

Neither 'joint' nor 'integrated'

The Joint Integrated Units and the future of the CPA

The formation and functioning of Sudan's Joint Integrated Units (JIUs), mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005, has proved a major sticking-point in the implementation of the peace agreement. The JIUs are military units composed of members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and are designed to serve both functional and symbolic purposes. Functionally, the JIUs are intended to fill security vacuums and to provide a unified military capability to meet internal security needs during the six-year interim period prior to the southern referendum on secession in 2011. Symbolically, the JIUs are supposed to demonstrate national unity during the interim period and to serve both as a key confidence-builder between the parties and as a foundation for a future national army, should the referendum result in a vote for unity.

Despite the importance placed on the JIUs in the CPA, and the fact that they provide a gauge of the parties' commitment to the agreement, their purpose and status are not well understood by the international community. This *Issue Brief* reviews the JIUs' current status, discusses challenges to their deployment and functionality, and explores the consequences of these challenges for the overall implementation of the CPA.

The *Brief* finds that:

- The creation of the JIUs has yielded a number of modest successes including the development of standard

operating procedures, limited joint patrols and training, and attempts to create a 'weapon-free zone' in Wau.

- The units continue to suffer from a range of problems, however, including serious delays in deployment,

ambiguities associated with the integration of Other Armed Groups (OAGs), poor command and control, and a desperate shortage of comprehensive, joint, integrated training.

Box 1 The JIU mandate, composition, and funding

The CPA required that the JIUs be fully deployed and functional during the interim period, and specified objectives, functions, command and control, and other operational details.¹ The JIU mandate is found in the Joint Integrated Units Bill of 2005,² which identifies the following objectives for the units:

- To be a symbol of national unity during the interim period.
- To preserve the constitutional and democratic system and to respect the supremacy of rule of law, civil rule, human rights, and the will of the people.
- To undertake the responsibility of the defence of Sudan and its sovereignty against internal and external threats, alongside the SAF and the SPLA.
- To assist in the development of their area of deployment with a view to achieving social cohesion and peace.

The functions of the JIUs are as follows:

- To secure the safety of the territories and boundaries of Sudan in areas where the units are deployed, and to participate in the development of these areas alongside the SAF and the SPLA.
- To enforce a state of emergency where necessary and as provided for by the Constitution.
- To assist civil authorities in non-military functions.
- To assist civil authorities in dealing with catastrophic events and emergencies.
- Any other functions as stipulated by the Joint Defence Council.³

The total target size of the JIUs is 39,600 troops (divided equally between SPLA and SAF):⁴ 24,000 based in South Sudan, 600 in Abyei, 6,000 in the Nuba Mountains, 6,000 in Blue Nile, and 3,000 in Khartoum.⁵ There are five divisions—in Juba, Wau, Malakal, Kadugli, and Damazin—as well as a unit headquarters in Juba, an 'Independent Brigade' in Khartoum, and an 'Abyei Area Independent Battalion'.⁶ UNMIS monitors deployment from each of its six sectors (see Map and Figure 2).

The units come under the direct command and control of the Joint Defence Board (JDB),⁷ a CPA-mandated body comprised of the respective Chiefs of Staff of the SPLA and the SAF, their deputies, and senior officers from both armies.⁸ The chairmanship of the JDB rotates between the SAF and SPLA. The leader and deputy leader of the JIUs are directly appointed by the Chiefs of Staff through consensus and also alternate between SPLA and SAF officers.

Funding is provided directly by the Ministry of the Presidency of the Republic and bypasses both the SPLA and SAF in order to avoid the pay irregularities that continue to plague those services and to avoid potential charges of favouritism. The rate of pay for JIU officers and soldiers is mandated to be equal in terms of welfare, salaries, pension rights, supplies, armaments, and equipment.⁹ The specific staffing of the JIUs is left to the discretion of each party to the CPA; the stipulations for staffing dictate only that JIU personnel be 'employed by the Armed Forces or the People's Army', as well as other routine requirements such as meeting age thresholds, having no criminal record, and being physically fit.¹⁰

More significantly, the failure to deploy functioning units is delaying implementation of other key provisions of the CPA, notably the redeployment of SPLA forces from disputed border areas and of SAF troops from oil-producing areas in South Sudan.


If the obstacles facing full deployment and functioning of the JIUs are not unblocked, they could threaten the entire CPA. Failed JIU deployment is already serving as a pretext for parties to roll back and violate key CPA provisions. The active and immediate assistance of the international community—through the JIU Support Group or otherwise—is required to resolve these issues.

The significance of the JIUs

The JIUs are designed to meet a number of purposes. Functionally, they are to provide an interim unified military capability for the defence of both the state's sovereignty from external threats and its internal needs for security provision. As the CPA stipulated the withdrawal of the SAF from the South and the SPLA from the North, the JIUs provide a de facto national army for both regions during the interim period. More specifically, the JIUs are expected to replace the so-called 'oil police'¹¹ in Unity and Upper Nile States. These troops have been contentious because of the strategic value of the oil fields and the efforts of both sides to control them. During the war, Khartoum con-

trolled and defended the oil areas through proxy forces, police, and SAF troops. The SPLA is naturally eager to see its own presence in these areas strengthened, and the JIUs provide a mechanism for doing so. At the same time, the JIUs are also supposed to fill the security vacuum left by the withdrawal of SPLA troops from Blue Nile and South Kordofan States, and to supply security in major southern Sudanese towns following the SPLA's withdrawal from major urban centres, as stipulated by the CPA.

Symbolically, the purpose of the JIUs is to provide a 'symbol of national unity during the interim period'.¹² The burden placed on the Government of National Unity (GNU), specifically the



National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), is to 'make unity attractive' to the people of South Sudan prior to the referendum on independence. After the long and bloody civil war (1983–2005), it was believed that a unified army would demonstrate the potential for renewed amity and cooperation. A prominent and effective national force was also seen as a prerequisite for security and a desired 'peace dividend'.

The strategic significance of the JIUs for the NCP is that they also allow it to maintain a SAF presence in the South for the duration of the interim period. For the SPLA, the JIUs provide an opportunity to keep forces in the disputed areas of South Kordofan (including the region of Abyei¹³) and Blue Nile States. For the international community, the units provide a means for encouraging tangible cooperation between the parties.

Present status of the JIUs: some notable successes

The JIUs have had a number of successes, although they remain modest. First, a Joint Doctrine has been agreed outlining modalities for routine operations, including standard operating procedures and codes of conduct.¹⁴ Although it is rudimentary and builds off both SAF and SPLA doctrines, it provides a starting point for defining the specific protocols for JIU operations. Second, in contrast to the SPLA, JIU members are routinely paid their salaries. They have also enjoyed better provisioning than the SPLA, although overall they, too, remain woefully under-supplied. Third, the early and complete segregation of the JIU troops from the SAF and SPLA appears to be slowly changing, with co-location of their contingents becoming more common.


The first co-location of troops occurred in Wau and Juba in 2006 and then in Malakal, a highly contentious location, where the SAF had long delayed relinquishing its base to joint control. Operationally, mixed JIUs

have begun conducting joint patrols in their areas of responsibility. While this has not yet been extensive, and has consisted mainly of JIU patrols on Land Cruisers around Malakal, it has ensured at least some public exposure. In Wau, the local JIU has reportedly assisted the governor's office in developing the city as a 'weapon-free zone'.¹⁵ In the same region, 140 mixed JIU troops have been trained in demining and subsequently participated in the demining of the Babanusa–Wau railway line.¹⁶ In addition, a UK company

has provided English-language training, and over the past year the British government has trained 30 JIU officers, including by providing instruction on peace support operations and defence management. It expects to continue the training, and to provide an expanded programme of in-country training.


These are significant successes given the immensity of the task of creating joint integrated units between bitter enemies and the scale of doing so in a country as large and as underdeveloped as Sudan.

Figure 1 Total JIU Deployment Progress, January 2006–March 2008



Source: UNMIS

Figure 2 JIU Deployment by UNMIS Sector, 11 March 2008



Source: UNMIS

Roadblocks to full implementation

Despite these important developments, a number of significant challenges have prevented the JIUs from reaching their full potential. Aside from the obvious bureaucratic and logistical obstacles, there are five specific areas where deep and thorny problems present major roadblocks to JIU formation and functionality.

Deployment delays. The JIUs are still not fully deployed, despite the original CPA deployment deadline of 9 October 2006 (see Figures 1 and 2).¹⁷ To address this, and in response to the SPLM's temporary withdrawal from the GNU in October 2007 in protest at the lack of CPA implementation, the Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) (the highest Sudanese political body governing the CPA's implementation) met in early November 2007 and fixed a new deployment date of 9 January 2008.¹⁸ But by 11 March 2008, the JIUs had only achieved 86.0 per cent deployment (see Map).¹⁹ The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has now verified 33,698 JIU members,²⁰ which means that 5,902 JIU troops remain undeployed. The JIU Independent Brigade in Khartoum is the only unit that is currently operating at full strength.

OAG alignment and JIU membership. The second significant challenge has been the selection and screening of JIU troops, as many of them are former members of Other Armed Groups (OAGs). The CPA clearly states that the staffing of JIU personnel must consist of individuals directly 'employed' by either the SAF or SPLA prior to their inclusion in a JIU. In subsequent discussions, this has come to mean that they have to have been 'incorporated' into either force first, and that they

must be 'considered a member/component of that force and assume all of the benefits, rights, and responsibilities associated'.²¹ This has caused problems given that OAGs in South Sudan have often been informally 'aligned' rather than fully 'incorporated' into one or other army.²² The ambiguity of this requirement has caused major tensions on the ground as each side accuses the other of using the JIUs as dumping grounds for their aligned OAGs without fully integrating them first.²³

The most prominent case is that of the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), an umbrella group that was a significant ally of the SAF against the SPLA during the civil war.²⁴ The SPLA has frequently complained through UNMIS that SSDF militias, notably those based in Malakal under the command of Major General Gabriel Tang-Ginya, have become JIU members without any significant integration into the SAF proper. The issue assumed national and international prominence during a November 2006 incident when fighting erupted in Malakal and JIU members from both forces turned on each another.²⁵ The UN Secretary-General's envoy at the time, Jan Pronk, commented that the 'JIUs, instead of functioning as a binding element . . . tend to become a splitting force'.²⁶ The incident served to confirm the ambiguities surrounding distinctions between SAF, SSDF, and JIU membership as individuals claimed to be participants in all three.

Following the fighting, the defence minister, General Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, publicly demanded that all southern OAGs join either the SPLA or the SAF.²⁷ For his part, Tang-Ginya explained that his soldiers feared they would be moved to northern Sudan as part of the SAF, and so he included them in the Malakal JIU to allow them to

remain in the South. Many of his officers were subsequently sent to the North with the SAF while the remainder of his forces was subsequently demobilized.²⁸

The practice of allowing OAG members to enter directly into JIUs negates the units' ability to function cohesively and undermines their selling power as a symbol for national unity. Integration between the SAF and SPLA is in itself an extremely challenging task; adding armed elements that fall outside the control of these forces' command mechanisms adds almost insurmountable problems.²⁹ Khartoum now insists that all its previously aligned OAGs have been incorporated into SAF structures or have been demobilized. Officially, it stopped acknowledging claims of alignment in mid-2006. Yet serious doubts persist as to the degree of incorporation of these armed groups and the nature of their demobilization.³⁰

Ethnic tensions. The SPLA continues to select JIU members from areas where ethnic tensions are acute. This stems partly from a broader SPLA effort to loosen local and ethnic lines of loyalty and build a unified army with strong command and control. But the process has created its own challenges. In some cases, SPLA JIU components composed of different ethnic groups to those in their deployment areas have provoked significant local strife.

Tensions in Malakal are a clear example of this. The local JIU contingent is primarily Dinka, while the town itself is Nuer—as is the bulk of the SSDF and of Upper Nile State more broadly.³¹ Animosity between Nuer and Dinka has long simmered in South Sudan, and the JIUs have also proven susceptible to them, as seen in Malakal. Another example is in Yambio, Western Equatoria, where Dinka JIU contingents detained local police who were Azande, later killing two of them.³² In Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria, where the local population is predominantly Toposa, the SAF's JIU contingent is also Toposa. This provoked a reorganization of the local Didinga militias to counter what they perceived as a heavy presence of Toposa, now 'privileged'

Each side accuses the other of using the JIUs as dumping grounds for their aligned OAGs

with JIU membership.³³ These tensions have sparked occasional violent clashes between Toposa JIU troops and local Didinga armed groups.³⁴

Command and control issues. The fourth major challenge has been to create a unified chain of command for the JIUs. Despite the CPA stipulation of a dedicated chain of command emanating from a JIU Commander supported by a Deputy Commander appointed by the JDB, to date there remain two parallel chains of command—that of the JIUs on the one hand, and of the SAF or SPLA on the other. In October 2007, the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), a body of international and Sudanese officials mandated by the CPA to produce status reports on the agreement's implementation, noted that the two commands 'have generally remained separate, with separate administrations, and to date, limited professional interaction'.³⁵

As already noted, there were persistent tensions in Malakal over the delay by the SAF in vacating its headquarters there. As a result, the Malakal JIU forces were barracked on either side of the city and only top officers occasionally interacted. Lack of effective command and control has also had negative effects on local security. Despite the creation of a Joint Doctrine and a Code of Conduct, documentation exists of JIU members engaging in extortion, sexual harassment, and stealing from local communities. Deadly violence is not uncommon: the Yambio incident in which the SPLA JIU contingent shot members of the local police force provides the highest-profile example.

Lack of training. The CPA called for consolidated training of JIUs by 9 October 2006, but this has still not taken place. Until comprehensive bottom-up training to encourage discipline and professionalism is provided, the JIUs cannot be fully functional. Training is a prerequisite for acting as joint integrated units as well as for being operationally competent to perform the specific tasks assigned to them, which include activities not routinely

The politics of redeployment are the most contentious of all post-CPA issues

undertaken by either the SAF or SPLA—such as demining.

Underfunding is one reason for the absence of a joint training programme. As the AEC has noted: 'the flow of operating funds has all but stopped and no significant funding has yet been made available by the Government of National Unity's Ministry of Finance from the Presidency agreed budget for JIU training.'³⁶ At the same time, both the SAF and the SPLA insist on undertaking their own unilateral programmes.³⁷ In light of this, it is hard to see how the units can be transformed into a skilled, disciplined, and unified force.

Broader ramifications for CPA implementation

The fact that the JIUs are not yet fully deployed, face ambiguities over their force composition, suffer from command and control issues, and have yet to undergo systematic and coordinated training means that they remain little more than co-located units of SAF and SPLA troops. Furthermore, the time frames for JIU deployment have been renegotiated repeatedly and subsequently ignored. The implications for the CPA are enormous.

The peace agreement does not allow for any qualifications on the withdrawal of SAF forces from South Sudan. They were required to fully redeploy by 9 July 2007, aside from the SAF components of the JIUs.³⁸ Conversely, the withdrawal of SPLA forces from the North is to be completed only after the JIUs are 'formed and deployed under international monitoring and assistance'.³⁹ Thus, SPLA forces have a justification for remaining in Blue Nile and South Kordofan States.⁴⁰

The politics of redeployment are the most contentious of all the post-

CPA issues. By late August 2007, the SAF had claimed to have withdrawn 87 per cent of its forces from the South, which was verified by UNMIS. By contrast, the SPLA claimed to have withdrawn only 32 per cent of its forces from the North, of which UNMIS was only able to verify that 7 per cent had actually been redeployed.⁴¹ The bulk of the remaining SAF troops in the South are located around the oil fields in Unity and Upper Nile States, while the bulk of the SPLA remaining in the North are located in Blue Nile and South Kordofan (including Abyei). The continued presence of the SAF and SPLA on each other's territory, especially in the contested areas of Abyei and Blue Nile, significantly increased GoS–GoSS tensions in the latter half of 2007. The SPLM justified its withdrawal from the GNU by citing the failure of the SAF to meet its July 2007 redeployment deadline, along with the NCP's dismissal of the Abyei Boundary Commission's report.⁴²

Following the withdrawal, the CPC decreed on 1 November 2007 that all JIUs be fully deployed by 9 January 2008, and that all additional SPLA and SAF forces be withdrawn by the same date.⁴³ But the SAF and SPLA could not agree on the question of concurrent redeployment, and the decision was not implemented.⁴⁴ At a subsequent CPC meeting on 29 November, the SPLA argued that it would not withdraw forces until two conditions were met: the full formation of the JIUs and the final determination by the Presidency of the numbers of SAF in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States.⁴⁵ Both the GoS and UNMIS found the setting of preconditions to be in violation of the spirit of the CPA and the CPC called, once again, for a withdrawal and full JIU deployment by 9 January 2008.

On that date, UNMIS verified that 92 per cent of SAF troops had redeployed from the South, and only 12 per cent of SPLA forces from the North.⁴⁶ The slow withdrawal of SPLA forces is especially problematic in the Abyei region where major clashes have taken place between SPLA forces, SAF forces and SAF-aligned Misseriya since December 2007. A JDB meeting on 5 January 2008 affirmed the need for the SPLA and its local militia allies to withdraw from Abyei in order to reduce tensions in the region, yet this has not been achieved. The JDB also emphasized the need to agree on an expedited JIU deployment to the oil-producing areas given the withdrawal of SAF troops there.⁴⁷

The deployment and functionality of the JIUs are central to furthering the CPA's implementation because they respond to one of the major challenges of achieving peace in Sudan. The status of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, as well as the oil-producing areas of Unity and Upper Nile, were central sticking points in the CPA negotiations. The JIUs provided the means to compromise, by allowing both the SPLA and SAF to maintain some forces on either side of the North–South border while at the same time withdrawing the bulk of their troops. Maintaining a presence on each side was crucial for both parties: the NCP needed to signal the continued unity of Sudan as well as proximity to the oil fields, while the SPLM needed a continued presence in Abyei, Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains, from where many 'northerners' fought against the SAF during the war and have since felt abandoned by the SPLM/A.

Under these circumstances, the full deployment and operational functioning of the JIUs is essential to the future of the CPA. Recognizing this, the UN Security Council issued a resolution on 31 October 2007 stating that UNMIS would assume a much greater role in funding and training the units to ensure their rapid deployment and full functionality. UNSC Resolution 1784 called explicitly for UNMIS 'to enable

the full establishment of JIUs as soon as possible'.⁴⁸

In response to the new resolution, a JIU Support Group was established in November 2007 to act as a vehicle to coordinate international support. The group is a committee chaired by the UNMIS Force Commander and comprised of the JIU Commander and representatives from UNMIS and from donor countries including the UK, USA, Egypt, Norway, and the Netherlands. The SPLM and the NCP are not included as committee members in order to prevent the politicization of international support for the JIUs. Various issues, notably resourcing and training needs, are discussed at the committee meetings and the JIU Commander subsequently makes specific requests to donor countries and to UNMIS for assistance. Donor countries have also used the JIU Support Group as a forum to encourage the GoS to improve its accounting practices in order to allow for more direct support to the units. This stems from donor concerns that relatively little of the 2007 budget for the units was actually spent.

Due to its recent formation, the JIU Support Group is still at a preliminary stage in terms of defining JIU needs. To this end, the UK government has launched a programme to assess and make recommendations concerning senior management and training needs. To date, the UK has been the only donor country to make direct contributions to JIU development. As needs are identified, however, it is hoped that the support group will become a medium for allowing other major donors to make similar contributions.

Conclusion

It is unclear whether the GoS and the SPLA ever really intended the JIUs to become an effective security organ, but the reality is that long-term peace in Sudan may be conditional on their success. Until now, both Khartoum and Juba have been able to blame each other for the slow implementation of the CPA, and they have used the limited

deployment of the JIUs to justify their ongoing violations of the agreement. This, in turn, has slowed implementation of the CPA overall, ultimately jeopardizing Sudan's future. It is high time that the international community stepped up its engagement on this issue. Facilitation of and insistence on full, effective, and integrated deployment and training is one of the best ways for donor countries and the UN to push both sides to adhere to their commitments. The GoS and GoSS, in turn, must demonstrate a clear willingness to work together to produce effective units. Without the necessary will to eliminate the stumbling blocks outlined in this *Brief*, the fate of Sudan's CPA will hang in the balance. ■

Notes

This Sudan Issue Brief was based on research by Matthew Arnold and Matthew LeRiche. Matthew Arnold is a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics and Matthew LeRiche is a Ph.D. candidate at King's College London.

- 1 CPA, Chapter 6, Section 2, p. 88. The full text of the CPA is available at <<http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf>>.
- 2 JIU Bill, available at <<http://www.unmis.org/common/documents/cpa-monitor/Annexes/Annex%2011%20-%20JIUs%20Act%20-%20FIXED.pdf>>.
- 3 JIU Bill, Chapter 2, Sections 6 and 7.
- 4 Although the CPA authorized 39,000 troops, UNMIS specifies 39,600. The 'extra' 600 are located in Abyei.
- 5 JIU Bill, Chapter 2, Section 8.1.
- 6 The Abyei force numbers are included as part of the division based in Wau.
- 7 The JDB is also referred to as the 'Joint Defence Council' in the English version of the Interim National Constitution. One purpose of the JDB is to ensure the routine management of the JIU forces throughout Sudan. The JDB is mandated to convene routinely to discuss pressing issues. It has been a relatively consistent collaborative organ for resolving issues of mutual concern between the SPLA and the SAF and has been an active forum for JIU issues.
- 8 JIU Bill, Chapter 5.
- 9 CPA, Chapter 6, Section 20.8. Note that salaries for JIU members are equivalent to those of the SAF. SPLA troops, however,

- are paid more than their SAF counterparts. The SPLA often unilaterally provides its JIU members with an additional allowance to increase their pay to that of the SPLA regular forces. This allowance is not always in cash but can take the form of food or supplies. This arrangement has caused much tension between the SAF and SPLA elements within the JIUs. Nevertheless, despite these controversies and ambiguities over pay, SPLA soldiers are attracted to join the JIUs because of their reputation for regular salary payments, in contrast to the SPLA itself. Interviews with SPLA JIU soldiers, Juba barracks, 24 November 2007.
- 10 JIU Bill, Chapter 3, Section 9.
 - 11 These 'oil police' are mostly SAF regulars, SAF-aligned OAGs, and private security firms, mostly Chinese.
 - 12 JIU Bill, Chapter 2, Section 6(a).
 - 13 For more information on the disputed border region of Abyei, see International Crisis Group (2007).
 - 14 The Joint Doctrine itself is not yet publicly available but the substance is outlined in both the CPA and the JIU Bill. Interview with SPLA officers, SPLA General Headquarters, Juba, 14 November 2007.
 - 15 Interview with international diplomat, Juba, 12 November 2007.
 - 16 Interview with international diplomat, Juba, 12 November 2007.
 - 17 Lidder (2007).
 - 18 CPC Meeting Summary, UNMIS confidential report, issued 2 November 2007.
 - 19 Correspondence with UNMIS, 11 March 2008.
 - 20 UNMIS has been tasked with monitoring the CPA's implementation. For instance, it is a participant in the CJMC, which among other responsibilities reviews JIU deployments.
 - 21 UNMIS (2007b). Note that this definition was agreed by all parties to the Ceasefire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC).
 - 22 The CPA's security protocol, Article 7, states that 'no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces'. It stipulates that those who have the desire and qualifications will be incorporated into the organized forces of both parties (army, police, prisons, and wildlife) and the rest will be integrated into the civil service or civil society.
 - 23 Deployment to a JIU is typically for two years. The SAF and the SPLA are not allowed to randomly rotate their members any more frequently.
 - 24 For a review of the SSDF, see Small Arms Survey (2006).
 - 25 Reuters (2007).
 - 26 Reuters (2007).
 - 27 *Sudan Tribune* (2006).
 - 28 Interview with Major General (SAF) Gabriel Tang-Ginya, Khartoum, 19 November 2007.
 - 29 For more information, see Arnold (2007).
 - 30 Gabriel Tang-Ginya declared that he was still in command of the men from his SSDF militia who had officially joined the SAF and then the Malakal JIU. A further concern is that officially demobilized SSDF members have merely returned to their homes without disarming. Interview with Major General (SAF) Gabriel Tang-Ginya, Khartoum, 19 November 2007.
 - 31 Interview with UNMIS official, Khartoum, 20 November 2007.
 - 32 Interview with UNMIS official, Juba, 12 November 2007.
 - 33 Interview with UNMIS official, Juba, 12 November 2007.
 - 34 Interview with UNMIS official, Juba, 12 November 2007.
 - 35 AEC (2007), p. 61.
 - 36 AEC (2007), p. 59.
 - 37 AEC (2007), p. 61.
 - 38 CPA, Chapter 6, Section 3.
 - 39 CPA, Chapter 6, Section 3.c.
 - 40 CPA, Chapter 6, Section 3.c.
 - 41 Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Sudan (2007), p. 15. An important qualification on the SAF number is that it includes the 'voluntary demobilization' of 8,919 SAF troops, which the SPLA did not accept as valid. This meant that in August 2007 it only accepted that 68.2 per cent of SAF troops had been withdrawn. See UNMIS (2007a), p. 33, Paragraph 187. By January 2008, however, the SPLA appeared to have reconsidered the issue and accepted SAF redeployment figures, including those soldiers who had voluntarily demobilized.
 - 42 The CPA created the GNU to allow national power sharing between the SPLM and the NCP during the interim period. The Abyei Boundary Commission was to 'define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area'. This border demarcation is essential in defining the North-South boundary. See Abyei Boundary Commission (2005).
 - 43 UNMIS (2007a), pp. 30-31.
 - 44 UNMIS (2007a), p. 31.
 - 45 CPC (2007), Paragraph 3.
 - 46 CJMC (2008). Note that the SAF figures include the voluntary demobilization numbers.
 - 47 The JIUs are to form an 'outer circle' for protection of the oil fields while state police and private security companies (primarily Chinese) will provide the 'inner circle' of security for the installations.
 - 48 UNSC (2007), Section 8. Prior to Resolution 1784, UNMIS had no mandate to intervene in the management and deployment of the JIUs.

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Number 1 September 2006

Persistent threats: widespread human insecurity in Lakes State, South Sudan, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (also available in Arabic)

Number 2 October 2006

Armed groups in Sudan: the South Sudan Defence Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration (also available in Arabic)

Number 3 (2nd edition)

November 2006–February 2007

Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: recent experiences and implications (also available in Arabic)

Number 4 December 2006

No dialogue, no commitment: the perils of dead-line diplomacy for Darfur (also available in Arabic)

Number 5 January 2007

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Number 6 April 2007

The militarization of Sudan: a preliminary review of arms flows and holdings

Number 7 July 2007

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Responses to pastoralist wars: a review of violence reduction efforts in Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya

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Echo effects: Chadian instability and the Darfur conflict

Sudan Working Papers

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Number 2 February 2007

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Number 11 December 2007

Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei, by Richard Garfield



HSBA project summary

The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) is a three-year research programme (2005–08) administered by the Small Arms Survey, an independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva.

It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNMIS, the UN Development Programme, and a wide array of international and Sudanese NGO partners. Through the active generation and dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, security sector reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote security. The assessment is being carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of regional, security, and public health specialists. It reviews the spatial distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offers policy-relevant advice to redress insecurity.

Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic snapshots of baseline information. Future issues will focus on a variety of issues, including armed groups and victimization rates. The HSBA also generates a series of timely and user-friendly working papers in English and Arabic, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan.

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