



# 2ND ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS (APPSNO)

13–18 APRIL 2008  
SINGAPORE



**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL  
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

NATIONAL SECURITY  
COORDINATION SECRETARIAT

# 2ND ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS (APPSNO)

REPORT ON A CONFERENCE ORGANIZED BY  
THE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (CENS)  
AT THE S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS),  
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, SINGAPORE  
AND  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COORDINATION SECRETARIAT (NSCS)  
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, SINGAPORE

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## OPENING REMARKS



*Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS, welcoming the participants*

**Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), welcomed the guests and participants to the Second Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior National Security Officers (APPSNO). Jointly organized by the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)—a centre within RSIS—and the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) of the Prime Minister’s Office, APPSNO brings together senior national security officers from the Asia Pacific and beyond for networking, learning and the frank exchange of ideas.

Ambassador Desker observed that being tasked with the formulation and implementation of national security policies, national security officers have a heavy responsibility and face a unique challenge. If ill-conceived, these policies would have far-reaching consequences on society. Hence this year’s APPSNO focuses on a critical element of national security—resilience.

While policies may be in place to prevent a terrorist attack or a pandemic outbreak, the issue of how quickly societies recover from national security threats needs to be addressed. Noting that no nation is impervious to attacks, Ambassador Desker stressed that “it’s not how and how often you fall that matters, but the getting up again”. As such, it is essential to reflect on how “resilience” is defined, understood, interpreted, explained and put into practice.

It is hoped that by examining the different elements of resilience, including cultural, economic and political resilience, APPSNO would provide participants with a platform to embark on this critical enterprise.

## OPENING ADDRESS



*Deputy Prime Minister Professor S Jayakumar delivering the opening address*

In his opening address, **Professor S Jayakumar**, Deputy Prime Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Law, underscored the salience of the concept of resilience in the face of constantly evolving threats. For instance, terrorist movements have shown an uncanny ability to survive and launch fresh attacks despite the best efforts of the international community. Apart from terrorism, nations also have to be prepared for other catastrophic threats such as pandemics and natural disasters, which may strike suddenly. These threats have the potential to instil fear and alarm among the populace and destabilize society.

While the government and security agencies can put in place the necessary effective security apparatus and formulate plans for various scenarios, such efforts

need to be complemented with the support and cooperation of the public in remaining vigilant. Moreover, national security strategies cannot rely on deterrence and protection alone, but also on building up resilience and strengthening citizens' psychological resolve to overcome crises necessary for society to recover to a state of normalcy as soon as possible. As threats and disasters come in different forms, resilience must develop in a variety of ways, according to the context and priorities of each individual society. Furthermore, resilience cannot be built overnight. It requires years of forging understanding, trust and confidence.

DPM Jayakumar emphasized the need for security agencies to be constantly vigilant to deal promptly and effectively with potential issues that undermine a nation's security. While setbacks are unavoidable, it was noted that the resilience of a society is reflected in the security agencies and the people coming together in a common effort to deal with the crisis. Citing the examples of the British experience with an IRA assassination attempt in 1984 and the recent escape of a *Jemaah Islamiyah* leader from a detention facility in Singapore, he noted that it is important that the security agencies learn from their mistakes and be stronger for it. He concluded by commending security officers for their good work and dedication to protecting the nation, much of which is unpublicized and unrecognized by the public.

## SESSION I

# Singapore's National Security Strategic Framework



*Lee Ark Boon providing an overview of Singapore's national security framework*

**Lee Ark Boon** outlined the national security strategic framework adopted by Singapore to deal with the terrorist threat and boost its resilience. Lee mentioned that in 2001–2002, the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) planned six attacks not just against Singapore's key installations but also against foreign missions and vessels based in Singapore. The plots, although foiled, raised several key security and social concerns. First, they highlighted the operational and financial support that foreign-based individuals or groups had given to local JI members. Next, the plots also drew attention to the roles that Singapore-based JI members had played in the overall JI structure. Finally, it is acknowledged that long-term measures to strengthen social resilience and cohesion constitute a vital component of counter-terrorism strategies alongside technical measures to harden Singapore as a target.

As a result of the security concerns raised in the 2004 strategic framework, the National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS) was established under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office in the same year to work on and coordinate issues and initiatives pertaining to Singapore's national security. The NSCS comprises the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter Terrorism Centre (JCTC), with the former tasked with national security planning, policy coordinating and strategic threats-anticipating roles, and the latter providing strategic analysis on terrorist threats and Singapore's level of security preparedness.

In view of the global and long-term nature of trans-national terrorism, Lee stressed that efforts to raise the security baseline, strengthen inter-agency collaboration in policy, intelligence and operational work would always be a work-in-progress. Moreover, securing the nation necessitates not just a "whole-of-government" but also a "whole-of-nation" approach. In conclusion, and with reference to the theme of resilience, Lee cited the Community Engagement Project (CEP) as an example of Singapore's effort towards the development of a holistic approach to enhance social cohesion and harmony as well as the management and mitigation of potential communal tensions during times of crisis.

## Discussion

In response to questions on the role of the private sector in national security programmes, Lee noted that to most firms, security measures are usually perceived as an expense rather than a profit-generating investment. Thus far, the government has resisted resorting to legislation to compel the private sector to be more involved, preferring instead to devise strategies to engage them in security initiatives. For example, programmes to better engage the business community in security work and set the pace for better business continuity management and resilience during crises include the Corporate First Responder Scheme, a joint project between the Singapore Police Force and private companies that focuses on post-incident recovery procedures for businesses.

Concerns were raised that iconic and tourist installations in Singapore might be potential terrorist targets. In response, the Ministry of Home Affairs has actively engaged the developers of new projects to incorporate security features as part of the architectural designs, although changes have to yet be made to the building codes to mandate security requirements.

Observing that most internal security policies have an impact on foreign affairs, a participant asked how the foreign affairs ministries could be better integrated into security plans. Lee responded that, in Singapore's case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) sits on several security boards and committees at the inter-ministerial and executive levels, such as the Security Policy Review Committee.

Moving on, a participant wanted to know the challenges faced by Singapore in implementing its national security framework and queried what future developments the NSCS wished to see. Lee replied that there are several coordination challenges, namely, in striking a balance between centralization and decentralization. He added that while the various government agencies do cooperate, bureaucratic issues such as timely information sharing and budget ownership do crop up.

On the topic of radicalization, a participant asked how Singapore determines individuals who are at risk of being radicalized. Lee mentioned that, on the whole, individuals are identified or tracked based on the information provided by the intelligence community. However, it is not enough to simply track individuals who have been to training camps abroad. The challenge today is the proliferation of radical ideologies on the Internet, which makes tracking potential radicalized individuals difficult. On the other hand, the Internet can also help build resilience. For instance, there is a committee in Singapore that looks into cyber security. At the grass-roots level, a number of Muslim leaders have created websites aimed at debunking extremist ideologies.

Lastly, a participant remarked that the threat to Singapore seems to arise from terrorism and not from inter-state issues. In response, it was highlighted that historically, Singapore had faced inter-state problems but the formation of confidence-building platforms such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967 has done much to improve external relations.

## SESSION II

# Conceptualizing National Security And Resilience



*Robert Ayson discussing the relationship between national security and resilience*

In his presentation, **Robert Ayson** noted that traditional understandings of national security emphasize the protection of the nation-state against threats of external military attacks. For many countries, however, concerns about domestic instability have often bubbled under the surface. In their early years of independence, for example, the inaugural member states of ASEAN were often more concerned about the risk of internal subversion, including opportunistic attempts by external powers to capitalize on this vulnerability.

Accordingly, the concept of national resilience was championed within ASEAN, emphasizing the economic, social and cultural aspects of national security in addition to the traditional emphasis on military issues. This concept of resilience was initially developed as a strategic concept in Indonesia under President Suharto, but its essence can also be found in Singapore's concept of Total Defence.

Although some of the enthusiasm for resilience thinking has declined with the mixed reputation and fortune of the Suharto era of Southeast Asian politics, interest in resilience has been reinvigorated by post-9/11 concerns about terrorism as a potential shock to domestic life and safety. Singapore's perspective of resilience, for example, focuses on the social capacity to recover from such shocks and resumption to normalcy as swiftly as possible, paying particular attention to the psychological dimension.

Ayson proposed that instead of being solely fixated on the conventional engineering conception of resilience, which focuses on the recovery of a single stable condition (i.e. "back to life as normal"), it may perhaps be useful to consider what he called "the ecological understanding" of resilience, which is well suited to complex systems like human societies. In these systems of alternative conditions and non-linear behaviour, declining resilience increases the likelihood that the system will shift dramatically to a new steady state, the consequences of which may or may not be desirable. The ecological approach therefore reminds people that deliberate intervention—in spite of good intentions—may well engender inadvertent consequences. In such circumstances, a counter-intuitive approach to resilience as a national security objective may be worth pondering.



*David Heyman on building resilient societies*

**David Heyman** began his talk with the observation that the international security landscape has changed in a number of fundamental ways. For one, today's world is one without borders. Second, the domestic challenges facing states are increasingly influenced by those of other states, redefining the notion of national security. Third, state adversaries are no longer just confined to the traditional exogenous threat of nation-states. Fourth, "front lines" are now no longer just the exclusive domain of the military. Lastly, the economy has become a prime target for adversaries of the state. These changes have meant that the need



to protect people, infrastructures and supply chains against catastrophic events has been concomitantly accompanied by the most dramatic expansion of the U.S. national security apparatus, as well as others, since World War II.

Despite all these, Heyman insisted that today's government programmes remain out-dated as they are largely built upon old notions of top-down solutions and hierarchical management. In particular, with reference to the Anti-Terrorism and Homeland Security strategies of the U.S. government, Heyman pointed out three key failings: (i) the maintenance of a twentieth century bureaucracy while facing a twenty-first century adversary; (ii) the securing of the global supply chain and critical infrastructure with an ad hoc and fragmented approach; and (iii) the flawed belief in the factoid that "government has to be right all the time; terrorists only once".

In a world where small groups of would-be terrorists live, move and plan among ordinary citizens—and indeed, succeed—by exploiting the openness of society, outmoded top-down approaches are unlikely to succeed or conversely, may only fare well with extraordinary resources and excessive costs. The solution, therefore, in Heyman's opinion, is to turn security programmes on their heads and adopt a more bottom-up, decentralized approach to anti-terrorism and homeland security—one that empowers individuals and communities and better integrates them into the national security enterprise, leading to greater prevention, protection and ultimately resilience in society.

## Discussion

The first question that was raised pertained to Ayson's concept of the "ecological understanding" of resilience—whether it implied that human societies, given their complex adaptive behaviour, are by definition resilient with the only difference being its degree. Acknowledging the pertinence of the query, Ayson felt that it was not necessarily the case that all systems or societies are intrinsically resilient. The broader point, instead, which he wanted to remind and caution against, was the belief that resilience can be effectively engineered or should be deliberately fostered. Sometimes, despite the good intentions involved, an overly interventionist governmental attitude and approach may, in fact, inadvertently reduce societal resiliency.

One participant wondered if minor perturbations within societies would actually help to imbue an "inoculating" effect on societal resiliency. In response, Heyman commented that the issue is essentially a matter of "resilience breeding resiliency", that having gone through unpleasant events or occurrences, communities establish and develop the history and the skill sets required to better cope with future adversities. As for Ayson, he noted that the question related to the issue of the level of volatility that should be tolerated in order to engender a wider shock immunity. He pointed out that while certain societies may seem to be ostensibly stable, underlying fundamentals may actually be quite brittle and all it takes is for a minor blip to upset the prevailing balance.

Another participant made the argument that there appears to be a "compartmentalized" security outlook among states today and this would negatively impact the larger global resilience vis-à-vis the trans-national terrorism threat. To this, Heyman opined that he shared the participant's viewpoint, in the sense that he agreed with the notion that terrorist disturbances at the local level may end up affecting interests at the global level, especially in the economic realm. Meanwhile, Ayson's perspective was that citizens in different countries would ineluctably have disparities in terms of the perceived level of threat from terrorism. Even if there is a greater local awareness of the terrorism threat elsewhere, Ayson was unsure whether that would naturally translate into a higher level of resiliency.

## SESSION III

### Trans-national Terrorism: Global And Regional Trends



*Rohan Gunaratna assessing the threat of terrorism*

**Rohan Gunaratna** examined the evolution of regional and global terrorist threats in the past decade. The four main changes were (i) a lower terrorist threat facing Southeast Asia and Asia in general as a result of counter-terrorism efforts; (ii) the shift of the epicentre of terrorism from Afghanistan to Iraq and Tribal Pakistan (Federally Administered Tribal Areas); (iii) greater collaboration between Middle East- and Southeast Asia-based terrorist groups during the last five to six years; and (iv) the shrinking of the numerical strength of *Al-Qaeda*, largely as a result of the global fight against terrorism.

However, despite its smaller group size, *Al-Qaeda* continues to exert its influence on terrorist groups through its active investment in propaganda. Moreover, Gunaratna also noted that the appeal and attractiveness of *Al-Qaeda* also lies in Osama bin Laden's ability to present himself as a man of religion who is fighting for Islam.

Gunaratna opined that the security landscape of Asia would be shaped by developments in Iraq, citing

analyses identifying Iraq as the breeding ground for a new generation of jihadists, and also intentions of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) groups to send its members to Iraqi training camps. Furthermore, it was emphasized that if not for the training that JI members have received from *Al-Qaeda* and other Arab groups based in Afghanistan—as well as their trans-national collaborations with Southeast Asian-based terrorist groups—the JI would not have been the most dangerous group in the region. Within Southeast Asia, highly resilient terrorist groups persist in Eastern Indonesia (especially the Sulawesi region and Maluku Islands) and southern Philippines (especially Mindanao). However, since Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia have put into place counter-terrorism mechanisms, the level of threat to these countries is no longer as high as before. Gunaratna also pointed out that ideological extremism is likely to be of a greater security threat than terrorism in the near future. It would not be easy to fight ideological extremism with the traditional methods of warfare. It would require the joint efforts of the religious institutions, the media and police forces to counter extremist effectively.

In conclusion, Gunaratna provided three assessments for consideration. First, it is vital that American and Australian troops maintain their presence in Southeast Asia to keep the threat of terrorism low through their facilitation of intelligence-building measures. Second, terrorism and terrorist organizations must be made illegal. Currently, in Indonesia, it is not a legal offence to join the JI. Third, a comprehensive counter-terrorism response that includes community-engagement projects is necessary to deal with the security challenges of 2008 and beyond.

## Discussion

In relation to Gunaratna's comments on the need to build bridges with the Muslim community to counter terrorism and radical ideology, a participant asked if he was suggesting that the problem is that of a clash of civilizations. Gunaratna replied that it is more of an intra-civilization conflict between adherents of mainstream and a deviant form of Islam driven by politics, rather than an inter-civilization clash. *Al-Qaeda*, for example, is a political organization that has used Islam to legitimize its fight. He added that fewer than one per cent of Singaporean Muslims support extremism or terrorism and the same would apply to Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and India.

Next, it was also articulated that a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach might not be possible to implement given the ongoing U.S.-Iraq and Israel-Palestine conflicts. In Gunaratna's opinion, a comprehensive counter-extremism response is possible but it would probably be a difficult process. This is because events and even images depicting the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan have a huge impact on radicals in Southeast Asia who feel for the suffering of their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters and, as a result, believe in their obligation to fight. A purely overbearing military response to terrorism would lead to failure and even create a negative perception of counter-terrorism efforts.

Responding to questions on the persuasive power of deviant Islam and the kind of ideological messages to be used to counter extreme ideologies, Gunaratna replied that Osama bin Laden is a most effective communicator as he has been able to exploit media resources such as the Internet, television and radio to broadcast and articulate his messages and threats more effectively than any Western leader. Moreover, due in part to the unresolved Israel-Palestine conflicts, Muslim leadership in the fight against Muslim terrorism and extremism is lacking.

On the topic of extremism, a participant queried if the definition of extremism should be broadened to include, for example, environmental and political views, and not just focus on religion alone. It was also asked if any key lessons could be drawn from the Cold War that might be applicable to current counter-extremism responses. On the whole, Gunaratna agreed that the term "extremism" should be broadened to include other security threats. However, due to limited financial and intellectual resources, national security measures have to be prioritized according to the threats faced. Terrorism, a by-product of ideological extremism, is therefore a national security priority. With regards to the Cold War, Gunaratna noted that the rest of the world was able to defeat the Soviet empire as they were able to overcome the Soviets both on ideological and military grounds. Gunaratna opined that without a military defeat, an ideological defeat might not be possible. Hence, adopting a comprehensive approach is necessary in the current fight against extremism.

Speaking on the security situation in Pakistan, Gunaratna articulated that the failure of the West to stabilize Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviets culminated in the current state of affairs. As for the usage of the term "jihad", Gunaratna agreed that it should not be used freely and in vain, as it will unnecessarily lend power and legitimacy to deviant groups. He also added that, so far, no concerted effort has been made to define jihad to counter any deviant definitions.

Finally, in addressing questions on the JI's modus operandi in Southeast Asia, Gunaratna replied that the JI has been selective in their tactics due to a lack of resources. While the JI is trained to conduct assassinations and forced-entry attacks, it has invested in and focused its activities mainly on the making of shoe bombs, suicide bombings and vehicle bombings.

## SESSION IV

### Resilience And Radicalization



*Mohamed bin Ali fielding questions on the rehabilitation of radicals in Singapore*

In his presentation, **Mohamed bin Ali** examined a model of radicalization and used the *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) cell in Singapore as a case study in rehabilitation and building resilience. Stating that the threat from terrorism today is not organizational but ideological, nations must now also deal with self-radicalized individuals who pick up ideology and form casual networks via the Internet.

The JI case in Singapore highlights a number of important factors for understanding radicalization as well as the importance of resilience in its many forms. First, it reaffirms the radicalization process as a multi-step one. Second, the lack of mental or emotional resilience of the JI detainees meant that they were unable to adapt to changes or adversity, which are a normal part of everyday life. Third, they lacked religious resilience. This form of resilience—related to the emotional or mental varieties—is based on the ability to successfully adjust to the challenges of modernity while at the same time keep one's faith intact. This lack of resilience is based both on ignorance and a shallow understanding of Islam. Without it, they have no capacity to adjust to compromising what they mistakenly understand as the fundamentals of Islam.

Singapore's de-radicalization strategy uses and empowers community and religious leaders to lead this battle. This includes not only the religious rehabilitation of JI detainees but also increasing the

religious resilience of the community. In the case of the former, the counselling of JI detainees aims to increase their religious resilience in many ways. The counsellors seek to correct misunderstood and misused Islamic concepts, aiming to enhance the religious understanding of the detainees and at the same time helping to show them how to adjust to living in a secular country while maintaining their Muslim identity. In the case of the latter, community and religious leaders recognize the importance of reaching out to youths and are leading efforts to reform Islamic education in Singapore by weeding out unqualified teachers and setting up websites and blogs to counter radical or extremist ideology.



*Stephen Ulph probing into the ideological and intellectual underpinnings of jihadism*

**Stephen Ulph** discussed the ideology of *Al-Qaeda* and related jihadists, examining the language and theology used by such groups to justify their worldview, as it is this ideology that has accounted for *Al-Qaeda*'s real strength and resilience. The challenge facing counter-terrorism today, even as successes are scored against the jihadists' fighting capabilities, is how to close down the factories that are training the next generation of radicals primed for militancy.

Ulph stated that Western audiences do not understand the ideological standpoints of jihadists. Indeed, for Ulph, one of the problems is that the West is narcissistic, believing that what happens in the Middle East or the broader Muslim world must be in some way dependent

on themselves, their actions and their values. Ulph argued that the starting point for the mental universe of the jihadist has no reference point to Western historical or ideological narrative. Instead of trying to interpret their actions and words via Western narratives, Ulph proposed simply taking the jihadists as the authorities of their worldview—however distasteful—and to pay attention to what they say and how they say it. Ulph stated that the debate over what is “true Islam” is irrelevant to this discussion as jihadism is not a religion but an aberration. However, the language they use is religious. It is important to understand the language of the ideology in order to facilitate communication and to debate with them in their own language.

Ulph noted that *Al-Qaeda* and militant jihadism are a peripheral element of the broader jihadist ideology. The intellectual resilience of this movement comes from the fact that it arises out of a genuine pietistic movement called Islamic Awakening, a conservative reform movement of Islam. With the end of colonialism and the rise of new nationalist movements, these groups saw something inauthentic and tainted in Islamic reform endeavours that sought to adapt Islam to the modern environment. More traditional than the traditionalists, they reject 1,400 years of scholarship and model themselves on what they perceive to be unassailably authentic—the very beginnings of Islam with the Prophet and the early generations. In this sense, the source of authority is not the long history of Islamic scholarship but the textual elements of the Quran. In doing so, all other sources of authority are isolated and the manipulation of texts to justify one’s beliefs or actions is much easier.

## Discussion

The question was asked that as we are not just fighting an ideology but a movement with old roots of tradition, moderate Muslim scholars who attempt to tell people to be more faithful might not be recognized as being worthy of any attention. How then do we generate the capacity to actually fight and uproot such an ideological phenomenon? One problem is the reliance on textualism due to a lack of intellectual training on the part of the jihadists. They exist isolated in an intellectual environment that ignores 1,400 years of Islamic scholarship. It was added that there is a lack of a return to the intellectual Islamic heritage in both the radical and moderate communities, which is why religion has been easily manipulated and used for nefarious means.

It was asked if the focus on religious arguments was perhaps one of the issues of those in search of an identity becoming polarized and if there were any attempts to counter these sorts of thought patterns or ideologies outside of purely religious arguments. It was discussed that in de-radicalization, very little element of psychology is being used, as most of the arguments are based on, or couched in, religious terms or texts.

## DISTINGUISHED DINNER LECTURE: Security, Resilience and The State



*Lord John Alderdice identifying lessons from the Northern Ireland peace process*

**Lord John Alderdice** provided an overview of the Irish conflict and assessed the responses adopted by the Northern Ireland and British governments to draw lessons for approaches to national security and the development of social resilience.

Lord Alderdice argued that in the early stages of the Troubles, the reaction of both the Irish and British governments was a traditional anti-insurgency response, beginning with security crackdowns by the police and followed by executive detention without trial. All these actions provoked moral outrage among the public, leading to a loss of cooperation from the community on both sides of the divide, rendering intelligence gathering and community policing exceedingly difficult, especially in working-class neighbourhoods. It also precipitated an increase in the recruitment of youths to paramilitary organizations, leading to a serious deterioration of the situation. Although most of the measures taken were legal, they were perceived by the public as unfair, undermining the legitimacy of the law.

It took the government many years to acknowledge the problem and even more years to reverse the trend. Initially, despite genuine and demonstrably fair judicial action implemented to address discrimination, such as those relating to employment, voting rights, housing and economic regeneration, the situation stabilized somewhat but the problem remained unresolved and

the stalemate persisted. Only when a new approach was developed which facilitated social, economic and political engagement and resilience was there the beginnings of a peaceful resolution and moves towards political stability, economic prosperity, social cohesion and respect for the rule of law. The initial approach encompassed political initiatives for the state to engage the moderate elements and exclude the extremist elements. However, the process was fraught with obstacles as the extremists continued their acts of violence to derail negotiation efforts, leading to the decision to engage the extremist elements. Although this inclusive political dialogue approach initially met with resistance and took years of negotiations, it eventually yielded some results as the various parties were able to directly address all the thorny issues and even resolve some of them. Lord Alderdice underscored that the traditional and natural responses of security agencies and government to use the legal and political justification to their own favour is often counter-productive. Engaging terrorists may even provide the state with the opportunity to explore alternatives to addressing their sense of alienation other than war.

Lord Alderdice was also struck by the terrorists' early discovery of the resilience of networks, especially when pitted against hierarchical institutions and bureaucracies. They were quick to realize that organizing themselves in a hierarchical manner led to swifter arrests, propelling them to adopt a cell structure and a system of information dissemination modelled on a need-to-know basis. This network system mirrors current terrorist efforts, yet most governments still operate in a hierarchical system. However, attempts to implement a networked approach did yield some result. For instance, the policing system was restructured to entail a closer collaboration with, and the empowerment of, the local community that improved security and state-community confidence. He also cautioned against an over-reliance on protocol in executing procedures and called instead for the development of reflective thinking.

Lord Alderdice concluded with two observations. First, he stressed that the conflict in Northern Ireland was not merely profoundly historic. Rather it was more about the failure of the state to engage the people and the problems they were facing. Second, the deliberation of political and security problems are often approached intellectually when they are by and large driven by

emotions. Rational justifications often mask the underlying emotional issues at stake. Politics is not about how people agree with each other but how people disagree without resorting to violence. In this respect, the fight against extremism should focus on finding different means to deal with disagreements.

## SESSION V

### Public Health, National Security and Resilience



*Laurie Garrett evaluating the response of states to pandemic outbreaks*

In her presentation, **Laurie Garrett** examined how globalization has increased the threat of future pandemics and the problems with preparing and responding to such a threat, given its trans-national nature. However, there are serious global political, scientific and public-health problems, which may render states ill-equipped to respond adequately.

Traditional Cold War notions of national security centring on containment and deterrence do not work in a world where threats may have no direct relationship to guns, bullets or bombs. Using the classical notion of national security espoused by George Kennan, defined as “the continued ability of this country to pursue its internal life without interference”, Garrett posited that such a conception of national security does indeed include trans-national and non-violent threats.

The increase in the travel and mobility of people and products means that a disease today can spread very far and very fast. States have to deal with a greater threat complexity and a global scale of risk. Quoting

the leading authority on avian flu, virologist Dr. Robert Webster, as saying, “these are the worst influenza viruses I have seen”, Garrett covered the threat of the H5N1 virus (avian flu) and charted its spread in two years to 67 countries.

Garrett cited a number of problems with the current state of global public health and pandemic preparedness that, in the event of the mutation of avian flu into one that is more easily transmissible among humans, could cause serious problems. In the realm of public health, there is a lack of infrastructure in APEC nations and the People’s Republic of China, except for Hong Kong and Singapore. Globally, there is a huge talent drain of medical workers from poorer countries to richer ones, causing serious shortages in the former countries and affecting their ability to respond to medical crises. The types of responses to the threat of avian flu put forward may not be effective either, Garrett stated. These include containment, culling and pre-pandemic vaccination. However, these responses would either be outright ineffective or prohibitively expensive. Current vaccines like TamiFlu also have serious drawbacks, including the emergence of TamiFlu-resistant viruses.

In terms of surveillance, there is a network of laboratories working on detecting outbreaks, but the laboratories in first-responder nations like Indonesia are woefully inadequate and the report of confirmed cases to WHO often exceeds six weeks. Such a delay between the outbreak of a pandemic and its detection and response could be fatal.

## Discussion

The point was brought up that a lesson from SARS is that one of the main problems in a flu pandemic is fear and a lack of a sense of control over the situation on the part of the public. However, immediate messages that offer people a range of responses that they can take, even if not 100 per cent effective in stopping the spread of illness, minimizes the sense of hopelessness that feeds fear.

A question was asked about the status of H5N1 in Myanmar. It was discussed that while there have been reports of cases pertaining to poultry, getting clear

statistics is an issue. Following on, discussants raised the issue that in the realm of public health, closed states that lacked transparency are a threat to the whole world. China was noted as an excellent example of a country that learned from its experiences during the SARS crisis and is now one of the prime examples of transparency in public health.

A participant brought up recent developments in avian flu and noted that increases in vaccine technology may lead to not only better vaccines but greater volumes of them. However, distribution remains a problem, as are more prosaic aspects of such plans, like ensuring there are ample sterile syringes.

## SESSION VI

### Social Resilience and National Security



*Chandran Kukathas offering a conceptual analysis of the problem of security*

**Chandran Kukathas** undertook a philosophical analysis of the concept of security. In particular, the presentation addressed the questions of what security is and how its importance can be evaluated against other values.

Security is defined as the assurance of safety or protection from danger in the pursuit of one's interests, including that of survival. Kukathas argued that security only matters for entities capable of having interests and with the capacity to make a decision whether or not to pursue some course of action. Two kinds of agents for which security matters were identified for

analysis: individual and corporate agents. Individual agents refer to human individual purposes and interests that require security for these ends to be obtained. Corporate agents refer to collectivities of human beings with interests and the capacity to pursue them. Kukathas highlighted that corporate agents, such as the state, are complex entities, constituting individuals with different security interests that might conflict. For instance, the interests of managers running a corporation and its stakeholders may be at odds.

A case was made against the broadening of the concept of security beyond the safety of agents to include other concerns such as the environment and health. First, if the concept of security is broadened to include all issues, then security ceases to be a concept with any independent purchase. Second, it is important to recognize that security is only one value that needs to be traded off with others, rather than a value that is in harmony with all others when, in reality, it is not. For instance, in the appropriation of limited resources, the security in one sector requires a compromise of another sector.

On evaluating the importance of security in relation to other values such as justice, prosperity and freedom,



Kukathas critiqued the works of political philosophers on this issue. Thomas Hobbes' call for the establishment of a sovereign authority with absolute power to provide its constituents with security is flawed because he (i) offers a false choice between security and civil strife when security is a matter of degree; (ii) assumes that the interests of the sovereign and its constituents converge; and (iii) exaggerates the importance of security vis-à-vis other values. John Rawls's argument that justice lays at the foundation of a good society is also problematic as it assumes the existence of a correct view of justice and ignores the reality that the blind pursuit of justice may be a potential source of conflict too.

In conclusion, he offered David Hume's philosophy as a lens to understand security. Hume argues that individuals seek to balance their own interests, affection for others and view of what is right, rather than to pursue any of them in isolation. Hence, security can be obtained if it is recognized as a limited good to be negotiated with other values.



*Rachel Briggs presenting a U.K. perspective on counter-terrorism and social resilience*

**Rachel Briggs** provided a British perspective on social resilience and national security. She highlighted two strategic errors made by British politicians in response to 9/11 to explain the importance of social resilience to national security. First, she argued that they had lost sight of the fact that terrorism is always a social, political, economic and cultural phenomenon that needs locals to take hold of. This is only possible if the terrorist interpretation of global issues resonate with the experiences of the locals, which is the case in the U.K. where the Muslim population is generally marginalized. The refusal of the government to allow

open discussions on British foreign policy also served to reinforce the Muslim community's sense of "voicelessness".

The second mistake the government made was to forget that terrorists prefer to get governments to do their job for them by sowing discord between the government and society. Briggs noted that the hard-handed approaches adopted by the government towards the Muslim population alienated them and reinforced the Al-Qaeda narrative of grievance and injustice borne by Muslims.

Briggs proposed a community-based approach to counter-terrorism for four reasons. First, they offer important sources of information and intelligence and provide early warning signals. Second, communities picking up these signals are themselves best placed to act pre-emptively to divert young people from violent extremism. Third, while the state must also play a role, communities must take the lead in tackling problems that either create grievances or hinder their ability to organize. Fourth, the police and Secret Service cannot act without the consent of the communities that they are to protect.

Briggs noted that in the British context, the notion of resilience is associated with memories of the determination of the Londoners to carry on as usual amidst the Blitz of the Second World War, connoting a defiant refusal to change in the face of an external threat. However, such a concept of resilience is no longer appropriate as Britain is facing many social changes. Rather, resilience should not be understood as returning to the elusive state of order and stability in the past, but as an opportunity to learn and adapt from a trauma.

In this respect, until recently, there has been a lack of social resilience in Britain vis-à-vis the Muslim community, as evidenced by the paucity of community structures within and between communities in the U.K. to facilitate communication and solving problems. However, even the recent proliferation of such organizations by the Muslim community is met with suspicion in view of a long-standing lack of understanding of Islam in Europe. Nevertheless, Briggs argued that most of these movements are non-

violent and serve as practical alternatives to divert young people from violent extremism. Hence, more should be done to engage these groups rather than to tame or alienate them.

Briggs concluded that governments must make difficult choices about who to engage with and, often, the organizations that offer social resilience may be highly critical of the government. In this sense, social resilience may not necessarily equate with community cohesion.

## Discussion

On the issue of the relationship between a national identity and social resilience, it was observed that its importance is context dependent. For instance, a strong national identity may be necessary to mobilize people to remain cohesive in the face of an extreme national security threat such as an attack by another country. However, a national identity may not be important in a society that is not under threat, especially in a large diverse society, as attempts to build a uniform identity may be resisted by the people who may perceive it as a threat rather than an attempt at fostering unity. It was also observed that the search for an identity is sometimes symptomatic of a desire for certainty in times of change. Moreover, a national identity can only be successfully forged if it resonates with ground sentiments. Often, the endeavour to foist a singular identity around national institutions and symbols is not engaging.

Asked to comment on the prospect of individuals who choose to disengage from the various national and community projects, it was noted that it is not only unrealistic but that there is no need for all to be part of these programmes as there are other ways for people to identify with their community. What is important is that there is enough integration and infrastructure to facilitate communication for harmony to prevail.

On the question of the role of the state in building social resilience, three suggestions were forwarded. First, the state should intervene as little as possible because, as soon as a programme is implemented, it is difficult to remove or change it even if it ceases to fulfil its purposes. Second, governments should also have a good risk-assessment mechanism to ensure that limited resources can be allocated effectively. Third, governments should learn to be comfortable with dissent.

A question was asked on whether or not a bottom-up approach may overburden communities that are already fragile. A suggestion was to set realistic expectations and not devolve all responsibility to the community.

## SESSION VII

### Business and Economic Resilience



*James Carafano discussing the partnership between governments and the private sector in counter-terrorism efforts*

**James Carafano** provided an overview of the meaning and significance of resilience to key political economies. He also suggested ways that both the public and private sectors could consider to strengthen their cooperation and boost economic resilience. According to Carafano, resilience deals more with psychological processes than material decisions. He argued that the most resilient societies are those that believe they are resilient. During World War II, for example, Britain was able to sustain the war effort, maintain a healthy civil society and meet the basic needs of citizenry even without much pre-war preparation. However, Carafano stressed that this does not suggest that crisis-preparation strategies should only be developed when a catastrophe occurs. Complacency, in his opinion, might result in humanitarian losses. Moreover, states might lose their legitimacy should they not respond quickly and appropriately enough to a crisis.

Resilience, to Carafano, is also a strategy that is both national in character and international in scope. It also refers to situations where both the general masses and government need to adjust to changes and restore normalcy. Carafano also noted that resilience should not be mistaken with the notion of protection. The idea that the community could be shielded and safeguarded from all attacks is, in his opinion, not only ridiculous but also operationally unfeasible. He reasoned that,

as societies progress, their vulnerabilities will increase as well and, therefore, it is impossible to protect every installation in a city.

Nonetheless, while full protective measures might not be possible, strategies to build resilience could still be structured to sustain societies in the face of known threats and unexpected disasters. Carafano opined that strategies combine the ends, ways and means by which the instruments of national power could be used to achieve national objectives. The ends of strategies to forge resilience rest fundamentally on effective communicative actions. Very simply, it deals with how information and expectations are managed pre- and post-crisis. He emphasized that any communication during a crisis has to be understandable, actionable and creditable to bring about prompt responses. Next, the different approaches to forging resilience determine how risk should be understood and responses to be shaped. It also covers risk ownership. In a public-private partnership, such an approach determines the stakes, responsibilities and roles of each sector in risk management. Finally, the elements of national power and security instruments that should be applied to a strategy of building resilience were examined. Carafano opined that not all threats should be considered a national security concern as it will over exaggerate the role of the government.

### Discussion


In response to questions on the strategic value of businesses and their impact on national security, Carafano agreed that there are certain key and critical industries—such as military technology—that countries would like to closely guard and avoid foreign ownership. However, the art of true statesmanship lies in a government's ability to not only act with and consult the people but also promote free-market behaviour. The government should not be the sole owners and protectors of all infrastructures.

A participant sought clarity on why pandemics should not be considered a national security issue, given the widespread implication and impact that pandemic have on the general population. Carafano replied that while there are problems in society that require national responses and the application of national security instruments, for example, the damages caused by Hurricane Katrina, this does not mean that they are all national security threats. In his opinion, national security should only include instances where individuals, state or non-state groups try to undermine the state through the use of violence. Elevating or labelling non-traditional security issues as national security problems raises the importance of the problem to a point where only the federal government has the power and authority to deal with the situation, trumping alternative solutions (e.g. economic and business) that might be more effective. Essentially, not all problems require a security solution.

A participant commented that while it is useless to try to protect everything, it is also wrong to believe that target-hardening strategies should be abandoned altogether. It was also articulated that perhaps by privatizing buildings or infrastructures, they would not be seen as being closely related to the government and thereby reducing the chances of an attack. Carafano reiterated that a resiliency strategy should not work on the principle of trying to protect or harden the security of all infrastructures. Finally, on the usage of a “consequence approach” to shape national security strategies, Carafano replied that this would only serve to restrict and subject all responses to the security dimension because national security solutions start with the presumption that the government has the power and authority to solve all problems.

## SESSION VIII

### Strategic Communications and Resilience



*Steve Corman assessing the strategic communication practices of the U.S. government*

In his presentation, **Steve Corman** critiqued the dominant model of strategic communication that is practised in the United States—the message influence model—and offered an alternative—the pragmatic complexity model—to engage the public in the face of current security challenges.

Developed in the 1950s, the message influence model assumes that communications is a set of transformation

that moves a message from a sender, over a channel, to a receiver. As a result, successful communication is achieved when a message is reliably and accurately transmitted through techniques such as the repetition of a simple message. This model became the basis for the conventional wisdom of political campaigns, business domains of public relations and marketing, and government domains of public diplomacy, information operations, and international broadcasting. However, communication theorists have recognized that communication is more complex than merely transferring thoughts from one person to another. First, there is the problem of a lack of control over the interpretation of the message by the receiver. Second, constant repetition may breed dysfunction, especially if the message is not effectively transmitted in the first place. Third, over-control of the message threatens its credibility.

Corman proposed the pragmatic complexity model as an alternative to the message influence model. This model treats communication as a complex system of

interaction between a source and an audience, where neither party is fully in control. Its key feature is the simultaneous mutual interdependence between participants of the communication process. Approaching communication in this manner goes beyond the construction and transmission of messages to focus on how they are interpreted and processed by a system with emergent properties.

Comparing the message influence model with the pragmatic complexity model, it was noted that the former focuses on implanting a message in the receiver while the latter on interpretation and attribution of action. The primary constraint of the former is communicator skill while that of the latter is double contingency, which dictates that effective communication is dependent on how the receiver interprets the message, which, in turn, is contingent on how the message is transmitted. The former dictates that communication is only necessary when there is a need to send a message while the latter posits that one cannot choose not to communicate, as it will encourage the audience to speculate on the issue. The former assumes that control of the message is possible and necessary while the latter assumes that it is impossible to do so. The former assumes that successful transmission of a message is probable unless there are obstacles in the process but the latter dictates that success is unlikely given the complexity of the system.

Corman concluded with the recommendation for resilient strategic communication. He suggested that governments (i) embrace complexity by acknowledging that control is not only impossible but inhibits variation and invites bad attribution; (ii) move from repeating a message to experimentation; and (iii) plan for failure with more contingency planning.



*Gillian Koh highlighting the challenges of crafting effective strategic communication processes to promote social resilience*

Drawing on a Singapore case study, **Gillian Koh** addressed the question of crafting an effective strategic communications process that promotes social resilience in today's world. Strategic communications is defined as a sustained process that is dynamic and iterative with the intent to precipitate change in values or belief systems where those objectives guide the execution of activities through the system. This involves a complex process of interpreting one another's actions and making attributions about their thoughts, motivations and intentions. Social resilience is defined as the capacity of a social entity to sustain and propel itself through crises, stress or change. Factors that influence social resilience include political participation, social networks and a sense of "rootedness".

First, the Community Engagement Programme (CEP) was examined to assess Singapore's strategic communication process. The CEP was implemented in response to concerns of a backlash against the Muslim population as a result of incidences of homegrown terrorists with the uncovering of the *Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)* plot in Singapore and the 7/7 London bombing. This entailed building up psychological and social resilience by establishing local networks, enabling leaders in different sectors, faith groups and races to interact on a continual basis to develop social bonds and common understanding, and creating local platforms for crisis preparedness and the management of ethnic and religious tensions. In her assessment of the CEP as a strategic communications process, it was observed that it is a government-led initiative due to the sensitivity of the issue. Nevertheless, it presents the potential for a bottom-up approach as the members are encouraged to design their own plans and approaches to enhance social bonding. This also allows for complexity

and variation to flourish and enhance community ownership and empowerment of the issues at hand. However, challenges include buy-in from certain groups, proof of effect and members sceptically viewed as government agents.

The second case was the dissemination of information pertaining to the escape of JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari from a detention facility. In particular, the diverse perspectives of the government leaders, security officials, civil society and citizens were examined. Some of the issues highlighted included the self-censorship of the media, the need for timely engagement versus full factual information, the state's confidence in the community versus the people's confidence in the authorities and resilience versus complacency.

In conclusion, Koh reiterated that there is no magic bullet for resilient strategic communications. Rather, more needs to be focused on how the message is being received, and adjustments and re-adjustments to be made in a direction that facilitates greater mutual understanding and trust.

## Discussion

Four key issues were raised. First, it was observed that humour in the form of satire and parodies could play a role in strategic communications by offering an

alternative approach and viewpoint to a heavy topic. Rather than reacting to it in a defensive manner, governments could see this as feedback on how their messages are being interpreted so as to improve on it.

Second, instead of targeting a general audience, it would be more effective to identify key groups and individuals to disseminate the message to so that they can in turn disseminate it to the wider society. While this strategy may, in principle, appear efficient, the challenge lies in identifying the right individuals. Even then, the problem of misinterpretation will not be overcome and the refusal to engage with the target audience may result in other problems.

Third, there are concerns that the adjustment and re-adjustment of messages may be viewed as inconsistency, which will in turn undermine the state's credibility. It was clarified that the solution lies in humility and being candid about the lack of information from the very beginning, which is different from repeating a message and abruptly changing it.

Finally, it was noted that the creation of more non-bureaucratic platforms would allow for the exchange of views and the discussion of issues that engages the man-on-the-street. Moreover, new media only gains legitimacy when the mainstream media is discredited in the eyes of the public.

## SESSION IX

### Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning



*Edna Tan presenting the risk assessment and horizon scanning project in Singapore*

**Edna Tan** opined that as the global and local landscapes shift in dramatic ways, extant governmental and organizational approaches to thinking about the future need to evolve as well. In this respect, Singapore's Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning (RAHS) programme emerged out of the recognition that, in an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, policymakers and analysts need to be able to better anticipate strategic surprises and asymmetric threats.

Tan elaborated on some of the key highlights of the strategic roadmap for RAHS. For a start, Exercise Radiance—a maritime security-themed exercise with the primary objective of evaluating the current operational baseline of RAHS—was conducted in March 2008. The exercise was an attempt to determine how analysts were able to piece information together and identify potential threats using RAHS. More importantly, results from the exercise would provide NSCC with a good sense of the current baseline capabilities of RAHS, which would help chart the way forward for the development of RAHS 2.0.

Second, NSCC intends to launch a RAHS portal soon. It will be a one-stop destination for a whole host of RAHS products. Users, for instance, will have access to features such as RAHS system outputs (like dashboards, system maps and ranking models) created by agencies within the RAHS network and the Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC), and general horizon scanning news published by the HSC to monitor trends and issues of interest. Users will also be able to access information from a data library, which covers a whole range of issues such as pandemic surveillance, maritime security, energy security and economic trends.

Meanwhile, other roadmap highlights include features such as (i) the launch of a RAHS website; (ii) thematic workshops; (iii) experiments to test new tools and their potential integration with RAHS; and (iv) outreach initiatives. The outreach strategy, in particular, seeks to extend RAHS to the local universities so that students and faculty can use the system for their research. At the same time, it also seeks to establish a trusted network of domain experts on whom NSCC can tap for better detection and “sense-making” of weak signals. Finally, the outreach strategy aims to extend horizon scanning beyond Singapore's national border by building links with like-minded agencies at an international level.

Tan also shared that, as part of addressing the challenges and approaches to implementing horizon scanning solutions in government and across various domains, NSCC would be hosting the Second International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium (IRAHSS 08), aptly themed “Realizing the Vision: Challenges and Solutions”.

In conclusion, Tan emphasized that it is the collective effort of the network of agencies that makes RAHS effective. With the help and support of these agencies, NSCC hopes to expand the network to include more domains and agencies, and to institutionalize collaboration and knowledge sharing. This will help Singapore to be better equipped to seize opportunities, and be better prepared for strategic shocks that may lie ahead on the horizon.

## Discussion

An interesting question posed was whether the RAHS system has the capacity to model social resilience. Concerning this, Tan stressed that RAHS is essentially a tool to augment—not replace—the analyst. In other words, the output of the system depended on the way the analyst frames the governing question. So if the control question relates, for example, to the level of social resilience in Singapore, Tan answered that it is

possible to use the RAHS system to construct system maps that chart out the various variables that impact social resilience.

The other question raised concerned the level of system security of RAHS and whether it was conceivable that radicals could access the system. Tan clarified that the RAHS system essentially operates on two levels of connectivity: a classified government intranet and an open unclassified network. For the closed classified network, the system requires pre-assigned user identifications as well as passwords to access. In addition, even after entering the network, a user may still need to obtain permission before being allowed entry to work on existing system models. As for the open unclassified version, Tan commented that it is technically separate from the closed network and will be suitable for external partners in the outreach initiatives.

Rapporteurs: Hoo Tiang Boon, Ng Sue Chia,  
Greg Dalziel, Yolanda Chin and Nirupama Keshav

Edited by: Yolanda Chin

This report summarizes the proceedings of the conference as interpreted by the assigned rapporteurs and editor of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Participants neither reviewed nor approved this report.



# 2ND ASIA-PACIFIC PROGRAMME FOR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICERS

The Sentosa Resort and Spa, Singapore  
13-18 April 2008

## Sunday, 13 April 2008

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1900 – 2130 Welcome Dinner hosted by  
Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean,  
S. Rajaratnam School of International  
Studies (RSIS)

1330 – 1530 **Session II: Conceptualizing National  
Security and Resilience**

Speakers:

**Robert Ayson**, Senior Fellow,  
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,  
Australian National University

## Monday, 14 April 2008

0930 – 0955 Opening Remarks  
**Ambassador Barry Desker**, Dean,  
S. Rajaratnam School of International  
Studies (RSIS)

**David Heyman**, Director and  
Senior Fellow, Homeland Security  
Programme, Centre for Strategic and  
International Studies

Opening Address

**Professor S Jayakumar**,  
Deputy Prime Minister,  
Co-ordinating Minister for National  
Security and Minister for Law, Singapore

Chairperson:

**Terence Lee**, Assistant Professor, RSIS

1530 – 1545 Coffee Break

0955 – 1015 Group Photo-taking

1545 – 1630 Syndicate Discussion

1015 – 1100 Reception/ Coffee Break

1430 – 1900 Free and Easy

1100 – 1130 Introduction to CENS and APPSNO  
**Kumar Ramakrishna**, Head,  
Centre of Excellence for National  
Security (CENS), RSIS

1900 Dinner hosted by  
Lee Ark Boon, Director, NSCC

**End of Day 1**

1130 – 1230 **Session I: Singapore's National  
Security Framework**

**Tuesday, 15 April 2008**

Speaker:

**Lee Ark Boon**, Director,  
National Security Coordination Centre  
(NSCC), Prime Minister's Office,  
Singapore

0830 – 1000 Foreign Participant Presentations on  
Homeland Security Management

1000 – 1130 **Session III: Transnational Terrorism:  
Global and Regional Trends**

Chairperson:

**Kumar Ramakrishna**, Head,  
Centre of Excellence for National  
Security (CENS), RSIS

Speaker:

**Rohan Gunaratna**, Head,  
International Centre for Political Violence  
and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), RSIS

Chairperson:  
**John Harrison**, Assistant Professor,  
ICPVTR, RSIS

1130 – 1145 Coffee Break

1145 – 1230 Syndicate Discussion

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1330 – 1530 **Session IV: Resilience  
and Radicalization**

Speakers:  
**Mohammed Bin Ali**, Associate  
Research Fellow, ICPVTR, RSIS

**Stephen Ulph**, Senior Fellow,  
Jamestown Foundation

Chairperson:  
**Kumar Ramakrishna**, Head,  
Centre of Excellence for National  
Security (CENS), RSIS

1530 – 1545 Coffee Break

1545 – 1630 Syndicate Discussion

1630 – 1830 Free and Easy

1830 Cocktails followed by Distinguished  
Dinner Lecture hosted by Barry Desker,  
Dean, RSIS

**Distinguished Dinner Lecture:  
Security, Resilience and the State**

Speaker:  
**Lord John Alderdice**, Member,  
House of Lords

Chairperson:  
**Barry Desker**, Dean, RSIS

**End of Day 2**

**Wednesday, 16 April 2008**

0830 – 1000 Foreign Participant Presentations on  
Homeland Security Management

1000 – 1130 **Session V: Public Health, National  
Security and Resilience**

Speaker:  
**Laurie Garrett**, Senior Fellow for Global  
Health, Council on Foreign Relations

Chairperson:  
Mely Caballero-Anthony,  
Associate Professor, RSIS

1130 – 1145 Coffee Break

1145 – 1230 Syndicate Discussion

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1330 – 1530 **Session VI: Social Resilience and  
National Security**

Speakers:  
**Chandran Kukathas**,  
Department of Government,  
London School of Economics

**Rachel Briggs**,  
Head of Identity Programme, Demos

Chairperson:  
**Norman Vasu**, Assistant Professor,  
CENS, RSIS

1530 – 1545 Coffee Break

1545 – 1630 Syndicate Discussion

**End of Day 3**

## Thursday, 17 April 2008

0830 – 1000 Foreign Participant Presentations on Homeland Security Management

### 1000 – 1130 **Session VII: Business and Economic Resilience**

Speaker:

**James Carafano**, Assistant Director, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Senior Research Fellow, Douglas and Sarah Allison Centre for Foreign Policy Studies

Chairperson:

**Deborah Elms**, Assistant Professor and Deputy Head of Studies, RSIS

1130 – 1145 Coffee Break

1145 – 1230 Syndicate Discussion

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1400 – 1800 City tour

### End of Day 4

## Friday, 18 April 2008

0830 – 1000 Foreign Participant Presentations on Homeland Security Management

1000 – 1020 Coffee Break

### 1020 – 1230 **Session VIII: Strategic Communications and Resilience**

Speakers:

**Steve Corman**, Director, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Hugh Downs School of Human Communication, Arizona State University

**Gillian Koh**, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Policy Studies

Chairperson:

**Rajesh Manohar Basrur**, Assistant Professor, RSIS

1230 – 1330 Lunch

1330 – 1415 Syndicate Discussion

1415 – 1430 Coffee Break

### 1430 – 1530 **Session IX: Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning**

Speaker:

**Edna Tan**, Assistant Director, National Security Coordination Centre

Chairperson:

**Kumar Ramakrishna**, Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security (GENS), RSIS

1530 – 1600 Course Evaluation

1600 – 1900 Free and Easy

1900 Certificate Presentation Ceremony and Closing Dinner hosted by Peter Ho, Permanent Secretary for National Security and Intelligence Co-ordination (NSIC), Singapore

### End of Programme

# LIST OF SPEAKERS AND CHAIRPERSONS

1. Lord John Alderdice  
Member  
House of Lords  
United Kingdom
2. Mr. Mohammed Bin Ali  
Associate Research Fellow  
International Centre for Political Violence and  
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S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
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3. Dr. Robert Ayson  
Senior Fellow  
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre  
Australian National University  
Australia
4. Associate Professor Rajesh Manohar Basrur  
Associate Professor  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Singapore
5. Ms. Rachel Briggs  
Head of Identity Programme  
Demos  
United Kingdom
6. Associate Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony  
Associate Professor  
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies  
Singapore
7. Dr. James Carafano  
Assistant Director  
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for  
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United States
8. Professor Steve Corman  
Director  
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Hugh Downs School of Human Communication  
Arizona State University  
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9. Ambassador Barry Desker  
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10. Dr. Deborah Elms  
Assistant Professor, Deputy Head of Graduate  
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11. Ms. Laurie Garrett  
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15. Dr. Gillian Koh  
Senior Research Fellow  
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16. Professor Chandran Kukathas  
Professor  
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17. Mr. Lee Ark Boon  
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18. Dr. Terence Lee  
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21. Mr. Stephen Ulph  
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22. Dr. Norman Vasu  
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**The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS)** is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

## Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategizing national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategizing national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office.

## What Research Does CENS Do?

CENS currently conducts research in three key areas of national security:

- Risk Assessment/Horizon Scanning
  - The art and science of detecting “weak signals” emanating from the total security

environment so as to forewarn policymakers, the private sector and the public about approaching “shocks” such as terrorism, pandemics, energy crises and other easy-to-miss trends and ostensibly distant events.

- Social Resilience
  - The capacity of globalized, multicultural societies to hold together in the face of systemic shocks such as diseases and terrorist strikes.
- Homeland Defence Programme
  - The security of land-based, aviation and maritime transport networks and increasingly, the total supply chain vital to Singapore's economic vitality.
  - Health, water and food security.
  - Crisis communications and management.

## How Does CENS Help Influence National Security Policy?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organizes courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

### **How Does CENS Help Raise Public Awareness of National Security Issues?**

To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as risk assessment and horizon scanning, multiculturalism and social resilience, intelligence reform and defending critical infrastructure against mass-casualty terrorist attacks

### **How Does CENS Keep Abreast of Cutting Edge National Security Research?**

The lean organizational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

### ***For More on CENS***

***Log on to <http://www.rsis.edu.sg> and follow the links to “Centre of Excellence for National Security”.***

**The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)** was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. RSIS's mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education in international affairs with a strong practical and area emphasis
- Conduct policy-relevant research in national security, defence and strategic studies, diplomacy and international relations
- Collaborate with like-minded schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence

### **Graduate Training in International Affairs**

RSIS offers an exacting graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (MSc) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations, and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Over 120 students, the majority from abroad, are enrolled in these programmes. A small, select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students whose interests match those of specific faculty members. RSIS also runs a one-semester course on '*The International Relations of the Asia Pacific*' for undergraduates in NTU.

### **Research**

RSIS research is conducted by five constituent Institutes and Centres: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, founded 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2002), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for the Advanced Study of Regionalism and Multilateralism (CASRM, 2007); and the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in ASIA (NTS-Asia, 2007). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region. The S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies brings distinguished scholars and practitioners to participate in the work of the Institute. Previous holders of the Chair include Professors Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Wang Jisi, Alastair Iain Johnston, John Mearsheimer, Raja Mohan, and Rosemary Foot.

### **International Collaboration**

Collaboration with other professional Schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS will initiate links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

# ABOUT NSCS

**The National Security Coordination Secretariat (NSCS)** was set up in the Prime Minister's Office in Jul 2004 to facilitate national security policy coordination from a Whole-Of-Government perspective. NSCS reports to the Prime Minister through the Coordinating Minister for National Security (CMNS). The current CMNS is the Deputy Prime Minister Professor S. Jayakumar, who is also Minister for Law.

NSCS is headed by Permanent Secretary (National Security and Intelligence Coordination). The current PS(NSIC) is Mr Peter Ho, who is concurrently Head of Civil Service and Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

NSCS provides support to the ministerial-level Security Policy Review Committee (SPRC) and Senior official-level National Security Coordination Committee (NSCCom) and Intelligence Coordinating Committee (ICC). It organises and manages national security programmes, one example being the Asia-Pacific Programme for National Security Officers. NSCS also funds experimental, research or start-up projects that contribute to our national security.

NSCS is made up of two components: the National Security Coordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre (JCTC). Each centre is headed by a director.

NSCC performs three vital roles in Singapore's national security: national security planning, policy coordination, and anticipating strategic threats. As a coordinating body, NSCC ensures that government agencies complement each other, and do not duplicate or perform competing tasks.

JCTC is a strategic analysis unit that compiles a holistic picture of terrorist threat. It studies the levels of preparedness in areas such as maritime terrorism and chemical, biological and radiological terrorist threats. It also maps out the consequences should an attack in that domain take place.

More information on NSCS can be found at [www.nscs.gov.sg](http://www.nscs.gov.sg)



## **S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University