International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects:

Case Study of East Africa

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SUMMARY

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) are a serious threat to the security and development of East Africa. However, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are tackling the illicit trade in SALW, developing new legislation, defining national objectives, and in some cases implementing action plans, and coordinating with the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the East Africa Community. Yet due to the lack of capacity and the extent of the SALW problem in the subregion, international assistance in implementing SALW programmes is necessary. Most SALW assistance received between 2001 and 2005 went toward disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes; only 5% of assistance was used to implement other SALW projects, primarily in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Each of the five states presented in this case study are at different levels of implementation and have different capacities available to implement the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

By early 2008, the states will have passed revised policies and legislation on SALW, and thus assistance in awareness-raising on, training in and enforcement of the policies and legislation will be key. Strengthening the capacity of the National Focal Points is a particular priority for Burundi and Rwanda, and improving the capacity and resources available along borders and at border entry points, record-keeping, stockpile security and management, and marking of arms are among the top needs consistently identified by states in the subregion. In addition to presenting the results of the case study on international assistance in East Africa, this report also includes some general policy recommendations for improving resource mobilization. Individual profiles of each state, outlining SALW action and needs for assistance, are presented at the end of the report.

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This case study was conducted as part of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) project on “International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons”, which aims to facilitate the matching of resources to needs and resource mobilization. More information on the project can be found on UNIDIR’s website at <www.unidir.org>.

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INTRODUCTION

When negotiating the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA), the international community unanimously agreed to “undertake to cooperate and to ensure coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons”.1 From 2001 through 2005, states contributed an estimated US$ 660 million toward PoA-related activities to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and its impacts.2 However, there is no established framework for mobilizing resources to implement the PoA or to help match needs and resources, and international assistance has often been allocated in an ad hoc, uncoordinated manner. States have only recently started focusing their discussions on resource mobilization.

This report discusses international assistance and resource mobilization, drawing specifically from the results of a case study in East Africa. The case study, undertaken in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, is part of a larger project on international assistance for implementing the PoA conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The project, which began in 2006 with the financial support of Austria, Canada, Finland and the United States of America, aims to provide information on international assistance, facilitate communication on the types of assistance states require to implement the PoA, and to improve resource mobilization and the matching of needs with resources.

The five East African countries were selected for the case study for a number of reasons. On the one hand, a wide range of SALW-related problems can be found in the subregion, from local insurgencies and banditry to pastoralist violence and cattle-rustling, trafficking and urban crime among others. On the other hand, the subregion has demonstrated the willingness to address SALW at the international, regional and national levels, particularly in terms of the active role of the Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), the secretariat of the Nairobi Protocol;3 Kenya’s engagement with the United Kingdom on the issue of transfers; and the concrete steps taken at national level in developing and implementing action plans.

Further, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are members of the East African Community (EAC), which Burundi and Rwanda are in the process of joining. The EAC is preparing for regional and economic integration, which will include a customs union (2005), common market (2008), monetary union (2010) and political federation (2014). The first two steps facilitate the movement of people and goods, which has serious implications for security and the proliferation of small arms.4 The EAC regards “equally paced progress” in

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3 The Regional Center on Small Arms (RECSA) is the secretariat of the Nairobi Protocol and collaborates with National Focal Points (NFPs) to implement workshops and training and allocates some financial assistance to its members. Twelve countries of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa are RECSA members. See <www.recsasec.org>.
4 Interview with Leonard M. Onyonyi, East African Community (EAC), Moshi, Tanzania, 15 February 2007. Mr. Onyonyi noted that “small arms are the Achilles’ heel to integration.”
implementing the Nairobi Protocol as essential to prevent a destabilizing backlash, and thus is working closely with RECSA to address SALW in the EAC member states.5

In early 2007 UNIDIR researchers travelled to these states to interview members of the National Focal Points (NFPs) on small arms. Known also as National Commissions, National Points of Contact or National Coordinating Bodies,6 the NFPs in East Africa consist of representatives from all of the government bodies that are national stakeholders in the SALW issue and often include civil society organizations. UNIDIR also interviewed individuals from international, regional and civil society organizations implementing SALW programmes in the subregion. The purpose of the interviews was to identify the main challenges of addressing the illicit trade of SALW in the subregion and to bring to the fore details of the types of assistance that the states require to effectively implement the PoA. In addition to presenting the results of the case study on international assistance in East Africa, this report also includes policy recommendations for improving resource mobilization. Individual profiles of each state, outlining SALW action and needs for assistance, are presented at the end of the report.

THE SALW SITUATION IN EAST AFRICA

As stated above, East Africa faces a broad range of SALW problems. For instance, violent cattle rustling affects the pastoralist lands of northern Kenya, eastern Uganda, south-eastern Sudan and western Somalia; ethnic tensions affect the border regions of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda; rebel groups have provided mutual support in southern Sudan and in northern Uganda; and armed violence impacts the major cities. The reasons for arming, and consequently what will enable disarming, vary across the subregion irrespective of political boundaries. Rather, ethnic, economic and environmental factors have a predominant influence on how and where these problems manifest.7 And given their geographic extent, a subregional approach to SALW problems is essential for combating the illegal trade in SALW.

Furthermore, four of these five countries—Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda—are classified as Least Developed Countries. While the low level of development negatively impacts a state’s capacity to monitor and control the illicit trade in SALW and reduces a state’s ability to provide protection and security for its population, the overall lack of economic opportunity for the population fosters rivalries, disputes over resources and crime. Although security or development concerns may take precedence in

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5 The EAC allocates funding to RECSA to implement technical activities and the EAC countries continue to benefit from RECSA’s mandate. Whereas the EAC is a political body interested in promoting the Nairobi Protocol and supporting RECSA’s activities in the five EAC members, RECSA remains the secretariat charged with implementing the Nairobi Protocol in the subregion. Regular coordination meetings between the two aim to ensure that there is no duplication of activities.

6 In section II, paragraph 4, the PoA stipulates that states should establish “national coordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”. In paragraph 5 of the same section, states undertake to establish a national point of contact to liaise among states on PoA matters. The term National Focal Point (NFP), used in the Nairobi Protocol to refer to the national coordinating body for SALW issues, is used most frequently among the East African states.

7 This point was also clearly expressed in interviews with Willet Weeks, Senior Advisor, Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE) Programme, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), Nairobi, Kenya, January 2007, and Sam Kona, Regional Advisor, Peace in East and Central Africa (PEACE) Programme, Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), Nairobi, Kenya, January 2007.
a specific location or at a given time, security and development are inextricably linked in East Africa. As a representative of the EAC stated, “You can disarm those arguing over a waterhole, but that doesn’t make another waterhole … the problem remains”. In poverty-stricken areas, individuals are more concerned about basic needs and property protection than they are about the inconvenience and cost of registering or relinquishing an illegal or unmarked weapon. In such contexts, it is difficult for communities to see the long-term value of SALW control.

Further, economic stress can increase the likelihood of corruption. For instance, Local Defence Forces in Uganda have been used to increase the manpower available for enforcing the rule of law. However, with little or no financial compensation for their work and often with limited oversight, these armed volunteers have been known to turn a blind eye to crimes committed by their tribes or to be themselves accomplices to crimes. A similar situation is found in Kenya.

The subregion lacks the necessary equipment, training and manpower for border control, while arms smugglers exploit the unpatrolled areas in between checkpoints. Existing border procedures and systems, for issues such as immigration and revenue, often do not take account of SALW-related matters. Surveillance of the Great Lakes is very weak despite the fact that they serve as a significant transit point for arms smuggling. Airports have basic screening technology, however there are no procedures for investigating irregular and emergency landings; those interviewed wished to know more about the risks such pose in terms of arms diversion in the subregion. Similarly, although the coordinators of the NFPs are aware of the multilateral discussions on brokering, the majority of other departments had little practical understanding of the issue and the extent of the problem in their respective countries.

Another major problem in the subregion is the lack of national control of arms due to ineffective record-keeping systems of private and state stocks. In order for states to monitor and account for stocks, there must be an effective record-keeping system in which data can be easily accessed and retrieved. Tanzania is the only country to have a

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8 In northern Uganda and north-western Burundi, for instance, the primary emphasis has been on establishing security since the situation was not conducive to sustainable development. However, advancements toward peace in these regions will depend on the sustainable opportunities available for reintegrated former combatants. Disarmament has proven ineffectual in the Karamoja region of eastern Uganda, due to inadequate efforts to provide alternative livelihoods to cattle-rustling or to provide solutions to disputes over resources.

9 Interview with Leonard M. Onyonyi, East African Community (EAC), Moshi, Tanzania, 15 February 2007.

10 The same arguments were expressed in interviews with Elly Oduol, Assistant Resident Representative, Enhanced Security Unit, UNDP Kenya, 25 January 2007; Jacques Ntibarikure, President, Colonie des Pionniers de Développement, Bujumbura, Burundi, 31 January 2007; Christine Muhongerwa, Coordinator of SaferRwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, 5 February 2007; and members of the Uganda Action Network on Small Arms (UANSA) Rose Othieno, administrative officer, Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), and Richard Mugisha, director of People with Disabilities, Kampala, Uganda, 8 February 2007. The interviewees referred to how local populations respond to public awareness and education on SALW, Mr. Mugisha characterized the public feeling as “What does this bring next? How does this help me today?” and stating “With the level of extreme poverty people think about their immediate needs and not ‘planning for tomorrow’.”

11 Interview with Maj. Aloysius Kagoro, Uganda People’s Defense Force representative to the National Focal Point, Kampala, Uganda, February 2007. He stated that the Local Defence Forces (LDF) were initially quite helpful and can be an effective resource if there is sufficient oversight, which is said to be one army officer for every LDF corps. He also stated that the oversight is not “foolproof” and members of the LDF have been known to be accomplices on occasion, especially if there is a conflict of interest along tribal lines. The interview also revealed that both the LDF and army personnel have been known to find guns and sell them for profit.

centralized registry of firearms, though currently the system only addresses civilian-held arms and cannot be accessed outside of Dar es Salaam. Furthermore, an effective record-keeping system requires arms to have markings. However, marking equipment and adequate training on marking is severely lacking in the subregion. Linked to effective record-keeping and marking is stockpile management and security, weak storage facilities being a problem throughout the subregion. At best, SALW and ammunition may be held in separate containers in a storage facility. Contrary to best practice, these states rely upon expiration dates labelled on ammunition to assess the stability of these stocks.13

A strong administrative and governing sector is essential to sustain the benefits of any initiative to address the illicit trade in SALW and to deter the types of crime that flourish as a result of weak infrastructure. SALW-related assistance activities that are implemented in isolation to development and building national capacity are likely to offer only temporary fixes. Thus, Uganda has included the issue of SALW within its national poverty reduction plan, an approach that is gaining popularity in other parts of the globe.

SUMMARY OF SMALL ARMS ACTION IN EAST AFRICA

NAIROBI PROTOCOL

The driving force behind small arms action in East Africa is the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. While the East African states recognize the international significance of the PoA, the Nairobi Protocol is more prominent since member states are legally required to implement its provisions and the Protocol is tailored to regional concerns.14 Signed in 2004 and with the Best Practice Guidelines on Implementation of the Protocol following in 2005, the Nairobi Protocol entered into force in May 2006.

As required, all five East African states have established NFPs to oversee implementation of the Protocol, which are also the points of contact for PoA implementation15 and the focal points for SALW-related activities of the EAC. The NFPs in East Africa consist of representatives from the police forces, national defence forces, various ministries (such as Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Immigration), and representatives from civil society in varying numbers.

Each of the five states have reviewed and modified their legislation in accordance with the provisions outlined in the Nairobi Protocol, which aims to harmonize the SALW legislation of its member states. Among other measures, the states are required to:

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13 “The concept of ‘shelf-life’ (i.e. the length of time an item of ammunition may be stored before the performance of that ammunition degrades) is not a reliable indicator of the safety and stability of ammunition in storage. The safety and stability of ammunition and explosives can only be established by a comprehensive ‘ammunition surveillance’ system involving both physical inspection by trained personnel and chemical analysis.” Owen Green, Sally Holt and Adrian Wilkinson, Ammunition Stocks: Promoting Safe and Secure Storage and Disposal, Biting the Bullet series in association with SEESAC, Briefing 18, 2005

14 The member states are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

15 The NFP contact information is available at <www.recsasec.org/branches.htm>.
• criminalize the illicit trafficking, illicit manufacturing, illicit possession and misuse of SALW;
• restrict civilian possession of small arms, and prohibit civilian possession of light weapons and automatic or semi-automatic rifles and machine guns;
• control civilian possession of small arms, including competency testing of prospective small arms owners, monitoring and auditing of licenses and centralized registration of all civilian-owned small arms;
• promote legal uniformity and minimum standards regarding the manufacture, control, possession, import, export, re-export, transit, transport and transfer of SALW;
• ensure standardized marking and criminalize the falsifying, removing or altering of markings;
• establish effective control of SALW, including the storage and usage;
• regulate brokering; and
• promote legal uniformity in the sphere of sentencing.\textsuperscript{16}

The NFPs anticipate their respective governments to approve the policies and legislation by the end of 2007. A common version of the policies and legislation, once finalized, will define the minimum standards on the issue of SALW for the EAC and will also serve as a model for other members of the Nairobi Protocol.

\textbf{NATIONAL ACTION PLANS}

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, in cooperation with local and international civil society organizations, have conducted assessments of the SALW situation in their territories. The results of these assessments informed the development of National Action Plans (NAPs). These plans set a state’s agenda on SALW for a period of five years. The types of international assistance sought are to support implementation of the NAP objectives.

Burundi and Rwanda are in the early stages of preparing NAPs. Funded by Belgium and in collaboration with RECSA, two civil society organizations, the Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP, Belgium) and the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC, Kenya), are assisting the NFPs to assess the SALW situation in Burundi and Rwanda. The assessments are expected to feed into the development of NAPs for both states. In addition, Burundi has prepared a National Strategy to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and to Promote Civilian Disarmament, which was adopted in October 2006.\textsuperscript{17}

Not only are NAPs useful for guiding SALW activities, they can also reassure donors that there is a framework in place to make optimal use of assistance funding. The dissemination of NAPs is also an important awareness-raising and confidence-building tool as the public becomes more informed of the government’s actions to address SALW. Civil society organizations and local communities can prepare activities to support the

\textsuperscript{16} The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, 21 April 2004, art. 3.

\textsuperscript{17} Burundi, Stratégie nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre et de désarmement des civils, 12 October 2006. The strategy is elaborated upon in the individual country case study at the end of this report.
NAP and, by comparing the content of NAP against the practical steps taken by the government, the public can commend the government for its action and question any inaction.

NAPs outline a state’s objectives and commitments for a designated period; however, they do not distinguish between activities that a state is capable of implementing and activities with which they will require assistance. In this regard, Uganda holds regular donor meetings and Kenya states that it is in the process of developing a resource mobilization strategy. Nevertheless, it is essential for national and international resources to be mobilized early in the NAP preparation phase. Delays in funding can hinder a NAP’s effective implementation, which can undermine public confidence in the state’s handling of SALW issues, having serious implications for disarmament and security.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

RECSA, the secretariat charged with overseeing implementation of the Protocol, has played an instrumental role in building momentum on SALW issues by working closely with NFPs, conducting training programmes, hosting workshops and building regional capacity to address SALW. Member states are expected to provide 30% of RECSA’s budget through annual contributions. The remaining 70% depends on international assistance coming mainly from Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Largely supported by Germany’s Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the EAC will provide approximately €3.7 million (US$ 5 million) over a six-year period (2005–2011) for implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. This will support activities such as an exchange programme, in which member states would send government officials to learn the best practices applied by other states and to provide constructive feedback on their systems and practices.

Other activities in the subregion include regular meetings of the East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) to discuss training and coordination on crime- and SALW-related matters and the six-month project Silaha Haramu conducted by the Interpol subregional bureau in Nairobi, Kenya, which investigates arms trafficking in the participating states of Kenya, South Africa and Tanzania and in partnership with organizations such as the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, RECSA, UNDP and the World Customs Organization.

Between 2001 and 2005, the states of the subregion received approximately US$ 125 million in PoA-related international assistance. Ninety-five percent of this

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18 “Progress Report on the implementation since the last Extraordinary Council of Ministers of April 2006”, 4th Ministerial Review Conference on the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol, Kampala, Uganda, 2007, presentation by Francis K. Sang, Executive Secretary of RECSA.

19 Presentation by Elisa Kabera, Interpol Sub-regional Bureau, at the 5th National Focal Point coordinators annual meeting, Nairobi, Kenya, 12 October 2006.

20 As noted in the 2006 global survey, there are a number of methodological challenges that bias the financial figures in particular. The main challenge being that many of the activities in an assistance project fall under one broad heading, not crediting the individual nature of each activity. In such cases, the authors would place the financial amount under what appeared to be the main objective of the project and count the additional activities under “frequency activity was included as part of another activity”. The figures also may not fully account for certain research and awareness-raising activities that international civil society organizations implemented with support from donor governments. See Kerry Maze and Sarah Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action*
assistance went to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme in Burundi, the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in Rwanda and the MDRP/Amnesty Commission reintegration programme in Uganda. The remaining 5% (approximately US$ 6 million) was allocated to address other issues of the PoA, primarily in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Figure 1 indicates the types and numbers of activities, and the respective amount of assistance received. DDR-related activities are not included in the chart since the funding difference is too great to give a clear representation of the other activities.

The chart is intended to give a general idea of how international assistance has been distributed across the range of PoA issues. The figures are based on the responses of a survey UNIDIR conducted in 2006 in which states listed the international assistance they either provided or received to implement the PoA, as well as on the interviews held in East Africa.

Most assistance for destruction and record-keeping was part of a SALW management and reduction project in Tanzania funded by the European Commission. International assistance allocated to Uganda mainly covered capacity-building, support for the NFP, awareness-raising and child protection. A UNDP project provided the majority of assistance to Kenya, focusing on SALW reduction in Garissa District. The civil society organization Norwegian Church Aid has been the sole financial supporter of SALW activities in Rwanda, although RECSA once provided a small contribution to support the

*to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2006, pp.3, 5, 8–9.*
The breakdown of assistance per country is included in the profiles at the end of this report.

The United States initiated a Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. PISCES is a counter-terrorism tool to network air, land and sea points of entry with a state’s immigration, police and intelligence services. However, the project was suspended pending review by the United States and, at the time of writing, the officials interviewed were unaware of when or whether the project would continue.

COMMON AREAS OF ASSISTANCE REQUIRED

A well-resourced NFP is essential for effective coordination and oversight of the SALW activities of a state. In the four states classified as Least Developed Countries—Tanzania, Uganda, and particularly Burundi and Rwanda—NFPs face severe technical and financial constraints. NFP coordinators can often be over-stretched and under-resourced, particularly as they are expected to address all SALW-related matters at the international, regional, national and local levels. UNDP’s sponsorship of United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) to the Uganda NFP, and the use of UNVs in UNDP’s project in Garissa District, proved useful in increasing the manpower available to support coordination of the NFP (Uganda) and implementation of SALW activities (Kenya).

Officials from each of the five states identified customs and borders as a top priority, in terms of improving the manpower, infrastructure and technical resources available at border entry points and for the surveillance of borders between checkpoints. Other priorities commonly identified include establishing a centralized firearms registry that is accessible at the district level, improving stockpile management, including physical assessments, strengthening storage facilities, training and record-keeping of stocks; marking of SALW; awareness-raising; and building the capacity of the regional and district levels to address SALW.

All government entities permitted access to weapons (national law enforcement, local reservists, administrative police, armed forces, wildlife protection, prison officials, etc.) will have to be trained in the new legislation. For many of the officials interviewed, this is also viewed as an opportunity to raise the profile of SALW issues and the PoA in order to give officials a better sense of their work in relation to global efforts. Training will be an important step for Burundi in particular. The post-conflict restructuring of police and security systems has resulted in national and local law enforcement having officials with varied training and backgrounds, often established in the context of war. Standardized training would greatly help areas such as law enforcement, stockpile management, and customs and border procedures.

21 Questionnaire response from RECSA, as part of Kerry Maze and Sarah Parker, *International Assistance for Implementing the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects: Findings of a Global Survey*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2006.

22 Tanzania already has a centralized registry in place, however it is not connected at the district level and they are currently reviewing and correcting the data for the registry.
Once the states have approved and passed their respective policies and legislation, as explained above, there will be a need for awareness-raising and training. Civilians, for instance, will have to be made aware of their rights, be informed of what is prohibited under the new legislation and be informed of the consequences for breaking the law. The provisions will need to be made available in various local languages and summarized in plain language that can be easily understood by individuals with limited education. Radio broadcasts and community meetings will also be necessary to educate the public on the new legislation. All awareness-raising efforts must be continuous to accommodate the movement of population (refugees and returning populations) in the subregion, as well as youths coming of age to legally possess weapons. This is an opportune area for engaging local civil society groups throughout the subregion.

COMMON CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Although rural areas in the subregion tend to be less developed than the major cities, the latter are often the main beneficiaries of international assistance since these areas are where the national agencies, as well as most international and civil society organizations, tend to be based. Activities in rural areas are often limited, for example, because access can be difficult for security reasons or because resources are less available and project costs are higher there. For these same reasons, when assistance does reach these areas, follow-up efforts may be limited. For instance, weapons collection programmes may not be followed by activities to ensure success, such as awareness-raising, community policing and confidence-building measures.23

Another challenge associated with receiving international assistance is the short funding cycle of SALW projects. Donors often allocate funding for a period of one or two years, making it difficult for NFPs to plan for the longer term.24 Short funding cycles can also limit the comprehensiveness of a project and hinder coordination and the building and strengthening of partnerships. Furthermore, there can be shortfalls in funding while new funding arrangements are discussed, which is more frequent when funding cycles are shorter.

Many projects are delayed for extended periods of time for bureaucratic or security reasons. The high turn-over rates typical of diplomatic and international communities that generally administer assistance, coupled with often limited human resources and sometimes slow bureaucratic processes of the recipient state,25 can additionally lead to project ideas losing momentum or being postponed for lack of follow-up. In other cases, strict or inflexible budget lines in assistance funding cannot absorb unforeseen or increased project costs (for example, more former combatants to be reintegrated than


25 A number of assistance providers interviewed commented on the difficulty of receiving responses to urgent matters due to bureaucratic hierarchies and long chains of command, particularly in Kenya.
anticipated, more arms being handed over at collection sites than expected, a changing security environment, currency fluctuations), which means that projects are delayed while new funding is secured.

Since developing states often lack the financial resources to bridge shortfalls in funding, activities may be only partially implemented or put on hold, which can have a negative impact on communities if they involve delivering promised incentives and reintegration benefits. As a Ugandan military officer expressed, “Donor funding stopping mid-way through projects, it’s like telling a cancer patient half-way through treatment that they have to wait for medication”.26

Effective resource mobilization is critical to international assistance and has a direct impact on the effectiveness and timeliness of a SALW project.27 Both donor and recipient states face a number of challenges in mobilizing resources. For donors, these include:

- lack of knowledge of the technical and financial needs of states;
- lack of communication and coordination on the ground among different implementing agencies and donors;
- not receiving the documentation and information from recipient states that donors need in order to approve the funding;
- funding constraints for donors and practitioners relating to accountability and transparency; and
- lack of means to measure the progress and impact of assistance funding in order to justify present and future expenditures to the public.

For states in need of SALW assistance, typical challenges to mobilizing resources include:

- lack of resources and capacity to assess their own needs;
- uncertainty of how or to whom to communicate their needs;
- need for certain types of assistance that donors are not in a position to fund;
- inflexibility of how and when funding can be used;
- lack of capacity or resources to provide the documentation and information that donors need to administer the assistance; and
- lack of control or national ownership of assistance.

Increasing the level of communication among states, donors and implementing agencies can mitigate many of these challenges. Listing priorities for international assistance in national reports on implementation of the PoA submitted to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs28 is one such means to communicate needs to donors and


27 In one case, seed was to be purchased for an Ugandan community as an incentive for weapons collection. However, by the time the seed could be purchased and delivered, it was the wrong time of year to make use of it, and it was therefore left to spoil. When the weapons collection programmes were later attempted in nearby communities, the implementers observed that the communities had lost confidence in the weapons collection programme and did not trust that the incentives promised would be delivered. Interview with Robert Mugisha, People with Disabilities, Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.

28 Until early 2007 known as the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA).
implementing agencies. NAPs are another tool to convey priorities for international assistance and should be accompanied by a strategy for resource mobilization, and thus their development should receive the support and attention of both donor and recipient states. Conducting regular coordination meetings of relevant government departments, donors, international organizations and civil society organizations would also help to communicate priorities to donors and would help to improve how international assistance is provided and received.

Another option to consider for improving international assistance would be to fit project funding into the five-year timeframe of the NAPs, which would give NFPs greater flexibility in planning and coordinating activities. It is also important for donors to consider the limitations of the types of activities they can fund in relation to accepted best practices on the issue, and if necessary, help develop alternatives or partnerships to alleviate the impact of any limitations. States could open up the channels of assistance available to them by incorporating SALW issues into relevant national strategies such as the Poverty Eradication Action Plan in Uganda. Even if budget line restrictions prevent SALW activities from being directly linked to certain programmes, those involved in SALW activities could still raise awareness on the relationship of SALW to the other programmes, and even plan and implement parallel projects of mutual benefit.

Sponsoring United Nations Volunteers can reinforce human resource capacity to assist the coordination and activities of the NFP; however, the funding of office space and resources for volunteers may also have to accompany the sponsorship. Although local civil society organizations rarely attract the attention of donors, they are a useful asset, particularly in remote areas, for raising the profile of SALW issues and distributing important information on safety and the rules and responsibilities of owning SALW. If local civil society groups receive SALW-related training they could further help to open dialogue and communication on security-related concerns between communities and government and law enforcement officials. Yet it should be noted, some civil society groups have been known to form under false pretences to profit from assistance money, and thus the screening of organizations should be considered to protect the legitimacy of other civil society groups.

Treating assistance as a partnership of affected states, donors and implementers is essential for international assistance to be effective. Although Section III of the PoA is worded in such a way that the responsibility of requesting assistance is placed on the states that require the assistance, it is often the case that states do not have the capacity or resources to identify their needs, prepare project proposals or know where or how to submit their requests for assistance. Building national plans and requesting assistance requires capacity-building as well. Furthermore, it can be difficult both for states providing assistance and for states receiving assistance to draw a balance between a donor’s responsibility to account for its assistance expenditures to its public and the leeway to

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29 National reports can be accessed from the country profiles on the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) website at <www.un-casa.org>.

promote national ownership of activities taking place in another state. Partnerships are often assumed to exist simply because there is engagement between states, or partnerships may exist on paper and less so in reality. Establishing the parameters of an active and engaged partnership early on may seem time consuming or may overburden human resources of the donor’s representatives in field missions but could reap great dividends during and after implementation of the activity. Donors should thus factor in the time and commitments of its field representatives when planning assistance programmes.

As stated, identifying the areas and activities in which international assistance could play a role is a particular challenge for donors and states that receive assistance. In this regard, UNIDIR is currently developing indicators to help recipient states identify and prioritize their needs for assistance, as well as a web-based tool to display what states have identified. Donors and practitioners would thus be able to search the site on a thematic and geographic basis. This tool would serve as a starting point for donors, practitioners and NFPs to discuss and develop targeted assistance programmes. The Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), a network of 16 UN agencies, is also in the process of making available electronically the information states provide in their national reports on implementation of the PoA with respect to international assistance requested. Both initiatives would facilitate communication and matching needs with resources on international assistance.

CONCLUSION

International SALW measures increasingly aim to control the global supply of arms, while peace-building, development and human security programmes aim to curb local demand. The success of such efforts, however, relies upon the capacity of states to manage, regulate and safely store weapons, to monitor and control borders and to adequately enforce laws and policies.

East African countries are taking the illicit trade in SALW seriously, developing new legislation and defining national objectives. Yet due to the lack of capacity in the subregion, long-term success cannot be assured. Thus, international assistance in implementing SALW programmes is necessary to make sure that these efforts are not in vain.

SALW problems manifest differently across the subregion, often according to cultural and environmental contexts and irrespective of political boundaries. A subregional approach to tackling the illicit trade and to addressing its impacts is therefore essential. However, such an approach is complicated by the differing national capacities of the states concerned. Four of the five countries—Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda—are classified as Least Developed Countries, where national capacities are greatly limited, particularly in rural areas. Without a strong administrative and governing sector, SALW-related activities cannot be sustained. It is thus imperative that efforts be pursued to build states’ national capacities, in addition to addressing development and security sector reform, simultaneously with subregional approaches in order to avoid shifting SALW problems and their effects to weaker areas in the subregion or into
neighbouring countries. The instability of the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa will continue to test the effectiveness of any effort to address SALW in East Africa, but adequate infrastructure, capacity, resources, coordination and information sharing, will help greatly to lessen the extent to which external instabilities affect the subregion.

This report has outlined a number of common areas for assistance the East African states would like to receive to support their efforts to address the illicit trade in SALW. Improving the capacity and resources available along borders and at border entry points, record-keeping, stockpile security and management, and marking of arms are among the top needs identified by these states. The report also highlighted a number of challenges associated with international assistance and offered some general but practical recommendations for improving how international assistance is provided and received. The profiles that follow elaborate on the specific status of SALW action in each of the states and detail the types of assistance that these states have identified as their top priorities for PoA-related assistance.
ANNEX: COUNTRY PROFILES

BURUNDI

Burundi ratified the Nairobi Protocol in 2006 and submitted national reports on implementation of the Programme of Action (PoA) in 2003, 2004 and 2005. It is classified as a Least Developed Country.

Burundi is rebuilding after the years of civil war, violent coups and political instability that have plagued the country since its independence in 1962. The Palipehutu-Forces nationales de libération (FNL), the only militant group to remain outside of the Arusha Peace Accord (2000), signed the Dar es Salaam Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement in September 2006. Upon completion of the 18-month mandate of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to enforce the Arusha Peace Accord and support the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) was mandated for a 12-month period to conduct demobilization and reintegration of former combatants as well as security sector reform under the Dar es Salaam Agreement with the FNL.31

It is estimated there are at least 100,000 SALW unaccounted for in Burundi.32 Military-style weapons flood the border areas with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the sources that supplied arms to Burundi from the DRC and Tanzania still exist and could exacerbate future instabilities. Locally crafted weapons, arms caches, crime and refugee flows further challenge Burundi’s efforts to control the illicit trade in SALW. The Ligue ITEKA, a human rights group in Burundi, states that the large number of arms circulating among civilians continues to fuel high levels of armed banditry, human rights violations and sexual violence.33

STATUS OF SMALL ARMS ACTION IN BURUNDI

In 2006, the National Focal Point (NFP) was restructured with President Nkurunziza appointing 17 members to the National Commission for Civilian Disarmament and on Small Arms Proliferation (CTDC).34 The CTDC35 is coordinated by a president and vice-president and four more permanent members are expected to be appointed to carry out activities in a permanent secretariat. Burundi is in the process of redrafting its legislation to bring it in line with its regional and international commitments and to

32 Noted in a study funded by UNDP and Oxfam Novib (Netherlands) and jointly conducted by the Small Arms Survey and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme ITEKA and referenced in the country’s national strategy, Stratégie nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre et de désarmement des civils, 2006.
34 Commission technique de désarmement de la population civile et de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre. In addition to the President of the CTDC, the representatives are from the Ministry of Interior; Office of the President; Office of the Vice-President of the Republic; Transitional National Assembly and Senate; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Public Safety; Ministry of Good Governance; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Communication; Ministry of Social Welfare; Ministry of Human Rights; Inspection Générale de l’Etat; and the civil society organization Colonie des Pionniers de Développement.
35 CTDC and NFP refer to the same body.
harmonize it with the Nairobi Protocol. The government is expected to approve the policies and legislation by the end of 2007.

Before undertaking the necessary steps to prepare a National Action Plan (NAP) and to submit it for governmental approval, the CTDC prepared a National Strategy to combat the proliferation of SALW and civilian disarmament, which was adopted in October 2006.36 The strategy frames the context of SALW action in Burundi, outlines aspects of what the NAP should contain, and emphasizes the need for weapons collection, stockpile management, arms registration and enhancing the state’s capacity to address SALW. It points to an interrelationship between poverty and small arms in Burundi and stipulates that different approaches are needed in rural and urban areas; recognizes the supporting role of transparency and good governance in combating SALW; and expresses the government’s intention to develop partnerships and mobilize resources to address SALW.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE RECEIVED

From 2001 to 2006, Burundi received approximately US$ 83 million in international assistance. However, approximately 99% of this went toward implementing and operating the 18-month national DDR programme.37 Of this, ONUB contributed approximately US$ 1.6 million toward disarmament and demobilization, while demobilization and reintegration costs were covered by donors through the World Bank-administered Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP, US$ 42 million), the World Bank (US$ 33 million), and Germany and the World Food Programme (about US$ 6 million combined).38

Approximately US$ 850,000 was allocated to the following PoA-related activities:

- The United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP–BCPR) implemented a two-year preparatory project (US$ 500,000) that engaged local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other international organizations in awareness-raising, training, collection and destruction. Also allocated was US$ 40,000 toward reestablishing the CTDC, the provision of office and computer equipment and technical expertise for the CTDC, funding for a baseline survey of the small arms situation in Burundi in association with the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey and the Ligue ITEKA, and assisting the CTDC in redrafting legislation and developing the national strategy.
- In association with UNDP, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme allocated US$ 30,000 regarding a safer cities programme.
- The Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA) provided US$ 10,000 in 2003 to support the NFP and conduct destruction activities.

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36 Burundi, Stratégie nationale de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre et de désarmement des civils, 12 October 2006.


38 Interview with Waldemar Vrey, DDR and SSR officer, ONUB, Bujumbura, Burundi, January 2007.
• The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs conducted a fact-finding mission in 2005.
• The UN Office on Drugs and Crime engaged in awareness-raising on crimes and terrorism in 2003.
• Switzerland allocated just over US$ 300,000 in 2004 to the international NGO Terre des Hommes for a project on children in conflict situations.
• The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided technical and financial support to ONUB and 10 NGO partners to assist with the DDR of children, and plans to provide technical support to BINUB once the DDR of FNL begins.

Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have provided support for security sector reform (SSR), which is an important step in establishing the infrastructure necessary to support SALW activities.

International assistance anticipated for 2007:

• Belgium has designated approximately US$ 400,000 to RECSA, in association with the Belgian organization Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP) and the Kenyan organization Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), to assess the SALW situation in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.
• The United States has been in discussions with the CTDC regarding possible financial support for stockpile management and the destruction of stocks.
• UNDP has pledged US$ 350,000 to support the operational capacity of the NFP.
• In association with UNDP and in the framework of BINUB civilian disarmament activities, Switzerland and the UN Peacebuilding Fund 39 are contributing approximately US$ 500,000 toward awareness-raising, strengthening institutional capacities (CTDC and local commissions) and “arms for development”. The project will focus on two provinces on a pilot basis for one-year and may expand to other provinces in 2008.
• The UNICEF field office in Burundi anticipates undertaking SALW-related work in the areas of education and awareness-raising, vocational training programmes and psychosocial counselling for children affected by armed conflict.
• The Netherlands have stated their willingness to provide an initial contribution of US $500,000 once a NAP is adopted.

PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE

Burundi has a number of priorities for international assistance. Years of war have damaged its infrastructure, interrupted skill development and training, and dominated the national psyche. Given the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s engagement with Burundi, a number of opportunities to coordinate efforts for peace and reconciliation will emerge, and thus it is essential for actors working in the field of SALW to engage and complement the process. In addition to DDR, the priority of the CTDC is to mobilize resources for

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implementing programmes on collection, customs and borders, destruction, marking and tracing, and stockpile management.

_Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration_  
DDR will continue to require assistance, not only to complete the reintegration phase of the initial DDR programme, but also for the DDR of the FNL, which is anticipated to commence in 2007. The FNL programme will be civilian-run with security support from the military. Land reforms taking place in Burundi and the employment needs of communities need to be considered when preparing the reintegration strategies; Waldemar Vrey, a DDR officer with ONUB, stated:

> War has occupied the minds of the former combatants for such a long time in Burundi, they are not aware of possible employment opportunities. Whereas 80% of the reintegration programmes in Burundi concentrate on agriculture upon request from the former combatants, there isn’t enough farming land and industry to support it.

Supporting sensitization and awareness-raising programmes for members of the FNL to inform them of and prepare them for DDR, and to educate them on the new laws and policies regarding SALW, will also be a critical undertaking, one in which local civil society groups could play a useful role.

_Collection_
Burundi identifies civil disarmament as its highest assistance priority. In its national strategy, the main principles for civilian disarmament in Burundi involve psychological disarmament through awareness-raising, education and confidence building, and physical disarmament guided by community building and arms for development. As with weapons collection programmes in general, collection will need to be culturally sensitive, be based on incentives that suit community needs, and have the resources to deliver incentives in a timely fashion.

There is a general sense among Burundians that their security is not yet guaranteed. As one local civil society organization states “construction and rehabilitation of the country is not possible without enhancing security”. Collection programmes alone are thus not sufficient; it is necessary to build the public’s trust in order for weapons collection and registration of legally held weapons to be successful. Reform, training and capacity-building of the police and strong community policing programmes will be critical for collection programmes to be successful in the long-term. Confidence-building forums and awareness-raising programmes should also accompany collection programmes in order to highlight the dangers of SALW and to inform the public of the Government’s response to SALW and of the public’s rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis licenses and ownership. One civil society organization based in Bujumbura further suggested involving

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40 Interview with Waldemar Vrey, DDR and SSR officer, ONUB, Bujumbura, Burundi, January 2007. As a consequence of delayed funding, a number of former combatants who were disarmed in 2004 were only reintegrated in 2006, and those who were demobilized in December 2006 had yet to proceed to the reintegration phase at the time of the interview.

41 Interview with Waldemar Vrey, ONUB DDR and SSR officer, Bujumbura, Burundi, January 2007.


43 Interview with Eric Niragira, Centre d’encadrement et de développement des Anciens Combattants, Bujumbura, Burundi, February 2007.
Parliament and civil society in the verification of police-held stocks to increase the public’s confidence.44

Customs and borders
Burundi’s border controls are limited in terms of infrastructure and manpower. Checkpoints were heavily damaged during the war and are now poorly equipped, lacking detection and surveillance technology and record-management and intelligence systems, to list but a few. In addition to detection and surveillance equipment (from binoculars and cameras to motorbikes and fuel to detect and investigate suspicious movements along borders), equipment (and supporting infrastructure) is needed to communicate with the capital city and other checkpoints. While a centralized record-keeping system needs to be established, border officials must also be equipped with office space, computers and software for record-keeping.

Human resources have also suffered from the war: trained personnel fled the country while those that remained could not receive training on new techniques and technologies. Current customs and border officials are a mixture of police, armed forces and border authorities that were reintegrated after the war and consequently do not share similar training and backgrounds. New training modules and programmes need to be put in place, as the types of training received in the context of war are no longer appropriate for the peaceful environment being built.

Interdepartmental workshops and training with other authorities present at border areas (such as revenue and immigration) can strengthen SALW surveillance capacity. At the moment, the district levels lack adequately trained agents to follow up with tracing requests and communicate intelligence matters. Officials at all types of border points need to be trained to identify types of SALW, distinguish between licit and illicit arms, and to become familiar with operational procedures for handling SALW. There are no measures or procedures in place related to handling the potential diversion of weapons from planes that have made unscheduled landings.

Destruction
Burundi has held five weapon burning ceremonies: twice in 2004, twice in 2006 and once in 2007. Logistical and technical support on destruction is needed, including for the destruction of ammunition.45 The need for destruction, a backlog of approximately 3,000 arms at the time of writing, is anticipated to increase as the country’s security situation stabilizes and assessments of stocks are conducted.46

Marking and Tracing
Burundi’s current marking system involves tape and pens.47 Once passed, Burundi’s new legislation will require arms to be properly and permanently marked upon import, which will require equipment and training. Current stocks will also need to be marked (or

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44 Interview with Jacques Ntibankuzi, President, Colonie des Pionniers de Développement, Bujumbura, Burundi, February 2007.
remarked) to differentiate between the stocks held by the various departments that have mandated access to arms and the arms legally held by civilians.

Tracing arms in Burundi is challenged by the absence of an effective record-keeping system of stocks and legally held arms. Again, record-keeping systems, computers and training are needed to enable effective tracing. When it comes to marking and tracing, a number of members of the NFP noted that they do not know what needs to be done to establish and manage an effective marking and tracing system. They would like to learn the systems and best practices of other states through exchange programmes, courses and workshops.

Stockpile management
There are at least 150 storage units in the country. The police and military are responsible for their own stocks, though the military shares little information with the NFP in this regard. The storage facilities of police stocks require being strengthened; the military states that its stocks are well protected due to the permanent presence of guards, but that sabotage and corruption are always possible.\(^48\)

In Burundi, the current method for storing stocks is to place the weapons in containers secured by chains and keyed locks. Contrary to best practice, evaluations of the safety of stored ammunition and explosives are based on the expiration dates. Physical assessments of the safety of stocks and their storage units are necessary, followed by resources to strengthen and reinforce the storage units, if necessary. Neither the military nor the police have a training curriculum on stockpile management or guidelines for the physical security and safekeeping of stocks. Comprehensive training in stockpile management, including training the trainer programmes, is thus necessary.

All of the military stocks are manually registered on paper. The Chief of Training and Operations for the Burundi armed forces expressed that the data on stocks is archaic, and difficult to monitor and time consuming to retrieve. Updates of local stocks are sent to Bujumbura by post or fax machine. The NFP affirmed that it lacks the financial resources to register all state-owned arms and thus they would like to focus on the registration of civilian-owned weapons as an immediate priority. As with marking and tracing, Burundi requires assistance in record-keeping systems and management.

\(^{48}\) Idem.
KENYA

Kenya is a member of the Nairobi Protocol and the UN Firearms Protocol, ratifying both in 2005. It submitted national reports for implementation of the PoA in 2005 and 2006.

Armed crime, banditry, urban and pastoral violence, cattle rustling, poaching and trafficking are the common SALW problems in Kenya. Armed violence is found most frequently in the pastoralist and cross-border areas in the North Rift, north-eastern and parts of the eastern and coastal provinces. Kenya’s lack of capacity at and in between border checkpoints, as well as proximity to countries experiencing varying levels of conflict, contributes to a steady flow of arms in and out of the country.

STATUS OF SMALL ARMS ACTION IN KENYA

The National Focal Point was established in 2002 and is made up of representatives from 13 governmental departments and five civil society members from the Kenya Action Network on Small Arms (KANSA). The NFP has a coordinating secretariat based in the Office of the President, which is expected to expand in staff size and office space in order to increase its capacity to implement the NAP.

The NAP was officially launched in 2006. The content of the NAP is based on a national assessment of Kenya’s SALW-related problems, conducted by the NFP in partnership with the civil society organizations Saferworld, SaferAfrica and SRIC. The NAP summarizes the findings of the national assessment and outlines its agenda for action for 2004–2007.

The NAP contains 10 sections that set out 23 objectives, addressing, among other things, building the administrative framework for addressing SALW, stockpile management, border control, and training and capacity-building. Recognizing that external resources are necessary for the effective implementation of the plan, the NFP is in the process of establishing a resource mobilization strategy to help raise funds for implementing the NAP. The strategy should be in place in 2007.

In order to be in line with requirements of the Protocol and the EAC, Kenya has revised its policies and legislation, which should receive government approval in late 2007. As with the other East African Community (EAC) members, once the policies and legislation have been approved, awareness-raising will be necessary to inform the public of their rights and responsibilities. Officials will need to be trained on how the new laws and policies will affect their daily duties.

49 These are the Office of the President, Department of Defence, Kenya Police Force, Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Wildlife, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services, Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage, Ministry of Tourism and Information, Ministry of Trade and Industry, National Security Intelligence Services, the Administration Police, and the Attorney General’s Office.

50 KANSA is represented at the NFP by five member organizations: Small Arms, Research and Advocacy (SRIC), Peace and Conflict Management (APFO), National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), Norwegian Church Aid-Kenya (NCA), and Kenya Coalition Against Landmines (KCAL).

51 Meeting with Peter Erege, Coordinator of the National Focal Point, Nairobi, January 2007.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE RECEIVED

Between 2001 and 2006, Kenya received approximately US$ 700,000 in international assistance, primarily from UNDP, but also from Canada, Switzerland, the United States and RECSA (channelling funds it received from donors). Among assistance received:\footnote{This information was gathered from the responses provided by Kenya and the listed donors to a UNIDIR questionnaire distributed in 2006 as part of its “International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons” project and from an interview with Elly Oduol, Assistant Resident Representative, Enhanced Security Unit, and Rasmus Klitgaard, Programme Officer, Enhanced Security Unit, UNDP–Kenya, 25 January 2007.}

- UNDP provided approximately US$ 600,000 to implement a two-year (2004–2006) pilot project in Garissa District, a pastoral area along the Somali border badly affected by armed conflict over livestock, pasture and watering points. In addition to supporting development goals of the district (in terms of promoting alternative livelihoods and enhancing water and pasture access), UNDP conducted SALW awareness-raising, collection and destruction, and strengthened a local police armoury.
- Canada provided assistance for community policing (US$ 27,000).
- Switzerland provided support for capacity-building on SALW issues (US$ 57,000) during 2001–2004.
- In 2005 the United States provided approximately US$ 16,000 in assistance for the physical security of SALW stocks and stockpile management.
- RECSA provided capacity-building for the NFP (US$ 12,000) during 2003–2004.

For 2007, the Kenyan field office of UNDP is fundraising in order to replicate its work in the Garissa District in other areas of northern Kenya. The NFP is preparing a strategy for mobilizing resources to implement the NAP.

PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE

Aside from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the members of the NFP were unable to participate in this case study.\footnote{The NFP explained that it was a question of government authorization, which he was unable to obtain in time for the case study interviews. The NFP further explained that they were not in a position to discuss international assistance until their resource mobilization strategy was prepared. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not require the same authorization as other members of the NFP.} The priorities for assistance listed here are thus drawn from the NFP’s responses to a questionnaire administered in 2006 as part of UNIDIR’s “International Assistance for Implementing the UN Programme of Action of the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons” project, the content of the NAP, and interviews with the civil society organizations Saferworld–Kenya and SRIC in October 2006, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations in Geneva, UNDP and Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), a consultant company implementing development activities for USAID, in January 2007. Among Kenya’s top priorities are capacity-building, customs and borders, collection, strengthening partnerships and awareness-raising. Capacity-building is particularly needed in the areas of law enforcement and stockpile management.

According to UNDP and DAI, much of the assistance and attention in Kenya remains in the central areas, although capacity is most lacking in rural areas. The Kenyan
government recognizes this, as the NAP incorporates and elaborates the role of Peace Committees and establishes eight Provincial Task Forces, consisting of law enforcement and civil society representatives, to implement the NAP in their respective areas. The effectiveness of the Peace Committees and Provincial Task Forces will largely depend on the technical and financial resources available to them from the government and through international assistance.

UNDP and DAI identified particular needs at the district level, which include raising awareness on SALW issues and supporting the cross-border joint actions and joint operations with Uganda; motorbikes for monitoring of borders; building communication and information-sharing infrastructure for the districts, border posts and Nairobi; establishing an effective record-keeping system at the district level; and reinforcing the capacity, training and competency of community policing programmes. According to those interviewed, the storage facilities for SALW are also weak and in need of physical reinforcement. As part of its project in Garissa, UNDP built a local armoury for the police. In addition, Kenya is in need of a centralized arms registry.\(^\text{55}\)

\(^{55}\) Without a centralized electronic registry, retrieving information on a weapon is slow, taking in one instance 8 hours to locate a gun used in the national police force, whereas the same query would have taken minutes with an electronic system. Interview with Leonard M. Onyonyi, East African Community (EAC), Moshi, Tanzania, 15 February 2007.
RWANDA


Despite the presence of international organizations and civil society in Rwanda since the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has received little international support to address SALW. Although the number of illicit SALW circulating in Rwanda and the extent of the SALW problem is unknown, arms are known to flow across the borders, weapons are buried or abandoned around the country, and refugees and returnees often carry arms for protection or sale. Further, the Deputy Commissioner of Police states that armed crime is an issue of increasing concern.56

STATUS OF SMALL ARMS ACTION IN RWANDA

The National Focal Point, which is made up of representatives from 12 government departments57 and three civil society organizations,58 was officially established in 2003 and the coordinator of the NFP is based in both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Police Headquarters.

After ratifying the Nairobi Protocol in 2004, Rwanda modified its national SALW legislation to conform to the Protocol and the requirements of the EAC. The new legislation is expected to include language on marking, brokering, illicit manufacturing and illegal sale of arms, among other topics.

At this time, Rwanda does not have an NAP. Belgium has provided RECSA, in association with GRIP and SRIC, US$ 400,000 to conduct the necessary research to assist with the development of NAPs in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda. The research is to be conducted during 2007, and an NAP is to be drafted by 2008.

The foremost difficulty for SALW action in Rwanda is the lack of technical and financial resources for the NFP, whose coordinator lacks office space equipped with the internet, an international phone line or reliable transportation. The activities of the NFP are thus severely constrained. However, the members of the NFP have mobilized a small amount of resources from their own internal capacities to start promoting information-sharing among its constituent bodies on SALW matters.

56 Interview with Marie Gahonzire, Deputy Commissioner General (Operations), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rwanda National Police, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007.

57 These are the Ministries of Commerce (Customs Department), Defence, Finance and Economic Planning, Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Gender, Internal Affairs, Justice, and National Security; The National Police; Department of Immigration; National Unity and Reconciliation Commission; and Rwanda Revenue Authority.

58 These are SaferRwanda, Collectif des ligues et associations de défense des droits de l’homme (CLADHO) and the Conseil de concertation des organisations d’appui aux initiatives de base (CCOAIB). The Center for Conflict Management (CCM) at the National University of Rwanda also works on the issue of small arms in the country.
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE RECEIVED

The national DDR programme was first implemented between 1997 and 2001, funded by the government, a UNDP-administered trust fund, and UN agencies.\(^{59}\) In 2001 the programme was brought under the mandate of the MDRP. According to MDRP, “Recent efforts have also focused on returning a sizeable number of Rwandese armed groups and their dependents from the DRC, but the process is slow”.\(^{60}\) The DDR of the Rwanda Defence Forces has completed, with one centre in northern Ruhengeri to process other former combatants as well as the Rwandans returned by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). A separate centre in the east processes underage former combatants. The MDRP programme (US$ 33.2 million)\(^{61}\) is expected to be handed over by December 2008, at which point the government will take over the activities.

As for other PoA-related assistance received since 2001:

- RECSA provided US$ 11,000 for the establishment of the NFP in 2003.
- Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) provided funds to assist the NFP to destroy 1,500 weapons in 2006. NCA also funded two workshops in Gisenyi in 2005 on “Understanding the Problem of the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Community Policing” and “Advocating for Voluntary Disarmament through Community-based Policing”.

In 2007 the NFP, in conjunction with GRIP and SRIC, will conduct an assessment of Rwanda’s SALW situation as part of the US$ 400,000 project funded by Belgium in association with RECSA to assist Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in establishing their NAPs. The UNDP field office in Rwanda also hopes to begin addressing SALW; however, no concrete plans were in place at the time of the interview.

PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE

As stated above, building the operational and coordination capacity of the NFP is Rwanda’s most immediate priority. Other areas in which assistance is required include stockpile management, customs and borders, collection, awareness-raising (sensitization), and research on the extent of the SALW problem in Rwanda.\(^{62}\)

Stockpile management

Storage facilities are considered to be secure as they are constantly guarded.\(^{63}\) The priority for stockpile management is thus to establish an effective record-keeping system for stocks, enabling easy retrieval, transmission and access of information.

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\(^{61}\) Ibid.

\(^{62}\) Interview with Eric Kayiranga, Coordinator of the National Focal Point, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007.

\(^{63}\) Interview with Marie Gahonzire, Deputy Commissioner General (Operations), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rwanda National Police, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007.


**Customs and borders**

Although both the Deputy Commissioner of Police and Head of the Customs Department/ Rwanda Revenue Authority consider border checkpoints to be sufficiently staffed, examination and surveillance equipment, computers, and training in all aspects related to SALW as a border issue are lacking. Other goods crossing the borders are recorded manually at the checkpoints; however, the system is not designed to address SALW.

Communication is particularly difficult in some of the mountainous areas, especially along the borders with Tanzania (Rusumo), Burundi (Akanyaru) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Gisenyi). Gisenyi, for instance, has five border posts and is viewed as a high-risk zone for trafficking and informal movement in and out of the DRC. There is also no physical monitoring of Lake Kivu, which extends into the DRC and which is a frequent transit point for illegal arms. A new airport is being built near the border with Burundi and staff will require training in monitoring for SALW. The NFP expressed that there is little knowledge of irregular and emergency flight landings being used as a method of arms smuggling, and thus suggested that research on the issue and how it relates to Rwanda would be useful.

Joint actions and bilateral cooperation on SALW-related issues exist among Rwandan customs, Revenue Authority and immigration personnel, and their counterparts in Tanzania and Uganda. There is also an increasing level of cooperation and coordination of Rwandan and DRC military personnel at the main border of Cyangugu (Rwanda) and Bukavu (DRC).

**Collection**

There are mixed opinions on the priority that weapons collection should be given, likely due to the fact that there is no information on the number of arms estimated to be unregistered in Rwanda, or any account for what happened to the arms that were publicly distributed prior to the 1994 genocide. On the one hand, the police state that individuals and communities do not want to be armed and require little incentive to hand over their arms. On the other hand, there is a common perception, particularly among civil society and expressed by the public in conversations with the UNIDIR research team, that many arms continue to circulate either out of fear that populations returning to the country or fleeing conflict from elsewhere are armed, out of a sense of insecurity brought on by the fragile or unstable situations in neighbouring states, or out of fear that ethnic violence will resurface locally. In order for Rwandans to come forward with the weapons they own, there will need to be a sense of security supported by community policing and confidence-building.

Abandoned weapons are also a problem in Rwanda. Many SALW that were distributed prior to 1994 remain unaccounted for and are suspected to be buried in

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64 Idem; and interview with Ambroise Ruboneza, Head, Customs Department, Rwanda Revenue Authority, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007.
65 Interview with Eric Kayiranga, Coordinator of the National Focal Point, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007.
66 Interview with Marie Gahonzire, Deputy Commissioner General (Operations), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Rwanda National Police, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007. In the interview, the Deputy Commissioner stated that research was needed to track down the arms that were distributed prior to the 1994 genocide.
caches around the country. In certain cases, criminals repeatedly bury and retrieve their weapons so as not to be caught with them, particularly if they are crossing a border with stolen goods. In other cases, individuals that own weapons for self-defence bury them to avoid being caught with an unregistered weapon. Metal detectors to search the areas where weapons caches and ammunition are suspected would be useful, while guidelines, procedures and training on how to deal with weapons and ammunition that are uncovered by community members and local law enforcement are necessary.

Awareness-raising
Little is known about the extent of the SALW problem in Rwanda and its impact on society. Awareness-raising campaigns that concentrate on encouraging communities to discuss SALW are one way to sensitize Rwandans to the issue in preparation for weapons collection programmes and to inform the public on their rights and responsibilities regarding ownership of arms. The director of SaferRwanda, Christine Muhongerwa, states “at least I would like everyone to understand the effects of small arms” and suggests that it is time for Rwandans to openly discuss the issues.67 Opening dialogue on SALW would further help the government and civil society gain a better sense of the unregistered arms that exist, the motivations for not registering arms, what the general public’s main concerns are regarding SALW, and the public’s perception of security in order to build appropriate and sensitive SALW programmes.

Unlike the other countries in the subregion, Rwanda has reconciliation and mediation structures in place throughout the country, which could support community-level SALW action, particularly with respect to raising awareness on weapons collection programmes, informing the public of their rights and responsibilities in owning and registering an arm and promoting dialogue on SALW in community forums.

67 Interview with Christine Muhongerwa, SaferRwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, February 2007.
TANZANIA

Tanzania is a member of the Nairobi Protocol and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Firearms Protocol, ratifying the agreements in 2005 and 2002 respectively. Tanzania has signed but not yet ratified the UN Firearms Protocol. Tanzania submitted one national report on implementation of the PoA in 2006. Tanzania is classified as a Least Developed Country.

Tanzania shares borders with eight countries and has, over the years, come to host over 800,000 refugees fleeing conflicts in the Great Lakes region. A number of foreign liberation movements have been based in Tanzania, which have left an unknown quantity of arms in circulation. Arms continue to flow in and out of conflict zones by way of the north-western borders, aided as well by rebels from neighbouring conflicts basing themselves in Tanzania. The national report on implementation of the PoA states “Tanzania has become one of the hubs of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the sub-region …” and Lake Tanganyika has earned a reputation as a transit point for arms smuggling. Notable increases in the level of armed crime throughout the country are also a growing concern.

Although Tanzania has never endured the level of civil unrest seen in its neighbours, it recognized a need to control arms proliferation and was one of the first countries involved in the SALW discourse. Still, Tanzania is classified as a Least Developed Country, which affects the resources, capacity and infrastructure available for effectively addressing SALW. While Tanzania has not needed DDR assistance, it has received more international assistance on other SALW issues than other states in the subregion, and, although progress has been slow due to limited resources, a number of its activities have been used as models elsewhere.

STATUS OF SMALL ARMS ACTION IN TANZANIA

In 2001, Tanzania established three governmental structures mandated to address SALW specifically:

- The National Focal Point: based at the Police Force Headquarters, the NFP was established in 2001 and is made up of representatives from 16 government departments and the civil society organization Centre for Peace and Economic Development (CEPEDE). The NFP liaises with those entities involved in SALW activities at the international, regional (EAC, RECSA, SADC) and district levels.

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68 UNHCR assists over 400,000 in north-western Tanzania and another 200,000 live in self-supporting settlements in the western region. The Government of Tanzania estimates that another 200,000 refugees may be unlawfully in urban areas.


72 CEPEDE is the main coordinating body of the Tanzanian National Action Network on Small Arms (TANANSA).
• The National Committee for Arms Management, Disarmament and Funding (AMAD): AMAD conducts training and engages in the planning, coordinating, fundraising and or monitoring of the NAP. The director of the Safety and Security programme of SaferAfrica was assigned the role of project manager for AMAD’s SALW activities.
• The Provincial Task Forces: the Provincial Task Forces for Arms Management and Disarmament implement SALW activities at the district level.

Tanzania has revised its SALW laws, policies and procedures, creating a new Firearms and Ammunition Control Bill and the Explosives Bill, which is being reviewed by the cabinet and is expected to be passed by the end of 2007. This new legislation will significantly curtail the types and numbers of arms and ammunition that can be civilian-owned, and prohibits the manufacture of homemade firearms (unless they comply with established regulations).

Based on a national survey of its SALW situation, Tanzania prepared an NAP in 2001. The five-year NAP was completed in 2006. The activities of the NAP centred on six main elements:

• establishment of national bodies and agencies to specifically address SALW and the sensitization of existing national bodies and agencies on the issue of SALW;
• review of national legislation, administrative procedures and regulations, followed by implementation of the new provisions;
• training and capacity-building;
• development of international and regional cooperation and information exchange;
• cooperation and interaction with civil society in order to build support for the NAP and secure civil society involvement in its implementation; and
• identification and action on critical areas of control such as cross-border entry points.74

Preparations for the second NAP began in October 2006.

The 2006 national report on implementation of the PoA stated that SaferAfrica and Saferworld conducted a mid-term assessment of the NAP in 2004–2005. The assessment recommended “some changes in the areas of regulations and administrative procedures, public education, civil society cooperation, stockpile management, and capacity building and training of law enforcement officials”.75 Since the assessment was completed toward the end of NAP implementation, the recommendations likely remain valid, and should be useful for elaborating and implementing the second NAP.

73 The survey was a collaborative effort of the Tanzanian Government, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Saferworld and the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC). ISS published the results in 2002 with the support of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Clare Jefferson and Angus Urquhart, “The Impact of Small Arms: Results of a Country Survey”, Monograph No. 70, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), March 2002.
74 The NAP 2001–2006 was obtained from the Ministry of Public Safety and Security. A summary of the NAP is available at <www.cepede.org/tzplan.php>.
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE RECEIVED

In the period of 2001–2006, Tanzania received approximately US$ 3.3 million in SALW-related assistance, which included:

- The European Commission “Small Arms Management and Reduction Project”, which was a three-year (2003–2006) nationwide project to support implementation of the NAP (US$ 2.4 million). Managed by the director of SaferAfrica, the main activities included reviewing legislation, training and capacity-building, regional cooperation and joint operations, record-keeping, collection and destruction, public awareness and education, and technical support to national agencies.
- UNDP implemented the project “Reducing the Illicit Proliferation of SALW and Concomitant Armed Violence” during 2004–2005 (US$ 900,000). The activities focused on public awareness-raising, collection, promotion of alternative livelihoods and mitigation measures for victims of SALW crime and violence. The SALW activities constituted one of several human security objectives of the joint UN response for north-western Tanzania, largely supported by the UN Human Security Trust Fund, an initiative of the Government of Japan.
- The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland assisted Saferworld and the Institute for Strategic Studies to prepare “The Impact of Small Arms: Results of a Country Survey”, published in 2002.76
- The UK Department for International Development (DfID) also provided support, primarily through SaferAfrica and Saferworld.
- In 2005 Finland contributed US$ 30,000 for a seminar on transfers.

Regarding international assistance for 2007:

- the UNDP field office is seeking funds to continue its SALW activities in north-western Tanzania;
- the European Commission has discussed possible projects in Tanzania funded through the EAC; and
- Germany’s Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) provided US$ 55,200 through the EAC to train district and Regional Task Force officers.

PRIORITIES FOR ASSISTANCE

The main priorities for SALW assistance in Tanzania are record-keeping, stockpile management, destruction, borders and awareness-raising (particularly in promotion of weapons collection).

Record-keeping

Tanzania has a Central Firearms Registry of civilian-held SALW, which other states (including Kenya and Uganda) are interested in emulating. The transfer of manually prepared SALW records into the computer registry is ongoing; however, as errors were

uncovered in almost half of the old records, investigation and re-registration of arms will be necessary, at the district level in particular.

Retrieving and sharing information is slow between the capital and rural areas. Currently only AMAD, based in Dar es Salaam, has access to the computerized registry. AMAD and the NFP would like to see the system accessible at the regional and district levels, which will require technical resources and extensive training.

Record-keeping of state-held arms and stocks continues to be conducted manually. The Deputy Commissioner of Police noted the need to computerize these records to ease their retrieval, transmission and access, which will also require technical resources and training.\footnote{Interview with Peter P. Mosha, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Chief of Planning and Research, Moshi, Tanzania, February 2007.}

Stockpile management

According to SaferAfrica, arms leaked from storage facilities make up most of the illicit arms circulating in Tanzania.\footnote{Telephone interview with Jakkie Potgieter, Director of the Safety and Security Programme, SaferAfrica, and Coordinator of the Tanzanian National Plan for Arms Management and Disarmament, March 2007.} The Police confirmed that a number of storage facilities for state-held stocks are weak, and there is insufficient capacity to store the large number of surrendered and recovered weapons that are waiting to be registered or destroyed. Containers to hold the weapons at the 470 police stations and posts need to be made secure.\footnote{Idem; and interview with Dominic Hayuma, Tanzania National Police Force and Coordinator of the NFP, Moshi, Tanzania, February 2007.}

Physical assessments of and strengthening the safety and security of storage facilities of the other authorities permitted access to arms, such as the National Parks Authority, is also necessary. Procedures for and inspections of the stocks held by private security companies are also necessary, as none currently exist. Support for this could include dispatching trained experts throughout the region to conduct physical assessments of all storage facilities. AMAD suggests that priority be given to the northern and central regions. SALW and ammunition are held in separate containers in the same storage facilities. The stability of ammunition and explosives are not tested, and expert training and technical resources are needed in this regard.

Stocktaking of the arms held by the Police and National Parks Authority has commenced, however, assistance is needed to complete the process for all of the departments mandated to carry arms.\footnote{The armed forces are not currently part of this stocktaking process.}

Destruction

Through 2001–2007, Tanzania held six destruction events, disposing of over 7,000 arms. The most common form of destruction is through burning, though there is little capacity (only one truck is available) for transporting the burned remains to a gun-cruncher to complete the destruction process. For instance, the most recent burning ceremony was held 23 January 2007 in Kigoma and the remains have yet to be fully destroyed.\footnote{Interview with Dominic Hayuma, Tanzania National Police Force and Coordinator of the NFP, Moshi, Tanzania, February 2007.} There is
one gun-cruncher in Tanzania, which is capable of destroying up to 200 arms a day. Considering the large number of recovered or obsolete weapons that need to be destroyed (estimated at over 170,000 in the current stockpiles alone), it would take over 2.5 years to complete destruction at that rate. Assistance in the form of additional gun-crunchers, transportation of burned remains from destruction sites or alternative methods of destruction would be useful, including in the area of identifying and destroying explosives.83

Customs and borders

Airports have metal detectors, though most other points of entry into the country do not. Many border areas lack even basic resources such as binoculars, radio-communication systems (walkie-talkies, for example) and under-vehicle mirrors, not to mention cargo scanning and x-ray machines where appropriate.

Citing the need for computers and communication resources, one officer noted “fax machines, computers, walkie-talkies … now you are talking about real needs in Africa!” However, improved communication also assumes a constant source of electricity, which is not always the case in the world’s Least Developed Countries, particularly in rural areas.

According to Tanzanian law enforcement officials, illicit arms rarely pass through border checkpoints, entering instead by way of the unpatrolled areas between checkpoints. In order to monitor suspicious activities along the borders, surveillance equipment, access to motorbikes (and fuel) and a reliable means of communication are necessary. Some of the more isolated border entry points also lack office space and sleeping quarters for staff. It is therefore important to build the technical capacity and infrastructure of some of the remote border entry points, especially along the high-risk north and north-western borders, to ensure that there are always sufficient personnel present at borders entry points, which is not currently the case.

Lake Tanganyika is a transit point for a significant number of arms flowing in and out of Tanzania; however, surveillance of the lake is severely limited by inadequate resources and training. Tanzania also shares borders at Lake Victoria and Lake Nyasa and has a long coastline along the Indian Ocean. Tanzanian officials are in need of boats, surveillance equipment and training in search and detection for monitoring the lakes and coastal waters. Further, customs, immigration and police all work at the border areas, each with distinct tasks, and each with different training. As such, all of the officials interviewed agreed that there is a need for a consolidated curriculum, interdepartmental training and standard operating procedures for identifying arms, dismantled components of arms and explosives, as well as on what to do upon their discovery.

83 Interview with Dominic Hayuma, Tanzania National Police Force and Coordinator of the NFP, Moshi, Tanzania, February 2007.
Tanzania has actively engaged in cross-border joint planning and operations, particularly with Rwanda, though technical and financial resources are necessary.

Awareness-raising
Only two civil society organizations deal with SALW in Tanzania, though there are over 200 local NGOs that could be a valuable asset in promoting awareness, education and research on SALW. The NFP, including its civil society member CEPEDE, would like to hold a number of workshops to train NGOs on SALW issues, though due to a lack of resources only one has taken place. Training and supporting local civil society groups on SALW issues would open more channels for educating the public on SALW, particularly in the remote areas of Tanzania.

Awareness-raising will be particularly important once the new policies and legislation are passed. It is estimated that only half of the arms in circulation are accounted for in the country’s registration system. Therefore, public awareness-raising campaigns on the rights and responsibilities of arms owners could help encourage individuals to register their arms and could be used as an opportunity to train gun owners on the safe storage and handling of arms. AMAD expressed that it would like to prepare guidelines for addressing these issues, contingent upon the available resources. Awareness-raising campaigns would also help prepare communities for weapons collection programmes and amnesties, as appropriate.

The Centre for Peace and Economic Development has published a number of booklets in Swahili to raise awareness on SALW issues. The booklets have been well received throughout the country with requests from public schools and universities to receive more of the booklets to integrate into their curricula. Resources are lacking, however, for further distribution.

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86 Interview with Michael Madikenya, Centre for Peace and Development (CEPEDE), Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, February 2007.
87 Interview with Dominic Hayuma, Tanzania National Police Force and Coordinator of the NFP, Moshi, Tanzania, February 2007.
UGANDA


Uganda is a textbook example of the many ways in which small arms can affect a state, illustrating as well the breadth of issues SALW programmes need to cover: from cattle-rustling and insurgencies, to post-conflict recovery, instability, conflict and involvement of armed Ugandans in neighbouring states, weak borders, displaced and returning populations, weapons trafficking, banditry and crime, and livelihoods and tribal identities that rely on guns. The diversity of SALW problems in Uganda likewise calls for diversity in responses; for instance, the approach to disarming the Lord’s Resistance Army in the north has proven ill-suited for disarming the Karamojong or for encouraging cattle-rustlers to adopt gun-free livelihoods.88

STATUS OF SMALL ARMS ACTION IN UGANDA

Uganda also serves as a good example of some of the positive and negative lessons learned in SALW disarmament. On the one hand, the military’s forced disarmament programmes have been associated with human rights violations and have undermined public confidence in the state’s handling of SALW, thus reducing the effectiveness of disarmament programmes. On the other hand, through its NFP Uganda has engaged in a number of comprehensive SALW activities on capacity-building, training, promotion of dialogue and awareness-raising.

The NFP was established in 2001 and is based in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is responsible for Police and Immigration, and is made up of representatives from 11 government departments89 and four civil society organizations.90 Similar to the other EAC countries, Uganda has drafted new policies and legislation, which are under review and are expected to be approved by the government by the end of 2007.

Following an evaluation of the SALW situation in Uganda (2002–2003), in 2004 Uganda adopted a five-year National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament. The NAP highlights a number of actions to be undertaken in the areas of:

- control and management of existing stocks of SALW;
- reduction of the volume of SALW in circulation; and
- prevention of future proliferation of SALW, including the reduction of demand.

88 Interview with Stephen Kagoda, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.
89 These are the Office of the President (Internal Security Office, External Security Office, Directorate of Information); Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism; Ministry of Internal Affairs (Police and Immigration); Office of the Prime Minister (Pacification and Development, Disaster Preparedness and Refugees); Ministry of Defence (Uganda People’s Defence Force); Uganda Revenue Authority (Customs Department); Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs; Ministry of Finance Planning, Economic Development; Ministry of Education and Sports; Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development.
90 These are People with Disabilities, Uganda Joint Christian Council, Oxfam (Great Britain), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE).
The NAP also led to the establishment of 12 Regional Task Forces (RTFs). The RTFs are expected to implement activities at the district level and a large share of SALW assistance is to be directed to them accordingly. To date, the RTFs participated in a training session in March 2005, giving them the background on SALW problems in Uganda and the significance to their work of global and regional agreements on SALW. A second set of workshops, resources permitting, will train the RTFs to design proposals and projects and will assist them to establish work plans in their respective regions.

Uganda has additionally incorporated SALW in a number of national programmes; four such programmes include the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme (KIDDP), the National Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP), and the Amnesty Commission. Each programme oversees its own resource mobilization. While these programmes receive international assistance, further financial and technical resources are needed for full implementation.

The Poverty Eradication Action Plan
Uganda’s national PEAP includes a paragraph on SALW under its third pillar, “Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management”. GTZ is the largest international supporter of the PEAP and has provided support toward implementing SALW activities under pillar three, particularly in terms of awareness-raising workshops with civil society and small contributions to the NFP. It will also sponsor a workshop in 2007 on safe storage of police weapons.91 Local civil society groups, however, state that pillar three does not go far enough to address SALW but do acknowledge that it is an important political expression linking SALW and development.92

National Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
Uganda is expected to launch the three-year PRDP in June 2007, which contains short- and medium-term recovery and development plans. The PRDP outlines a total required budget of almost US$ 340 million, which is distributed among four strategic objectives: consolidation of state authority, rebuilding and empowering communities, revitalization of the economy, and peace-building and reconciliation.

Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme
A revised KIDDP was issued in January 2007 for a period of four years. The KIDDP feeds into the objectives of the PEAP and it elaborates upon the Karamoja component of the PRDP for northern Uganda. The programme aims to implement voluntary and peaceful disarmament and to address the demand for illegal weapons as a means to help achieve sustainable peace and development.

The Amnesty Commission
The Amnesty Reintegration Programme implemented by the Amnesty Commission was created to demobilize and reintegrate non-government forces under the Amnesty Act of

91 Interview with Frauke Bartels, Advisor, PEAP and Conflict Resolution, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.

92 Interview with Richard Mugesha, Director of People with Disabilities, Kampala, Uganda; and interview with Rose Othieno, Administrative Officer, Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE), Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.
2000. It took five years—until May 2005—before sufficient resources were in place to officially launch the programme. Resource constraints have affected the level of awareness-raising, outreach and dialogue activities taking place, which are viewed as necessary to encourage participation. The Amnesty Commission also states that it is understaffed and lacking resources. \(^\text{94}\)

**INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE RECEIVED**

Donors and international organizations have been active in addressing various aspects of Uganda’s SALW problems.

With respect to DDR-related activities, the main supporter of the Amnesty Commission is the MDRP, providing US$ 4.2 million for the resettlement of former combatants, which the programme refers to as “reporters”. Uganda covers the operating costs of basic staff and utilities of the Amnesty Commission and assistance has also come from Ireland’s Irish Aid, the Danish International Development Agency and UNDP. \(^\text{95}\)

Apart from DDR-related activities, Uganda has received approximately US$ 1.3 million in international assistance to implement the PoA, mainly from Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, and GTZ and UNDP. SaferAfrica and Saferworld have provided primarily technical expertise.

The international assistance implemented during 2001–2006 includes:

- In 2004 Germany provided approximately US$ 70,000 to build the technical capacity of the NFP (vehicle, computers, office equipment) and in 2005 provided approximately US$ 25,000 for SALW activities implemented by the NFP.
- The United States provided approximately US$ 28,000 in 2004 for an assessment and training seminar on SALW physical security and stockpile management. The United States also provided explosives for a weapon destruction programme implemented by UNDP.
- The United Kingdom supported a number of activities since 2002, mainly implemented by SaferAfrica and Saferworld. The activities covered include technical support to the NFP, the development of the NAP, development of reference and operations manuals for Regional Task Forces, development of national policy on firearms and review legislation (technical advice, sponsorship of consultative forums, etc), sponsorship of a stakeholders conference for NAP.

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\(^{93}\) The work of the Amnesty Commission will continue through at least 2008.


implementation, and civil society advocacy workshops and awareness-raising activities.

- Switzerland supported a child protection programme implemented by UNICEF during 2005–2007 (US$ 360,000).
- Sweden supported awareness-raising on SALW issues in 2001 (US$ 27,000).

UNDP also sponsored three United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) to support the work of the NFP. The UNVs have made a valuable contribution to the NFP’s human resources. However, their one-year contracts make it difficult for the NFP to plan longer-term activities and the contracts have often come to an end before the UNVs could take on more independent responsibilities.

Regarding international assistance for 2007:

- A number of funding partners have been involved with the KIDDP, and further resources will be mobilized as a result of the January 2007 relaunch of the programme.96
- In protest of the forcible disarmament undertaken by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) in 2006, the UNDP halted its activities in Karamoja but, with the revised KIDDP, it expects to resume its activities in 2007 or 2008.
- Many of the activities implemented by GTZ are thus far considered to be pilot projects that may be replicated around the country in the future, particularly with respect to stockpile security.

ASSISTANCE REQUIRED

The anticipated budget requirement to finance the third year of the NAP is US$ 620,000, of which 80% is not yet secured. The NAP does not differentiate between the areas that the government is already implementing and the areas that will require international assistance. The NFP does, however, organize regular donor support meetings, and donors and implementing agencies are encouraged to consult the NAP to identify activities they could support.

Uganda’s highest priority is to build the capacity of the Regional Task Forces to implement the NAP at the district levels. As the Commissioner of Police and Coordinator of the NFP states, “we need to take activities where the problems are …”, 97 thus mobilizing resources for the RTFs in essential. Other priorities include record-keeping, physical security and stockpile management, marking and tracing, customs and borders, destruction, collection and awareness-raising.

Regional Task Forces
The role of the RTFs is to implement the NAP at the district levels. As a first step, the RTFs participated in workshops on SALW problems in Uganda and the international, regional

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96 The funding partners associated with KIDDP include the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Government of Italy, Irish Aid, the Netherlands Development Organization (SNV), UNDP, USAID, the UN World Food Programme, and the World Bank.

97 Interview with Richard Nabudere, Commissioner of Police, Coordinator of the National Focal Point, Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.
and national contexts of SALW proliferation. A second round of workshops will assist the RTFs to prepare work plans for implementing the NAP in their regions. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the RTFs will depend on the financial and technical resources available to them.

Once the new policies and legislation are approved, the RTFs will require training on applying them to their daily activities. The RTFs also require training on stock management, the detection and identification of arms (for example, dismantled components or unregistered arms), and the procedures for dealing with illicit firearms.

Record-keeping
The NFP, police, intelligence, immigration, the Amnesty Commission and KIDDP all reported the need to improve the systems by which records are kept.98 Uganda does not have a centralized record-keeping system. While a few areas have computerized records, they are not part of an integrated system; most records are kept manually.

As its first priority in this area, Uganda seeks to establish a central firearms registry of the stocks held by the different authorities that are authorized to carry weapons and of privately held arms (including by private security companies). The next goal would be to give relevant departments and local authorities access to the registry.

Physical security and stockpile management
The police and prison systems have specified a particular need for improving stockpile management and the physical security of storage facilities. The storage facilities are generally not purpose built, but rather were originally office or storage space. Collection programmes move across the country, taking with them the collected arms, which are stored in makeshift shelters. A number of temporary storage facilities, particularly those in the Karamoja region, are especially weak, vulnerable to attack and theft.99

Across the state, ammunition and arms are generally stored in the same shelters but are placed in separate containers. In addition to physical assessments and reinforcement of storage facilities, training, the development of guidelines and procedures, and technical experts are needed to ensure safer storage.

Although not all prisons in Uganda have armed guards, the ones that do lack guidelines or facilities for the safe and secure storage of arms; at best, the arms are locked in a cupboard, at worst they are left in a corner. The Assistant Commissioner of Prisons suggests that it would be useful to learn about the methods for handling SALW in the prison sectors of others states.100

98 The main difficulties being the difficulty of retrieving information, the time delay in knowing who has registered and renewed their licences, records being easily lost and limited use of records that could be beneficial for other departments. Furthermore, when arms are handed out among the armed forces, for instance, they are not assigned and registered to a specific officer. Although there is great confidence with personnel working at the reception centres, there are no regularized records kept by the reception centres where people are reporting to the Amnesty Commission.

99 The districts of particular concern are Abim, Amolatar, Amuria, Amuru, Budaka, Bududa, Bukedea, Bukwa, Bulina, Busiki, Butaleja, Dokolo, Ibanda, Kabongo, Kabong, Kaliro, Kilak/Nwoya, Kiruhura, Koboko, Lyantonde, Manafa, Mityana, Nakaseke, Oyam and Teresgo/Maracha.

100 Interview with W.J. Kururagyire, Assistant Commissioner of Prisons, Uganda Prisons Service, Kampala, Uganda, February, 2007.
Marking and tracing
The marking of arms is a priority of the NFP and police. Most of the current stocks in Uganda are old, unmarked and unrecorded, making them difficult to trace. Once approved, Uganda’s new legislation will require arms to be marked upon import according to the end-user, be they government bodies, private security companies or civilians. Stocks held not meeting the minimum marking requirements will either have to be remarked or destroyed. Implementing these measures will call for marking equipment and training and an effective record-keeping system to facilitate tracing and information sharing. The police are also interested in exchanges to learn the methods of marking and tracing in other states.

Customs and borders
Uganda shares borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan and Tanzania. With few natural barriers, the borders are difficult to secure. The number of official entry points is not sufficient and the ones that exist lack the necessary resources. Detection equipment, such as under-vehicle mirrors, metal detectors, x-ray machines and night vision equipment, are necessary. Remote border posts lack sleeping quarters or office space and the officials have little supervision and oversight of their work. Transportation and communication among the border posts is also severely limited. Interviewees also noted that immigration and other officers present at border areas need to be trained in search and detection methods and to recognize guns that have been dismantled to reinforce the manpower available to deal with SALW matters.

The majority of arms entering Uganda do not come through official entry checkpoints, and thus building the capacity for surveillance, communications and mobility along the borders is essential. Since there are a number of militia groups in the vicinity of Lake Albert, which shares a border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is a common access point for arms trafficking. However, Uganda has little capacity or infrastructure for lake surveillance. There is a cross-border joint action between Kenya and Uganda in the areas bordering the Karamoja region, and Uganda is interested in undertaking joint actions with its other neighbours. Those interviewed had little knowledge of whether or not irregular and emergency flight landings are being used as a method of arms smuggling in Uganda, but stated that research on the issue and how it relates to Uganda would be useful. The Crime Investigation Directorate also noted that there is little communication among departments and information is not efficiently shared, thus assistance with information sharing and communication would be useful.

Collection and destruction
Arms and ammunition in most of Uganda are less visible in public now than they were in previous years,101 however, this does not necessarily mean that the number of arms circulating has decreased. Rather, it could be that the public fears the consequences of owning unregistered arms, for example forcible disarmament. A number of collection activities are taking place, particularly in relation to the Amnesty Commission and the ongoing disarmament efforts in the Karamoja region (the KIDDP). Collection programmes continuously move throughout the country, often in areas that pose risks to the safety of

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staff and the security of the arms collected. Training on recording and safely storing collected weapons and other best practices for weapons collection is necessary.

Collected arms are dismantled or made inoperable on site and then transported to a private company for destruction. There is no regular destruction programme in Uganda, particularly because of the lack of resources. According to the national police only 50% of the arms that should have been destroyed have been and tons of ammunition remain to be destroyed.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{Awareness-raising}

The priority for awareness-raising is, as one civil society organization put it, “disarmament of the minds”.\textsuperscript{103} The NFP, armed forces and police also emphasized the need to raise awareness and educate on SALW issues across Uganda, particularly in the conflict-ridden north of the country and in the areas that rely on guns for livelihoods or as part of tribal identity, particularly in eastern Uganda.

\textsuperscript{102} Joint interview with the members of the Uganda Police Force, including Rwego Francis Xavier, PS Assistant Inspector General of Police, Operations, Kiyaga Frederick Richard, Commissioner of Police, Uganda Police Force, as well as the commissioners responsible for the Central Firearms Registry, Logistics and Supplies, Private Security and Firearms Control, Stockpile Management, and Transport and Communication, and the Director of Operations, Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.

\textsuperscript{103} Joint interview with members of the Uganda Action Network on Small Arms (UANSA), Rose Othieno, administrative officer CECORE, Center for Conflict Resolution, and Richard Mugisha, Director, People with Disabilities, Kampala, Uganda, February 2007.
ACRONYMS

**AMAD**  National Committee for Arms Management, Disarmament and Funding

**BINUB**  United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

**CASA**  Coordinating Action on Small Arms

**CEPEDE**  Centre for Peace and Economic Development

**CTDC**  National Commission for Civilian Disarmament and on Small Arms Proliferation

**DAI**  Development Alternatives, Inc.

**DDR**  disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

**DfID**  Department for International Development

**DRC**  Democratic Republic of the Congo

**EAC**  East African Community

**EAPCCO**  East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization

**FNLL**  Forces nationales de libération

**GRIP**  Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité

**GTZ**  Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

**KANSA**  Kenya Action Network on Small Arms

**KIDDP**  Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and Development Programme

**MDRP**  Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

**MONUC**  United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**NAP**  National Action Plan

**NCA**  Norwegian Church Aid

**NFP**  National Focal Point

**NGO**  non-governmental organization

**ONUB**  United Nations Operation in Burundi

**PEAP**  Poverty Eradication Action Plan

**PISCES**  Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System

**PoA**  Programme of Action

**PRDP**  National Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda

**RECSA**  Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons

**RTF**  Regional Task Force

**SADC**  Southern Africa Development Community

**SALW**  small arms and light weapons

**SRIC**  Security Research and Information Centre

**SSR**  security sector reform

**UNDP–BCPR**  United Nations Development Programme Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

**UNICEF**  United Nations Children’s Fund

**UNIDIR**  United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

**UNV**  United Nations Volunteers

**UPDF**  Ugandan People’s Defense Force