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and Ramzi Yousef,

143 Ibid.
who were jailed for their involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.” This garnered the U.S.’s attention, and ASG has since been placed on the list of foreign terrorist groups. The group’s kidnapping schemes continued but given the terrorist atmosphere following the September 11th attacks, the group evolved. ASG shifted its modus operandi away from kidnappings and instead planned and executed a number of high profile bombings. “In February of 2004, the group planted a bomb in a passenger ferry docked off the coast of Manila killing more than 100 people.” The government of the Philippines condemned ASG for its actions and it appears that they have taken a proactive approach in confronting this terrorist group. There does not seem to be the same level of hesitation from the government of the Philippines as there is in Indonesia. This might be in large part the result of Indonesia’s overwhelming Muslim majority, whereas in the Philippines Muslims make up only a fraction of the population. Abu Sayyaf’s plans for the future are uncertain, but it clear that the group has increased the ferocity of its attacks.

Why is ASG a concern for international security? There are a number of answers. First, while this terrorist group primarily operates in the Philippines, its ties with other Islamic extremists are worrisome. It is clear that al-Qaeda has supported Abu Sayyaf in the past, offering them millions of dollars in financial assistance, as well as training its members in camps inside Afghanistan. Also, ASG is known to cooperate with JI in Indonesia, who are known to have trained on the island of Mindanao. Abu Sayyaf has

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145 Ibid., p.1
not proved invulnerable and has suffered a number of setbacks recently. One of the most significant developments occurred only a few months ago when the group’s leader, Khadaffy Janjalani, was killed by the government’s military forces. Khadaffy was the younger brother of the group’s founder, Abdurajik Janjalani, and his death was confirmed by Manila in January. It is important to note that the Philippines’ effort to disprove and destroy ASG has been more aggressive than Indonesia’s efforts against JI. Mark Bowden chronicled one such exploit for his recent article in the Atlantic Monthly. The government of the Philippines, with the specific help of its marine intelligence units and the CIA, were able to target and kill Abu Sabaya one of the key leaders and spokesman for the organization.\footnote{Mark Bowden, “Jihadists in Paradise,” The Atlantic Monthly, March 2007} It is Bowden’s contention that since this attack, ASG has been unable to recover its stature of the pre-September 11th era. Perhaps this indicates that government cooperation against terrorists is essential for success, and complacency with their presence only encourages more violence. It remains unclear how aggressive the Indonesian government has been with regards to eliminating JI. Judging by the research and current available information, the efforts are mixed. The Philippines example with respect to ASG should serve as a beacon of light for the Indonesian government that terrorism cannot be tolerated and furthermore can be confronted in an aggressive manner.
Appendix 6: Timeline of Events

The Night of the Attack

22:10 Ali Imron prepares to make a delivery from a safe house far away from the Bali hot spots. He collects the first of three bombs and heads towards the American consulate.

22:16 Ali Imron arrives outside the American consulate and drops off the 500g bomb that will be triggered by a mobile phone, the first in a sequence of deadly explosions.

22:24 In the safehouse, Jimi and Iqbal are going through the mental preparation to end their lives as martyrs.


22:30 The bombers leave the safe house and make their way to their targets.

22:58 Ali Imron stops the van 100 meters away from the Sari Club. After giving final instructions, he quickly leaves with Idris on the motorcycle.

23:02 The two suicide bombers, Jimi and Iqbal are now alone. Jimi maneuvers the van to within 30 meters of the Sari Club. Iqbal puts on the smaller bomb and begins to walk towards Paddy’s Irish Bar. There is no going back.

23:10 Iqbal’s attractor bomb goes off, and people come out into the street in confusion. Seconds later, Jimi sets off the car bomb in the world’s worst terrorist attack since September 11th.

JI Timeline

- **August 1, 2000:** Jemaah Islamiyah attempts to assassinate the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, Leonides Caday. The bomb detonates as his car entered his official residence in central Jakarta killing two people and injuring 21, including the ambassador.

- **September 13, 2000:** A car bomb explosion tears through a packed parking deck

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beneath the Jakarta Stock Exchange building killing 15 people and injuring 20.

- **December 24, 2000:** JI takes part in a major coordinated terror strike, the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings.

- **March 12, 2002:** Three JI members are arrested in Manila carrying plastic explosives in their luggage. One of them is later jailed for 17 years.

- **June 5, 2002:** Indonesian authorities arrest Kuwaiti Omar al-Faruq. Handed over to the U.S. authorities, he subsequently confesses that he is a senior al-Qaeda operative sent to Southeast Asia to orchestrate attacks against U.S. interests. He reveals to investigators detailed plans of a new terror spree in Southeast Asia.

- **September 23, 2002:** After many warnings by U.S. authorities of a credible terrorist threat in Jakarta, a grenade explodes in a car near the residence of a U.S. embassy official in Jakarta, killing one of the attackers.

- **September 26, 2002:** The U.S. State Department issues a travel warning urging Americans and other Westerners in Indonesia to avoid locations such as bars, restaurants and tourist areas.

- **October 2, 2002:** A U.S. Marine and two Filipinos are killed in a JI nail-bomb attack outside a bar in the southern Philippine city of Zamboanga.

- **October 10, 2002:** A bomb rips through a bus terminal in the southern Philippine city of Kidapawan, killing six people and injuring 24. On the same day, the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta, Ralph Boyce, personally delivers to the Indonesian President a message of growing concern that Americans could become targets of terrorist actions in her country.

- **October 12, 2002:** A car bomb and two smaller bombs kill more than 202 and
injure 300 people on the Indonesian resort island of Bali. Most casualties are foreigners, particularly Australian tourists. The attack known as the “2002 Bali Bombing” is the most deadly attack executed by JI to date. It is also the second anniversary of the USS Cole bombing in Yemen.

- **October 19, 2002:** Bashir is arrested by the Indonesian police and is given a light sentence for treason.

- **August 11, 2003:** Hambali is arrested in Thailand and according to Haaretz, is in prison in Jordan as of this writing.

- It is determined that a bomb manual published by Jemaah Islamiyah was used in the 2002 Bali terrorist bombing and the 2003 JW Marriot Hotel bombing.

- **May 28, 2004:** A British-born Australian named Jack Roche confesses to being part of a JI plot to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, Australia. He is sentenced to 9 years in prison on May 31, 2004. Roche admits to meeting figures like Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.

- **September 9, 2004:** JI is widely suspected of being responsible for the bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta, which killed 11 Indonesians and wounded over 160 more.

- **October 1st, 2005:** JI is suspected of committing the 2005 Bali bombings.

- **August 5, 2006:** Al-Qaeda's Al Zawahiri appear on a recorded video announcing that JI and al-Qaeda had joined forces and that the two groups will form "one line, facing its enemies." \(^{150}\)

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Abu Sayyaf Timeline

- **April 4, 1991:** Grenade attack in Zamboanga City kills two American evangelists
- **August 1991:** Bombing of Christian missionary ship *M/V Doulos*
- **May 20, 1992:** Killing of Italian priest Fr. Salvatorre Carzedda in Zamboanga
- **August 10, 1992:** Bombing of building in Zamboanga resulting in 2 deaths and 40 other casualties (from Christian missionary ship)
- **January 17, 1993:** Kidnapping of two Spanish nuns in Sulu
- **March 18, 1993:** Kidnapping of a Spanish priest
- **November 14, 1993:** Kidnapping of an American missionary
- **December 26, 1993:** Bombing of a cathedral in Davao
- **June 10, 1994:** Bombings in Zamboanga kill 71 people
- **April 4, 1995:** Attack on Ipil resulting in 53 deaths, 48 wounded, and the destruction of 17 commercial buildings.
- **March 2000:** The ASG kidnaps 55 people, mainly school children, teachers, and a priest in Basilan.
- **April 2000:** The ASG kidnaps 20 foreigners and a Filipino from a dive resort on the Malaysian island of Sipidan.
- **May 2001:** The ASG kidnaps 30 tourists, including two Americans, from the Dos Palmas resort on Palawan.
- **November 12, 2004:** In Jolo, Sulu, the kidnapping and execution of Gene Boyd Lumawag of MindaNews.
- **November 13, 2004:** In Aklan, the kidnapping and execution of Philippine
journalist Herson Hinolan, manager and commentator of Bombo Radiyo radio station.

- **November 19, 2004:** In Parang, Sulu, the abduction of Dr. Alberio Canda from the municipal health office, reportedly used to treat wounded ASG members.

- **December 11, 2004:** In Zamboanga, the execution of provincial director of Philippine Coconut Authority is shot in the head on the way to the market. Authorities believe he was mistaken for an intelligence agent.

- **January 8, 2005:** On Siasi, Sulu, the ASG abduct, try, and execute 3 salesmen. Authorities believe they were mistaken for military intelligence agents. 151

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Figure 1: Jemaah Islamiyah Organizational Link Chart
Figure 2: Diagram of a Similar Ammonium Nitrate Bomb

1. Electric Blasting Cap
2. Dynamite
3. Dynamite
4. ANFO

Two-step explosive train

Three-step explosive train

Four-step explosive train

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Figure 3: Financial Transactions Associated with Bali Bombing

Wan Min Wan Mat

JI Member

JI

Approximately $35,000

JI Member

JI Member

JI Member

JI Member

JI Member

Mukhlas

Up to $35,000

Idris

Silvester Tendean

Owner of Chemical Shop

Tidar Kimia Chemical Shop

Credit Card Scam

Unknown amount of funds

Samudra

Purchase of two L300 mini vans

2.5 kg of gold and $550 received from Jewelry store robbery

2.5 kg of gold

Mini Van

Explosives

An unknown amount of the $35,000

Amrozi

Purchase of one ton of explosives

Purchase of explosives

Sale of one ton of explosives

Maps

The Island of Bali and the City of Kuta

Map of the Site of the 2002 Bali Bombing

Map of the Site of the 2002 Bali Bombing

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Maps (Continued)

Indonesia

Site of the Poso Training Camp


157 GoogleMaps. <www.googlemaps.com>
Charts

Number of Casualties in the Bali Bombing\textsuperscript{158}

![Pie Chart showing the number of casualties in the Bali Bombing](chart.png)

- Australian: 88
- Indonesian: 39
- British: 24
- American: 38
- German: 6
- Other: 7

Training Camps Associated with JI

![Diagram showing training camps](diagram.png)

- Camp Abubakar
- Camp Hudaybiyya (JI & Indonesians)
- Camp Vietnam (JI & Indonesians)
- Camp Palestine (Arabs)
- Poso Camp

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